XMPP Protocol Extensions for Use with IODEF
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Abstract

This document describes the extensions made to Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) [RFC6120] that enables the use of XMPP as a transport protocol for collecting and distributing any security telemetry information between and among network platforms, endpoints, and most any network connected device. Specifically, this document will focus on how these extensions can be used to transport the Incident Object Description Exchange Format (IODEF) information.

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1. Introduction

XMPP-Grid is a set of standards-based XMPP [RFC6120] messages with extensions. It is intended for use as a secure transport and communications protocol ecosystem for devices and organizations to interconnect, forming an information grid for the exchange of formatted data (e.g. XML, JSON, etc). This document describes the extensions made to XMPP [RFC6120] that enable use of XMPP as a transport protocol for securely collecting and distributing security telemetry information between and among network platforms, endpoints, and most any network connected device.

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

1.1. Glossary of Terms

AAA
Authentication, Authorization and Accounting.

CA
Certification Authority.

Capability Provider
Providers who are capable of sharing information on XMPP-Grid.

CMDB
Configuration Management Database.

IDS
Intrusion Detection System.

IPS
Intrusion Prevention System.
JID
    Jabber Identifier, native address of an XMPP entity.

MDM
    Mobile Device Management.

NAC
    Network Admission Control.

PDP
    Policy Decision Point.

PEP
    Policy Enforcement Point.

Presence
    XMPP-Grid node availability and online status on XMPP-Grid.

Publisher
    A capability provider sharing content information to other devices participating on XMPP-Grid.

SIEM
    Security Information and Event Management.

Subscriber
    A device participating in XMPP-Grid and subscribing or consuming information published by Publishers on XMPP-Grid.

Sub-Topics
    Topic created by XMPP-Grid Controller under a capability provider’s topic based on message filter criteria expressed by subscribers.

Topics
Contextual information channel created on XMPP-Grid where a published message by the Publisher will be propagated by XMPP in real-time to a set a subscribed devices.

VoIP

Voice over IP.

XMPP-Grid

Set of standards-based XMPP messages with extensions, intended for use as a transport and communications protocol framework between devices forming an information grid for sharing information.

XMPP-Grid Controller

Centralized component of XMPP-Grid responsible for managing all control plane operations.

XMPP-Grid Connection Agent

XMPP-Grid client library that a XMPP-Grid node implements to connect and exchange information with other vendor devices on XMPP-Grid.

XMPP-Grid Node

Platform or device that implements XMPP-Grid Connection Agent to connect to XMPP-Grid and share or consume security data.

1.2. What is XMPP-Grid?

XMPP-Grid is a set of standards-based XMPP messages with extensions. It is intended for use as a transport and communications protocol framework for devices that interconnect with each other, forming a secure information grid.

XMPP-Grid enables secure, bi-directional multi-vendor exchange of contextual information between IT infrastructure platforms such as security monitoring and detection systems, network policy platforms, asset and configuration management, identity and access management platforms. XMPP-Grid can serve to securely exchange any contextual information. XMPP-Grid is built on top of XMPP [RFC6120], [RFC6121] which is an open IETF standard messaging routing protocol used in commercial platforms such as Google Voice, Jabber IM, Microsoft Messenger, AOL IM and a variety of IoT and XML message routing services. XMPP is also being considered as a means to transport IODEF [RFC5070]. XMPP-Grid is designed for orchestration of data
sharing between security platforms on a many-to-many basis for millions of end systems.

XMPP-Grid provides a security data sharing framework that enables multiple vendors to integrate to XMPP-Grid once, then both share and consume data bi-directionally with many IT infrastructure platforms and applications from a single consistent framework akin to a network-wide information bus. This reduces the need to develop to explicit, multiple platform-specific interfaces, thereby increasing the breadth of platforms that can interface and share security data. XMPP-Grid is also configurable thereby enabling partners to share only security data they want to share and consume only information relevant to their platform or use-case and to customize information shared without revising the interfaces. XMPP-Grid is data-agnostic enabling it to operate with virtually any data type such as IODEF [RFC5070].

1.3. Overview of XMPP-Grid

XMPP-Grid employs publish/subscribe/query operations brokered by a controller, which enforces access control in the system. This architecture controls what platforms can connect to the "grid" to share ("publish") and/or consume ("subscribe" or "query") contextual information ("Topics") (described in Section 3.3 and 3.5) such as security data needed to support MILE. The control of publish/subscribe/query operations is architecturally distinct from the actual sharing of the contextual information. Control functions are split into a logical control plane, whereas information exchange is considered a logical data plane. This separation enables scalability and customizability.

XMPP-Grid defines an infrastructure protocol that hides the nuances of the XMPP data plane protocol and makes the information sharing models extensible with simple intuitive interfaces. XMPP-Grid Nodes connect to the Grid using the XMPP-Grid Protocol. The XMPP-Grid Protocol makes use of the XMPP transport protocol and introduces an application layer protocol leveraging XML and XMPP extensions to define the protocol.

The components of XMPP-Grid are:

- XMPP-Grid Controller (Controller): The Controller manages the control plane of XMPP-Grid operations. As such it authenticates and authorizes platforms connecting to the data exchange grid and controls whether or not they can publish, subscribe or query Topics of security data.
XMPP-Grid Connection Agent (Connection Agent): The Connection Agent enables the adopting Node to communicate with the Controller and other vendor platforms that have adopted XMPP-Grid. Through this communication privileges of the connecting platform—authorization to connect, publish, subscribe, query—are established. The Connection Agent is typically implemented as a client library.

XMPP-Grid Node (Node): A Node is a platform that has implemented the Connection Agent so that it can connect to an XMPP-Grid deployment to share and/or consume security data.

Data Repository: This is the source of security data available on the Grid and may be a network security platform, management console, endpoint, etc. XMPP-Grid does not mandate a specific information model, but instead remains open to transport structured or unstructured data. Data may be supplied by the security platform itself or by an external information repository.

Topic: An XMPP-Grid Topic defines a type of security data that a platform wants to share with other platform(s).

The operations carried out by XMPP-Grid to exchange security data are:

- Grid Connect: This is a Controller operation that authenticates a Node that has implemented the Connection Agent to establish a connection with the XMPP-Grid. Once authenticated, authorization policies on the Controller establish a Node’s privileges on the XMPP-Grid such as the right to undertake publish, subscribe or query operations explained below.

- Publish Topic: Security information is made available when a XMPP-Grid enabled platform "publishes" a "Topic". This operation is authorized by the Controller and communicated to the connecting platform via the Connection Agent.

- Topic Discovery: Nodes on a XMPP-Grid discover Topics of security data relevant to them by searching the Topic directory available within the XMPP-Grid deployment. The Controller maintains such a Topic directory for every instance of XMPP-Grid.

- Subscribe to Topic: A Node seeking to consume security information "subscribes" to a Topic that provides the security information it seeks to serve its use-case. This operation has its authorization checked by the Controller and communicated with the connecting platform via the Connection Agent.
Query: This operation enables a Node to request a specific set of security data regarding a specific asset (such as a specific user endpoint) or bulk output history from a Topic over a specific span of time. Such queries can be carried out node-to-node or by querying a central data repository. Query structure is adaptable to match the information model in use.

XMPP-Grid is used to exchange security context data between systems on a 1-to-1, 1-to-many, or many-to-many basis. Security data shared between these systems may use pre-negotiated non-standard/native data formats or may utilize an optional common information repository with a standardized data format, such as IODEF. XMPP-Grid is data format agnostic and accommodates transport of whatever format the end systems agree upon.

XMPP-Grid can operate in the following deployment architectures:

- Broker-Flow: An XMPP-Grid control plane brokers the authorization and redirects the Topic subscriber to Topic publisher directly. In this architecture, the Controller only manages the connection; the security data flow is directly between Nodes using data formats negotiated out-of-band.

- Centralized Data-Flow: An XMPP-Grid maintains the data within its optional centralized database. In this architecture, the Controller provides a common information structure for use in formatting and storing security context data, such as IODEF, and directly responds to Node publish and Subscribe requests.

- Proxy-Flow: An XMPP-Grid is acting as proxy, collecting the data from the publisher(s) and presenting it to the subscriber directly. This is used for ad-hoc queries.

Within the deployment architecture, XMPP-Grid may be used in any combination of the following data exchange modes. The flexibility afforded by the different modes enables security information to be exchanged between systems in the method most suitable for serving a given use-case.

- Continuous Topic update stream: This mode delivers in real-time any data published to a Topic to the Nodes that are subscribed to that Topic.

- Directed query: This mode enables Nodes to request a specific set of security information regarding a specific asset, such as a specific user endpoint.
1.4. Benefits of XMPP-Grid

Benefits of XMPP-Grid can be summarized on two fronts: 1) end-user benefits, 2) benefits for adopting vendors.

Benefits for end-users deploying security services based on XMPP-Grid security context information sharing capabilities are derived from the results that come with standardization including:

- Consolidating relevant security event data from multiple systems to the "right console at the right time".
- Cross-vendor interoperability out-of-the-box, when using a standard data format.
- Coordinated security response across multiple products from multiple vendors, ranging from endpoint security to AAA, NAC, IDS/IPS, Data Loss Prevention, firewalls to infrastructure such as SIEM, CMDB, physical access control systems.
- Customer product choice and flexibility. No need to buy all security products from one vendor.

Adopting XMPP-Grid security data sharing capabilities provides a number of benefits for adopting vendors, especially when compared to proprietary interfaces, such as:

- Integrate the XMPP-Grid Connection Agent once to interface with many platforms, simultaneously by subscribing or publishing relevant security data
- Security information shared is configurable (via Topics) based on relevance to specific use-cases and platforms
- Only sharing relevant data enables both publishing and subscribing platforms to scale their security data sharing by eliminating excess, irrelevant data
- Integrated authorization and security ensures only appropriate XMPP-Grid operations are executed by permitted platforms
- Ability to share security data in native or structured formats enables data model flexibility for adopting vendors
Flexibility, adaptability to evolve to address new use cases over time. Utilize data-agnostic transport protocol or the extensible schema that allows for easy support for vendor-specific data.

1.5. Example Workflow

Figure 1: Typical XMPP-Grid Workflow

a. XMPP-Grid Controller establishes a grid for platforms wanting to exchange security data.

b. A platform (Node) with a source of security data requests connection to the Grid.

c. Controller authenticates and establishes authorized privileges (e.g. privilege to publish and/or subscribe to security data Topics) for the requesting Node.

d. Node may either publish a security data Topic, subscribe to a security data Topic, query a Node or Topic, or any combination of these operations.

e. Publishing Nodes unicast Topic updates to the Grid in real-time. The Grid handles replication and distribution of the Topic to
A Node may publish multiple Topics, thereby allowing for customized relevance of the security data shared.

f. Subscribing Nodes receive continuous real-time stream of updates to the Topic to which they are subscribed.

g. Any Node on the Grid may subscribe to any Topics published to the Grid (as permitted by authorization policy), thereby allowing for one-to-one, one-to-many and many-to-many meshed security data sharing between Nodes.

2. XMPP-Grid Architecture

XMPP-Grid is a communication fabric that facilitates secure sharing of information between network elements and networked applications connected to the fabric both in real time and on demand.

XMPP-Grid uses XMPP servers that operate as a cluster with message routing between them, for data plane communication. XMPP-Grid uses a control plane element, the XMPP-Grid Controller, that is an external component of XMPP for centralized policy-based control plane.

```
---------------         ---------------        ---------------
|  XMPP-Grid  |         |  XMPP-Grid  |        |  XMPP-Grid  |
|  Controller |         |  Controller |        |  Controller |
|             |         |             |        |             |
| XMPP Server |---------|             |--------|             |
|             |         |             |        |             |
---------------         ---------------        ---------------
```

Figure 2: XMPP Server and XMPP-Grid Cluster Architecture

The connected Nodes, with appropriate authorization privileges, can:

- Receive real-time events of the published messages from the publisher through Topic subscriptions
- Make directed queries to other Nodes in the XMPP-Grid with appropriate authorization from the Controller
- Negotiate out-of-band secure file transfer channel with the peer
This model enables flexible API usage depending on the Nodes’ contextual and time-sensitivity needs of security information.

2.1. XMPP Overview

XMPP is used as the foundation message routing protocol for exchanging security data between systems across XMPP-Grid. XMPP is a communications protocol for message-oriented middleware based on XML. Designed to be extensible, the protocol uses de-centralized client-server architecture where the clients connect to the servers securely and the messages between the clients are routed through the XMPP servers deployed within the cluster. XMPP has been used extensively for publish-subscribe systems, file transfer, video, VoIP, Internet of Things, Smart Grid Software Defined Networks (SDN) and other collaboration and social networking applications. The following are the 4 IETF specifications produced by XMPP working group:


XMPP offers several of the following salient features for building a security data interexchange protocol:

- Open - standards-based, decentralized and federated architecture, with no single point of failure
- Real-time event management/exchange - using publish, subscribe notifications
- Flexibility and Extensibility - XMPP is XML based and is easily extensible to adapt to new use-cases. Custom functionality can be built on top of it.
- Multiple information exchanges - XMPP offers multiple information exchange mechanisms between the participating clients -
Real-time event notifications through publish and subscribe.

On-demand or directed queries between the clients communicated through the XMPP server

Facilitates out-of-band, direct communication between participating clients

- Bi-directional - avoids firewall tunneling and avoids opening up a new connection in each direction between client and server.
- Scalable - supports cluster mode deployment with fan-out and message routing
- Peer-to-peer communications also enables scale - directed queries and out-of-band file transfer support
- XMPP offers Node availability, Node service capability discovery, and Node presence within the XMPP network. Nodes ability to detect the availability, presence and capabilities of other participating nodes eases turnkey deployment.

The XMPP extensions used in XMPP-Grid are now part (e.g. publish/subscribe) of the main XMPP specification [RFC6120] and the presence in [RFC6121]. A full list of XMPP Extension Protocols (XEPs) [RFC6120] can be found in http://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0001.html.

2.2. XMPP-Grid Protocol Extensions to XMPP

XMPP-Grid defines an infrastructure protocol that hides the nuances of the XMPP data plane protocol and makes the information sharing models extensible with simple intuitive APIs. XMPP-Grid Nodes connect to the Grid using the XMPP-Grid Protocol. The XMPP-Grid Protocol makes use of the XMPP transport protocol and introduces an application layer protocol leveraging XML and XMPP extensions to define the protocol. The capability providers on the Grid extend the XMPP-Grid Protocol infrastructure model and define capability specific models and schemas, allowing a cleaner separation of infrastructure and capabilities that can run on the infrastructure.

2.3. XMPP-Grid Controller Protocol Flow

At the heart of the XMPP-Grid network, the XMPP-Grid Controller serves as the centralized policy-based control plane element managing all Node authentications, authorizations, capabilities/Topics and their subscription list. XMPP-Grid Controller manages all control
aspects of the Node communication (including management) with the
XMPP-Grid and other participating Nodes with mutual trust and
authorizations’ enforcement. XMPP-Grid Controller is a component of
XMPP server and programs the data plane XMPP server with Node
accounts, account status, XMPP Topics that are dynamically created
and Topic subscriptions. This is analogous to File Transfer Protocol
(FTP) that has control and data plane communication phases. Once the
Node requests are authenticated and authorized in the control plane
phase by the Controller, the Controller removes itself from the data
flow. All data plane communication then occurs between the Nodes,
publishers and subscribers of XMPP Topics happen at the XMPP data
plane layer.

Through a centralized authorization model, XMPP-Grid Controller provides:

- Visibility into "who is connecting", "who is accessing what"
- Node account management with provisions to add, delete or disable accounts, and with provisions to auto or manual approve Node account approval requests during the Node registration phase
- Centralized, policy-based authorization, providing "who can do what" for publish-subscribe, directed peer-to-peer queries or for bulk out-of-band transfers between participating Nodes
Topics and subscription list management with provision to enable or disable Topics

Dynamic creation of sub-Topics within the main Topic depending on attributes of interest from the requesting Node

Ability to perform message filters on the published messages

2.4. XMPP-Grid Node Connection Protocol Flow

Nodes connecting to XMPP-Grid go through the phases of authentication, registration and authorization before they can participate in information exchange on XMPP-Grid.

2.4.1. Authentication

The communication between the Node and the XMPP-Grid Controller is cryptographically encrypted using TLS. XMPP-Grid uses X.509 certificate-based mutual authentication between the Nodes and Controller. Internally, XMPP uses Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) [RFC4422] External mechanism to authenticate and establish secure tunnel with the Nodes, allowing the XMPP-Grid Controller to rely on this capability offered by XMPP. If the Node certificate does not pass the validation process, the connection establishment is terminated with the error messages defined by the XMPP standard. On successful authentication, XMPP SASL component extracts the Node certificate and Node username to the Controller for registration.

2.4.2. Registration

Once a Node has been authenticated and a secure tunnel has been successfully established, the Nodes will register their accounts with the Controller and Nodes provide their username to the Controller as part of the registration request. XMPP-Grid supports manual registration (requires explicit approval of the Node account) and mutual authentication trust-based auto-approval registration in order to provide additional trust and usability options to the administrator. The administrator may map the Nodes to the Node groups to add additional level of validation and trust, and enforce Node group based authorization. This allows the certificate-username-group trust to get uniquely establishment for each Node and duplicate registration requests using the same username will be rejected.

During the registration process, the Controller restricts all Node communication with the XMPP-Grid and only Node to Controller communication is allowed. Once the Node is successfully registered,
the Controller lifts the restriction and allows the Nodes to communicate on XMPP-Grid after it passes the authorization phase. It should be noted that the registered and authorized Nodes could publish, subscribe or query to multiple XMPP Topics between login and logout to XMPP-Grid. Multiple Node applications running on a Node could use one XMPP-Grid Node to connect to XMPP-Grid. The XMPP-Grid Node should support Node applications’ subscription to Topics and should multiplex messages on its connection to XMPP-Grid. If a Node application wants to be identified explicitly on XMPP-Grid, a new XMPP-Grid Node connection to XMPP-Grid is required.
Register

---

TLS Connect(username, cert)

__________________________

Track (username, cert)

__________________________

Register(username)

__________________________

Approve & Authorize Account

__________________________

Create User Account (username)

__________________________

Registration Successful

__________________________

Login()

__________________________

Pub/Sub/Query

__________________________

Logout()

__________________________

Figure 4: XMPP-Grid Node Registration
2.4.3. Authorization

The registered Nodes send subscription requests to the Controller. The Controller, depending on the defined authorization privileges, grants permissions to subscribe and/or publish to a Topic at the registration time. The Controller updates the XMPP data plane server with the new subscriber information and its capability. Node identity extracted from the request, group to which the Node is assigned during account approval and Topic/capability to which the permission is sought could be some of the ways to authorize Nodes and their requests in XMPP-Grid. Similarly, the Controller authorizes directed peer-to-peer or out-of-band requests from a requesting peer. The destination peer has options to query back the Controller to retrieve and enforce granular authorizations such as read-only, write-only, read/write.

In a Query Authorization flow, the capability provider responding to the query is responsible for enforcing the authorization decision. It retrieves "is authorized" from the XMPP-Grid Controller. Based on the result, the service either allows or disallows the flow from continuing.

Figure 5: Node Query Authorization Flow
For Publish Authorization, prior to allowing a publish request by a user, the XMPP-Grid Controller calls the rule evaluation engine directly for "is authorized". Based this result, the Controller either allows or disallowed the flow from continuing.

![Diagram of Publish Authorization Flow]

Figure 6: Node Publish Authorization Flow

For Subscribe Authorization, prior to allowing a subscribe request by a user, the XMPP-Grid Controller calls the rule evaluation engine directly for "is authorized". Based this result, the Controller either allows or disallowed the flow from continuing.
Bulk Data Query differs from other data transfer modes. Unlike with other modes of communication that operate in-band with the XMPP-Grid, bulk downloads occur out-of-band (over a different protocol, outside of the connection that was established with the XMPP-Grid Controller). Previously discussed authorization mechanisms are therefore not appropriate in this context.
Figure 8: Node Bulk Data Query Flow

Instead the bulk download service sends the certificate chain used by a Node in the TLS connection to the XMPP-Grid Controller for purposes of authenticating and authorizing the Node. Upon receiving a request with a certificate chain, the Controller checks the issuing certificate against the trust store, looks up the identity associated with the certificate, evaluates the rules, and returns "is authorized" to the service. Then the service can either allow or disallow the flow from continuing.

2.5. XMPP-Grid Topics Protocol Flow

For each capability, XMPP-Grid supports extensibility through XML schemas where the providers (publishers) of the capabilities define the schemas for the data exchanged. The capability provider shall also define the version, the available queries and notifications that it can support. The capability provider publishes the messages to one or more XMPP Topics, that it requests XMPP-Grid to create dynamically, depending on:

a. If the capability provider has mutually exclusive schemas, different Topics will be created where the capability provider will be a publisher to each Topic with a separate schema.

b. For a given Topic, if the subscribers wants to receive filtered attributes or attribute values in capability provider’s published data, XMPP-Grid Controller creates sub Topics to the main Topic
based on the message filters expressed. XMPP-Grid Controller enrolls the capability provider as the publisher and the requesting subscribers based on the message filter criteria they express. The capability provider will be the publisher to both the main Topic and the sub-Topics.

c. In the case mentioned in (b) above, it is possible for the capability provider to just publish on the main Topic and have the XMPP-Grid Controller filter the published messages on the Controller-side and deliver attributes and attribute values of interest to the subscribers. Controller-side message filter application and the specify mechanisms such as XPATH that can be used for parsing the messages is beyond the scope of this specification.

2.5.1. Topic Versioning

XMPP-Grid supports versioning to support forward and backward compatible information models. The providers of capability include the version number in the messages they publish and the receiving Nodes can interpret the Topic version and process the attributes accordingly. The expectation is any new version of a capability must be of additive updates only. In other words, existing elements and attributes cannot be changed, only new elements or attributes can be added. This will enable nodes with older capability be able to process newer version. The extra new elements or attributes will be ignored. Instead of using the same Topic for all versions, it is possible in XMPP-Grid to programatically create separate Topics for each version and allow them to be discovered and subscribed by the Nodes.

In XMPP-Grid, versioning support applies equally to both publish/subscribe, directed and out-of-band queries.

2.5.2. Topic Discovery

The Nodes connected to XMPP-Grid can query the Controller and get the list of all capabilities/Topics running on XMPP-Grid. The XML samples provided in XMPP-Grid Protocol section above provide illustrations of Capability Query and Capability Provider Query.

2.5.3. Subtopics and Message Filters

XMPP-Grid supports semantic message filtering for Topics. The content being published by a provider can be semantically grouped into categories based on domain, location of endpoints for example. The provider of a capability specifies whether it supports semantic
filtering or not to the Controller at the subscribe time to the Topic under consideration.

XMPP-Grid subscribers query the Controller and obtain the filtering options available for each capability, and express their message filtering criteria at subscription time. The Controller, for each unique filter criteria specified by the subscribers, creates a new sub Topic under the main capability Topic. All the subscribers with the same filtering criteria will be subscribed to the Subtopic. The set of filter criteria for a capability will be predefined by the capability provider and could be based on the well-defined attributes of the message.

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Node</th>
<th>Grid Controller</th>
<th>XMPP Server</th>
<th>Capability Provider</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subscribe with filter</td>
<td>translate &amp; validate</td>
<td>filter</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Check if sub-topic</td>
<td>exists</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Create subtopic if doesn’t exist</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Add Pub &amp; Sub to Sub-Topic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Notify Publisher</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subscribe Success</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 9: Subtopics and Information Filter Subscribe Operations Flow

The publisher will be responsible for applying the filter on the message and publishing the message on the Topic and the Subtopic based on the filter criteria. Filtering logic will be on the...
publisher, as the publisher understands the message content. XMPP-Grid fabric is oblivious to the message content.

To avoid proliferation of new Subtopics, the capability provider could express the configurable limit on the number of Subtopics that can be created for its capability at registration time. The XMPP-Grid Controller will perform periodic cleanup of Subtopics whenever their subscription list reduces to 0.

In XMPP-Grid, message filters are provided to all APIs i.e. publish/subscribe and directed query.

Figure 10: Subtopic Publish Operations Flow
2.6. XMPP-Grid Protocol Details

The XMPP-Grid Protocol provides an abstraction layer over and above XMPP messages with the intent to provide intuitive interfaces to the Nodes connecting to XMPP-Grid. Nodes connecting to XMPP-Grid use the following interfaces (provided as XML samples) offered by XMPP-Grid protocol to connect and participate in information exchange on XMPP-Grid:

- Register the Node to XMPP-Grid: Node identified as "Node2@domain.com/mac" sends the following Registration request to XMPP-Grid controller.

```xml
<iq id="ay0tK-4" to="grid_Controller.jabber"
    from="Node2@domain.com/syam-mac" type="get">
    <grid xmlns='gi' type='request'>
        <AccountQuery xmlns='com.domain.gi.gcl.Controller'>
            <register/>
            </AccountQuery>
        </grid>
    </iq>
```

- Node login to XMPP-Grid: The following XML sample shows the Login request from Node "Node2@domain.com/mac" to XMPP-Grid controller and Login response returned by the XMPP-Grid controller to the Node.

```xml
// Request
<iq id="ay0tK-5" to="grid_Controller.jabber"
    from="Node2@domain.com/mac" type="get">
    <grid xmlns='gi' type='request'>
        <AccountQuery xmlns='com.domain.gi.gcl.Controller'>
            <login/>
        </AccountQuery>
    </grid>
</iq>

// Response
<iq xmlns="jabber:client" to="Node2@domain.com/mac"
    from="grid_Controller.jabber" type="result" id="ay0tK-5">
    <grid xmlns='gi' type='response'>
        <AccountQuery xmlns='com.domain.gi.gcl.Controller'>
            <login xmlns="">
                <value xmlns:ns2="gi" xmlns:xsi=" xsi:nil="true" />
            </login>
        </AccountQuery>
    </grid>
</iq>
```
Node logout from XMPP-Grid: The following XML sample shows the Logout request sent by Node "Node2@domain.com/mac" to XMPP-Grid controller.

```xml
<iq id="o47m2-8" to="grid_Controller.jabber"
    from="Node2@domain.com/mac" type="get">
    <grid xmlns='gi' type='request'>
        <AccountQuery xmlns='com.domain.gi.gcl.Controller'>
            <logout></logout>
        </AccountQuery>
    </grid>
</iq>
```

Capability Discovery Query: The following XML sample shows the Capability Discovery query request from Node "Node2@domain.com/mac" to XMPP-Grid controller. The XMPP-Grid controller returns the list of capabilities supported by XMPP-Grid and their versions as a response to the Node’s request.

```
// Request
<iq id="tVKqm-6" to="grid_Controller.jabber"
    from="Node2@domain.com/mac" type="get">
    <grid xmlns="xgrid" type="request">
        <ns2:getCapabilityListRequest xmlns:ns2=" xmlns:ns4="
            xmlns:ns3=" xmlns:ns5=" xmlns:ns6=" xmlns:ns7=" />
    </grid>
</iq>

// Response
<iq from="grid_Controller.jabber" id="tVKqm-6"
    to="Node2@domain.com/mac" type="result" xmlns="jabber:client">
    <grid type="response" xmlns="xgrid">
        <ns2:getCapabilityListResponse xmlns:ns2=" xmlns:ns3="
            xmlns:ns4=" xmlns:ns5=" xmlns:ns6=" xmlns:ns7=">
            <ns2:capability xmlns:xsi=" xsi:type="ns5:TrustSecMetaDataCapability">
                <ns2:id>0</ns2:id>
                <ns2:name>TrustSecMetaDataCapability-1.0</ns2:name>
                <ns2:version>1.0</ns2:version>
            </ns2:capability>
            <ns2:capability xmlns:xsi=" xsi:type="ns5:EndpointProfileMetaDataCapability">
                <ns2:id>0</ns2:id>
                <ns2:name>EndpointProfileMetaDataCapability-1.0</ns2:name>
                <ns2:version>1.0</ns2:version>
            </ns2:capability>
        </ns2:capability>
    </grid>
</iq>
```
<ns2:capability xmlns:xsi="" xsi:type="ns5:IdentityGroupCapability">
  <ns2:id>0</ns2:id>
  <ns2:name>IdentityGroupCapability-1.0</ns2:name>
  <ns2:version>1.0</ns2:version>
</ns2:capability>

<ns2:capability xmlns:ns9=" xmlns:xsi="" xsi:type="ns9:TDAnalysisServiceCapability">
  <ns2:id>0</ns2:id>
  <ns2:name>TDAnalysisServiceCapability-1.0</ns2:name>
  <ns2:version>1.0</ns2:version>
</ns2:capability>

<ns2:capability xmlns:xsi="" xsi:type="ns7:NetworkCaptureCapability">
  <ns2:id>0</ns2:id>
  <ns2:name>NetworkCaptureCapability-1.0</ns2:name>
  <ns2:version>1.0</ns2:version>
</ns2:capability>

<ns2:capability xmlns:xsi="" xsi:type="ns6:EndpointProtectionServiceCapability">
  <ns2:id>0</ns2:id>
  <ns2:name>EndpointProtectionServiceCapability-1.0</ns2:name>
  <ns2:version>1.0</ns2:version>
</ns2:capability>

<ns2:capability xmlns:xsi="" xsi:type="ns4:GridControllerAdminServiceCapability">
  <ns2:id>0</ns2:id>
  <ns2:name>GridControllerAdminServiceCapability-1.0</ns2:name>
  <ns2:version>1.0</ns2:version>
</ns2:capability>

<ns2:capability xmlns:xsi="" xsi:type="ns5:SessionDirectoryCapability">
  <ns2:id>0</ns2:id>
  <ns2:name>SessionDirectoryCapability-1.0</ns2:name>
  <ns2:version>1.0</ns2:version>
</ns2:capability>

</iq>
Specific Capability Provider Query: The following XML sample shows the Capability Provider hostname query request from Node "Node2@domain.com/mac" to XMPP-Grid controller. XMPP-Grid controller returns the hostname of the specific Capability Provider as a response to the Node’s request.

// Request
<iq id="996IL-8" to="grid_Controller.jabber" from="Node2@domain.com/mac" type="get">
  <grid xmlns='gi' type='request'>
    <DiscoveryQuery xmlns='com.domain.gi.gcl.Controller'>
      <find><param xsi:type="xs:string" xmlns:ns2="gi" xmlns:xs="xmlns:xsi=">com.domain.ise.session.SessionQuery
        </param></find>
    </DiscoveryQuery>
  </grid>
</iq>

// Response
<iq from='grid_Controller.jabber' id='996IL-8' to='Node2@domain.com/mac' type='result' xmlns='jabber:client'>
  <grid type='response' xmlns='gi'>
    <DiscoveryQuery xmlns='com.domain.gi.gcl.Controller'>
      <find xmlns=''><value xmlns:ns3='http://jaxb.dev.java.net/array' xmlns:xsi='http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance' xsi:type='ns3:stringArray'>
        <item>ise@syam-06.domain.com/syam-mac</item>
      </value></find>
    </DiscoveryQuery>
  </grid>
</iq>
o Register as a publisher to the Topic: The following XML sample shows the Register as a Publisher request from a Node "Node2@domain.com/mac" to XMPP-Grid controller.

```xml
<iq id="fD65a-6" to="grid_Controller.jabber"
    from="Node2@domain.com/mac" type="get">
    <grid xmlns="xgrid" type="request">
        <ns2:initPublishRequest xmlns:ns2=" 
            xmlns:ns4=" 
            xmlns:ns3=" 
            xmlns:ns5=" 
            xmlns:ns6=" 
            xmlns:ns7="">
            <ns2:capability xsi:type="ns5:SessionCapability"
                xmlns:xsi="">
                <ns2:id>0</ns2:id>
                <ns2:version>1.0</ns2:version>
                </ns2:capability>
        </ns2:initPublishRequest>
    </grid>
</iq>
```
Register as a subscriber to the Topic: The following XML sample shows a subscription request made by Node "Node2@domain.com/mac" for "SessionCapability" Topic to XMPP-Grid controller. On success, determined by the Node’s authorization privilege, XMPP-Grid controller returns the Topic name, version and the Publishers’ hostname as a response to the Node’s request.

// Subscribe Request
<iq id="lQJIT-6" to="grid_Controller.jabber"
from="Node2@domain.com/mac" type="get">
  <grid xmlns="xgrid" type="request">
    <ns2:subscribeRequest xmlns:ns2=" xmlns:ns4=" xmlns:ns3=
    xmlns:ns5=" xmlns:ns6=" xmlns:ns7="">
      <ns2:capability xsi:type="ns5:SessionCapability"
           xmlns:xsi="">
        <ns2:id>0</ns2:id>
        <ns2:version>1.0</ns2:version>
      </ns2:capability>
    </ns2:subscribeRequest>
  </grid>
</iq>

// Subscribe Response
<iq from="grid_Controller.jabber" id="lQJIT-6"
to="Node2@domain.com/mac" type="result" xmlns="jabber:client">
  <grid type="response" xmlns="xgrid">
    <ns2:subscribeResponse xmlns:ns2=" xmlns:ns3=" xmlns:ns4=" xmlns:ns5=
    xmlns:ns6=" xmlns:ns7="">
      <ns2:topicName>SessionCapability-1.0</ns2:topicName>
      <ns2:xmppDetails>
        <ns2:jid>ise-mnt-XMPP-Grid-004@xgrid.domain.com/gcl
        </ns2:jid>
        <ns2:jid>ise-mnt-XMPP-Grid-005@xgrid.domain.com/gcl
        </ns2:jid>
      </ns2:xmppDetails>
    </ns2:subscribeResponse>
  </grid>
</iq>
Peer-to-Peer Directed Query: The following XML sample shows a peer-to-peer directed query request made by Node "Node2@domain.com/mac" to other XMPP-Grid participating Node "grid_Controller.jabber", seeking identity group information for a specific user "user1". "grid_Controller.jabber" returns the list of identity groups "user1" belongs as a response to the request.

```xml
// Query Request
<iq id="kR0YY-8" to="grid_Controller.jabber"
    from="Node2@domain.com/mac" type="get">
    <grid xmlns="xgrid" type="request">
        <ns5:getIdentityGroupRequest xmlns:ns2=" xmlns:ns4=" xmlns:ns3=" xmlns:ns5=" xmlns:ns6=" xmlns:ns7="">
            <ns5:user>
                <ns2:name>user1</ns2:name>
            </ns5:user>
        </ns5:getIdentityGroupRequest>
    </grid>
</iq>

// Query Response
<iq from="grid_Controller.jabber"
    id=" kR0YY-8" to="Node2@domain.com/mac" type="result">
    <grid type="response" xmlns="xgrid">
        <ns5:getIdentityGroupResponse xmlns:ns2=" xmlns:ns3=" xmlns:ns4=" xmlns:ns5=" xmlns:ns6=" xmlns:ns7="">
            <ns5:user>
                <ns2:name>user1</ns2:name>
                <ns3:groupList>
                    <ns3:object>
                        <ns2:name>User Identity Groups:Employee</ns2:name>
                        <ns3:type>Identity</ns3:type>
                    </ns3:object>
                    <ns3:object>
                        <ns2:name>User Identity Groups:Internal</ns2:name>
                        <ns3:type>Identity</ns3:type>
                    </ns3:object>
                </ns3:groupList>
            </ns5:user>
        </ns5:getIdentityGroupResponse>
    </grid>
</iq>
```

3. XMPP-Grid Compatibility with IODEF

The Incident Object Description and Exchange Format (IODEF) [RFC5070] defines a common data format and common exchange procedures for sharing incidents and related data between CSIRTs. RFC5070 provides the information and data model for IODEF specified with XML schema.
XEP-0268 (http://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0268.html), Incident Handling, defines ways for XMPP server deployments to share incident reports with each other using the IODEF format and handle attacks on the servers in real-time.

Providers of incident reports, across administrative domains, could participate as publishers to an XMPP topic (for example: IODEF). Trust is achieved through authentication, authorization and account approval as defined in Section 2.4. The providers could expose IODEF incident attributes such as Authority as message filter criteria for the topic in order for subscribing systems to subscribe to incident reports from administrative domains of interest. The providers could further expose other IODEF attributes such as Assessment, Method, Attacker etc as message filter criteria for subscribers to selectively choose events of interest that are published from administrative domain(s). Privacy and regulatory requirements of information shared across administrative domains is beyond the scope of this document.

4. IANA Considerations

IANA Considerations to be determined

5. Security Considerations

A XMPP-Grid Controller serves as an controlling broker for XMPP-Grid Nodes such as Enforcement Points, Policy Servers, CMDBs, and Sensors, using a publish-subscribe-search model of information exchange and lookup. By increasing the ability of XMPP-Grid Nodes to learn about and respond to security-relevant events and data, XMPP-Grid can improve the timeliness and utility of the security system. However, this integrated security system can also be exploited by attackers if they can compromise it. Therefore, strong security protections for XMPP-Grid are essential.

This section provides a security analysis of the XMPP-Grid transport protocol and the architectural elements that employ it, specifically with respect to their use of this protocol. Three subsections define the trust model (which elements are trusted to do what), the threat model (attacks that may be mounted on the system), and the countermeasures (ways to address or mitigate the threats previously identified).

5.1. Trust Model

The first step in analyzing the security of the XMPP-Grid transport protocol is to describe the trust model, listing what each architectural element is trusted to do. The items listed here are
assumptions, but provisions are made in the Threat Model and Countermeasures sections for elements that fail to perform as they were trusted to do.

5.1.1. Network

The network used to carry XMPP-Grid messages is trusted to:

- Perform best effort delivery of network traffic

The network used to carry XMPP-Grid messages is not expected (trusted) to:

- Provide confidentiality or integrity protection for messages sent over it
- Provide timely or reliable service

5.1.2. XMPP-Grid Nodes

Authorized XMPP-Grid Nodes are trusted to:

- Preserve the confidentiality of sensitive data retrieved via the XMPP-Grid Controller

5.1.3. XMPP-Grid Controller

The XMPP-Grid Controller is trusted to:

- Broker requests for data and enforce authorization of access to this data throughout its lifecycle
- Perform service requests in a timely and accurate manner
- Create and maintain accurate operational attributes
- Only reveal data to and accept service requests from authorized parties

The XMPP-Grid Controller is not expected (trusted) to:

- Verify the truth (correctness) of data

5.1.4. Certification Authority

The Certification Authority (CA) that issues certificates for the XMPP-Grid Controller and/or XMPP-Grid Nodes (or each CA, if there are several) is trusted to:
o Protect the confidentiality of the CA’s private key
o Ensure that only proper certificates are issued and that all certificates are issued in accordance with the CA’s policies
o Revoke certificates previously issued when necessary
o Regularly and securely distribute certificate revocation information
o Promptly detect and report any violations of this trust so that they can be handled

The CA is not expected (trusted) to:

o Issue certificates that go beyond name constraints or other constraints imposed by a relying party or a cross-certificate

5.2. Threat Model

To secure the XMPP-Grid transport protocol and the architectural elements that implement it, this section identifies the attacks that can be mounted against the protocol and elements.

5.2.1. Network Attacks

A variety of attacks can be mounted using the network. For the purposes of this subsection the phrase "network traffic" should be taken to mean messages and/or parts of messages. Any of these attacks may be mounted by network elements, by parties who control network elements, and (in many cases) by parties who control network-attached devices.

o Network traffic may be passively monitored to glean information from any unencrypted traffic
o Even if all traffic is encrypted, valuable information can be gained by traffic analysis (volume, timing, source and destination addresses, etc.)

o Network traffic may be modified in transit
o Previously transmitted network traffic may be replayed
o New network traffic may be added
o Network traffic may be blocked, perhaps selectively
A "Man In The Middle" (MITM) attack may be mounted where an attacker interposes itself between two communicating parties and poses as the other end to either party or impersonates the other end to either or both parties.

Resist attacks (including denial of service and other attacks from XMPP-Grid Nodes).

Undesired network traffic may be sent in an effort to overload an architectural component, thus mounting a denial of service attack.

5.2.2. XMPP-Grid Nodes

An unauthorized XMPP-Grid Nodes (one which is not recognized by the XMPP-Grid Controller or is recognized but not authorized to perform any actions) cannot mount any attacks other than those listed in the Network Attacks section above.

An authorized XMPP-Grid Node, on the other hand, can mount many attacks. These attacks might occur because the XMPP-Grid Node is controlled by a malicious, careless, or incompetent party (whether because its owner is malicious, careless, or incompetent or because the XMPP-Grid Node has been compromised and is now controlled by a party other than its owner). They might also occur because the XMPP-Grid Node is running malicious software; because the XMPP-Grid Node is running buggy software (which may fail in a state that floods the network with traffic); or because the XMPP-Grid Node has been configured improperly. From a security standpoint, it generally makes no difference why an attack is initiated. The same countermeasures can be employed in any case.

Here is a list of attacks that may be mounted by an authorized XMPP-Grid Node:

- Cause many false alarms or otherwise overload the XMPP-Grid Controller or other elements in the network security system (including human administrators) leading to a denial of service or disabling parts of the network security system.
- Omit important actions (such as posting incriminating data), resulting in incorrect access.
- Use confidential information obtained from the XMPP-Grid Controller to enable further attacks (such as using endpoint health check results to exploit vulnerable endpoints).
o Advertise data crafted to exploit vulnerabilities in the XMPP-Grid Controller or in other XMPP-Grid Nodes, with a goal of compromising those systems

o Issue a search request or set up a subscription that matches an enormous result, leading to resource exhaustion on the XMPP-Grid Controller, the publishing XMPP-Grid Node, and/or the network

o Establish a communication channel using another XMPP-Grid Node’s session-id

Dependencies of or vulnerabilities of authorized XMPP-Grid Nodes may be exploited to effect these attacks. Another way to effect these attacks is to gain the ability to impersonate a XMPP-Grid Node (through theft of the XMPP-Grid Node’s identity credentials or through other means). Even a clock skew between the XMPP-Grid Node and XMPP-Grid Controller can cause problems if the XMPP-Grid Node assumes that old XMPP-Grid Node data should be ignored.

5.2.3. XMPP-Grid Controllers

An unauthorized XMPP-Grid Controller (one which is not trusted by XMPP-Grid Nodes) cannot mount any attacks other than those listed in the Network Attacks section above.

