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Requirements for IPv6 Enterprise Firewalls  
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Abstract

While there has been some work in the area of firewalls, concrete requirements for IPv6 firewalls have never been specified in the RFC series. The more limited experience with the IPv6 protocols and the more reduced number of firewalls that support IPv6 has made it rather difficult to infer what are reasonable features to expect in an IPv6 firewall. This has typically been a problem for network operators, who typically have to produce a "Request for Proposal" from scratch that describes such features. This document specifies a set of requirements for IPv6 firewalls, in order to establish some common-ground in terms of what features can be expected in them.

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## 1. DISCLAIMER

This initial version of the document is based on a typical IPv6 firewall "Request for Proposal" (RFP), and is mostly meant to trigger discussion in the community, and define a direction for the document. Future versions of this document may contain all, more, or a subset of the requirements present in the current version of this document. Additionally, the current version DOES NOT yet properly separate requirements among MUST/REQUIRED, SHOULD/RECOMMENDED, and MAY/OPTIONAL.

Please DO read Section 3 of this document, since it provides important information about the conventions used throughout this document that is mandatory to be able to understand it.

Finally, please note this version is meant to provide requirements, rather than implementation guidelines.

## 2. Introduction

While the IETF has published a large number of documents discussing IP and IPv6 packet filtering (see e.g. [RFC7126] and some documents on the topic of IP firewalls (see e.g. [RFC2979] and [RFC3511]), concrete requirements for IP firewalls have never been specified in the RFC series. When it comes to IPv4, a number of features have become common over the years, and firewall requirements have somehow become operational wisdom. When it comes to IPv6 [RFC2460], the more limited experience with the protocols, and the reduced variety of IPv6 firewalls has made it rather difficult to specify what are reasonable features to be expected of an IPv6 firewall. This has proven to be a problem for network operators (who have typically had to produce a "Request for Proposal" from scratch), but also for vendors (who lack a well defined set of requirements that can serve as a roadmap for implementation).

This situation has not only made the process of purchasing an IPv6 firewall harder, but at times has also meant that a number of important/basic features have remained unimplemented by major firewall vendors, or that aforementioned features have not behaved as expected.

This document aims to provide a set of requirements for firewall vendors, which are specified as "MUST", "SHOULD", or "MAY". An IPv6 firewall product is said to be "fully-compliant" with this specification provided it implements all requirements marked as "MUST" and "SHOULD". An IPv6 firewall product is said to be "conditionally-compliant" with this specification provided it implements all requirements marked as "MUST", but fails to implement one or more of the requirements marked as "SHOULD".

## 3. Conventions

### 3.1. Requirements Language

Take careful note: Unlike other IETF documents, the key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are not used as described in [RFC2119]. This document uses these keywords not

strictly for the purpose of interoperability, but rather for the purpose of establishing industry-common baseline functionality.

In this document, the words that are used to define the significance of each particular requirement are capitalized. These words are:

- o "MUST" This word, or the words "REQUIRED" and "SHALL" mean that the item is an absolute requirement of the specification.
- o "SHOULD" This word or the adjective "RECOMMENDED" means that there may exist valid reasons in particular circumstances to ignore this item, but the full implications should be understood and the case carefully weighed before choosing a different course.
- o "MAY" This word or the adjective "OPTIONAL" means that this item is truly optional. One vendor may choose to include the item because a particular marketplace requires it or because it enhances the product, for example; another vendor may omit the same item.

A firewall implementation is a module that supports at least one of the feature types defined in this document. Firewall implementations may support multiple feature types, but conformance is considered individually for each type.

A firewall implementation is not compliant with a specific feature type if it fails to satisfy one or more of the MUST requirements of such specific feature type. An implementation that satisfies all the MUST and all the SHOULD requirements of a specific feature is said to be "unconditionally compliant" with such feature type; one that satisfies all the MUST requirements but not all the SHOULD requirements is said to be "conditionally compliant" with such feature type.

### 3.2. Terminology

Where possible, this document employs the terminology defined in [RFC2647]. Other additional terms are defined below:

#### session:

The term session refers to any protocol instance that involves some sort of stateful exchange. Examples of "sessions" could be TCP connections, UDP query/response pairs, ICMPv6 echo/response pairs, etc. Our definition of session corresponds to the definition of "connection" in Section 3.7 of [RFC2647], but we rather employ "session" to avoid possible confusion.

