Identifying Modified Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) Semantics for Ultra-Low Queuing Delay
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Abstract

This specification defines the identifier to be used on IP packets for a new network service called low latency, low loss and scalable throughput (L4S). It is similar to the original (or ‘Classic’) Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN). ‘Classic’ ECN marking was required to be equivalent to a drop, both when applied in the network and when responded to by a transport. Unlike ‘Classic’ ECN marking, the network applies the L4S identifier more immediately and more aggressively than drop, and the transport response to each mark is reduced and smoothed relative to that for drop. The two changes counterbalance each other so that the bit-rate of an L4S flow will be roughly the same as a ‘Classic’ flow under the same conditions. However, the much more frequent control signals and the finer responses to them result in ultra-low queuing delay without compromising link utilization, even during high load. Examples of new active queue management (AQM) marking algorithms and examples of new transports (whether TCP-like or real-time) are specified separately. The new L4S identifier is the key piece that enables them to interwork and distinguishes them from ‘Classic’ traffic. It gives an incremental migration path so that existing ‘Classic’ TCP traffic will be no worse off, but it can be prevented from degrading the ultra-low delay and loss of the new scalable transports.

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1. Introduction

This specification defines the identifier to be used on IP packets for a new network service called low latency, low loss and scalable throughput (L4S). It is similar to the original (or ‘Classic’) Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN). ‘Classic’ ECN marking was required to be equivalent to a drop, both when applied in the network and when responded to by a transport. Unlike ‘Classic’ ECN marking, the network applies the L4S identifier more immediately and more aggressively than drop, and the transport response to each mark is reduced and smoothed relative to that for drop. The two changes counterbalance each other so that the bit-rate of an L4S flow will be roughly the same as a ‘Classic’ flow under the same conditions. However, the much more frequent control signals and the finer responses to them result in ultra-low queuing delay without compromising link utilization, even during high load.

An example of an active queue management (AQM) marking algorithm that enables the L4S service is the DualQ Coupled AQM defined in a complementary specification [I-D.briscoe-aqm-dualq-coupled]. An example of a scalable transport that would enable the L4S service is Data Centre TCP (DCTCP), which until now has been applicable solely to controlled environments like data centres [I-D.bensley-tcpm-dctcp], because it is too aggressive to co-exist with existing TCP. However, AQMs like DualQ Coupled enable scalable transports like DCTCP to co-exist with existing traffic, each getting roughly the same flow rate when they compete under similar conditions.

The new L4S identifier is the key piece that enables these two parts to interwork and distinguishes them from ‘Classic’ traffic. It gives an incremental migration path so that existing ‘Classic’ TCP traffic will be no worse off, but it can be prevented from degrading the ultra-low delay and loss of the new scalable transports. The performance improvement is so great that it is hoped it will motivate initial deployment of the separate parts of this system.

1.1. Problem

Latency is becoming the critical performance factor for many (most?) applications on the public Internet, e.g. Web, voice, conversational video, gaming and finance apps. In the developed world, further increases in access network bit-rate offer diminishing returns, whereas latency is still a multi-faceted problem. In the last decade or so, much has been done to reduce propagation time by placing
caches or servers closer to users. However, queuing remains a major component of latency.

The Diffserv architecture provides Expedited Forwarding [RFC3246], so that low latency traffic can jump the queue of other traffic. However, on access links dedicated to individual sites (homes, small enterprises or mobile devices), often all traffic at any one time will be latency-sensitive. Then Diffserv is of little use. Instead, we need to remove the causes of any unnecessary delay.

The bufferbloat project has shown that excessively-large buffering (‘bufferbloat’) has been introducing significantly more delay than the underlying propagation time. These delays appear only intermittently—only when a capacity-seeking (e.g. TCP) flow is long enough for the queue to fill the buffer, making every packet in other flows sharing the buffer sit through the queue.

Active queue management (AQM) was originally developed to solve this problem (and others). Unlike Diffserv, which gives low latency to some traffic at the expense of others, AQM controls latency for _all_ traffic in a class. In general, AQMs introduce an increasing level of discard from the buffer the longer the queue persists above a shallow threshold. This gives sufficient signals to capacity-seeking (aka. greedy) flows to keep the buffer empty for its intended purpose: absorbing bursts. However, RED [RFC2309] and other algorithms from the 1990s were sensitive to their configuration and hard to set correctly. So, AQM was not widely deployed. More recent state-of-the-art AQMs, e.g. fq_CoDel [I-D.ietf-aqm-fq-codel], PIE [I-D.ietf-aqm-pie], Adaptive RED [ARED01], define the threshold in time not bytes, so it is invariant for different link rates.

Latency is not our only concern: It was known when TCP was first developed that it would not scale to high bandwidth-delay products. Given regular broadband bit-rates over WAN distances are already [RFC3649] beyond the scaling range of ‘classic’ TCP Reno, ‘less unscalable’ Cubic [I-D.zimmermann-tcpm-cubic] and Compound [I-D.sridharan-tcpm-ctcp] variants of TCP have been successfully deployed. However, these are now approaching their scaling limits. Unfortunately, fully scalable TCPs such as DCTCP [I-D.bensley-tcpm-dctcp] cause ‘classic’ TCP to starve itself, which is why they have been confined to private data centres or research testbeds (until now).

It turns out that a TCP algorithm like DCTCP that solves TCP’s scalability problem also solves the latency problem, because the finer sawteeth cause very little queuing delay. A supporting paper [DCttH15] gives the full explanation of why the design solves both the latency and the scaling problems, both in plain English and in
more precise mathematical form. The explanation is summarised without the maths in [I-D.briscoe-aqm-dualq-coupled].

1.2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. In this document, these words will appear with that interpretation only when in ALL CAPS. Lower case uses of these words are not to be interpreted as carrying RFC-2119 significance.

Classic service: The ‘Classic’ service is intended for all the behaviours that currently co-exist with TCP Reno (TCP Cubic, Compound, SCTP, etc).

Low-Latency, Low-Loss and Scalable (L4S): The 'L4S' service is intended for traffic from scalable TCP algorithms such as Data Centre TCP. But it is also more general—it will allow a set of congestion controls with similar scaling properties to DCTCP (e.g. Relentless [Mathis09]) to evolve.

Both Classic and L4S services can cope with a proportion of unresponsive or less-responsive traffic as well (e.g. DNS, VoIP, etc).

Classic ECN: The original Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) protocol [RFC3168].

1.3. Scope

The new L4S identifier defined in this specification is applicable for IPv4 and IPv6 packets (as for classic ECN [RFC3168]). It is applicable for the unicast, multicast and anycast forwarding modes. It is an orthogonal packet classification to Differentiated Services (Diffserv [RFC2474]), therefore it can be applied to any packet in any Diffserv traffic class. However, as with classic ECN, any particular forwarding node might not implement an active queue management algorithm in all its Diffserv queues.

This document is intended for experimental status, so it does not update any standards track RFCs. If the experiment is successful and this document proceeds to the standards track, it would be expected to update the specification of ECN in IP and in TCP [RFC3168]. For packets carrying the L4S identifier, it would update both the network’s ECN marking behaviour and the TCP response to ECN feedback, making them distinct from the behaviours for drop. It would also update the specification of ECN in RTP over UDP [RFC6679] [ToDo: DCCP]
and SCTP refs}. Finally, it would also obsolete the experimental ECN nonce [RFC3540].

2. L4S Packet Identifier

2.1. L4S Packet Identification Requirements

Ideally, the identifier for packets using the Low Latency, Low Loss, Scalable throughput (L4S) service ought to meet the following requirements:

- it SHOULD survive end-to-end between source and destination applications: across the boundary between host and network, between interconnected networks, and through middleboxes;
- it SHOULD be common to IPv4 and IPv6;
- it SHOULD be incrementally deployable;
- it SHOULD enable an AQM to classify packets encapsulated by outer IP or lower-layer headers;
- it SHOULD consume minimal extra codepoints;
- it SHOULD not lead to some packets of a transport-layer flow being served by a different queue from others.

It is recognised that the chosen identifier is unlikely to satisfy all these requirements, particularly given the limited space left in the IP header. Therefore a compromise will be necessary, which is why all the requirements are expressed with the word 'SHOULD' not 'MUST'. Appendix A discusses the pros and cons of the compromises made in various competing identification schemes. The chosen scheme is defined in Section 2.2 below.

Whether the identifier would be recoverable if the experiment failed is a factor that could be taken into account. However, this has not been made a requirement, because that would favour schemes that would be easier to fail, rather than those more likely to succeed.

2.2. L4S Packet Identification

The L4S treatment is an alternative packet marking treatment [RFC4774] to the classic ECN treatment [RFC3168]. Like classic ECN, it identifies the marking treatment that network nodes are expected to apply to L4S packets, and it identifies packets that are expected to have been sent from hosts applying a broad type of behaviour, termed L4S congestion control.
For a packet to receive L4S treatment as it is forwarded, the sender MUST set the ECN field in the IP header (v4 or v6) to the ECT(1) codepoint.

A network node that implements the L4S service MUST classify arriving ECT(1) packets for L4S treatment and it SHOULD classify arriving CE packets for L4S treatment as well. Section 2.3 describes an exception to this latter rule.

The L4S AQM treatment follows similar codepoint transition rules to those in RFC 3168. Specifically, the ECT(1) codepoint MUST NOT be changed to any other codepoint than CE, and CE MUST NOT be changed to any other codepoint. An ECT(1) packet is classified as ECN-capable and, if congestion increases, an L4S AQM algorithm will set the ECN marking of an increasing proportion of packets to CE, otherwise forwarding packets unchanged as ECT(1). The L4S marking treatment is defined in Section 2.4. Under persistent overload conditions, the AQM will follow RFC 3168 and turn off ECN marking, using drop as a congestion signal until the overload episode has subsided.

The L4S treatment is the default for ECT(1) packets in all Diffserv Classes [RFC4774].

For backward compatibility, a network node that implements the L4S treatment MUST also implement a classic AQM treatment. It MUST classify arriving ECT(0) and Not-ECT packets for treatment by the Classic AQM. Classic treatment means that the AQM will mark ECT(0) packets under the same conditions as it would drop Not-ECT packets [RFC3168].

2.3. L4S Packet Identification with Transport-Layer Awareness

To implement the L4S treatment, a network node does not need to identify transport-layer flows. Nonetheless, if a network node is capable of identifying transport-layer flows, it SHOULD classify CE packets for classic ECN [RFC3168] treatment if the most recent ECT packet in the same flow was ECT(0). If a network node does not identify transport-layer flows, or if the most recent ECT packet was ECT(1), it MUST classify CE packets for L4S treatment.

Only the most recent ECT packet of a flow is used to classify a CE packet, because a sender might have to switch from sending ECT(1) (L4S) packets to sending ECT(0) (Classic) packets, or back again, in the middle of a transport-layer flow. Such a switch-over is likely to be very rare, but it could be necessary if the path bottleneck moves from a network node that supports L4S to one that only supports Classic ECN. Such a change ought to be detectable from the change in RTT variation.
2.4. The Meaning of CE Relative to Drop

The likelihood that an AQM drops a Not-ECT Classic packet MUST be proportional to the square of the likelihood that it would have marked it if it had been an L4S packet. The constant of proportionality does not have to be standardised for interoperability, but a value of 1 is RECOMMENDED.

[I-D.briscoe-aqm-dualq-coupled].specifies the essential aspects of an L4S AQM, as well as recommending other aspects. It gives an example implementation in an appendix.

The term ‘likelihood’ is used above to allow for marking and dropping to be either probabilistic or deterministic. This example AQM in [I-D.briscoe-aqm-dualq-coupled] drops and marks probabilistically, so the drop probability is arranged to be the square of the marking probability. Nonetheless, an alternative AQM that dropped and marked deterministically would be valid, as long as the dropping frequency was proportional to the square of the marking frequency.

Note that, contrary to RFC 3168, an AQM implementing the L4S and Classic treatments does not mark an ECT(1) packet under the same conditions that it would have dropped a Not-ECT packet. However, it does mark and ECT(0) packet under the same conditions that it would have dropped a Not-ECT packet.

3. IANA Considerations

This specification contains no IANA considerations.

(ToDo: If this specification becomes an experimental RFC, should IANA be asked to update <http://www.iana.org/assignments/ipv4-tos-byte/ipv4-tos-byte.xhtml#ipv4-tos-byte-1> so that the reference for the specification of ECT(1) points to this document, and CE points to both RFC3168 and this document? I think not, because this experimental specification will not update RFC3168, which is standards track.)

4. Security Considerations

Two approaches to assure the integrity of signals using the new identifier are introduced in Appendix B.1.

5. Acknowledgements

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Appendix A. Alternative Identifiers

This appendix is informative, not normative. It records the pros and cons of various alternative ways to identify L4S packets to record the rationale for the choice of ECT(1) (Appendix A.1) as the L4S identifier. At the end, Appendix A.6 summarises the distinguishing features of the leading alternatives. It is intended to supplement, not replace the detailed text.

The leading solutions all use the ECN field, sometimes in combination with the DiffServ field. Both the ECN and DiffServ fields have the additional advantage that they are no different in either IPv4 or IPv6. A couple of alternatives that use other fields are mentioned at the end, but it is quickly explained why they are not serious contenders.

A.1. ECT(1) and CE codepoints

Definition:

Packets with ECT(1) and conditionally packets with CE would signify L4S semantics as an alternative to the semantics of classic ECN [RFC3168], specifically:

* The ECT(1) codepoint would signify that the packet was sent by an L4S-capable sender. Successful negotiation of accurate ECN
(AccECN) feedback [I-D.ietf-tcpm-accecn-reqs] is a prerequisite for a sender to send L4S packets, therefore ECT(1) in turn signifies that both endpoints support AccECN;

* Given shortage of codepoints, both L4S and classic ECN sides of an AQM would have to use the same CE codepoint to indicate that a packet had experienced congestion. If a packet that had already been marked CE in an upstream buffer arrived at a subsequent AQM, this AQM would then have to guess whether to classify CE packets as L4S or classic ECN. Choosing the L4S treatment would be a safer choice, because then a few classic packets might arrive early, rather than a few L4S packets arriving late;

* Additional information might be available if the classifier were transport-aware. Then it could classify a CE packet for classic ECN treatment if the most recent ECT packet in the same flow had been marked ECT(0). However, the L4S service should not need transport-layer awareness;

Cons:

Consume the last ECN codepoint: The L4S service is intended to supersede the service provided by classic ECN, therefore using ECT(1) to identify L4S packets could ultimately mean that the ECT(0) codepoint was ‘wasted’ purely to distinguish one form of ECN from its successor;

ECN hard in some lower layers: It is not always possible to support ECN in an AQM acting in a buffer below the IP layer [I-D.ietf-tswg-ecn-encap-guidelines]. In such cases, the L4S service would have to drop rather than mark frames even though they might contain an ECN-capable packet. However, such cases would be unusual.

Risk of reordering classic CE packets: Having to classify all CE packets as L4S risks some classic CE packets arriving early, which is a form of reordering. Reordering can cause the TCP sender to retransmit spuriously. However, one or two packets delivered early does not cause any spurious retransmissions because the subsequent packets continue to move the cumulative acknowledgement boundary forwards. Anyway, even the risk of reordering would be low, because: i) it is quite unusual to experience more than one bottleneck queue on a path; ii) even then, reordering would only occur if there was simultaneous mixing of classic and L4S traffic, which would be more unlikely in an access link, which is where most bottlenecks are located; iii) even then, spurious retransmissions would only occur if a contiguous sequence of three
Non-L4S service for control packets: The classic ECN RFCs [RFC3168] and [RFC5562] require a sender to clear the ECN field to Not-ECT for retransmissions and certain control packets specifically pure ACKs, window probes and SYNs. When L4S packets are classified by the ECN field alone, these control packets would not be classified into an L4S queue, and could therefore be delayed relative to the other packets in the flow. This would not cause re-ordering (because retransmissions are already out of order, and the control packets carry no data). However, it would make critical control packets more vulnerable to loss and delay. (ToDo: Discuss the likelihood that all these packets might be made ECN-capable in future.)

Pros:

Should work e2e: The ECN field generally works end-to-end across the Internet. Unlike the DSCP, the setting of the ECN field is at least forwarded unchanged by networks that do not support ECN, and networks rarely clear it to zero;

Should work in tunnels: Unlike Diffserv, ECN is defined to always work across tunnels. However, tunnels do not always implement ECN processing as they should do, particularly because IPsec tunnels were defined differently for a few years.

Could migrate to one codepoint: If all classic ECN senders eventually evolve to use the L4S service, the ECT(0) codepoint could be reused for some future purpose, but only once use of ECT(0) packets had reduced to zero, or near-zero, which might never happen.

A.2. ECN Plus a Diffserv Codepoint (DSCP)

Definition:

For packets with a defined DSCP, all codepoints of the ECN field (except Not-ECT) would signify alternative L4S semantics to those for classic ECN [RFC3168], specifically:

* The L4S DSCP would signify that the packet came from an L4S-capable sender;
* ECT(0) and ECT(1) would both signify that the packet was travelling between transport endpoints that were both ECN-capable and supported accurate ECN feedback [I-D.ietf-tcpm-accecn-reqs];

* CE would signify that the packet had been marked by an AQM implementing the L4S service.

Use of a DSCP is the only approach for alternative ECN semantics given as an example in [RFC4774]. However, it was perhaps considered more for controlled environments than new end-to-end services;

Cons:

Consumes DSCP pairs: A DSCP is obviously not orthogonal to DiffServ. Therefore, wherever the L4S service is applied to multiple DiffServ scheduling behaviours, it would be necessary to replace each DSCP with a pair of DSCPs.

Uses critical lower-layer header space: The resulting increased number of DSCPs might be hard to support for some lower layer technologies, e.g. 802.1p and MPLS both offer only 3-bits for a maximum of 8 traffic class identifiers. Although L4S should reduce and possibly remove the need for some DSCPs intended for differentiated queuing delay, it will not remove the need for DiffServ entirely, because DiffServ is also used to allocate bandwidth, e.g. by prioritising some classes of traffic over others when traffic exceeds available capacity.

Not end-to-end (host-network): Very few networks honour a DSCP set by a host. Typically a network will zero (bleach) the DiffServ field from all hosts. Sometimes networks will attempt to identify applications by some form of packet inspection and, based on network policy, they will set the DSCP considered appropriate for the identified application. Network-based application identification might use some combination of protocol ID, port numbers(s), application layer protocol headers, IP address(es), VLAN ID(s) and even packet timing.

Not end-to-end (network-network): Very few networks honour a DSCP received from a neighbouring network. Typically a network will zero (bleach) the DiffServ field from all neighbouring networks at an interconnection point. Sometimes bilateral arrangements are made between networks, such that the receiving network remarks some DSCPs to those it uses for roughly equivalent services. The likelihood that a DSCP will be bleached or ignored depends on the type of DSCP:
Local-use DSCP: These tend to be used to implement application-specific network policies, but a bilateral arrangement to remark certain DSCPs is often applied to DSCPs in the local-use range simply because it is easier not to change all of a network’s internal configurations when a new arrangement is made with a neighbour;

Global-use DSCP: These do not tend to be honoured across network interconnections more than local-use DSCPs. However, if two networks decide to honour certain of each other’s DSCPs, the reconfiguration is a little easier if both of their globally recognised services are already represented by the relevant global-use DSCPs.

Note that today a global-use DSCP gives little more assurance of end-to-end service than a local-use DSCP. In future the global-use range might give more assurance of end-to-end service than local-use, but it is unlikely that either assurance will be high, particularly given the hosts are included in the end-to-end path.

Not all tunnels: Diffserv codepoints are often not propagated to the outer header when a packet is encapsulated by a tunnel header. DSCPs are propagated to the outer of uniform mode tunnels, but not pipe mode [RFC2983], and pipe mode is fairly common.

ECN hard in some lower layers:: Because this approach uses both the Diffserv and ECN fields, an AQM will only work at a lower layer if both can be supported. If individual network operators wished to deploy an AQM at a lower layer, they would usually propagate an IP Diffserv codepoint to the lower layer, using for example IEEE 802.1p. However, the ECN capability is harder to propagate down to lower layers because few lower layers support it.

Pros:

Could migrate to e2e: If all usage of classic ECN migrates to usage of L4S, the DSCP would become redundant, and the ECN capability alone could eventually identify L4S packets without the interconnection problems of Diffserv detailed below, and without having permanently consumed more than one codepoint in the IP header. Although the DSCP does not generally function as an end-to-end identifier (see below), it could be used initially by individual ISPs to introduce the L4S service for their own locally generated traffic;
A.3.  ECN capability alone

Definition:

This approach uses ECN capability alone as the L4S identifier. It is only feasible if classic ECN is not widely deployed. The specific definition of codepoints would be:

* Any ECN codepoint other than Not-ECT would signify an L4S-capable sender, which in turn would indicate that both transports supported accurate ECN feedback [I-D.ietf-tcpm-accecn-reqs];

* ECN codepoints would not be used for classic ECN, and the classic network service would only be used for Not-ECT packets.

This approach would only be feasible if

A. it was generally agreed that there was little chance of any classic ECN deployment in any network;

B. developers of operating systems for user devices would only enable ECN by default once the TCP stack implemented accurate ECN [I-D.ietf-tcpm-accecn-reqs] including requesting it by default;

C. hosts would only negotiate accurate ECN if they supported L4S behaviour. In other words, developers of client OSs would all have to agree not to encourage further deployment of classic ECN.