An authorized XMPP-Grid Controller can mount many attacks. Similar to the XMPP-Grid Node case described above, these attacks might occur because the XMPP-Grid Controller is controlled by a malicious, careless, or incompetent party (either a XMPP-Grid Controller administrator or an attacker who has seized control of the XMPP-Grid Controller). They might also occur because the XMPP-Grid Controller is running malicious software, because the XMPP-Grid Controller is running buggy software (which may fail in a state that corrupts data or floods the network with traffic), or because the XMPP-Grid Controller has been configured improperly.

All of the attacks listed for XMPP-Grid Node above can be mounted by the XMPP-Grid Controller. Detection of these attacks will be more difficult since the XMPP-Grid Controller can create false operational attributes and/or logs that imply some other party created any bad data.

Additional XMPP-Grid Controller attacks may include:

o Expose different data to different XMPP-Grid Nodes to mislead investigators or cause inconsistent behavior
Mount an even more effective denial of service attack than a single XMPP-Grid Node could

Obtain and cache XMPP-Grid Node credentials so they can be used to impersonate XMPP-Grid Nodes even after a breach of the XMPP-Grid Controller is repaired

Obtain and cache XMPP-Grid Controller administrator credentials so they can be used to regain control of the XMPP-Grid Controller after the breach of the XMPP-Grid Controller is repaired

Dependencies of or vulnerabilities of the XMPP-Grid Controller may be exploited to obtain control of the XMPP-Grid Controller and effect these attacks.

5.2.4. Certification Authority

A Certification Authority trusted to issue certificates for the XMPP-Grid Controller and/or XMPP-Grid Nodes can mount several attacks:

Issue certificates for unauthorized parties, enabling them to impersonate authorized parties such as the XMPP-Grid Controller or a XMPP-Grid Node. This can lead to all the threats that can be mounted by the certificate’s subject.

Issue certificates without following all of the CA’s policies. Because this can result in issuing certificates that may be used to impersonate authorized parties, this can lead to all the threats that can be mounted by the certificate’s subject.

Fail to revoke previously issued certificates that need to be revoked. This can lead to undetected impersonation of the certificate’s subject or failure to revoke authorization of the subject, and therefore can lead to all of the threats that can be mounted by that subject.

Fail to regularly and securely distribute certificate revocation information. This may cause a relying party to accept a revoked certificate, leading to undetected impersonation of the certificate’s subject or failure to revoke authorization of the subject, and therefore can lead to all of the threats that can be mounted by that subject. It can also cause a relying party to refuse to proceed with a transaction because timely revocation information is not available, even though the transaction should be permitted to proceed.
o Allow the CA’s private key to be revealed to an unauthorized party. This can lead to all the threats above. Even worse, the actions taken with the private key will not be known to the CA.

o Fail to promptly detect and report errors and violations of trust so that relying parties can be promptly notified. This can cause the threats listed earlier in this section to persist longer than necessary, leading to many knock-on effects.

5.3. Countermeasures

Below are countermeasures for specific attack scenarios to the XMPP-Grid infrastructure.

5.3.1. Securing the XMPP-Grid Transport Protocol

To address network attacks, the XMPP-Grid transport protocol described in this document requires that the XMPP-Grid messages MUST be carried over TLS (minimally TLS 1.2 [RFC5246]) as described in [RFC2818]. The XMPP-Grid Node MUST verify the XMPP-Grid Controller’s certificate and determine whether the XMPP-Grid Controller is trusted by this XMPP-Grid Node before completing the TLS handshake. The XMPP-Grid Controller MUST authenticate the XMPP-Grid Node either using mutual certificate-based authentication in the TLS handshake or using Basic Authentication as described in IETF RFC 2617. XMPP-Grid Controller MUST use Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL), described in [RFC4422], to support the aforesaid authentication mechanisms. SASL offers authentication mechanism negotiations between the XMPP-Grid Controller and XMPP-Grid node during the connection establishment phase. XMPP-Grid Nodes and XMPP-Grid Controllers using mutual certificate-based authentication SHOULD each verify the revocation status of the other party. All XMPP-Grid Controllers and XMPP-Grid Nodes MUST implement both mutual certificate-based authentication and Basic Authentication. The selection of which XMPP-Grid Node authentication technique to use in any particular deployment is left to the administrator.

An XMPP-Grid Controller MAY also support a local, configurable set of Basic Authentication userid-password pairs. If so, it is implementation dependent whether a XMPP-Grid Controller ends a session when an administrator changes the configured password. Since Basic Authentication has many security disadvantages (especially the transmission of reusable XMPP-Grid Node passwords to the XMPP-Grid Controller), it SHOULD only be used when absolutely necessary. Per the HTTP specification, when basic authentication is in use, a XMPP-Grid Controller MAY respond to any request that lacks credentials with an error code similar to HTTP code 401. A XMPP-Grid Node SHOULD avoid this code by submitting basic auth credentials with every
request when basic authentication is in use. If it does not do so, a XMPP-Grid Node MUST respond to this code by resubmitting the same request with credentials (unless the XMPP-Grid Node is shutting down).

As XMPP uses TLS as the transport and security mechanisms, it is understood that best practices such as those in [I-D.ietf-uta-tls-bcp] are followed.

These protocol security measures provide protection against all the network attacks listed in the above document section except denial of service attacks. If protection against these denial of service attacks is desired, ingress filtering, rate limiting per source IP address, and other denial of service mitigation measures may be employed. In addition, a XMPP-Grid Controller MAY automatically disable a misbehaving XMPP-Grid Node.

5.3.2. Securing XMPP-Grid Nodes

XMPP-Grid Nodes may be deployed in locations that are susceptible to physical attacks. Physical security measures may be taken to avoid compromise of XMPP-Grid Nodes, but these may not always be practical or completely effective. An alternative measure is to configure the XMPP-Grid Controller to provide read-only access for such systems. The XMPP-Grid Controller SHOULD also include a full authorization model so that individual XMPP-Grid Nodes may be configured to have only the privileges that they need. The XMPP-Grid Controller MAY provide functional templates so that the administrator can configure a specific XMPP-Grid Node as a DHCP server and authorize only the operations and metadata types needed by a DHCP server to be permitted for that XMPP-Grid Node. These techniques can reduce the negative impacts of a compromised XMPP-Grid Node without diminishing the utility of the overall system.

To handle attacks within the bounds of this authorization model, the XMPP-Grid Controller MAY also include rate limits and alerts for unusual XMPP-Grid Node behavior. XMPP-Grid Controllers SHOULD make it easy to revoke a XMPP-Grid Node’s authorization when necessary. Another way to detect attacks from XMPP-Grid Nodes is to create fake entries in the available data (honeytokens) which normal XMPP-Grid Nodes will not attempt to access. The XMPP-Grid Controller SHOULD include auditable logs of XMPP-Grid Node activities.

To avoid compromise of XMPP-Grid Node, XMPP-Grid Node SHOULD be hardened against attack and minimized to reduce their attack surface. They SHOULD go through a TNC handshake to verify the integrity of the XMPP-Grid Node, and SHOULD, if feasible, utilize a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) for identity and/or integrity measurements of the XMPP-
Grid Node within a TNC handshake. They should be well managed to minimize vulnerabilities in the underlying platform and in systems upon which the XMPP-Grid Node depends. Personnel with administrative access should be carefully screened and monitored to detect problems as soon as possible.

5.3.3. Securing XMPP-Grid Controllers

Because of the serious consequences of XMPP-Grid Controller compromise, XMPP-Grid Controllers SHOULD be especially well hardened against attack and minimized to reduce their attack surface. They SHOULD go through a regular TNC handshake to verify the integrity of the XMPP-Grid Controller, and SHOULD utilize a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) for identity and/or integrity measurements of the XMPP-Grid Node within a TNC handshake. They should be well managed to minimize vulnerabilities in the underlying platform and in systems upon which the XMPP-Grid Controller depends. Network security measures such as firewalls or intrusion detection systems may be used to monitor and limit traffic to and from the XMPP-Grid Controller. Personnel with administrative access should be carefully screened and monitored to detect problems as soon as possible. Administrators should not use password-based authentication but should instead use non-reusable credentials and multi-factor authentication (where available). Physical security measures SHOULD be employed to prevent physical attacks on XMPP-Grid Controllers.

To ease detection of XMPP-Grid Controller compromise should it occur, XMPP-Grid Controller behavior should be monitored to detect unusual behavior (such as a reboot, a large increase in traffic, or different views of an information repository for similar XMPP-Grid Nodes). XMPP-Grid Nodes should log and/or notify administrators when peculiar XMPP-Grid Controller behavior is detected. To aid forensic investigation, permanent read-only audit logs of security-relevant information (especially administrative actions) should be maintained. If XMPP-Grid Controller compromise is detected, a careful analysis should be performed of the impact of this compromise. Any reusable credentials that may have been compromised should be reissued.

5.3.4. Limit on search result size

While XMPP-Grid is designed for high scalability to 100,000s of Nodes, an XMPP-Grid Controller MAY establish a limit to the amount of data it is willing to return in search or subscription results. This mitigates the threat of a XMPP-Grid Node causing resource exhaustion by issuing a search or subscription that leads to an enormous result.
5.3.5. Cryptographically random session-id and authentication checks for ARC

A XMPP-Grid Controller SHOULD ensure that the XMPP-Grid Node establishing an ARC is the same XMPP-Grid Node as the XMPP-Grid Node that established the corresponding SSRC. The XMPP-Grid Controller SHOULD employ both of the following strategies:

- session-ids SHOULD be cryptographically random
- The HTTPS transport for the SSRC and the ARC SHOULD be authenticated using the same credentials. SSL session resumption MAY be used to establish the ARC based on the SSRC SSL session.

5.3.6. Securing the Certification Authority

As noted above, compromise of a Certification Authority (CA) trusted to issue certificates for the XMPP-Grid Controller and/or XMPP-Grid Nodes is a major security breach. Many guidelines for proper CA security have been developed: the CA/Browser Forum’s Baseline Requirements, the AICPA/CICA Trust Service Principles, etc. The CA operator and relying parties should agree on an appropriately rigorous security practices to be used.

Even with the most rigorous security practices, a CA may be compromised. If this compromise is detected quickly, relying parties can remove the CA from their list of trusted CAs, and other CAs can revoke any certificates issued to the CA. However, CA compromise may go undetected for some time, and there’s always the possibility that a CA is being operated improperly or in a manner that is not in the interests of the relying parties. For this reason, relying parties may wish to "pin" a small number of particularly critical certificates (such as the certificate for the XMPP-Grid Controller). Once a certificate has been pinned, the relying party will not accept another certificate in its place unless the Administrator explicitly commands it to do so. This does not mean that the relying party will not check the revocation status of pinned certificates. However, the Administrator may still be consulted if a pinned certificate is revoked, since the CA and revocation process are not completely trusted.

5.4. Summary

XMPP-Grid’s considerable value as a broker for security-sensitive data exchange distribution also makes the protocol and the network security elements that implement it a target for attack. Therefore, strong security has been included as a basic design principle within the XMPP-Grid design process.
The XMPP-Grid transport protocol provides strong protection against a variety of different attacks. In the event that a XMPP-Grid Node or XMPP-Grid Controller is compromised, the effects of this compromise have been reduced and limited with the recommended role-based authorization model and other provisions, and best practices for managing and protecting XMPP-Grid systems have been described. Taken together, these measures should provide protection commensurate with the threat to XMPP-Grid systems, thus ensuring that they fulfill their promise as a network security clearing-house.

6. Privacy Considerations

XMPP-Grid Nodes may publish information about endpoint health, network access, events (which may include information about what services an endpoint is accessing), roles and capabilities, and the identity of the end user operating the endpoint. Any of this published information may be queried by other XMPP-Grid Nodes and could potentially be used to correlate network activity to a particular end user.

Dynamic and static information brokered by a XMPP-Grid Controller, ostensibly for purposes of correlation by XMPP-Grid Nodes for intrusion detection, could be misused by a broader set of XMPP-Grid Nodes which hitherto have been performing specific roles with strict well-defined separation of duties.

Care should be taken by deployers of XMPP-Grid to ensure that the information published by XMPP-Grid Nodes does not violate agreements with end users or local and regional laws and regulations. This can be accomplished either by configuring XMPP-Grid Nodes to not publish certain information or by restricting access to sensitive data to trusted XMPP-Grid Nodes. That is, the easiest means to ensure privacy or protect sensitive data, is to omit or not share it at all.

Another consideration for deployers is to enable end-to-end encryption to ensure the data is protected from the data layer to data layer and thus protect it from the transport layer.

7. Acknowledgements

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8. References

8.1. Normative References


8.2. Informative References


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MILE Implementation Report
draft-ietf-mile-implementreport-06

Abstract

This document is a collection of implementation reports from vendors, consortiums, and researchers who have implemented one or more of the standards published from the IETF INCident Handling (INCH) and Management Incident Lightweight Exchange (MILE) working groups.

Status of This Memo

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1. Introduction

This document is a collection of implementation reports from vendors and researchers who have implemented one or more of the standards published from the INCH and MILE working groups. The standards include:

- Incident Object Description Exchange Format (IODEF) v1, RFC5070,
- Incident Object Description Exchange Format (IODEF) v2, RFC5070-bis,
o Extensions to the IODEF-Document Class for Reporting Phishing, RFC5901

o Sharing Transaction Fraud Data, RFC5941

o IODEF-extension for Structured Cybersecurity Information, RFCXXXX

o Real-time Inter-network Defense (RID), RFC6545

o Transport of Real-time Inter-network Defense (RID) Messages over HTTP/TLS, RFC6546.

o Incident Object Description Exchange Format (IODEF) Extension for Structured Cybersecurity Information, RFC7203

The implementation reports included in this document have been provided by the team or product responsible for the implementations of the mentioned RFCs. Additional submissions are welcome and should be sent to the draft editor. A more complete list of implementations, including open source efforts and vendor products, can also be found at the following location:

http://siis.realmv6.org/implementations/

2. Consortiums and Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs)

2.1. Anti-Phishing Working Group

Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG) is one of the biggest coalition against cybercrime, especially phishing. In order to collect threat information in a structured format, APWG provides a phishing and cybercrime reporting tool which sends threat information to APWG by tailoring information with IODEF format, based on RFC5070 and RFC5901.

2.2. Advanced Cyber Defence Centre

The Advanced Cyber Defense Centre (ACDC), is EU-wide activity to fight against botnets. ACDC provides a solutions to mitigate on-going attacks, as well as consolidating information provided by various stakeholders into a pool of knowledge. Within ACDC, IODEF is one of the supported schema for exchanging the information.
2.3. Research and Education Networking Information Sharing and Analysis Center

Research and Education Networking Information Sharing and Analysis Center (REN-ISAC) is a private community of the research and higher education members for sharing threat information, and employs IODEF formatted-message to exchange information.

REN-ISAC also recommends to use of the IODEF attachment provided with the notification email be processed rather than relying on parsing of the email body text. The interface provided by REN-ISAC are designed for dealing with such email.

http://www.ren-isac.net/notifications/using_iodef.html

3. Open Source Implementations

3.1. EMC/RSA RID Agent

The EMC/RSA RID agent is an open source implementation of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) standards for the exchange of incident and indicator data. The code has been released under an MIT license and development will continue with the open source community at the Github site for RSA Intelligence Sharing:

https://github.com/RSAIntelShare/RID-Server.git

The code implements the RFC6545, Real-time Inter-network Defense (RID) and RFC6546, Transport of RID over HTTP/TLS protocol. The code supports the evolving RFC5070-bis Incident Object Description Exchange Format (IODEF) data model from the work in the IETF working group Managed Incident Lightweight Exchange (MILE).

3.2. NICT IODEF-SCI implementation

Japan’s National Institute of Information and Communications Technology (NICT) Network Security Research Institute implemented open source tools for exchanging, accumulating, and locating IODEF-SCI documents.

Three tools are available in GitHub. They assist the exchange of IODEF-SCI documents between parties. IODEF-SCI is the IETF draft that extends IODEF so that IODEF document can embed structured cybersecurity information (SCI). For instance, it can embed MMDEF, CEE, MAEC in XML and CVE identifiers.

The three tools are generator, exchanger, and parser. The generator generates IODEF-SCI document or appends an XML to existing IODEF.
document. The exchanger sends the IODEF document to its corresponding node. The parser receives, parses, and stores the IODEF-SCI document. It also equips the interface that enable users to locate IODEF-SCI documents it has ever received. The code has been released under an MIT license and development will continue here.

Note that users can enjoy this software with their own responsibility.

Available Online:

https://github.com/TakeshiTakahashi/IODEF-SCI

3.3. n6

n6 is a platform for processing security-related information, developed by NASK, CERT Polska. Its API provides a common and unified way of representing data across the different sources that participate in knowledge management.

n6 exposes a REST-ful API over HTTPS with mandatory authentication via TLS client certificates, to ensure confidential and trustworthy communications. Moreover, it uses an event-based data model for representation of all types of security information.

Each event is represented as a JSON object with a set of mandatory and optional attributes. It also supports alternative output data formats for keeping compatibility with existing systems - IODEF and CSV - although they lack some of the attributes that may be present in the native JSON format.

Available Online:

https://github.com/CERT-Polska/n6sdk

4. Vendor Implementations

4.1. Deep Secure

Deep-Secure Guards are built to protect a trusted domain from:

- releasing sensitive data that does not meet the organisational security policy
- applications receiving badly constructed or malicious data which could exploit a vulnerability (known or unknown)
Deep-Secure Guards support HTTPS and XMPP (optimised server to server protocol) transports. The Deep-Secure Guards support transfer of XML based business content by creating a schema to translate the known good content to and from the intermediate format. This means that the Deep-Secure Guards can be used to protect:

- IODEF/RID using the HTTPS transport binding (RFC 6546)
- IODEF/RID using an XMPP binding
- ROLIE using HTTPS transport binding (draft-field-mile-rolie-02)
- STIX/TAXII using the HTTPS transport binding

Deep-Secure Guards also support the SMTP transport and perform deep content inspection of content including XML attachments. The Mail Guard supports S/MIME and Deep Secure are working on support for the upcoming PLASMA standard which enables information centric policy enforcement of data.

### 4.2. IncMan Suite, DFLabs

The Incident Object Description Exchange Format, documented in the RFC 5070, defines a data representation that provides a framework for sharing information commonly exchanged by Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs) about computer security incidents. IncMan Suite implements the IODEF standard for exchanging details about incidents, either for exporting and importing activities. This has been introduced to enhance the capabilities of the various CSIRT, to facilitate collaboration and sharing of useful experiences, conveying awareness on specific cases.

The IODEF implementation is specified as an XML schema, therefore all data are stored in an xml file: in this file all data of an incident are organized in a hierarchical structure to describe the various objects and their relationships.

IncMan Suite relies on IODEF as a transport format, composed by various classes for describing the entities which are part of the incident description: for instance the various relevant timestamps (detect time, start time, end time, report time), the techniques used by the intruders to perpetrate the incident, the impact of the incident, either technical and non-technical (time and monetary) and obviously all systems involved in the incident.
4.2.1. Exporting Incidents

Each incident defined in IncMan Suite can be exported via a User Interface feature and it will populate an xml document. Due to the nature of the data processed, the IODEF extraction might be considered privacy sensitive by the parties exchanging the information or by those described by it. For this reason, specific care needs to be taken in ensuring the distribution to an appropriate audience or third party, either during the document exchange and subsequent processing.

The xml document generated will include description and details of the incident along with all the systems involved and the related information. At this stage it can be distributed for import into a remote system.

4.2.2. Importing Incidents

IncMan Suite provides a functionality to import incidents stored in files and transported via IODEF-compliant xml documents. The importing process comprises of two steps: firstly, the file is inspected to validate if well formed, then all data are uploaded inside the system.

If an incident is already existing in the system with the same incident id, the new one being imported will be created under a new id. This approach prevents from accidentally overwriting existing info or merging inconsistent data.

IncMan Suite includes also a feature to upload incidents from emails. The incident, described in xml format, can be stored directly into the body of the email message or transported as an attachment of the email. At regular intervals, customizable by the user, IncMan Suite monitors for incoming emails, filtered by a configurable white-list and black-list mechanism on the sender’s email account, then a parser processes the received email and a new incident is created automatically, after having validated the email body or the attachment to ensure it is a well formed format.

4.3. Surevine Proof of Concept

XMPP is enhanced and extended through the XMPP Extension Protocols (or XEPs). XEP-0268 (http://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0268.html) describes incident management (using IODEF) of the XMPP network itself, effectively supporting self-healing the XMPP network. In order to more generically cover incident management of a network and over a network, XEP-0268 requires some updates. We are working on
these changes together with a new XEP that supports "social networking" over XMPP, enhancing the publish-and-subscribe XEP (XEP-0060). This now allows nodes to publish any type of content and subscribe to and therefore receive the content. XEP-0268 will be used to describe IODEF content. We now have an alpha version of the server-side software and client-side software required to demonstrate the "social networking" capability and are currently enhancing this to support Cyber Incident management in real-time.

4.4. MANTIS Cyber-Intelligence Management Framework

MANTIS provides an example implementation of a framework for managing cyber threat intelligence expressed in standards such as STIX, CybOX, IODEF, etc. The aims of providing such an example implementation are:

- To aide discussions about emerging standards such as STIX, CybOX et al. with respect to questions regarding tooling: how would a certain aspect be implemented, how do changes affect an implementation? Such discussions become much easier and have a better basis if they can be lead in the context of example tooling that is known to the community.

- To lower the entrance barrier for organizations and teams (esp. CERT teams) in using emerging standards for cyber-threat intelligence management and exchange.

- To provide a platform on the basis of which research and community-driven development in the area of cyber-threat intelligence management can occur.

5. Vendors with Planned Support

5.1. Threat Central, HP

HP has developed HP Threat Central, a security intelligence platform that enables automated, real-time collaboration between organizations to combat today’s increasingly sophisticated cyber attacks. One way automated sharing of threat indicators is achieved is through close integration with the HP ArcSight SIEM for automated upload and consumption of information from the Threat Central Server. In addition HP Threat Central supports open standards for sharing threat information so that participants who do not use HP Security Products can participate in the sharing ecosystem. General availability of Threat Central will be in 2014. It is planned that future versions also support IODEF for the automated upload and download of threat information.
5.2. DAEDALUS, NICT

DAEDALUS is a real-time alert system based on a large-scale darknet monitoring facility that has been deployed as a part of the nicter system of NICT, Japan. DAEDALUS consists of an analysis center (i.e., nicter) and several cooperate organizations. Each organization installs a darknet sensor and establishes a secure channel between it and the analysis center, and continuously forwards darknet traffic toward the center. In addition, each organization registers the IP address range of its livenet at the center in advance. When these distributed darknet sensors observe malware activities from the IP address of a cooperate organization, then the analysis center sends an alert to the organization. The future version of DAEDALUS will support IODEF for sending alert messages to the users.

6. Other Implementations

6.1. Collaborative Incident Management System

Collaborative Incident Management System (CIMS) is a proof-of-concept system for collaborative incident handling and for the sharing of cyber defence situational awareness information between the participants, developed for the Cyber Coalition 2013 (CC13) exercise organized by NATO. CIMS was implemented based on Request Tracker (RT), an open source software widely used for handling incident response by many CERTs and CSIRTs.

One of the functionality implemented in CIMS was the ability to import and export IODEF messages in the body of emails. The intent was to verify the suitability of IODEF to achieve the objective of collaborative incident handling. The customized version of RT could be configured to send an email message containing an IODEF message whenever an incident ticket was created, modified or deleted. These IODEF messages would then be imported into other incident handling systems in order to allow participating CSIRTs to use their usual means for incident handling, while still interacting with those using the proof-of-concept CIMS. Having an IODEF message generated for every change made to the incident information in RT (and for the system to allow incoming IODEF email messages to be associated to an existing incident) would in some way allow all participating CSIRTs to actually work on a "common incident ticket", at least at the conceptual level. Of particular importance was the ability for users to exchange information between each other concerning actions taken in the handling of a particular incident, thus creating a sort of common action log, as well as requesting/tasking others to provide information or perform specified action and correlating received responses to the original request or tasking. As well, a specific
"profile" was developed to identify a subset of the IODEF classes that would be used during the exercise, in an attempt to channel all users into a common usage pattern of the otherwise flexible IODEF standard.

6.2. Automated Incident Reporting - AirCERT

AirCERT was implemented by CERT/CC of Carnegie Mellon’s Software Engineering Institute CERT division. AirCERT was designed to be an Internet-scalable distributed system for sharing security event data. The AirCERT system was designed to be an automated collector of flow and IDS alerts. AirCERT would collect that information into a relational database and be able to share reporting using IODEF and IDMEF. AirCERT additionally used SNML to exchange information about the network. AirCERT was implemented in a combination of C and perl modules and included periodic graphing capabilities leveraging RRDTool.

AirCERT was intended for large scale distributed deployment and eventually the ability to sanitize data to be shared across administrative domains. The architecture was designed to allow collection of data at a per site basis and to allow each site to create data sharing based on its own particular trust relationships.

6.3. US Department of Energy CyberFed

The CyberFed system was implemented and deployed by Argonne National Laboratory to automate the detection and response of attack activity against Department of Energy (DoE) computer networks. CyberFed automates the collection of network alerting activity from various perimeter network defenses and logs those events into its database. CyberFed then automatically converts that information into blocking information transmitted to all participants. The original implementation used IODEf messages wrapped in an XML extension to manage a large array of indicators. The CyberFed system was not designed to describe a particular incident as much as to describe a set of current network blocking indicators that can be generated and deployed machine-to-machine.

CyberFed is primarily implemented in Perl. Included as part of the CyberFed system are scripts which interact with a large number of firewalls, IDS/IPS devices, DNS systems, and proxies which operate to implement both the automated collection of events as well as the automated deployment of blocking.

Currently CyberFed supports multiple exchange formats including IODEf and STIX. OpenIOC is also a potential exchange format that DoE is considering.
7. Implementation Guide

The section aims at sharing the tips for development of IODEF-capable systems.

7.1. Code Generators

For implementing IODEF-capable systems, it is feasible to employ code generators for XML Schema Document (XSD). The generators are used to save development costs since they automatically create useful libraries for accessing XML attributes, composing messages, and/or validating XML objects. The IODEF XSD was defined in section 8 of RFC 5070, and is available at http://www.iana.org/assignments/xml-registry/schema/iodef-1.0.xsd.

However, there still remains some problem. Due to the complexity of IODEF XSD, some code generators could not generate from the XSD file. The tested code generators were as follows.

- XML::Pastor [XSD:Perl] (Perl)
- RXSD [XSD:Ruby] (Ruby)
- PyXB [XSD:Python] (Python)
- JAXB [XSD:Java] (Java)
- CodeSynthesis XSD [XSD:Cxx] (C++)
- Xsd.exe [XSD:CS] (C#)

For instance, we have used XML::Pastor, but it could not properly understand its schema due to the complexity of IODEF XSD. The same applies to RXSD and JAXB. Only PyXB, CodeSynthesis XSD and Xsd.exe were able to understand the schema.

There is no recommended workaround, however, a double conversion of XSD file is one option to go through the situation; it means XSD is serialized to XML, and it is again converted to XSD. The resultant XSD was process-able by all the tools above.

It should be noted that IODEF uses ‘-’ (hyphen) symbols in its classes or attributes, listed as follows.

- IODEF-Document Class; it is the top level class in the IODEF data model described in section 3.1 of [RFC5070].
The vlan-name and vlan-num Attribute; according to section 3.16.2 of [RFC5070], they are the name and number of Virtual LAN and are the attributes for Address class.

Extending the Enumerated Values of Attribute; according to section 5.1 of [RFC5070], it is an extension technique to add new enumerated values to an attribute, and has a prefix of "ext-", e.g., ext-value, ext-category, ext-type, and so on.

According to the language specification, many programming languages prohibit to contain ‘-’ symbols in the name of class. The code generators must replace or remove ‘-’ when building the libraries. They should have the name space to restore ‘-’ when outputting the XML along with IODEF XSD.

7.2. iodeflib

iodeflib is an open source implementation written in Python. This provides a simple but powerful APIs to create, parse and edit IODEF documents. It was designed in order to keep its interface as simple as possible, whereas generated libraries tend to inherit the complexity of IODEF XSD. As well as the interface, iodeflib involves functions of hiding some unnecessarily nested structures of the IODEF schema, and adding more convenient shortcuts.

This tool is available through the following link:

http://www.decalage.info/python/iodeflib

7.3. iodefpm

IODEF.pm is an open source implementation written in Perl. This also provides a simple interface for creating and parsing IODEF documents, in order to facilitate the translation of the a key-value based format to the IODEF representation. The module contains a generic XML DTD parser and includes a simplified node based representation of the IODEF DTD. It can hence easily be upgraded or extended to support new XML nodes or other DTDs.

This tool is available through the following link:

http://search.cpan.org/˜saxjazman/

7.4. Usability

Here notes some tips to avoid problems.
IODEF has category attribute for NodeRole class. Though various categories are described, they are not enough. For example, in the case of web mail servers, you should choose either "www" or "mail". One suggestion is selecting "mail" as the category attribute and adding "www" for another attribute.

The numbering of Incident ID needs to be considered. Otherwise, information, such as the number of incidents within certain period could be observed by document receivers. For instance, we could randomize the assignment of the numbers.

8. Acknowledgements

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9. IANA Considerations

This memo includes no request to IANA.

10. Security Considerations

This draft provides a summary of implementation reports from researchers and vendors who have implemented RFCs and drafts from the MILE and INCH working groups. There are no security considerations added in this draft because of the nature of the document.
11. Informative References


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IODEF Usage Guidance
draft-ietf-mile-iodef-guidance-04

Abstract

The Incident Object Description Exchange Format [RFC5070] defines a data representation that provides a framework for sharing information commonly exchanged by Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs) about computer security incidents. Since the IODEF model includes a wealth of available options that can be used to describe a security incident or issue, it can be challenging for implementers to develop tools that can leverage IODEF for incident sharing. This document provides guidelines for IODEF implementers. It will also address how common security indicators can be represented in IODEF and use-cases of how IODEF is being used so far. The goal of this document is to make IODEF’s adoption by vendors easier and encourage faster and wider adoption of the model by Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs) around the world.

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1. Introduction

The Incident Object Description Exchange Format in [RFC5070] defines a data representation that provides a framework for sharing information commonly exchanged by Computer Security Incident Response
Teams (CSIRTs) about computer security incidents. The IODEF data model consists of multiple classes and data types that are used in the IODEF XML schema.

The IODEF schema was designed to be able to describe all the possible fields that would be needed in a security incident exchange. Thus, IODEF contains plenty data constructs that could potentially make it harder for IODEF implementers to decide which are the most important ones. Additionally, in the IODEF schema, there exist multiple fields and classes which do not necessarily need to be used in every possible data exchange. Moreover, there are fields that are useful only in data exchanges of non-traditional security events. This document tries to address the issues above. It will also address how common security indicators can be represented in IODEF. It will point out the most important IODEF classes for an implementer and describe other ones that are not as important. Also, it addresses some common challenges for IODEF implementers and how they should be addressed. The end goal of this document is to make IODEF’s adoption by vendors easier and encourage faster and wider adoption of the model by Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs) around the world.

Section 3 discusses the recommended classes and how an IODEF implementer should chose the classes to implement. Section 4 presents common considerations and implementer will come across and how to address them. Section 5 goes over some basic security concepts and how they can be expressed in IODEF.

2. Terminology

The terminology used in this document follows the one defined in [RFC5070] and [RFC7203].

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

3. Implementation Strategy

It is important for IODEF implementers to be able to distinguish how the IODEF classes will be used for incident information exchanges. It is critical for an implementer to follow a strategy according to which he will chose to implement various IODEF classes. It is also important to know what the most common classes that will be used to describe common security incident or indicators. Thus, this section will describe the most important classes and factors an IODEF implementer should take into consideration before designing the implementation or tool.
3.1. Recommended classes to implement

This section explains the mandatory to implement IODEF classes that are required more than once and also are useful. The mandatory top level class is the IODEF-Document class. One or more Incident class that represents the incident information need to be arranged under the IODEF-Document class. IncidentID, ReportTime, Assessment, and Contact under Incident class are mandatory classes. EventData, Record, Assessment, ReportTime, DetectTime, StartTime, ReportTime Description, Discovery

[TODO: More to be added...]

3.2. Decide what IODEF will be used for

This section describes that there is no need to implement all fields of IODEF, the ones that are necessary for your use-cases. The implementer should look into the schema and decide classes to implement (or not) Also it explains that other external schemata might be needed to describe incidents or indicators, based on SCI draft extensions.

[TODO: More to be added...]

4. IODEF considerations and how to address them

4.1. Unnecessary Fields

This section talks about fields that do not always play in important role like Assessment, Impact

[TODO: More to be added...]

4.2. External References

The IODEF format has the Reference class that refers to external information such as a vulnerability, Intrusion Detection System (IDS) alert, malware sample, advisory, or attack technique. However, due to insufficiency of the capability of the Reference class itself to describe external enumeration specifications, the Enumeration Reference Format needs to be used with. The Enumeration Reference Format[RFC7495] specifies a format to include enumeration values from external data representations into IODEF, and manages references to external representations using IANA registry.

[TODO: More to be added...]
4.3. Extensions

The IODEF data model ([RFC5070]) is extensible. Many class attributes and their values can be extended using the "ext-*" prefix. Additional classes can also be defined by using the AdditionalData and RecordItem classes. An extension to the AdditionalData class for reporting Phishing emails is defined in [RFC5901].

Additionally, IODEF can import existing schemata by using an extension framework defined in [RFC7203]. The framework enables IODEF users to embed XML data inside an IODEF document using external schemata or structures defined by external specifications. Examples include CVE, CVRF and OVAL. Thus, [RFC7203] enhances the IODEF capabilities without further extending the data model.

IODEF implementers should consider using their own IODEF extensions only for data that cannot be described using existing standards or importing them in and IODEF document using [RFC7203] is not a suitable option.

4.4. Predicate logic

IODEF [I-D.ietf-mile-rfc5070-bis] allows for nesting of incident information. For example, a EventData Class could include multiple Flows or Records. In turn, a Flow could consist of many Nodes and a Record of many RecordData classes. To ensure consistency, IODEF presumes certain predicate logic.

An EventData class that contains multiple EventData classes depicts an Event that consists of smaller events. For the parent event to take place, all the children EventData events SHOULD take place.

An EventData class with multiple Flows means that all the information defined in the flows need to exist for the event described to take place. For Records, the Records in an event just add more context to the event, they do not all need to be present for the event to take place. A Record in an EventData class with three RecordData in it, means that either of these RecordData classes needs to be present for the event described to take place.

In [RFC5070], if a Flow Class contained two System classes that have "source" and "target" as the category attributes, both Systems SHOULD be present in order for the Flow to be true and thus marked as an event. There SHOULD NOT be more than one "source" or "watchlist-source" and one "target" or "watchlist-target" Systems per Flow.
In Node class, Node information grouped together under a System class depicts different representations of the same System. For example, if a System consists of different Nodes with an IPv4 address, a domain-name and an IPv6 address, they all represent the same system. Of course, different representations could also be grouped under the same Node class.

[I-D.ietf-mile-rfc5070-bis] defined the HashData Class that describes a file's hash information as also described in [RFC5901]. Similar to the Node, if a HashData class consists of many digital signatures, the signatures represent alternative hash algorithms for the same signature. For example, if the HashData type is file-hash, then the signatures represent MD5, SHA1, SHA2 etc hashes.

For grouped Key classes the logic changes. Multiple Key classes in a WindowsRegistryKeysModified class represent necessary Windows Registry Keys that constitute an indicator. All SHOULD be present in order for the indicator to be present. Multiple WindowsRegistryKeysModified classes grouped under the same RecordData class represent alternatives for the same indicator. For example, if a RecordData class included two WindowsRegistryKeysModified classes, if either of the classes was true the RecordData class would be true.

4.5. Predicate Logic for watchlist of indicators

Multiple indicators occasionally need to be combined in an IODEF document. For example, a botnet might have multiple command and control servers. A consistent predicate logic for indicators SHOULD be followed in order to present such relationships in IODEF.

[I-D.ietf-mile-rfc5070-bis] defines two new category attributes in the System Class that can enhance the IODEF predicate logic functionality. These are watchlist-source and watchlist-target and they serve for watchlist indicator groupings. A watchlist of Systems means that the information is ORed with the information in the Flow section. In other words, if a Flow Class consists of multiple Systems with watchlist-source or watchlist-target attributes the Systems of the same watchlist type are ORed in the Flow Class. Multiple Flows in the EventData Class follow AND logic. There SHOULD NOT be more than one "watchlist-source" and one "watchlist-target" Systems per Flow. In the following example the EventData class will evaluates as a Flow of one System with source address being (10.10.10.104 OR 10.10.10.106) AND target address 10.1.1.1
<iodef:EventData>
  <iodef:Flow>
    <iodef:System category="watchlist-source" spoofed="no">
      <iodef:Node>
        <iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">
          10.10.10.104
        </iodef:Address>
      </iodef:Node>
      <iodef:Node>
        <iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">
          10.10.10.106
        </iodef:Address>
      </iodef:Node>
    </iodef:System>
    <iodef:System category="target">
      <iodef:Node>
        <iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">
          10.1.1.1
        </iodef:Address>
      </iodef:Node>
      <iodef:Node>
        <iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">
          10.1.1.2
        </iodef:Address>
      </iodef:Node>
    </iodef:System>
  </iodef:Flow>
</iodef:EventData>

Similarly, the HashData Class includes a type attribute that introduces watchlist groupings (i.e. PKI_email_ds_watchlist, PGP_email_ds_watchlist, file_hash_watchlist, email_hash_watchlist). Two HashData classes that contain a watchlist type attribute follow OR logic in a RecordData class. In the following example the RecordData class consists of either of the two files with two different hashes.
Similarly, [I-D.ietf-mile-rfc5070-bis] introduces the WindowsRegistryKeyModified Class which consists of Key Classes. Key has an optional type attribute which has watchlist as an option in order to include the ability to group Keys. Multiple Keys of the same watchlist of indicators SHOULD be grouped in the same WindowsRegistryKeysModified Class. These Keys follow OR logic.

### 4.6. Indicator identifiers

[I-D.ietf-mile-rfc5070-bis] defines attributes indicator-set-id and indicator-uid. These are data elements that are commonly used as indicators. They are used in multiple IODEF classes. Their purpose is to be able to define indicator relationships and reference respectively. The indicator-uid is used as a unique indicator identifier. Practitioners MAY use them to establish that a class represents an indicator that is different than other IODEF contextual information.

On the other hand, an IODEF report could contain multiple indicators that are part of the same or different indicator group. For example, an IP source address, a target address, that constitute a Flow and a
RecordData class respectively could be representing indicators of a virous and the traffic it generates. In such a situation, the indicator-set-id for all the classes (Address, RecordData) MUST be the same. Unrelated indicators MUST contain different indicator-set-id attributes or no indicator-set-id attributes.

Similarly,

4.7. Restrictions in IODEF

This section describes how Restriction can pose challenges

[TODO: More to be added...]

5. Current uses of IODEF

IODEF is currently used by various organizations in order to represent security incidents and share incident and threat information between security operations organizations.

5.1. Inter-vendor and Service Provider Exercise

Various vendors organized and executed an exercise where multiple threat indicators were exchanged using IODEF. The transport protocol used was RID. The threat information shared included incidents like DDoS attacks, Malware, and Spear-Phishing. As this was a proof-of-concept (PoC) exercise only example information (no real threats) were shared as part of the exchanges.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vendor X RID Agent</th>
<th>Internet</th>
<th>Vendor Y RID Agent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RID Report message ---</td>
<td>over TLS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>carrying IODEF example -&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt;----- RID Ack message ----</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---- in case of failure ----</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PoC peering topology

The figure above shows how RID interactions took place during the PoC. Participating organizations were running RID Agent software on-premises. The RID Agents formed peering relationships with other participating organizations. When Entity X had a new incident to
exchange it would package it in IODEF and send it to Entity Y over TLS in a RID Report message. In case there was an issue with the message, Entity Y would send an RID Acknowledgement message back to Entity X which included an application level message to describe the issue. Interoperability between RID agents and the standards, [RFC6545] and [RFC6546], was also proven in this exercise. Appendix A includes some of the incident IODEF example information that was exchanged by the organizations’ RID Agents as part of this proof-of-concept.

The first use-case included sharing of Malware Data Related to an Incident between CSIRTs. After Entity X detected an incident, she would put data about malware found during the incident in a backend system. Entity X then decided to share the incident information with Entity Y about the malware discovered. This could be a human decision or part of an automated process.

Below are the steps followed for the malware information exchange that was taking place:

1. Entity X has a sharing agreement with Entity Y, and has already been configured with the IP address of Entity Y’s RID Agent

2. Entity X’s RID Agent connects to Entity Y’s RID Agent, and mutual authentication occurs using PKI certificates.

3. Entity X pushes out a RID Report message which contains information about N pieces of discovered malware. IODEF is used in RID to describe the
   
   a) Hash of malware files
   
   b) Registry settings changed by the malware
   
   c) C&C Information for the malware

4. Entity Y receives RID Report message, sends RID Acknowledgement message

5. Entity Y stores the data in a format that makes it possible for the back end to know which source the data came from.

Another use-case was sharing Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) as presented below information: Entity X, a Critical Infrastructure and Key Resource (CIKR) company detects that their internet connection is saturated with an abnormal amount of traffic. Further investigation determines that this is an actual DDoS attack. Entity X’s computer incident response team (CIRT) contacts their ISP and shares
information with them about the attack traffic characteristics. In addition, Entity X has an information sharing relationship with Entity Y. It shares information with Entity Y on characteristics of the attack to watch for. Entity X’s ISP is being overwhelmed by the amount of traffic, so it shares attack signatures and IP addresses of the most prolific hosts with its adjacent ISPs.

Below are the steps followed for a DDoS information exchange:

1. Entity X has a sharing agreement with Entity Y, and has already been configured with the IP address of Entity Y’s RID Agent
2. Entity X’s RID Agent connects to Entity Y’s RID Agent, and mutual authentication occurs using PKI certificates.
3. Entity X pushes out a RID Report message which contains information about the DDoS attack. IODEF is used in RID to describe the
   a. Start and Detect dates and times
   b. IP Addresses of nodes sending DDoS Traffic
   c. Sharing and Use Restrictions
   d. Traffic characteristics (protocols and ports)
   e. HTTP User-Agents used
   f. IP Addresses of C&C for a botnet
4. Entity Y receives RID Report message, sends RID Acknowledgement message
5. Entity Y stores the data in a format that makes it possible for the back end to know which source the data came from.