XXX: Should we just get rid of the term "session" and use "connection" throughout this document, with a big reference to the definition in RFC2647?

### 3.3. Numbering Conventions

The items for each feature type will follow a monotonically-increasing order -- typically in increments to 10. This is to prevent the insertion of an item in the list of requirements to change the numbering of all the following requirements. Prior to the final publication of this document, each of items of each the feature types will be numbered starting from 1, with increments of 1 (1, 2, 3, 4, etc.).

NOTE: Those with BASIC language programming experience may find the idea familiar.

## 4. General Security Features

### REQ GEN-5:

The firewall MUST include performance benchmarking documentation. Such documentation MUST include information that reflects firewall performance with respect to IPv6 packet, but also regarding how IPv6 traffic may affect the performance of IPv4 traffic. The aforementioned documentation MUST be, at the very least, conditionally-compliant with both [RFC3511] and [RFC5180] (that is, it MUST support all "MUST" requirements in such documents, and may also support the "SHOULD" requirements in such documents).

NOTE: This is for operators to spot be able to identify cases where a devices may under-perform in the presence of IPv6 traffic (see e.g. [FW-Benchmark]). XXX: This note may be removed before publication if deemed appropriate.

### REQ GEN-10:

All features of the firewall MUST be able to be individually configured (at least ON or OFF, with other configurable parameters as applicable). A well-documented default initial setting must be provided for each feature.

### REQ GEN-20:

MUST support basic Access Control Lists (ACLs).

### REQ GEN-30:

MUST support stateless packet inspection and filtering at transport layer.

### REQ GEN-40:

MUST support stateful packet inspection and filtering at transport layer.

REQ GEN-50:

SHOULD support full-proxy for the TCP [RFC0793] connections (the handshake is validated on the firewall before reaching the target system).

Some products identify this feature with terms such as "TCP Intercept and Limiting Embryonic Connections".

REQ GEN-60:

MUST be able to enforce timeouts on protocol sessions based on the upper-layer protocol (e.g. enforce a timeout on the FIN-WAIT state for TCP connections, a timeout for DNS query/response pair, etc.). In general, it MUST have different timeout parameters and thresholds to be used to prevent idle sessions from exhausting resources on the device and/or the service that is defended. For sessions composed of multiple packets (such as TCP connections), the exchange of valid packets MUST refresh the timers employed for enforcing the aforementioned timeouts.

NOTE: This is to avoid the known and buggy behavior where firewalls enforce a maximum lifetime for the protocol session (e.g. TCP connection) regardless of whether there is ongoing exchange of legitimate packets for such session.

REQ GEN-70:

MUST be able to provide anti-spoofing features (e.g. uRPF ).

REQ GEN-80:

MUST be able to redirect specific traffic to a proxy server e.g. for HTTP/S protocols.

NOTE: "Redirection means that the firewall should be able to divert the traffic to a proxy - i.e., take the traffic, send it to an inspection engine, receive it back and forward it (all this completely transparent to the users).

REQ GEN-90:

MUST be able to detect and reject invalid source or destination addresses (e.g. local-link addresses that try to traverse the firewall) with a single policy.

## 5. IPv6-Specific Features

### REQ SPC-10:

MUST be able to filter ICMPv6 [RFC4443] traffic at a message type/code granularity. [RFC4890] MUST be employed for the default filtering configuration.

### REQ SPC-20:

MUST be able to block packets containing any specified extension header type (based on its Next Header value), on a specified number of instances of a specified extension header type, and on a specified overall number of IPv6 extension headers.

### REQ SPC-30:

MUST be able to block IPv6 packets that employ a Routing Header both at the granularity of Extension Header Type (as required in SPC-20) and Routing Header Type.

### REQ SPC-40:

SHOULD be able to drop packets based on IPv6 option types.

### REQ SPC-50:

MUST be able to detect IPv6 tunnels such as SIIT [RFC6145], 6to4 [RFC3056], 6in4 [RFC4213], ISATAP [RFC5214] and Teredo [RFC4380] (please see [RFC7123]), and MUST be able to selectively block or allow them for specific sources, destinations, routes or interfaces.

### REQ SPC-60:

MUST be able to validate IPv6 Neighbor Discovery [RFC4861] packets (RS, RA, NS, NA, Redirect) according to [I-D.ietf-opsec-ipv6-nd-security].

### REQ SPC-70:

MUST be able to statefully match ICMPv6 errors to TCP [RFC0793], UDP [RFC0768], and ICMPv6 [RFC4443] communication instances (see [RFC5927]).