Cons:

Near-infeasible deployment constraints: The constraints for deployment above represent a highly unlikely set of circumstances, but not completely impossible. If, despite the above measures, a pair of hosts did negotiate to use classic ECN, their packets would be classified into the same queue as L4S traffic, and if they had to compete with a long-running L4S flow they would get a very small capacity share;

ECN hard in some lower layers: See the same issue with "ECT(1) and CE codepoints" (Appendix A.1);

Non-L4S service for control packets: See the same issue with "ECT(1) and CE codepoints" (Appendix A.1).

Pros:
Consumes no additional codepoints: The ECT(1) codepoint and all spare Diffserv codepoints would remain available for future use;

Should work e2e: As with "ECT(1) and CE codepoints" (Appendix A.1);

Should work in tunnels: As with "ECT(1) and CE codepoints" (Appendix A.1).

A.4. Protocol ID

It has been suggested that a new ID in the IPv4 Protocol field or the IPv6 Next Header field could identify L4S packets. However this approach is ruled out by numerous problems:

- A new protocol ID would need to be paired with the old one for each transport (TCP, SCTP, UDP, etc.);
- In IPv6, there can be a sequence of Next Header fields, and it would not be obvious which one would be expected to identify a network service like L4S;
- A new protocol ID would rarely provide an end-to-end service, because it is well-known that new protocol IDs are often blocked by numerous types of middlebox;
- The approach is not a solution for AQMs below the IP layer;

A.5. Source or destination addressing

Locally, a network operator could arrange for L4S service to be applied based on source or destination addressing, e.g. packets from its own data centre and/or CDN hosts, packets to its business customers, etc. It could use addressing at any layer, e.g. IP addresses, MAC addresses, VLAN IDs, etc. Although addressing might be a useful tactical approach for a single ISP, it would not be a feasible approach to identify an end-to-end service like L4S. Even for a single ISP, it would require packet classifiers in buffers to be dependent on changing topology and address allocation decisions elsewhere in the network. Therefore this approach is not a feasible solution.

A.6. Summary: Merits of Alternative Identifiers

Table 1 provides a very high level summary of the pros and cons detailed against the schemes described respectively in Appendix A.2, Appendix A.3 and Appendix A.1, for six issues that set them apart.
### Table 1: Comparison of the Merits of Three Alternative Identifiers

The schemes are scored based on both their capabilities now ('initial') and in the long term ('eventual'). The 'ECN' scheme shares the 'eventual' scores of the 'ECT(0) + CE' scheme. The scores are one of 'N, O, Y', meaning 'Poor', 'Ordinary', 'Good' respectively. The same scores are aligned vertically to aid the eye. A score of '?' in one of the positions means that this approach might optimistically become this good, given sufficient effort. The table is not meant to be understandable without referring to the text.

#### Appendix B. Potential Competing Uses for the ECT(1) Codepoint

The ECT(1) codepoint of the ECN field has already been assigned once for experimental use [RFC3540]. ECN is probably the only remaining field in the Internet Protocol that is common to IPv4 and IPv6 and still has potential to work end-to-end, with tunnels and with lower layers. Therefore, ECT(1) should not be reassigned to a different experimental use without carefully assessing competing potential uses. These fall into the following categories:

#### B.1. Integrity of Congestion Feedback

Receiving hosts can fool a sender into downloading faster by suppressing feedback of ECN marks (or loss if retransmissions are not necessary or available otherwise). [RFC3540] proposes that a TCP sender could set either ECT(0) or ECT(1) in each packet of a flow and remember the pattern, termed the ECN nonce. If any packet is lost or congestion marked, the receiver will miss that bit of the sequence. An ECN Nonce receiver has to feed back the least significant bit of

---

Note 1: Only feasible if classic ECN is obsolete.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>DSCP + ECN</th>
<th>ECN</th>
<th>ECT(1) + CE</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>initial</td>
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<td></td>
<td>eventual</td>
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<td>end-to-end</td>
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<td>end-to-end</td>
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<td>codepoints</td>
<td>N . .</td>
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<td>N . .</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Note 1</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the sum, so it cannot suppress feedback of a loss or mark without a 50-50 chance of guessing the sum incorrectly.

As far as is known, the ECN Nonce has never been deployed, and it was only implemented for a couple of testbed evaluations. It would be nearly impossible to deploy now, because any misbehaving receiver can simply opt-out, which would be unremarkable given all receivers currently opt-out.

Other ways to protect TCP feedback integrity have since been developed that do not consume any extra codepoints. For instance:

- the sender can test the integrity of the receiver’s feedback by occasionally setting the IP-ECN field to a value normally only set by the network. Then it can test whether the receiver’s feedback faithfully reports what it expects [I-D.moncaster-tcpm-rcv-cheat]. This works for loss and it will work for the accurate ECN feedback [I-D.ietf-tcpm-accecn-reqs] intended for L4S;

- A network can enforce a congestion response to its ECN markings (or packet losses) by auditing congestion exposure (ConEx) [I-D.ietf-conex-abstract-mech]. Whether the receiver or a downstream network is suppressing congestion feedback or the sender is unresponsive to the feedback, or both, ConEx audit can neutralise any advantage that any of these three parties would otherwise gain.

ECN in RTP [RFC6679] is defined so that the receiver can ask the sender to send all ECT(0); all ECT(1); or both randomly. It recommends that the receiver asks for ECT(0), which is the default. The sender can choose to ignore the receiver’s request. A rather complex but optional nonce mechanism was included in early drafts of RFC 6679, but it was replaced with a statement that a nonce mechanism is not specified, explaining that misbehaving receivers could opt-out anyway. RFC 6679 as published gives no rationale for why ECT(1) or ‘random’ might be needed, but it warns that ‘random’ would make header compression highly inefficient. The possibility of using ECT(1) may have been left in the RFC to allow a nonce mechanism to be added later.

Therefore, it seems unlikely that anyone has implemented the optional use of ECT(1) for RTP, it even if they have, it seems even less likely that any deployment actually uses it. However these assumptions will need to be verified.
B.2. Notification of Less Severe Congestion than CE

Various researchers have proposed to use ECT(1) as a less severe congestion notification than CE, particularly to enable flows to fill available capacity more quickly after an idle period, when another flow departs or when a flow starts, e.g. VCP [VCP], Queue View (QV) [QV] (ToDo: Jonathan Morton’s ELR if relevant once the promised write-up appears).

Before assigning ECT(1) as an identifier for L4S, we must carefully consider whether it might be better to hold ECT(1) in reserve for future standardisation of rapid flow acceleration, which is an important and enduring problem [RFC6077].

Pre-Congestion Notification (PCN) is another scheme that assigns alternative semantics to the ECN field. It uses ECT(1) to signify a less severe level of pre-congestion notification than CE [RFC6660]. However, the ECN field only takes on the PCN semantics if packets carry a Diffserv codepoint defined to indicate PCN marking within a controlled environment. PCN is required to be applied solely to the outer header of a tunnel across the controlled region in order not to interfere with any end-to-end use of the ECN field. Therefore a PCN region on the path would not interfere with any of the L4S service identifiers proposed in Appendix A.

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Identifying Modified Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) Semantics for Ultra-Low Queuing Delay
draft-briscoe-tsvwg-ecn-l4s-id-02

Abstract

This specification defines the identifier to be used on IP packets for a new network service called low latency, low loss and scalable throughput (L4S). It is similar to the original (or 'Classic') Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN). ‘Classic’ ECN marking was required to be equivalent to a drop, both when applied in the network and when responded to by a transport. Unlike ‘Classic’ ECN marking, for packets carrying the L4S identifier, the network applies marking more immediately and more aggressively than drop, and the transport response to each mark is reduced and smoothed relative to that for drop. The two changes counterbalance each other so that the throughput of an L4S flow will be roughly the same as a ‘Classic’ flow under the same conditions. However, the much more frequent control signals and the finer responses to them result in ultra-low queuing delay without compromising link utilization, even during high load. Examples of new active queue management (AQM) marking algorithms and examples of new transports (whether TCP-like or real-time) are specified separately. The new L4S identifier is the key piece that enables them to interwork and distinguishes them from ‘Classic’ traffic. It gives an incremental migration path so that existing ‘Classic’ TCP traffic will be no worse off, but it can be prevented from degrading the ultra-low delay and loss of the new scalable transports.

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1. Introduction

This specification defines the identifier to be used on IP packets for a new network service called low latency, low loss and scalable throughput (L4S). It is similar to the original (or ‘Classic’) Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN). ‘Classic’ ECN marking was required to be equivalent to a drop, both when applied in the network and when responded to by a transport. Unlike ‘Classic’ ECN marking, the network applies L4S marking more immediately and more aggressively than drop, and the transport response to each mark is reduced and smoothed relative to that for drop. The two changes counterbalance each other so that the bit-rate of an L4S flow will be roughly the same as a ‘Classic’ flow under the same conditions. However, the much more frequent control signals and the finer responses to them result in ultra-low queuing delay without compromising link utilization, even during high load.

An example of an active queue management (AQM) marking algorithm that enables the L4S service is the DualQ Coupled AQM defined in a complementary specification [I-D.briscoe-aqm-dualq-coupled]. An example of a scalable transport that would enable the L4S service is Data Centre TCP (DCTCP), which until now has been applicable solely to controlled environments like data centres [I-D.ietf-tcpm-dctcp], because it is too aggressive to co-exist with existing TCP. However, AQMs like DualQ Coupled enable scalable transports like DCTCP to co-exist with existing traffic, each getting roughly the same flow rate when they compete under similar conditions. Note that DCTCP will still not be safe to deploy on the Internet until it satisfies the ‘Safety Additions’ listed in Appendix A of [I-D.briscoe-tsvwg-aqm-tcpm-rmcat-l4s-problem].

The new L4S identifier is the key piece that enables these two parts to interwork and distinguishes them from ‘Classic’ traffic. It gives an incremental migration path so that existing ‘Classic’ TCP traffic will be no worse off, but it can be prevented from degrading the ultra-low delay and loss of the new scalable transports. The performance improvement is so great that it is hoped it will motivate initial deployment of the separate parts of this system.
1.1. Problem

Latency is becoming the critical performance factor for many (most?) applications on the public Internet, e.g. Web, voice, conversational video, gaming, finance apps, remote desktop and cloud-based applications. In the developed world, further increases in access network bit-rate offer diminishing returns, whereas latency is still a multi-faceted problem. In the last decade or so, much has been done to reduce propagation time by placing caches or servers closer to users. However, queuing remains a major component of latency.

The Diffserv architecture provides Expedited Forwarding [RFC3246], so that low latency traffic can jump the queue of other traffic. However, on access links dedicated to individual sites (homes, small enterprises or mobile devices), often all traffic at any one time will be latency-sensitive. Then Diffserv is of little use. Instead, we need to remove the causes of any unnecessary delay.

The bufferbloat project has shown that excessively-large buffering (‘bufferbloat’) has been introducing significantly more delay than the underlying propagation time. These delays appear only intermittently—only when a capacity-seeking (e.g. TCP) flow is long enough for the queue to fill the buffer, making every packet in other flows sharing the buffer sit through the queue.

Active queue management (AQM) was originally developed to solve this problem (and others). Unlike Diffserv, which gives low latency to some traffic at the expense of others, AQM controls latency for _all_ traffic in a class. In general, AQMs introduce an increasing level of discard from the buffer the longer the queue persists above a shallow threshold. This gives sufficient signals to capacity-seeking (aka. greedy) flows to keep the buffer empty for its intended purpose: absorbing bursts. However, RED [RFC2309] and other algorithms from the 1990s were sensitive to their configuration and hard to set correctly. So, AQM was not widely deployed.

More recent state-of-the-art AQMs, e.g. fq_CoDel [I-D.ietf-aqm-fq-codel], PIE [I-D.ietf-aqm-pie], Adaptive RED [ARED01], are easier to configure, because they define the queuing threshold in time not bytes, so it is invariant for different link rates. However, no matter how good the AQM, the sawtoothing rate of TCP will either cause queuing delay to vary or cause the link to be under-utilized. Even with a perfectly tuned AQM, the additional queuing delay will be of the same order as the underlying speed-of-light delay across the network. Flow-queuing can isolate one flow from another, but it cannot isolate a TCP flow from the delay variations it inflicts on itself, and it has other problems — it overrides the flow rate decisions of variable rate video.
applications, it does not recognise the flows within IPSec VPN tunnels and it is relatively expensive to implement.

Latency is not our only concern: It was known when TCP was first developed that it would not scale to high bandwidth-delay products. Given regular broadband bit-rates over WAN distances are already [RFC3649] beyond the scaling range of 'Classic' TCP Reno, 'less unscalable' Cubic [I-D.ietf-tcpm-cubic] and Compound [I-D.sridharan-tcpm-ctcp] variants of TCP have been successfully deployed. However, these are now approaching their scaling limits. Unfortunately, fully scalable TCPS such as DCTCP [I-D.ietf-tcpm-dctcp] cause 'Classic' TCP to starve itself, which is why they have been confined to private data centres or research testbeds (until now).

It turns out that a TCP algorithm like DCTCP that solves TCP’s scalability problem also solves the latency problem, because the finer sawteeth cause very little queuing delay. A supporting paper [DCttH15] gives the full explanation of why the design solves both the latency and the scaling problems, both in plain English and in more precise mathematical form. The explanation is summarised without the maths in [I-D.briscoe-aqm-dualq-coupled].

1.2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. In this document, these words will appear with that interpretation only when in ALL CAPS. Lower case uses of these words are not to be interpreted as carrying RFC-2119 significance.

Classic service: The ‘Classic’ service is intended for all the behaviours that currently co-exist with TCP Reno (e.g. TCP Cubic, Compound, SCTP, etc).

Low-Latency, Low-Loss and Scalable (L4S) service: The ‘L4S’ service is intended for traffic from scalable TCP algorithms such as Data Centre TCP. But it is also more general--it will allow a set of congestion controls with similar scaling properties to DCTCP (e.g. Relentless [Mathis09]) to evolve.

Both Classic and L4S services can cope with a proportion of unresponsive or less-responsive traffic as well (e.g. DNS, VoIP, etc).

Classic ECN: The original Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) protocol [RFC3168].
1.3. Scope

The new L4S identifier defined in this specification is applicable for IPv4 and IPv6 packets (as for classic ECN [RFC3168]). It is applicable for the unicast, multicast and anycast forwarding modes. It is an orthogonal packet classification to Differentiated Services (Diffserv [RFC2474]), therefore it can be applied to any packet in any Diffserv traffic class. However, as with classic ECN, any particular forwarding node might not implement an active queue management algorithm in all its Diffserv queues.

This document is intended for experimental status, so it does not update any standards track RFCs. Therefore it depends on [I-D.black-tsvwg-ecn-experimentation], which proposes to:

- update the ECN proposed standard [RFC3168] (in certain specified cases including the present document) to relax the requirement that an ECN mark must be equivalent to a drop, both when applied by the network, and when responded to by the sender;

- obsolete the experimental ECN nonce [RFC3540] (see Appendix B.1 for rationale);

- make consequent updates to the following proposed standard RFCs to reflect the above two bullets:
  * ECN for RTP [RFC6679];
  * the congestion control specifications of various DCCP CCIDs [RFC4341], [RFC4342], [RFC5622].

2. L4S Packet Identifier

2.1. L4S Packet Identification Requirements

Ideally, the identifier for packets using the Low Latency, Low Loss, Scalable throughput (L4S) service ought to meet the following requirements:

- it SHOULD survive end-to-end between source and destination applications: across the boundary between host and network, between interconnected networks, and through middleboxes;

- it SHOULD be common to IPv4 and IPv6 and transport agnostic;

- it SHOULD be incrementally deployable;
it SHOULD enable an AQM to classify packets encapsulated by outer IP or lower-layer headers;

it SHOULD consume minimal extra codepoints;

it SHOULD not lead to some packets of a transport-layer flow being served by a different queue from others.

Whether the identifier would be recoverable if the experiment failed is a factor that could be taken into account. However, this has not been made a requirement, because that would favour schemes that would be easier to fail, rather than those more likely to succeed.

It is recognised that the chosen identifier is unlikely to satisfy all these requirements, particularly given the limited space left in the IP header. Therefore a compromise will be necessary, which is why all the requirements are expressed with the word ‘SHOULD’ not ‘MUST’. Appendix A discusses the pros and cons of the compromises made in various competing identification schemes against the above requirements. On the basis of this analysis, the "ECT(1) and CE codepoints" is the best compromise. Therefore this scheme is defined in detail in the following section (Section 2.2), while Appendix A has been left to document the rationale for this decision.

2.2. L4S Packet Identification

The L4S treatment is an alternative packet marking treatment [RFC4774] to the classic ECN treatment [RFC3168]. Like classic ECN, it identifies both network and host behaviour: it identifies the marking treatment that network nodes are expected to apply to L4S packets, and it identifies packets that have been sent from hosts that are expected to comply with a broad type of behaviour.

For a packet to receive L4S treatment as it is forwarded, the sender MUST set the ECN field in the IP header (v4 or v6) to the ECT(1) codepoint.

A network node that implements the L4S service MUST classify arriving ECT(1) packets for L4S treatment and it SHOULD classify arriving CE packets for L4S treatment as well. Section 2.4 describes a possible exception to this latter rule.

The L4S AQM treatment follows similar codepoint transition rules to those in RFC 3168. Specifically, the ECT(1) codepoint MUST NOT be changed to any other codepoint than CE, and CE MUST NOT be changed to any other codepoint. An ECT(1) packet is classified as ECN-capable and, if congestion increases, an L4S AQM algorithm will mark the ECN field as CE for an increasing proportion of packets, otherwise
forwarding packets unchanged as ECT(1). The L4S marking treatment is defined in Section 2.5. Under persistent overload conditions, the AQM will follow RFC 3168 and turn off ECN marking, using drop as a congestion signal until the overload episode has subsided.

The L4S treatment is the default for ECT(1) packets in all Diffserv Classes [RFC4774].

For backward compatibility in uncontrolled environments, a network node that implements the L4S treatment MUST also implement a classic AQM treatment. It MUST classify arriving ECT(0) and Not-ECT packets for treatment by the Classic AQM. Classic treatment means that the AQM will mark ECT(0) packets under the same conditions as it would drop Not-ECT packets [RFC3168].

2.3. Pre-Requisite Transport Layer Behaviour

For a host to send packets with the L4S identifier (ECT(1)), it SHOULD implement a congestion control behaviour that ensures the flow rate is inversely proportional to the proportion of bytes in packets marked with the CE codepoint. This is termed a scalable congestion control, because the number of control signals (ECN marks) per round trip remains roughly constant for any flow rate. As with all transport behaviours, a detailed specification will need to be defined for each type of transport or application, including the timescale over which the proportionality is averaged, and control of burstiness. The inverse proportionality requirement above is worded as a ‘SHOULD’ rather than a ‘MUST’ to allow reasonable flexibility when defining these specifications.

Data Center TCP (DCTCP [I-D.ietf-tcpm-dctcp]) is an example of a scalable congestion control.

Each sender in a session can use a scalable congestion control independently of the congestion control used by the receiver(s) when they send data. Therefore theoretically there might be ECT(1) packets in one direction and ECT(0) in the other.

In general, a scalable congestion control needs feedback of the extent of CE marking on the forward path. Due to the history of TCP development, when ECN was added it reported no more than one CE mark per round trip. Some transport protocols derived from TCP mimic this behaviour while others report the extent of TCP marking. This means that some transport protocols will need to be updated as a pre-requisite for scalable congestion control. The position for a few well-known transport protocols is given below.
TCP: Support for accurate ECN feedback (AccECN [I-D.ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn]) by both ends is a pre-requisite for scalable congestion control. However, the reverse does not apply. So even if both ends support AccECN, either of the two ends can choose not to use a scalable congestion control, whatever the other end’s choice. Nonetheless, the presence of ECT(1) in the IP headers even in one direction of a TCP connection will imply that both ends support AccECN.

SCTP: An ECN feedback protocol such as that specified in [I-D.stewart-tsvwg-sctpecn] would be a pre-requisite for scalable congestion control. That draft would update the ECN feedback protocol sketched out in Appendix A of the standards track specification of SCTP [RFC4960] by adding a field to report the number of CE marks.

RTP over UDP: A pre-requisite for scalable congestion control is for both (all) ends of one media-level hop to signal ECN support using the ecn-capable-rtp attribute [RFC6679]. However, the reverse does not apply, so each end of a media-level hop can independently choose not to use a scalable congestion control, even if both ends support ECN. Nonetheless, the presence of ECT(1) implies that both (all) ends of that hop support ECN.

DCCP: The ACK vector in DCCP [RFC4340] is already sufficient to report the extent of CE marking as needed by a scalable congestion control.

2.4. L4S Packet Identification by Network Nodes with Transport-Layer Awareness

To implement the L4S treatment, a network node does not need to identify transport-layer flows. Nonetheless, if an implementer is willing to identify transport-layer flows at a network node, and if the most recent ECT packet in the same flow was ECT(0), the node MAY classify CE packets for classic ECN [RFC3168] treatment. In all other cases, a network node MUST classify CE packets for L4S treatment. Examples of such other cases are: i) if no ECT packets have yet been identified in a flow; ii) if it is not desirable for a network node to identify transport-layer flows; or iii) if the most recent ECT packet in a flow was ECT(1).

If an implementer uses flow-awareness to classify CE packets, to determine whether the flow is using ECT(0) or ECT(1) it only uses the most recent ECT packet of a flow (ToDo: this advice will need to be verified experimentally). This is because a sender might have to switch from sending ECT(1) (L4S) packets to sending ECT(0) (Classic) packets, or back again, in the middle of a transport-layer flow.
Such a switch-over is likely to be very rare, but it could be necessary if the path bottleneck moves from a network node that supports L4S to one that only supports Classic ECN. A host ought to be able to detect such a change from a change in RTT variation.