One more use-case was sharing spear-phishing email information as explained in the following scenario: The board members of several defense contractors receive an email inviting them to attend a conference in San Francisco. The board members are asked to provide their personally identifiable information such as their home address, phone number, corporate email, etc in an attached document which came with the email. The board members were also asked to click on a URL which would allow them to reach the sign up page for the conference. One of the recipients believes the email to be a phishing attempt and forwards the email to their corporate CSIRT for analysis. The CSIRT
identifies the email as an attempted spear phishing incident and distributes the indicators to their sharing partners.

Below are the steps followed for a spear-phishing information exchange between CSIRTs that was part of this PoC.

(1) Entity X has a sharing agreement with Entity Y, and has already been configured with the IP address of Entity Y’s RID Agent

(2) Entity X’s RID Agent connects to Entity Y’s RID Agent, and mutual authentication occurs using PKI certificates.

(3) Entity X pushes out a RID Report message which contains information about the spear-phishing email. IODEF is used in RID to describe the

   (a) Attachment details (file Name, hash, size, malware family

   (b) Target description (IP, domain, NSLookup)

   (c) Email information (From, Subject, header information, date/time, digital signature)

   (d) Confidence Score

(4) Entity Y receives RID Report message, sends RID Acknowledgement message

(5) Entity Y stores the data in a format that makes it possible for the back end to know which source the data came from.

5.2. Implementations

   [ TODO: Mention and quickly describe [I-D.ietf-mile-implementreport] ... ]

5.3. Other

IODEF is also used in various projects and products to consume and share security information. Various vendor incident reporting products have the ability to consume and export in IODEF format [implementations]. Perl and Python modules (XML::IODEF, Iodef::Pb, iodeflib) exist in order to parse IODEF documents and their extensions. Additionally, some worldwide CERT organizations are already able to use receive incident information in IODEF.

Future use-cases of IODEF could be:
(1) ISP notifying a national CERT or organization when it identifies and acts upon an incident and CERTs notifying ISPs when they are aware of incidents.

(2) Suspected phishing emails could be shared amongst organizations and national agencies. Automation could validate web content that the suspicious emails are pointing to. Identified malicious content linked in a phishing email could then be shared using IODEF. Phishing campaigns could thus be subverted much faster by automating information sharing using IODEF.

(3) When finding a certificate that should be revoked, a thrid-party would forward an automated IODEF message to the CA with the full context of the certificate and the CA could act accordingly after checking its validity. Alternatively, in the event of a compromise of the private key of a certificate, a third-party could alert the certificate owner about the compromise using IODEF.

6. Security Considerations

7. Updates

version -04 updates:

(1) Expanded on the Extensions section using Take’s suggestion.

(2) Moved Future use-cases under the Other section.

(3) CIF and APWG were consolidated in one "Implementation" section

(4) Added abstract of RFC7495 to the "External References" section

(5) Added Kathleen’s example of malware delivery URL to "Appendix"

(6) Added a little description to "Recommended classes to implement" section

version -03 updates:

(1) Added "Updates" section.

(2) Added details about the flow of information exchanges in "Inter-vendor and Service Provider Exercise" section. Also updated the usecases with more background information.

(3) Added future use-cases in the "Collective Intelligence Framework" section
(4) Updated Perl and Python references with the actual module names. Added IODEF implementation reference "implementations".

(5) Added Predicate logic section

(6) Updated Logic of watchlist of indicators section to simplify the logic and include examples.

(7) Renamed Externally defined indicators section to Indicator reference and elaborated on the use of indicator-uid and indicator-set-uid attribute use.

version -02 updates:

(1) Updated the "Logic for watchlist of indications" section to clarify the logic based on community feedback.

(2) Added "Inter-vendor and Service Provider Exercise" section.

(3) Added Appendix to include actual use-case IODEF examples.

8. Acknowledgements

9. Security Considerations

10. References

10.1. Normative References


10.2. Informative References


[I-D.ietf-mile-implementreport]
Inacio, C. and d. daisu-mi@nc.u-tokyo.ac.jp, "MILE Implementation Report", draft-ietf-mile-implementreport-06 (work in progress), October 2015.

[I-D.ietf-mile-rfc5070-bis]

[implementations]

Appendix A. Inter-vendor and Service Provider Exercise Examples

Below some of the incident IODEF example information that was exchanged by the vendors as part of this proof-of-concept Inter-vendor and Service Provider Exercise.

A.1. Malware

In this test, malware information was exchanged using RID and IODEF. The information included file hashes, registry setting changes and the C&C servers the malware uses.
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
 xmlns:iodef="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.41">

<iodef:Incident purpose="reporting">
  <iodef:ReportID name="EXAMPLE CSIRT">189234</iodef:ReportID>
  <iodef:Description>
    Malware and related indicators identified
  </iodef:Description>
  <iodef:Assessment occurrence="potential">
    <iodef:Impact severity="medium" type="info-leak">
      Malware with Command and Control Server and System Changes
    </iodef:Impact>
  </iodef:Assessment>
  <iodef:Contact role="creator" type="organization">
    <iodef:ContactName>EXAMPLE CSIRT</iodef:ContactName>
    <iodef:Email>emccirt@emc.com</iodef:Email>
  </iodef:Contact>
  <iodef:EventData>
    <iodef:Method>
      <iodef:ReferenceName>Zeus</iodef:ReferenceName>
    </iodef:Reference>
  </iodef:EventData>
  <iodef:Flow>
    <iodef:System category="watchlist-source">
      <iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">192.168.2.200</iodef:Address>
      <iodef:Address category="site-uri">http://zeus.55667889900.com/log-bin/lunch_install.php?aff_id=1&amp;amp;amp;amp;maddr=&amp;amp;amp;maddr=action=install</iodef:Address>
      <iodef:NodeRole attacktype="c2-server"/>
    </iodef:Node>
  </iodef:Flow>
</iodef:Incident>
</iodef:IODEF-Document>
<iodef:ReferenceName>Cridex</iodef:ReferenceName>
<iodef:URL>
  md5=c3c528c939f9b176c883ae0ce5df0001
</iodef:URL>
</iodef:Reference>
</iodef:Method>
<iodef:Flow>
<iodef:System category="watchlist-source">
  <iodef:Node>
    <iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">
      10.10.199.100
    </iodef:Address>
    <iodef:NodeRole attacktype="c2-server"/>
  </iodef:Node>
  <iodef:Service ip_protocol="6">
    <iodef:Port>8080</iodef:Port>
  </iodef:Service>
</iodef:System>
</iodef:Flow>
<iodef:Record>
<iodef:RecordData>
<iodef:HashData>
  <ds:Reference>
    <ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha1"/>
    <ds:DigestValue>
      MHg3MjYzRkUwRDNBMDk1RDUSQzhFMEM4OTBOUM
      1ODVFMzQzRTcxNDFD
    </ds:DigestValue>
  </ds:Reference>
</iodef:HashData>
</iodef:RecordData>
<iodef:HashData>
  <ds:Reference>
    <ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#md5"/>
    <ds:DigestValue>
      MHg0MONEODUwRkNEQURFDmMzMEE1
      QkVBNkYxNkVFOTcxQw==
    </ds:DigestValue>
  </ds:Reference>
</iodef:HashData>
<iodef:HashData>
  <ds:Reference>
    <ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#md5"/>
    <ds:DigestValue>
      MHg0MONEODUwRkNEQURFDmMzMEE1
      1QkVBNkYxNkVFOTcxQw==
    </ds:DigestValue>
  </ds:Reference>
</iodef:HashData>
<iodef:HashData>
  <ds:Reference>
    <ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha1"/>
  </ds:Reference>
</iodef:HashData>
<iodf:DigestValue>MHg3MjYzRkUwRDNBMDk1RDU5QzhFM4OTVBOMlQDFzQzRTcxNDFD</iodf:DigestValue>
</ds:Reference>

</iodf:HashData>

<iodf:WindowsRegistryKeysModified>
  <iodf:Key registryaction="add_value">
    <iodf:KeyName>
      HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\KB00121600.exe
    </iodf:KeyName>
    <iodf:Value>
      \%\%AppData\%KB00121600.exe\%\%
    </iodf:Value>
  </iodf:Key>
</iodf:WindowsRegistryKeysModified>
</iodf:RecordData>
</iodf:Record>
</iodf:EventData>

<iodf:EventData>
  <iodf:Expectation action="other"/>
  <iodf:Flow>
    <iodf:System category="source"
      indicator-set-id="91011">
      <iodf:Node>
        <iodf:Address category="url"
          indicator-uid="qrst">
          http://foo.com:12345/evil/cc.php
        </iodf:Address>
        <iodf:NodeName indicator-uid="rstu">
          evil.com
        </iodf:NodeName>
        <iodf:Address category="ipv4-addr"
          indicator-uid="stuv">
          1.2.3.4</iodf:Address>
        <iodf:Address category="ipv4-addr"
          indicator-uid="tuvw">
          5.6.7.8</iodf:Address>
        <iodf:Address category="ipv6-addr"
          indicator-uid="uvwx">
          2001:dead:beef::<iodf:Address>
        </iodf:Address>
        <iodf:NodeRole category="c2-server"/>
      </iodf:Node>
    </iodf:System>
  </iodf:Flow>
</iodf:Record>

<iodf:RecordData indicator-set-id="91011">
  <iodf:HashData>
    <ds:Reference>
      SUZUKI & KAMPANAKIS Expires April 21, 2016 [Page 19]
<ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha256"/>
<ds:DigestValue>141accec23e7e5157de60853cb1e01bc38042d08f9086040815300b7fe75c184</ds:DigestValue>
</ds:Reference>
</iodef:HashData>
<iodef:WindowsRegistryKeysModified indicator-set-id="91011">
<iodef:Key registryaction="add_key" indicator-uid="vwxy">
<iodef:KeyName>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Net CLR</iodef:KeyName>
</iodef:Key>
<iodef:Key registryaction="add_key" indicator-uid="wxyz">
<iodef:KeyName>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Net CLR\Parameters</iodef:KeyName>
<iodef:Value>%AppData%\KB00121600.exe\"</iodef:Value>
</iodef:Key>
<iodef:Key registryaction="add_value" indicator-uid="xyza">
<iodef:KeyName>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Net CLR\Parameters\ServiceDll</iodef:KeyName>
<iodef:Value>C:\bad.exe</iodef:Value>
</iodef:Key>
<iodef:Key registryaction="modify_value" indicator-uid="zabc">
<iodef:KeyName>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Net CLR\Parameters\Bar</iodef:KeyName>
<iodef:Value>Baz</iodef:Value>
</iodef:Key>
</iodef:WindowsRegistryKeysModified>
</iodef:RecordData>
</iodef:Record>
</iodef:EventData>
A.2. Malware Delivery URL

[TODO: fix indicator_uid attribute to Indicator class]

This example indicates malware and related URL for file delivery.

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE IODEF-Document SYSTEM "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0">
<IODEF-Document version="1.00" lang="en">
  <iodef:Incident purpose="reporting">
    <iodef:IncidentID name="csirt.example.com" indicator_uid="xxxxx">189801</iodef:IncidentID>
    <iodef:ReportTime>2012-12-05T12:20:00+00:00</iodef:ReportTime>
    <iodef:Description>Malware and related indicators</iodef:Description>
    <iodef:Assessment occurrence="potential">
      <iodef:Impact severity="medium" type="info-leak">Malware with C&amp;amp;C</iodef:Impact>
    </iodef:Assessment>
    <iodef:Contact role="creator" type="organization">
      <iodef:ContactName>example.com CSIRT</iodef:ContactName>
      <iodef:Email>contact@csirt.example.com</iodef:Email>
    </iodef:Contact>
    <iodef:EventData>
      <iodef:Flow>
        <iodef:System category="source">
        </iodef:System>
      </iodef:Flow>
    </iodef:EventData>
  </iodef:Incident>
</IODEF-Document>

A.3. DDoS

The DDoS test exchanged information that described a DDoS including protocols and ports, bad IP addresses and HTTP User-Agent fields.
The IODEF version used for the data representation was based on [I-D.ietf-mile-rfc5070-bis]

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<IODEF-Document version="1.00" lang="en"
 xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.41"
 xmlns:iodef="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.41"
 xmlns:iodef-sci="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-sci-1.0"
 xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
 xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
 <iodef:Incident purpose="reporting" restriction="default">
  <iodef:IncidentID name="csirt.example.com">
   189701
  </iodef:IncidentID>
  <iodef:StartTime>2013-02-05T00:34:45+00:00</iodef:StartTime>
  <iodef:DetectTime>2013-02-05T01:15:45+00:00</iodef:DetectTime>
  <iodef:ReportTime>2013-02-05T01:34:45+00:00</iodef:ReportTime>
  <iodef:description>DDoS Traffic Seen</iodef:description>
  <iodef:Assessment occurrence="actual">
   <iodef:Impact severity="medium" type="dos">
    DDoS Traffic
   </iodef:Impact>
   <iodef:Confidence rating="numeric">90</iodef:Confidence>
  </iodef:Assessment>
  <iodef:Contact role="creator" type="organization">
   <iodef:ContactName>Dummy Test</iodef:ContactName>
   <iodef:Email>contact@dummytest.com</iodef:Email>
  </iodef:Contact>
  <iodef:EventData>
   <iodef:Description>Dummy Test sharing with ISP1</iodef:Description>
   <iodef:Expectation action="other"/>
   <iodef:Method>
    <iodef:Reference>
     <iodef:ReferenceName>
      Low Orbit Ion Cannon User Agent
     </iodef:ReferenceName>
     <iodef:URL>
     </iodef:URL>
     <iodef:URL>
      http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Low_Orbit_Ion_Cannon
     </iodef:URL>
    </iodef:Reference>
   </iodef:Method>
   <iodef:Flow>
<iodef:System category="watchlist-source" spoofed="no">
  <iodef:Node>
    <iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">
      10.10.10.104
    </iodef:Address>
  </iodef:Node>
  <iodef:Node>
    <iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">
      10.10.10.106
    </iodef:Address>
  </iodef:Node>
  <iodef:Node>
    <iodef:Address category="ipv4-net">
      172.16.66.0/24
    </iodef:Address>
  </iodef:Node>
  <iodef:Node>
    <iodef:Address category="ipv6-addr">
      2001:db8:dead:beef::
    </iodef:Address>
  </iodef:Node>
  <iodef:Service ip_protocol="6">
    <iodef:Port>1337</iodef:Port>
    <iodef:Application user-agent="Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; Intel Mac OS X 10.5; en-US; rv:1.9.2.12) Gecko/20100106 Firefox/3.6.12">
    </iodef:Application>
  </iodef:Service>
</iodef:System>

<iodef:System category="target">
  <iodef:Node>
    <iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">
      10.1.1.1
    </iodef:Address>
  </iodef:Node>
  <iodef:Service ip_protocol="6">
    <iodef:Port>80</iodef:Port>
  </iodef:Service>
</iodef:System>

<iodef:Description>
  Information provided in Flow class instance is from Inspection of traffic from network tap
</iodef:Description>
</iodef:Flow>
</iodef:EventData>
</iodef:Incident>
</IODEF-Document>

A.4. Spear-Phishing

The Spear-Phishing test exchanged information that described a Spear-Phishing email including DNS records and addresses about the sender, malicious attached file information and email data. The IODEF
version used for the data representation was based on [I-D.ietf-mile-rfc5070-bis].

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<IODEF-Document version="1.00" lang="en"
 xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.41"
 xmlns:iodef="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.41"
 xmlns:iodef-sci="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-sci-1.0"
 xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
 xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
 <iodef:Incident purpose="reporting">
   <iodef:IncidentID name="csirt.example.com">
     189601
   </iodef:IncidentID>
   <iodef:StartTime>2013-01-04T08:01:34+00:00</iodef:StartTime>
   <iodef:StopTime>2013-01-04T08:31:27+00:00</iodef:StopTime>
   <iodef:DetectTime>2013-01-04T08:06:12+00:00</iodef:DetectTime>
   <iodef:ReportTime>2013-01-04T09:15:45+00:00</iodef:ReportTime>
   <iodef:description>
     Zeus Spear Phishing E-mail with Malware Attachment
   </iodef:description>
   <iodef:Assessment occurrence="potential">
     <iodef:Impact severity="medium" type="info-leak">
       Malware with Command and Control Server and System Changes
     </iodef:Impact>
   </iodef:Assessment>
   <iodef:Contact role="creator" type="organization">
     <iodef:ContactName>example.com CSIRT</iodef:ContactName>
     <iodef:Email>contact@csirt.example.com</iodef:Email>
   </iodef:Contact>
   <iodef:EventData>
     <iodef:Description>Targeting Defense Contractors, specifically board members attending Dummy Con</iodef:Description>
     <iodef:Expectation action="other"/>
   </iodef:EventData>
   <iodef:Method>
     <iodef:Reference indicator_uid="1234">
       <iodef:ReferenceName>Zeus</iodef:ReferenceName>
     </iodef:Reference>
   </iodef:Method>
   <iodef:Flow>
     <iodef:System category="source">
       <iodef:Node>
         <iodef:Address category="url">
           http://www.zeusevil.com
         </iodef:Address>
         <iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">
           10.10.10.166
         </iodef:Address>
       </iodef:Node>
     </iodef:System category="source">
   </iodef:Flow>
 </iodef:Incident>
</IODEF-Document>
<iodef:Address category="as">
  225</iodef:Address>
<iodef:Address category="ext-value"
  ext-category="as-name">
  EXAMPLE-AS - University of Example
</iodef:Address>
<iodef:Address category="ext-value"
  ext-category="as-prefix">
  172.16.0.0/16
</iodef:Address>
<iodef:NodeRole category="www"
  attacktype="malware-distribution"/>
</iodef:Node>
</iodef:System>
</iodef:Flow>
</iodef:Flow>
<iodef:Flow>
<iodef:System category="source">
<iodef:Node>
<iodef:NodeName>mail1.evildave.com</iodef:NodeName>
<iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">
  172.16.55.6</iodef:Address>
<iodef:Address category="asn">
  225</iodef:Address>
<iodef:Address category="ext-value"
  ext-category="as-name">
  EXAMPLE-AS - University of Example
</iodef:Address>
<iodef:DomainData>
<iodef:Name>evildaveexample.com</iodef:Name>
<iodef:DateDomainWasChecked>2013-01-04T09:10:24+00:00</iodef:DateDomainWasChecked>
<iodef:RelatedDNS RecordType="MX">
  evildaveexample.com MX preference = 10, mail exchanger
  = mail1.evildave.com
</iodef:RelatedDNS>
<iodef:RelatedDNS RecordType="A">
  mail1.evildaveexample.com
  internet address = 172.16.55.6
</iodef:RelatedDNS>
<iodef:RelatedDNS RecordType="SPF">
  zuesevil.com. IN TXT "v=spf1 a mx -all"
</iodef:RelatedDNS>
</iodef:DomainData>
<iodef:NodeRole category="mail"
  attacktype="spear-phishing"/>
</iodef:Node>
<iodef:Service>
<iodef:EmailInfo>
<iodef:Email>emaildave@evildaveexample.com</iodef:Email>
</iodef:Email>
</iodef:Service>
"http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha256"
<ds:DigestValue>
  352bddec13e4e5257ee63854cb1f05de48043d09f9
  076070845307b7ce76c185
</ds:DigestValue>
</ds:Reference>
</ds:SignedInfo>
</ds:Signature>
</iodef:RecordData>
</iodef:Record>
</iodef:EventData>
</iodef:Incident>
</IODEF-Document>

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Abstract

The Incident Object Description Exchange Format (IODEF) defines a data representation for security incident reports and cyber indicators commonly exchanged by operational security teams for mitigation and watch and warning. This document describes the information model for the IODEF and provides an associated data model specified with XML Schema.

Status of This Memo

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1. Introduction

Organizations require help from other parties to mitigate malicious activity targeting their network and to gain insight into potential threats. This coordination might entail working with an ISP to filter attack traffic, contacting a remote site to take down a botnet, or sharing watch-lists of known malicious indicators in a consortium.
The Incident Object Description Exchange Format (IODEF) is a format for representing computer security information commonly exchanged between Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs). It provides an XML representation for conveying:

- cyber intelligence to characterize threats;
- cyber incident reports to document particular cyber security events or relationships between events;
- cyber event mitigation activity to proactively and reactively mitigate activity; and
- meta-data so that these various classes of information can be exchanged among parties.

The purpose of the IODEF is to enhance the operational capabilities of CSIRTs. Adoption of the IODEF will improve the ability of a CSIRT to resolve security incidents; understand cyber threats; and coordinate response activities and proactive mitigations by simplifying collaboration and data sharing with its partners. This structured format provided by the IODEF allows for:

- machine-to-machine exchange of incident and cyber intelligence data;
- automated processing of this data whereby allowing more rapid execution of appropriate courses of action; and
- the development of an ecosystem of interoperable tools enabling security operations.

Sharing and coordinating with other organizations is not strictly a technical problem. There are numerous procedural, cultural, legal and trust-related barriers to overcome. The IODEF does not attempt to address them directly. However, operational implementations of the IODEF will need to consider these challenges.

Section 1 provides the background for the IODEF. Sections 3 and 8 specify the IODEF information and data model respectively. The data types used in this document are described in Section 2. Processing considerations, extending the specification, internationalization and security issues are covered in Sections 4, 5, 6 and 9 respectively. Examples are listed in Section 7.
1.1. Terminology

The key words "MUST," "MUST NOT," "REQUIRED," "SHALL," "SHALL NOT," "SHOULD," "SHOULD NOT," "RECOMMENDED," "MAY," and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

1.2. Notations

The IODEF is specified as an Extensible Markup Language (XML) [W3C.XML] Schema [W3C.SCHEMA]. The normative IODEF data model is found in the XML schema in Section 8. To aid in the understanding of the data elements, Section 3 also depicts the underlying information model using Unified Modeling Language (UML). This abstract presentation of the IODEF is not normative.

For clarity in this document, the term "XML document" will be used when referring generically to any instance of an XML document. The term "IODEF document" will be used to refer to an XML document conforming to the IODEF specification. The terms "schema" will be used to refer to Section 8 of this document. The terms "data model" and "schema" will be used interchangeably. The terms "class" and "element" will be used to reference either the corresponding data element in the UML-based information or XML Schema-based data models, respectively.

1.3. About the IODEF Data Model

A number of considerations were made in the design of the IODEF data model.

- The data model found in this document is an evolution of the one previously specified in [RFC5070]. New fields were added to represent additional information. [RFC5070] was developed primarily to represent incident reports. This document builds upon it by adding support for cyber indicators and revising it to reflect the current challenges faced by CSIRTs. An attempt was made to preserve backward compatibility but this was not possible in all cases. See Section 4.4.

- The IODEF is a transport format. Therefore, the data model may not be the optimal archival or in-memory processing format.

- The IODEF is intended to be a framework to convey only commonly exchanged information. It ensures that there are mechanisms for extensibility to support organization-specific information and techniques to reference information kept outside of the data model.
Not all commonly exchanged information has a well-defined format or taxonomy. The IODEF attempts to strike a balance between enforcing sufficient structure to allow automated processing and supporting free-form content that enables maximum flexibility.

The IODEF fits into a broader ecosystem of standards and conventions. An attempt was made to harmonize the data model with this context.

2. IODEF Data Types

The IODEF uses a number of simple and complex types. This section describes these data types.

2.1. Integers

An integer is represented in the information model by the INTEGER data type. Integer data MUST be encoded in Base 10.

The INTEGER data type is implemented in the data model as a "xs:integer" type per Section 3.3.13 of [W3C.SCHEMA.DTYPES].

2.2. Real Numbers

A real (floating-point) number is represented in the information model by the REAL data type. Real data MUST be encoded in Base 10.

The REAL data type is implemented in the data model as a "xs:float" type per Section 3.2.4 of [W3C.SCHEMA.DTYPES].

2.3. Characters and Strings

A single character is represented in the information model by the CHARACTER data type. A string is represented by the STRING data type. Special characters MUST be encoded using entity references. See Section 4.1.

The CHARACTER and STRING data types are implemented in the data model as a "xs:string" type per Section 3.2.1 of [W3C.SCHEMA.DTYPES].

2.4. Multilingual Strings

A string that needs to be represented in a human-readable language different than the default encoding of the document is represented in the information model by the ML_STRING data type.
The ML_STRING data type is implemented in the data model as the "iodef:MLStringType" type. This type extends the "xs:string" to include two attributes.

```
+------------------------+
| iodef:MLStringType     |
|                        |
| xs:string              |
|                        |
| ENUM xml:lang          |
| STRING translation-id  |
+------------------------+
```

Figure 1: The iodef:MLStringType Type

The content of the class is a character string of type "xs:string" whose language MAY be specified by the xml:lang attribute.

The attributes of the iodef:MLStringType type are:

**xml:lang**
Optional. ENUM. A language identifier per Section 2.12 of [W3C.XML] whose values and format are described in [RFC5646]. The interpretation of this code is described in Section 6.

**translation-id**
Optional. STRING. An identifier to relate other instances of this class with the same parent as translations of this text. The scope of this identifier is limited to all of the direct, peer child classes of a given parent class.

Using this class enables representing translations of the same text in multiple languages. Each translation is a distinct instance of this class with a common parent. A group of classes each with a translated instance of text is related by setting a common identifier in the translation-id attribute. The language of a given class is set by the xml:lang attribute. See Section 6 for more details on representing translations of free-form text.

### 2.5. Binary Strings

Binary octets can be represented with two encodings.

#### 2.5.1. Base64 Bytes

A binary octet encoded with Base64 is represented in the information model by the BYTE data type. A sequence of these octets is of the BYTE[] data type.
The BYTE and BYTE[] data types are implemented in the data model as a "xs:base64Binary" type per Section 3.2.16 of [W3C.SCHEMA.DTYPES].

2.5.2. Hexadecimal Bytes

A binary octet encoded as a character tuple consistent of two hexadecimal digits is represented in the information model by the HEXBIN data type. A sequence of these octets is of the HEXBIN[] data type. The HEXBIN and HEXBIN[] data types are implemented in the data model as a "xs:hexBinary" type per Section 3.2.15 of [W3C.SCHEMA.DTYPES].

2.6. Enumerated Types

An enumerated type is represented in the information model by the ENUM data type. It is an ordered list of acceptable string values. Each value has a representative keyword. Within the data model, the enumerated type keywords are used as attribute values.

The ENUM data type is implemented in the data model as values of a "xs:NMTOKEN" type per Section 3.3.4 of [W3C.SCHEMA.DTYPES].

2.7. Date-Time String

A date-time string that describes a particular instant in time is represented in the information model by the DATETIME data type. Ranges are not supported.

The DATETIME data type is implemented in the data model as a "xs:dateTime" type per Section 3.2.7 of [W3C.SCHEMA.DTYPES].

2.8. Timezone String

A timezone offset from UTC is represented in the information model by the TIMEZONE data type. It is formatted according to the following regular expression: "Z|([-+\-]0[0-9]|1[0-4]):[0-5][0-9]".

The TIMEZONE data type is implemented in the data model as an "iodef:TimezoneType" type.

2.9. Port Lists

A list of network ports is represented in the information model by the PORTLIST data type. A PORTLIST consists of a comma-separated list of numbers and ranges (N-M means ports N through M, inclusive). It is formatted according to the following regular expression:
"\d+(\-\d+)?,\d+(\-\d+)?". For example, "2,5-15,30,32,40-50,55-60".

The PORTLIST data type is implemented in the data model as an "iodef:PortlistType" type.

2.10. Postal Address

A postal address is represented in the information model by the POSTAL data type. The format of the POSTAL data type is documented in Section 2.23 of [RFC4519] as a free-form multi-line string separated by the "$" character.

The POSTAL data type is implemented in the data model as an "iodef:MLStringType" type.

2.11. Telephone Number

A telephone number is represented in the information model by the PHONE data type. The format of the PHONE data type is documented in Section 2.35 of [RFC4519].

The PHONE data type is implemented in the data model as a "xs:string" type per Section 3.2.1 of [W3C.SCHEMA.DTYPES].

2.12. Email String

An email address is represented in the information model by the EMAIL data type. The format of the EMAIL data type is documented in Section 3.4.1 [RFC5322].

The EMAIL data type is implemented in the data model as a "xs:string" type per Section 3.2.1 of [W3C.SCHEMA.DTYPES].

2.13. Uniform Resource Locator strings

A uniform resource locator (URL) is represented in the information model by the URL data type. The format of the URL data type is documented in [RFC3986].

The URL data type is implemented as a "xs:anyURI" type per Section 3.2.17 of [W3C.SCHEMA.DTYPES].

2.14. Identifiers and Identifier References

An identifier unique to the IODEF document is represented in the information model by the ID data type. A reference to this identifier is represented by the IDREF data type.
The ID and IDREF data types are implemented in the model as "xs:ID" and "xs:IDREF" types per Sections 3.3.8 and 3.3.9 of [W3C.SCHEMA.DTYPES].

2.15. Software

A particular version of software is represented in the information model by the SOFTWARE data type. This software can be described by using a reference, a URL or with free-form text.

The SOFTWARE data type is implemented in the data model as the "iodef:SoftwareType" type.

```
+--------------------+
| iodef:SoftwareType |
+--------------------+
    |<--(0..1)--[ SoftwareReference ]|
    |<--(0..*)--[ URL ]|
    |<--(0..*)--[ Description ]|
+--------------------+
```

Figure 2: The SoftwareType Type

The aggregate classes of the SoftwareType type are:

SoftwareReference
Zero or one. Reference to a software application. See Section 2.15.1.

URL
Zero or more. URL. A URL to a resource describing the software.

Description
Zero or more. ML_STRING. A free-form text description of the software.

At least one of these classes MUST be present.

The iodef:SoftwareType type has no attributes.

2.15.1. SoftwareReference Class

The SoftwareReference class is a reference to a particular version of software.
The element content varies according to the value of the spec-name attribute. It is defined in the data model as "xs:any" per [W3C.SCHEMA].

The attributes of the SoftwareReference class are:

spec-name
Required. ENUM. Identifies the format and semantics of the element body of this class. Formal standards and specifications can be referenced as well as a free-form text description with a user-provided data type. These values are maintained in the "SoftwareReference-spec-id" IANA registry per Section 10.2

1. custom. The element content is free-form and of the data type specified by the dtype attribute. If this value is selected, then the dtype attribute MUST be set.

2. cpe. The element content describes a Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) entry.

3. swid. The element content describes a software identification (SWID) tag per [ISO19770].

4. ext-value. A value used to indicate that this attribute is extended and the actual value is provided using the corresponding ext-* attribute. See Section 5.1.1.

ext-spec-name
Optional. STRING. A means by which to extend the spec-name attribute. See Section 5.1.1.

dtype
Optional. ENUM. The data type of the element content. The permitted values for this attribute are shown below. The default
value is "string". These values are maintained in the "SoftwareReference-dtype" IANA registry per Section 10.2.

1. bytes. The element content is of type HEXBIN.
2. integer. The element content is of type INTEGER.
3. real. The element content is of type REAL.
4. string. The element content is of type STRING.
5. xml. The element content is XML. See Section 5.2.
6. ext-value. A value used to indicate that this attribute is extended and the actual value is provided using the corresponding ext-* attribute. See Section 5.1.1.

ext-dtype
Optional. STRING. A means by which to extend the dtype attribute. See Section 5.1.1.

2.16. Extension

Information not otherwise represented in the IODEF can be added using the EXTENSION data type. This data type is a generic extension mechanism.

The EXTENSION data type is implemented in the data model as the "iodef:ExtensionType" type.

The data type of an EXTENSION is described by the dtype attribute. For simple information, atomic data types (e.g., integers, strings) are supported. Their semantics are further described by the meaning and formatid attributes. Encapsulating XML documents conforming to another schema is also supported. A detailed discussion of extending the schema can be found in Section 5. Additional coordination may be required to ensure that a recipient of a document using this type can parse and process it.
The element content of this type is the extension being added to the
data model. This content is defined in the data model as "xs:any"
per [W3C.SCHEMA].

The attributes of the iodef:ExtensionType type are:

name
Optional. STRING. A free-form name of the field or data element.

dtype
Required. ENUM. The data type of the element content. The
default value is "string". These values are maintained in the
"ExtensionType-dtype" IANA registry per Section 10.2.

1. boolean. The element content is of type BOOLEAN.
2. byte. The element content is of type BYTE.
3. bytes. The element content is of type HEXBIN.
4. character. The element content is of type CHARACTER.
5. date-time. The element content is of type DATETIME.
6. ntpstamp. Same as date-time.
7. integer. The element content is of type INTEGER.
8. portlist. The element content is of type PORTLIST.
9. real. The element content is of type REAL.
10. string. The element content is of type STRING.

11. file. The element content is a base64 encoded binary file encoded as a BYTE[] type.

12. path. The element content is a file-system path encoded as a STRING type.

13. frame. The element content is a layer-2 frame encoded as a HEXBIN type.

14. packet. The element content is a layer-3 packet encoded as a HEXBIN type.

15. ipv4-packet. The element content is an IPv4 packet encoded as a HEXBIN type.

16. ipv6-packet. The element content is an IPv6 packet encoded as a HEXBIN type.

17. url. The element content is of type URL.

18. csv. The element content is a common separated value (CSV) list per Section 2 of [RFC4180] encoded as a STRING type.

19. winreg. The element content is a Windows registry key encoded as a STRING type.

20. xml. The element content is XML. See Section 5.

21. ext-value. A value used to indicate that this attribute is extended and the actual value is provided using the corresponding ext-* attribute. See Section 5.1.1.

   ext-dtype
     Optional. STRING. A means by which to extend the dtype attribute. See Section 5.1.1.

   meaning
     Optional. STRING. A free-form text description of the element content.

   formatid
     Optional. STRING. An identifier referencing the format or semantics of the element content.

   restriction
     Optional. ENUM. See Section 3.3.1.
ext-restriction
   Optional. STRING. A means by which to extend the restriction attribute. See Section 5.1.1.

observable-id
   Optional. ID. See Section 3.3.2.

3. The IODEF Information Model

The specifics of the IODEF information model are discussed in this section. Each class and its relationships with the other classes is described. When necessary, clarifications are made about translating this information model to the schema in Section 8.

3.1. IODEF-Document Class

The IODEF-Document class is the top level class in the IODEF data model. All IODEF documents are an instance of this class.

```
+--------------------------+
| IODEF-Document           |
+--------------------------+
| STRING version           |<>--{1..*}--[ Incident ]
| ENUM xml:lang            |<>--{0..*}--[ AdditionalData ]
| STRING format-id         |
| STRING private-enum-name |
| STRING private-enum-id   |
+--------------------------+
```

Figure 5: IODEF-Document Class

The aggregate classes of the IODEF-Document class are:

Incident
   One or more. The information related to a single incident. See Section 3.2.

AdditionalData
   Zero or more. EXTENSION. Mechanism by which to extend the data model.

The attributes of the IODEF-Document class are:

version
   Required. STRING. The IODEF specification version number to which this IODEF document conforms. The value of this attribute MUST be "2.00"
xml:lang
   Optional. ENUM. A language identifier per Section 2.12 of [W3C.XML] whose values and form are described in [RFC5646]. The interpretation of this code is described in Section 6.

format-id
   Optional. STRING. A free-form string to convey processing instructions to the recipient of the document. Its semantics must be negotiated out-of-band.

private-enum-name
   Optional. STRING. A globally unique identifier for the CSIRT generating the document to deconflict private extensions used in the document. The fully qualified domain name associated with the CSIRT MUST be used as the identifier. See Section 5.3.

private-enum-id
   Optional. STRING. An organizationally unique identifier for an extension used in the document. If this attribute is set, the private-enum-name MUST also be set. See Section 5.3.

3.2. Incident Class

The Incident class describes commonly exchanged information when reporting or sharing derived analysis from security incidents.
Figure 6: The Incident Class

The aggregate classes of the Incident class are:

IncidentID
One. An incident tracking number assigned to this incident by the CSIRT that generated the IODEF document. See Section 3.4.

AlternativeID
Zero or one. The incident tracking numbers used by other CSIRTs to refer to the incident described in the document. See Section 3.5.

RelatedActivity
Zero or more. Related activity and attribution of this activity. See Section 3.6.

DetectTime
Zero or one. DATETIME. The time the incident was first detected.

StartTime
Zero or one. DATETIME. The time the incident started.

EndTime
Zero or one. DATETIME. The time the incident ended.
RecoveryTime
Zero or one.  DATETIME.  The time the site recovered from the incident.

ReportTime
Zero or one.  DATETIME.  The time the incident was reported.

GenerationTime
One.  DATETIME.  The time the content in this Incident class was generated.

Description
Zero or more.  ML_STRING.  A free-form text description of the incident.

Discovery
Zero or more.  The means by which this incident was detected.  See Section 3.10.

Assessment
Zero or more.  A characterization of the impact of the incident.  See Section 3.12.

Method
Zero or more.  The techniques used by the threat actor in the incident.  See Section 3.11.

Contact
One or more.  Contact information for the parties involved in the incident.  See Section 3.9.

EventData
Zero or more.  Description of the events comprising the incident.  See Section 3.14.

IndicatorData
Zero or one.  Indicators from the analysis of an incident.  See Section 3.28.

History
Zero or one.  A log of significant events or actions that occurred during the course of handling the incident.  See Section 3.13.

AdditionalData
Zero or more.  EXTENSION.  Mechanism by which to extend the data model.
Purpose

Required. ENUM. The purpose attribute represents describes the rational for document the information in this class. It is closely related to the Expectation class (Section 3.15). These values are maintained in the "Incident-purpose" IANA registry per Section 10.2. This attribute is defined as an enumerated list:

1. traceback. The Incident was sent for trace-back purposes.
2. mitigation. The Incident was sent to request aid in mitigating the described activity.
3. reporting. The Incident was sent to comply with reporting requirements.
4. watch. The Incident was sent to convey indicators that should be monitored.
5. other. The Incident was sent for purposes specified in the Expectation class.
6. ext-value. A value used to indicate that this attribute is extended and the actual value is provided using the corresponding ext-* attribute. See Section 5.1.1.

Ext-purpose

Optional. STRING. A means by which to extend the purpose attribute. See Section 5.1.1.

Status

Optional. ENUM. The status attribute conveys the state in a workflow where the incident is currently found. These values are maintained in the "Incident-status" IANA registry per Section 10.2. This attribute is defined as an enumerated list:

1. new. The Incident is newly reported and has not been actioned.
2. in-progress. The contents of this Incident are under investigation.
3. forwarded. The Incident has been forwarded to another party for handling.
4. resolved. The investigation into the activity in this Incident has concluded.
5. future. The described activity has not yet been detected.
6. ext-value. A value used to indicate that this attribute is extended and the actual value is provided using the corresponding ext-* attribute. See Section 5.1.1.

ext-status
Optional. STRING. A means by which to extend the status attribute. See Section 5.1.1.

xml:lang
Optional. ENUM. A language identifier per Section 2.12 of [W3C.XML] whose values and form are described in [RFC5646]. The interpretation of this code is described in Section 6.

restriction
Optional. ENUM. See Section 3.3.1. The default value is "private".

ext-restriction
Optional. STRING. A means by which to extend the restriction attribute. See Section 5.1.1.

observable-id
Optional. ID. See Section 3.3.2.

3.3. Common Attributes

There are a number of recurring attributes used in the information model. They are documented in this section.

3.3.1. restriction Attribute

The restriction attribute indicates the disclosure guidelines to which the sender expects the recipient to adhere for the information represented in this class and its children. This guideline provides no security since there are no technical means to ensure that the recipient of the document handles the information as the sender requested.

The value of this attribute is logically inherited by the children of this class. That is to say, the disclosure rules applied to this class, also apply to its children.

It is possible to set a granular disclosure policy, since all of the high-level classes (i.e., children of the Incident class) have a restriction attribute. Therefore, a child can override the guidelines of a parent class, be it to restrict or relax the disclosure rules (e.g., a child has a weaker policy than an ancestor; or an ancestor has a weak policy, and the children selectively apply...
more rigid controls). The implicit value of the restriction attribute for a class that did not specify one can be found in the closest ancestor that did specify a value.

This attribute is defined as an enumerated value with a default value of "private". Note that the default value of the restriction attribute is only defined in the context of the Incident class. In other classes where this attribute is used, no default is specified.

These values are maintained in the "Restriction" IANA registry per Section 10.2.

1. public. The information can be freely distributed without restriction.
2. partner. The information may be shared within a closed community of peers, partners, or affected parties, but cannot be openly published.
3. need-to-know. The information may be shared only within the organization with individuals that have a need to know.
4. private. The information may not be shared.
5. default. The information can be shared according to an information disclosure policy pre-arranged by the communicating parties.
6. white. Same as ‘public’.
7. green. Same as ‘partner’.
8. amber. Same as ‘need-to-know’.
9. red. Same as ‘private’.
10. ext-value. A value used to indicate that this attribute is extended and the actual value is provided using the corresponding ext-* attribute. See Section 5.1.1.

3.3.2. observable-id Attribute

The observable-id attribute tags information in the document as an observable so that it can be referenced later in the description of an indicator. The value of this attribute is a unique identifier in the scope of the document. It is used by the ObservableReference class to enumerate observables when defining an indicator with the IndicatorData class.
3.4. IncidentID Class

The IncidentID class represents a tracking number that is unique in the context of the CSIRT. It serves as an identifier for an incident or a document identifier when sharing indicators. This identifier would serve as an index into a CSIRT’s incident handling or knowledge management system.

The combination of the name attribute and the string in the element content MUST be a globally unique identifier describing the activity. Documents generated by a given CSIRT MUST NOT reuse the same value unless they are referencing the same incident.

```
+------------------------+
| IncidentID             |
+------------------------+
| STRING                 |
|                        |
| STRING name            |
| STRING instance        |
| ENUM restriction       |
| STRING ext-restriction |
+------------------------+
```

Figure 7: The IncidentID Class

The content of the class is an incident identifier of type STRING.

The attributes of the IncidentID class are:

- **name**
  
  Required. STRING. An identifier describing the CSIRT that created the document. In order to have a globally unique CSIRT name, the fully qualified domain name associated with the CSIRT MUST be used.

- **instance**
  
  Optional. STRING. An identifier referencing a subset of the named incident.

- **restriction**
  
  Optional. ENUM. See Section 3.3.1.