### REQ SPC-80:

MUST be able to parse all defined extension headers according to [RFC7045], and SHOULD filter packets containing IPv6 Extension Headers as recommended in [draft-gont-opsec-ipv6-eh-filtering].

### REQ SPC-90:

MUST be able to find the upper-layer protocol in an IPv6 header chain (see [RFC7112]).

### REQ SPC-100:

SHOULD be able to normalize (rewrite) the following IPv6 header fields on a per-interface basis:

- \* Hop Limit

## 6. VPN Security Requirements

### REQ VPN-10:

MUST implement IPsec-based [RFC4301] VPN technology.

### REQ VPN-20:

MUST implement "hub-and-spoke" Dynamic Multipoint VPN-like technology, allowing creation of dynamic-meshed VPN without having to pre-configure all of possible tunnels.

### REQ VPN-30:

MUST implement SSL/TLS-based [SSL-VPNs] VPN technology.

### REQ VPN-40:

MUST be able to use digital certificates, including CRL and OCSP revocation checking methods, to mutually authenticate VPN peers.

### REQ VPN-50:

MUST be able to disable or enable split-tunnelling feature on VPN as required.

### REQ VPN-60:

MUST support the enrollment of the system in a PKI infrastructure for the regular renewal of certificates.

### REQ VPN-70:

MUST be able to transit IPv4 and IPv6 packets providing full parity for services, and also offer both protocols in dual-stack in the same VPN connection.

### REQ VPN-80:

MUST be able to apply to the tunnelled content that is terminated on the device, the same inspection policies that are possible in the non tunnelled traffic.

### REQ VPN-90:

MUST perform a full validation of the certificates' chains when verifying the validity of the OCSP/CLR responses. Caching of responses SHOULD be configurable by end users, and the default response SHOULD be not to accept a non-valid certificate. The default response MAY be overridden by the administrators, but it MUST be configurable on a per-domain basis (e.g. accept incomplete



certificate chains for "intranet\_of\_internal\_corp.example.org", but refuse it for all of the other domains).

## 7. Denial of Service (DoS) Protection

### REQ DoS-10:

MUST be able to protect against implementation-specific attacks, including:

- \* Winnuke [Myst1997]
- \* ping-of-death [Kenney1996]
- \* Smurf [CERT1998a]
- \* LAND Attack [Meltman1997]
- \* Teardrop Attack [CERT1997] [Junos-Teardrop]

### REQ DoS-20:

MUST be able to protect against IPv6 resource exhaustion attacks, including:

- \* fragment flooding attacks
- \* Neighbor Cache Exhaustion attacks, whether launched from a local network (see [I-D.ietf-opsec-ipv6-nd-security] or from remote networks (see [RFC6583])

### REQ DoS-30:

MUST be able to protect against TCP flooding attacks: connection-flooding, FIN-WAIT-1 flooding, etc. (see e.g. [CPNI-TCP])

### REQ DoS-40:

MUST be able to protect against TCP resource exhaustion attacks: zero-window attacks, SYN-floods, etc. (see e.g. [CPNI-TCP])

### REQ DoS-50:

MUST be able to detect and drop malformed IPv6 packets (incorrect header/option lengths, etc.).

### REQ DoS-60:

MUST be able to detect and drop malformed TCP packets (incorrect segment/options lengths, etc.).

### REQ DoS-70:

MUST be able to provide bandwidth management (QoS or anti-flooding) policies customizable for specific source and destination networks, or by VLAN or MPLS ID.

REQ DoS-80:

MUST be able to participate to a blackhole/synkhole routing infrastructure as per [RFC5635].

REQ DoS-85:

MUST be able to fetch and use third party "reputational" IP white- and black-lists (e.g. download them via RSS feeds or query via them DNS record) and use them in policy constructs/ACLs. In general, it MUST be able to provide some form of reputational service for IP addresses which must include IPv6 networks.

REQ DoS-90:

MUST be able to set up a maximum session setup rate, and detect hosts or networks exceeding it.

REQ DoS-100:

MUST be able to set up a maximum IPv6 source and/or destination session limit, and detect when they are exceeded.