2.5. The Meaning of CE Relative to Drop

The likelihood that an AQM drops a Not-ECT Classic packet \( p_C \) MUST be roughly proportional to the square of the likelihood that it would have marked it if it had been an L4S packet \( p_L \). That is:

\[
p_C \approx (p_L / k)^2
\]

The constant of proportionality \( k \) does not have to be standardised for interoperability, but a value of 2 is RECOMMENDED.

[I-D.briscoe-aqm-dualq-coupled] specifies the essential aspects of an L4S AQM, as well as recommending other aspects. It gives example implementations in appendices.

The term ‘likelihood’ is used above to allow for marking and dropping to be either probabilistic or deterministic. The example AQMs in [I-D.briscoe-aqm-dualq-coupled] drop and mark probabilistically, so the drop probability is arranged to be the square of the marking probability. Nonetheless, an alternative AQM that dropped and marked deterministically would be valid, as long as the dropping frequency was proportional to the square of the marking frequency.

Note that, contrary to RFC 3168, an AQM implementing the L4S and Classic treatments does not mark an ECT(1) packet under the same conditions that it would have dropped a Not-ECT packet. However, it does mark an ECT(0) packet under the same conditions that it would have dropped a Not-ECT packet.

3. IANA Considerations

This specification contains no IANA considerations.

4. Security Considerations

Two approaches to assure the integrity of signals using the new identifier are introduced in Appendix B.1.

5. Acknowledgements

Thanks to Richard Scheffenegger, John Leslie, David Taeht, Jonathan Morton, Gorry Fairhurst, Michael Welzl, Mikael Abrahamsson and Andrew McGregor for the discussions that led to this specification.
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Appendix A. Alternative Identifiers

This appendix is informative, not normative. It records the pros and cons of various alternative ways to identify L4S packets to record the rationale for the choice of ECT(1) (Appendix A.1) as the L4S identifier. At the end, Appendix A.6 summarises the distinguishing features of the leading alternatives. It is intended to supplement, not replace the detailed text.

The leading solutions all use the ECN field, sometimes in combination with the Diffserv field. Both the ECN and Diffserv fields have the additional advantage that they are no different in either IPv4 or IPv6. A couple of alternatives that use other fields are mentioned at the end, but it is quickly explained why they are not serious contenders.
A.1. ECT(1) and CE codepoints

Definition:

Packets with ECT(1) and conditionally packets with CE would signify L4S semantics as an alternative to the semantics of classic ECN [RFC3168], specifically:

* The ECT(1) codepoint would signify that the packet was sent by an L4S-capable sender;

* Given shortage of codepoints, both L4S and classic ECN sides of an AQM would have to use the same CE codepoint to indicate that a packet had experienced congestion. If a packet that had already been marked CE in an upstream buffer arrived at a subsequent AQM, this AQM would then have to guess whether to classify CE packets as L4S or classic ECN. Choosing the L4S treatment would be a safer choice, because then a few classic packets might arrive early, rather than a few L4S packets arriving late;

* Additional information might be available if the classifier were transport-aware. Then it could classify a CE packet for classic ECN treatment if the most recent ECT packet in the same flow had been marked ECT(0). However, the L4S service ought not to need transport-layer awareness;

Cons:

Consumes the last ECN codepoint: The L4S service is intended to supersede the service provided by classic ECN, therefore using ECT(1) to identify L4S packets could ultimately mean that the ECT(0) codepoint was ‘wasted’ purely to distinguish one form of ECN from its successor;

ECN hard in some lower layers: It is not always possible to support ECN in an AQM acting in a buffer below the IP layer [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-ecn-encap-guidelines]. In such cases, the L4S service would have to drop rather than mark frames even though they might contain an ECN-capable packet. However, such cases would be unusual.

Risk of reordering classic CE packets: Having to classify all CE packets as L4S risks some classic CE packets arriving early, which is a form of reordering. Reordering can cause the TCP sender to retransmit spuriously. However, one or two packets delivered early does not cause any spurious retransmissions because the subsequent packets continue to move the cumulative acknowledgement
boundary forwards. Anyway, the risk of reordering would be low, because: i) it is quite unusual to experience more than one bottleneck queue on a path; ii) even then, reordering would only occur if there was simultaneous mixing of classic and L4S traffic, which would be more unlikely in an access link, which is where most bottlenecks are located; iii) even then, spurious retransmissions would only occur if a contiguous sequence of three or more classic CE packets from one bottleneck arrived at the next, which should in itself happen very rarely with a good AQM. The risk would be completely eliminated in AQMs that were transport-aware (but they should not need to be);

Non-L4S service for control packets: The classic ECN RFCs [RFC3168] and [RFC5562] require a sender to clear the ECN field to Not-ECT for retransmissions and certain control packets specifically pure ACKs, window probes and SYNs. When L4S packets are classified by the ECN field alone, these control packets would not be classified into an L4S queue, and could therefore be delayed relative to the other packets in the flow. This would not cause re-ordering (because retransmissions are already out of order, and the control packets carry no data). However, it would make critical control packets more vulnerable to loss and delay. To address this problem, [I-D.bagnulo-tswg-generalized-ecn] proposes an experiment in which all TCP control packets and retransmissions are ECN-capable.

Pros:

Should work e2e: The ECN field generally works end-to-end across the Internet. Unlike the DSCP, the setting of the ECN field is at least forwarded unchanged by networks that do not support ECN, and networks rarely clear it to zero;

Should work in tunnels: Unlike DiffServ, ECN is defined to always work across tunnels. However, tunnels do not always implement ECN processing as they should do, particularly because IPsec tunnels were defined differently for a few years.

Could migrate to one codepoint: If all classic ECN senders eventually evolve to use the L4S service, the ECT(0) codepoint could be reused for some future purpose, but only once use of ECT(0) packets had reduced to zero, or near-zero, which might never happen.
A.2. ECN Plus a Diffserv Codepoint (DSCP)

Definition:

For packets with a defined DSCP, all codepoints of the ECN field (except Not-ECT) would signify alternative L4S semantics to those for classic ECN [RFC3168], specifically:

* The L4S DSCP would signify that the packet came from an L4S-capable sender;

* ECT(0) and ECT(1) would both signify that the packet was travelling between transport endpoints that were both ECN-capable;

* CE would signify that the packet had been marked by an AQM implementing the L4S service.

Use of a DSCP is the only approach for alternative ECN semantics given as an example in [RFC4774]. However, it was perhaps considered more for controlled environments than new end-to-end services;

Cons:

Consumes DSCP pairs: A DSCP is obviously not orthogonal to Diffserv. Therefore, wherever the L4S service is applied to multiple Diffserv scheduling behaviours, it would be necessary to replace each DSCP with a pair of DSCPs.

Uses critical lower-layer header space: The resulting increased number of DSCPs might be hard to support for some lower layer technologies, e.g. 802.1p and MPLS both offer only 3-bits for a maximum of 8 traffic class identifiers. Although L4S should reduce and possibly remove the need for some DSCPs intended for differentiated queuing delay, it will not remove the need for Diffserv entirely, because Diffserv is also used to allocate bandwidth, e.g. by prioritising some classes of traffic over others when traffic exceeds available capacity.

Not end-to-end (host-network): Very few networks honour a DSCP set by a host. Typically a network will zero (bleach) the Diffserv field from all hosts. Sometimes networks will attempt to identify applications by some form of packet inspection and, based on network policy, they will set the DSCP considered appropriate for the identified application. Network-based application identification might use some combination of protocol ID, port numbers(s), application layer protocol headers, IP address(es), VLAN ID(s) and even packet timing.
Not end-to-end (network-network): Very few networks honour a DSCP received from a neighbouring network. Typically a network will zero (bleach) the Diffserv field from all neighbouring networks at an interconnection point. Sometimes bilateral arrangements are made between networks, such that the receiving network remarks some DSCPs to those it uses for roughly equivalent services. The likelihood that a DSCP will be bleached or ignored depends on the type of DSCP:

Local-use DSCP: These tend to be used to implement application-specific network policies, but a bilateral arrangement to remark certain DSCPs is often applied to DSCPs in the local-use range simply because it is easier not to change all of a network’s internal configurations when a new arrangement is made with a neighbour;

Global-use DSCP: These do not tend to be honoured across network interconnections more than local-use DSCPs. However, if two networks decide to honour certain of each other’s DSCPs, the reconfiguration is a little easier if both of their globally recognised services are already represented by the relevant global-use DSCPs.

Note that today a global-use DSCP gives little more assurance of end-to-end service than a local-use DSCP. In future the global-use range might give more assurance of end-to-end service than local-use, but it is unlikely that either assurance will be high, particularly given the hosts are included in the end-to-end path.

Not all tunnels: Diffserv codepoints are often not propagated to the outer header when a packet is encapsulated by a tunnel header. DSCPs are propagated to the outer of uniform mode tunnels, but not pipe mode [RFC2983], and pipe mode is fairly common.

ECN hard in some lower layers:: Because this approach uses both the Diffserv and ECN fields, an AQM will only work at a lower layer if both can be supported. If individual network operators wished to deploy an AQM at a lower layer, they would usually propagate an IP Diffserv codepoint to the lower layer, using for example IEEE 802.1p. However, the ECN capability is harder to propagate down to lower layers because few lower layers support it.

Pros:

Could migrate to e2e: If all usage of classic ECN migrates to usage of L4S, the DSCP would become redundant, and the ECN capability alone could eventually identify L4S packets without the
interconnection problems of Diffserv detailed above, and without
having permanently consumed more than one codepoint in the IP
header. Although the DSCP does not generally function as an end-
to-end identifier (see above), it could be used initially by
individual ISPs to introduce the L4S service for their own locally
generated traffic;

A.3. ECN capability alone

Definition:

This approach uses ECN capability alone as the L4S identifier. It
is only feasible if classic ECN is not widely deployed. The
specific definition of codepoints would be:

* Any ECN codepoint other than Not-ECT would signify an L4S-
capable sender;

* ECN codepoints would not be used for classic [RFC3168] ECN, and
the classic network service would only be used for Not-ECT
packets.

This approach would only be feasible if

A. it was generally agreed that there was little chance of any
classic [RFC3168] ECN deployment in any network nodes;

B. it was generally agreed that there was little chance of any
client devices being deployed with classic [RFC3168] TCP-ECN
on by default (note that classic TCP-ECN is already on-by-
default on many servers);

C. for TCP connections, developers of client OSs would all have
to agree not to encourage further deployment of classic ECN.
Specifically, at the start of a TCP connection classic ECN
could be disabled during negotiation of the ECN capability:

+ an L4S-capable host would have to disable ECN if the
  corresponding host did not support accurate ECN feedback
  [RFC7560], which is a prerequisite for the L4S service;

+ developers of operating systems for user devices would only
  enable ECN by default for TCP once the stack implemented
  L4S and accurate ECN feedback [RFC7560] including
  requesting accurate ECN feedback by default.

Cons:
Near-infeasible deployment constraints: The constraints for
deployment above represent a highly unlikely, but not completely
impossible, set of circumstances. If, despite the above measures,
a pair of hosts did negotiate to use classic ECN, their packets
would be classified into the same queue as L4S traffic, and if
they had to compete with a long-running L4S flow they would get a
very small capacity share;

ECN hard in some lower layers: See the same issue with "ECT(1) and
CE codepoints" (Appendix A.1);

Non-L4S service for control packets: See the same issue with "ECT(1)
and CE codepoints" (Appendix A.1).

Pros:
Consumes no additional codepoints: The ECT(1) codepoint and all
spare Diffserv codepoints would remain available for future use;
Should work e2e: As with "ECT(1) and CE codepoints" (Appendix A.1);
Should work in tunnels: As with "ECT(1) and CE codepoints"
(Appendix A.1).

A.4. Protocol ID

It has been suggested that a new ID in the IPv4 Protocol field or the
IPv6 Next Header field could identify L4S packets. However this
approach is ruled out by numerous problems:

  o A new protocol ID would need to be paired with the old one for
each transport (TCP, SCTP, UDP, etc.);

  o In IPv6, there can be a sequence of Next Header fields, and it
would not be obvious which one would be expected to identify a
network service like L4S;

  o A new protocol ID would rarely provide an end-to-end service,
because It is well-known that new protocol IDs are often blocked
by numerous types of middlebox;

  o The approach is not a solution for AQMs below the IP layer;

A.5. Source or destination addressing

Locally, a network operator could arrange for L4S service to be
applied based on source or destination addressing, e.g. packets from
its own data centre and/or CDN hosts, packets to its business
customers, etc. It could use addressing at any layer, e.g. IP addresses, MAC addresses, VLAN IDs, etc. Although addressing might be a useful tactical approach for a single ISP, it would not be a feasible approach to identify an end-to-end service like L4S. Even for a single ISP, it would require packet classifiers in buffers to be dependent on changing topology and address allocation decisions elsewhere in the network. Therefore this approach is not a feasible solution.

A.6. Summary: Merits of Alternative Identifiers

Table 1 provides a very high level summary of the pros and cons detailed against the schemes described respectively in Appendix A.2, Appendix A.3 and Appendix A.1, for six issues that set them apart.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>DSCP + ECN</th>
<th>ECN</th>
<th>ECT(1) + CE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>initial</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>eventual</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>end-to-end tunnels</td>
<td>N . .</td>
<td>. ? .</td>
<td>. . Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lower layers</td>
<td>O . .</td>
<td>. O .</td>
<td>. . Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>codepoints</td>
<td>N . .</td>
<td>. ? .</td>
<td>. . Y</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note 1: Only feasible if classic ECN is obsolete.

Table 1: Comparison of the Merits of Three Alternative Identifiers

The schemes are scored based on both their capabilities now ('initial') and in the long term ('eventual'). The ‘ECN’ scheme shares the ‘eventual’ scores of the ‘ECT(1) + CE’ scheme. The scores are one of ‘N, O, Y’, meaning ‘Poor’, ‘Ordinary’, ‘Good’ respectively. The same scores are aligned vertically to aid the eye. A score of "?" in one of the positions means that this approach might optimistically become this good, given sufficient effort. The table summarises the text and is not meant to be understandable without having read the text.
Appendix B. Potential Competing Uses for the ECT(1) Codepoint

The ECT(1) codepoint of the ECN field has already been assigned once for experimental use as the ECN nonce [RFC3540]. ECN is probably the only remaining field in the Internet Protocol that is common to IPv4 and IPv6 and still has potential to work end-to-end, with tunnels and with lower layers. Therefore, ECT(1) should not be reassigned to a different experimental use without carefully assessing competing potential uses. These fall into the following categories:

B.1. Integrity of Congestion Feedback

Receiving hosts can fool a sender into downloading faster by suppressing feedback of ECN marks (or of losses if retransmissions are not necessary or available otherwise). [RFC3540] proposes that a TCP sender could set either of ECT(0) or ECT(1) in each packet of a flow and remember the sequence it had set, termed the ECN nonce. If any packet is lost or congestion marked, the receiver will miss that bit of the sequence. An ECN Nonce receiver has to feed back the least significant bit of the sum, so it cannot suppress feedback of a loss or mark without a 50-50 chance of guessing the sum incorrectly.

As far as is known, the ECN Nonce has never been deployed, and it was only implemented for a couple of testbed evaluations. It would be nearly impossible to deploy now, because any misbehaving receiver can simply opt-out, which would be unremarkable given all receivers currently opt-out.

Other ways to protect TCP feedback integrity have since been developed that do not consume any extra codepoints in the base IP header. For instance:

- the sender can test the integrity of the receiver’s feedback by occasionally setting the IP-ECN field to a value normally only set by the network. Then it can test whether the receiver’s feedback faithfully reports what it expects [I-D.moncaster-tcpm-rcv-cheat]. This works for loss and it will work for the accurate ECN feedback [RFC7560] intended for L4S;

- A network can enforce a congestion response to its ECN markings (or packet losses) by auditing congestion exposure (ConEx) [RFC7713]. Whether the receiver or a downstream network is suppressing congestion feedback or the sender is unresponsive to the feedback, or both, ConEx audit can neutralise any advantage that any of these three parties would otherwise gain.

ECN in RTP [RFC6679] is defined so that the receiver can ask the sender to send all ECT(0); all ECT(1); or both randomly. It
recommends that the receiver asks for ECT(0), which is the default. The sender can choose to ignore the receiver’s request. A rather complex but optional nonce mechanism was included in early drafts of RFC 6679, but it was replaced with a statement that a nonce mechanism is not specified, explaining that misbehaving receivers could opt-out anyway. RFC 6679 as published gives no rationale for why ECT(1) or ‘random’ might be needed, but it warns that ‘random’ would make header compression highly inefficient. The possibility of using ECT(1) may have been left in the RFC to allow a nonce mechanism to be added later.

Therefore, it seems unlikely that anyone has implemented the optional use of ECT(1) for RTP. Even if they have, it seems even less likely that any deployment actually uses it. However these assumptions will need to be verified.

B.2. Notification of Less Severe Congestion than CE

Various researchers have proposed to use ECT(1) as a less severe congestion notification than CE, particularly to enable flows to fill available capacity more quickly after an idle period, when another flow departs or when a flow starts, e.g. VCP [VCP], Queue View (QV) [QV] (ToDo: consider Jonathan Morton’s Explicit Load Regulation (ELR) if relevant, once the promised write-up appears).

Before assigning ECT(1) as an identifier for L4S, we must carefully consider whether it might be better to hold ECT(1) in reserve for future standardisation of rapid flow acceleration, which is an important and enduring problem [RFC6077].

Pre-Congestion Notification (PCN) is another scheme that assigns alternative semantics to the ECN field. It uses ECT(1) to signify a less severe level of pre-congestion notification than CE [RFC6660]. However, the ECN field only takes on the PCN semantics if packets carry a Diffserv codepoint defined to indicate PCN marking within a controlled environment. PCN is required to be applied solely to the outer header of a tunnel across the controlled region in order not to interfere with any end-to-end use of the ECN field. Therefore a PCN region on the path would not interfere with any of the L4S service identifiers proposed in Appendix A.

Authors’ Addresses
Abstract

This specification defines magic numbers in UDP which allow a node to determine or confirm the protocol contained in a UDP payload. This is primarily applicable for encapsulation and transport protocols encapsulated within UDP where intermediate devices, such as middle boxes, need to parse these protocols for providing service. Magic numbers can also be used to multiplex different UDP encapsulated protocols over the same UDP port.

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1 Introduction

Several transport and encapsulation protocols have been defined to be encapsulated within UDP [RFC0768]. In this model, the payload of a UDP packet contains a protocol header and payload for an encapsulated protocol. Transport protocols encapsulated in UDP include QUIC [QUIC], SCTP-in-UDP [RFC6951], and SPUD [I-D.hildebrand-spud-prototype]. Encapsulation protocols include Geneve [I-D.ietf-nvo3-geneve], VXLAN-GPE [I-D.ietf-nvo3-vxlan-gpe], GUE [I-D.ietf-nvo3-gue], MPLS-in-UDP [RFC7510], and GRE-in-UDP [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-gre-in-udp-encap]. For various reasons, intermediate devices in a network may want to parse these protocols. For instance, a middlebox would need to parse an encapsulated transport protocol to implement a stateful firewall. To parse the encapsulated protocol in a UDP packet, a node must positively identify the encapsulated protocol.

The destination UDP port number is commonly used to interpret the contents of a UDP payload, however this is problematic in intermediate devices for several reasons:

- Port numbers can only be correctly interpreted by the endpoints. Interpretation by intermediate devices in the network may be incorrect ([RFC7605]).

- Encapsulation and transport protocols will usually have assigned UDP ports, but they are not restricted to use only those.

- UDP encapsulated protocols may use a "substrate" protocol header as espoused in SPUD. Use of a substrate header may be common across several port numbers. Configuring each network device for each port that uses the substrate could be cumbersome.

This specification describes UDP magic numbers which allows network nodes to identify UDP encapsulated protocols without relying solely on UDP port numbers. A UDP magic number is a protocol specific, constant value which is logically inserted between the UDP header and the encapsulated protocol header. If a node matches the magic number in a packet to a known protocol’s magic number, then it can parse the encapsulated payload per the matched protocol. Each UDP encapsulated protocol uses a different magic number which allows multiplexing multiple encapsulated protocols over the same UDP port.

Note that the use of magic numbers is inherently probabilistic. It is possible that a UDP packet may have a payload that inadvertently matches a magic number. The magic number is defined to minimize the probability of this occurring (1/2^64 assuming that UDP data has a random distribution), nevertheless the probability is non-zero. The consequences of incorrectly matching a UDP packet should be
considered for each UDP encapsulated protocol. An encapsulated protocol may include its own verification to ensure correct interpretation.

The use of magic numbers to identify UDP encapsulated protocols was specified in the SPUD prototype protocol ([I-D.hildebrand-spud-prototype]) and in "Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN)" ([RFC5389]). This proposal generalizes the concept.

1.1 Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

2 Magic number format

The UDP magic number is a sixty-four bit value that includes a fixed constant, an encapsulated protocol type, and a checksum. The magic number within a UDP packet is diagrammed below.

```
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source port</th>
<th>Destination port</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Length</td>
<td>Checksum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magic value</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xor’ed protocol</td>
<td>Xor’ed checksum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encapsulated protocol</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
```

The fields of the magic number are:

- **Magic value**: A fixed constant of 0xffff71a2. This value is the same for all encapsulated protocol types.
- **Xor’ed protocol**: Indicates the protocol type of the encapsulated protocol. The value in the field is a protocol type number exclusive or’ed with 0x36b4.
- **Xor’ed Checksum**: Indicates the standard one’s complement
checksum over the magic number (including the Magic value and Xor’ed Protocol fields). The value in this field is the calculated checksum exclusive or’ed with 0x5ce9.