- **ext-restriction**
  
  Optional. STRING. A means by which to extend the restriction attribute. See Section 5.1.1.
3.5. AlternativeID Class

The AlternativeID class lists the tracking numbers used by CSIRTs, other than the one generating the document, to refer to the identical activity described in the IODEF document. A tracking number listed as an AlternativeID references the same incident detected by another CSIRT. The tracking numbers of the CSIRT that generated the IODEF document must never be considered an AlternativeID.

```
+------------------------+
| AlternativeID          |
+------------------------+
    ENUM restriction    |
    STRING ext-restriction
```

**Figure 8: The AlternativeID Class**

The aggregate class of the AlternativeID class is:

**IncidentID**
One or more. The tracking number of another CSIRT. See Section 3.4.

The attributes of the AlternativeID class are:

**restriction**
Optional. ENUM. See Section 3.3.1.

**ext-restriction**
Optional. STRING. A means by which to extend the restriction attribute. See Section 5.1.1.

3.6. RelatedActivity Class

The RelatedActivity class relates the information described in the rest of the document to previously observed incidents or activity; and allows attribution to a specific actor or campaign.

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The aggregate classes of the RelatedActivity class are:

IncidentID
Zero or more. The tracking number of a related incident. See Section 3.4.

URL
Zero or more. URL. A URL to activity related to this incident.

ThreatActor
Zero or more. The threat actor to whom the incident activity is attributed. See Section 3.7.

Campaign
Zero or more. The campaign of a given threat actor to whom the described activity is attributed. See Section 3.8.

IndicatorID
Zero or more. A reference to a related indicator. See Section 3.4.

Confidence
Zero or one. An estimate of the confidence in attributing this RelatedActivity to the events described in the document. See Section 3.12.5.

Description
Zero or more. ML_STRING. A description of how these relationships were derived.

AdditionalData
Zero or more. EXTENSION. A mechanism by which to extend the data model.
The RelatedActivity class MUST have at least one instance of any of the following child classes: IncidentID, URL, ThreatActor, Campaign, Description or AdditionalData.

The attributes of the RelatedActivity class are:

- **restriction**: Optional. ENUM. See Section 3.3.1.
- **ext-restriction**: Optional. STRING. A means by which to extend the restriction attribute. See Section 5.1.1.

### 3.7. ThreatActor Class

The ThreatActor class describes a threat actor.

```
+------------------------+
| ThreatActor            |
+------------------------+
| ENUM restriction       |<>--{0..*}--[ ThreatActorID ]
| STRING ext-restriction |<>--{0..*}--[ URL       ]
|                       |<>--{0..*}--[ Description ]
|                       |<>--{0..*}--[ AdditionalData ]
+------------------------+
```

Figure 10: ThreatActor Class

The aggregate classes of the ThreatActor class are:

- **ThreatActorID**: Zero or more. STRING. An identifier for the threat actor.
- **URL**: Zero or more. URL. A URL to a reference describing the threat actor.
- **Description**: Zero or more. ML_STRING. A description of the threat actor.
- **AdditionalData**: Zero or more. EXTENSION. A mechanism by which to extend the data model.

The ThreatActor class MUST have at least one instance of a child class.

The attributes of the ThreatActor class are:
3.8. Campaign Class

The Campaign class describes a campaign of attacks by a threat actor.

```
+------------------------+
| Campaign               |
+------------------------+
| ENUM restriction       |<>--{0..*}--[ CampaignID ]
| STRING ext-restriction |<>--{0..*}--[ URL ]
|                        |<>--{0..*}--[ Description ]
|                        |<>--{0..*}--[ AdditionalData ]
+------------------------+
```

Figure 11: Campaign Class

The aggregate classes of the Campaign class are:

- **CampaignID**
  - Zero or more. STRING. An identifier for the campaign.

- **URL**
  - Zero or more. URL. A URL to a reference describing the campaign.

- **Description**
  - Zero or more. ML_STRING. A description of the campaign.

- **AdditionalData**
  - Zero or more. EXTENSION. A mechanism by which to extend the data model.

The Campaign class MUST have at least one instance of a child class.

The attributes of the Campaign class are:

- **restriction**
  - Optional. ENUM. See Section 3.3.1.

- **ext-restriction**
  - Optional. STRING. A means by which to extend the restriction attribute. See Section 5.1.1.
3.9. Contact Class

The Contact class describes contact information for organizations and personnel involved in the incident. This class allows for the naming of the involved party, specifying contact information for them, and identifying their role in the incident.

People and organizations are treated interchangeably as contacts; one can be associated with the other using the recursive definition of the class (the Contact class is aggregated into the Contact class). The 'type' attribute disambiguates the type of contact information being provided.

The recursive definition of Contact provides a way to relate information without requiring the explicit use of identifiers or duplication of data. A complete point of contact is derived by a particular traversal from the root Contact class to the leaf Contact class. Each child Contact class logically inherits contact information from its ancestors.

```
+------------------------+
| Contact                |
+------------------------+
    ENUM role          <---(0..*)--[ ContactName  ]
    STRING ext-role    <---(0..*)--[ ContactTitle ]
    ENUM type          <---(0..*)--[ Description  ]
    STRING ext-type    <---(0..*)--[ RegistryHandle]
    ENUM restriction   <---(0..1)--[ PostalAddress ]
    STRING ext-restriction <---(0..*1)--[ Email ]
    <---(0..*1)--[ Telephone ]
    <---(0..1)--[ Timezone ]
    <---(0..*1)--[ Contact ]
    <---(0..*1)--[ AdditionalData ]
+------------------------+
```

Figure 12: The Contact Class

The aggregate classes of the Contact class are:

**ContactName**
Zero or more. ML_STRING. The name of the contact. The contact may either be an organization or a person. The type attribute disambiguates the semantics.

**ContactTitle**
Zero or more. ML_STRING. The title for the individual named in the ContactName.
Description
Zero or more.  ML_STRING.  A free-form text description of the contact.

RegistryHandle
Zero or more.  A handle name into the registry of the contact.  See Section 3.9.1.

PostalAddress
Zero or more.  The postal address of the contact.  See Section 3.9.2.

Email
Zero or more.  The email address of the contact.  See Section 3.9.3.

Telephone
Zero or more.  The telephone number of the contact.  See Section 3.9.4.

Timezone
Zero or one.  TIMEZONE.  The timezone in which the contact resides.

Contact
Zero or more.  A recursive definition of the Contact class.  This definition can be used to group common data pertaining to multiple points of contact and is especially useful when listing multiple contacts at the same organization.

AdditionalData
Zero or more.  EXTENSION.  A mechanism by which to extend the data model.

At least one of the aggregate classes MUST be present in an instance of the Contact class.

The attributes of the Contact class are:

role
Required.  ENUM.  Indicates the role the contact fulfills.  These values are maintained in the "Contact-role" IANA registry per Section 10.2.

1.  creator.  The entity that generate the document.

2.  reporter.  The entity that reported the information.
3. admin. An administrative contact or business owner for an asset or organization.

4. tech. An entity responsible for the day-to-day management of technical issues for an asset or organization.

5. provider. An external hosting provider for an asset.

6. zone. An entity with authority over a DNS zone.

7. user. An end-user of an asset or part of an organization.

8. billing. An entity responsible for billing issues for an asset or organization.

9. legal. An entity responsible for legal issue related to an asset or organization.

10. irt. An entity responsible for handling security issues for an asset or organization.

11. abuse. An entity responsible for handling abuse originating from an asset or organization.

12. cc. An entity that is to be kept informed about the events related to an asset or organization.

13. cc-irt. A CSIRT or information sharing organization coordinating activity related to an asset or organization.

14. leo. A law enforcement organization supporting the investigation of activity affecting an asset or organization.

15. vendor. The vendor that produces an asset.

16. vendor-support. A vendor that provides services.

17. victim. A victim in the incident.

18. victim-notified. A victim in the incident who has been notified.

19. ext-value. A value used to indicate that this attribute is extended and the actual value is provided using the corresponding ext-* attribute. See Section 5.1.1.
Optional. STRING. A means by which to extend the role attribute. See Section 5.1.1.

type
Required. ENUM. Indicates the type of contact being described. This attribute is defined as an enumerated list. These values are maintained in the "Contact-type" IANA registry per Section 10.2.

1. person. The information for this contact references an individual.
2. organization. The information for this contact references an organization.
3. ext-value. A value used to indicate that this attribute is extended and the actual value is provided using the corresponding ext-* attribute. See Section 5.1.1.

ext-type
Optional. STRING. A means by which to extend the type attribute. See Section 5.1.1.

restriction
Optional. ENUM. See Section 3.3.1.

ext-restriction
Optional. STRING. A means by which to extend the restriction attribute. See Section 5.1.1.

3.9.1. RegistryHandle Class

The RegistryHandle class represents a handle into an Internet registry or community-specific database.

+---------------------+
| RegistryHandle      |
+---------------------+
| STRING              |
| ENUM registry       |
| STRING ext-registry |
+---------------------+

Figure 13: The RegistryHandle Class

The content of the class is a handle into a registry of type STRING.

The attributes of the RegistryHandle class are:
registry
   Required. ENUM. The database to which the handle belongs. These values are maintained in the "RegistryHandle-registry" IANA registry per Section 10.2. The possible values are:

1. internic. Internet Network Information Center
2. apnic. Asia Pacific Network Information Center
3. arin. American Registry for Internet Numbers
4. lacnic. Latin-American and Caribbean IP Address Registry
5. ripe. Reseaux IP Europeens
6. afrinic. African Internet Numbers Registry
7. local. A database local to the CSIRT
8. ext-value. A value used to indicate that this attribute is extended and the actual value is provided using the corresponding ext-* attribute. See Section 5.1.1.

ext-registry
   Optional. STRING. A means by which to extend the registry attribute. See Section 5.1.1.

3.9.2. PostalAddress Class

The PostalAddress class specifies an postal address and associated annotation.

+------------------------+
| PostalAddress          |
+------------------------+
| ENUM type              |<>----------[ PAddress ] |
| STRING ext-type        |<>--{0..*}--[ Description ] |
+------------------------+

Figure 14: The PostalAddress Class

The aggregate classes of the PostalAddress class are:

PAddress
   One. POSTAL. A postal address.

Description
Zero or more. ML_STRING. A free-form text description of the address.

The attributes of the PostalAddress class are:

- **type**
  - Optional. ENUM. Categorizes the type of address described in the PAddress class. These values are maintained in the "PostalAddress-type" IANA registry per Section 10.2.
    1. **street**. An address describing a physical location.
    2. **mailing**. An address to which correspondence should be sent.
    3. **ext-value**. A value used to indicate that this attribute is extended and the actual value is provided using the corresponding ext-* attribute. See Section 5.1.1.

- **ext-type**
  - Optional. STRING. A means by which to extend the type attribute. See Section 5.1.1.

3.9.3. Email Class

The Email class specifies an email address and associated annotation.

```
+-------------------+
| Email             |
+-------------------+
| ENUM type        |
| STRING ext-type  |
+-------------------+
```

Figure 15: The Email Class

The aggregate classes of the Email class are:

- **EmailTo**
  - One. EMAIL. An email address.

- **Description**
  - Zero or more. ML_STRING. A free-form text description of the email address.

The attributes of the Email class are:

- **type**
Optional. ENUM. Categorizes the type of email address described in the EmailTo class. These values are maintained in the "Email-type" IANA registry per Section 10.2.

1. direct. A email address of an individual.

2. hotline. A email address regularly monitored for operational purposes.

3. ext-value. A value used to indicate that this attribute is extended and the actual value is provided using the corresponding ext-* attribute. See Section 5.1.1.

tag-type
Optional. STRING. A means by which to extend the type attribute. See Section 5.1.1.

3.9.4. Telephone Class

The Telephone class describes a telephone number and associated annotation.

+----------------------------+
| Telephone                  |
+----------------------------+
| ENUM type                  |
| STRING ext-type            |
+----------------------------+

Figure 16: The Telephone Class

The aggregate classes of the Telephone class are:

TelephoneNumber
One. PHONE. A telephone number.

Description
Zero or more. ML_STRING. A free-form text description of the phone number.

The attributes of the Telephone class are:

type
Optional. ENUM. Categorizes the type of telephone number described in the TelephoneNumber class. These values are maintained in the "Telephone-type" IANA registry per Section 10.2.

1. wired. A number of a wire-line (land-line) phone.
2. mobile. A number of a mobile phone.

3. fax. A number to a fax machine.

4. hotline. A number to a regularly monitored operational hotline.

5. ext-value. A value used to indicate that this attribute is extended and the actual value is provided using the corresponding ext-* attribute. See Section 5.1.1.

   ext-type
   Optional. STRING. A means by which to extend the type attribute. See Section 5.1.1.

3.10. Discovery Class

The Discovery class describes how an incident was detected.

+------------------------+
| Discovery              |
+------------------------+
| ENUM source            |<>--{0..*}--[ Description ] |
| STRING ext-source      |<>--{0..*}--[ Contact ] |
| ENUM restriction       |<>--{0..*}--[ DetectionPattern ] |
| STRING ext-restriction |
+------------------------+

Figure 17: The Discovery Class

The aggregate classes of the Discovery class are:

Description
   Zero or more. ML_STRING. A free-form text description of how this incident was detected.

Contact
   Zero or more. Contact information for the party that discovered the incident. See Section 3.9.

DetectionPattern
   Zero or more. Describes an application-specific configuration that detected the incident. See Section 3.10.1.

The attributes of the Discovery class are:

source
Optional. ENUM. Categorizes the techniques used to discover the incident. These values are partially derived from Table 3-1 of [NIST800.61rev2]. These values are maintained in the "Discovery-source" IANA registry per Section 10.2.

1. nidps. Network Intrusion Detection or Prevention system.
2. hips. Host-based Intrusion Prevention system.
4. av. Antivirus or antispam software.
5. third-party-monitoring. Contracted third-party monitoring service.
6. incident. The activity was discovered while investigating an unrelated incident.
7. os-log. Operating system logs.
8. application-log. Application logs.
12. investigation. Manual investigation initiated based on notification of a new vulnerability or exploit.
14. internal-notification. A party within the organization reported the activity.
15. external-notification. A party outside of the organization reported the activity.
16. leo. A law enforcement organization notified the victim organization.
17. partner. A customer or business partner reported the activity to the victim organization.
18. actor. The threat actor directly or indirectly reported this activity to the victim organization.
19. unknown. Unknown detection approach.

20. ext-value. A value used to indicate that this attribute is extended and the actual value is provided using the corresponding ext-* attribute. See Section 5.1.1.

ext-source
Optional. STRING. A means by which to extend the source attribute. See Section 5.1.1.

restriction
Optional. ENUM. See Section 3.3.1.

ext-restriction
Optional. STRING. A means by which to extend the restriction attribute. See Section 5.1.1.

3.10.1. DetectionPattern Class

The DetectionPattern class describes a configuration or signature that can be used by an IDS/IPS, SIEM, anti-virus, end-point protection, network analysis, malware analysis, or host forensics tool to identify a particular phenomenon. This class requires the identification of the target application and allows the configuration to be describes in either free-form or machine readable form.

```
+------------------------+
| DetectionPattern       |
+------------------------+
| ENUM restriction       |<>----------[ Application            |
| STRING ext-restriction |<>--{0..*}--[ Description            |
|                        |<>--{0..*}--[ DetectionConfiguration |
+------------------------+
```

Figure 18: The DetectionPattern Class

The aggregate classes of the DetectionPattern class are:

Application
One. SOFTWARE. The application for which the DetectionConfiguration or Description is being provided.

Description
Zero or more. ML_STRING. A free-form text description of how to use the Application or provided DetectionConfiguration.
Zero or more. STRING. A machine consumable configuration to find a pattern of activity.

Either an instance of the Description or DetectionConfiguration class MUST be present.

The attributes of the DetectionPattern class are:

- **restriction**
  - Optional. ENUM. See Section 3.3.1.
- **ext-restriction**
  - Optional. STRING. A means by which to extend the restriction attribute. See Section 5.1.1.

### 3.11. Method Class

The Method class describes the tactics, techniques, procedures or weakness used by the threat actor in an incident. This class consists of both a list of references describing the attack methods and weaknesses and a free-form text description.

```
+------------------------+
| Method                 |
+------------------------+
    ENUM restriction     |<--(0..*)--[ Reference ]
    STRING ext-restriction|<--(0..*)--[ Description ]
    |<--(0..*)--[ sci:AttackPattern ]
    |<--(0..*)--[ sci:Vulnerability ]
    |<--(0..*)--[ sci:Weakness ]
    |<--(0..*)--[ AdditionalData ]
+------------------------+
```

Figure 19: The Method Class

The aggregate classes of the Method class are:

- **Reference**
  - Zero or more. A reference to a vulnerability, malware sample, advisory, or analysis of an attack technique. See Section 3.11.1.

- **Description**
  - Zero or more. ML_STRING. A free-form text description of techniques, tactics, or procedures used by the threat actor.

- **sci:AttackPattern**
  - Zero or more. A reference to a pattern of attack or exploitation per [RFC-SCI]
sci:Vulnerability
  Zero or more. A reference to a vulnerability per [RFC-SCI]

sci:Weakness
  Zero or more. A reference to the exploited weakness per [RFC-SCI]

AdditionalData
  Zero or more. EXTENSION. A mechanism by which to extend the data model.
An instance of one of these child MUST be present.

The attributes of the Method class are:

  restriction
    Optional. ENUM. See Section 3.3.1.
  ext-restriction
    Optional. STRING. A means by which to extend the restriction attribute. See Section 5.1.1.

3.11.1. Reference Class

The Reference class is an external reference to relevant information such as a vulnerability, IDS alert, malware sample, advisory, or attack technique.

Figure 20: The Reference Class

The aggregate classes of the Reference class are:

enum:ReferenceName
  Zero or one. Reference identifier per [RFC-ENUM].

URL
  Zero or more. URL. A URL to a reference.

Description
  Zero or more. ML_STRING. A free-form text description of this reference.
At least one of these classes MUST be present.

The attribute of the Reference class is:

observable-id
    Optional. ID. See Section 3.3.2.

3.12. Assessment Class

The Assessment class describes the repercussions of the incident to the victim.

```
+-------------------------+
| Assessment              |
+-------------------------+
    ENUM occurrence      |<--{0..*}--[ IncidentCategory ]
    ENUM restriction      |<--{0..*}--[ SystemImpact ]
    STRING ext-restriction|<--{0..*}--[ BusinessImpact ]
    ID observable-id      |<--{0..*}--[ TimeImpact ]
                          |<--{0..*}--[ MonetaryImpact ]
                          |<--{0..*}--[ IntendedImpact ]
                          |<--{0..*}--[ Counter ]
                          |<--{0..*}--[ MitigatingFactor ]
                          |<--{0..*}--[ Cause ]
                          |<--{0..1}--[ Confidence ]
                          |<--{0..*}--[ AdditionalData ]
+-------------------------+
```

Figure 21: Assessment Class

The aggregate classes of the Assessment class are:

IncidentCategory
    Zero or more. ML_STRING. A free-form text description categorizing the type of Incident.

SystemImpact
    Zero or more. A technical characterization of the impact of the incident activity on the victim’s enterprise. See Section 3.12.1.

BusinessImpact
    Zero or more. Impact of the incident activity on the business functions of the victim organization. See Section 3.12.2.

TimeImpact
    Zero or more. A characterization of the victim organization due to the incident activity as a function of time. See Section 3.12.3.
MonetaryImpact
Zero or more. The financial loss due to the incident activity. See Section 3.12.4.

IntendedImpact
Zero or more. The intended outcome to the victim sought by the threat actor. Defined identically to the BusinessImpact defined in Section 3.12.2, but describes intent rather than the realized impact.

Counter
Zero or more. A counter with which to summarize the magnitude of the activity. See Section 3.18.3.

MitigatingFactor
Zero or more. ML_STRING. A description of a mitigating factor relative to the impact on the victim organization.

Cause
Zero or more. ML_STRING. A description of an underlying cause of the impact.

Confidence
Zero or one. An estimate of confidence in the impact assessment. See Section 3.12.5.

AdditionalData
Zero or more. EXTENSION. A mechanism by which to extend the data model.

A least one instance of the possible five impact classes (i.e., SystemImpact, BusinessImpact, TimeImpact, MonetaryImpact or IntendedImpact) MUST be present.

The attributes of the Assessment class are:

occurrence
Optional. ENUM. Specifies whether the assessment is describing actual or potential outcomes.

1. actual. This assessment describes activity that has occurred.
2. potential. This assessment describes potential activity that might occur.

restriction
Optional. ENUM. See Section 3.3.1.
ext-restriction
  Optional.  STRING.  A means by which to extend the restriction
  attribute.  See Section 5.1.1.

observable-id
  Optional.  ID.  See Section 3.3.2.

3.12.1.  SystemImpact Class

The SystemImpact class describes the technical impact of the incident
to the systems on the network.

+-----------------------+
| SystemImpact          |
+-----------------------+
| ENUM severity         |<--(0..*)--[ Description ]
| ENUM completion       |
| ENUM type             |
| STRING ext-type       |
+-----------------------+

Figure 22: SystemImpact Class

The aggregate class of the SystemImpact class is:

Description
  Zero or more.  ML_STRING.  A free-form text description of the
  impact to the system.

The attributes of the SystemImpact class are:

severity
  Optional.  ENUM.  An estimate of the relative severity of the
  activity.  The permitted values are shown below.  There is no
  default value.

1.  low.  Low severity
2.  medium.  Medium severity
3.  high.  High severity

completion
  Optional.  ENUM.  An indication whether the described activity was
  successful.  The permitted values are shown below.  There is no
  default value.
1. failed. The attempted activity was not successful.
2. succeeded. The attempted activity succeeded.

**type**

*Required. ENUM. Classifies the impact. The permitted values are shown below. The default value is "unknown". These values are maintained in the "SystemImpact-type" IANA registry per Section 10.2.*

1. **takeover-account.** Control was taken of a given account.
2. **takeover-service.** Control was taken of a given service.
3. **takeover-system.** Control was taken of a given system.
4. **cps-manipulation.** A cyber physical system was manipulated.
5. **cps-damage.** A cyber physical system was damaged.
6. **availability-data.** Access to particular data was degraded or denied.
7. **availability-account.** Access to an account was degraded or denied.
8. **availability-service.** Access to a service was degraded or denied.
9. **availability-system.** Access to a system was degraded or denied.
10. **damaged-system.** Hardware on a system was irreparably damaged.
11. **damaged-data.** Data on a system was deleted.
12. **breach-proprietary.** Sensitive or proprietary information was accessed or exfiltrated.
13. **breach-privacy.** Personally identifiable information was accessed or exfiltrated.
14. **breach-credential.** Credential information was accessed or exfiltrated.
15. **breach-configuration.** System configuration or data inventory was access or exfiltrated.
16. integrity-data. Data on the system was modified.

17. integrity-configuration. Application or system configuration was modified.

18. integrity-hardware. Firmware of a hardware component was modified.

19. traffic-redirection. Network traffic on the system was redirected.

20. monitoring-traffic. Network traffic emerging from a host or enclave was monitored.

21. monitoring-host. System activity (e.g., running processes, keystrokes) were monitored.

22. policy. Activity violated the system owner’s acceptable use policy.

23. unknown. The impact is unknown.

24. ext-value. A value used to indicate that this attribute is extended and the actual value is provided using the corresponding ext-* attribute. See Section 5.1.1.

   ext-type
   Optional. STRING. A means by which to extend the type attribute. See Section 5.1.1.

3.12.2. BusinessImpact Class

The BusinessImpact class describes and characterizes the degree to which the function of the organization was impacted by the Incident.

+-------------------------+
| BusinessImpact          |
+-------------------------+
| ENUM severity           |<>--{0..*}--[ Description ]
| STRING ext-severity     |
| ENUM type               |
| STRING ext-type         |
+-------------------------+

Figure 23: BusinessImpact Class

The aggregate class of the BusinessImpact class is:
Description
Zero or more. ML_STRING. A free-form text description of the impact to the organization.

The attributes of the BusinessImpact class are:

severity
Optional. ENUM. Characterizes the severity of the incident on business functions. The permitted values are shown below. They were derived from Table 3-2 of [NIST800.61rev2]. The default value is "unknown". These values are maintained in the "BusinessImpact-severity" IANA registry per Section 10.2.

1. none. No effect to the organization’s ability to provide all services to all users.
2. low. Minimal effect as the organization can still provide all critical services to all users but has lost efficiency.
3. medium. The organization has lost the ability to provide a critical service to a subset of system users.
4. high. The organization is no longer able to provide some critical services to any users.
5. unknown. The impact is not known.
6. ext-value. A value used to indicate that this attribute is extended and the actual value is provided using the corresponding ext-* attribute. See Section 5.1.1.

ext-severity
Optional. STRING. A means by which to extend the severity attribute. See Section 5.1.1.

type
Required. ENUM. Characterizes the effect this incident had on the business. The permitted values are shown below. The default value is "unknown". These values are maintained in the "BusinessImpact-type" IANA registry per Section 10.2.

1. breach-proprietary. Sensitive or proprietary information was accessed or exfiltrated.
2. breach-privacy. Personally identifiable information was accessed or exfiltrated.
3. breach-credential. Credential information was accessed or exfiltrated.

4. loss-of-integrity. Sensitive or proprietary information was changed or deleted.

5. loss-of-service. Service delivery was disrupted.

6. theft-financial. Money was stolen.

7. theft-service. Services were misappropriated.

8. degraded-reputation. The reputation of the organization’s brand was diminished.

9. asset-damage. A cyber-physical system was damaged.

10. asset-manipulation. A cyber-physical system was manipulated.

11. legal. The incident resulted in legal or regulatory action.

12. extortion. The incident resulted in actors extorting the victim organization.

13. unknown. The impact is unknown.

14. ext-value. A value used to indicate that this attribute is extended and the actual value is provided using the corresponding ext-* attribute. See Section 5.1.1.

   ext-type
   Optional. STRING. A means by which to extend the type attribute. See Section 5.1.1.

3.12.3. TimeImpact Class

The TimeImpact class describes the impact of the incident on an organization as a function of time. It provides a way to convey down time and recovery time.
The content of the class is of type REAL and specifies an amount of time. The duration attribute provides units for this content; and the metric attribute explains what this content is measuring.

The attributes of the TimeImpact class are:

severity
   Optional. ENUM. An estimate of the relative severity of the activity. The permitted values are shown below. There is no default value.
   1. low. Low severity
   2. medium. Medium severity
   3. high. High severity

metric
   Required. ENUM. Defines the meaning of the value in the element content. These values are maintained in the "TimeImpact-metric" IANA registry per Section 10.2.
   1. labor. Total staff-time to recovery from the activity (e.g., 2 employees working 4 hours each would be 8 hours).
   2. elapsed. Elapsed time from the beginning of the recovery to its completion (i.e., wall-clock time).
   3. downtime. Duration of time for which some provided service(s) was not available.
   4. ext-value. A value used to indicate that this attribute is extended and the actual value is provided using the corresponding ext-* attribute. See Section 5.1.1.
ext-metric
  Optional. STRING. A means by which to extend the metric attribute. See Section 5.1.1.

duration
  Optional. ENUM. Defines the unit of time for the value in the element content. The default value is "hour". These values are maintained in the "TimeImpact-duration" IANA registry per Section 10.2.
  1. second. The unit of the element content is seconds.
  2. minute. The unit of the element content is minutes.
  3. hour. The unit of the element content is hours.
  4. day. The unit of the element content is days.
  5. month. The unit of the element content is months.
  6. quarter. The unit of the element content is quarters.
  7. year. The unit of the element content is years.
  8. ext-value. A value used to indicate that this attribute is extended and the actual value is provided using the corresponding ext-* attribute. See Section 5.1.1.

ext-duration
  Optional. STRING. A means by which to extend the duration attribute. See Section 5.1.1.

3.12.4. MonetaryImpact Class

The MonetaryImpact class describes the financial impact of the activity on an organization. For example, this impact may consider losses due to the cost of the investigation or recovery, diminished productivity of the staff, or a tarnished reputation that will affect future opportunities.
The content of the class is of type REAL and specifies a quantity of money. The currency attribute defines the currency of this value.

The attributes of the MonetaryImpact class are:

- **severity**
  - Optional. ENUM. An estimate of the relative severity of the activity. The permitted values are shown below. There is no default value.
    1. low. Low severity
    2. medium. Medium severity
    3. high. High severity

- **currency**
  - Optional. STRING. Defines the currency in which the value in the element content is expressed. The permitted values are defined in "Codes for the representation of currencies and funds" of [ISO4217]. There is no default value.

### 3.12.5. Confidence Class

The Confidence class represents an estimate of the validity and accuracy of data expressed in the document. This estimate can be expressed as a category or a numeric calculation.
The content of the class is of type REAL and specifies a numerical assessment in the confidence of the data when the value of the rating attribute is "numeric". Otherwise, this element MUST be empty.

The attributes of the Confidence class are:

**rating**
- Required. ENUM. A qualitative assessment of confidence.
  - 1. low. Low confidence.
  - 2. medium. Medium confidence.
  - 3. high. High confidence.
  - 4. numeric. The element content contains a number that conveys the confidence of the data. The semantics of this number outside the scope of this specification.
  - 5. unknown. The confidence rating value is not known.
  - 6. ext-value. A value used to indicate that this attribute is extended and the actual value is provided using the corresponding ext-* attribute. See Section 5.1.1.

**ext-rating**
- Optional. STRING. A means by which to extend the rating attribute. See Section 5.1.1.

3.13. History Class

The History class is a log of the significant events or actions performed by the involved parties during the course of handling the incident.

The level of detail maintained in this log is left up to the discretion of those handling the incident.
The aggregate classes of the History class are:

History

One or more. An entry in the history log of significant events or actions performed by the involved parties. See Section 3.13.1.

The attributes of the History class are:

restriction
Optional. ENUM. See Section 3.3.1.

ext-restriction
Optional. STRING. A means by which to extend the restriction attribute. See Section 5.1.1.

3.13.1. HistoryItem Class

The HistoryItem class is an entry in the History (Section 3.13) log that documents a particular action or event that occurred in the course of handling the incident. The details of the entry are a free-form text description, but each can be categorized with the type attribute.

The aggregate classes of the HistoryItem class are:

DateTime

Danyliw
Expires September 22, 2016
One. DATETIME. A timestamp of this entry in the history log.

IncidentID
Zero or One. In a history log created by multiple parties, the IncidentID provides a mechanism to specify which CSIRT created a particular entry and references this organization’s tracking number. When a single organization is maintaining the log, this class can be ignored. See Section 3.4.

Contact
Zero or One. Provides contact information for the entity that performed the action documented in this class. See Section 3.9.

Description
Zero or more. ML_STRING. A free-form text description of the action or event.

DefinedCOA
Zero or more. STRING. An identifier meaningful to the sender and recipient of this document that references a course of action. This class MUST be present if the action attribute is set to "defined-coa".

AdditionalData
Zero or more. EXTENSION. A mechanism by which to extend the data model.

The attributes of the HistoryItem class are:

action
Required. ENUM. Classifies a performed action or occurrence documented in this history log entry. As activity will likely have been instigated either through a previously conveyed expectation or internal investigation. This attribute is identical to the action attribute of the Expectation class. The difference is only one of tense. When an action is in this class, it has been completed. See Section 3.15.

ext-action
Optional. STRING. A means by which to extend the action attribute. See Section 5.1.1.

restriction
Optional. ENUM. See Section 3.3.1.

ext-restriction
Optional. STRING. A means by which to extend the restriction attribute. See Section 5.1.1.
observable-id
Optional. ID. See Section 3.3.2.

3.14. EventData Class

The EventData class is a container class to organize data about events that occurred during an incident.

```
+-------------------------+
| EventData               |
+-------------------------+
| ENUM restriction        |<>--{0..*}--[ Description ] |
| STRING ext-restriction  |<>--{0..1}--[ DetectTime ]   |
| ID observable-id        |<>--{0..1}--[ StartTime ]     |
|                         |<>--{0..1}--[ EndTime ]       |
|                         |<>--{0..1}--[ RecoveryTime ]  |
|                         |<>--{0..1}--[ ReportTime ]    |
|                         |<>--{0..*}--[ Contact ]       |
|                         |<>--{0..*}--[ Discovery ]     |
|                         |<>--{0..1}--[ Assessment ]    |
|                         |<>--{0..*}--[ Method ]        |
|                         |<>--{0..*}--[ Flow ]          |
|                         |<>--{0..*}--[ Expectation ]   |
|                         |<>--{0..1}--[ Record ]        |
|                         |<>--{0..*}--[ EventData ]     |
|                         |<>--{0..*}--[ AdditionalData ]|
```

Figure 29: The EventData Class

The aggregate classes of the EventData class are:

- **Description**
  Zero or more. ML_STRING. A free-form text description of the event.

- **DetectTime**
  Zero or one. DATETIME. The time the event was detected.

- **StartTime**
  Zero or one. DATETIME. The time the event started.

- **EndTime**
  Zero or one. DATETIME. The time the event ended.

- **RecoveryTime**
  Zero or one. DATETIME. The time the site recovered from the event.
ReportTime
  One.  DATETIME.  The time the event was reported.

Contact
  Zero or more.  Contact information for the parties involved in the event.  See Section 3.9.

Discovery
  Zero or more.  The means by which the event was detected.  See Section 3.10.

Assessment
  Zero or one.  The impact of the event on the victim and the actions taken.  See Section 3.12.

Method
  Zero or more.  The technique used by the threat actor in the event.  See Section 3.11.

Flow
  Zero or more.  A description of the systems or networks involved.  See Section 3.16.

Expectation
  Zero or more.  The expected action to be performed by the recipient for the described event.  See Section 3.15.

Record
  Zero or one.  Supportive data (e.g., log files) that provides additional information about the event.  See Section 3.22.

EventData
  Zero or more.  A recursive definition of the EventData class.  See Section 3.14.2 for an explanation on using this class.

AdditionalData
  Zero or more.  EXTENSION.  An extension mechanism for data not explicitly represented in the data model.

At least one of the aggregate classes MUST be present in an instance of the EventData class.

The attributes of the EventData class are:

  restriction
    Optional.  ENUM.  See Section 3.3.1.  The default value is "default".
ext-restriction
  Optional. STRING. A means by which to extend the restriction attribute. See Section 5.1.1.

observable-id
  Optional. ID. See Section 3.3.2.

3.14.1. Relating the Incident and EventData Classes

There is substantial overlap in the child classes aggregated in the Incident and EventData classes. Nevertheless, the semantics of these classes are quite different. The Incident class provides summary information about the entire incident, while the EventData class provides information about the individual events comprising the incident. In the common case, the EventData class will provide more specific information for the general description provided in the Incident class. However, in the case where the summarized information in the Incident class conflicts the detailed information in an EventData class the more specific EventData class MUST supersede the more generic information provided in Incident class.

3.14.2. Recursive Definition of EventData

The EventData class is container for the properties of an event in an incident. These properties include: the hosts involved, impact of the incident activity on the hosts, forensic logs, etc. The recursive definition of EventData allows for the grouping of related information with common properties. This approach eliminates the need for explicit identifiers to relate information or duplicate it. Instead, the relative depth (nesting) of a class is used to group (relate) information.

For example, consider a case where two hosts experience different impacts during an incident. However, these two hosts have common contact information. A depiction of how this situation would be represented can be found in Figure 30. EventData (2) and (3) group each of the two hosts with their unique impact. EventData (1) describes the common Contact class these two hosts share.
3.15. Expectation Class

The Expectation class conveys to the recipient of the IODEF document the actions the sender is requesting.

```
+-------------------------+
| Expectation             |
+-------------------------+
| ENUM action             |<--{0..*}--[ Description ] |
| STRING ext-action       |<--{0..*}--[ DefinedCOA ] |
| ENUM severity           |<--{0..1}--[ StartTime ]   |
| ENUM restriction        |<--{0..1}--[ EndTime ]     |
| STRING ext-restriction  |<--{0..1}--[ Contact ]     |
| ID observable-id        |<--{0..1}--|                 |
+-------------------------+
```

Figure 31: The Expectation Class

The aggregate classes of the Expectation class are:

**Description**
Zero or more. ML_STRING. A free-form text description of the desired action(s).

**DefinedCOA**
Zero or more. STRING. A unique identifier meaningful to the sender and recipient of this document that references a course of action. This class MUST be present if the action attribute is set to "defined-coa".

**StartTime**
Zero or one. DATETIME. The time at which the sender would like the action performed. A timestamp that is earlier than the ReportTime specified in the Incident class denotes that the sender
would like the action performed as soon as possible. The absence of this element indicates no expectations of when the recipient would like the action performed.

EndTime
Zero or one. DATETIME. The time by which the sender expects the recipient to complete the action. If the recipient cannot complete the action before EndTime, the recipient MUST NOT carry out the action. Because of transit delays and clock drift the sender MUST be prepared for the recipient to have carried out the action, even if it completes past EndTime.

Contact
Zero or one. The entity expected to perform the action. See Section 3.9.

The attributes of the Expectation class are:

action
Optional. ENUM. Classifies the type of action requested. The default value of "other". These values are maintained in the "Expectation-action" IANA registry per Section 10.2.

1. nothing. No action is requested. Do nothing with the information.
2. contact-source-site. Contact the site(s) identified as the source of the activity.
3. contact-target-site. Contact the site(s) identified as the target of the activity.
4. contact-sender. Contact the originator of the document.
5. investigate. Investigate the systems(s) listed in the event.
6. block-host. Block traffic from the machine(s) listed as sources the event.
7. block-network. Block traffic from the network(s) lists as sources in the event.
8. block-port. Block the port listed as sources in the event.
9. rate-limit-host. Rate-limit the traffic from the machine(s) listed as sources in the event.
10. rate-limit-network. Rate-limit the traffic from the network(s) lists as sources in the event.

11. rate-limit-port. Rate-limit the port(s) listed as sources in the event.

12. redirect-traffic. Redirect traffic from the intended recipient for further analysis.

13. honeypot. Redirect traffic from systems listed in the event to a honeypot for further analysis.

14. upgrade-software. Upgrade or patch the software or firmware on an asset listed in the event.

15. rebuild-asset. Reinstall the operating system or applications on an asset listed in the event.

16. harden-asset. Change the configuration an asset listed in the event to reduce the attack surface.

17. remediate-other. RemEDIATE the activity in a way other than by rate limiting or blocking.

18. status-triage. Confirm receipt and begin triaging the incident.

19. status-new-info. Notify the sender when new information is received for this incident.

20. watch-and-report. Watch for the described activity or indicators; and notify the sender when seen.

21. training. Train user to identify or mitigate the described threat.

22. defined-coa. Perform a predefined course of action (COA). The COA is named in the DefinedCOA class.

23. other. Perform a custom action described in the Description class.

24. ext-value. A value used to indicate that this attribute is extended and the actual value is provided using the corresponding ext-* attribute. See Section 5.1.1.
Optional. STRING. A means by which to extend the action attribute. See Section 5.1.1.

severity
Optional. ENUM. Indicates the desired priority of the action. This attribute is an enumerated list with no default value, and the semantics of these relative measures are context dependent.

1. low. Low priority
2. medium. Medium priority
3. high. High priority

restriction
Optional. ENUM. See Section 3.3.1. The default value is "default".

ext-restriction
Optional. STRING. A means by which to extend the restriction attribute. See Section 5.1.1.

observable-id
Optional. ID. See Section 3.3.2.

3.16. Flow Class

The Flow class describes the systems and networks involved in the incident; and the relationships between them.

```
+------------------+
| Flow             |
+------------------+
|                  |<>--{1..*}--[ System ]
+------------------+
```

Figure 32: The Flow Class

The aggregate class of the Flow class is:

System
One or More. A host or network involved in an event. See Section 3.17.

The Flow class has no attributes.
3.17. System Class

The System class describes a system or network involved in an event.

```
+------------------------+
| System                 |
+------------------------+
  | ENUM category          |<>----------[ Node            ]
  | STRING ext-category    |<>--{0..*}--[ NodeRole        ]
  | STRING interface       |<>--{0..*}--[ Service         ]
  | ENUM spoofed           |<>--(0..*)--[ OperatingSystem ]
  | ENUM virtual           |<>--(0..*)--[ Counter         ]
  | ENUM ownership         |<>--(0..*)--[ AssetID         ]
  | STRING ext-ownership   |<>--(0..*)--[ Description     ]
  | ENUM restriction       |<>--(0..*)--[ AdditionalData  ]
  | STRING ext-restriction |                          |
+------------------------+
```

Figure 33: The System Class

The aggregate classes of the System class are:

Node
   One. A host or network involved in the incident. See Section 3.18.

NodeRole
   Zero or more. The intended purpose of the system. See Section 3.18.2.

Service
   Zero or more. A network service running on the system. See Section 3.20.

OperatingSystem
   Zero or more. SOFTWARE. The operating system running on the system.

Counter
   Zero or more. A counter with which to summarize properties of this host or network. See Section 3.18.3.

AssetID
   Zero or more. STRING. An asset identifier for the System.

Description
   Zero or more. ML_STRING. A free-form text description of the System.
AdditionalData
Zero or more. EXTENSION. A mechanism by which to extend the data model.

The attributes of the System class are:

category
Optional. ENUM. Classifies the role the host or network played in the incident. These values are maintained in the "System-category" IANA registry per Section 10.2.

1. source. The System was the source of the event.
2. target. The System was the target of the event.
3. intermediate. The System was an intermediary in the event.
4. sensor. The System was a sensor monitoring the event.
5. infrastructure. The System was an infrastructure node of IODEF document exchange.
6. ext-value. A value used to indicate that this attribute is extended and the actual value is provided using the corresponding ext-* attribute. See Section 5.1.1.

ext-category
Optional. STRING. A means by which to extend the category attribute. See Section 5.1.1.

interface
Optional. STRING. Specifies the interface on which the event(s) on this System originated. If the Node class specifies a network rather than a host, this attribute has no meaning.

spoofed
Optional. ENUM. An indication of confidence in whether this System was the true target or attacking host. The permitted values for this attribute are shown below. The default value is "unknown".

