

Decentralizing Authorities (such as time services)

<http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ford-trans-witness/>

<http://arxiv.org/abs/1503.08768>


<https://github.com/DeDiS/cothority>

Ewa Syta, Iulia Tamas, Dylan Visher, David Wolinsky – **Yale University**

Bryan Ford, Linus Gasser, Nicolas Gailly – **Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (EPFL)**

IETF – November 2, 2015

The Internet needs authorities



The Internet needs authorities



**Respect my
Authoritah!**



Bob



Software
Update




Alice

What is:

- The current time?
- Gmail's SSL public key?
- Bob's IM public key?
- Latest version of App?

Authorities can be compromised



Including time servers



RISK ASSESSMENT / SECURITY & HACKTIVISM

New attacks on Network Time Protocol can defeat HTTPS and create chaos

Exploits can be used to snoop on encrypted traffic and cause debilitating outages.

by Dan Goodin - Oct 22, 2015 7:07am JST

 Share  Tweet 121




Challenge: Decentralize Authorities

Split important authority functions across multiple participants (preferably independent)

- So authority isn't compromised unless multiple participants compromised

From **weakest-link** to **strongest-link** security




Goal: Secure Time Bootstrap

Enable freshly-booted devices to get a secure, **coarse-grained** notion of current time on start

- Protect against “retrograde time” attacks
 - Even by powerful MITM-capable adversaries
 - Even if adversary has control of one or a few NTP servers' private keys
- Need not be ms-accurate, just guarantee time is not “way off”
 - e.g., not hours or days wrong
- Prevent replay-based “upgrade” of a device to old software version with now-known exploit

CoSi: Scalable Collective Signing



A Timestamping Cothority

Like classic **digital timestamp** services, only decentralized.




- Each round (e.g., 10 secs):
 - 1) Each server collects hashes, nonces to timestamp
 - 2) Each server aggregates hashes into Merkle tree
 - 3) Servers aggregate local trees into one global tree
 - 4) Servers collectively sign root of global tree
 - 5) Server give signed root + inclusion proof to clients
- Clients verify signature + Merkle inclusion proof

Verifiably Fresh Software Updates

Alice accepts only updates with fresh timestamp:

- Knows update can't be an outdated version: tree contains inclusion proof of *her* nonce
- Knows update can't have targeted backdoor: witness cothority ensures *many* parties saw it



Collective signing performance