- Encapsulated protocol: This contains the header and payload of the encapsulated protocol. The type for the protocol is indicated in the Xor’ed protocol field.

2.1 Magic value

The first byte of the Magic value field is 0xff and the other three bytes are a randomly chosen constant.

For UDP encapsulated protocols that allow magic number use to be optional, the magic number must be clearly distinguishable from a valid header. Each such protocol must declare that a header which would match the associated magic number is invalid. The value of 0xff as the first byte in the magic number was chosen as a likely value that would indicate an invalid header. It is common that the first byte of a protocol header contains a version number, and most protocols have not gotten past version zero. So if a magic number is received by a node that does not yet support magic numbers, the UDP payload would likely be interpreted as a protocol header with a bad version number; this should result in dropping the packet and not misinterpreting it. In this way, the use of magic numbers can be enabled for many existing protocols with forward compatibility.

2.2 Protocol types

Protocol types can generally refer to any encapsulation, transport, substrate, or application specific protocol that is encapsulated in UDP for which intermediate devices might need to parse. A protocol type number is encoded in UDP magic numbers to allow intermediate devices to distinguish different payload types while still using a common magic number format.

Protocol types are indicated by sixteen bits numbers, and the space is divided into three regions.

Numbers 0-49151 are reserved to mirror the assigned UDP port number space. If a port number is assigned to a UDP encapsulated protocol, that same number can be used as the protocol type number. This is allowed for convenience, there is no required correlation between protocol type numbers and UDP port numbers.

Numbers 49152-57343 are reserved for assigned protocol types.

Numbers 57344-65535 are reserved for private protocol types.
The Xor’ed protocol field in a magic number is a protocol type number exclusive or’ed with 0x36b4.

2.3 Magic number checksum

The magic number checksum is calculated as the standards one complement checksum computed over the sixty-four bit magic number where the Xor’ed checksum field is set to zero for the purposes of calculation. The checksum calculation covers the Magic value and the Xor’ed protocol fields. The Xor’ed checksum field is set to the result of the calculation exclusive or’ed with 0x5ce9.

Note that the magic number checksum is performed over constant fields and is itself a constant value per protocol type. An implementation should not need to perform this calculation when processing packets. Appendix A demonstrates how the checksum is applied to create a magic number constant for Generic UDP Encapsulation.

The magic number checksum may be used to validate the presence of a well formed UDP magic number. This is demonstrated in Appendix B.

3 Usage

This section describes the processing of UDP magic numbers on end hosts and intermediate devices.

3.1 End hosts

The use of UDP magic numbers is enabled on a per port basis. Magic numbers may be required for every UDP packet sent on a port, or may be optional. If a UDP port is assigned to a single protocol, the magic number in packets sent to that port is the one assigned to the protocol. If different encapsulated protocols are multiplexed on the same UDP port, magic numbers for those protocols will be used.

3.1.1 Required magic numbers

If magic numbers are required for a UDP port, a sender must set the magic number in any packets sent to the destination port. A receiver must check for a valid magic number. If the magic number is valid, that is the Magic value is correct and the protocol type is supported by the receiver for the port, then the packet is accepted. Otherwise, the magic number is not matched so the packet is dropped.

3.1.2 Optional magic numbers

When magic numbers are optional for a UDP port, a receiver must check if a magic number is present in a received packet. If a magic number
is matched for a protocol type supported by the receiver, then the packet must be accepted and the Encapsulated protocol in the packet is processed according to the protocol type. If the magic number is not matched, the packet is still accepted and the UDP payload is processed as a protocol type implied by the port number.

If it is not feasible in a protocol to distinguish a magic number from a valid header (MPLS-in-UDP for instance), UDP magic numbers cannot be optional on the protocol’s port number. They can be used on a separate port number for which magic numbers would be required.

3.1.3 Use with DTLS

UDP magic numbers are intended to occupy the first bytes of the UDP payload to facilitate interpretation at middleboxes. When they are used with DTLS [RFC6347], the magic number must precede the DTLS headers. The protocol type in the magic number would refer to the payload type contained in DTLS.

3.2 Intermediate devices

Intermediate devices may match magic numbers in two ways:

- Match both the destination port and magic numbers associated with the port.
- Match magic numbers across a range (possibly all) of ports.

Matching both the port and magic number is recommended. This is feasible in cases where a UDP encapsulated protocol has an assigned port number. Matching the port number and magic number significantly reduces the possibility of misinterpreting a packet.

Matching just the magic number and not a port may be done when UDP encapsulated protocols are used on unassigned ports, or configuring port numbers on intermediate devices is prohibitive.

In either case, if a middlebox is able to match a magic number it may parse the encapsulated payload of the packet for the associated protocol.

If a middle box does not match a magic number for a packet it should follow default processing for UDP packets. If magic numbers are known to be required for a port, a middlebox may perform some alternative processing when the magic number is not present. This alternative processing should not be more restrictive than had the packet been sent to another arbitrary UDP port. In particular, if UDP packets for other ports would not be dropped, failure to match a magic number
should not result in the packet being dropped.

4 Security Considerations

UDP magic numbers are not a security mechanism and should not increase security risk.

5 IANA Considerations

IANA will be requested to create a "UDP Magic Number Protocol Type" registry to allocate protocol types. This shall be a registry of 16-bit values along with descriptive strings. The allocation ranges are described in section 2.2.

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Appendix A: Example of creating a UDP magic number

This section demonstrates how a magic can be created for a UDP encapsulated protocol. For this example we consider Generic UDP Encapsulation (GUE), and assume that the assigned port number is used as the protocol type number.

The assigned port number for GUE is 6080 or 0x17c0 in hexadecimal. So the value of the Xor’ed protocol field is:

\[ 0x17c0 \oplus 0x36b4 = 0x2174 \]

To compute the magic checksum we first sum the words of the Magic value and the Xor’ed protocol field value computed above:

\[ 0xffd8 + 0x71a2 + 0x2174 = 0x192ee \]

The result is folded and then complemented:

\[ (0x92ee + 1) \oplus 0xffffff = 0x6d10 \]

So the value in the Xor’ed checksum field is:

\[ 0x6d10 \oplus 0x5ce9 = 0x31f9 \]

Thus the full 64 bit magic number value for GUE is:

\[ 0xffd871a2:0x217431f9 \]

Appendix B: Checking magic numbers

This section provides some guidelines for how to check magic numbers.

B.1 Matching a single magic number

When a port supports precisely one protocol type there is only one magic number to check. This will be a common case at a receiver where magic numbers are enabled for encapsulated protocols that have assigned ports. Receiver processing in pseudo code may be:

```c
dataptr = UDP_payload_ptr
good_magic = false
PROTO_MAGIC_NUMBER = Pre computed 64 bit value for protocol type

if (UDP_payload_length >= 8 &&
    memcmp(UDP_payload_ptr, PROTO_MAGIC_NUMBER, 8) == 0) {
```
B.2 Matching against a set of magic numbers

A host needs to check against a set of magic numbers when different encapsulated protocols are multiplexed over a single port, and an intermediate device checks against a set when matching magic numbers across a range of ports. In either case, the typical method is to check the first four bytes of the UDP payload against the constant magic number value. If this is a match then the protocol type number is extracted and a lookup is performed to find a context. If a context is found, the checksum field in the packet is compared against a precomputed value in the context. In pseudo code this is:

```c
    dataptr = UDP_payload_ptr;
    good_magic = false;

    if (UDP_payload_length >= 8 &&
        *(u32 *)UDP_payload_ptr == 0xffd871a2) {
        proto = *(u16 *)(UDP_payload_ptr + 4) ^ 0x36b4
        checksum = *(u16 *)(UDP_payload_ptr + 6)
        ctx = protocol_lookup(proto)
        if (ctx && checksum == ctx->checksum) {
            /* Protocol found and matched */
            good_magic = true
            dataptr += 8;
        }
    }

    if (good_magic)
        process_as_protocol(dataptr, proto);
    else
        /* Handle bad packet */
```

B.3 Magic number validation

A node can validate that a magic number is well formed for any protocol. This requires checking the Magic value is correct and verifying the checksum. In pseudo code this would be:
good_magic = false
u16 checksum(start, len) /* Checksum function */
if (UDP_payload_length >= 8 &&
   *(u32 *)UDP_payload_ptr == 0xffd871a2) {
   csum = checksum(UDP_payload_ptr, 6)
   if (csum ^ 0x5ce9 == *(u16 *)(UDP_payload_ptr + 6))
      good_magic = true
}

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Abstract

This document discusses the role of IP tunnels in the Internet architecture. An IP tunnel transits IP datagrams as payloads in non-link layer protocols. This document explains the relationship of IP tunnels to existing protocol layers and the challenges in supporting IP tunneling, based on the equivalence of tunnels to links. The implications of this document are used to derive recommendations that update MTU and fragment issues in RFC 4459.
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1. Introduction

The Internet layering architecture is loosely based on the ISO seven layer stack, in which data units traverse the stack by being wrapped inside data units of the next layer down [Cl88][Zi80]. A tunnel is a mechanism for transmitting data units between endpoints by wrapping them as data units of the same or higher layers, e.g., IP in IP (Figure 1) or IP in UDP (Figure 2).

```
+----+----+--------------+
| IP'| IP |     Data     |
+----+----+--------------+
```

Figure 1 IP inside IP
This document focuses on tunnels that transit IP packets, i.e., in which an IP packet is the payload of another protocol, other than a typical link layer. A tunnel is a virtual link that can help decouple the network topology seen by transiting packets from the underlying physical network [To98][RFC2473]. Tunnels were critical in the development of multicast because not all routers were capable of processing multicast packets [Er94]. Tunnels allowed multicast packets to transit efficiently between multicast-capable routers over paths that did not support native link-layer multicast. Similar techniques have been used to support incremental deployment of other protocols over legacy substrates, such as IPv6 [RFC2546].

Use of tunnels is common in the Internet. The word "tunnel" occurs in nearly 1,500 RFCs (of nearly 8,000 current RFCs, close to 20%), and is supported within numerous protocols, including:

- IP in IPv6 - IPv6 or IPv4 in IPv6 [RFC2473]
- IPsec - includes a tunnel mode to enable encryption or authentication of the entire IP datagram inside another IP datagram [RFC4301]
- Generic Router Encapsulation (GRE) - a shim layer for tunneling any network layer in any other network layer, as in IP in GRE in IP [RFC2784][RFC7588][RFC7676], or inside UDP in IP [RFC8086]
- MPLS - a shim layer for tunneling IP over a circuit-like path over a link layer [RFC3031] or inside UDP in IP [RFC7510], in which identifiers are rewritten on each hop, often used for traffic provisioning
- LISP - a mechanism that uses multipoint IP tunnels to reduce routing table load within an enclave of routers at the expense of more complex tunnel ingress encapsulation tables [RFC6830]
- TRILL - a mechanism that uses multipoint L2 tunnels to enable use of L3 routing (typically IS-IS) in an enclave of Ethernet bridges [RFC5556][RFC6325]

- Generic UDP Encapsulation (GUE) - IP in UDP in IP [He19]

- Automatic Multicast Tunneling (AMT) - IP in UDP in IP for multicast [RFC7450]

- L2TP - PPP over IP, to extend a subscriber’s DSL/FTTH connection from an access line provider to an ISP [RFC3931]

- L2VPNs - provides a link topology different from that provided by physical links [RFC4664]; many of these are not classical tunnels, using only tags (Ethernet VLAN tags) rather than encapsulation

- L3VPNs - provides a network topology different from that provided by ISPs [RFC4176]

- NVO3 - data center network sharing (to be determined, which may include use of GUE or other tunnels) [RFC7364]

- PWE3 - emulates wire-like services over packet-switched services [RFC3985]

- SEAL/AERO - IP in IP tunneling with an additional shim header designed to overcome the limitations of RFC2003 [RFC5320][Te18]

- A number of legacy variants, including swIPe (an IPsec precursor), a GRE precursor, and the Internet Encapsulation Protocol, all of which included a shim layer [RFC1853]

The variety of tunnel mechanisms raises the question of the role of tunnels in the Internet architecture and the potential need for these mechanisms to have similar and predictable behavior. In particular, the ways in which packet size (i.e., Maximum Transmission Unit or MTU) mismatches and error signals (e.g., ICMP) are handled may benefit from a coordinated approach.

Regardless of the layer in which encapsulation occurs, tunnels emulate a link. The only difference is that a link operates over a physical communication channel, whereas a tunnel operates over other software protocol layers. Because tunnels are links, they are subject to the same issues as any link, e.g., MTU discovery, signaling, and the potential utility of native support for broadcast and multicast [RFC3819]. Tunnels have some advantages over native links, being potentially easier to reconfigure and control because they can
generally rely on existing out-of-band communication between its endpoints.

The first attempt to use large-scale tunnels was to transit multicast traffic across the Internet in 1988, and this resulted in 'tunnel collapse'. At the time, tunnels were not implemented as encapsulation-based virtual links, but rather as loose source routes on un-encapsulated IP datagrams [RFC1075]. Then, as now, routers did not support use of the loose source route IP option at line rate, and the multicast traffic caused overload of the so-called "slow path" processing of IP datagrams in software. Using encapsulation tunnels avoided that collapse by allowing the forwarding of encapsulated packets to use the "fast path" hardware processing [Er94].

The remainder of this document describes the general principles of IP tunneling and discusses the key considerations in the design of any protocol that tunnels IP datagrams. It derives its conclusions from the equivalence of tunnels and links and from requirements of existing standards for supporting IPv4 and IPv6 as payloads.

2. Conventions used in this document

2.1. Key Words

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

2.2. Terminology

This document uses the following terminology. Optional words in the term are indicated in parentheses, e.g., "(link or network) interface" or "egress (interface)".

Terms from existing RFCs:

- Messages: variable length data labeled with globally-unique endpoint IDs, also known as a datagram for IP messages [RFC791].

- Node: a physical or logical network device that participates as either a host [RFC1122][RFC6434] or router [RFC1812]. This term originally referred to gateways since some very early RFCs [RFC5], but is currently the common way to describe a point in a network at which messages are processed.
Host or endpoint: a node that sources or sinks messages labeled from/to its IDs, typically known as a host for both IP and higher-layer protocol messages [RFC1122].

Source or sender: the node that generates a message [RFC1122].

Destination or receiver: the node that consumes a message [RFC1122].

Router or gateway: a node that relays IP messages using destination IDs and local context [RFC1812]. Routers also act as hosts when they source or sink messages. Also known as a forwarder for IP messages. Note that the notion of router is relative to the layer at which message processing is considered [To16].

Link: a communications medium (or emulation thereof) that transfers IP messages between nodes without traversing a router (as would require decrementing the hop count) [RFC1122][RFC1812].

Link packet: a link layer message, which can carry an IP datagram as a payload

(Link or network) Interface: a location on a link co-located with a node where messages depart onto that link or arrive from that link. On physical links, this interface formats the message for transmission and interprets the received signals.

Path: a sequence of one or more links over which an IP message traverses between source and destination nodes (hosts or routers).

(Link) MTU: the largest message that can transit a link [RFC791], also often referred to simply as "MTU". It does not include the size of link-layer information, e.g., link layer headers or trailers, i.e., it refers to the message that the link can carry as a payload rather than the message as it appears on the link. This is thus the largest network layer packet (including network layer headers, e.g., IP datagram) that can transit a link. Note that this need not be the native size of messages on the link, i.e., the link may internally fragment and reassemble messages. For IPv4, the smallest MTU must be at least 68 bytes [RFC791], and for IPv6 the smallest MTU must be at least 1280 bytes [RFC8200].
- EMTU_S (effective MTU for sending): the largest message that can transit a link, possibly also accounting for fragmentation that happens before the fragments are emitted onto the link [RFC1122]. When source fragmentation is possible, EMTU_S = EMTU_R. When source fragmentation is not possible, EMTU_S = (link) MTU. For IPv4, this is MUST be at least 68 bytes [RFC791] and for IPv6 this MUST be at least 1280 bytes [RFC8200].

- EMTU_R (effective MTU to receive): the largest payload message that a receiver must be able to accept. This thus also represents the largest message that can traverse a link, taking into account reassembly at the receiver that happens after the fragments are received [RFC1122]. For IPv4, this is MUST be at least 576 bytes [RFC791] and for IPv6 this MUST be at least 1500 bytes [RFC8200].

- Path MTU (PMTU): the largest message that can transit a path of links [RFC1191][RFC8201]. Typically, this is the minimum of the link MTUs of the links of the path, and represents the largest network layer message (including network layer headers) that can transit a path without requiring fragmentation while in transit. Note that this is not the largest network packet that can be sent between a source and destination, because that network packet might have been fragmented at the network layer of the source and reassembled at the network layer of the destination.

- Tunnel: a protocol mechanism that transits messages between an ingress interface and egress interface using encapsulation to allow an existing network path to appear as a single link [RFC1853]. Note that a protocol can be used to tunnel itself (IP over IP). There is essentially no difference between a tunnel and the conventional layering of the ISO stack (i.e., by this definition, Ethernet is can be considered tunnel for IP). A tunnel is also known as a virtual link.

- Ingress (interface): the virtual link interface of a tunnel that receives messages within a node, encapsulates them according to the tunnel protocol, and transmits them into the tunnel [RFC2983]. An ingress is the tunnel equivalent of the outgoing (departing) network interface of a link, and its encapsulation processing is the tunnel equivalent of encoding a message for transmission over a physical link. The ingress virtual link interface can be co-located with the traffic source.

The term 'ingress' in other RFCs also refers to 'network ingress', which is the entry point of traffic to a transit network. Because this document focuses on tunnels, the term "ingress" used in the remainder of this document implies "tunnel ingress".
o Egress (interface): a virtual link interface of a tunnel that receives messages that have finished transiting a tunnel and presents them to a node [RFC2983]. For reasons similar to ingress, the term ‘egress’ will refer to ‘tunnel egress’ throughout the remainder of this document. An egress is the tunnel equivalent of the incoming (arriving) network interface of a link and its decapsulation processing is the tunnel equivalent of interpreting a signal received from a physical link. The egress decapsulates messages for further transit to the destination. The egress virtual link interface can be co-located with the traffic destination.

o Ingress node: network device on which an ingress is attached as a virtual link interface [RFC2983]. Note that a node can act as both an ingress node and an egress node at the same time, but typically only for different tunnels.

o Egress node: device where an egress is attached as a virtual link interface [RFC2983]. Note that a device can act as both a ingress node and an egress node at the same time, but typically only for different tunnels.

o Inner header: the header of the message as it arrives to the ingress [RFC2003].

o Outer header(s): one or more headers added to the message by the ingress, as part of the encapsulation for tunnel transit [RFC2003].

o Mid-tunnel fragmentation: Fragmentation of the message during the tunnel transit, as could occur for IPv4 datagrams with DF=0 [RFC2983].

o Atomic packet, datagram, or fragment: an IP packet that has not been fragmented and which cannot be fragmented further [RFC6864] [RFC6946].

The following terms are introduced by this document:

o (Tunnel) transit packet: the packet arriving at a node connected to a tunnel that enters the ingress interface and exits the egress interface, i.e., the packet carried over the tunnel. This is sometimes known as the ‘tunneled packet’, i.e., the packet carried over the tunnel. This is the tunnel equivalent of a network layer packet as it would traverse a link. This document focuses on IPv4 and IPv6 transit packets.
(Tunnel) link packet (TLP): packets that traverse between two interfaces, e.g., from ingress interface to egress interface, in which resides all or part of a transit packet. A tunnel link packet is the tunnel equivalent of a link (layer) packet as it would traverse a link, which is why we use the same terminology.

Tunnel MTU: the largest transit packet that can traverse a tunnel, i.e., the tunnel equivalent of a link MTU, which is why we use the same terminology. This is the largest transit packet which can be reassembled at the egress interface.

Tunnel maximum atomic packet (MAP): the largest transit packet that can traverse a tunnel as an atomic packet, i.e., without requiring tunnel link packet fragmentation either at the ingress or on-path between the ingress and egress.

Inner fragmentation: fragmentation of the transit packet that arrives at the ingress interface before any additional headers are added. This can only correctly occur for IPv4 DF=0 datagrams.

Outer fragmentation: source fragmentation of the tunnel link packet after encapsulation; this can involve fragmenting the outermost header or any of the other (if any) protocol layers involved in encapsulation.

Maximum frame size (MFS): the link-layer equivalent of the MTU, using the OSI term ‘frame’. For Ethernet, the MTU (network packet size) is 1500 bytes but the MFS (link frame size) is 1518 bytes originally, and 1522 bytes assuming VLAN (802.1Q) tagging support.

EMFS_S: the link layer equivalent of EMTU_S.

EMFS_R: the link layer equivalent of EMTU_R.

Path MFS: the link layer equivalent of PMTU.