1. unknown. The accuracy of the category attribute value is unknown.
2. yes. The category attribute value is likely incorrect. In the case of a source, the System is likely a decoy; with a target, the System was likely not the intended victim.
3. no. The category attribute value is believed to be correct.

virtual
Optional. ENUM. Indicates whether this System is a virtual or physical device. The default value is "unknown".
1. yes. The System is a virtual device.
2. no. The System is a physical device.
3. unknown. It is not known if the System is virtual.

ownership
Optional. ENUM. Describes the ownership of this System relative to the victim in the incident. These values are maintained in the "System-ownership" IANA registry per Section 10.2.
1. organization. Corporate or enterprise-owned.
2. personal. Personally-owned by an employee or affiliate of the corporation or enterprise.
3. partner. Owned by a partner of the corporation or enterprise.
4. customer. Owned by a customer of the corporation or enterprise.
5. no-relationship. Owned by an entity that has no known relationship with victim organization.
6. unknown. Ownership is unknown.
7. ext-value. A value used to indicate that this attribute is extended and the actual value is provided using the corresponding ext-* attribute. See Section 5.1.1.

ext-ownership
Optional. STRING. A means by which to extend the ownership attribute. See Section 5.1.1.

restriction
Optional. ENUM. See Section 3.3.1.

ext-restriction
Optional. STRING. A means by which to extend the restriction attribute. See Section 5.1.1.
3.18. Node Class

The Node class identifies a system, asset or network; and its location.

```
+-------------+
| Node        |
+-------------+
  |----------|<--{0..*}--[ DomainData ]|
  |----------|<--{0..*}--[ Address ]|
  |----------|<--{0..1}--[ PostalAddress ]|
  |----------|<--{0..*}--[ Location ]|
  |----------|<--{0..*}--[ Counter ]|
+-------------+
```

Figure 34: The Node Class

The aggregate classes of the Node class are:

DomainData
Zero or more. The domain (DNS) information associated with this Node. If an Address is not provided, at least one DomainData MUST be specified. See Section 3.19.

Address
Zero or more. The hardware, network, or application address of the Node. If a DomainData is not provided, at least one Address MUST be specified. See Section 3.18.1.

PostalAddress
Zero or one. POSTAL. The postal address of the node.

Location
Zero or more. ML_STRING. A free-form text description of the physical location of the Node. This description may provide a more detailed description of where in the PostalAddress this Node is found (e.g., room number, rack number, slot number in a chassis).

Counter
Zero or more. A counter with which to summarizes properties of this host or network. See Section 3.18.3.

The Node class has no attributes.
3.18.1. Address Class

The Address class represents a hardware (layer-2), network (layer-3), or application (layer-7) address.

```
+-------------------------+
| Address                 |
+-------------------------+
| STRING                  |
| ENUM category           |
| STRING ext-category     |
| STRING vlan-name        |
| INTEGER vlan-num        |
| ID observable-id        |
+-------------------------+
```

Figure 35: The Address Class

The content of the class is an address of type STRING whose semantics are determined by the category attribute.

The attributes of the Address class are:

- **category**
  - Required. ENUM. The type of address represented. The default value is "ipv6-addr". These values are maintained in the "Address-category" IANA registry per Section 10.2.
  1. **asn.** Autonomous System Number.
  2. **atm.** Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) address.
  3. **e-mail.** Email address (RFC 822).
  4. **ipv4-addr.** IPv4 host address in dotted-decimal notation (a.b.c.d).
  5. **ipv4-net.** IPv4 network address in dotted-decimal notation, slash, significant bits (i.e., a.b.c.d/nn).
  6. **ipv4-net-mask.** IPv4 network address in dotted-decimal notation, slash, network mask in dotted-decimal notation (i.e., a.b.c.d/w.x.y.z).
  7. **ipv6-addr.** IPv6 host address.
  8. **ipv6-net.** IPv6 network address, slash, significant bits.
9. ipv6-net-mask. IPv6 network address, slash, network mask.

10. mac. Media Access Control (MAC) address (i.e., a:b:c:d:e:f).

11. site-uri. A URL or URI for a resource.

12. ext-value. A value used to indicate that this attribute is extended and the actual value is provided using the corresponding ext-* attribute. See Section 5.1.1.

ext-category
   Optional. STRING. A means by which to extend the category attribute. See Section 5.1.1.

vlan-name
   Optional. STRING. The name of the Virtual LAN to which the address belongs.

vlan-num
   Optional. STRING. The number of the Virtual LAN to which the address belongs.

observable-id
   Optional. ID. See Section 3.3.2.

3.18.2. NodeRole Class

The NodeRole class describes the function performed by or role of a particular system, asset or network.

+-----------------------+
| NodeRole              |
+-----------------------+
| ENUM category          |<>--{0..*}--[ Description ] |
| STRING ext-category   |
+-----------------------+

Figure 36: The NodeRole Class

The aggregate class of the NodeRole class is:

Description
   Zero or more. ML_STRING. A free-form text description of the role of the system.

The attributes of the NodeRole class are:

category
Required. ENUM. Function or role of a node. These values are maintained in the "NodeRole-category" IANA registry per Section 10.2.

1. client. Client computer.
2. client-enterprise. Client computer on the enterprise network.
3. client-partner. Client computer on network of a partner.
4. client-remote. Client computer remotely connected to the enterprise network.
5. client-kiosk. Client computer serving as a kiosk.
6. client-mobile. Mobile device.
7. server-internal. Server with internal services.
8. server-public. Server with public services.
10. mail. Mail server.
11. webmail. Web mail server.
12. messaging. Messaging server (e.g., NNTP, IRC, IM).
14. voice. Voice server (e.g., SIP, H.323).
15. file. File server.
17. p2p. Peer-to-peer node.
18. name. Name server (e.g., DNS, WINS).
19. directory. Directory server (e.g., LDAP, finger, whois).
20. credential. Credential server (e.g., domain controller, Kerberos).
22. application. Application server.
23. database. Database server.
24. backup. Backup server.
25. dhcp. DHCP server.
26. assessment. Assessment server (e.g., vulnerability scanner, end-point assessment).
27. source-control. Source code control server.
29. monitoring. Security monitoring server (e.g., IDS).
30. infra. Infrastructure server (e.g., router, firewall, DHCP).
31. infra-firewall. Firewall.
32. infra-router. Router.
33. infra-switch. Switch.
34. camera. Camera and video system.
35. proxy. Proxy server.
36. remote-access. Remote access server.
37. log. Log server (e.g., syslog).
38. virtualization. Server running virtual machines.
40. scada. Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system.
41. scada-supervisory. Supervisory system for a SCADA.
42. sinkhole. Traffic sinkhole destination.
43. honeypot. Honeypot server.
44. anonymization. Anonymization server (e.g., Tor node).
45. c2-server. Malicious command and control server.
46. malware-distribution. Server that distributes malware
47. drop-server. Server to which exfiltrated content is uploaded.
48. hop-point. Intermediary server used to get to a victim.
49. reflector. A system used in a reflector attack.
50. phishing-site. Site hosting phishing content.
51. spear-phishing-site. Site hosting spear-phishing content.
52. recruiting-site. Site to recruit.
53. fraudulent-site. Fraudulent site.
54. ext-value. A value used to indicate that this attribute is extended and the actual value is provided using the corresponding ext-* attribute. See Section 5.1.1.

ext-category
Optional. STRING. A means by which to extend the category attribute. See Section 5.1.1.

3.18.3. Counter Class

The Counter class summarizes multiple occurrences of an event or conveys counts or rates of various features.

The complete semantics of this class are context dependent based on the class in which it is aggregated.
The content of the class is a value of type REAL whose meaning and units are determined by the type and duration attributes, respectively. If the duration attribute is present, the element content is a rather. Otherwise, it is a simple counter.

The attributes of the Counter class are:

type
  Required. ENUM. Specifies the type of counter specified in the element content. These values are maintained in the "Counter-type" IANA registry per Section 10.2.
  1. count. The Counter class value is a counter.
  2. peak. The Counter class value is a peak value.
  3. average. The Counter class value is an average.
  4. ext-value. A value used to indicate that this attribute is extended and the actual value is provided using the corresponding ext-* attribute. See Section 5.1.1.

ext-type
  Optional. STRING. A means by which to extend the type attribute. See Section 5.1.1.

unit
  Required. ENUM. Specifies the units of the element content. These values are maintained in the "Counter-unit" IANA registry per Section 10.2.
  1. byte. Bytes transferred.
2. mbit. Megabits (Mbits) transferred.
5. session. Sessions.
6. alert. Notifications generated by another system (e.g., IDS or SIM).
7. message. Messages (e.g., mail messages).
8. event. Events.
10. site. Site.
11. organization. Organizations.
12. ext-value. A value used to indicate that this attribute is extended and the actual value is provided using the corresponding ext-* attribute. See Section 5.1.1.

ext-unit
Optional. STRING. A means by which to extend the unit attribute. See Section 5.1.1.

meaning
Optional. STRING. A free-form text description of the metric represented by the Counter.

duration
Optional. ENUM. If present, the Counter class represents a rate. This attribute specifies unit of time over which the rate whose units are specified in the unit attribute is being conveyed. This attribute is the denominator of the rate (where the unit attribute specifies the nominator). The possible values of this attribute are defined in the duration attribute of Section 3.12.3

ext-duration
Optional. STRING. A means by which to extend the duration attribute. See Section 5.1.1.
3.19. DomainData Class

The DomainData class describes a domain name and meta-data associated with this domain.

```
+--------------------------+
| DomainData               |
+--------------------------+
| ENUM system-status       |<>--{0..1}--[ Name                 ]
| STRING ext-system-status |<>--{0..1}--[ DateDomainWasChecked ]
| ENUM domain-status       |<>--{0..1}--[ RegistrationDate    ]
| STRING ext-domain-status |<>--{0..1}--[ ExpirationDate      ]
| ID observable-id         |<>--{0..*}--[ RelatedDNS          ]
|                          |<>--{0..*}--[ Nameservers         ]
|                          |<>--{0..1}--[ DomainContacts      ]
+--------------------------+
```

Figure 38: The DomainData Class

The aggregate classes of the DomainData class are:

Name
One. STRING. The domain name of a system.

DateDomainWasChecked
Zero or one. DATETIME. A timestamp of when the domain listed in the Name class was resolved.

RegistrationDate
Zero or one. DATETIME. A timestamp of when domain listed in Name class was registered.

ExpirationDate
Zero or one. DATETIME. A timestamp of when the domain listed in Name class is set to expire.

RelatedDNS
Zero or more. EXTENSION. Additional DNS records associated with this domain.

Nameservers
Zero or more. The name servers identified for the domain listed in Name class. See Section 3.19.1.

DomainContacts
Zero or one. Contact information for the domain listed in Name class supplied by the registrar or through a whois query.
The attributes of the DomainData class are:

system-status
Required. ENUM. Assesses the domain’s involvement in the event. These values are maintained in the "DomainData-system-status" IANA registry per Section 10.2.
1. spoofed. This domain was spoofed.
2. fraudulent. This domain was operated with fraudulent intentions.
3. innocent-hacked. This domain was compromised by a third party.
4. innocent-hijacked. This domain was deliberately hijacked.
5. unknown. No categorization for this domain known.
6. ext-value. A value used to indicate that this attribute is extended and the actual value is provided using the corresponding ext-* attribute. See Section 5.1.1.

ext-system-status
Optional. STRING. A means by which to extend the system-status attribute. See Section 5.1.1.

domain-status
Required. ENUM. Categorizes the registry status of the domain at the time the document was generated. These values and their associated descriptions are derived from Section 3.2.2 of [RFC3982]. These values are maintained in the "DomainData-domain-status" IANA registry per Section 10.2.
1. reservedDelegation. The domain is permanently inactive.
2. assignedAndActive. The domain is in a normal state.
3. assignedAndInactive. The domain has an assigned registration but the delegation is inactive.
4. assignedAndOnHold. The domain is in dispute.
5. revoked. The domain is in the process of being purged from the database.
6. transferPending. The domain is pending a change in authority.
7. registryLock. The domain is on hold by the registry.

8. registrarLock. Same as "registryLock".

9. other. The domain has a known status but it is not one of the redefined enumerated values.

10. unknown. The domain has an unknown status.

11. ext-value. A value used to indicate that this attribute is extended and the actual value is provided using the corresponding ext-* attribute. See Section 5.1.1.

ext-domain-status
   Optional. STRING. A means by which to extend the domain-status attribute. See Section 5.1.1.

observable-id
   Optional. ID. See Section 3.3.2.

3.19.1. Nameservers Class

The Nameservers class describes the name servers associated with a given domain.

```
+--------------------+
| Nameservers        |
+--------------------+
    +------------------+
    | <----------[ Server ] |
    | <--(1..*)--[ Address ] |
    +------------------+
```

Figure 39: The Nameservers Class

The aggregate classes of the Nameservers class are:

Server
   One. STRING. The domain name of the name server.

Address
   One or more. The address of the name server. The value of the category attribute MUST be either "ipv4-addr" or "ipv6-addr". See Section 3.18.1.

The Nameservers class has no attributes.
3.19.2. DomainContacts Class

The DomainContacts class describes the contact information for a given domain provided either by the registrar or through a whois query.

This contact information can be explicitly described through a Contact class or a reference can be provided to a domain with identical contact information. Either a single SameDomainContact MUST be present or one or more Contact classes.

```
+-------------------+
| DomainContacts    |
+-------------------+
    |<--{(0..1)--[ SameDomainContact ] |
    |<--{(1..*})--[ Contact ] |
+-------------------+
```

Figure 40: The DomainContacts Class

The aggregate classes of the DomainContacts class are:

- **SameDomainContact**
  - Zero or one. STRING. A domain name already cited in this document or through previous exchange that contains the identical contact information as the domain name in question. The domain contact information associated with this domain should be used instead of an explicit definition with the Contact class.

- **Contact**
  - One or more. Contact information for the domain. See Section 3.9.

The DomainContacts class has no attributes.

3.20. Service Class

The Service class describes a network service. The service is described by protocol, port, protocol header field and application providing or using the service.
Figure 41: The Service Class

The aggregate classes of the Service class are:

ServiceName
Zero or one. A protocol name.

Port
Zero or one. INTEGER. A port number.

Portlist
Zero or one. PORTLIST. A list of port numbers.

ProtoCode
Zero or one. INTEGER. A transport layer (layer 4) protocol-specific code field (e.g., ICMP code field).

ProtoType
Zero or one. INTEGER. A transport layer (layer 4) protocol specific type field (e.g., ICMP type field).

ProtoField
Zero or one. INTEGER. A transport layer (layer 4) protocol specific flag field (e.g., TCP flag field).

ApplicationHeader
Zero or one. A protocol header. See Section 3.20.2.

EmailData
Zero or one. Headers associated with an email message. See Section 3.21.
Zero or one. SOFTWARE. The application acting as either the client or server for the service.

At least one of these classes MUST be present.

When a given System classes with category="source" and another with category="target" are aggregated into a single Flow class, and each of these System classes has a Service and Portlist class, an implicit relationship between these Portlists exists. If N ports are listed for a System@category="source", and M ports are listed for System@category="target", the number of ports in N must be equal to M. Likewise, the ports MUST be listed in an identical sequence such that the n-th port in the source corresponds to the n-th port of the target. If N is greater than 1, a given instance of a Flow class MUST only have a single instance of a System@category="source" and System@category="target".

The attributes of the Service class are:

- **ip-protocol**
  Optional. INTEGER. The IANA assigned IP protocol number per [IANA.Protocols] The attribute MUST be set if a Port, Portlist, ProtoCode, ProtoType, ProtoField class is present.

- **observable-id**
  Optional. ID. See Section 3.3.2.

### 3.20.1. ServiceName Class

The ServiceName class identifies an application protocol. It can be described by referencing an IANA registered protocol, a URL or with free-form text.

```
+------------------------+
| |                     |
| | ServiceName          |
| | +-------------------+ |
| | |                   | |
| | |<-<(0..1)--{ IANAService } |
| | |<-<(0..*)--{ URL }    |
| | |<-<(0..*)--{ Description } |
| +------------------------+
```

Figure 42: The ServiceName Class

The aggregate classes of the ServiceName class are:

- **IANAService**
  Zero or one. STRING. The name of the service per the "Service Name" field of the [IANA.Ports] registry.
URL
   Zero or more. URL. A URL to a resource describing the service.

Description
   Zero or more. ML_STRING. A free-form text description of the
   service.

At least one of these classes MUST be present.

The ServiceName class has no attributes.

3.20.2. ApplicationHeader Class

The ApplicationHeader class describes arbitrary fields from a
protocol header and its corresponding value.

+--------------------------+
| ApplicationHeader        |
+--------------------------+
|                          |<>--{1..*}--[ ApplicationHeaderField ]
+--------------------------+

Figure 43: The ApplicationHeader Class

The aggregate class of the ApplicationHeader class is:

ApplicationHeaderField
   One or more. EXTENSION. A field name and value in a protocol
   header. The ‘name’ attribute MUST be set to the field name. The
   field value MUST be set in the element content.

The ApplicationHeader class has no attributes.

3.21. EmailData Class

The EmailData class describes headers from an email message and
cryptographic hash and signatures applied to it.
The aggregate classes of the EmailData class are:

**EmailTo**
Zero or more. EMAIL. The value of the "To:" header field (Section 3.6.3 of [RFC5322]) in an email.

**EmailFrom**
Zero or one. EMAIL. The value of the "From:" header field (Section 3.6.2 of [RFC5322]) in an email.

**EmailSubject**
Zero or one. STRING. The value of the "Subject:" header field in an email. See Section 3.6.4 of [RFC5322].

**EmailX-Mailer**
Zero or one. STRING. The value of the "X-Mailer:" header field in an email.

**EmailHeaderField**
Zero or more. EXTENSION. The header name and value of an arbitrary header field of the email message. The 'name' attribute MUST be set to header name. The header value MUST be set in the element body. The dtype attribute MUST be set to "string".

**EmailHeaders**
Zero or one. STRING. The headers of an email message.

**EmailBody**
Zero or one. STRING. The body of an email message.

**EmailMessage**
Zero or one. STRING. The headers and body of an email message.

HashData
Zero or more. Hash(es) associated with this email message. See Section 3.26.

SignatureData
Zero or more. Signature(s) associated with this email message. See Section 3.27.

The attribute of the EmailData class is:

observable-id
Optional. ID. See Section 3.3.2.

3.22. Record Class

The Record class is a container class for log and audit data that provides supportive information about the events in an incident. The source of this data will often be the output of monitoring tools. These logs substantiate the activity described in the document.

+------------------------+
| Record                 |
+------------------------+
   ENUM restriction      | <>-(1..*)--[ RecordData ]
   STRING ext-restriction|
+------------------------+

Figure 45: Record Class

The aggregate classes of the Record class are:

RecordData
One or more. Log or audit data generated by a particular tool. Separate instances of the RecordData class SHOULD be used for each type of log. See Section 3.22.1.

The attributes of the Record class are:

restriction
Optional. ENUM. See Section 3.3.1.

ext-restriction
Optional. STRING. A means by which to extend the restriction attribute. See Section 5.1.1.
3.22.1. RecordData Class

The RecordData class describes or references log or audit data from a given type of tool and provides a means to annotate the output.

+------------------------+
| RecordData             |
+------------------------+
| ENUM restriction       |
| STRING ext-restriction |
| ID observable-id       |
| DateTime               |
| Application            |
| RecordPattern          |
| RecordItem             |
| URL                    |
| FileData               |
| WindowsRegistryKeysModified |
| CertificateData        |
| AdditionalData         |

Figure 46: The RecordData Class

The aggregate classes of the RecordData class are:

DateTime
Zero or one. DATETIME. A timestamp of the data found in the RecordItem or URL classes.

Description
Zero or more. ML_STRING. A free-form text description of the data provided in the RecordItem or URL classes.

Application
Zero or one. SOFTWARE. Identifies the tool used to generate the data in the RecordItem or URL classes.

RecordPattern
Zero or more. A search string to precisely find the relevant data in the RecordItem or URL classes. See Section 3.22.2.

RecordItem
Zero or more. EXTENSION. Log, audit, or forensic data to support the conclusions made during the course of analyzing the incident.

URL
Zero or more. URL. A URL reference to a log or audit data.
FileData
  Zero or one. The files involved in the incident. See Section 3.25.

WindowsRegistryKeysModified
  Zero or more. The registry keys that were involved in the incident. See Section 3.23.

CertificateData
  Zero or more. The certificates that were involved in the incident. See Section 3.24.

AdditionalData
  Zero or more. EXTENSION. An extension mechanism for data not explicitly represented in the data model.

At least one of the following classes MUST be present: RecordItem, URL, FileData, WindowsRegistryKeysModified, CertificateData or AdditionalData.

The attributes of the RecordData class are:

  restriction
    Optional. ENUM. See Section 3.3.1.

  ext-restriction
    Optional. STRING. A means by which to extend the restriction attribute. See Section 5.1.1.

  observable-id
    Optional. ID. See Section 3.3.2.

3.22.2. RecordPattern Class

The RecordPattern class describes where in the log data provided or referenced in RecordData class relevant information can be found. It provides a way to reference subsets of information, identified by a pattern, in a large log file, audit trail, or forensic data.
Figure 47: The RecordPattern Class

The content of the class is of type STRING and specifies a search pattern.

The attributes of the RecordPattern class are:

**type**  
Required. ENUM. Describes the type of pattern being specified in the element content. The default is "regex". These values are maintained in the "RecordPattern-type" IANA registry per Section 10.2.

1. regex. regular expression as defined by POSIX Extended Regular Expressions (ERE) in Chapter 9 of [IEEE.PSIX].
2. binary. Binhex encoded binary pattern, per the HEXBIN data type.
3. xpath. XML Path (XPath) [W3C.XPATH]
4. ext-value. A value used to indicate that this attribute is extended and the actual value is provided using the corresponding ext-* attribute. See Section 5.1.1.

**ext-type**  
Optional. STRING. A means by which to extend the type attribute. See Section 5.1.1.

**offset**  
Optional. INTEGER. Amount of units (determined by the offsetunit attribute) to seek into the RecordItem data before matching the pattern.

**offsetunit**
Optional. ENUM. Describes the units of the offset attribute. The default is "line". These values are maintained in the "RecordPattern-offsetunit" IANA registry per Section 10.2.

1. line. Offset is a count of lines.
2. byte. Offset is a count of bytes.
3. ext-value. A value used to indicate that this attribute is extended and the actual value is provided using the corresponding ext-* attribute. See Section 5.1.1.

ext-offsetunit
Optional. STRING. A means by which to extend the offsetunit attribute. See Section 5.1.1.

instance
Optional. INTEGER. Number of times to apply the specified pattern.

3.23. WindowsRegistryKeysModified Class

The WindowsRegistryKeysModified class describes Windows operating system registry keys and the operations that were performed on them. This class was derived from [RFC5901].

+-----------------------------+
| WindowsRegistryKeysModified |
+-----------------------------+

| ID observable-id | &gt;--{1..*}--[ Key ] |
+-----------------------------+

Figure 48: The WindowsRegistryKeysModified Class

The aggregate classes of the WindowsRegistryKeysModified class are:

Key
One or more. The Window registry key. See Section 3.23.1.

The attribute of the WindowsRegistryKeysModified class is:

observable-id
Optional. ID. See Section 3.3.2.
3.23.1. Key Class

The Key class describes a Windows operating system registry key name and value pair, and the operation performed on it.

```
+---------------------------+
| Key                       |
+---------------------------+
| ENUM registryaction       |<>----------[ KeyName  ]
| STRING ext-registryaction |<>--(0..1)--[ KeyValue ]
| ID observable-id          |
+---------------------------+
```

Figure 49: The Key Class

The aggregate classes of the Key class are:

KeyName
One. STRING. The name of a Windows operating system registry key (e.g., [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Test\KeyName])

KeyValue
Zero or one. STRING. The value of the registry key identified in the KeyName class encoded per the .reg file format [KB310516].

The attributes of the Key class are:

registryaction
Optional. ENUM. The type of action taken on the registry key. These values are maintained in the "Key-registryaction" IANA registry per Section 10.2.

1. add-key. Registry key added.
2. add-value. Value added to a registry key.
3. delete-key. Registry key deleted.
4. delete-value. Value deleted from a registry key.
5. modify-key. Registry key modified.
6. modify-value. Value modified in a registry key.
7. ext-value. A value used to indicate that this attribute is extended and the actual value is provided using the corresponding ext-* attribute. See Section 5.1.1.
ext-registryaction
  Optional. STRING. A means by which to extend the registryaction attribute. See Section 5.1.1.

observable-id
  Optional. ID. See Section 3.3.2.

3.24. CertificateData Class

The CertificateData class describes X.509 certificates.

+------------------------+
| CertificateData        |
+------------------------+
| ENUM restriction       |<--[ Certificate    |
| STRING ext-restriction |
| ID observable-id       | }--{1..*}--| Certificate
+------------------------+

Figure 50: The CertificateData Class

The aggregate classes of the CertificateData class are:

Certificate
  One or more. A description of an X.509 certificate or certificate chain. See Section 3.24.1.

The attributes of the CertificateData class are:

restriction
  Optional. ENUM. See Section 3.3.1.

ext-restriction
  Optional. STRING. A means by which to extend the restriction attribute. See Section 5.1.1.

observable-id
  Optional. ID. See Section 3.3.2.

3.24.1. Certificate Class

The Certificate class describes a given X.509 certificate or certificate chain.
The aggregate classes of the Certificate class are:

\texttt{ds:X509Data}

One. A given X.509 certificate or chain. See Section 4.4.4 of [W3C.XMLSIG].

\texttt{Description}

Zero or more. ML\_STRING. A free-form text description explaining the context of this certificate.

The attributes of the Certificate class are:

\texttt{observable-id}

Optional. ID. See Section 3.3.2.

3.25. FileData Class

The FileData class describes a file or set of files.

The aggregate classes of the FileData class are:

\texttt{File}

One or more. A description of a file. See Section 3.25.1.
ext-restriction
  Optional. STRING. A means by which to extend the restriction attribute. See Section 5.1.1.

observable-id
  Optional. ID. See Section 3.3.2.

3.25.1. File Class

The File class describes a file; its associated meta data; and cryptographic hashes and signatures applied to it.

+-----------------------+
| File                  |
+-----------------------+
    | ID observable-id     |
    |<--{0..1}--[ FileName  ] |
    |<--{0..1}--[ FileSize  ] |
    |<--{0..1}--[ FileType  ] |
    |<--{0..*}--[ URL      ] |
    |<--{0..1}--[ HashData  ] |
    |<--{0..1}--[ SignatureData ] |
    |<--{0..1}--[ AssociatedSoftware ] |
    |<--{0..*}--[ FileProperties ] |
+-----------------------+

Figure 53: The File Class

The aggregate classes of the File class are:

FileName
  Zero or One. STRING. The name of the file.

FileSize
  Zero or One. INTEGER. The size of the file in bytes.

FileType
  Zero or One. STRING. The type of file per the IANA Media Types Registry [IANA.Media]. Valid values correspond to the text in the "Template" column (e.g., "application/pdf").

URL
  Zero or more. URL. A URL reference to the file.

HashData
  Zero or One. Hash(es) associated with this file. See Section 3.26.

SignatureData
Zero or One. Signature(s) associated with this file. See Section 3.27.

AssociatedSoftware
Zero or One. SOFTWARE. The software application or operating system to which this file belongs or by which it can be processed.

FileProperties
Zero or more. EXTENSION. Mechanism by which to extend the data model to describe properties of the file.

The attributes of the File class are:

observable-id
Optional. ID. See Section 3.3.2.

3.26. HashData Class

The HashData class describes different types of hashes on an given object (e.g., file, part of a file, email).

+--------------------------+
| HashData                |
+--------------------------+
| ENUM scope               |<)--(0..1)--[ HashTargetID ] |
|                         |<)--(0..*)--[ Hash ] |
|                         |<)--(0..*)--[ FuzzyHash ] |
+--------------------------+

Figure 54: The HashData Class

The aggregate classes of the HashData class are:

HashTargetID
Zero or One. STRING. An identifier that references a subset of the object being hashed. The semantics of this identifier are specified by the scope attribute.

Hash
Zero or more. The hash of an object. See Section 3.26.1.

FuzzyHash
Zero or more. The fuzzy hash of an object. See Section 3.26.2.

At least one instance of either Hash or FuzzyHash MUST be present.

The attribute of the HashData class is:
scope

Required. ENUM. Describes on which part of the object the hash should be applied. These values are maintained in the "HashData-scope" IANA registry per Section 10.2.

1. file-contents. A hash computed over the entire contents of a file.

2. file-pe-section. A hash computed on a given section of a Windows Portable Executable (PE) file. If set to this value, the HashTargetID class MUST identify the section being hashed. A section is identified by an ordinal number (starting at 1) corresponding to the order in which the given section header was defined in the Section Table of the PE file header.

3. file-pe-iat. A hash computed on the Import Address Table (IAT) of a PE file. As IAT hashes are often tool dependent, if this value is set, the Application class of either the Hash or FuzzyHash classes MUST specify the tool used to generate the hash.

4. file-pe-resource. A hash computed on a given resource in a PE file. If set to this value, the HashTargetID class MUST identify the resource being hashed. A resource is identified by an ordinal number (starting at 1) corresponding to the order in which the given resource is declared in the Resource Directory of the Data Dictionary in the PE file header.

5. file-pdf-object. A hash computed on a given object in a Portable Document Format (PDF) file. If set to this value, the HashTargetID class MUST identify the object being hashed. This object is identified by its offset in the PDF file.

6. email-hash. A hash computed over the headers and body of an email message.

7. email-headers-hash. A hash computed over all of the headers of an email message.

8. email-body-hash. A hash computed over the body of an email message.

9. ext-value. A value used to indicate that this attribute is extended and the actual value is provided using the corresponding ext-* attribute. See Section 5.1.1.

ext-scope
Optional.  STRING.  A means by which to extend the scope attribute.  See Section 5.1.1.

3.26.1. Hash Class

The Hash class describes a cryptographic hash value; the algorithm and application used to generate it; and the canonicalization method applied to the object being hashed.

+----------------+  
| Hash           |  
+----------------+  
|                |<>----------[ ds:DigestMethod            ]  
|                |<>----------[ ds:DigestValue             ]  
|<>--{0..1}--[ ds:CanonicalizationMethod  ]  
|<>--{0..1}--[ Application                      ]  

Figure 55: The Hash Class

The aggregate classes of the Hash class are:

ds:DigestMethod
    One.  The hash algorithm used to generate the hash.  See Section 4.3.3.5 of [W3C.XMLSIG]

ds:DigestValue
    One.  The computed hash value.  See Section 4.3.3.6 of [W3C.XMLSIG].

ds:CanonicalizationMethod
    Zero or one.  The canonicalization method used on the object being hashed.  See Section 4.3.1 of [W3C.XMLSIG].

Application
    Zero or One.  SOFTWARE.  The application used to calculate the hash.

The HashData class has no attributes.

3.26.2. FuzzyHash Class

The FuzzyHash class describes a fuzzy hash and the application used to generate it.
The aggregate classes of the FuzzyHash class are:

FuzzyHashValue
  One or more. EXTENSION. The computed fuzzy hash value.

Application
  Zero or one. SOFTWARE. The application used to calculate the hash.

AdditionalData
  Zero or more. EXTENSION. Mechanism by which to extend the data model.

The FuzzyData class has no attributes.

3.27. SignatureData Class

The SignatureData class describes different types of digital signatures on an object.

Signature
  One or more. An given signature. See Section 4.2 of [W3C.XMLSIG]

The SignatureData class has no attributes.
3.28. IndicatorData Class

The IndicatorData class describes cyber indicators and meta-data associated with them.

+--------------------------+
| IndicatorData            |
+--------------------------+
|                          |<>--{1..*}--[ Indicator ]
+--------------------------+

Figure 58: The IndicatorData Class

The aggregate class of the IndicatorData class is:

Indicator
  One or more. A description of an indicator. See Section 3.29.

The IndicatorData class has no attributes.

3.29. Indicator Class

The Indicator class describes a cyber indicator. An indicator consists of observable features and phenomenon that aid in the forensic or proactive detection of malicious activity; and associated meta-data. An indicator can be described outright; by referencing or composing previously defined indicators; or by referencing observables described in the incident report found in this document.
The aggregate classes of the Indicator class are:

IndicatorID
One. An identifier for this indicator. See Section 3.29.1

AlternativeIndicatorID
Zero or more. An alternative identifier for this indicator. See Section 3.29.2

Description
Zero or more. ML_STRING. A free-form text description of the indicator.

StartTime
Zero or one. DATETIME. A timestamp of the start of the time period during which this indicator is valid.

EndTime
Zero or one. DATETIME. A timestamp of the end of the time period during which this indicator is valid.

Confidence
Zero or one. An estimate of the confidence in the quality of the indicator. See Section 3.12.5.

Contact
Zero or more. Contact information for this indicator. See Section 3.9.

Observable
Zero or one. An observable feature or phenomenon of this indicator. See Section 3.29.3.

ObservableReference
Zero or one. A reference to an observable feature or phenomenon defined elsewhere in the document. See Section 3.29.6.

IndicatorExpression
Zero or one. A composition of observables. See Section 3.29.4.

IndicatorReference
Zero or one. A reference to an indicator. See Section 3.29.7.

NodeRole
Zero or more. The role of the system in the attack should this indicator be matched to it. See Section 3.18.2.

AttackPhase
Zero or more. The phase in an attack lifecycle during which this indicator might be seen. See Section 3.29.8.

Reference
Zero or more. A reference to additional information relevant to this indicator. See Section 3.11.1.

AdditionalData
Zero or more. EXTENSION. Mechanism by which to extend the data model.

The Indicator class MUST have exactly one instance of an Observable, IndicatorExpression, ObservableReference, or IndicatorReference class.

The StartTime and EndTime classes can be used to define an interval during which the indicator is valid. If both classes are present, the indicator is consider valid only during the described interval. If neither class is provided, the indicator is considered valid during any time interval. If only a StartTime is provided, the indicator is valid anytime after this timestamp. If only an EndTime is provided, the indicator is valid anytime prior to this timestamp.

The attributes of the Indicator class are:
Optional. ENUM. See Section 3.3.1.

ext-restriction
Optional. STRING. A means by which to extend the restriction attribute. See Section 5.1.1.

3.29.1. IndicatorID Class

The IndicatorID class identifies an indicator with a globally unique identifier. The combination of the name and version attributes, and the element content form this identifier. Indicators generated by given CSIRT MUST NOT reuse the same value unless they are referencing the same indicator.

```
+------------------+
| IndicatorID      |
+------------------+
| ID               |
    | STRING name     |
    | STRING version  |
+------------------+
```

Figure 60: The IndicatorID Class

The content of the class is of type ID and specifies an identifier for an indicator.

The attributes of the IndicatorID class are:

name
Required. STRING. An identifier describing the CSIRT that created the indicator. In order to have a globally unique CSIRT name, the fully qualified domain name associated with the CSIRT MUST be used. This format is identical to the IncidentID@name attribute in Section 3.4.

version
Required. STRING. A version number of an indicator.

3.29.2. AlternativeIndicatorID Class

The AlternativeIndicatorID class lists alternative identifiers for an indicator.
The aggregate class of the AlternativeIndicatorID class is:

IndicatorReference
   One or more. A reference to an indicator. See Section 3.29.7

The attributes of the AlternativeIndicatorID class are:

restriction
   Optional. ENUM. See Section 3.3.1.

ext-restriction
   Optional. STRING. A means by which to extend the restriction attribute. See Section 5.1.1.

3.29.3. Observable Class

The Observable class describes a feature and phenomenon that can be observed or measured for the purposes of detecting malicious behavior.
Figure 62: The Observable Class

The aggregate classes of the Observable class are:

Address
Zero or one. An Address observable. See Section 3.18.1.

DomainData
Zero or one. A DomainData observable. See Section 3.19.

Service
Zero or one. A Service observable. See Section 3.20.

EmailData
Zero or one. A EmailData observable. See Section 3.21.

WindowsRegistryKeysModified
Zero or one. A WindowsRegistryKeysModified observable. See Section 3.23.

FileData
Zero or one. A FileData observable. See Section 3.25.

CertificateData
RegistryHandle
  Zero or one. A RegistryHandle observable. See Section 3.9.1.

RecordData
  Zero or one. A RecordData observable. See Section 3.22.1.

EventData
  Zero or one. An EventData observable. See Section 3.14.

Incident
  Zero or one. An Incident observable. See Section 3.2.

EventData
  Zero or one. An EventData observable. See Section 3.14.

Expectation
  Zero or one. An Expectation observable. See Section 3.15.

Reference
  Zero or one. A Reference observable. See Section 3.11.1.

Assessment
  Zero or one. An Assessment observable. See Section 3.12.

HistoryItem
  Zero or one. A HistoryItem observable. See Section 3.13.1.

BulkObservable
  Zero or one. A bulk list of observables. See Section 3.29.3.1.

AdditionalData
  Zero or more. EXTENSION. Mechanism by which to extend the data model.

The Observable class MUST have exactly one of the possible child classes.

The attributes of the Observable class are:

  restriction
    Optional. ENUM. See Section 3.3.1.

  ext-restriction
    Optional. STRING. A means by which to extend the restriction attribute. See Section 5.1.1.
3.29.3.1. BulkObservable Class

The BulkObservable class allows the enumeration of a single type of observables without requiring each one to be encoded individually in multiple instances of the same class.

The type attribute describes the type of observable listed in the child BulkObservableList class. The BulkObservableFormat class optionally provides additional meta-data.

```
+---------------------------+
| BulkObservable            |
+---------------------------+
| ENUM type                 |<>--(0..1)--[ BulkObservableFormat ] |
| STRING ext-type           |<------------[ BulkObservableList ] |
|                            |<>--(0..*)--[ AdditionalData ] |
+---------------------------+
```

Figure 63: The BulkObservable Class

The aggregate classes of the BulkObservable class are:

BulkObservableFormat
Zero or one. Provides additional meta-data about the observables enumerated in the BulkObservableList class. See Section 3.29.3.1.1.

BulkObservableList
One. STRING. A list of observables, one per line. Each line is separated with either a LF character or CR-and-LF characters. The type attribute specifies which observables will be listed.

AdditionalData
Zero or more. EXTENSION. Mechanism by which to extend the data model.

The attributes of the BulkObservable class are:

**type**
Optional. ENUM. The type of the observable listed in the child ObservableList class. These values are maintained in the "BulkObservable-type" IANA registry per Section 10.2.

1. **asn.** Autonomous System Number (per the Address@category attribute).

2. **atm.** Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) address (per the Address@category attribute).
3. e-mail. Electronic mail address (RFC 822) (per the Address@category attribute).

4. ipv4-addr. IPv4 host address in dotted-decimal notation (e.g., 192.0.2.1) (per the Address@category attribute).

5. ipv4-net. IPv4 network address in dotted-decimal notation, slash, significant bits (e.g., 192.0.2.0/24) (per the Address@category attribute).

6. ipv4-net-mask. IPv4 network address in dotted-decimal notation, slash, network mask in dotted-decimal notation (i.e., 192.0.2.0/255.255.255.0) (per the Address@category attribute).

7. ipv6-addr. IPv6 host address (e.g., 2001:DB8::3) (per the Address@category attribute).

8. ipv6-net. IPv6 network address, slash, significant bits (e.g., 2001:DB8::/32) (per the Address@category attribute).

9. ipv6-net-mask. IPv6 network address, slash, network mask (per the Address@category attribute).

10. mac. Media Access Control (MAC) address (i.e., a:b:c:d:e:f) (per the Address@category attribute).

11. site-uri. A URL or URI for a resource (per the Address@category attribute).

12. domain-name. A fully qualified domain name or part of a name. (e.g., fqdn.example.com, example.com).

13. domain-to-ipv4. A fqdn-to-IPv4 address mapping specified as a comma separated list (e.g., "fqdn.example.com, 192.0.2.1").

14. domain-to-ipv6. A fqdn-to-IPv6 address mapping specified as a comma separated list (e.g., "fqdn.example.com, 2001:DB8::3").

15. domain-to-ipv4-timestamp. Same as domain-to-ipv4 but with a timestamp (in the DATETIME format) of the resolution (e.g., "fqdn.example.com, 192.0.2.1, 2015-06-11T00:38:31-06:00").

16. domain-to-ipv6-timestamp. Same as domain-to-ipv6 but with a timestamp (in the DATETIME format) of the resolution (e.g., "fqdn.example.com, 2001:DB8::3, 2015-06-11T00:38:31-06:00").
17. **ipv4-port.** An IPv4 address, port and protocol tuple (e.g., 192.0.2.1, 80, tcp). The protocol name corresponds to the "Keyword" column in the [IANA.Protocols] registry.

18. **ipv6-port.** An IPv6 address, port and protocol tuple (e.g., 2001:DB8::3, 80, tcp). The protocol name corresponds to the "Keyword" column in the [IANA.Protocols] registry.

19. **windows-reg-key.** A Microsoft Windows Registry key.

20. **file-hash.** A file hash. The format of this hash is described in the Hash class that MUST be present in a sibling BulkObservableFormat class.

21. **email-x-mailer.** An X-Mailer field from an email.

22. **email-subject.** An email subject line.

23. **http-user-agent.** A User Agent field from an HTTP request header (e.g., "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; WOW64; rv:38.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/38.0").

24. **http-request-uri.** The Request URI from an HTTP request header.

25. **mutex.** The name of a system mutex.

26. **file-path.** A file path (e.g., "/tmp/local/file", "c:\windows\system32\file.sys")

27. **user-name.** A username.

28. **ext-value.** A value used to indicate that this attribute is extended and the actual value is provided using the corresponding ext-* attribute. See Section 5.1.1.

   **ext-type**
   Optional. STRING. A means by which to extend the type attribute. See Section 5.1.1.

3.29.3.1.1. **BulkObservableFormat Class**

The ObservableFormat class specifies meta-data about the format of an observable enumerated in a sibling BulkObservableList class.
The aggregate classes of the BulkObservableFormat class are:

Hash
Zero or one. Describes the format of a hash. See Section 3.26.1.

AdditionalData
Zero or more. EXTENSION. Mechanism by which to extend the data model.

The BulkObservableFormat class has no attributes.

Either Hash or AdditionalData MUST be present.

3.29.4. IndicatorExpression Class

The IndicatorExpression describes an expression composed of observed phenomenon or features, or indicators. Elements of the expression can be described directly, reference relevant data from other parts of a given IODEF document, or reference previously defined indicators.

All child classes of a given instance of IndicatorExpression form a boolean algebraic expression where the operator between them is determined by the operator attribute.

The aggregate classes of the IndicatorExpression class are:
IndicatorExpression
Zero or more. An expression composed of other observables or indicators. See Section 3.29.4.

Observable
Zero or more. A description of an observable. See Section 3.29.3.

ObservableReference
Zero or more. A reference to an observable. See Section 3.29.6.

IndicatorReference
Zero or more. A reference to an indicator. See Section 3.29.7.

