RPKI Out-Of-Band Setup Protocol

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... and a lot of help from our friends

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Purpose

Encapsulate BPKI public keys, subject names, service URLs and SIA URIs needed to set up RPKI provisioning (RFC 6492) and publication (draft-ietf-sidr-publication) protocols in a simple interoperable format.
What This Protocol Deliberately Leaves Out

- How these messages are exchanged is deliberately unspecified. USB stick, PGP-signed email, HTTPS, T-shirt printed with QR code, carrier pigeon, . . . .

- Receiver must authenticate and check integrity of messages, but how receiver does this is also deliberately unspecified.
Changes since IETF88 in 2013

- Added RRDP support.
History

- Earliest setup experiments just passed around BPKI certificates and URLs. Mistakes were frequent and almost inevitable.
- Tokyo RPKI workshop (January 2010) hit upon idea of a simple encapsulation so that each step in the protocol would involve sending exactly one well-formed message with labeled fields.
- Other RPKI CA engine implementors implemented provisioning portion of the protocol to simplify inter-operation.
- At this point, our setup protocol has become the de facto standard for provisioning protocol setup.
- Review of user experience concluded that protocol semantics were OK but syntax was unnecessarily confusing.
Where We Are Now

- draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-oob-setup describes a cleaned-up version of the protocol.
- Semantics unchanged from original, only syntax is different from what we’re using now.
- RRDP support (one additional URI) added October 2015.
- One experimental implementation (not yet in production)
- Converting existing implementations to the new syntax should be easy.
- XSL transform available for automatic translation between old and new syntax of parent/child exchange.
The Setup Minuet

1. Child(Alice)→Parent(Bob): “Hi, I’m Alice, here’s my BPKI key, and I’d like to get RPKI resources from you.”

2. Parent(Bob)→Child(Alice): “OK, I’m Bob, here’s my BPKI key, I’m going to call you Alice-17, you can contact me using the provisioning protocol at URL http://bob.example/alice-17, and maybe Carol can help if you’re looking for a repository to use.”

3. Publisher(Alice)→Repository(Carol): “Hi, I’m Alice, here’s my BPKI key, I’d like to publish in your repository, Bob sent me.”

4. Repository(Carol)→Publisher(Alice): “OK, here’s my BPKI key, you can publish your stuff under URI rsync://carol.example/rpki/bob/alice, you can contact me using the publication protocol at URL http://carol.example/bob/alice, and use https://carol.example/rrdp/notify.xml as the RRDP notification URL.”
Who Must Do What

- Bob doesn’t have to accept Alice as a child.
- Carol doesn’t have to accept Alice as a publisher.
- Alice doesn’t have to use Carol as a repository.
- Bob can call Alice anything Bob wants, the name Alice gives to Bob is just a hint. This matches expected RFC 6492 behavior.
- If Bob and Carol are the same entity, we call it a “publication offer,” otherwise we call it a “publication referral;” referrals include an authorization token to support hierarchical repository structures.
BPKI Keys & Certificates

- “BPKI keys” in the above description are really self-signed X.509 BPKI certificates, for historical reasons given how the protocol evolved. We could have used PKCS#10, but we didn’t, and we see no obvious benefit to changing this now.
- Details of exactly how receivers use incoming BPKI keys are implementation specific, but probably involve some form of cross-certification.
- Recommended approach: Receiver checks self-signature, then extracts public key and subject name and cross-certifies under receiver’s own BPKI root, using a Basic Constraints extension with cA = TRUE and pathLenConstraint = 0.
Is This Cooked?

- RRDP is only change in last two years.
- We have an existence proof that upgrading from the old version of the protocol is straightforward.
- Does the WG still want this?
- Does this need to wait for the document on BPKI certificate structure that nobody has ever written?
- Should we ship this now or wait for publication and RRDP?
Thanks To...

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- The participants in the 2010 Tokyo workshop, who told us we needed this protocol.
- The other RPKI CA implementors, for making this work with their engines.
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- Leif Johansson, for telling us to fix the syntax.
- Everyone who reviewed the pre-00 draft.
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Questions?