3. The Tunnel Model

A network architecture is an abstract description of a distributed communications system, its components and their relationships, the requisite properties of those components and the emergent properties of the system that result [To03]. Such descriptions can help explain behavior, as when the OSI seven-layer model is used as a teaching example [Zi80]. Architectures describe capabilities - and, just as importantly, constraints.
A network can be defined as a system of endpoints and relays interconnected by communication paths, abstracting away issues of naming in order to focus on message forwarding. To the extent that the Internet has a single, coherent interpretation, its architecture is defined by its core protocols (IP [RFC791], TCP [RFC793], UDP [RFC768]) whose messages are handled by hosts, routers, and links [Cl88][To03], as shown in Figure 3:

![Figure 3 Basic Internet architecture](https://example.com)

As a network architecture, the Internet is a system of hosts (endpoints) and routers (relays) interconnected by links that exchange messages when possible. "When possible" defines the Internet's "best effort" principle. The limited role of routers and links represents the End-to-End Principle [Sa84] and longest-prefix match enables hierarchical forwarding using compact tables.

Although the definitions of host, router, and link seem absolute, they are often relative as viewed within the context of one protocol layer, each of which can be considered a distinct network architecture. An Internet gateway is an OSI Layer 3 router when it transits IP datagrams but it acts as an OSI Layer 2 host as it sources or sinks Layer 2 messages on attached links to accomplish this transit capability. In this way, one device (Internet gateway) behaves as different components (router, host) at different layers.

Even though a single device may have multiple roles - even concurrently - at a given layer, each role is typically static and determined by context. An Internet gateway always acts as a Layer 2 host and that behavior does not depend on where the gateway is viewed from within Layer 2. In the context of a single layer, a device's behavior is typically modeled as a single component from all viewpoints in that layer (with some notable exceptions, e.g., Network Address Translators, which appear as hosts and routers, depending on the direction of the viewpoint [To16]).

### 3.1. What is a Tunnel?

A tunnel can be modeled as a link in another network [To98][To01][To03]. In Figure 4, a source host (Hsrc) and destination host (Hdst) communicating over a network M in which two routers (Ra...
and Rd) are connected by a tunnel. Keep in mind that it is possible that both network N and network M can both be components of the Internet, i.e., there may be regular traffic as well as tunneled traffic over any of the routers shown.

```
+------+-     /  \
| Hsrc |--- Ra +-- -- + Rd ---| Hdst |
+------+-     /  \
              / \
--/I 
--+ Rb +--+ Rc --/E --
|\   \    \   \  |
\  /    --\  /
\/       --/
<------ Network N ------>
```

Figure 4 The big picture

The tunnel consists of two interfaces – an ingress (I) and an egress (E) that lie along a path connected by network N. Regardless of how the ingress and egress interfaces are connected, the tunnel serves as a link between the nodes it connects (here, Ra and Rd).

IP packets arriving at the ingress interface are encapsulated to traverse network N. We call these packets ‘tunnel transit packets’ (or just ‘transit packets’) because they will transit the tunnel inside one or more of what we call ‘tunnel link packets’. Transit packets correspond to network (IP) packets traversing a conventional link and tunnel link packets correspond to the packets of a conventional link layer (which can be called just ‘link packets’).

Link packets use the source address of the ingress interface and the destination address of the egress interface - using whatever address is appropriate to the Layer at which the ingress and egress interfaces operate (Layer 2, Layer 3, Layer 4, etc.). The egress interface decapsulates those messages, which then continue on network M as if emerging from a link. To transit packets and to the routers the tunnel connects (Ra and Rd), the tunnel acts as a link and the ingress and egress interfaces act as network interfaces to that link.

The model of each component (ingress and egress interfaces) and the entire system (tunnel) depends on the layer from which they are viewed. From the perspective of the outermost hosts (Hsrc and Hdst), the tunnel appears as a link between two routers (Ra and Rd). For routers along the tunnel (e.g., Rb and Rc), the ingress and egress interfaces appear as the endpoint hosts on network N.
When the tunnel network (N) is implemented using the same protocol as the endpoint network (M), the picture looks flatter (Figure 5), as if it were running over a single network. However, this appearance is incorrect - nothing has changed from the previous case. From the perspective of the endpoints, Rb and Rc and network N don’t exist and aren’t visible, and from the perspective of the tunnel, network M doesn’t exist. The fact that network N and M use the same protocol, and may traverse the same links is irrelevant.

--- __ __ __ ---
| Hsrc |--- Ra |+I |--- Rb |--- Rc ++E |+ Rd |---| Hdst |
--- __ __ __ ---

<---- Network N ---->
<--------------- Network M ------------->

Figure 5 IP in IP network picture

3.2. View from the Outside

As already observed, from outside the tunnel, to network M, the entire tunnel acts as a link (Figure 6). Consequently all requirements for links supporting IP also apply to tunnels [RFC3819].

--- __ __ __ ---
| Hsrc |--- Ra |--------------------------| Rd |---| Hdst |
--- __ __ __ ---

<--------------- Network M ------------->

Figure 6 Tunnels as viewed from the outside

For example, the IP datagram hop counts (IPv4 Time-to-Live [RFC791] and IPv6 Hop Limit [RFC8200]) are decremented when traversing a router, but not when traversing a link - or thus a tunnel. Similarly, because the ingress and egress are interfaces on this outer network, they should never issue ICMP messages. A router or host would issue the appropriate ICMP, e.g., “packet too big” (IPv4 fragmentation needed and DF set [RFC792] or IPv6 packet too big [RFC4443]), when trying to send a packet to the egress, as it would for any interface.

Tunnels have a tunnel MTU - the largest message that can transit that tunnel, just as links have a link MTU. This MTU may not reflect the native message size of hops within a multihop link (or tunnel) and
the same is true for a tunnel. In both cases, the MTU is defined by
the link’s (or tunnel’s) effective MTU to receive (EMTU_R).

3.3. View from the Inside

Within network N, i.e., from inside the tunnel itself, the ingress
interface is a source of tunnel link packets and the egress interface
is a sink – so both are viewed as hosts on network N (Figure 7).
Consequently [RFC1122] Internet host requirements apply to ingress
and egress interfaces when Network N uses IP (and thus the
ingress/egress interfaces use IP encapsulation).

```
--  --  --
/I \--- Rb ++++ Rc +++/E \n  \ /  \ /  \ /  \
/\ -- -- \/
/ |   |   |   |
\|--- Network N ---->
```

Figure 7 Tunnels, as viewed from within the tunnel

Viewed from within the tunnel, the outer network (M) doesn’t exist.
Tunnel link packets can be fragmented by the source (ingress
interface) and reassembled at the destination (egress interface),
just as at conventional hosts. The path between ingress and egress
interfaces has a path MTU, but the endpoints can exchange messages as
large as can be reassembled at the destination (egress interface),
i.e., the EMTU_R of the egress interface. However, in both cases,
these MTUs refer to the size of the message that can transit the
links and between the hosts of network N, which represents a link
layer to network M. I.e., the MTUs of network N represent the maximum
frame sizes (MFSs) of the tunnel as a link in network M.

Information about the network – i.e., regarding network N MTU sizes,
network reachability, etc. – are relayed from the destination (egress
interface) and intermediate routers back to the source (ingress
interface), without regard for the external network (M). When such
messages arrive at the ingress interface, they may affect the
properties of that interface (e.g., its reported MTU to network M),
but they should never directly cause new ICMPs in the outer network
M. Again, events at interfaces don’t generate ICMP messages; it would
be the host or router at which that interface is attached that would
generate ICMPs, e.g., upon attempting to use that interface.
3.4. Location of the Ingress and Egress

The ingress and egress interfaces are endpoints of the tunnel. Tunnel interfaces may be physical or virtual. The interface may be implemented inside the node where the tunnel attaches, e.g., inside a host or router. The interface may also be implemented as a "bump in the wire" (BITW), somewhere along a link between the two nodes the link interconnects. IP in IP tunnels are often implemented as interfaces on nodes, whereas IPsec tunnels are sometimes implemented as BITW. These implementation variations determine only whether information available at the link endpoints (ingress/egress interfaces) can be easily shared with the connected network nodes.

An ingress or egress can be implemented as an integrated component, appearing equivalent to any other network interface, or can be more complex. In the simple variant, each is tightly coupled to another network interface, e.g., where the ingress emits encapsulated packets directly into another network interface, or where the egress receives packets to decapsulate directly from another network interface.

The other implementation variant is more modular, but more complex to explain. The ingress acts like a network interface by receiving IP packets to transmit from an upper layer protocol (or relay mechanism of a router), but then acts like an upper layer protocol (or relay mechanism of a router) when it emits encapsulated packets back into the same node. The egress acts like an upper layer interface (or relay mechanism of a router) by receiving packets from a network interface, but then acts like a network interface when it emits decapsulated packets back in to the same node. To the existing network interfaces, the ingress/egress act like upper layer interfaces (i.e., sending or receiving application stacks), while to the interior of the node, the ingress/egress act like network interfaces. This dual nature inside the node reflects the duality of the tunnel as transit link and host-host channel.

3.5. Implications of This Model

This approach highlights a few key features of a tunnel as a network architecture construct:

- To the transit packets, tunnels turn a network (Layer 3) path into a (Layer 2) link
- To nodes the tunnel traverses, the tunnel ingress and egress interfaces act as hosts that source and sink tunnel link packets

The consequences of these features are as follow:
Like a link MTU, a tunnel MTU is defined by the effective MTU of the receiver (i.e., EMTU_R of the egress). The messages inside the tunnel are treated like any other link layer, i.e., the MTU is determined by the largest (transit) payload that traverses the link. The tunnel path MFS is not relevant to the transited traffic. There is no mechanism or protocol by which it can be determined. Because routers, not links, alter hop counts [RFC1812], hopcounts are not decremented solely by the transit of a tunnel. A packet with a hop count of zero should successfully transit a link (and thus a tunnel) that connects two hosts. The addresses of a tunnel ingress and egress interface correspond to link layer addresses to the transit packet. Like links, some tunnels may not have their own addresses. Like network interfaces, ingress and egress interfaces typically require network layer addresses. Like network interfaces, the ingress and egress interfaces are never a direct source of ICMP messages but may provide information to their attached host or router to generate those ICMP messages during the processing of transit packets. Like network interfaces and links, two nodes may be connected by any combination of tunnels and links, including multiple tunnels. As with multiple links, existing network layer forwarding determines which IP traffic uses each link or tunnel. These observations make it much easier to determine what a tunnel must do to transit IP packets, notably it must satisfy all requirements expected of a link [RFC1122][RFC3819]. The remainder of this document explores these implications in greater detail.

3.6. Fragmentation

There are two places where fragmentation can occur in a tunnel, called 'outer fragmentation' and 'inner fragmentation'. This document assumes that only outer fragmentation is viable because it is the only approach that works for both IPv4 datagrams with DF=1 and IPv6.

3.6.1. Outer Fragmentation

Outer fragmentation is shown in Figure 8. The bottom of the figure shows the network topology, where transit packets originate at the
source, enter the tunnel at the ingress interface for encapsulation, exit the tunnel at the egress interface where they are decapsulated, and arrive at the destination. The packet traffic is shown above the topology, where the transit packets are shown at the top. In this diagram, the ingress interface is located on router ‘Ra’ and the egress interface is located on router ‘Rd’.

When the link packet – which is the encapsulated transit packet – would exceed the tunnel MTU, the packet needs to be fragmented. In this case the packet is fragmented at the outer (link) header, with the fragments shown as (b1) and (b2). The outer header indicates fragmentation (as ‘ and ”), the inner (transit) header occurs only in the first fragment, and the inner (transit) data is broken across the two packets. These fragments are reassembled at the egress interface during decapsulation in step (c), where the resulting link packet is reassembled and decapsulated so that the transit packet can continue on its way to the destination.

Transit packet

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</table>

Figure 8 Fragmentation of the (outer) link packet

Outer fragmentation isolates the tunnel encapsulation duties to the ingress and egress interfaces. This can be considered a benefit in clean, layered network design, but also may require complex egress
interface decapsulation, especially where tunnels aggregate large amounts of traffic, such as may result in IP ID overload (see Sec. 4.1.4). Outer fragmentation is valid for any tunnel link protocol that supports fragmentation (e.g., IPv4 or IPv6), in which the tunnel endpoints act as the host endpoints of that protocol.

Along the tunnel, the inner (transit) header is contained only in the first fragment, which can interfere with mechanisms that 'peek' into lower layer headers, e.g., as for relayed ICMP (see Sec. 4.3).

3.6.2. Inner Fragmentation

Inner fragmentation distributes the impact of tunnel fragmentation across both egress interface decapsulation and transit packet destination, as shown in Figure 9; this can be especially important when the tunnel would otherwise need to source (outer) fragment large amounts of traffic. However, this mechanism is valid only when the transit packets can be fragmented on-path, e.g., as when the transit packets are IPv4 datagrams with DF=0.

Again, the network topology is shown at the bottom of the figure, and the original packets show at the top. Packets arrive at the ingress node (router Ra) and are fragmented there based into transit packet fragments #1 (a1) and #2 (a2). These fragments are encapsulated at the ingress interface in steps (b1) and (b2) and each resulting link packet traverses the tunnel. When these link packets arrive at the egress interface they are decapsulated in steps (c1) and (c2) and the egress node (router) forwards the transit packet fragments to their destination. This destination is then responsible for reassembling the transit packet fragments into the original transit packet (d).

Along the tunnel, the inner headers are copied into each fragment, and so can be 'peeked at’ inside the tunnel (see Sec. 4.3).

Fragmentation shifts from the ingress interface to the ingress router and reassembly shifts from the egress interface to the destination.
3.6.3. The Necessity of Outer Fragmentation

Fragmentation is critical for tunnels that support transit packets for protocols with minimum MTU requirements, while operating over tunnel paths using protocols that have their own MTU requirements. Depending on the amount of space used by encapsulation, these two minimums will ultimately interfere (especially when a protocol transits itself either directly, as with IP-in-IP, or indirectly, as in IP-in-GRE-in-IP), and the transit packet will need to be fragmented to both support a tunnel MTU while traversing tunnels with their own tunnel path MTUs.

Outer fragmentation is the only solution that supports all IPv4 and IPv6 traffic, because inner fragmentation is allowed only for IPv4 datagrams with DF=0.
4. IP Tunnel Requirements

The requirements of an IP tunnel are defined by the requirements of an IP link because both transit IP packets. A tunnel thus must transit the IP minimum MTU, i.e., 68 bytes for IPv4 [RFC793] and 1280 bytes for IPv6 [RFC8200] and a tunnel must support address resolution when there is more than one egress interface for that tunnel.

The requirements of the tunnel ingress and egress interfaces are defined by the network over which they exchange messages (link packets). For IP-over-IP, this means that the ingress interface MUST NOT exceed the IP fragment identification field uniqueness requirements [RFC6864]. Uniqueness is more difficult to maintain at high packet rates for IPv4, whose fragment ID field is only 16 bits.

These requirements remain even though tunnels have some unique issues, including the need for additional space for encapsulation headers and the potential for tunnel MTU variation.

4.1. Encapsulation Header Issues

Tunnel encapsulation uses a non-link protocol as a link layer. The encapsulation layer thus has the same requirements and expectations as any other IP link layer when used to transit IP packets. These relationships are addressed in the following subsections.

4.1.1. General Principles of Header Fields Relationships

Some tunnel specifications attempt to relate the header fields of the transit packet and tunnel link packet. In some cases, this relationship is warranted, whereas in other cases the two protocol layers need to be isolated from each other. For example, the tunnel link header source and destination addresses are network endpoints in the tunnel network N, but have no meaning in the outer network M. The two sets of addresses are effectively independent, just as are other network and link addresses.

Because the tunneled packet uses source and destination addresses with a separate meaning, it is inappropriate to copy or reuse the IPv4 Identification (ID) or IPv6 Fragment ID fields of the tunnel transit packet (see Section 4.1.4). Similarly, the DF field of the transit packet is not related to that field in the tunnel link packet header (presuming both are IPv4) (see Section 4.2). Most other fields are similarly independent between the transit packet and tunnel link packet. When a field value is generated in the encapsulation header, its meaning should be derived from what is desired in the context of the tunnel as a link. When feedback is received from these fields,
they should be presented to the tunnel ingress and egress as if they were network interfaces. The behavior of the node where these interfaces attach should be identical to that of a conventional link.

There are exceptions to this rule that are explicitly intended to relay signals from inside the tunnel to the network outside the tunnel, typically relevant only when the tunnel network N and the outer network M use the same network. These apply only when that coordination is defined, as with explicit congestion notification (ECN) [RFC6040] (see Section 4.3.2), and differentiated services code points (DSCP) [RFC2251]. Equal-cost multipath routing may also affect how some encapsulation fields are set, including IPv6 flow labels [RFC6438] and source ports for transport protocols when used for tunnel encapsulation [RFC8085] (see Section 4.3.4).

4.1.2. Addressing Fields

Tunnel ingresses and egresses have addresses associated with the encapsulation protocol. These addresses are the source and destination (respectively) of the encapsulated packet while traversing the tunnel network.

Tunnels may or may not have addresses in the network whose traffic they transit (e.g., network M in Figure 4). In some cases, the tunnel is an unnumbered interface to a point-to-point virtual link. When the tunnel has multiple egresses, tunnel interfaces require separate addresses in network M.

To see the effect of tunnel interface addresses, consider traffic sourced at router Ra in Figure 4. Even before being encapsulated by the ingress, traffic needs a source IP network address that belongs to the router. One option is to use an address associated with one of the other interfaces of the router [RFC1122]. Another option is to assign a number to the tunnel interface itself. Regardless of which address is used, the resulting IP packet is then encapsulated by the tunnel ingress using the ingress address as a separate operation.

4.1.3. Hop Count Fields

The Internet hop count field is used to detect and avoid forwarding loops that cannot be corrected without a synchronized reboot. The IPv4 Time-to-Live (TTL) and IPv6 Hop Limit field each serve this purpose [RFC791][RFC8200]. The IPv4 TTL field was originally intended to indicate packet expiration time, measured in seconds. A router is required to decrement the TTL by at least one or the number of seconds the packet is delayed, whichever is larger [RFC1812]. Packets are rarely held that long, and so the field has come to represent the
count of the number of routers traversed. IPv6 makes this meaning more explicit.

These hop count fields represent the number of network forwarding elements (routers) traversed by an IP datagram. An IP datagram with a hop count of zero can traverse a link between two hosts because it never visits a router (where it would need to be decremented and would have been dropped).

An IP datagram traversing a tunnel thus need not have its hop count modified, i.e., the tunnel transit header need not be affected. A zero hop count datagram should be able to traverse a tunnel as easily as it traverses a link. A router MAY be configured to decrement packets traversing a particular link (and thus a tunnel), which may be useful in emulating a tunnel path as if it were a network path that traversed one or more routers, but this is strictly optional. The ability of the outer network M and tunnel network N to avoid indefinitely looping packets does not rely on the hop counts of the transit packet and tunnel link packet being related.

The hop count field is also used by several protocols to determine whether endpoints are ‘local’, i.e., connected to the same subnet (link-local discovery and related protocols [RFC4861]). A tunnel is a way to make a remote network address appear directly-connected, so it makes sense that the other ends of the tunnel appear local and that such link-local protocols operate over tunnels unless configured explicitly otherwise. When the interfaces of a tunnel are numbered, these can be interpreted the same way as if they were on the same link subnet.

4.1.4. IP Fragment Identification Fields

Both IPv4 and IPv6 include an IP Identification (ID) field to support IP datagram fragmentation and reassembly [RFC791][RFC1122][RFC8200]. When used, the ID field is intended to be unique for every packet for a given source address, destination address, and protocol, such that it does not repeat within the Maximum Segment Lifetime (MSL).

For IPv4, this field is in the default header and is meaningful only when either source fragmented or DF=0 ("non-atomic packets") [RFC6864]. For IPv6, this field is contained in the optional Fragment Header [RFC8200]. Although IPv6 supports only source fragmentation, the field may occur in atomic fragments [RFC6946].

Although the ID field was originally intended for fragmentation and reassembly, it can also be used to detect and discard duplicate packets, e.g., at congested routers (see Sec. 3.2.1.5 of [RFC1122]).
For this reason, and because IPv4 packets can be fragmented anywhere along a path, all non-atomic IPv4 packets and all IPv6 packets between a source and destination of a given protocol must have unique ID values over the potential fragment reordering period [RFC6864][RFC8200].

The uniqueness of the IP ID is a known problem for high speed nodes, because it limits the speed of a single protocol between two endpoints [RFC4963]. Although this RFC suggests that the uniqueness of the IP ID is moot, tunnels exacerbate this condition. A tunnel often aggregates traffic from a number of different source and destination addresses, of different protocols, and encapsulates them in a header with the same ingress and egress addresses, all using a single encapsulation protocol. If the ingress enforces IP ID uniqueness, this can either severely limit tunnel throughput or can require substantial resources; the alternative is to ignore IP ID uniqueness and risk reassembly errors. Although fragmentation is somewhat rare in the current Internet at large, it can be common along a tunnel. Reassembly errors are not always detected by other protocol layers (see Sec. 4.3.3), and even when detected they can result in excessive overall packet loss and can waste bandwidth between the egress and ultimate packet destination.

The 32-bit IPv6 ID field in the Fragment Header is typically used only during source fragmentation. The size of the ID field is typically sufficient that a single counter can be used at the tunnel ingress, regardless of the endpoint addresses or next-header protocol, allowing efficient support for very high throughput tunnels.

The smaller 16-bit IPv4 ID is more difficult to correctly support. A recent update to IPv4 allows the ID to be repeated for atomic packets [RFC6864]. When either source fragmentation or on-path fragmentation is supported, the tunnel ingress may need to keep independent ID counters for each tunnel source/destination/protocol tuple.