AdditionalData
Zero or more. EXTENSION. Mechanism by which to extend the data model.

The attributes of the IndicatorExpression class are:

operator
Optional. ENUM. The operator to be applied between the child elements. See Section 3.29.5 for parsing guidance. The default value is "and". These values are maintained in the "IndicatorExpression-operator" IANA registry per Section 10.2.

1. not. negation operator.
2. and. conjunction operator.
3. or. disjunction operator.
4. xor. exclusive disjunction operator.

ext-operator
Optional. STRING. A means by which to extend the operator attribute. See Section 5.1.1.

3.29.5. Expressions with IndicatorExpression

Boolean algebraic expressions can be used to specify relationships between observables and indicator. These expressions are constructed through the use of the operator attribute and parent-child relationships in IndicatorExpressions. These expressions should be parsed as follows:

1. The operator specified by the operator attribute is applied between each of the child elements of the immediate parent
IndicatorExpression element. If no operator attribute is specified, it should be assumed to be the conjunction operator (i.e., operator="and").

2. A nested IndicatorExpression element with a parent IndicatorExpression is the equivalent of a parentheses in the expression.

The following four examples in Figure 66 through Figure 69 illustrate these parsing rules:

1     : <IndicatorExpression>
2 [O1]:    <Observable>..</Observable>
3 [O2]:    <Observable>..</Observable>
4     : </IndicatorExpression>

Equivalent expression: (O1 AND O2)

Figure 66: Nested elements in an IndicatorExpression without an operator attribute specified

1     : <IndicatorExpression operator="or">
2 [O1]:    <Observable>..</Observable>
3 [O2]:    <Observable>..</Observable>
4     : </IndicatorExpression>

Equivalent expression: (O1 OR O2)

Figure 67: Nested elements in an IndicatorExpression with an operator attribute specified

1     : <IndicatorExpression operator="or">
2     :    <IndicatorExpression operator="or">
2 [O1]:      <Observable>..</Observable>
3 [O2]:      <Observable>..</Observable>
4     :    </IndicatorExpression>
2 [O3]:    <Observable>..</Observable>
4     : </IndicatorExpression>

Equivalent expression: ((O1 OR O2) OR O3)

Figure 68: Nested elements with a recursive IndicatorExpression with an operator attribute specified
1 : <IndicatorExpression operator="not">
2 :   <IndicatorExpression operator="and">
2 [O1]:   <Observable>..</Observable>
3 [O2]:   <Observable>..</Observable>
4 : </IndicatorExpression>
4 : </IndicatorExpression>

Equivalent expression: (NOT (O1 AND O2))

Figure 69: A recursive IndicatorExpression with an operator attribute specified

Invalid algebraic expressions while valid XML, MUST not be specified.

3.29.6. ObservableReference Class

The ObservableReference describes a reference to an observable feature or phenomenon described elsewhere in the document.

The ObservableReference class has no content.

+-------------------------+
| ObservableReference     |
+-------------------------+
| IDREF uid-ref           |
+-------------------------+

Figure 70: The ObservableReference Class

The ObservableReference class has no content.

The attribute of the ObservableReference class is:

uid-ref
  Required. IDREF. An identifier that serves as a reference to a class in the IODEF document. The referenced class will have this identifier set in its observable-id attribute.

3.29.7. IndicatorReference Class

The IndicatorReference describes a reference to an indicator. This reference may be to an indicator described in this IODEF document or in a previously exchanged IODEF document.

The IndicatorReference class has no content.
The attributes of the IndicatorReference class are:

uid-ref
Optional. IDREF. An identifier that references an Indicator class in the IODEF document. The referenced Indicator class will have this identifier set in its IndicatorID class.

euid-ref
Optional. STRING. An identifier that references an IndicatorID not in this IODEF document.

version
Optional. STRING. A version number of an indicator.

Either the uid-ref or the euid-ref attribute MUST be set.

3.29.8. AttackPhase Class

The AttackPhase class describes a particular phase of an attack lifecycle.

The aggregate classes of the AttackPhase class are:

AttackPhaseID
Zero or more. STRING. An identifier for the phase of the attack.

URL
Zero or more.  URL.  A URL to a resource describing this phase of the attack.

Description
Zero or more.  ML_STRING.  A free-form text description of this phase of the attack.

AdditionalData
Zero or more.  EXTENSION.  A mechanism by which to extend the data model.

AttackPhase MUST have at least one instance of a child class.

The AttackPhase class has no attributes.

4.  Processing Considerations

This section provides additional requirements and guidance on creating and processing IODEF documents.

4.1.  Encoding

Every IODEF document MUST begin with an XML declaration and MUST specify the XML version used.  The character encoding MUST also be explicitly specified.  UTF-8 [RFC3629] SHOULD be used unless UTF-16 [RFC2781] is necessary.  Encodings other than UTF-8 and UTF-16 SHOULD NOT be used.  The IODEF conforms to all XML data encoding conventions and constraints.

The XML declaration with no character encoding will read as follows:

```xml
<?xml version="1.0" ?>
```

When a character encoding is specified, the XML declaration will read as follows:

```xml
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="charset" ?>
```

Where "charset" is the name of the character encoding as registered with the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), see [RFC2978].

The following characters have special meaning in XML and MUST be escaped with their entity reference equivalent: "&", "<", ">", "\" (double quotation mark), and "'" (apostrophe).  These entity references are "&amp;", "&lt;", "&gt;", "&quot;", and "&apos;" respectively.
4.2. IODEF Namespace

The IODEF schema declares a namespace of "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-2.0" and registers it per [W3C.XMLNS]. Each IODEF document MUST include a valid reference to the IODEF schema using the "xsi:schemaLocation" attribute. An example of such a declaration would look as follows:

```xml
<IODEF-Document
    version="2.00" lang="en-US"
    xmlns:iodef="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-2.0"
    xsi:schemaLocation="urn:ietf:params:xmls:schema:iodef-2.0" ...>
```

4.3. Validation

IODEF documents MUST be well-formed XML. It is RECOMMENDED that recipients validate the document against the schema described in Section 8. However, mere conformance to this schema is not sufficient for a semantically valid IODEF document. The text of Section 3 describes further formatting and constraints; some that cannot be conveniently encoded in the schema. These MUST must also be considered by an IODEF implementation. Furthermore, the enumerated values present in this document are a static list that will be incomplete over time as select attributes can be extended by a corresponding IANA registry per Section 10.2. Therefore, the schema to validate a given document MUST be dynamically generated from these registry values.

4.4. Incompatibilities with v1

The IODEF data model in this document makes a number of changes to [RFC5070]. These changes were largely additive -- classes and enumerated values were added. However, some incompatibilities between [RFC5070] and this new specification were introduced. These incompatibilities are as follows:

- The IODEF-Document@version attribute is set to "2.0".
- Attributes with enumerated values can now also be extended with IANA registries.
- All iodef:MLStringType classes use xml:lang. IODEF-Document also uses xml:lang.
- The Service@ip_protocol attribute was renamed to @ip-protocol.
- The Node/NodeName class was removed in favor of representing domain names with Node/DomainData/Name class. The Node/DataTime...
class was also removed so that the Node/DomainData/
DateDomainWasChecked class can represent the time at which the
name to address resolution occurred.

- The Node/NodeRole class was moved to System/NodeRole.

- The Reference class is now defined by [RFC-ENUM].

- The data previously represented in the Impact class is now in the
SystemImpact and IncidentCategory classes. The Impact class has
been removed.

- The semantics of Counter@type are now represented in Counter@unit.

- The IODEF-Document@formatid attribute has been renamed to @format-
id.

- Incident/ReportTime is no longer mandatory. However,
GenerationTime is.

- The Fax class was removed and is now represented by a generic
Telephone class.

- The Telephone, Email and PostalAddress classes were redefined from
improved internationalization.

5. Extending the IODEF

In order to support the dynamic nature of security operations, the
IODEF data model will need to continue to evolve. This section
discusses how new data elements can be incorporated into the IODEF.
There is support to add additional enumerated values and new classes.
Adding additional attributes to existing classes is not supported.

These extension mechanisms are designed so that adding new data
elements is possible without requiring a modifications to this
document. Extensions can be implemented publicly or privately. With
proven value, well documented extensions can be incorporated into
future versions of the specification.

5.1. Extending the Enumerated Values of Attributes

Additional enumerated values can be added to select attributes either
through the use of specially marked attributes with the "ext-" prefix
or through a set of corresponding IANA registries. The former
approach allows for the extension to remain private. The latter
approach is public.
5.1.1. Private Extension of Enumerated Values

The data model supports adding new enumerated values to an attribute without public registration. For each attribute that supports this extension technique, there is a corresponding attribute in the same element whose name is identical but with a prefix of "ext-". This special attribute is referred to as the extension attribute. The attribute being extended is referred to as an extensible attribute. For example, an extensible attribute named "foo" will have a corresponding extension attribute named "ext-foo". An element may have many extensible attributes.

In addition to a corresponding extension attribute, each extensible attribute has "ext-value" as one its possible enumerated values. Selection of this particular value in an extensible attribute signals that the extension attribute contains data. Otherwise, this "ext-value" value has no meaning.

In order to add a new enumerated value to an extensible attribute, the value of this attribute MUST be set to "ext-value", and the new desired value MUST be set in the corresponding extension attribute. For example, extending the type attribute of the SystemImpact class would look as follows:

```xml
<SystemImpact type="ext-value" ext-type="new-attack-type">
```

A given extension attribute MUST NOT be set unless the corresponding extensible attribute has been set to "ext-value".

5.1.2. Public Extension of Enumerated Values

The data model also supports publicly extending select enumerated attributes. A new entry can be added by registering a new entry in the appropriate IANA registry. Section 10.2 provides a mapping between the extensible attributes and their corresponding registry. Section 4.3 discusses the XML Validation implications of this type of extension. All extensible attributes that support private extensions also support public extensions.

5.2. Extending Classes

Classes of the EXTENSION (iodef:ExtensionType) type can extend the data model. They provide the ability to have new atomic or XML-encoded data elements in all of the top-level classes of the Incident class and a few of the complex subordinate classes. As there are multiple instances of the extensible classes in the data model, there is discretion on where to add a new data element. It is RECOMMENDED
that the extension be placed in the most closely related class to the new information.

Extensions using the atomic data types (i.e., all values of the dtype attributes other than "xml") MUST:

1. Set the element content to the desired value, and
2. Set the dtype attribute to correspond to the data type of the element content.

The following guidelines exist for extensions using XML (i.e., dtype="xml"):

1. The element content of the extensible class MUST be set to the desired value and the dtype attribute MUST be set to "xml".
2. The extension schema MUST declare a separate namespace. It is RECOMMENDED that these extensions have the prefix "iodef-". This recommendation makes readability of the document easier by allowing the reader to infer which namespaces relate to IODEF by inspection.
3. It is RECOMMENDED that extension schemas follow the naming convention of the IODEF data model. This too improves the readability of extended IODEF documents. The names of all elements SHOULD be capitalized. For elements with composed names, a capital letter SHOULD be used for each word. Attribute names SHOULD be in lower case. Attributes with composed names SHOULD be separated by a hyphen.
4. Implementations that encounter an unrecognized element in a supported namespace MUST reject the document as a syntax error.
5. There are security and performance implications in requiring implementations to dynamically download schemas at runtime. Therefore, implementations SHOULD NOT download schemas at runtime unless the appropriate precautions are taken. Implementations also need to contend with the potential of significant network and processing issues.
6. Some adopters of the IODEF may have private schema definitions that are not publicly available. Thus implementations may encounter IODEF documents with references to private schemas that may not be resolvable. Hence, IODEF document recipients MUST be prepared for a schema definition in an IODEF document never to resolve.
The following schema and XML document excerpt provide a template for an extension schema and its use in the IODEF document.

This example schema defines a namespace of "iodef-extension1" and a single element named "newdata".

```xml
<xs:schema
  targetNamespace="iodef-extension1.xsd"
  xmlns:iodef-extension1="iodef-extension1.xsd"
  xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema">
  <xs:import
    namespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-2.0"
    schemaLocation="urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:iodef-2.0"/>
  <xs:element name="newdata" type="xs:string" />
</xs:schema>
```

The following XML excerpt demonstrates the use of the above schema as an extension to the IODEF.

```xml
<IODEF-Document
  version="2.00" lang="en-US"
  xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-2.0"
  xmlns:iodef=" urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-2.0"
  xmlns:iodef-extension1="iodef-extension1.xsd"
  xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
  xsi:schemaLocation="iodef-extension1.xsd">
  <Incident purpose="reporting">
    ...
    <AdditionalData dtype="xml" meaning="xml">
      <iodef-extension1:newdata>
        Field that could not be represented elsewhere
      </iodef-extension1:newdata>
    </AdditionalData>
  </Incident>
</IODEF-Document>
```

5.3. Deconflicting Private Extensions

To disambiguate which private extension is used in an IODEF document, the data model provides a means to identify the source of an extension. Two attributes in the IODEF-Document class, private-enum-name and private-enum-id, are used to specify this attribution. Only a single private extension can be identified in a given IODEF-Document.
If an implementor has a single private extension, then only the private-enum-name attribute needs to be specified. Multiple distinct private extensions or versioning of a single extension can be attributed by also setting the corresponding private-num-id attribute.

The following XML excerpt demonstrates the specification of a private extension from "example.com" with an identifier of "13".

```xml
<IODEF-Document
  version="2.00" lang="en-US"
  private-enum-name="example.com"
  private-enum-id="13"
...
</IODEF-Document>
```

If an unrecognized private extension is encountered in processing, the recipient MAY reject the entire document as a syntax error.

6. Internationalization Issues

Internationalization and localization is of specific concern to the IODEF as it facilitates operational coordination with a diverse set of partners. The IODEF implements internationalization by relying on XML constructs and through explicit design choices in the data model.

Since the IODEF is implemented as an XML Schema, it supports different character encodings, such as UTF-8 and UTF-16, possible with XML. Additionally, each IODEF document MUST specify the language in which its content is encoded. The language can be specified with the attribute "xml:lang" (per Section 2.12 of [W3C.XML]) in the top-level element (i.e., IODEF-Document) and letting all other elements inherit that definition. All IODEF classes with a free-form text definition (i.e., all those defined with type iodef:MLStringType) can also specify a language different from the rest of the document.

The data model supports multiple translations of free-form text. All ML_STRING (iodef:MLStringType) classes have a one-to-many cardinality to their parent. This allows the identical text translated into different languages to be encoded in different instances of the same class with a common parent. This design also enables the creation of a single document containing all the translations. The IODEF implementation SHOULD extract the appropriate language relevant to the recipient.

Related instances of a given iodef:MLStringType class that are translations of each other are identified by a common identifier set
in the translation-id attribute. The example below shows three instances of a Description class expressed in three different languages. The relationship between these three instances of the Description class is conveyed by the common value of "1" in the translation-id attribute.

```xml
<IODEF-Document version="2.00" xml:lang="en" ...
 <Incident purpose="reporting">
   ...
   <Description translation-id="1"
       xml:lang="en">English</Description>
   <Description translation-id="1"
       xml:lang="de">Englisch</Description>
   <Description translation-id="1"
       xml:lang="fr">Anglais</Description>
 </Incident>
</IODEF-Document>
```

The IODEF balances internationalization support with the need for interoperability. While the IODEF supports different languages, the data model also relies heavily on standardized enumerated attributes that can crudely approximate the contents of the document. With this approach, a CSIRT should be able to make some sense of an IODEF document it receives even if the free-form text data elements are written in a language unfamiliar to the recipient.

7. Examples

This section provides example of IODEF documents. These examples do not represent the full capabilities of the data model or the the only way to encode particular information.

7.1. Minimal Example

A document containing only the mandatory elements and attributes.
7.2. Indicators from a Campaign

An example of C2 domains from a given campaign.

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!-- A list of C2 domains associated with a campaign -->
<IODEF-Document version="2.00" xml:lang="en"
 xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-2.0"
 xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
 xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.iana.org/assignments/xml-registry/schema/iodef-2.0.xsd">
 <Incident purpose="watch" restriction="green">
  <IncidentID name="csirt.example.com">897923</IncidentID>
  <RelatedActivity>
   <ThreatActor>
    <ThreatActorID>TA-12-AGGRESSIVE-BUTTERFLY</ThreatActorID>
    <Description>Aggressive Butterfly</Description>
   </ThreatActor>
   <Campaign>
    <CampaignID>C-2015-59405</CampaignID>
    <Description>Orange Giraffe</Description>
   </Campaign>
  </RelatedActivity>
  <GenerationTime>2015-10-02T11:18:00-05:00</GenerationTime>
 </Incident>
</IODEF-Document>
<Description>Summarizes the Indicators of Compromise for the Orange Giraffe campaign of the Aggressive Butterfly crime gang.</Description>

<Assessment>
  <BusinessImpact type="breach-proprietary"/>
</Assessment>

<Contact type="organization" role="creator">
  <ContactName>CSIRT for example.com</ContactName>
  <Email>
    <EmailTo>contact@csirt.example.com</EmailTo>
  </Email>
</Contact>

<IndicatorData>
  <Indicator>
    <IndicatorID name="csirt.example.com" version="1">G90823490</IndicatorID>
    <Description>C2 domains</Description>
    <StartTime>2014-12-02T11:18:00-05:00</StartTime>
    <Observable>
      <BulkObservable type="fqdn">
        <BulkObservableList>
          kj290023j09r34.example.com
          09ijk23jgf0k8.example.net
          klknjwfiowfjefr923.example.org
          oimireik79msd.example.org
        </BulkObservableList>
      </BulkObservable>
    </Observable>
  </Indicator>
</IndicatorData>

8. The IODEF Data Model (XML Schema)

<?xml version="1.0"?>
<xs:schema xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-2.0"
  xmlns:iodef="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-2.0"
  xmlns:enum="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-enum-1.0"
  xmlns:sci="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-sci-1.0"
  xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
  targetNamespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-2.0"
  elementFormDefault="qualified"
  attributeFormDefault="unqualified">
  <xs:import namespace="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"/>
Incident Object Description Exchange Format v2.0, RFC5070bis

---

== IODEF-Document class ==

---

== Incident class ==

---
<xs:simpleType name="incident-status-type">
  <xs:restriction base="xs:NMTOKEN">
    <xs:enumeration value="new"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="in-progress"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="forwarded"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="resolved"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="future"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="ext-value"/>
  </xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>

<xs:element name="IncidentID" type="iodef:IncidentIDType"/>
<xs:complexType name="IncidentIDType">
  <xs:simpleContent>
    <xs:extension base="xs:string">
      <xs:attribute name="name" type="xs:string" use="required"/>
      <xs:attribute name="instance" type="xs:string" use="optional"/>
      <xs:attribute name="restriction" type="iodef:restriction-type" use="optional"/>
      <xs:attribute name="ext-restriction" type="xs:string" use="optional"/>
    </xs:extension>
  </xs:simpleContent>
</xs:complexType>

<xs:element name="AlternativeID">
  <xs:complexType>
    <xs:sequence>
      <xs:element ref="iodef:IncidentID" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
    </xs:sequence>
    <xs:attribute name="restriction" type="iodef:restriction-type" use="optional"/>
    <xs:attribute name="ext-restriction" type="xs:string" use="optional"/>
  </xs:complexType>
</xs:element>

<xs:element>
</xs:element>

== RelatedActivity class ==
<xs:element name="RelatedActivity">
  <xs:complexType>
    <xs:sequence>
      <xs:element ref="iodef:IncidentID" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
      <xs:element ref="iodef:URL" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
      <xs:element ref="iodef:ThreatActor" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
      <xs:element ref="iodef:Campaign" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
      <xs:element ref="iodef:IndicatorID" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
      <xs:element ref="iodef:Confidence" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
      <xs:element ref="iodef:Description" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
      <xs:element ref="iodef:AdditionalData" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
    </xs:sequence>
    <xs:attribute name="restriction" type="iodef:restriction-type" use="optional"/>
    <xs:attribute name="ext-restriction" type="xs:string" use="optional"/>
  </xs:complexType>
</xs:element>

<xs:element name="ThreatActor">
  <xs:complexType>
    <xs:sequence>
      <xs:element ref="iodef:ThreatActorID" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
      <xs:element ref="iodef:URL" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
      <xs:element ref="iodef:Description" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
      <xs:element ref="iodef:AdditionalData" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
    </xs:sequence>
    <xs:attribute name="restriction" type="iodef:restriction-type" use="optional"/>
    <xs:attribute name="ext-restriction" type="xs:string" use="optional"/>
  </xs:complexType>
</xs:element>

<xs:element name="ThreatActorID" type="xs:string"/>

<xs:element name="Campaign">
  <xs:complexType>
    <xs:sequence>
      <xs:element ref="iodef:Confidence" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
      <xs:element ref="iodef:Description" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
    </xs:sequence>
    <xs:attribute name="restriction" type="iodef:restriction-type" use="optional"/>
    <xs:attribute name="ext-restriction" type="xs:string" use="optional"/>
  </xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:element ref="iodef:CampaignID"
  minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef:URL"
  minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef:Description"
  minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef:AdditionalData"
  minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</xs:sequence>
<xs:attribute name="restriction"
  type="iodef:restriction-type" use="optional"/>
<xs:attribute name="ext-restriction"
  type="xs:string" use="optional"/>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="CampaignID" type="xs:string"/>
</!--
===================================================================
==   Contact class                                               ==
===================================================================
-->
<xs:element name="Contact">
  <xs:complexType>
    <xs:sequence>
      <xs:element ref="iodef:ContactName"
        minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>  
      <xs:element ref="iodef:ContactTitle"
        minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>  
      <xs:element ref="iodef:Description"
        minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>  
      <xs:element ref="iodef:RegistryHandle"
        minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>  
      <xs:element ref="iodef:PostalAddress"
        minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>  
      <xs:element ref="iodef:Email"
        minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>  
      <xs:element ref="iodef:Telephone"
        minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>  
      <xs:element ref="iodef:Timezone" minOccurs="0"/>  
      <xs:element ref="iodef:Contact"
        minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>  
      <xs:element ref="iodef:AdditionalData"
        minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>  
    </xs:sequence>
    <xs:attribute name="role"
      type="contact-role-type" use="required"/>
    <xs:attribute name="ext-role"
      type="xs:string" use="optional"/>
  </xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:attribute name="type" type="contact-type-type" use="required"/>
<xs:attribute name="ext-type" type="xs:string" use="optional"/>
<xs:attribute name="restriction" type="iodef:restriction-type" use="optional"/>
<xs:attribute name="ext-restriction" type="xs:string" use="optional"/>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:simpleType name="contact-role-type">
  <xs:restriction base="xs:NMTOKEN">
    <xs:enumeration value="creator"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="reporter"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="admin"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="tech"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="provider"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="zone"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="user"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="billing"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="legal"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="abuse"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="irt"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="cc"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="cc-irt"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="leo"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="vendor"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="vendor-services"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="victim"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="victim-notified"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="ext-value"/>
  </xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
<xs:simpleType name="contact-type-type">
  <xs:restriction base="xs:NMTOKEN">
    <xs:enumeration value="person"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="organization"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="ext-value"/>
  </xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
<xs:element name="ContactName" type="iodef:MLStringType"/>
<xs:element name="ContactTitle" type="iodef:MLStringType"/>
<xs:element name="RegistryHandle">
  <xs:complexType>
    <xs:complexContent>
      <xs:extension base="xs:string">
        <xs:attribute name="registry" type="registryhandle-registry-type"/>
      </xs:extension>
    </xs:complexContent>
  </xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:attribute name="ext-registry" type="xs:string" use="optional"/>
</xs:extension>
</xs:simpleContent>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:complexType name="registryhandle-registry-type">
<xs:restriction base="xs:NMTOKEN">
<xs:enumeration value="internic"/>
<xs:enumeration value="apnic"/>
<xs:enumeration value="arin"/>
<xs:enumeration value="lacnic"/>
<xs:enumeration value="ripe"/>
<xs:enumeration value="afринic"/>
<xs:enumeration value="local"/>
<xs:enumeration value="ext-value"/>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
</xs:element>

<xs:element name="PostalAddress">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element ref="iodef:PAddress"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef:Description" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</xs:sequence>
<xs:attribute name="type" type="postaladdress-type-type" use="optional"/>
<xs:attribute name="ext-type" type="xs:string" use="optional"/>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>

<xs:element name="PAddress" type="iodef:MLStringType"/>
<xs:simpleType name="postaladdress-type-type">
<xs:restriction base="xs:NMTOKEN">
<xs:enumeration value="street"/>
<xs:enumeration value="mailing"/>
<xs:enumeration value="ext-value"/>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
</xs:element>

<xs:element name="Telephone">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element ref="iodef:TelephoneNumber"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef:Description" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</xs:sequence>
<xs:attribute name="type" type="telephone-type-type" use="optional"/>
<xs:attribute name="ext-type" type="xs:string" use="optional"/>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:complexType>
  <xs:element name="TelephoneNumber" type="xs:string"/>
  <xs:simpleType name="telephone-type-type">
    <xs:restriction base="xs:NMTOKEN">
      <xs:enumeration value="wired"/>
      <xs:enumeration value="mobile"/>
      <xs:enumeration value="fax"/>
      <xs:enumeration value="hotline"/>
      <xs:enumeration value="ext-value"/>
    </xs:restriction>
  </xs:simpleType>
</xs:element>

<xs:element name="Email">
  <xs:complexType>
    <xs:sequence>
      <xs:element ref="iodef:EmailTo"/>
      <xs:element ref="iodef:Description" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
    </xs:sequence>
    <xs:attribute name="type" type="email-type-type" use="optional"/>
    <xs:attribute name="ext-type" type="xs:string" use="optional"/>
  </xs:complexType>
</xs:element>

<xs:simpleType name="email-type-type">
  <xs:restriction base="xs:NMTOKEN">
    <xs:enumeration value="direct"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="hotline"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="ext-value"/>
  </xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>

<!--
===================================================================
==  Time-based classes                                           ==
===================================================================
-->
<xs:element name="DateTime" type="xs:dateTime"/>
<xs:element name="ReportTime" type="xs:dateTime"/>
<xs:element name="DetectTime" type="xs:dateTime"/>
<xs:element name="StartTime" type="xs:dateTime"/>
<xs:element name="EndTime" type="xs:dateTime"/>
<xs:element name="RecoveryTime" type="xs:dateTime"/>
<xs:element name="GenerationTime" type="xs:dateTime"/>

<!--
===================================================================
==  History class                                                ==
===================================================================
-->
<xs:element name="Timezone" type="iodef:TimezoneType"/>
<xs:element name="History">
    <xs:complexType>
        <xs:sequence>
            <xs:element ref="iodef:HistoryItem" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
        </xs:sequence>
        <xs:attribute name="restriction" type="iodef:restriction-type" use="optional"/>
        <xs:attribute name="ext-restriction" type="xs:string" use="optional"/>
    </xs:complexType>
</xs:element>

<xs:element name="HistoryItem">
    <xs:complexType>
        <xs:sequence>
            <xs:element ref="iodef:DateTime"/>
            <xs:element ref="iodef:IncidentID" minOccurs="0"/>
            <xs:element ref="iodef:Contact" minOccurs="0"/>
            <xs:element ref="iodef:Description" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
            <xs:element ref="iodef:DefinedCOA" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
            <xs:element ref="iodef:AdditionalData" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
        </xs:sequence>
        <xs:attribute name="action" type="iodef:action-type" use="required"/>
        <xs:attribute name="ext-action" type="xs:string" use="optional"/>
        <xs:attribute name="restriction" type="iodef:restriction-type" use="optional"/>
        <xs:attribute name="ext-restriction" type="xs:string" use="optional"/>
        <xs:attribute name="observable-id" type="xs:ID" use="optional"/>
    </xs:complexType>
</xs:element>

<xs:element name="DefinedCOA" type="xs:string"/>

<xs:element name="Expectation">
    <xs:complexType>
        <xs:sequence>
            <xs:element ref="iodef:Description" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
            <xs:element ref="iodef:DefinedCOA"/>
        </xs:sequence>
    </xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="Discovery">
   <xs:complexType>
      <xs:sequence>
         <xs:element ref="iodef:Description" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
         <xs:element ref="iodef:Contact" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
         <xs:element ref="iodef:DetectionPattern" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
      </xs:sequence>
      <xs:attribute name="source" type="discovery-source-type" use="optional" default="unknown"/>
      <xs:attribute name="ext-source" type="xs:string" use="optional"/>
      <xs:attribute name="restriction" type="iodef:restriction-type" use="optional"/>
      <xs:attribute name="ext-restriction" type="xs:string" use="optional"/>
   </xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:simpleType name="discovery-source-type">
   <xs:restriction base="xs:NMTOKEN">
      <xs:enumeration value="nidps"/>
      <xs:enumeration value="hips"/>
      <xs:enumeration value="siem"/>
   </xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
<xs:enumeration value="av"/>
<xs:enumeration value="third-party-monitoring"/>
<xs:enumeration value="incident"/>
<xs:enumeration value="os-log"/>
<xs:enumeration value="application-log"/>
<xs:enumeration value="device-log"/>
<xs:enumeration value="network-flow"/>
<xs:enumeration value="passive-dns"/>
<xs:enumeration value="investigation"/>
<xs:enumeration value="audit"/>
<xs:enumeration value="internal-notification"/>
<xs:enumeration value="external-notification"/>
<xs:enumeration value="leo"/>
<xs:enumeration value="partner"/>
<xs:enumeration value="actor"/>
<xs:enumeration value="unknown"/>
<xs:enumeration value="ext-value"/>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:element>
</xs:complexType>
<xs:element name="DetectionPattern">
  <xs:complexType>
    <xs:sequence>
      <xs:element ref="iodef:Application"/>
      <xs:element ref="iodef:Description" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
      <xs:element name="DetectionConfiguration" type="xs:string" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
    </xs:sequence>
    <xs:attribute name="restriction" type="iodef:restriction-type" use="optional"/>
    <xs:attribute name="ext-restriction" type="xs:string" use="optional"/>
  </xs:complexType>
</xs:element>

<!--
===================================================================
==  Method class                                                 ==
===================================================================
-->
<xs:element name="Method">
  <xs:complexType>
    <xs:sequence>
      <xs:element ref="iodef:Reference" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
      <xs:element ref="iodef:Description" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
      <xs:element ref="sci:AttackPattern"/>
<xs:element ref="sci:Vulnerability" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<xs:element ref="sci:Weakness" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef:AdditionalData" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</xs:sequence>
<xs:attribute name="restriction" type="iodef:restriction-type" use="optional"/>
<xs:attribute name="ext-restriction" type="xs:string" use="optional"/>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
</xs:element>

--
Reference class
--

<xs:element name="Reference">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element ref="enum:ReferenceName" minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef:URL" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef:Description" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</xs:sequence>
<xs:attribute name="observable-id" type="xs:ID" use="optional"/>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>

--
Assessment class
--

<xs:element name="Assessment">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element ref="iodef:IncidentCategory" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<xs:choice maxOccurs="unbounded">
<xs:element ref="iodef:SystemImpact"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef:BusinessImpact"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef:TimeImpact"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef:MonetaryImpact"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef:IntendedImpact"/>
</xs:choice>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:restriction base="xs:NMTOKEN">
  <xs:enumeration value="failed"/>
  <xs:enumeration value="succeeded"/>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>

<xs:simpleType name="systemimpact-type-type">
  <xs:restriction base="xs:NMTOKEN">
    <xs:enumeration value="takeover-account"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="takeover-service"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="takeover-system"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="cps-manipulation"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="cps-damage"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="availability-data"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="availability-account"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="availability-service"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="availability-system"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="damaged-system"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="damaged-data"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="breach-proprietary"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="breach-privacy"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="breach-credential"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="breach-configuration"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="integrity-data"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="integrity-configuration"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="integrity-hardware"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="traffic-redirection"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="monitoring-traffic"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="monitoring-host"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="policy"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="unknown"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="ext-value"/>
  </xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>

<xs:complexType name="BusinessImpactType">
  <xs:sequence>
    <xs:element ref="iodef:Description" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
  </xs:sequence>
  <xs:attribute name="severity" type="businessimpact-severity-type" use="optional"/>
  <xs:attribute name="ext-severity" type="xs:string" use="optional"/>
  <xs:attribute name="type" type="businessimpact-type-type" use="optional" default="unknown"/>
  <xs:attribute name="ext-type" type="xs:string" use="optional"/>
</xs:complexType>

<xs:simpleType name="businessimpact-severity-type">
  <!-- Contents here -->
</xs:simpleType>
<xs:restriction base="xs:NMTOKEN">
  <xs:enumeration value="none"/>
  <xs:enumeration value="low"/>
  <xs:enumeration value="medium"/>
  <xs:enumeration value="high"/>
  <xs:enumeration value="unknown"/>
  <xs:enumeration value="ext-value"/>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
<xs:element name="TimeImpact">
  <xs:complexType>
    <xs:simpleContent>
      <xs:extension base="iodef:PositiveFloatType">
        <xs:attribute name="severity" type="iodef:severity-type"/>
        <xs:attribute name="metric" type="timeimpact-metric-type" use="required"/>
        <xs:attribute name="ext-metric" type="xs:string" use="optional"/>
        <xs:attribute name="duration" type="iodef:duration-type"/>
        <xs:attribute name="ext-duration" type="xs:string" use="optional"/>
      </xs:extension>
    </xs:simpleContent>
  </xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:simpleType name="timeimpact-metric-type">
  <xs:restriction base="xs:NMTOKEN">
    <xs:enumeration value="labor"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="elapsed"/>
  </xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
<xs:enumeration value="ext-value"/></xs:restriction>
</xs:element>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:simpleType>

<xsl:element name="MonetaryImpact">
  <xs:complexType>
    <xs:simpleContent>
      <xs:extension base="iodef:PositiveFloatType">
        <xs:attribute name="severity" type="iodef:severity-type"/>
        <xs:attribute name="currency" type="xs:string"/>
      </xs:extension>
    </xs:simpleContent>
  </xs:complexType>
</xs:element>

<xsl:element name="Confidence">
  <xs:complexType>
    <xs:attribute name="rating" type="confidence-rating-type" use="required"/>
    <xs:attribute name="ext-rating" type="xs:string" use="optional"/>
  </xs:complexType>
</xs:element>

<xsl:element name="EventData">
  <xs:complexType>
    <xs:sequence>
      <xs:element ref="iodef:Description" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
      <xs:element ref="iodef:DetectTime" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="0"/>
      <xs:element ref="iodef:StartTime" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="0"/>
      <xs:element ref="iodef:EndTime" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="0"/>
      <xs:element ref="iodef:RecoveryTime" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="0"/>
      <xs:element ref="iodef:ReportTime" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="0"/>
      </xs:sequence>
  </xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:element ref="iodef:Discovery"
  minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef:Assessment" minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef:Method"
  minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef:Flow"
  minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef:Expectation"
  minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef:Record" minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef:EventData"
  minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef:AdditionalData"
  minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</xs:sequence>
<xs:attribute name="restriction"
  type="iodef:restriction-type" use="optional"/>
<xs:attribute name="ext-restriction"
  type="xs:string" use="optional"/>
<xs:attribute name="observable-id" type="xs:ID" use="optional"/>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>

-- Flow class

<xs:element name="Flow">
  <xs:complexType>
    <xs:sequence>
      <xs:element ref="iodef:System" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
    </xs:sequence>
  </xs:complexType>
</xs:element>

-- System class

<xs:element name="System">
  <xs:complexType>
    <xs:sequence>
      <xs:element ref="iodef:Node"/>
      <xs:element ref="iodef:NodeRole"
        minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
      <xs:element ref="iodef:Service"
        minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
      <xs:element ref="iodef:OperatingSystem"/>
<xs:element name="OperatingSystem" type="iodef:SoftwareType"/>
<xs:simpleType name="system-category-type">
  <xs:restriction base="xs:NMTOKEN">
    <xs:enumeration value="source"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="target"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="intermediate"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="sensor"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="infrastructure"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="ext-value"/>
  </xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
<xs:simpleType name="system-ownership-type">
  <xs:restriction base="xs:NMTOKEN">
    <xs:enumeration value="organization"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="personal"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="partner"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="customer"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="no-relationship"/>
  </xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
<xs:enumeration value="unknown"/>
<xs:enumeration value="ext-value"/>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>

<!--
==================================================================
== Node class                                                   ==
==================================================================
-->
<xs:element name="Node">
  <xs:complexType>
    <xs:sequence>
      <xs:choice maxOccurs="unbounded">
        <xs:element ref="iodef:DomainData" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
        <xs:element ref="iodef:Address" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
      </xs:choice>
      <xs:element ref="iodef:PostalAddress" minOccurs="0"/>
      <xs:element ref="iodef:Location" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
      <xs:element ref="iodef:Counter" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
    </xs:sequence>
  </xs:complexType>
</xs:element>

<xs:element name="Address">
  <xs:complexType>
    <xs:simpleContent>
      <xs:extension base="xs:string">
        <xs:attribute name="category" type="address-category-type" default="ipv6-addr"/>
        <xs:attribute name="ext-category" type="xs:string" use="optional"/>
        <xs:attribute name="vlan-name" type="xs:string"/>
        <xs:attribute name="vlan-num" type="xs:integer"/>
        <xs:attribute name="observable-id" type="xs:ID" use="optional"/>
      </xs:extension>
    </xs:simpleContent>
  </xs:complexType>
</xs:element>

<xs:simpleType name="address-category-type">
  <xs:restriction base="xs:NMTOKEN">
    <xs:enumeration value="asn"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="atm"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="e-mail"/>
  </xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
<xs:enumeration value="mac"/>
<xs:enumeration value="ipv4-addr"/>
<xs:enumeration value="ipv4-net"/>
<xs:enumeration value="ipv4-net-mask"/>
<xs:enumeration value="ipv6-addr"/>
<xs:enumeration value="ipv6-net"/>
<xs:enumeration value="ipv6-net-mask"/>
<xs:enumeration value="site-uri"/>
<xs:enumeration value="ext-value"/>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
<xs:element name="Location" type="iodef:MLStringType"/>
<xs:element name="NodeRole">
  <xs:complexType>
    <xs:sequence>
      <xs:element ref="iodef:Description"
        minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
    </xs:sequence>
    <xs:attribute name="category"
      type="noderole-category-type" use="required"/>
    <xs:attribute name="ext-category"
      type="xs:string" use="optional"/>
  </xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:simpleType name="noderole-category-type">
  <xs:restriction base="xs:NMTOKEN">
    <xs:enumeration value="client"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="client-enterprise"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="client-partner"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="client-remote"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="client-kiosk"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="client-mobile"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="server-internal"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="server-public"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="www"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="mail"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="webmail"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="messaging"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="streaming"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="voice"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="file"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="ftp"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="p2p"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="name"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="directory"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="credential"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="application"/>
  </xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
<xs:enumeration value="database"/>
<xs:enumeration value="backup"/>
<xs:enumeration value="dhcp"/>
<xs:enumeration value="assessment"/>
<xs:enumeration value="source-control"/>
<xs:enumeration value="config-management"/>
<xs:enumeration value="monitoring"/>
<xs:enumeration value="infra"/>
<xs:enumeration value="infra-firewall"/>
<xs:enumeration value="infra-router"/>
<xs:enumeration value="infra-switch"/>
<xs:enumeration value="camera"/>
<xs:enumeration value="proxy"/>
<xs:enumeration value="remote-access"/>
<xs:enumeration value="log"/>
<xs:enumeration value="virtualization"/>
<xs:enumeration value="pos"/>
<xs:enumeration value="scada"/>
<xs:enumeration value="scada-supervisory"/>
<xs:enumeration value="sinkhole"/>
<xs:enumeration value="honeypot"/>
<xs:enumeration value="anonymization"/>
<xs:enumeration value="c2-server"/>
<xs:enumeration value="malware-distribution"/>
<xs:enumeration value="drop-server"/>
<xs:enumeration value="hop-point"/>
<xs:enumeration value="reflector"/>
<xs:enumeration value="phishing-site"/>
<xs:enumeration value="spear-phishing-site"/>
<xs:enumeration value="recruiting-site"/>
<xs:enumeration value="fraudulent-site"/>
<xs:enumeration value="ext-value"/>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
<!--
===================================================================
== Service Class                                                ==
===================================================================
-->
<xs:element name="Service">
  <xs:complexType>
    <xs:sequence>
      <xs:element ref="iodef:ServiceName" minOccurs="0"/>
      <xs:element ref="iodef:Port" minOccurs="0"/>
      <xs:element ref="iodef:Portlist" minOccurs="0"/>
      <xs:element ref="iodef:ProtoType" minOccurs="0"/>
      <xs:element ref="iodef:ProtoCode" minOccurs="0"/>
      <xs:element ref="iodef:ProtoField" minOccurs="0"/>
    </xs:sequence>
  </xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:element ref="iodef:ApplicationHeader" minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef:EmailData" minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef:Application" minOccurs="0"/>
</xs:sequence>
<xs:attribute name="ip-protocol"
  type="xs:integer" use="optional"/>
<xs:attribute name="observable-id" type="xs:ID" use="optional"/>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="Port" type="xs:integer"/>
<xs:element name="Portlist" type="iodef:PortlistType"/>
<xs:element name="ProtoType" type="xs:integer"/>
<xs:element name="ProtoCode" type="xs:integer"/>
<xs:element name="ProtoField" type="xs:integer"/>
<xs:element name="ApplicationHeader">
  <xs:complexType>
    <xs:sequence>
      <xs:element ref="iodef:ApplicationHeaderField" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
    </xs:sequence>
  </xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="Port" type="xs:integer"/>
<xs:element name="IANAService" type="iodef:IANAService"/>
<xs:element name="URL" type="iodef:URL" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<xs:element name="Description" type="iodef:Description" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="IANAService" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="Application" type="iodef:SoftwareType"/>
<!--
===================================================================
==  Counter class                                                ==
===================================================================
-->
<xs:element name="Counter" type="iodef:Counter">
  <xs:complexType>
    <xs:simpleContent>
      <xs:extension base="xs:float">
        <xs:attribute name="type" type="xs:string"/>
      </xs:extension>
    </xs:simpleContent>
  </xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="EmailData">
    <xs:complexType>
        <xs:sequence>
            <xs:extension base="counter-type-type">
                <xs:attribute name="ext-type" type="xs:string" use="optional"/>
            </xs:extension>
        </xs:sequence>
    </xs:complexType>
</xs:element>