REQ DoS-110:

For each of the previous detection controls, different configurable reactions SHOULD be possible by IPv6 address and network sources and/or destinations. The minimum actions required are the following:

1. allow the traffic ("ignore" or "whitelist")
2. allow the traffic but log ("bypass" or "detection only" mode)
3. drop the packet (only the offending packet but do not reset the connection)
4. drop session (drop the entire connection, but do not send a reset back)
5. "greylist" - put it in a list of blocked addresses, but remove it from the list after a configurable amount of time
6. send an email/SMS/pager text to the firewall administrator
7. send TCP reset to source only
8. send TCP reset to destination only

9. send TCP reset to both source and destination
  10. perform a specific, preconfigured change on the firewall policy
  11. feed a third party source such as a switch/NAC/NAP or RADIUS system, to isolate/quarantine the offending port/MAC address/user
  12. quarantine the specific traffic or source (block them for a configurable amount of time, e.g. 5 minutes, and then allow them again; eventually, the quarantine time may get longer if the offense is repeated)
8. Application Layer Firewall

## REQ APP-10:

MUST be able to provide web filtering features, such as enforcing access to allowed web content and filtering high risk URLs such as anonymizers and known hostile addresses.

## REQ APP-20:

MUST be able to provide email filtering features, such as mitigating spam, phishing and email harvesting, and enforce email policies.

9. Logging, Auditing and Security Operation Centre (SOC) requirements

## REQ SOC-10:

MUST generate log for all the changes performed to the system, including change of group membership for a device, new or removed devices in a group, new or removed administrators.

## REQ SOC-20:

MUST provide the following features:

1. Connection logs
2. Local log storage
3. Network logging
4. Real time log viewer
5. Attack detected
6. Per rule logging

7. Automatic log file compression

8. Log file rotation

REQ SOC-30:

MUST be able to generate a log for:

1. all the logins, logouts and failed login attempts from firewall administrators
2. any modifications or disabling of the firewall rules

REQ SOC-40:

Any security event detected - malicious traffic, hit of a policy, policy violation, termination of a session and so on - MUST be able to generate a log, and be configurable to do that or not by administrators.

REQ SOC-50:

There MUST be a mechanism to prevent log flooding from the device against the management system, such as aggregation of like events.

REQ SOC-60:

The amount of information in the alerts MUST be configurable; it SHOULD be possible to have the date/time and type of event and the full payload of the traffic that has triggered the signature/event.

REQ SOC-70:

The firewall MUST minimize the number of log entries generated for a single event - e.g. when repeated similar events for a short period of time are detected, they are aggregated and the cumulative number of events is reported.

REQ SOC-80:

The firewall MUST be able to send logs in multiple ways and formats, for instance UDP syslog, TCP syslog, SMTP, SNMP and so on. It must be possible to configure different ways and formats for different policies and configure some ways and formats as a "backup" in the case that the main way fails. Please describe the different possibilities.

REQ SOC-90:

The firewall SHOULD alert the firewall administrator when the policy to be enforced does not follow the advice in [RFC4890] -- particularly if the filtering policy would block/drop ICMPv6 Packet Too Big error messages.

## 10. Console and Events Visualization requirements

## REQ CON-10:

MUST provide a dashboard view, which must be customizable by end-user and end-users' group (e.g. their Microsoft Active Directory or LDAP group).

## REQ CON-20:

The dashboard must be able to include system health monitoring information, such as the following:

1. CPU idle
2. Real and Swap memory usage
3. Disk usage
4. Number of accepted and dropped packets
5. Operating status for all supported facilities (HA, QoS, VPN)
6. VPN tunnels status
7. NIC link state

## REQ CON-30:

MUST have the possibility to select a particular piece of data or individual alert, and visualize the policy that has triggered the event.

## REQ CON-40:

MUST be able to create exception filters that will suppress visualization of a specific alert (e.g. from specific sources, or specific events), without actually affecting the detection and log retention.

## REQ CON-50:

MUST provide a remote access method to obtain all current operational data on demand, in a documented format, covering items such as those listed in REQ CON-20.

Note: This is to be able to integrate firewall operations in an existing NMS.

## 11. Reporting requirements

### REQ REP-10:

Built in reports MUST be provided by default, such as protocol distribution, policy and rule matched, top attacks, top sources/destinations, top targets, top geographical sources, device status including utilizations, and so on.

### REQ REP-20:

SHOULD allow to run reporting over historical and archived logs, automatically restoring and re-archiving them.

## 12. IANA Considerations

There are no IANA registries within this document. The RFC-Editor can remove this section before publication of this document as an RFC.

## 13. Security Considerations

[TBD]

## 14. Acknowledgements

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