4.1.5. Checksums

IP traffic transiting a tunnel needs to expect a similar level of error detection and correction as it would expect from any other link. In the case of IPv4, there are no such expectations, which is partly why it includes a header checksum [RFC791].

IPv6 omitted the header checksum because it already expects most link errors to be detected and dropped by the link layer and because it also assumes transport protection [RFC8200]. When transiting IPv6 over IPv6, the tunnel fails to provide the expected error detection.
This is why IPv6 is often tunneled over layers that include separate protection, such as GRE [RFC2784].

The fragmentation created by the tunnel ingress can increase the need for stronger error detection and correction, especially at the tunnel egress to avoid reassembly errors. The Internet checksum is known to be susceptible to reassembly errors that could be common [RFC4963], and should not be relied upon for this purpose. This is why some tunnel protocols, e.g., SEAL and AERO [RFC5320][Te18] and GRE [RFC2784] as well as legacy protocols swIPE and the Internet Encapsulation Protocol [RFC1853], include a separate checksum. This requirement can be undermined when using UDP as a tunnel with no UDP checksum (as per [RFC6935][RFC6936]) when fragmentation occurs because the egress has no checksum with which to validate reassembly. For this reason, it is safe to use UDP with a zero checksum for atomic tunnel link packets only; when used on fragments, whether generated at the ingress or en-route inside the tunnel, omission of such a checksum can result in reassembly errors that can cause additional work (capacity, forwarding processing, receiver processing) downstream of the egress.

4.2. MTU Issues

Link MTUs, IP datagram limits, and transport protocol segment sizes are already related by several requirements [RFC768][RFC791][RFC1122][RFC1812][RFC8200] and by a variety of protocol mechanisms that attempt to establish relationships between them, including path MTU discovery (PMTUD) [RFC1191][RFC8201], packetization layer path MTU discovery (PLMTUD) [RFC4821], as well as mechanisms inside transport protocols [RFC793][RFC4340][RFC4960]. The following subsections summarize the interactions between tunnels and MTU issues, including minimum tunnel MTUs, tunnel fragmentation and reassembly, and MTU discovery.

4.2.1. Minimum MTU Considerations

There are a variety of values of minimum MTU values to consider, both in a conventional network and in a tunnel as a link in that network. These are indicated in Figure 10, an annotated variant of Figure 4. Note that a (link) MTU (a) corresponds to a tunnel MTU (d) and that a path MTU (b) corresponds to a tunnel path MTU (e). The tunnel MTU is the EMTU_R of the egress interface, because that defines the largest transit packet message that can traverse the tunnel as a link in network M. The ability to traverse the hops of the tunnel — in network N — is not related, and only the ingress need be concerned with that value.
Consider the following example values. For IPv6 transit packets, the minimum (link) MTU (a) is 1280 bytes, which similarly applies to tunnels as the tunnel MTU (b). The path MTU (c) is the minimum of the links (including tunnels as links) along a path, and indicates the smallest IP message (packet or fragment) that can traverse a path between a source and destination without on-path fragmentation (e.g., supported in IPv4 with DF=0). Path MTU discovery, either at the network layer (PMTUD [RFC1191][RFC8201]) or packetization layer (PLPMTUD [RFC4821]) attempts to tune the source IP packets and fragments (i.e., EMTU_S) to fit within this path MTU size to avoid fragmentation and reassembly [Ke95]. The minimum EMTU_R (d) is 1500 bytes, i.e., the minimum MTU for endpoint-to-endpoint communication.

The tunnel is a source-destination communication in network N. Messages between the tunnel source (the ingress interface) and tunnel destination (egress interface) similarly experience a variety of network N MTU values, including a link MTU (e), a path MTU (f), and an EMTU_R (g). The network N message maximum is limited by the path MTU, and the source-destination message maximum (EMTU_S) is limited.

Figure 10 The variety of MTU values
by the path MTU when source fragmentation is disabled and by EMTU_R otherwise, just as it was in for those types of MTUs in network M. For an IPv6 network N, its link and path MTUs must be at least 1280 and its EMTU_R must be at least 1500.

However, viewed from the context of network M, these network N MTUs are link layer properties, i.e., maximum frame sizes (MFS (h)). The network N EMTU_R determines the largest message that can transit between the source (ingress) and destination (egress), but viewed from network M this is a link layer, i.e., EMFS_R (j). The tunnel EMTU_R is EMFS_R minus the link (encapsulation) headers and includes the encapsulation headers of the link layer. Just as the path MTU has no bearing on EMTU_R, the path MFS (i) in network N has no bearing on the MTU of the tunnel.

For IPv6 networks M and N, these relationships are summarized as follows:

- Network M MTU = 1280, the largest transit packet (i.e., payload) over a single IPv6 link in the base network without source fragmentation
- Network M path MTU = 1280, the transit packet (i.e., payload) that can traverse a path of links in the base network without source fragmentation
- Network M EMTU_R = 1500, the largest transit packet (i.e., payload) that can traverse a path in the base network with source fragmentation
- Network N MTU = 1280 (for the same reasons as for network M)
- Network N path MTU = 1280 (for the same reasons as for network M)
- Network N EMTU_R = 1500 (for the same reasons as for network M)
- Tunnel MTU = 1500-encapsulation (typically 1460), the network N EMTU_R payload
- Tunnel MAP (maximum atomic packet) = largest network M message that transits a tunnel as an atomic packet using network N as a link layer: 1280-encapsulation, i.e., the network N path MTU payload (which is itself limited by the tunnel path MFS)

The difference between the network N MTU and its treatment as a link layer in network M is the reason why the tunnel ingress interfaces need to support fragmentation and tunnel egress interfaces need to
support reassembly in the encapsulation layer(s). The high cost of
fragmentation and reassembly is why it is useful for applications to
avoid sending messages too close to the size of the tunnel path MTU
[Ke95], although there is no signaling mechanism that can achieve
this (see Section 4.2.3).

4.2.2. Fragmentation

A tunnel interacts with fragmentation in two different ways. As a
link in network M, transit packets might be fragmented before they
reach the tunnel - i.e., in network M either during source
fragmentation (if generated at the same node as the ingress
interface) or forwarding fragmentation (for IPv4 DF=0 datagrams). In
addition, link packets traversing inside the tunnel may require
fragmentation by the ingress interface - i.e., source fragmentation
by the ingress as a host in network N. These two fragmentation
operations are no more related than are conventional IP fragmentation
and ATM segmentation and reassembly; one occurs at the (transit)
network layer, the other at the (virtual) link layer.

Although many of these issues with tunnel fragmentation and MTU
handling were discussed in [RFC4459], that document described a
variety of alternatives as if they were independent. This document
explains the combined approach that is necessary.

Like any other link, an IPv4 tunnel must transit 68 byte packets
without requiring source fragmentation [RFC791][RFC1122] and an IPv6
tunnel must transit 1280 byte packets without requiring source
fragmentation [RFC8200]. The tunnel MTU interacts with routers or
hosts it connects the same way as would any other link MTU. The
pseudocode examples in this section use the following values:

- **TP**: transit packet
- **TLP**: tunnel link packet
- **TPsize**: size of the transit packet (including its headers)
- **encaps**: ingress encapsulation overhead (tunnel link headers)
- **tunMTU**: tunnel MTU, i.e., network N egress EMTU_R - encaps
- **tunMAP**: tunnel maximum atomic packet as limited by the tunnel path
  MFS
These rules apply at the host/router where the tunnel is attached, i.e., at the network layer of the transit packet (we assume that all tunnels, including multipoint tunnels, have a single, uniform MTU). These are basic source fragmentation rules (or transit refragmentation for IPv4 DF=0 datagrams), and have no relation to the tunnel itself other than to consider the tunnel MTU as the effective link MTU of the next hop.

Inside the source during transit packet generation or a router during transit packet forwarding, the tunnel is treated as if it were any other link (i.e., this is not tunnel processing, but rather typical source or router processing), as indicated in the pseudocode in Figure 11.

```plaintext
if (TPsize > tunMTU) then
  if (TP can be on-path fragmented, e.g., IPv4 DF=0) then
    split TP into TP fragments of tunMTU size
    and send each TP fragment to the tunnel ingress interface
  else
    drop the TP and send ICMP "too big" to the TP source
  endif
else
  send TP to the tunnel ingress (i.e., as an outbound interface)
endif
```

Figure 11 Router / host packet size processing algorithm

The tunnel ingress acts as host on the tunnel path, i.e., as source fragmentation of tunnel link packets (we assume that all tunnels, even multipoint tunnels, have a single, uniform tunnel MTU), using the pseudocode shown in Figure 12. Note that ingress source fragmentation occurs in the encapsulation process, which may involve more than one protocol layer. In those cases, fragmentation can occur at any of the layers of encapsulation in which it is supported, based on the configuration of the ingress.

```plaintext
if (TPsize <= tunMAP) then
  encapsulate the TP and emit
else
  if (tunMAP < TPsize) then
    encapsulate the TP, creating the TLP
    fragment the TLP into tunMAP chunks
    emit the TLP fragments
  endif
endif
```

Figure 12 Ingress processing algorithm
Note that these Figure 11 and Figure 12 indicate that a node might both "fragment then encapsulate" and "encapsulate then fragment", i.e., the effect is "on-path fragment, then encapsulate, then source fragment". The first (on-path) fragmentation occurs only for IPv4 DF=0 packets, based on the tunnel MTU. The second (source) fragmentation occurs for all packets, based on the tunnel maximum atomic packet (MAP) size. The first fragmentation is a convenience for a subset of IPv4 packets; it is the second (source) fragmentation that ensures that messages traverse the tunnel.

Just as a network interface should never receive a message larger than its MTU, a tunnel should never receive a message larger than its tunnel MTU limit (see the host/router processing above). A router attempting to process such a message would already have generated an ICMP "packet too big" and the transit packet would have been dropped before entering into this algorithm. Similarly, a host would have generated an error internally and aborted the attempted transmission.

As an example, consider IPv4 over IPv6 or IPv6 over IPv6 tunneling, where IPv6 encapsulation adds a 40 byte fixed header plus IPv6 options (i.e., IPv6 header extensions) of total size ‘EHsize’. The tunnel MTU will be at least 1500 - (40 + EHsize) bytes. The tunnel path MTU will be at least 1280 - (40 + EHsize) bytes, which then also represents the tunnel maximum atomic packet size (MAP). Transit packets larger than the tunnel MTU will be dropped by a node before ingress processing, and so do not need to be addressed as part of ingress processing. Considering these minimum values, the previous algorithm uses actual values shown in the pseudocode in Figure 13.

```plaintext
if (TPsize <= (1240 - EHsize)) then
    encapsulate TP and emit
else
    if ((1240 - EHsize) < TPsize) then
        encapsulate the TP, creating the TLP
        fragment the TLP into (1240 - EHsize) chunks
        emit the TLP fragments
    endif
endif
```

Figure 13 Ingress processing for an tunnel over IPv6

IPv6 cannot necessarily support all tunnel encapsulations. When the egress EMTU_R is the default of 1500 bytes, an IPv6 tunnel supports IPv6 transit only if EHsize is 180 bytes or less; otherwise the incoming transit packet would have been dropped as being too large by the host/router. Under the same EMTU_R assumption, an IPv6 tunnel supports IPv4 transit only if EHsize is 884 bytes or less. In this
example, transit packets of up to (1240 - Ehsize) can traverse the tunnel without ingress source fragmentation and egress reassembly.

When using IP directly over IP, the minimum transit packet EMTU_R for IPv4 is 576 bytes and for IPv6 is 1500 bytes. This means that tunnels of IPv4-over-IPv4, IPv4-over-IPv6, and IPv6-over-IPv6 are possible without additional requirements, but this may involve ingress fragmentation and egress reassembly. IPv6 cannot be tunneled directly over IPv4 without additional requirements, notably that the egress EMTU_R is at least 1280 bytes.

When ongoing ingress fragmentation and egress reassembly would be prohibitive or costly, larger MTUs can be supported by design and confirmed either out-of-band (by design) or in-band (e.g., using PLPMTUD [RFC4821], as done in SEAL [RFC5320] and AERO [Te18]). In particular, many tunnel specifications are often able to avoid persistent fragmentation because they operationally assume larger EMTU_R and tunnel MAP sizes than are guaranteed for IPv4 [RFC1122] or IPv6 [RFC8200].

4.2.3. Path MTU Discovery

Path MTU discovery (PMTUD) enables a network path to support a larger PMTU than it can assume from the minimum requirements of protocol over which it operates. Note, however, that PMTUD never discovers EMTU_R that is larger than the required minimum; that information is available to some upper layer protocols, such as TCP [RFC1122], but cannot be determined at the IP layer.

There is temptation to optimize tunnel traversal so that packets are not fragmented between ingress and egress, i.e., to attempt tune the network M MTU to the tunnel MAP size rather than to the tunnel MTU, to avoid ingress fragmentation. This is often impossible because the ICMP "packet too big" message (IPv4 fragmentation needed [RFC792] or IPv6 packet too big [RFC4443]) indicates the complete failure of a link to transit a packet, not a preference for a size that matches that internal the mechanism of the link. ICMP messages are intended to indicate whether a tunnel MTU is insufficient; there is no ICMP message that can indicate when a transit packet is "too big for the tunnel path MTU, but not larger than the tunnel MTU". If there were, endpoints might receive that message for IP packets larger than 40 bytes (the payload of a single ATM cell, allowing for the 8-byte AAL5 trailer), but smaller than 9K (the ATM EMTU_R payload).

In addition, attempting to try to tune the network transit size to natively match that of the link internal transit can be hazardous for many reasons:
The tunnel is capable of transiting packets as large as the network N EMTU_R - encapsulation, which is always at least as large as the tunnel MTU and typically is larger.

ICMP has only one type of error message regarding large packets - "too big", i.e., too large to transit. There is no optimization message of "bigger than I’d like, but I can deal with if needed".

IP tunnels often involve some level of recursion, i.e., encapsulation over itself [RFC4459].

Tunnels that use IPv4 as the encapsulation layer SHOULD set DF=0, but this requires generating unique fragmentation ID values, which may limit throughput [RFC6864]. These tunnels might have difficulty assuming ingress EMTU_S values over 64 bytes, so it may not be feasible to assume that larger packets with DF=1 are safe.

Recursive tunneling occurs whenever a protocol ends up encapsulated in itself. This happens directly, as when IPv4 is encapsulated in IPv4, or indirectly, as when IP is encapsulated in UDP which then is a payload inside IP. It can involve many layers of encapsulation because a tunnel provider isn’t always aware of whether the packets it transits are already tunneled.

Recursion is impossible when the tunnel transit packets are limited to that of the native size of the ingress payload. Arriving tunnel transit packets have a minimum supported size (1280 for IPv6) and the tunnel PMFS has the same requirement; there would be no room for the tunnel’s "link layer" headers, i.e., the encapsulation layer. The result would be an IPv6 tunnel that cannot satisfy IPv6 transit requirements.

It is more appropriate to require the tunnel to satisfy IP transit requirements and enforce that requirement at design time or during operation (the latter using PLPMTUD [RFC4821]). Conventional path MTU discovery (PMTUD) relies on existing endpoint ICMP processing of explicit negative feedback from routers along the path via "packet too big" ICMP packets in the reverse direction of the tunnel [RFC1191][RFC8201]. This technique is susceptible to the "black hole" phenomenon, in which the ICMP messages never return to the source due to policy-based filtering [RFC2923]. PLPMTUD requires a separate, direct control channel from the egress to the ingress that provides positive feedback; the direct channel is not blocked by policy filters and the positive feedback ensures fail-safe operation if feedback messages are lost [RFC4821].
PLPMTUD might require that the ingress consider the potential impact of multipath forwarding (see Section 4.3.4). In such cases, probes generated by the ingress might need to track different flows, e.g., that might traverse different tunnel paths. Additionally, encapsulation might need to consider mechanisms to ensure that probes traverse the same path as their corresponding traffic, even when labeled as the same flow (e.g., using the IPv6 flow ID). In such cases, the transit packet and probe may need to be encrypted or encapsulated in an additional flow-based transport header, to avoid differential path traversal based on deep-packet inspection within the tunnel.

4.3. Coordination Issues

IP tunnels interact with link layer signals and capabilities in a variety of ways. The following subsections address some key issues of these interactions. In general, they are again informed by treating a tunnel as any other link layer and considering the interactions between the IP layer and link layers [RFC3819].

4.3.1. Signaling

In the current Internet architecture, signaling goes upstream, either from routers along a path or from the destination, back toward the source. Such signals are typically contained in ICMP messages, but can involve other protocols such as RSVP, transport protocol signals (e.g., TCP RSTs), or multicast control or transport protocols.

A tunnel behaves like a link and acts like a link interface at the nodes where it is attached. As such, it can provide information that enhances IP signaling (e.g., ICMP), but itself does not directly generate ICMP messages.

For tunnels, this means that there are two separate signaling paths. The outer network M nodes can each signal the source of the tunnel transit packets, Hsrc (Figure 14). Inside the tunnel, the inner network N nodes can signal the source of the tunnel link packets, the ingress I (Figure 15).
These two signal paths are inherently distinct except where information is exchanged between the network interface of the tunnel (the ingress) and its attached node (Ra, in both figures).

It is always possible for a network interface to provide hints to its attached node (host or router), which can be used for optimization. In this case, when signals inside the tunnel indicate a change to the tunnel, the ingress (i.e., the tunnel network interface) can provide information to the router (Ra, in both figures), so that Ra can generate the appropriate signal in return to Hsrc. This relaying may be difficult, because signals inside the tunnel may not return enough information to the ingress to support direct relaying to Hsrc.

In all cases, the tunnel ingress needs to determine how to relay the signals from inside the tunnel into signals back to the source. For some protocols this is either simple or impossible (such as for ICMP), for others, it can even be undefined (e.g., multicast). In some cases, the individual signals relayed from inside the tunnel may result in corresponding signals in the outside network, and in other cases they may just change state of the tunnel interface. In the
latter case, the result may cause the router Ra to generate new ICMP errors when later messages arrive from Hsrc or other sources in the outer network.

The meaning of the relayed information must be carefully translated. An ICMP error within a tunnel indicates a failure of the path inside the tunnel to support an egress atomic packet or packet fragment size. It can be very difficult to convert that ICMP error into a corresponding ICMP message from the ingress node back to the transit packet source. The ICMP message may not contain enough of a packet prefix to extract the transit packet header sufficient to generate the appropriate ICMP message. The relationship between the egress EMTU_R and the transit packet may be indirect, e.g., the ingress node may be performing source fragmentation that should be adjusted instead of propagating the ICMP upstream.

Some messages have detailed specifications for relaying between the tunnel link packet and transit packet, including Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN [RFC6040]) and multicast (IGMP, e.g.).

4.3.2. Congestion

Tunnels carrying IP traffic (i.e., the focus of this document) need not react directly to congestion any more than would any other link layer [RFC8085]. IP transit packet traffic is already expected to be congestion controlled.

It is useful to relay network congestion notification between the tunnel link and the tunnel transit packets. Explicit congestion notification requires that ECN bits are copied from the tunnel transit packet to the tunnel link packet on encapsulation, as well as copied back at the egress based on a combination of the bits of the two headers [RFC6040]. This allows congestion notification within the tunnel to be interpreted as if it were on the direct path.

4.3.3. Multipoint Tunnels and Multicast

Multipoint tunnels are tunnels with more than two ingress/egress endpoints [RFC2529][RFC5214][Te18]. Just as tunnels emulate links, multipoint tunnels emulate multipoint links, and can support multicast as a tunnel capability. Multipoint tunnels can be useful on their own, or may be used as part of more complex systems, e.g., LISP and TRILL configurations [RFC6830][RFC6325].

Multipoint tunnels require a support for egress determination, just as multipoint links do. This function is typically supported by ARP [RFC826] or ARP emulation (e.g., LAN Emulation, known as LANE
for multipoint links. For multipoint tunnels, a similar mechanism is required for the same purpose - to determine the egress address for proper ingress encapsulation (e.g., LISP Map-Service [RFC6833]).

All multipoint systems - tunnels and links - might support different MTUs between each ingress/egress (or link entrance/exit) pair. In most cases, it is simpler to assume a uniform MTU throughout the multipoint system, e.g., the minimum MTU supported across all ingress/egress pairs. This applies to both the ingress EMTU_S and egress EMTU_R (the latter determining the tunnel MTU). Values valid across all receivers need to be confirmed in advance (e.g., via IPv6 ND announcements or out-of-band configuration information) before a multipoint tunnel or link can use values other than the default, otherwise packets may reach some receivers but be "black-holed" to others (e.g., if PMTUD fails [RFC2923]).

A multipoint tunnel MUST have support for broadcast and multicast (or their equivalent), in exactly the same way as this is already required for multipoint links [RFC3819]. Both modes can be supported either by a native mechanism inside the tunnel or by emulation using serial replication at the tunnel ingress (e.g., AMT [RFC7450]), in the same way that links may provide the same support either natively (e.g., via promiscuous or automatic replication in the link itself) or network interface emulation (e.g., as for non-broadcast multiaccess networks, i.e., NBMA).

IGMP snooping enables IP multicast to be coupled with native link layer multicast support [RFC4541]. A similar technique may be relevant to couple transit packet multicast to tunnel link packet multicast, but the coupling of the protocols may be more complex because many tunnel link protocols rely on their own network N multicast control protocol, e.g., via PIM-SM [RFC6807][RFC7761].