<xs:simpleType name="counter-type-type">
    <xs:restriction base="xs:NMTOKEN">
        <xs:enumeration value="counter"/>
        <xs:enumeration value="rate"/>
        <xs:enumeration value="average"/>
        <xs:enumeration value="ext-value"/>
    </xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>

<xs:simpleType name="counter-unit-type">
    <xs:restriction base="xs:NMTOKEN">
        <xs:enumeration value="byte"/>
        <xs:enumeration value="mbit"/>
        <xs:enumeration value="packet"/>
        <xs:enumeration value="flow"/>
        <xs:enumeration value="session"/>
        <xs:enumeration value="event"/>
        <xs:enumeration value="alert"/>
        <xs:enumeration value="message"/>
        <xs:enumeration value="host"/>
        <xs:enumeration value="site"/>
        <xs:enumeration value="organization"/>
        <xs:enumeration value="ext-value"/>
    </xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
<xs:element ref="iodef:EmailTo" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef:EmailFrom" minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef:EmailSubject" minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef:EmailX-Mailer" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef:EmailHeaderField" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef:EmailHeaders" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef:EmailBody" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef:EmailMessage" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef:HashData" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef:SignatureData" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</xs:sequence>
<xs:attribute name="observable-id" type="xs:ID" use="optional"/>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="EmailTo" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="EmailFrom" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="EmailSubject" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="EmailX-Mailer" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="EmailHeaderField" type="iodef:ExtensionType"/>
<xs:element name="EmailHeaders" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="EmailBody" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="EmailMessage" type="xs:string"/>
<!--
===================================================================
==   DomainData class                                            ==
===================================================================
-->
<xs:element name="DomainData">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element ref="iodef:Name" maxOccurs="1"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef:DateDomainWasChecked" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef:RegistrationDate" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef:ExpirationDate" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef:RelatedDNS" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef:Nameservers" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef:DomainContacts" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1"/>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
<xs:attribute name="system-status" type="domaindata-system-status-type"/>
<xs:attribute name="ext-system-status" type="xs:string" use="optional"/>
<xs:attribute name="domain-status" type="domaindata-domain-status-type"/>
<xs:attribute name="ext-domain-status" type="xs:string" use="optional"/>
<xs:attribute name="observable-id" type="xs:ID" use="optional"/>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="Name" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="DateDomainWasChecked" type="xs:dateTime"/>
<xs:element name="RegistrationDate" type="xs:dateTime"/>
<xs:element name="ExpirationDate" type="xs:dateTime"/>
<xs:simpleType name="domaindata-system-status-type">
<xs:restriction base="xs:string">
<xs:enumeration value="spoofed"/>
<xs:enumeration value="fraudulent"/>
<xs:enumeration value="innocent-hacked"/>
<xs:enumeration value="innocent-hijacked"/>
<xs:enumeration value="unknown"/>
<xs:enumeration value="ext-value"/>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
<xs:simpleType name="domaindata-domain-status-type">
<xs:restriction base="xs:string">
<xs:enumeration value="reservedDelegation"/>
<xs:enumeration value="assignedAndActive"/>
<xs:enumeration value="assignedAndInactive"/>
<xs:enumeration value="assignedAndOnHold"/>
<xs:enumeration value="revoked"/>
<xs:enumeration value="transferPending"/>
<xs:enumeration value="registryLock"/>
<xs:enumeration value="registrarLock"/>
<xs:enumeration value="other"/>
<xs:enumeration value="unknown"/>
<xs:enumeration value="ext-value"/>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
<xs:element name="RelatedDNS" type="iodef:ExtensionType"/>
<xs:element name="Nameservers">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element ref="iodef:Server"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef:Address" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>

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<xs:complexType>
  <xs:choice>
    <xs:element ref="iodef:SameDomainContact"/>
    <xs:element ref="iodef:Contact" minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
  </xs:choice>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="SameDomainContact" type="xs:string"/>

<!--
===================================================================
==  Record class                                                 ==
===================================================================
-->
<xs:element name="Record">
  <xs:complexType>
    <xs:sequence>
      <xs:element ref="iodef:RecordData" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
    </xs:sequence>
    <xs:attribute name="restriction" type="iodef:restriction-type" use="optional"/>
    <xs:attribute name="ext-restriction" type="xs:string" use="optional"/>
  </xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="RecordData">
  <xs:complexType>
    <xs:sequence>
      <xs:element ref="iodef:DateTime" minOccurs="0"/>
      <xs:element ref="iodef:Description" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
      <xs:element ref="iodef:Application" minOccurs="0"/>
      <xs:element ref="iodef:RecordPattern" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
      <xs:element ref="iodef:RecordItem" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
      <xs:element ref="iodef:URL" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
      <xs:element ref="iodef:FileData" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
      <xs:element ref="iodef:WindowsRegistryKeysModified" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
      <xs:element ref="iodef:CertificateData" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
      <xs:element ref="iodef:AdditionalData"/>
    </xs:sequence>
  </xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="RecordPattern">
  <xs:complexType>
    <xs:simpleContent>
      <xs:extension base="xs:string">
        <xs:attribute name="type" type="recordpattern-type-type" use="required"/>
        <xs:attribute name="ext-type" type="xs:string" use="optional"/>
        <xs:attribute name="offset" type="xs:integer" use="optional"/>
        <xs:attribute name="offsetunit" type="recordpattern-offsetunit-type" use="optional" default="line"/>
        <xs:attribute name="ext-offsetunit" type="xs:string" use="optional"/>
        <xs:attribute name="instance" type="xs:integer" use="optional"/>
      </xs:extension>
    </xs:simpleContent>
  </xs:complexType>
</xs:element>

<xs:simpleType name="recordpattern-type-type">
  <xs:restriction base="xs:NMTOKEN">
    <xs:enumeration value="regex"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="binary"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="xpath"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="ext-value"/>
  </xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>

<xs:simpleType name="recordpattern-offsetunit-type">
  <xs:restriction base="xs:NMTOKEN">
    <xs:enumeration value="line"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="byte"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="ext-value"/>
  </xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>

</xs:element>
== WindowsRegistryKeysModified Class ==

```xml
<xs:element name="WindowsRegistryKeysModified">
  <xs:complexType>
    <xs:sequence>
      <xs:element ref="iodef:Key" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
    </xs:sequence>
    <xs:attribute name="observable-id" type="xs:ID" use="optional"/>
  </xs:complexType>
</xs:element>

<xs:element name="Key">
  <xs:complexType>
    <xs:sequence>
      <xs:element ref="iodef:KeyName"/>
      <xs:element ref="iodef:Value" minOccurs="0"/>
    </xs:sequence>
    <xs:attribute name="registryaction" type="key-registryaction-type"/>
    <xs:attribute name="ext-registryaction" type="xs:string" use="optional"/>
    <xs:attribute name="observable-id" type="xs:ID" use="optional"/>
  </xs:complexType>
</xs:element>

<xs:element name="KeyName" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="Value" type="xs:string"/>

<xs:simpleType name="key-registryaction-type">
  <xs:restriction base="xs:NMTOKEN">
    <xs:enumeration value="add-key"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="add-value"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="delete-key"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="delete-value"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="modify-key"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="modify-value"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="ext-value"/>
  </xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
```

---

== FileData Class ==

```xml
<xs:element name="FileData">
  <xs:complexType>
    <xs:sequence>
      <xs:element ref="iodef:File" minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
    </xs:sequence>
  </xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
```

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<xs:element name="File">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element ref="iodef:FileName" minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef:FileSize" minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef:FileType" minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef:URL" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef:HashData" minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef:SignatureData" minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef:AssociatedSoftware" minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef:FileProperties" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</xs:sequence>
<xs:attribute name="observable-id" type="xs:ID" use="optional"/>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="FileName" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="FileSize" type="xs:integer"/>
<xs:element name="FileType" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="AssociatedSoftware" type="iodef:SoftwareType"/>
<xs:element name="FileProperties" type="iodef:ExtensionType"/>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="HashData">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element ref="iodef:HashTargetID" minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef:Hash" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef:FuzzyHash" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</xs:sequence>
<xs:attribute name="scope" type="hashdata-scope-type" use="required"/>
<xs:attribute name="ext-scope" type="xs:string" use="optional"/>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
</xs:element>
</xs:element name="HashTargetID" type="xs:string"/>

<xs:simpleType name="hashdata-scope-type">
  <xs:restriction base="xs:NMTOKEN">
    <xs:enumeration value="file-contents"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="file-pe-section"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="file-pe-iat"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="file-pe-resource"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="file-pdf-object"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="email-hash"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="email-headers-hash"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="email-body-hash"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="ext-value"/>
  </xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>

</xs:element name="Hash">
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>

<xs:element name="FuzzyHash">
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>

<xs:element name="FuzzyHashValue" type="iodef:ExtensionType"/>
</xs:element>

<xs:element name="SignatureData">
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="CertificateData">
  <xs:complexType>
    <xs:sequence>
      <xs:element ref="iodef:Certificate" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
    </xs:sequence>
    <xs:attribute name="restriction" type="iodef:restriction-type" use="optional"/>
    <xs:attribute name="ext-restriction" type="xs:string" use="optional"/>
    <xs:attribute name="observable-id" type="xs:ID" use="optional"/>
  </xs:complexType>
</xs:element>

<xs:element name="Certificate">
  <xs:complexType>
    <xs:sequence>
      <xs:element ref="ds:X509Data"/>
      <xs:element ref="iodef:Description" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
    </xs:sequence>
    <xs:attribute name="observable-id" type="xs:ID" use="optional"/>
  </xs:complexType>
</xs:element>

<xs:element name="IndicatorData">
  <xs:complexType>
    <xs:sequence>
      <xs:element ref="iodef:Indicator" minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
    </xs:sequence>
  </xs:complexType>
</xs:element>

<xs:element name="Indicator">
  <xs:complexType>
    <xs:sequence>
      <xs:element ref="iodef:IndicatorID"/>
      <xs:element ref="iodef:AlternativeIndicatorID" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
    </xs:sequence>
  </xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:element ref="iodef:Description" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef:StartTime" minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef:EndTime" minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef:Confidence" minOccurs="0"/>
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<xs:element ref="iodef:Observable"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef:ObservableReference"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef:IndicatorExpression"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef:IndicatorReference"/>
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<xs:element ref="iodef:AttackPhase" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef:Reference" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef:AdditionalData" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
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</xs:element>
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<xs:attribute name="version" type="xs:string" use="required"/>
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</xs:element>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="Observable">
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<xs:element ref="iodef:DomainData" minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef:EmailAddress" minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef:Service" minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef:WindowsRegistryKeysModified" minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef:CertificateData" minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef:RegistryHandle" minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef:RecordData" minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef:EventData" minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef:Incident" minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef:Expectation" minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef:Reference" minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef:Assessment" minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef:HistoryItem" minOccurs="0"/>
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<xs:element ref="iodef:AdditionalData" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
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<xs:enumeration value="atm"/>
</xs:restriction>
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<xs:enumeration value="ipv4-net"/>
<xs:enumeration value="ipv4-net-mask"/>
<xs:enumeration value="ipv6-addr"/>
<xs:enumeration value="ipv6-net"/>
<xs:enumeration value="ipv6-net-mask"/>
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<xs:enumeration value="domain-to-ipv6-timestamp"/>
<xs:enumeration value="ipv4-port"/>
<xs:enumeration value="ipv6-port"/>
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<xs:enumeration value="email-x-mailer"/>
<xs:enumeration value="email-subject"/>
<xs:enumeration value="http-user-agent"/>
<xs:enumeration value="http-request-uri"/>
<xs:enumeration value="mutex"/>
<xs:enumeration value="file-path"/>
<xs:enumeration value="user-name"/>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
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    <xs:sequence>
      <xs:element ref="iodef:Hash" minOccurs="0"/>
      <xs:element ref="iodef:AdditionalData" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
    </xs:sequence>
  </xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="BulkObservableList" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="IndicatorExpression">
  <xs:complexType>
    <xs:sequence maxOccurs="unbounded">
      <xs:choice>
        <xs:element ref="iodef:IndicatorExpression"/>
        <xs:element ref="iodef:Observable"/>
        <xs:element ref="iodef:ObservableReference"/>
        <xs:element ref="iodef:IndicatorReference"/>
      </xs:choice>
    </xs:sequence>
    <xs:attribute name="operator"/>
<xs:element name="ObservableReference">
  <xs:complexType>
    <xs:attribute name="uid-ref" type="xs:IDREF" use="required"/>
  </xs:complexType>
</xs:element>

<xs:element name="IndicatorReference">
  <xs:complexType>
    <xs:attribute name="uid-ref" type="xs:IDREF" use="optional"/>
    <xs:attribute name="euid-ref" type="xs:string" use="optional"/>
    <xs:attribute name="version" type="xs:string" use="optional"/>
  </xs:complexType>
</xs:element>

<xs:element name="AttackPhase">
  <xs:complexType>
    <xs:sequence>
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      <xs:element ref="iodef:URL" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
      <xs:element ref="iodef:Description" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
      <xs:element ref="iodef:AdditionalData" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
    </xs:sequence>
  </xs:complexType>
</xs:element>

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<xs:complexType>
  <xs:sequence>
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    <xs:element ref="iodef:URL" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
    <xs:element ref="iodef:Description" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
    <xs:element ref="iodef:AdditionalData" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
  </xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>

<xs:element name="AdditionalData" type="iodef:ExtensionType"/>
<xs:element name="Description" type="iodef:MLStringType"/>
<xs:element name="URL" type="xs:anyURI"/>
<xs:simpleType name="PositiveFloatType">
    <xs:restriction base="xs:float">
        <xs:minExclusive value="0"/>
    </xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>

<xs:complexType name="MLStringType">
    <xs:simpleContent>
        <xs:extension base="xs:string">
            <xs:attribute name="translation-id" type="xs:string" use="optional"/>
            <xs:attribute ref="xml:lang"/>
        </xs:extension>
    </xs:simpleContent>
</xs:complexType>

<xs:simpleType name="PortlistType">
    <xs:restriction base="xs:string">
        <xs:pattern value="\d+(\-\d+)?(,\d+(\-\d+)?)*/">
    </xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>

<xs:simpleType name="TimezoneType">
    <xs:restriction base="xs:string">
        <xs:pattern value="Z|\[\+\-\](0[0-9]|1[0-4]):[0-5][0-9]"/>
    </xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>

<xs:complexType name="ExtensionType" mixed="true">
    <xs:sequence>
        <xs:any namespace="##any" processContents="lax"
            minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
    </xs:sequence>
    <xs:attribute name="name" type="xs:string" use="optional"/>
    <xs:attribute name="dtype" type="iodef:dtype-type" use="required"/>
    <xs:attribute name="ext-dtype" type="xs:string" use="optional"/>
    <xs:attribute name="meaning" type="xs:string" use="optional"/>
    <xs:attribute name="formatid" type="xs:string" use="optional"/>
    <xs:attribute name="restriction" type="iodef:restriction-type" use="optional"/>
    <xs:attribute name="ext-restriction" type="xs:string" use="optional"/>
    <xs:attribute name="observable-id" type="xs:ID" use="optional"/>
</xs:complexType>

<xs:complexType name="SoftwareType">
</xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence>
  <xs:element ref="iodef:SoftwareReference" minOccurs="0"/>
  <xs:element ref="iodef:URL" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
  <xs:element ref="iodef:Description" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>

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  <xs:complexType>
    <xs:sequence>
      <xs:any namespace="##any" processContents="lax" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
    </xs:sequence>
    <xs:attribute name="spec-name" type="softwarereference-spec-name-type" use="required"/>
    <xs:attribute name="ext-spec-name" type="xs:string" use="optional"/>
    <xs:attribute name="dtype" type="softwarereference-dtype-type" use="optional"/>
    <xs:attribute name="ext-dtype" type="xs:string" use="optional"/>
  </xs:complexType>
</xs:element>

<xs:simpleType name="softwarereference-spec-name-type">
  <xs:restriction base="xs:NMTOKEN">
    <xs:enumeration value="custom"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="cpe"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="swid"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="ext-value"/>
  </xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>

<xs:simpleType name="softwarereference-dtype-type">
  <xs:restriction base="xs:NMTOKEN">
    <xs:enumeration value="bytes"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="integer"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="real"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="string"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="xml"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="ext-value"/>
  </xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>

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<xs:simpleType name="yes-no-unknown-type">
  <xs:restriction base="xs:NMTOKEN">
    <xs:enumeration value="yes"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="no"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="unknown"/>
  </xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>

<xs:simpleType name="restriction-type">
  <xs:restriction base="xs:NMTOKEN">
    <xs:enumeration value="default"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="public"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="partner"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="need-to-know"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="private"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="white"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="green"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="amber"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="red"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="ext-value"/>
  </xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>

<xs:simpleType name="severity-type">
  <xs:restriction base="xs:NMTOKEN">
    <xs:enumeration value="low"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="medium"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="high"/>
  </xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>

<xs:simpleType name="duration-type">
  <xs:restriction base="xs:NMTOKEN">
    <xs:enumeration value="second"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="minute"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="hour"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="day"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="month"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="quarter"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="year"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="ext-value"/>
  </xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>

<xs:simpleType name="action-type">
  <xs:restriction base="xs:NMTOKEN">
    <xs:enumeration value="nothing"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="contact-source-site"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="contact-target-site"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="contact-sender"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="investigate"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="block-host"/>
  </xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
<xs:enumeration value="block-network"/>
<xs:enumeration value="block-port"/>
<xs:enumeration value="rate-limit-host"/>
<xs:enumeration value="rate-limit-network"/>
<xs:enumeration value="rate-limit-port"/>
<xs:enumeration value="redirect-traffic"/>
<xs:enumeration value="honeypot"/>
<xs:enumeration value="upgrade-software"/>
<xs:enumeration value="rebuild-asset"/>
<xs:enumeration value="harden-asset"/>
<xs:enumeration value="remediate-other"/>
<xs:enumeration value="status-triage"/>
<xs:enumeration value="status-new-info"/>
<xs:enumeration value="watch-and-report"/>
<xs:enumeration value="defined-coa"/>
<xs:enumeration value="other"/>
<xs:enumeration value="ext-value"/>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>

<xs:simpleType name="dtype-type">
  <xs:restriction base="xs:NMTOKEN">
    <xs:enumeration value="boolean"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="byte"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="bytes"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="character"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="date-time"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="integer"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="ntpstamp"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="portlist"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="real"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="string"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="file"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="path"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="frame"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="packet"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="ipv4-packet"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="ipv6-packet"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="url"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="csv"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="winreg"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="xml"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="ext-value"/>
  </xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
</xs:schema>
9. Security Considerations

The IODEF data model does not directly introduce security issues. However, as the data encoded by the IODEF might be considered sensitive by the parties exchanging it or by those described by it, care needs to be taken to ensure appropriate handling during the document exchange, subsequent processing or archiving.

The contents of an IODEF document may include a request for action. An IODEF implementation may also initiate courses of action based on the document contents. For these reasons, care must be taken by IODEF implementations to properly authenticate the sender and receiver of the document. The recipient must also ascribe appropriate confidence to the data prior to action.

The underlying messaging format and protocol used to exchange instances of the IODEF MUST provide appropriate guarantees of confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity. The use of a standardized security protocol is encouraged. The Real-time Internetwork Defense (RID) protocol [RFC6545] and its associated transport binding IODEF/RID over HTTP/TLS [RFC6546] provide such security.

Executable content could be embedded into the IODEF document directly or through an extension. The IODEF implementation MUST handle this content with care to prevent unintentional automated execution.

In order to suggest data processing and handling guidelines of the encoded information, the IODEF allows a document sender to convey a privacy policy using the restriction attribute. The various instances of this attribute allow different data elements of the document to be covered by dissimilar policies. While flexible, it must be stressed that this approach only serves as a guideline from the sender, as the recipient is free to ignore it.

10. IANA Considerations

This document registers a namespace, an XML schema, and a number of registries that map to enumerated values defined in the data model.

10.1. Namespace and Schema

This document uses URNs to describe an XML namespace and schema conforming to a registry mechanism described in [RFC3688]

Registration for the IODEF namespace:

10.2. Enumerated Value Registries

This document creates 33 identically structured registries to be managed by IANA:

- Name of the parent registry: "Incident Object Description Exchange Format v2 (IODEF)"
- URL of the registry: http://www.iana.org/assignments/iodef2
- Namespace format: A registry entry consists of:
  - Value. An enumerated value for a given IODEF attribute.
  - Description. A short description of the enumerated value.
  - Reference. An optional list of URIs to further describe the value.
- Allocation policy: Expert Review per [RFC5226]

The registries to be created are named in the "Registry Name" column of Table 1. The initial values for the Value and Description fields of a given registry are listed in the "IV (Value)" and "IV (Description)" columns respectively. The "IV (Value)" points to a given schema type per Section 8. Each enumerated value in the schema gets a corresponding entry in a given registry. The "IV (Description)" points to a section in the text of this document that describes each enumerated value. The initial value of the Reference field of every registry entry described below should be this document.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Registry Name</th>
<th>IV (Value)</th>
<th>IV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Section</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Restriction</td>
<td>iodef-restriction-type</td>
<td>3.3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incident-purpose</td>
<td>incident-purpose-type</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incident-status</td>
<td>incident-status-type</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact-role</td>
<td>contact-role-type</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact-type</td>
<td>contact-type-type</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RegistryHandle-registry</td>
<td>registryhandle-registry-type</td>
<td>3.9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephone-type</td>
<td>telephone-type-type</td>
<td>3.9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Email-type</td>
<td>email-type-type</td>
<td>3.9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expectation-action</td>
<td>action-type</td>
<td>3.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discovery-source</td>
<td>discovery-source-type</td>
<td>3.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SystemImpact-type</td>
<td>systemimpact-type-type</td>
<td>3.12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BusinessImpact-severity</td>
<td>businessimpact-severity-type</td>
<td>3.12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BusinessImpact-type</td>
<td>businessimpact-type-type</td>
<td>3.12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TimeImpact-metrics</td>
<td>timeimpact-metric-type</td>
<td>3.12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TimeImpact-duration</td>
<td>duration-type</td>
<td>3.12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidence-rating</td>
<td>confidence-rating-type</td>
<td>3.12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>noderole-category-type</td>
<td>3.18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>System-category</td>
<td>system-category-type</td>
<td>3.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>System-ownership</td>
<td>system-ownership-type</td>
<td>3.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Address-category</td>
<td>address-category-type</td>
<td>Section 3.18.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter-type</td>
<td>counter-type-type</td>
<td>Section 3.18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter-unit</td>
<td>counter-unit-type</td>
<td>Section 3.18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DomainData-system-status</td>
<td>domaindata-system-status-type</td>
<td>Section 3.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DomainData-domain-status</td>
<td>domaindata-domain-status-type</td>
<td>Section 3.19</td>
</tr>
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<td>recordpattern-type-type</td>
<td>Section 3.22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RecordPattern-offsetunit</td>
<td>recordpattern-offsetunit-type</td>
<td>Section 3.22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key-registryaction</td>
<td>key-registryaction-type</td>
<td>Section 3.23.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HashData-scope</td>
<td>hashdata-scope-type</td>
<td>Section 3.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BulkObservable-type</td>
<td>bulkobservable-type-type</td>
<td>Section 3.29.3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IndicatorExpression-operator</td>
<td>indicatorexpression-operator-type</td>
<td>Section 3.29.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ExtensionType-dtype</td>
<td>dtype-type</td>
<td>Section 2.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SoftwareReference-spec-id</td>
<td>softwarereference-spec-id-type</td>
<td>Section 2.15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SoftwareReference-dtype</td>
<td>softwarereference-dtype-type</td>
<td>Section 2.15.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: IANA Enumerated Value Registries

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Thanks to Paul Stockler for his editorial leadership in the transition of RFC5070bis to this document.
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12.1. Normative References


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12.2. Informative References


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Resource-Oriented Lightweight Indicator Exchange
draft-ietf-mile-rolie-01

Abstract

This document defines a resource-oriented approach to cyber security information sharing. Using this approach, a CSIRT or other stakeholder may share and exchange representations of cyber security incidents, indicators, and other related information as Web-addressable resources. The transport protocol binding is specified as HTTP(S) with a MIME media type of Atom+XML. An appropriate set of link relation types specific to cyber security information sharing is defined. The resource representations leverage the existing IODEF [RFC5070] and RID [RFC6545] specifications as appropriate. Coexistence with deployments that conform to existing specifications including RID [RFC6545] and Transport of Real-time Inter-network Defense (RID) Messages over HTTP/TLS [RFC6546] is supported via appropriate use of HTTP status codes.

Status of This Memo

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1. Introduction

This document defines a resource-oriented approach to cyber security information sharing that follows the REST (Architectural Styles and the Design of Network-based Software Architectures) architectural style. The resource representations leverage the existing IODEF [RFC5070] and RID [RFC6545] specifications as appropriate. The transport protocol binding is specified as HTTP(S) with a media type of Atom+XML. An appropriate set of link relation types specific to cyber security information sharing is defined. Using this approach, a CSIRT or other stakeholder may exchange cyber security incident and/or indicator information as Web-addressable resources.

The goal of this specification is to define a loosely-coupled, agile approach to cyber security situational awareness. This approach has architectural advantages for some use case scenarios, such as when a CSIRT or other stakeholder is required to share cyber security information broadly (e.g., at internet scale), or when an information sharing consortium requires support for asymmetric interactions amongst their stakeholders.

Coexistence with deployments that conform to existing specifications including RID [RFC6545] and Transport of Real-time Inter-network Defense (RID) Messages over HTTP/TLS [RFC6546] is supported via appropriate use of HTTP status codes.

2. Terminology

The key words "MUST," "MUST NOT," "REQUIRED," "SHALL," "SHALL NOT," "SHOULD," "SHOULD NOT," "RECOMMENDED," "MAY," and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. Definitions for some of the common computer security-related
terminology used in this document can be found in Section 2 of [RFC5070].

3. Background and Motivation

It is well known that Internet security threats are evolving ever more rapidly, and are becoming ever more sophisticated than before. The threat actors are frequently distributed and are not constrained to operating within a fixed, closed consortium. The technical skills needed to perform effective analysis of a security incident, or to even recognize an indicator of compromise are already specialized and relatively scarce. As threats continue to evolve, even an established network of CSIRT may find that it does not always have all of the skills and knowledge required to immediately identify and respond to every new incident. Effective identification of and response to a sophisticated, multi-stage attack frequently depends upon cooperation and collaboration, not only amongst the defending CSIRTs, but also amongst other stakeholders, including, potentially, individual end users.

Existing approaches to cyber security information sharing are based upon message exchange patterns that are point-to-point, and event-driven. Sometimes, information that may be useful to, and sharable with multiple peers is only made available to peers after they have specifically requested it. Unfortunately, a sharing peer may not know, a priori, what information to request from another peer. Sending unsolicited RID reports does provide a mechanism for alerting, however these reports are again sent point-to-point, and must be reviewed for relevance and then prioritized for action by the recipient. Thus, distribution of some relevant incident and indicator information may exhibit significant latency.

In order to appropriately combat the evolving threats, the defending CSIRTs should be enabled to operate in a more agile manner, sharing selected cyber security information proactively, if and as appropriate.

For example, a CSIRT analyst would benefit by having the ability to search a comprehensive collection of indicators that has been published by a government agency, or by another member of a sharing consortium. The representation of each indicator may include links to the related resources, enabling an appropriately authenticated and authorized analyst to freely navigate the information space of indicators, incidents, and other cyber security domain concepts, as needed. In general, a more Web-centric sharing approach will enable a more dynamic and agile collaboration amongst a broader, and varying constituency.
The following sections discuss additional specific technical issues that motivate the development of an alternative approach.

3.1. Message-oriented versus Resource-oriented Architecture

The existing approaches to cyber security information sharing are based upon message-oriented interactions. The following paragraphs explore some of the architectural constraints associated with message-oriented interactions and consider the relative merits of an alternative model based on a Resource-oriented architecture for use in some use case scenarios.

3.1.1. Message-oriented Architecture

In general, message-based integration architectures may be based upon either an RPC-style or a document-style binding. The message types defined by RID represent an example of an RPC-style request. This approach imposes implied requirements for conversational state management on both of the communicating RID endpoint(s). Experience has shown that this state management frequently becomes the limiting factor with respect to the runtime scalability of an RPC-style architecture.

In addition, the practical scalability of a peer-to-peer message-based approach will be limited by the administrative procedures required to manage O(N^2) trust relationships and at least O(N) policy groups.

As long as the number of CSIRTs participating in an information sharing consortium is limited to a relatively smaller number of nodes (i.e., O(2^N), where N < 5), these scalability constraints may not represent a critical concern. However, when there is a requirement to support a significantly larger number of participating peers, a different architectural approach will be required. One alternative to the message-based approach that has demonstrated scalability is the REST [REST] architectural style.

3.1.2. Resource-Oriented Architecture

Applying the REST architectural style to the problem domain of cyber security information sharing would take the approach of exposing incidents, indicators, and any other relevant types as simple Web-addressable resources. By using this approach, a CSIRT or other organization can more quickly and easily share relevant incident and indicator information with a much larger and potentially more diverse constituency. A client may leverage virtually any available HTTP user agent in order to make requests of the service provider. This
improved ease of use could enable more rapid adoption and broader participation, thereby improving security for everyone.

A key interoperability aspect of any RESTful Web service will be the choices regarding the available resource representations. For example, clients may request that a given resource representation be returned as either XML or JSON. In order to enable back-compatibility and interoperability with existing CSIRT implementations, IODEF [RFC5070] is specified for this transport binding as a mandatory to implement (MTI) data representation for incident and indicator resources. In addition to the REQUIRED representation, an implementation MAY support additional representations if and as needed such as IODEF extensions, the RID schema, or other schemas. For example, an implementation may choose to provide support for returning a JSON representation of an incident resource.

Finally, an important principle of the REST architectural style is the use of hypertext links as the embodiment of application state (HATEOAS). Rather than the server maintaining conversational state for each client context, the server will instead include a suitable set of hyperlinks in the resource representation that is returned to the client. In this way, the server remains stateless with respect to a series of client requests. The included hyperlinks provide the client with a specific set of permitted state transitions. Using these links the client may perform an operation, such as updating or deleting the resource representation. The client may also be provided with hypertext links that can be used to navigate to any related resource. For example, the resource representation for an incident object may contain links to the related indicator resource(s).

This document specifies the use of Atom Syndication Format [RFC4287] and Atom Publishing Protocol [RFC5023] as the mechanism for representing the required hypertext links.

3.1.2.1. A Resource-Oriented Use Case: "Mashup"

In this section we consider a non-normative example use case scenario for creating a cyber security "mashup".

Any CSIRT can enable any authenticated and authorized client that is a member of the sharing community to quickly and easily navigate through any of the cyber security information that that provider is willing to share. An authenticated and authorized analyst may then make HTTP(S) requests to collect incident and indicator information known at one CSIRT with threat actor data being made available from another CSIRT. The resulting correlations may yield new insights
that enable a more timely and effective defensive response. Of course, this report may, in turn, be made available to others as a new Web-addressable resource, reachable via another URL. By employing the RESTful Web service approach the effectiveness of the collaboration amongst a consortium of CSIRTs and their stakeholders can be greatly improved.

3.2. Authentication of Users

In the store-and-forward, message-based model for information sharing client authentication is provided via a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) -based trust and mutually authenticated TLS between the messaging system endpoints. There is no provision to support authentication of a client by another means. As a result, participation in the sharing community is limited to those organizations that have sufficient resources and capabilities to manage a PKI.

A CSIRT may apply XML Security to the content of a message, however the contact information provided within the message body represents a self-asserted identity, and there is no guarantee that the contact information will be recognized by the peer. As a result, the audit trail and the granularity of any authorization policies is limited to the identity of the peer CSIRT organization.

A CSIRT implementing this specification MUST implement server-authenticated TLS. The CSIRT may choose to authenticate its client users via any suitable authentication scheme that can be implemented via HTTP(S). A participating CSIRT MAY choose to support more than one authentication method. Support for use of a Federated Identity approach is RECOMMENDED. Establishing a specific end user identity prior to processing a request is RECOMMENDED. Doing so will enable the source system to maintain a more complete audit trail of exactly what cyber security incident and indicator information has been shared, when, and with whom.

3.3. Authorization Policy Enforcement

A key aspect of any cyber security information sharing arrangement is assigning the responsibility for authorization policy enforcement. The authorization policy must be enforced either at the destination system, or the source system, or both. The following sections discuss these alternatives in greater detail.
3.3.1. Enforcement at Destination System

The store-and-forward, message-based approach to cyber security information sharing requires that the origin system delegate authorization policy enforcement to the destination system. The origin system may leverage XML Encryption and DigitalSignature to protect the message content. In addition, the origin system assigns a number of policy-related attribute values, including a "restriction" attribute, before the message is sent. These labels indicate the sender's expectation for confidentiality enforcement and appropriate handling at the destination. Section 9.1 of RFC6545 provides specific guidance to implementers on use of the XML security standards in order to achieve the required levels of security for the exchange of incident information.

Once the message has been received at the destination system, the XML encryption and digital signature protections on the message will be processed, and based upon the pre-established PKI-based trust relationships, the message content is validated and decrypted. Typical implementations will then pass the cleartext data to an internal Incident Handling System (IHS) for further review and/or action by a human operator or analyst. Regardless of where in the deployment architecture the XML message-level security is being handled, eventually the message content will be made available as cleartext for handling by human systems analysts and other operational staff.

The authorization policy enforcement of the message contents must then be provided by the destination IHS. It is the responsibility of the destination system to honor the intent of the policy restriction labels assigned by the origin system. Ideally, these policy labels would serve as part of a distributed Mandatory Access Control scheme. However, in practice a typical IHS will employ a Discretionary Access Control (DAC) model rather than a MAC model and so the policy related attributes are defined to represent handling "hints" and provide no guarantee of enforcement at the destination.

As a result, ensuring that the destination system or counterparty will in fact correctly enforce the intended authorization policies becomes a key issue when entering into any information sharing agreements. The origin CSIRT must accept a non-zero risk of information leakage, and therefore must rely upon legal recourse as a compensating control. Establishing such legal sharing agreements can be a slow and difficult process, as it assumes a high level of trust in the peer, with respect to both intent and also technical capabilities.
3.3.2. Enforcement at Source System

In this model, the required authorization policy enforcements are implemented entirely within the source system. Enforcing the required authorization policy controls at the source system eliminates the risk of subsequent information leakage at the destination system due to inadequate or incomplete implementation of the expected controls. The destination system is not expected to perform any additional authorization enforcements. Authorization enforcement at the source system may be based on, e.g. Role-based Access Controls applied in the context of an established user identity. The source system may use any appropriate authentication mechanism in order to determine the user identity of the requestor, including, e.g. federated identity. An analyst or operator at a CSIRT may request specific information on a given incident or indicator from a peer CSIRT, and the source system will return a suitable representation of that resource based upon the specific role of the requestor. A different authenticated user (perhaps from the same destination CSIRT) may receive a different representation of the same resource, based upon the source system applying suitable Role-based Access Control policy enforcements for the second user identity.

Consistent with HTTP [RFC2616] a user’s request MAY be denied with a resulting HTTP status code value of 4xx such as 401 Unauthorized, 403 Forbidden, or 404 Not Found, or 405 Method Not Allowed, if and as appropriate.

4. RESTful Usage Model

This section describes the basic use of Atom Syndication Format [RFC4287] and Atom Publishing Protocol [RFC5023] as a RESTful transport binding and dynamic discovery protocol, respectively, for cyber security information sharing.

As described in Atom Publishing Protocol [RFC5023], an Atom Service Document is an XML-based document format that allows a client to dynamically discover the collections provided by a publisher.

As described in Atom Syndication Format [RFC4287], Atom is an XML-based document format that describes lists of related information items known as collections, or "feeds". Each feed document contains a collection of zero or more related information items called "member entries" or "entries".

When applied to the problem domain of cyber security information sharing, an Atom feed may be used to represent any meaningful collection of information resources such as a set of incidents, or
indicators. Each entry in a feed could then represent an individual incident, or indicator, or some other resource, as appropriate. Additional feeds could be used to represent other meaningful and useful collections of cyber security resources. A feed may be categorized, and any feed may contain information from zero or more categories. The naming scheme and the semantic meaning of the terms used to identify an Atom category are application-defined.

4.1. Dynamic Service Discovery versus Static URL Template

In order to specify a protocol for cyber security information sharing using the REST architectural style it is necessary to define the set of resources to be modeled, and how these resources are related. Based on this interface contract, clients will then interact with the REST service by navigating the modeled entities, and their relationships. The interface contract between the client and the server may either be statically bound or dynamically bound.

In the statically bound case, the clients have a priori knowledge of the resources that are supported. In the REST architectural style this static interface contract takes the form of a URL template. This approach is not appropriate for the cyber security information sharing domain for at least two reasons.

First, there is no standard for a cyber security domain model. While information security practitioners can generally agree on some of the basic concepts that are important to modeling the cyber security domain -- such as "indicator," "incident," or "attacker," -- there is no single domain model that can been referenced as the basis for specifying a standardized RESTful URI Template. Second, the use of static URL templates creates a tighter coupling between the client implementation and the server implementation. Security threats on the internet are evolving ever more rapidly, and it will never be possible to establish a statically defined resource model and URL Template. Even if there were an initial agreement on an appropriate URL template, it would eventually need to change. If and when a CSIRT finds that it needs to change the URL template, then any existing deployed clients would need to be upgraded.

Thus, rather than attempting to define a fixed set of resources via a URI Template, this document has instead specified an approach based on dynamic discovery of resources via an Atom Publishing Protocol Service Document. By using this approach, it is possible to standardize the RESTful usage model, without needing to standardize on the definitions of specific, strongly-typed resources. A client can dynamically discover what resources are provided by a given CSIRT, and then navigate that domain model accordingly. A specific server implementation may still embody a particular URL template,
however the client does not need a priori knowledge of the format of
the links, and the URL itself is effectively opaque to the client.
Clients are not bound to any particular server’s interface.

The following paragraphs provide a number of non-normative examples
to illustrate the use of Atom Publishing Protocol for basic cyber
security information sharing service discovery, as well as the use of
Atom Syndication Format as a mechanism to publish cyber security
information feeds.

Normative requirements are defined below, in Section 5.

4.2. Non-Normative Examples

4.2.1. Service Discovery

This section provides a non-normative example of a client doing
service discovery.

An Atom service document enables a client to dynamically discover
what feeds a particular publisher makes available. Thus, a CSIRT may
use an Atom service document to enable clients of the CSIRT to
determine what specific cyber security information the CSIRT makes
available to the community. The service document could be made
available at any well known location, such as via a link from the
CSIRT’s home page. One common technique is to include a link in the
<HEAD> section of the organization’s home page, as shown below:

Example of bootstrapping Service Document discovery:

<link rel="introspection" type="application/atomsvc+xml" title="Atom Publ
ishing Protocol Service Document" href="/csirt/svcdoc.xml" />

A client may then format an HTTP GET request to retrieve the service
document:

GET /csirt/svcdoc.xml
Host: www.example.org
Accept: application/atomsvc+xml

Notice the use of the HTTP Accept: request header, indicating the
MIME type for Atom service discovery. The response to this GET
request will be an XML document that contains information on the
specific feed collections that are provided by the CSIRT.
Example HTTP GET response:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Fri, 24 Aug 2012 17:09:11 GMT
Content-Length: 570
Content-Type: application/atomsvc+xml;charset="utf-8"

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<service xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2007/app"
    xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom">
        <atom:title type="text">Incidents</atom:title>
        <collection href="http://example.org/csirt/incidents">
            <atom:title type="text">Incidents Feed</atom:title>
            <accept>application/atom+xml; type=entry</accept>
        </collection>
    </workspace>
</service>

This simple Service Document example shows that this CSIRT provides one workspace, named "Incidents." Within that workspace, the CSIRT makes one feed collection available. When attempting to GET or POST entries to that feed collection, the client must indicate a content type of application/atom+xml.

A CSIRT may also offer a number of different feeds, each containing different types of cyber security information. In the following example, the feeds have been categorized. This categorization will help the clients to decide which feeds will meet their needs.
<service xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2007/app"
    xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom">
    <workspace>
        <collection href="http://example.org/csirt/public/indicators">
            <atom:title>Public Indicators</atom:title>
            <categories fixed="yes">
                <atom:category scheme="http://example.org/csirt/restriction" term="public" />
                <atom:category scheme="http://example.org/csirt/purpose" term="reporting" />
            </categories>
            <accept>application/atom+xml; type=entry</accept>
        </collection>
        <collection href="http://example.org/csirt/public/incidents">
            <atom:title>Public Incidents</atom:title>
            <categories fixed="yes">
                <atom:category scheme="http://example.org/csirt/restriction" term="public" />
                <atom:category scheme="http://example.org/csirt/purpose" term="reporting" />
            </categories>
            <accept>application/atom+xml; type=entry</accept>
        </collection>
    </workspace>
    <workspace>
        <atom:title>Private Consortium Sharing</atom:title>
        <collection href="http://example.org/csirt/private/incidents">
            <atom:title>Incidents</atom:title>
            <categories fixed="yes">
                <atom:category scheme="http://example.org/csirt/purpose" term="traceback, mitigation, reporting" />
                <atom:category scheme="http://example.org/csirt/restriction" term="private, need-to-know" />
            </categories>
            <accept>application/atom+xml;type=entry</accept>
        </collection>
    </workspace>
</service>

In this example, the CSIRT is providing a total of three feed collections, organized into two different workspaces. The first workspace contains two feeds, consisting of publicly available indicators and publicly available incidents, respectively. The second workspace provides one additional feed, for use by a sharing consortium. The feed contains incident information containing entries related to three purposes: traceback, mitigation, and
The entries in this feed are categorized with a restriction of either "Need-to-Know" or "private". An appropriately authenticated and authorized client may then proceed to make GET requests for one or more of these feeds. The publicly provided incident information may be accessible with or without authentication. However, users accessing the feed targeted to the private sharing consortium would be expected to authenticate, and appropriate authorization policies would subsequently be enforced by the feed provider.

4.2.2. Feed Retrieval

This section provides a non-normative example of a client retrieving an incident feed.

Having discovered the available cyber security information sharing feeds, an authenticated and authorized client who is a member of the private sharing consortium may be interested in receiving the feed of known incidents. The client may retrieve this feed by performing an HTTP GET operation on the indicated URL.

Example HTTP GET request for a Feed:

GET /csirt/private/incidents
Host: www.example.org
Accept: application/atom+xml

The corresponding HTTP response would be an XML document containing the incidents feed:

Example HTTP GET response for a Feed:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Fri, 24 Aug 2012 17:20:11 GMT
Content-Length: 2882
Content-Type: application/atom+xml;type=feed;charset=utf-8

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
     xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
     xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom file:/C:/schemas/atom.xsd
urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0 file:/C:/schemas/iodef-1.0.xsd"
     xml:lang="en-US">
  <generator version="1.0" xml:lang="en-US">emc-csirt-iodef-feed-service</generator>
  <id xml:lang="en-US">http://www.example.org/csirt/private/incidents</id>
  <title type="text" xml:lang="en-US">Atom formatted representation of a feed of IODEF documents</title>
  <author>
    <email>csirt@example.org</email>
    <name>EMC CSIRT</name>
  </author>
  <!-- By convention there is usually a self link for the feed -->
  <link href="http://www.example.org/csirt/private/incidents" rel="self"/>
  <link href="http://www.example.org/csirt/private/incidents" rel="alternate"/>
  <!-- The category is based upon IODEF purpose and restriction attributes -->
  <category term="traceback" scheme="purpose" label="trace back"/>
  <category term="need-to-know" scheme="restriction" label="need to know"/>
  <summary>A short description of this incident, extracted from the IODEF Incident class, <description> element. </summary>
</feed>

This feed document has two atom entries, one of which has been elided. The completed entry illustrates an Atom <entry> element that provides a summary of essential details about one particular
incident. Based upon this summary information and the provided category information, a client may choose to do an HTTP GET operation to retrieve the full details of the incident. This example provides a RESTful alternative to the RID investigation request message, as described in sections 6.1 and 7.2 of RFC6545.

4.2.3. Entry Retrieval

This section provides a non-normative example of a client retrieving an incident as an Atom entry.

Having retrieved the feed of interest, the client may then decide based on the description and/or category information that one of the entries in the feed is of further interest. The client may retrieve this incident Entry by performing an HTTP GET operation on the indicated URL.

Example HTTP GET request for an Entry:

GET /csirt/private/incidents/123456
Host: www.example.org
Accept: application/atom+xml

The corresponding HTTP response would be an XML document containing the incident:

Example HTTP GET response for an Entry:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Fri, 24 Aug 2012 17:30:11 GMT
Content-Length: 4965
Content-Type: application/atom+xml;type=entry;charset="utf-8"

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<entry>
  <id>http://www.example.org/csirt/private/incidents/123456</id>
  <title>Sample Incident</title>
  <link rel="self" href="http://www.example.org/csirt/private/incidents/123456"/>
  <link rel="alternate" href="http://www.example.org/csirt/private/incidents/123456"/>
  <published>2012-08-04T18:13:51.0Z</published>
  <updated>2012-08-05T18:13:51.0Z</updated>
  <!-- The category is based upon IODEF purpose and restriction attributes -->
  <category term="traceback" scheme="purpose" label="trace back"/>
  <category term="need-to-know" scheme="restriction" label="need to know"/>
  <summary>A short description of this incident, extracted from the IODEF Incident class, <description> element. </summary>
</entry>
<!-- Refer to section 5.9 for the list of supported (cyber information-specific) link relationships -->
<!-- Typical operations that can be performed on this IODEF message include edit -->
<link href="http://www.example.org/csirt/private/incidents/123456" rel="edit"/>

<!-- the next and previous are just sequential access, may not map to anything related to this IODEF Incident ID -->
<link href="http://www.example.org/csirt/private/incidents/123457" rel="next"/>
<link href="http://www.example.org/csirt/private/incidents/123455" rel="previous"/>

<!-- navigate up to the full collection. Might also be rel="collection" as per IANA registry -->
<link href="http://www.example.org/csirt/private/incidents" rel="up"/>

<content type="application/xml">
  <iodef:Incident purpose="traceback" restriction="need-to-know">
    <iodef:IncidentID name="http://www.example.org/csirt/private/incidents">123456</iodef:IncidentID>
    <iodef:DetectTime>2004-02-02T22:49:24+00:00</iodef:DetectTime>
    <iodef:StartTime>2004-02-02T22:19:24+00:00</iodef:StartTime>
    <iodef:ReportTime>2004-02-02T23:20:24+00:00</iodef:ReportTime>
    <iodef:Description>Host involved in DoS attack</iodef:Description>
    <iodef:Assessment>
      <iodef:Impact completion="failed" severity="low" type="dos"/>
    </iodef:Assessment>
    <iodef:Contact role="creator" type="organization">
      <iodef:ContactName>Constituency-contact for 192.0.2.35</iodef:ContactName>
      <iodef:Email>Constituency-contact@192.0.2.35</iodef:Email>
    </iodef:Contact>
    <iodef:EventData>
      <iodef:Flow>
        <iodef:System category="source">
          <iodef:Node>
            <iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">192.0.2.35</iodef:Address>
          </iodef:Node>
          <iodef:Service ip_protocol="6">
            <iodef:Port>38765</iodef:Port>
          </iodef:Service>
        </iodef:System>
        <iodef:System category="target">
          <iodef:Node>
            <iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">192.0.2.67</iodef:Address>
          </iodef:Node>
        </iodef:System>
      </iodef:Flow>
    </iodef:EventData>
  </iodef:Incident>
</iodef:IODEF-Document>
</content>
As can be seen in the example response, above, an IODEF document is contained within the Atom <content> element. The client may now process the IODEF document as needed.

Note also that, as described previously, the content of the Atom <category> element is application-defined. In the present context, the Atom categories have been assigned based on a mapping of the <restriction> and <purpose> attributes, as defined in the IODEF schema. In addition, the IODEF <incidentID> element has been judiciously chosen so that the associated name attribute, as well as the corresponding incidentID value, can be concatenated in order to easily create the corresponding <id> element for the Atom entry. These and other mappings are normatively defined in Section 5, below.

Finally, it should be noted that in order to optimize the client experience, and avoid an additional round trip, a feed provider may choose to include the entry content inline, as part of the feed document. That is, an Atom <entry> element within a Feed document.
may contain an Atom `<content>` element as a child. In this case, the client will receive the full content of the entries within the feed. The decision of whether to include the entry content inline or to include it as a link is a design choice left to the feed provider (e.g., based upon local environmental factors such as the number of entries contained in a feed, the available network bandwidth, the available server compute cycles, the expected client usage patterns, etc.).

4.2.4. Use of Link Relations

As noted previously, a key benefit of using the RESTful architectural style is the ability to enable the client to navigate to related resources through the use of hypermedia links. In the Atom Syndication Format, the type of the related resource identified in a `<link>` element is indicated via the "rel" attribute, where the value of this attribute identifies the kind of related resource available at the corresponding "href" attribute. Thus, in lieu of a well-known URI template the URI itself is effectively opaque to the client, and therefore the client must understand the semantic meaning of the "rel" attribute in order to successfully navigate. Broad interoperability may be based upon a sharing consortium defining a well-known set of Atom Link Relation types. These Link Relation types may either be registered with IANA, or held in a private registry.

Individual CSIRTs may always define their own link relation types in order to support specific use cases, however support for a core set of well-known link relation types is encouraged as this will maximize interoperability.

In addition, it may be beneficial to define use case profiles that correspond to specific groupings of supported link relationship types. In this way, a CSIRT may unambiguously specify the classes of use cases for which a client can expect to find support.

The following sections provide NON-NORMATIVE examples of link relation usage. Four distinct cyber security information sharing use case scenarios are described. In each use case, the unique benefits of adopting a resource-oriented approach to information sharing are illustrated. It is important to note that these use cases are intended to be a small representative set and is by no means meant to be an exhaustive list. The intent is to illustrate how the use of link relationship types will enable this resource-oriented approach to cyber security information sharing to successfully support the complete range of existing use cases, and also to motivate an initial list of well-defined link relationship types.
4.2.4.1. Use Case: Incident Sharing

This section provides a non-normative example of an incident sharing use case.

In this use case, a member CSIRT shares incident information with another member CSIRT in the same consortium. The client CSIRT retrieves a feed of incidents, and is able to identify one particular entry of interest. The client then does an HTTP GET on that entry, and the representation of that resource contains link relationships for both the associated "indicators" and the incident "history", and so on. The client CSIRT recognizes that some of the indicator and history may be relevant within her local environment, and can respond proactively.
Example HTTP GET response for an incident entry:

```xml
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<entry>
  <id>http://www.example.org/csirt/private/incidents/123456</id>
  <title>Sample Incident</title>
  <link href="http://www.example.org/csirt/private/incidents/123456" rel="self"/>
  <link href="http://www.example.org/csirt/private/incidents/123456" rel="alternate"/>
  <published>2012-08-04T18:13:51.0Z</published>
  <updated>2012-08-05T18:13:51.0Z</updated>
  <link href="http://www.example.org/csirt/private/incidents/123456" rel="edit"/>
  <!-- The links to indicators related to this incident, and the history of this incident, and so on.... -->
  <link href="http://www.example.org/csirt/private/incidents/123456/relationships/indicators" rel="indicators"/>
  <link href="http://www.example.org/csirt/private/incidents/123456/relationships/history" rel="history"/>
  <link href="http://www.example.org/csirt/private/incidents/123456/relationships/campaign" rel="campaign"/>
  <!-- navigate up to the full collection. Might also be rel="collection" as per IANA registry -->
  <link href="http://www.example.org/csirt/private/incidents" rel="up"/>
  <content type="application/xml">
    <iodef:IODEF-Document lang="en" xmlns:iodef="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0">
      <iodef:Incident purpose="traceback" restriction="need-to-know">
        <iodef:IncidentID name="http://www.example.org/csirt/private/incidents">123456</iodef:IncidentID>
        <!-- ...additional incident data.... -->
      </iodef:Incident>
    </iodef:IODEF-Document>
  </content>
</entry>
```

As can be seen in the example response, the Atom <link> elements enable the client to navigate to the related indicator resources, and/or the history entries associated with this incident.

4.2.4.2. Use Case: Collaborative Investigation

This section provides a non-normative example of a collaborative investigation use case.

In this use case, two member CSIRTs that belong to a closed sharing consortium are collaborating on an incident investigation. The initiating CSIRT performs an HTTP GET to retrieve the service document of the peer CSIRT, and determines the collection name to be used for creating a new investigation request. The initiating CSIRT then POSTs a new incident entry to the appropriate collection URL.
The target CSIRT acknowledges the request by responding with an HTTP status code 201 Created.

Example HTTP GET response for the service document:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Fri, 24 Aug 2012 17:09:11 GMT
Content-Length: 934
Content-Type: application/atomsvc+xml;charset="utf-8"

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<service xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2007/app"
  xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
>
  <atom:title type="text">RID Use Case Requests</atom:title>
  <collection href="http://www.example.org/csirt/RID/InvestigationRequests"
    accept="application/atom+xml; type=entry">
    <atom:title type="text">Investigation Requests</atom:title>
  </collection>
  <collection href="http://www.example.org/csirt/RID/TraceRequests"
    accept="application/atom+xml; type=entry">
    <atom:title type="text">Trace Requests</atom:title>
  </collection>
</service>

As can be seen in the example response, the Atom <collection> elements enable the client to determine the appropriate collection URL to request an investigation or a trace.
The client CSIRT then POSTs a new entry to the appropriate feed collection. Note that the <content> element of the new entry may contain a RID message of type "InvestigationRequest" if desired, however this would NOT be required. The entry content itself need only be an IODEF document, with the choice of the target collection resource URL indicating the callers intent. A CSIRT would be free to use any URI template to accept investigationRequests.

POST /csirt/RID/InvestigationRequests HTTP/1.1
Host: www.example.org
Content-Type: application/atom+xml;type=entry
Content-Length: 852

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<entry xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom">
  <title>New Investigation Request</title>
  <id>http://www.example2.org/csirt/private/incidents/123456</id>  <!-- id and updated not guaranteed to be preserved -->
  <updated>2012-08-12T11:08:22Z</updated>                         <!-- may want to profile that behavior in this document -->
  <author><name>Name of peer CSIRT</name></author>
  <content type="application/xml">
    <iodef:IODEF-Document lang="en" xmlns:iodef="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0">
      <iodef:Incident purpose="traceback" restriction="need-to-know">
        <iodef:IncidentID name="http://www.example2.org/csirt/private/incidents">123</iodef:IncidentID>
        <!-- ...additional incident data.... -->
      </iodef:Incident>
    </iodef:IODEF-Document>
  </content>
</entry>

The receiving CSIRT acknowledges the request with HTTP return code 201 Created.
Consistent with HTTP/1.1 RFC, the location header indicates the URL of the newly created InvestigationRequest. If for some reason the request were not authorized, the client would receive an HTTP status code 403 Unauthorized. In this case the HTTP response body may contain additional details, if any as appropriate.

4.2.4.3. Use Case: Search (Query)

This section provides a non-normative example of a search use case.

The following example provides a RESTful alternative to the RID Query message, as described in sections 6.5 and 7.4 of RFC6545. Note that in the RESTful approach described herein there is no requirement to define a query language specific to RID queries. Instead, CSIRTs may provide support for search operations via existing search facilities, and advertise these capabilities via an appropriate URL template. Clients dynamically retrieve the search description document, and invoke specific searches via an instantiated URL template.

An HTTP response body may include a link relationship of type "search." This link provides a reference to an OpenSearch description document.
Example HTTP response that includes a "search" link:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Fri, 24 Aug 2012 17:20:11 GMT
Content-Length: nnnn
Content-Type: application/atom+xml;type=feed;charset=utf-8

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
     xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
     xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom file:/C:/schemas/atom.xsd
urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:ioodef-1.0 file:/C:/schemas/ioodef-1.0.xsd"
     xml:lang="en-US">
  <link href="http://www.example.org/opensearchdescription.xml" rel="search"
        type="application/opensearchdescription+xml"
        title="CSIRT search facility"/>

  <!-- ...other links... -->

  <entry>
    <!-- ...zero or more entries... -->
  </entry>

</feed>

The OpenSearch Description document contains the information needed by a client to request a search. An example of an Open Search description document is shown below:
Example HTTP response that includes a "search" link:

```xml
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<OpenSearchDescription xmlns="http://a9.com/-/spec/opensearch/1.1/"
  xmlns:op="http://a9.com/-/spec/opensearch/1.1/">
  <ShortName>CSIRT search example</ShortName>
  <Description>Cyber security information sharing consortium search interface</Description>
  <Tags>example csirt indicator search</Tags>
  <Contact>admin@example.org</Contact>
  <Url type="application/opensearchdescription+xml" rel="self" template="http://www.example.com/csirt/opensearchdescription.xml"/>
  <Url type="application/atom+xml" rel="results" template="http://www.example.org/csirt?q={searchTerms}&amp;format=Atom+xml"/>
  <LongName>www.example.org CSIRT search</LongName>
  <Query role="example" searchTerms="incident"/>
  <Language>en-us</Language>
  <OutputEncoding>UTF-8</OutputEncoding>
  <InputEncoding>UTF-8</InputEncoding>
</OpenSearchDescription>
```

The OpenSearch Description document shown above contains two `<Url>` elements that contain parameterized URL templates. These templates provide a representation of how the client should make search requests. The exact format of the query string, including the parameterization is specified by the feed provider.

This OpenSearch Description Document also contains an example of a `<Query>` element. Each `<Query>` element describes a specific search request that can be made by the client. Note that the parameters of the `<Query>` element correspond to the URL template parameters. In this way, a provider may fully describe the search interface available to the clients. Section 5.12, below, provides specific NORMATIVE requirements for the use of Open Search.

4.2.4.4. Use Case: Cyber Data Repository

This section provides a non-normative example of a cyber security data repository use case.

In this use case a client accesses a persistent repository of cyber security data via a RESTful usage model. Retrieving a feed collection is analogous to an SQL SELECT statement producing a result set. Retrieving an individual Atom Entry is analogous to a SQL SELECT statement based upon a primary key producing a unique record. The cyber security data contained in the repository may include different data types, including indicators, incidents, benchmarks, or
any other related resources. In this use case, the repository is queried via HTTP GET, and the results that are returned to the client may optionally contain URL references to other cyber security resources that are known to be related. These related resources may also be persisted locally, or they may exist at another (remote) cyber data repository.

Example HTTP GET request to a persistent repository for any resources representing Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) attacks:

GET /csirt/repository/ddos
Host: www.example.org
Accept: application/atom+xml

The corresponding HTTP response would be an XML document containing the DDOS feed.

Example HTTP GET response for a DDOS feed:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Fri, 24 Aug 2012 17:20:11 GMT
Content-Length: nnnn
Content-Type: application/atom+xml;type=feed;charset=utf-8

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
     xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
     xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom file:/C:/schemas/atom.xsd
urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0 file:/C:/schemas/iodef-1.0.xsd"
     xml:lang="en-US">
  <generator version="1.0" xml:lang="en-US">emc-csirt-iodef-feed-service</generator>
  <id xml:lang="en-US">http://www.example.org/csirt/repository/ddos</id>
  <title type="text" xml:lang="en-US">Atom formatted representation of a feed of known ddos resources.</title>
  <author>
    <email>csirt@example.org</email>
    <name>EMC CSIRT</name>
  </author>
  <!-- By convention there is usually a self link for the feed -->
  <link href="http://www.example.org/csirt/repository/ddos" rel="self"/>
  <entry>
    <id>http://www.example.org/csirt/repository/ddos/123456</id>
    <title>Sample DDOS Incident</title>
    <link href="http://www.example.org/csirt/repository/ddos/123456" rel="self"/>
    <link href="http://www.example.org/csirt/repository/ddos/123456" rel="alternate"/>
    <link href="http://www.example.org/csirt/repository/ddos/987654" rel="related"/>
    <link href="http://www.cyber-agency.gov/repository/indicators/1a2b3c" rel="related"/>
    <published>2012-08-04T18:13:51.0Z</published>
    <updated>2012-08-05T18:13:51.0Z</updated>
    <!-- The category is based upon IODEF purpose and restriction attributes -->
    <category term="traceback" scheme="purpose" label="trace back"/>
    <category term="need-to-know" scheme="restriction" label="need to know"/>
    <summary>A short description of this DDOS attack, extracted from the IODEF Incident class, <description> element. </summary>
  </entry>
  <!-- ...another entry... -->
</feed>
This feed document has two atom entries, one of which has been elided. The completed entry illustrates an Atom <entry> element that provides a summary of essential details about one particular DDOS incident. Based upon this summary information and the provided category information, a client may choose to do an HTTP GET operation to retrieve the full details of the DDOS incident. This example shows how a persistent repository may provide links to additional resources, both local and remote.

Note that the provider of a persistent repository is not obligated to follow any particular URL template scheme. The repository available at the hypothetical provider "www.example.com" uses a different URL pattern than the hypothetical repository available at "www.cyber-agency.gov". When a client de-references a link to resource that is located in a remote repository the client may be challenged for authentication credentials acceptable to that provider. If the two repository providers choose to support a federated identity scheme or some other form of single-sign-on technology, then the user experience can be improved for interactive clients (e.g., a human user at a browser). However, this is not required and is an implementation choice that is out of scope for this specification.

5. Requirements for RESTful (Atom+xml) Binding

This section provides the NORMATIVE requirements for using Atom format and Atom Pub as a RESTful binding for cyber security information sharing.

5.1. Transport Layer Security

Servers implementing this specification MUST support server-authenticated TLS.

Servers MAY support mutually authenticated TLS.

5.2. Archiving and Paging

A feed may contain an arbitrary number of entries. In some cases, the complete response to a given query may consist of a logical result set that contains a large number of entries. As a practical matter, the full result set may need to be divided into more manageable portions. For example, a query may produce a full result set that may need to be grouped into logical pages, for purposes of rendering on a user interface.

An historical feed may need to be stable, and/or divided into some defined epochs.
Use cases that require capabilities for paging and archiving of feeds 
SHOULD support the mechanisms described in Feed Paging and Archiving 
[RFC5005].

5.3. Expectation and Impact Classes

It is frequently the case that a CSIRT organization will need to 
triage their investigation and response activities based upon, e.g.,
the state of the current threat environment, or simply as a result of 
having limited resources.

In order to enable CSIRTs to effectively prioritize their response 
activity, it is RECOMMENDED that feed implementors provide Atom 
categories that correspond to the IODEF Expectation and Impact 
classes. The availability of these feed categories will enable 
clients to more easily retrieve and prioritize cyber security 
information that has already been identified as having a specific 
potential impact, or having a specific expectation.

Support for these categories may also enable efficiencies for 
organizations that already have established (or plan to establish) 
operational processes and workflows that are based on these IODEF 
classes.

5.4. User Authentication

Servers MUST require user authentication.

Servers MAY support more than one client authentication method.

Servers participating in an information sharing consortium and 
supporting interactive user logins by members of the consortium 
SHOULD support client authentication via a federated identity scheme 
as per SAML 2.0.

Servers MAY support client authenticated TLS.

5.5. User Authorization

This document does not mandate the use of any specific user 
authorization mechanisms. However, service implementers SHOULD 
provide appropriate authorization checking for all resource accesses, 
including individual Atom Entries, Atom Feeds, and Atom Service 
Documents.

Authorization for a resource MAY be adjudicated based on the value(s) 
of the associated Atom <category> element(s).
When the content model for the Atom <content> element of an Atom Entry contains an <IODEF-Document>, then authorization MUST be adjudicated based upon the Atom <category> element(s), whose values have been mapped as per Section 5.9.

Any use of the <category> element(s) as an input to an authorization policy decision MUST include both the "scheme" and "term" attributes contained therein. As described in Section 5.9 below, the namespace of the "term" attribute is scoped by the associated "scheme" attribute.

5.6. Content Model

Member entry resources providing a representation of an incident resource (e.g., as specified in the link relation type) MUST use the IODEF schema as the content model for the Atom Entry <content> element.

Member Entry resources providing a representation of an indicator resource (e.g., as specified in the link relation type) MUST use the IODEF schema as the content model for the Atom Entry <content> element.

The resource representation MAY include an appropriate indicator schema type within the <AdditionalData> element of the IODEF Incident class. Supported indicator schema types SHALL be registered via an IANA table (todo: IANA registration/review).

Member Entry resources providing a representation of a RID report resource (e.g., as specified in the link relation type) MUST use the RID schema as the content model for the Atom Entry <content> element.

Member Entry resources providing representation of other types, SHOULD use the IODEF schema as the content model for the Atom Entry <content> element.

If the member entry content model is not IODEF, then the <content> element of the Atom entry MUST contain an appropriate XML namespace declaration.

5.7. HTTP methods

The following table defines the HTTP [RFC2616] uniform interface methods supported by this specification:
HTTP method | Description
-------------|----------------------------------------------------------
GET          | Returns a representation of an individual member entry resource, or a feed collection.
PUT          | Replaces the current representation of the specified member entry resource with the representation provided in the HTTP request body.
POST         | Creates a new instance of a member entry resource. The representation of the new resource is provided in the HTTP request body.
DELETE       | Removes the indicated member entry resource, or feed collection.
HEAD         | Returns metadata about the member entry resource, or feed collection, contained in HTTP response headers.
PATCH        | Support TBD.

Table 1: Uniform Interface for Resource-Oriented Lightweight Indicator Exchange

Clients MUST be capable of recognizing and prepared to process any standard HTTP status code, as defined in [RFC2616]

5.8. Service Discovery

This specification requires that a CSIRT MUST publish an Atom Service Document that describes the set of cyber security information sharing feeds that are provided.

The service document SHOULD be discoverable via the CSIRT organization’s Web home page or another well-known public resource.

5.8.1. Workspaces

The service document MAY include multiple workspaces. Any CSIRT providing both public feeds and private consortium feeds MUST place these different classes of feeds into different workspaces, and provide appropriate descriptions and naming conventions to indicate the intended audience of each workspace.

5.8.2. Collections

A CSIRT MAY provide any number of collections within a given Workspace. It is RECOMMENDED that each collection appear in only a single Workspace. It is RECOMMENDED that at least one collection be provided that accepts new incident reports from users. At least one
collection MUST provide a feed of incident information for which the content model for the entries uses the IODEF schema. The title of this collection SHOULD be "Incidents".

5.8.3. Service Document Security

Access to the service document MUST be protected via server-authenticated TLS and a server-side certificate.

When deploying a service document for use by a closed consortium, the service document MAY also be digitally signed and/or encrypted, using XML DigSig and/or XML Encryption, respectively.

5.9. Category Mapping

This section defines normative requirements for mapping IODEF metadata to corresponding Atom category elements. (todo: decide between IANA registration of scheme, or use a full URI).

5.9.1. Collection Category

An Atom collection MAY hold entries from one or more categories. The collection category set MUST contain at least the union of all the member entry categories. A collection MAY have additional category metadata that are unique to the collection, and not applicable to any individual member entry. A collection containing IODEF incident content MUST contain at least two <category> elements. One category MUST be specified with the value of the "scheme" attribute as "restriction". One category MUST be specified with the value of the "scheme" attribute as "purpose". The value of the "fixed" attribute for both of these category elements MUST be "yes". When the category scheme="restriction", the allowable values for the "term" attribute are constrained as per section 3.2 of IODEF, e.g. public, need-to-know, private, default. When the category scheme="purpose", the allowable values for the "term" attribute are constrained as per section 3.2 of IODEF, e.g. traceback, mitigation, reporting, other.

5.9.2. Entry Category

An Atom entry containing IODEF content MUST contain at least two <category> elements. One category MUST be specified with the value of the "scheme" attribute as "restriction". One category MUST be specified with the value of the "scheme" attribute as "purpose". When the category scheme="restriction", the value of the "term" attribute must be exactly one of (public, need-to-know, private, default). When the category scheme="purpose", the value of the "term" attribute must be exactly one of (traceback, mitigation, reporting, other). When the purpose is "other"....
Any member entry MAY have any number of additional categories.

5.10. Entry ID

The ID element for an Atom entry SHOULD be established via the concatenation of the value of the name attribute from the IODEF <IncidentID> element and the corresponding value of the <IncidentID> element. This requirement ensures a simple and direct one-to-one relationship between an IODEF incident ID and a corresponding Feed entry ID and avoids the need for any system to maintain a persistent store of these identity mappings.

(todo: Note that this implies a constraint on the IODEF document that is more restrictive than the current IODEF schema. IODEF section 3.3 requires only that the name be a STRING type. Here we are stating that name must be an IRI. Possible request to update IODEF to constrain, or to support a new element or attribute).

5.11. Entry Content

The <content> element of an Atom <entry> SHOULD include an IODEF document. The <entry> element SHOULD include an appropriate XML namespace declaration for the IODEF schema. If the content model of the <entry> element does not follow the IODEF schema, then the <entry> element MUST include an appropriate XML namespace declaration.

A client MAY ignore content that is not using the IODEF schema.

5.12. Link Relations

In addition to the standard Link Relations defined by the Atom specification, this specification defines the following additional Link Relation terms, which are introduced specifically in support of the Resource-Oriented Lightweight Indicator Exchange protocol.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Conformance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>service</td>
<td>Provides a link to an atom service document associated with the collection feed.</td>
<td>MUST</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>search</td>
<td>Provides a link to an associated Open Search document that describes a URL template for search queries.</td>
<td>MUST</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>history</td>
<td>Provides a link to a</td>
<td>MUST</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field</td>
<td>Expires June 4, 2016</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>incidents</td>
<td>MUST</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>indicators</td>
<td>MUST</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>evidence</td>
<td>SHOULD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>campaign</td>
<td>SHOULD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>attacker</td>
<td>SHOULD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vector</td>
<td>SHOULD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>assessments</td>
<td>SHOULD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reports</td>
<td>SHOULD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2: Link Relations for Resource-Oriented Lightweight Indicator Exchange

Unless specifically registered with IANA these short names MUST be fully qualified via concatenation with a base-uri. An appropriate base-uri could be established via agreement amongst the members of an information sharing consortium. For example, the rel="indicators" relationship would become rel="http://www.example.org/csirt/incidents/relationships/indicators."

5.12.1. Additional Link Relation Requirements

An IODEF document that is carried in an Atom Entry SHOULD NOT contain a <relatedActivity> element. Instead, the related activity SHOULD be available via a link rel=related.

An IODEF document that is carried in an Atom Entry SHOULD NOT contain a <history> element. Instead, the related history SHOULD be available via a link rel="history" (todo: or a fully qualified link rek name). The associated href MAY leverage OpenSearch to specify the required query.

An Atom Entry MAY include additional link relationships not specified here. If a client encounters a link relationship of an unkown type the client MUST ignore the offending link and continue processing the remaining resource representation as if the offending link element did not appear.

5.13. Member Entry Forward Security

As described in Authorization Policy Enforcement (Authorization Policy Enforcement) a RESTful model for cyber security information sharing requires that all of the required security enforcement for feeds and entries MUST be enforced at the source system, at the point the representation of the given resource(s) is
created. A CSIRT provider SHALL NOT return any feed content or
member entry content for which the client identity has not been
specifically authenticated, authorized, and audited.

Sharing communities that have a requirement for forward message
security (such that client systems are required to participate in
providing message level security and/or distributed authorization
policy enforcement), MUST use the RID schema as the content model for
the member entry <content> element.

5.14. Date Mapping

The Atom feed <updated> element MUST be populated with the current
time at the instant the feed representation was generated. The Atom
entry <published> element MUST be populated with the same time value
as the <reportTime> element from the IODEF document.

5.15. Search

Implementers MUST support OpenSearch 1.1 [opensearch] as the
mechanism for describing how clients may form search requests.

Implementers MUST provide a link with a relationship type of
"search". This link SHALL return an Open Search Description Document
as defined in OpenSearch 1.1.

Implementers MUST support an OpenSearch 1.1 compliant search URL
template that enables a search query via Atom Category, including the
scheme attribute and terms attribute as search parameters.

Implementers SHOULD support search based upon the IODEF AlternativeID
class as a search parameter.

Implementers SHOULD support search based upon the four timestamp
elements of the IODEF Incident class: <startTime>, <EndTime>,
<DetectTime>, and <ReportTime>.

Implementers MAY support additional search capabilities based upon
any of the remaining elements of the IODEF Incident class, including
the <Description> element.

Collections that support use of the RID schema as a content model in
the Atom member entry <content> element (e.g. in a report resource
representation reachable via the "report" link relationship) MUST
support search operations that include the RID MessageType as a
search parameter, in addition to the aforementioned IODEF schema
elements, as contained within the <ReportSchema> element.
Implementers MUST fully qualify all OpenSearch URL template parameter names using the defined IODEF or RID XML namespaces, as appropriate.

5.16. / (forward slash) Resource URL

The "/" resource MAY be provided for compatibility with existing deployments that are using Transport of Real-time Inter-network Defense (RID) Messages over HTTP/TLS [RFC6546]. Consistent with RFC6546 errata, a client requesting a GET on "/" MUST receive an HTTP status code 405 Method Not Allowed. An implementation MAY provide full support for RFC6546 such that a POST to "/" containing a recognized RID message type just works. Alternatively, a client requesting a POST to "/" MAY receive an HTTP status code 307 Temporary Redirect. In this case, the location header in the HTTP response will provide the URL of the appropriate RID endpoint, and the client may repeat the POST method at the indicated location. This resource could also leverage the new draft by reschke that proposes HTTP status code 308 (cf: draft-reschke-http-status-308-07.txt).

6. Security Considerations

This document defines a resource-oriented approach to lightweight indicator exchange using HTTP, TLS, Atom Syndicate Format, and Atom Publishing Protocol. As such, implementers must understand the security considerations described in those specifications.

In addition, there are a number of additional security considerations that are unique to this specification.

As described above in the section Authentication of Users (Section 3.2), the approach described herein is based upon all policy enforcements being implemented at the point when a resource representation is created. As such, CSIRTS sharing cyber security information using this specification must take care to authenticate their HTTP clients using a suitably strong user authentication mechanism. Sharing communities that are exchanging information on well-known indicators and incidents for purposes of public education may choose to rely upon, e.g. HTTP Authentication, or similar. However, sharing communities that are engaged in sensitive collaborative analysis and/or operational response for indicators and incidents targeting high value information systems should adopt a suitably stronger user authentication solution, such as TLS client certificates, or a risk-based or multi-factor approach. In general, trust in the sharing consortium will depend upon the members maintaining adequate user authentication mechanisms.
Collaborating consortiums may benefit from the adoption of a federated identity solution, such as those based upon SAML-core [SAML-core] and SAML-bind [SAML-bind] and SAML-prof [SAML-prof] for Web-based authentication and cross-organizational single sign-on. Dependency on a trusted third party identity provider implies that appropriate care must be exercised to sufficiently secure the Identity provider. Any attacks on the federated identity system would present a risk to the CISRT, as a relying party. Potential mitigations include deployment of a federation-aware identity provider that is under the control of the information sharing consortium, with suitably stringent technical and management controls.

As discussed above in the section Authorization Policy Enforcement (Section 3.3), authorization of resource representations is the responsibility of the source system, i.e. based on the authenticated user identity associated with an HTTP(S) request. The required authorization policies that are to be enforced must therefore be managed by the security administrators of the source system. Various authorization architectures would be suitable for this purpose, such as RBAC [1] and/or ABAC, as embodied in XACML [XACML]. In particular, implementers adopting XACML may benefit from the capability to represent their authorization policies in a standardized, interoperable format.

Additional security requirements such as enforcing message-level security at the destination system could supplement the security enforcements performed at the source system, however these destination-provided policy enforcements are out of scope for this specification. Implementers requiring this capability should consider leveraging, e.g. the <RIDPolicy> element in the RID schema. Refer to RFC6545 section 9 for more information.

When security policies relevant to the source system are to be enforced at both the source and destination systems, implementers must take care to avoid unintended interactions of the separately enforced policies. Potential risks will include unintended denial of service and/or unintended information leakage. These problems may be mitigated by avoiding any dependence upon enforcements performed at the destination system. When distributed enforcement is unavoidable, the usage of a standard language (e.g. XACML) for the expression of authorization policies will enable the source and destination systems to better coordinate and align their respective policy expressions.

Adoption of the information sharing approach described in this document will enable users to more easily perform correlations across separate, and potentially unrelated, cyber security information providers. A client may succeed in assembling a data set that would
not have been permitted within the context of the authorization policies of either provider when considered individually. Thus, providers may face a risk of an attacker obtaining an access that constitutes an undetected separation of duties (SOD) violation. It is important to note that this risk is not unique to this specification, and a similar potential for abuse exists with any other cyber security information sharing protocol. However, the wide availability of tools for HTTP clients and Atom feed handling implies that the resources and technical skills required for a successful exploit may be less than it was previously. This risk can be best mitigated through appropriate vetting of the client at account provisioning time. In addition, any increase in the risk of this type of abuse should be offset by the corresponding increase in effectiveness that that this specification affords to the defenders.

While it is a goal of this specification to enable more agile cyber security information sharing across a broader and varying constituency, there is nothing in this specification that necessarily requires this type of deployment. A cyber security information sharing consortium may chose to adopt this specification while continuing to operate as a gated community with strictly limited membership.

7. IANA Considerations

This document does not require any actions from IANA.

8. Acknowledgements

The author gratefully acknowledges the valuable contributions of Tom Maguire, Kathleen Moriarty, and Vijayanand Bharadwaj. These individuals provided detailed review comments on earlier drafts, and many suggestions that have helped to improve this document.

9. References

9.1. Normative References


9.2. Informative References


9.3. URIs


Appendix A. Change Tracking

Changes since -02 version, August 15, 2013 to December 2, 2015:

- Added section specifying the use of RFC5005 for Archive and Paging of feeds. See: Section 5.2
- Added section describing use of atom categories that correspond to IODEF expectation class and impact classes. See: Section 5.3
- Dropped references to adoption of a MILE-specific HTTP media type parameter.
- Updated IANA Considerations section to clarify that no IANA actions are required.

Appendix B. Resource Authorization Model

As described in Section 3.3.2 above, ROLIE assumes that all authorization policy enforcement is provided at the source server. The implementation details of the authorization scheme chosen by a ROLIE-compliant provider are out of scope for this specification. Implementers are free to choose any suitable authorization mechanism that is capable of fulfilling the policy enforcement requirements relevant to their consortium and/or organization.

It is well known that one of the major barriers to information sharing is ensuring acceptable use of the information shared. In the case of ROLIE, one way to lower that barrier may be to develop a XACML profile. Use of XACML would allow a ROLIE-compliant provider to express their information sharing authorization policies in a standards-compliant, and machine-readable format.

This improved interoperability may, in turn, enable more agile interactions in the cyber security sharing community. For example, a peer CSIRT, or another interested stakeholder such as an auditor, would be able to review and compare CSIRT sharing policies using appropriate tooling.

The XACML 3.0 standard is based upon the notion that authorization policies are defined in terms of predicate logic expressions written against the attributes associated with one or more of the following four entities:
Thus, a suitable approach to a XACML 3.0 profile for ROLIE authorization policies could begin by using the 3-tuple of [SUBJECT, ACTION, RESOURCE] where:

- SUBJECT is the suitably authenticated identity of the requestor.
- ACTION is the associated HTTP method, GET, PUT, POST, DELETE, HEAD, (PATCH).
- RESOURCE is an XPath expression that uniquely identifies the instance or type of the ROLIE resource being requested.

Implementers who have a need may also choose to evaluate based upon the additional ENVIRONMENT factors, such as current threat level, and so on. One could also write policy to consider the CVSS score associated with the resource, or the lifecycle phase of the resource (vulnerability unverified, confirmed, patch available, etc.), and so on.

Having these policies expressed in a standards-compliant and machine-readable format could improve the agility and effectiveness of a cyber security information sharing group or consortium, and enable better cyber defenses.

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Security alerts over the first MILE
draft-moskowitz-firstmile-00.txt

Abstract

This document describes a pub/sub styled protocol to send security alerts to a security monitor that can feed into MILE and other management platforms. It uses data structures from NETCONF, MILE, and IPFIX to manage the reporting and report security alerts.

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1. Introduction

This document proposes a set of protocols to automate the reporting of security alerts to the various monitoring systems. The intent is primarily to automate the input of security events to the MILE environment (RID [RFC6545] and IODEF [I-D.ietf-mile-rfc5070-bis]). Any authorized monitoring system can subscribe to any of the security alerts reports.

An Internet security defense device first registers with a security alert monitoring system. At this point the content and protocol used has not been identified. Since such a registration is normally at ‘quiet time’, the registration does not occur during a network congested time and can use some HTTPS-based service. At this time both systems exchange their X.509 identifiers to be used for the sub/pub security and identification.

Once a defense device is registered, the monitoring system can subscribe to it for those alerts in needs to receive. The subscription protocol should use NETCONF [RFC6536] with the publication/subscription push service [I-D.ietf-netconf-yang-push]. If the system needs a "pull" service, the NETCONF and I2RS subscription service could be expanded to support a pull service.

Any secure NETCONF transport that this pub/sub service support can be used.
The defense device publishes security alerts to subscribed monitors using IODEF or IPFIX [RFC7011] data structures. The protocol(s) for these reports are discussed within this document.

2. Terms and Definitions

2.1. Requirements Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

3. Problem Space

At the time of developing this document, there is no IETF defined set of standardized security alert messages and protocols. Administrators of systems which provide MILE service currently use "cut-and-paste" where they cut selected messages from proprietary monitoring systems and past these messages into their MILE environment. The intent here is to standardize and automate this process. It is recognized that many of these alerts are too detailed to be actionable. Some implementations of the alert monitor will include analytic tools to select the actionable information from the alerts. Alerts which are too detailed to be actionable or alerts which include analytical tools are outside of any standardizing process.

Many of the needed alerts are scattered throughout the various standards like IPFIX and IODEF, but are not collected together as recognized security alerts that should be aggregated into a reporting framework.

4. The first mile of security alerts

There are three components to the first MILE process

- Register
- Subscribe
- Publish

4.1. Register

An Internet security defense device first registers with a security alert monitoring system. This is typically done at the time the device is installed, but may occur later as the device is registered to more monitoring systems. There is no theoretical limit on the
number of monitors a device is registered to. The limit within a
system are practical limits based on internal limits within the
device.

Most monitors will be commercial and the registration will be based
on existing business relationships. One such example is the ISP’s
security monitor. It is possible that a CERT may accept direct
registration without a business relationship. However this may
require more study to ensure that this will not introduce potential
attacks of false reporting to CERTs.

The actual content of the registration has not been determined.
Minimally it needs to include

- Identifiers (e.g. X.509 certificates)
- Reports available from device (i.e. what to subscribe to)
- Subscription protocols(s)
- Publication protocols(s)

A device can alter any of its registered information at any time as
well as cancel a registration.

4.2. Subscribe

Once a defense device is registered, the monitoring system can
subscribe to it for those alerts in needs to receive. This is
typically done via NETCONF, but is controlled by what the device
registered as supported subscript protocols.

A monitor can subscribe or unsubscribe for reports at any time. With
the first subscription, a secure communication transport will be
enabled from the device to the monitor. See Section 4.3 for more on
the this secure transport.

4.3. Publish

The defense device publishes security alerts to subscribed monitors.
The reports will be sent over the subscribed protocol using the
subscribed data model, either IODEF or IPFIX.

Since these alerts may be reported during an attack that degrades
communications, many of the DOTS requirements
[I-D.ietf-dots-requirements] apply here. One that doesn’t is the bi-
directional requirement. Even so, the same security and transport
design used for DOTS should be used here.
5. first MILE data model

The data model will support the constraints of the NETCONF publication/subscription model [I-D.ietf-netconf-yang-push], and the NETCONF module library function [I-D.ietf-netconf-yang-library] which indicates pub/sub support within a model. If the MILE service which to utilize non-persistent (aka ephemeral) data that disappears on reboot, the netconf publication/subscription model will support non-persistent configuration.

Work on the data model is an open item.

6. IANA Considerations

No IANA considerations exist for this document at this time.

7. Security Considerations

An attacker that can disable first MILE may be able to attack a device at will as those monitoring it expect these attacks to show up on their monitor. As such each part of the firstMILE system will need the complete security services that are defined or referenced here.

8. Contributors

TBD

9. References

9.1. Normative References

[I-D.ietf-netconf-yang-library]

[I-D.ietf-netconf-yang-push]

9.2. Informative References

[I-D.ietf-dots-requirements]

[I-D.ietf-mile-rfc5070-bis]
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