4.3.4. Load Balancing

Load balancing can impact the way in which a tunnel operates. In particular, multipath routing inside the tunnel can impact some of the tunnel parameters to vary, both over time and for different transit packets. The use of multiple paths can be the result of MPLS link aggregation groups (LAGs), equal-cost multipath routing (ECMP [RFC2991]), or other load balancing mechanisms. In some cases, the tunnel exists as the mechanism to support ECMP, as for GRE in UDP [RFC8086].

A tunnel may have multiple paths between the ingress and egress with different tunnel path MTU or tunnel MAP values, causing the ingress
EMTU_S to vary [RFC7690]. When individual values cannot be correlated to transit traffic, the EMTU_S can be set to the minimum of these different path MTU and MAP values.

In some cases, these values can be correlated to paths, e.g., IPv6 packets include a flow label to enable multipath routing to keep packets of a single flow following the same path, as well as to help differentiate path properties (e.g., for path MTU discovery [RFC4821]). It is important to preserve the semantics of that flow label as an aggregate identifier of the encapsulated link packets of a tunnel. This is achieved by hashing the transit IP addresses and flow label to generate a new flow label for use between the ingress and egress addresses [RFC6438]. It is not appropriate to simply copy the flow label from the transit packet into the link packet because of collisions that might arise if a label is used for flows between different transit packet addresses that traverse the same tunnel.

When the transit packet is visible to forwarding nodes inside the tunnel (e.g., when it is not encrypted), those nodes use deep packet inspection (DPI) context to send a single flow over different paths. This sort of "DPI override" of the IP flow information can interfere with both PMTUD and PLPMTUD mechanisms. The only way to ensure that intermediate nodes do not interfere with PLPMTUD is to encrypt the transit packet when it is encapsulated for tunnel traversal, or to provide some other signals (e.g., an additional layer of encapsulation header including transport ports) that preserves the flow semantics.

4.3.5. Recursive Tunnels

The rules described in this document already support tunnels over tunnels, sometimes known as "recursive" tunnels, in which IP is transited over IP either directly or via intermediate encapsulation (IP-UDP-IP, as in GUE [He19]).

There are known hazards to recursive tunneling, notably that the independence of the tunnel transit header and tunnel link header hop counts can result in a tunneling loop. Such looping can be avoided when using direct encapsulation (IP in IP) by use of a header option to track the encapsulation count and to limit that count [RFC2473]. This looping cannot be avoided when other protocols are used for tunneling, e.g., IP in UDP in IP, because the encapsulation count may not be visible where the recursion occurs.
5. Observations

The following subsections summarize the observations of this document and a summary of issues with existing tunnel protocol specifications. It also includes advice for tunnel protocol designers, implementers, and operators. It also includes

5.1. Summary of Recommendations

- Tunnel endpoints are network interfaces, tunnel are virtual links
  - ICMP messages MUST NOT be generated by the tunnel (as a link)
  - ICMP messages received by the ingress inside link change the link properties (they do not generate transit-layer ICMP messages)
  - Link headers (hop, ID, options) are largely independent of arriving ID (with few exceptions based on translation, not direct copying, e.g., ECN and IPv6 flow IDs)
- MTU values should treat the tunnel as any other link
  - Require source ingress source fragmentation and egress reassembly at the tunnel link packet layer
  - The tunnel MTU is the tunnel egress EMTU_R less headers, and not related at all to the ingress-egress MFS
- Tunnels must obey core IP requirements
  - Obey IPv4 DF=1 on arrival at a node (nodes MUST NOT fragment IPv4 packets where DF=1 and routers MUST NOT clear the DF bit)
  - Shut down an IP tunnel if the tunnel MTU falls below the required minimum

5.2. Impact on Existing Encapsulation Protocols

Many existing and proposed encapsulation protocols are inconsistent with the guidelines of this document. The following list summarizes only those inconsistencies, but omits places where a protocol is inconsistent solely by reference to another protocol.

[should this be inverted as a table of issues and a list of which RFCs have problems?]
  o Sets link DF when transit DF=1 (fails without PLPMTUD)
  o Drops at egress if hopcount = 0 (host-host tunnels fail)
  o Drops based on transit source (same as router IP, matches egress), i.e., performs routing functions it should not
  o Ingress generates ICMP messages (based on relayed context), rather than using inner ICMP messages to set interface properties only
  o Treats tunnel MTU as tunnel path MTU, not tunnel egress MTU

o IPv6 tunnels [RFC2473] – IPv6 or IPv4 in IPv6
  o Treats tunnel MTU as tunnel path MTU, not tunnel egress MTU
  o Decrements transiting packet hopcount (by 1)
  o Copies traffic class from tunnel link to tunnel transit header
  o Ignores IPv4 DF=0 and fragments at that layer upon arrival
  o Fails to retain soft ingress state based on inner ICMP messages affecting tunnel MTU
  o Tunnel ingress issues ICMPs
  o Fragments IPv4 over IPv6 fragments only if IPv4 DF=0 (misinterpreting the "can fragment the IPv4 packet" as permission to fragment at the IPv6 link header)

o IPsec tunnel mode (IP in IPsec in IP) [RFC4301] – IP in IPsec
  o Uses security policy to set, clear, or copy DF (rather than generating it independently, which would also be more secure)
  o Intertwines tunnel selection with security selection, rather than presenting tunnel as an interface and using existing forwarding (as with transport mode over IP-in-IP [RFC3884])

o GRE (IP in GRE in IP or IP in GRE in UDP in IP) [RFC2784][RFC7588][RFC7676][RFC8086]
  o Treats tunnel MTU as tunnel path MTU, not tunnel egress MTU
- Requires ingress to generate ICMP errors
- Copies IPv4 DF to outer IPv4 DF
- Violates IPv6 MTU requirements when using IPv6 encapsulation
- LISP [RFC6830]
  - Treats tunnel MTU as tunnel path MTU, not tunnel egress MTU
  - Requires ingress to generate ICMP errors
  - Copies inner hop limit to outer
- L2TP [RFC3931]
  - Treats tunnel MTU as tunnel path MTU, not tunnel egress MTU
  - Requires ingress to generate ICMP errors
- PWE [RFC3985]
  - Treats tunnel MTU as tunnel path MTU, not tunnel egress MTU
  - Requires ingress to generate ICMP errors
- GUE (Generic UDP encapsulation) [He19] - IP (et. al) in UDP in IP
  - Allows inner encapsulation fragmentation
- Geneve [RFC7364][Gr19] - IP (et al.) in Geneve in UDP in IP
  - Treats tunnel MTU as tunnel path MTU, not tunnel egress MTU
- SEAL/AERO [RFC5320][Te18] - IP in SEAL/AERO in IP
  - Some issues with SEAL (MTU, ICMP), corrected in AERO
- RTG DT encapsulations [No16]
  - Assumes fragmentation can be avoided completely
  - Allows encapsulation protocols that lack fragmentation
  - Relies on ICMP PTB to correct for tunnel path MTU
- No known issues
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o L2VPN (framework for L2 virtualization) [RFC4664]
o L3VPN (framework for L3 virtualization) [RFC4176]
o MPLS (IP in MPLS) [RFC3031]
o TRILL (Ethernet in Ethernet) [RFC5556][RFC6325]

5.3. Tunnel Protocol Designers

[To be completed]

Recursive tunneling + minimum MTU = frag/reassembly is inevitable, at least to be able to split/join two fragments

Account for egress MTU/path MTU differences.

Include a stronger checksum.

Ensure the egress MTU is always larger than the path MTU.

Ensure that the egress reassembly can keep up with line rate OR design PLPMTUD into the tunneling protocol.

5.3.1. For Future Standards

[To be completed]

Larger IPv4 MTU (2K? or just 2x path MTU?) for reassembly

Always include frag support for at least two frags; do NOT try to deprecate fragmentation.

Limit encapsulation option use/space.

Augment ICMP to have two separate messages: PTB vs P-bigger-than-optimal

Include MTU as part of BGP as a hint - SB

Hazards of multi-MTU draft-van-beijnum-multi-mtu-04

5.3.2. Diagnostics

[To be completed]

Touch, Townsley         Expires March 12, 2020                [Page 40]
Some current implementations include diagnostics to support monitoring the impact of tunneling, especially the impact on fragmentation and reassembly resources, the status of path MTU discovery, etc.

>> Because a tunnel ingress/egress is a network interface, it SHOULD have similar resources as any other network interface. This includes resources for packet processing as well as monitoring.

5.4. Tunnel Implementers

[To be completed]

Detect when the egress MTU is exceeded.

Detect when the egress MTU drops below the required minimum and shut down the tunnel if that happens - configuring the tunnel down and issuing a hard error may be the only way to detect this anomaly, and it’s sufficiently important that the tunnel SHOULD be disabled. This is always better than blindly assuming the tunnel has been deployed correctly, i.e., that the solution has been engineered.

Do NOT decrement the TTL as part of being a tunnel. It’s always already OK for a router to decrement the TTL based on different next-hop routers, but TTL is a property of a router not a link.

5.5. Tunnel Operators

[To be completed]

Keep the difference between "enforced by operators" vs. "enforced by active protocol mechanism" in mind. It’s fine to assume something the tunnel cannot or does not test, as long as you KNOW you can assume it. When the assumption is wrong, it will NOT be signaled by the tunnel. Do NOT decrement the TTL as part of being a tunnel. It’s always already OK for a router to decrement the TTL based on different next-hop routers, but TTL is a property of a router not a link.

Consider the circuit breakers doc to provide diagnostics and last-resort control to avoid overload for non-reactive traffic (see Gorry’s RFC-to-be)

Do NOT decrement the TTL as part of being a tunnel. It’s always already OK for a router to decrement the TTL based on different next-hop routers, but TTL is a property of a router not a link.
PLPMTUD can give multiple conflicting PMTU values during ECMP or LAG if PMTU is cached per endpoint pair rather than per flow -- but so can PMTUD! This is another reason why ICMP should never drive up the effective MTU (if aggregate, treat as the minimum of received messages over an interval).

6. Security Considerations

Tunnels may introduce vulnerabilities or add to the potential for receiver overload and thus DOS attacks. These issues are primarily related to the fact that a tunnel is a link that traverses a network path and to fragmentation and reassembly. ICMP signal translation introduces a new security issue and must be done with care. ICMP generation at the router or host attached to a tunnel is already covered by existing requirements (e.g., should be throttled).

Tunnels traverse multiple hops of a network path from ingress to egress. Traffic along such tunnels may be susceptible to on-path and off-path attacks, including fragment injection, reassembly buffer overload, and ICMP attacks. Some of these attacks may not be as visible to the endpoints of the architecture into which tunnels are deployed and these attacks may thus be more difficult to detect.

Fragmentation at routers or hosts attached to tunnels may place an undue burden on receivers where traffic is not sufficiently diffuse, because tunnels may induce source fragmentation at hosts and path fragmentation (for IPv4 DF=0) more for tunnels than for other links. Care should be taken to avoid this situation, notably by ensuring that tunnel MTUs are not significantly different from other link MTUs.

Tunnel ingresses emitting IP datagrams MUST obey all existing IP requirements, such as the uniqueness of the IP ID field. Failure to either limit encapsulation traffic, or use additional ingress/egress IP addresses, can result in high speed traffic fragments being incorrectly reassembled.

Tunnels are susceptible to attacks at both the inner and outer network layers. The tunnel ingress/egress endpoints appear as network interfaces in the outer network, and are as susceptible as any other network interface. This includes vulnerability to fragmentation reassembly overload, traffic overload, and spoofed ICMP messages that misreport the state of those interfaces. Similarly, the ingress/egress appear as hosts to the path traversed by the tunnel, and thus are as susceptible as any other host to attacks as well.
describe relationship to [RFC6169] - JT (as per INTAREA meeting notes, don’t cover Teredo-specific issues in RFC6169, but include generic issues here)

7. IANA Considerations

This document has no IANA considerations.

The RFC Editor should remove this section prior to publication.

8. References

8.1. Normative References


[are there others? 3819? ECN? Flow label issues?]

8.2. Informative References


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APPENDIX A: Fragmentation efficiency

A.1. Selecting fragment sizes

There are different ways to fragment a packet. Consider a network with a PMTU as shown in Figure 16, where packets are encapsulated over the same network layer as they arrive on (e.g., IP in IP). If a packet as large as the PMTU arrives, it must be fragmented to accommodate the additional header.

Figure 16 Fragmenting via maximum fit

Figure 16 shows this process using “maximum fit”, assuming outer fragmentation as an example (the situation is the same for inner fragmentation, but the headers that are affected differ). In maximum fit, the arriving packet is split into (a) and (b), where (a) is the size of the first tunnel, i.e., the tunnel 1 MTU (the maximum that fits over the first tunnel). However, this tunnel then traverses over another tunnel (number 2), whose impact the first tunnel ingress has not accommodated. The packet (a) arrives at the second tunnel.
ingress, and needs to be encapsulated again, but it needs to be fragmented as well to fit into the tunnel 2 MTU, into (a1) and (a2).
In this case, packet (b) arrives at the second tunnel ingress and is encapsulated into (b1) without fragmentation, because it is already below the tunnel 2 MTU size.

In Figure 17, the fragmentation is done using "even split", i.e., by splitting the original packet into two roughly equal-sized components, (c) and (d). Note that (d) contains more packet data, because (c) includes the original packet header because this is an example of outer fragmentation. The packets (c) and (d) arrive at the second tunnel encapsulator, and are encapsulated again; this time, neither packet exceeds the tunnel 2 MTU, and neither requires further fragmentation.

A.2. Packing

Encapsulating individual packets to traverse a tunnel can be inefficient, especially where headers are large relative to the packets being carried. In that case, it can be more efficient to encapsulate many small packets in a single, larger tunnel payload.

Figure 17 Fragmenting via "even split"
This technique, similar to the effect of packet bursting in Gigabit Ethernet (regardless of whether they’re encoded using L2 symbols as delineators), reduces the overhead of the encapsulation headers (Figure 18). It reduces the work of header addition and removal at the tunnel endpoints, but increases other work involving the packing and unpacking of the component packets carried.

![Figure 18 Packing packets into a tunnel](image-url)
Abstract

This document presents a high-level overview architecture for building data center network virtualization overlay (NVO3) networks. The architecture is given at a high-level, showing the major components of an overall system. An important goal is to divide the space into individual smaller components that can be implemented independently with clear inter-component interfaces and interactions. It should be possible to build and implement individual components in isolation and have them interoperate with other independently implemented components. That way, implementers have flexibility in implementing individual components and can optimize and innovate within their respective components without requiring changes to other components.

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1. Introduction

This document presents a high-level architecture for building data center network virtualization overlay (NVO3) networks. The architecture is given at a high-level, showing the major components of an overall system. An important goal is to divide the space into smaller individual components that can be implemented independently with clear inter-component interfaces and interactions. It should be possible to build and implement individual components in isolation and have them interoperate with other independently implemented components. That way, implementers have flexibility in implementing individual components and can optimize and innovate within their respective components without requiring changes to other components.

The motivation for overlay networks is given in "Problem Statement: Overlays for Network Virtualization" [RFC7364]. "Framework for DC Network Virtualization" [RFC7365] provides a framework for discussing overlay networks generally and the various components that must work together in building such systems. This document differs from the framework document in that it doesn’t attempt to cover all possible approaches within the general design space. Rather, it describes one particular approach that the NVO3 WG has focused on.

2. Terminology

This document uses the same terminology as [RFC7365]. In addition, the following terms are used:

**NV Domain** A Network Virtualization Domain is an administrative construct that defines a Network Virtualization Authority (NVA), the set of Network Virtualization Edges (NVEs) associated with that NVA, and the set of virtual networks the NVA manages and supports. NVEs are associated with a (logically centralized) NVA,
and an NVE supports communication for any of the virtual networks in the domain.

NV Region A region over which information about a set of virtual networks is shared. The degenerate case of a single NV Domain corresponds to an NV region corresponding to that domain. The more interesting case occurs when two or more NV Domains share information about part or all of a set of virtual networks that they manage. Two NVAs share information about particular virtual networks for the purpose of supporting connectivity between tenants located in different NV Domains. NVAs can share information about an entire NV domain, or just individual virtual networks.

Tenant System Interface (TSI) Interface to a Virtual Network as presented to a Tenant System (TS, see [RFC7365]). The TSI logically connects to the NVE via a Virtual Access Point (VAP). To the Tenant System, the TSI is like a Network Interface Card (NIC); the TSI presents itself to a Tenant System as a normal network interface.

VLAN Unless stated otherwise, the terms VLAN and VLAN Tag are used in this document to denote a C-VLAN [IEEE-802.1Q] and the terms are used interchangeably to improve readability.

3. Background

Overlay networks are an approach for providing network virtualization services to a set of Tenant Systems (TSs) [RFC7365]. With overlays, data traffic between tenants is tunneled across the underlying data center's IP network. The use of tunnels provides a number of benefits by decoupling the network as viewed by tenants from the underlying physical network across which they communicate. Additional discussion of some NVO3 use cases can be found in [I-D.ietf-nvo3-use-case].

Tenant Systems connect to Virtual Networks (VNs), with each VN having associated attributes defining properties of the network, such as the set of members that connect to it. Tenant Systems connected to a virtual network typically communicate freely with other Tenant Systems on the same VN, but communication between Tenant Systems on one VN and those external to the VN (whether on another VN or connected to the Internet) is carefully controlled and governed by policy. The NVO3 architecture does not impose any restrictions to the application of policy controls even within a VN.

A Network Virtualization Edge (NVE) [RFC7365] is the entity that implements the overlay functionality. An NVE resides at the boundary
between a Tenant System and the overlay network as shown in Figure 1. An NVE creates and maintains local state about each Virtual Network for which it is providing service on behalf of a Tenant System.

Figure 1: NVO3 Generic Reference Model

The following subsections describe key aspects of an overlay system in more detail. Section 3.1 describes the service model (Ethernet vs. IP) provided to Tenant Systems. Section 3.2 describes NVEs in more detail. Section 3.3 introduces the Network Virtualization Authority, from which NVEs obtain information about virtual networks. Section 3.4 provides background on Virtual Machine (VM) orchestration systems and their use of virtual networks.
3.1. VN Service (L2 and L3)

A Virtual Network provides either L2 or L3 service to connected tenants. For L2 service, VNs transport Ethernet frames, and a Tenant System is provided with a service that is analogous to being connected to a specific L2 C-VLAN. L2 broadcast frames are generally delivered to all (and multicast frames delivered to a subset of) the other Tenant Systems on the VN. To a Tenant System, it appears as if they are connected to a regular L2 Ethernet link. Within the NVO3 architecture, tenant frames are tunneled to remote NVEs based on the MAC addresses of the frame headers as originated by the Tenant System. On the underlay, NVO3 packets are forwarded between NVEs based on the outer addresses of tunneled packets.

For L3 service, VNs are routed networks that transport IP datagrams, and a Tenant System is provided with a service that supports only IP traffic. Within the NVO3 architecture, tenant frames are tunneled to remote NVEs based on the IP addresses of the packet originated by the Tenant System; any L2 destination addresses provided by Tenant Systems are effectively ignored by the NVEs and overlay network. For L3 service, the Tenant System will be configured with an IP subnet that is effectively a point-to-point link, i.e., having only the Tenant System and a next-hop router address on it.

L2 service is intended for systems that need native L2 Ethernet service and the ability to run protocols directly over Ethernet (i.e., not based on IP). L3 service is intended for systems in which all the traffic can safely be assumed to be IP. It is important to note that whether an NVO3 network provides L2 or L3 service to a Tenant System, the Tenant System does not generally need to be aware of the distinction. In both cases, the virtual network presents itself to the Tenant System as an L2 Ethernet interface. An Ethernet interface is used in both cases simply as a widely supported interface type that essentially all Tenant Systems already support. Consequently, no special software is needed on Tenant Systems to use an L3 vs. an L2 overlay service.

NVO3 can also provide a combined L2 and L3 service to tenants. A combined service provides L2 service for intra-VN communication, but also provides L3 service for L3 traffic entering or leaving the VN. Architecturally, the handling of a combined L2/L3 service within the NVO3 architecture is intended to match what is commonly done today in non-overlay environments by devices providing a combined bridge/router service. With combined service, the virtual network itself retains the semantics of L2 service and all traffic is processed according to its L2 semantics. In addition, however, traffic requiring IP processing is also processed at the IP level.
The IP processing for a combined service can be implemented on a standalone device attached to the virtual network (e.g., an IP router) or implemented locally on the NVE (see Section 5.4 on Distributed Gateways). For unicast traffic, NVE implementation of a combined service may result in a packet being delivered to another Tenant System attached to the same NVE (on either the same or a different VN) or tunneled to a remote NVE, or even forwarded outside the NV domain. For multicast or broadcast packets, the combination of NVE L2 and L3 processing may result in copies of the packet receiving both L2 and L3 treatments to realize delivery to all of the destinations involved. This distributed NVE implementation of IP routing results in the same network delivery behavior as if the L2 processing of the packet included delivery of the packet to an IP router attached to the L2 VN as a Tenant System, with the router having additional network attachments to other networks, either virtual or not.

3.1.1. VLAN Tags in L2 Service

An NVO3 L2 virtual network service may include encapsulated L2 VLAN tags provided by a Tenant System, but does not use encapsulated tags in deciding where and how to forward traffic. Such VLAN tags can be passed through, so that Tenant Systems that send or expect to receive them can be supported as appropriate.

The processing of VLAN tags that an NVE receives from a TS is controlled by settings associated with the VAP. Just as in the case with ports on Ethernet switches, a number of settings are possible. For example, C-TAGs can be passed through transparently, they could always be stripped upon receipt from a Tenant System, they could be compared against a list of explicitly configured tags, etc.

Note that that there are additional considerations when VLAN tags are used to identify both the VN and a Tenant System VLAN within that VN, as described in Section 4.2.1 below.

3.1.2. Packet Lifetime Considerations

For L3 service, Tenant Systems should expect the IPv4 TTL (Time to Live) or IPv6 Hop Limit in the packets they send to be decremented by at least 1. For L2 service, neither the TTL nor the Hop Limit (when the packet is IP) are modified. The underlay network manages TTLs and Hop Limits in the outer IP encapsulation - the values in these fields could be independent from or related to the values in the same fields of tenant IP packets.
3.2. Network Virtualization Edge (NVE)

Tenant Systems connect to NVEs via a Tenant System Interface (TSI). The TSI logically connects to the NVE via a Virtual Access Point (VAP) and each VAP is associated with one Virtual Network as shown in Figure 2. To the Tenant System, the TSI is like a NIC; the TSI presents itself to a Tenant System as a normal network interface. On the NVE side, a VAP is a logical network port (virtual or physical) into a specific virtual network. Note that two different Tenant Systems (and TSIs) attached to a common NVE can share a VAP (e.g., TS1 and TS2 in Figure 2) so long as they connect to the same Virtual Network.

The Overlay Module performs the actual encapsulation and decapsulation of tunneled packets. The NVE maintains state about the virtual networks it is a part of so that it can provide the Overlay Module with such information as the destination address of the NVE to tunnel a packet to and the Context ID that should be placed in the

![Figure 2: NVE Reference Model](image_url)
encapsulation header to identify the virtual network that a tunneled packet belongs to.

On the data center network side, the NVE sends and receives native IP traffic. When ingressing traffic from a Tenant System, the NVE identifies the egress NVE to which the packet should be sent, adds an overlay encapsulation header, and sends the packet on the underlay network. When receiving traffic from a remote NVE, an NVE strips off the encapsulation header, and delivers the (original) packet to the appropriate Tenant System. When the source and destination Tenant System are on the same NVE, no encapsulation is needed and the NVE forwards traffic directly.

Conceptually, the NVE is a single entity implementing the NVO3 functionality. In practice, there are a number of different implementation scenarios, as described in detail in Section 4.

3.3. Network Virtualization Authority (NVA)

Address dissemination refers to the process of learning, building and distributing the mapping/forwarding information that NVEs need in order to tunnel traffic to each other on behalf of communicating Tenant Systems. For example, in order to send traffic to a remote Tenant System, the sending NVE must know the destination NVE for that Tenant System.

One way to build and maintain mapping tables is to use learning, as 802.1 bridges do [IEEE-802.1Q]. When forwarding traffic to multicast or unknown unicast destinations, an NVE could simply flood traffic. While flooding works, it can lead to traffic hot spots and can lead to problems in larger networks (e.g., excessive amounts of flooded traffic).

Alternatively, to reduce the scope of where flooding must take place, or to eliminate it all together, NVEs can make use of a Network Virtualization Authority (NVA). An NVA is the entity that provides address mapping and other information to NVEs. NVEs interact with an NVA to obtain any required address mapping information they need in order to properly forward traffic on behalf of tenants. The term NVA refers to the overall system, without regards to its scope or how it is implemented. NVAs provide a service, and NVEs access that service via an NVE-to-NVA protocol as discussed in Section 8.

Even when an NVA is present, Ethernet bridge MAC address learning could be used as a fallback mechanism, should the NVA be unable to provide an answer or for other reasons. This document does not consider flooding approaches in detail, as there are a number of benefits in using an approach that depends on the presence of an NVA.
For the rest of this document, it is assumed that an NVA exists and will be used. NVAs are discussed in more detail in Section 7.

3.4. VM Orchestration Systems

VM orchestration systems manage server virtualization across a set of servers. Although VM management is a separate topic from network virtualization, the two areas are closely related. Managing the creation, placement, and movement of VMs also involves creating, attaching to and detaching from virtual networks. A number of existing VM orchestration systems have incorporated aspects of virtual network management into their systems.

Note also, that although this section uses the term "VM" and "hypervisor" throughout, the same issues apply to other virtualization approaches, including Linux Containers (LXC), BSD Jails, Network Service Appliances as discussed in Section 5.1, etc.

From an NVO3 perspective, it should be assumed that where the document uses the term "VM" and "hypervisor", the intention is that the discussion also applies to other systems, where, e.g., the host operating system plays the role of the hypervisor in supporting virtualization, and a container plays the equivalent role as a VM.

When a new VM image is started, the VM orchestration system determines where the VM should be placed, interacts with the hypervisor on the target server to load and start the VM and controls when a VM should be shutdown or migrated elsewhere. VM orchestration systems also have knowledge about how a VM should connect to a network, possibly including the name of the virtual network to which a VM is to connect. The VM orchestration system can pass such information to the hypervisor when a VM is instantiated. VM orchestration systems have significant (and sometimes global) knowledge over the domain they manage. They typically know on what servers a VM is running, and meta data associated with VM images can be useful from a network virtualization perspective. For example, the meta data may include the addresses (MAC and IP) the VMs will use and the name(s) of the virtual network(s) they connect to.

VM orchestration systems run a protocol with an agent running on the hypervisor of the servers they manage. That protocol can also carry information about what virtual network a VM is associated with. When the orchestrator instantiates a VM on a hypervisor, the hypervisor interacts with the NVE in order to attach the VM to the virtual networks it has access to. In general, the hypervisor will need to communicate significant VM state changes to the NVE. In the reverse direction, the NVE may need to communicate network connectivity information back to the hypervisor. Examples of deployed VM orchestration systems include VMware’s vCenter Server, Microsoft’s
System Center Virtual Machine Manager, and systems based on OpenStack
and its associated plugins (e.g., Nova and Neutron). Each can pass
information about what virtual networks a VM connects to down to the
hypervisor. The protocol used between the VM orchestration system
and hypervisors is generally proprietary.

It should be noted that VM orchestration systems may not have direct
access to all networking related information a VM uses. For example,
a VM may make use of additional IP or MAC addresses that the VM
management system is not aware of.

4. Network Virtualization Edge (NVE)

As introduced in Section 3.2 an NVE is the entity that implements the
overlay functionality. This section describes NVEs in more detail.
An NVE will have two external interfaces:

Tenant System Facing: On the Tenant System facing side, an NVE
interacts with the hypervisor (or equivalent entity) to provide
the NVO3 service. An NVE will need to be notified when a Tenant
System "attaches" to a virtual network (so it can validate the
request and set up any state needed to send and receive traffic on
behalf of the Tenant System on that VN). Likewise, an NVE will
need to be informed when the Tenant System "detaches" from the
virtual network so that it can reclaim state and resources
appropriately.

Data Center Network Facing: On the data center network facing side,
an NVE interfaces with the data center underlay network, sending
and receiving tunneled packets to and from the underlay. The NVE
may also run a control protocol with other entities on the
network, such as the Network Virtualization Authority.

4.1. NVE Co-located With Server Hypervisor

When server virtualization is used, the entire NVE functionality will
typically be implemented as part of the hypervisor and/or virtual
switch on the server. In such cases, the Tenant System interacts
with the hypervisor and the hypervisor interacts with the NVE.
Because the interaction between the hypervisor and NVE is implemented
entirely in software on the server, there is no "on-the-wire"
protocol between Tenant Systems (or the hypervisor) and the NVE that
needs to be standardized. While there may be APIs between the NVE
and hypervisor to support necessary interaction, the details of such
an API are not in-scope for the NVO3 WG at the time of publication of
this memo.
Implementing NVE functionality entirely on a server has the disadvantage that server CPU resources must be spent implementing the NVO3 functionality. Experimentation with overlay approaches and previous experience with TCP and checksum adapter offloads suggests that offloading certain NVE operations (e.g., encapsulation and decapsulation operations) onto the physical network adapter can produce performance advantages. As has been done with checksum and/or TCP server offload and other optimization approaches, there may be benefits to offloading common operations onto adapters where possible. Just as important, the addition of an overlay header can disable existing adapter offload capabilities that are generally not prepared to handle the addition of a new header or other operations associated with an NVE.

While the exact details of how to split the implementation of specific NVE functionality between a server and its network adapters is an implementation matter and outside the scope of IETF standardization, the NVO3 architecture should be cognizant of and support such separation. Ideally, it may even be possible to bypass the hypervisor completely on critical data path operations so that packets between a Tenant System and its VN can be sent and received without having the hypervisor involved in each individual packet operation.

4.2. Split-NVE

Another possible scenario leads to the need for a split NVE implementation. An NVE running on a server (e.g. within a hypervisor) could support NVO3 service towards the tenant, but not perform all NVE functions (e.g., encapsulation) directly on the server; some of the actual NVO3 functionality could be implemented on (i.e., offloaded to) an adjacent switch to which the server is attached. While one could imagine a number of link types between a server and the NVE, one simple deployment scenario would involve a server and NVE separated by a simple L2 Ethernet link. A more complicated scenario would have the server and NVE separated by a bridged access network, such as when the NVE resides on a top of rack (ToR) switch, with an embedded switch residing between servers and the ToR switch.

For the split NVE case, protocols will be needed that allow the hypervisor and NVE to negotiate and setup the necessary state so that traffic sent across the access link between a server and the NVE can be associated with the correct virtual network instance. Specifically, on the access link, traffic belonging to a specific Tenant System would be tagged with a specific VLAN C-TAG that identifies which specific NVO3 virtual network instance it connects to. The hypervisor-NVE protocol would negotiate which VLAN C-TAG to
use for a particular virtual network instance. More details of the protocol requirements for functionality between hypervisors and NVEs can be found in [I-D.ietf-nvo3-nve-nva-cp-req].

### 4.2.1. Tenant VLAN handling in Split-NVE Case

Preserving tenant VLAN tags across an NVO3 VN as described in Section 3.1.1 poses additional complications in the split-NVE case. The portion of the NVE that performs the encapsulation function needs access to the specific VLAN tags that the Tenant System is using in order to include them in the encapsulated packet. When an NVE is implemented entirely within the hypervisor, the NVE has access to the complete original packet (including any VLAN tags) sent by the tenant. In the split-NVE case, however, the VLAN tag used between the hypervisor and offloaded portions of the NVE normally only identifies the specific VN that traffic belongs to. In order to allow a tenant to preserve VLAN information from end to end between Tenant Systems in the split-NVE case, additional mechanisms would be needed (e.g., carry an additional VLAN tag by carrying both a C-Tag and an S-Tag as specified in [IEEE-802.1Q] where the C-Tag identifies the tenant VLAN end-to-end and the S-Tag identifies the VN locally between each Tenant System and the corresponding NVE).

### 4.3. NVE State

NVEs maintain internal data structures and state to support the sending and receiving of tenant traffic. An NVE may need some or all of the following information:

1. An NVE keeps track of which attached Tenant Systems are connected to which virtual networks. When a Tenant System attaches to a virtual network, the NVE will need to create or update local state for that virtual network. When the last Tenant System detaches from a given VN, the NVE can reclaim state associated with that VN.

2. For tenant unicast traffic, an NVE maintains a per-VN table of mappings from Tenant System (inner) addresses to remote NVE (outer) addresses.

3. For tenant multicast (or broadcast) traffic, an NVE maintains a per-VN table of mappings and other information on how to deliver tenant multicast (or broadcast) traffic. If the underlying network supports IP multicast, the NVE could use IP multicast to deliver tenant traffic. In such a case, the NVE would need to know what IP underlay multicast address to use for a given VN. Alternatively, if the underlying network does not support multicast, a source NVE could use unicast replication to deliver...
traffic. In such a case, an NVE would need to know which remote
NVEs are participating in the VN. An NVE could use both
approaches, switching from one mode to the other depending on
such factors as bandwidth efficiency and group membership
sparseness. [I-D.ietf-nvo3-mcast-framework] discusses the
subject of multicast handling in NVO3 in further detail.

4. An NVE maintains necessary information to encapsulate outgoing
traffic, including what type of encapsulation and what value to
use for a Context ID to identify the VN within the encapsulation
header.

5. In order to deliver incoming encapsulated packets to the correct
Tenant Systems, an NVE maintains the necessary information to map
incoming traffic to the appropriate VAP (i.e., Tenant System
Interface).

6. An NVE may find it convenient to maintain additional per-VN
information such as QoS settings, Path MTU information, ACLs,
etc.

4.4. Multi-Homing of NVEs

NVEs may be multi-homed. That is, an NVE may have more than one IP
address associated with it on the underlay network. Multihoming
happens in two different scenarios. First, an NVE may have multiple
interfaces connecting it to the underlay. Each of those interfaces
will typically have a different IP address, resulting in a specific
Tenant Address (on a specific VN) being reachable through the same
NVE but through more than one underlay IP address. Second, a
specific tenant system may be reachable through more than one NVE,
each having one or more underlay addresses. In both cases, NVE
address mapping functionality needs to support one-to-many mappings
and enable a sending NVE to (at a minimum) be able to fail over from
one IP address to another, e.g., should a specific NVE underlay
address become unreachable.

Finally, multi-homed NVEs introduce complexities when source unicast
replication is used to implement tenant multicast as described in
Section 4.3. Specifically, an NVE should only receive one copy of a
replicated packet.

Multi-homing is needed to support important use cases. First, a bare
metal server may have multiple uplink connections to either the same
or different NVEs. Having only a single physical path to an upstream
NVE, or indeed, having all traffic flow through a single NVE would be
considered unacceptable in highly-resilient deployment scenarios that
seek to avoid single points of failure. Moreover, in today’s
networks, the availability of multiple paths would require that they be usable in an active-active fashion (e.g., for load balancing).

4.5. Virtual Access Point (VAP)

The VAP is the NVE-side of the interface between the NVE and the TS. Traffic to and from the tenant flows through the VAP. If an NVE runs into difficulties sending traffic received on the VAP, it may need to signal such errors back to the VAP. Because the VAP is an emulation of a physical port, its ability to signal NVE errors is limited and lacks sufficient granularity to reflect all possible errors an NVE may encounter (e.g., inability reach a particular destination). Some errors, such as an NVE losing all of its connections to the underlay, could be reflected back to the VAP by effectively disabling it. This state change would reflect itself on the TS as an interface going down, allowing the TS to implement interface error handling, e.g., failover, in the same manner as when a physical interfaces becomes disabled.

5. Tenant System Types

This section describes a number of special Tenant System types and how they fit into an NVO3 system.

5.1. Overlay-Aware Network Service Appliances

Some Network Service Appliances [I-D.ietf-nvo3-nve-nva-cp-req] (virtual or physical) provide tenant-aware services. That is, the specific service they provide depends on the identity of the tenant making use of the service. For example, firewalls are now becoming available that support multi-tenancy where a single firewall provides virtual firewall service on a per-tenant basis, using per-tenant configuration rules and maintaining per-tenant state. Such appliances will be aware of the VN an activity corresponds to while processing requests. Unlike server virtualization, which shields VMs from needing to know about multi-tenancy, a Network Service Appliance may explicitly support multi-tenancy. In such cases, the Network Service Appliance itself will be aware of network virtualization and either embed an NVE directly, or implement a split NVE as described in Section 4.2. Unlike server virtualization, however, the Network Service Appliance may not be running a hypervisor and the VM orchestration system may not interact with the Network Service Appliance. The NVE on such appliances will need to support a control plane to obtain the necessary information needed to fully participate in an NV Domain.
5.2. Bare Metal Servers

Many data centers will continue to have at least some servers operating as non-virtualized (or "bare metal") machines running a traditional operating system and workload. In such systems, there will be no NVE functionality on the server, and the server will have no knowledge of NVO3 (including whether overlays are even in use). In such environments, the NVE functionality can reside on the first-hop physical switch. In such a case, the network administrator would (manually) configure the switch to enable the appropriate NVO3 functionality on the switch port connecting the server and associate that port with a specific virtual network. Such configuration would typically be static, since the server is not virtualized, and once configured, is unlikely to change frequently. Consequently, this scenario does not require any protocol or standards work.

5.3. Gateways

Gateways on VNs relay traffic onto and off of a virtual network. Tenant Systems use gateways to reach destinations outside of the local VN. Gateways receive encapsulated traffic from one VN, remove the encapsulation header, and send the native packet out onto the data center network for delivery. Outside traffic enters a VN in a reverse manner.

Gateways can be either virtual (i.e., implemented as a VM) or physical (i.e., as a standalone physical device). For performance reasons, standalone hardware gateways may be desirable in some cases. Such gateways could consist of a simple switch forwarding traffic from a VN onto the local data center network, or could embed router functionality. On such gateways, network interfaces connecting to virtual networks will (at least conceptually) embed NVE (or split-NVE) functionality within them. As in the case with Network Service Appliances, gateways may not support a hypervisor and will need an appropriate control plane protocol to obtain the information needed to provide NVO3 service.

Gateways handle several different use cases. For example, one use case consists of systems supporting overlays together with systems that do not (e.g., bare metal servers). Gateways could be used to connect legacy systems supporting, e.g., L2 VLANs, to specific virtual networks, effectively making them part of the same virtual network. Gateways could also forward traffic between a virtual network and other hosts on the data center network or relay traffic between different VNs. Finally, gateways can provide external connectivity such as Internet or VPN access.
5.3.1. Gateway Taxonomy

As can be seen from the discussion above, there are several types of gateways that can exist in an NVO3 environment. This section breaks them down into the various types that could be supported. Note that each of the types below could be implemented in either a centralized manner or distributed to co-exist with the NVEs.

5.3.1.1. L2 Gateways (Bridging)

L2 Gateways act as layer 2 bridges to forward Ethernet frames based on the MAC addresses present in them.

L2 VN to Legacy L2: This type of gateway bridges traffic between L2 VNs and other legacy L2 networks such as VLANs or L2 VPNs.

L2 VN to L2 VN: The main motivation for this type of gateway to create separate groups of Tenant Systems using L2 VNs such that the gateway can enforce network policies between each L2 VN.

5.3.1.2. L3 Gateways (Only IP Packets)

L3 Gateways forward IP packets based on the IP addresses present in the packets.

L3 VN to Legacy L2: This type of gateway forwards packets between L3 VNs and legacy L2 networks such as VLANs or L2 VPNs. The original sender’s destination MAC address in any frames that the gateway forwards from a legacy L2 network would be the MAC address of the gateway.

L3 VN to Legacy L3: The type of gateway forwards packets between L3 VNs and legacy L3 networks. These legacy L3 networks could be local the data center, in the WAN, or an L3 VPN.

L3 VN to L2 VN: This type of gateway forwards packets on between L3 VNs and L2 VNs. The original sender’s destination MAC address in any frames that the gateway forwards from a L2 VN would be the MAC address of the gateway.

L2 VN to L2 VN: This type of gateway acts similar to a traditional router that forwards between L2 interfaces. The original sender’s destination MAC address in any frames that the gateway forwards from any of the L2 VNs would be the MAC address of the gateway.
L3 VN to L3 VN: The main motivation for this type of gateway to create separate groups of Tenant Systems using L3 VNs such that the gateway can enforce network policies between each L3 VN.

5.4. Distributed Inter-VN Gateways

The relaying of traffic from one VN to another deserves special consideration. Whether traffic is permitted to flow from one VN to another is a matter of policy, and would not (by default) be allowed unless explicitly enabled. In addition, NVAs are the logical place to maintain policy information about allowed inter-VN communication. Policy enforcement for inter-VN communication can be handled in (at least) two different ways. Explicit gateways could be the central point for such enforcement, with all inter-VN traffic forwarded to such gateways for processing. Alternatively, the NVA can provide such information directly to NVEs, by either providing a mapping for a target Tenant System (TS) on another VN, or indicating that such communication is disallowed by policy.

When inter-VN gateways are centralized, traffic between TSs on different VNs can take suboptimal paths, i.e., triangular routing results in paths that always traverse the gateway. In the worst case, traffic between two TSs connected to the same NVE can be hairpinned through an external gateway. As an optimization, individual NVEs can be part of a distributed gateway that performs such relaying, reducing or completely eliminating triangular routing. In a distributed gateway, each ingress NVE can perform such relaying activity directly, so long as it has access to the policy information needed to determine whether cross-VN communication is allowed. Having individual NVEs be part of a distributed gateway allows them to tunnel traffic directly to the destination NVE without the need to take suboptimal paths.

The NVO3 architecture supports distributed gateways for the case of inter-VN communication. Such support requires that NVO3 control protocols include mechanisms for the maintenance and distribution of policy information about what type of cross-VN communication is allowed so that NVEs acting as distributed gateways can tunnel traffic from one VN to another as appropriate.

Distributed gateways could also be used to distribute other traditional router services to individual NVEs. The NVO3 architecture does not preclude such implementations, but does not define or require them as they are outside the scope of the NVO3 architecture.
5.5. ARP and Neighbor Discovery

For an L2 service, strictly speaking, special processing of Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) [RFC0826] (and IPv6 Neighbor Discovery (ND) [RFC4861]) is not required. ARP requests are broadcast, and an NVO3 can deliver ARP requests to all members of a given L2 virtual network, just as it does for any packet sent to an L2 broadcast address. Similarly, ND requests are sent via IP multicast, which NVO3 can support by delivering via L2 multicast. However, as a performance optimization, an NVE can intercept ARP (or ND) requests from its attached TSs and respond to them directly using information in its mapping tables. Since an NVE will have mechanisms for determining the NVE address associated with a given TS, the NVE can leverage the same mechanisms to suppress sending ARP and ND requests for a given TS to other members of the VN. The NVO3 architecture supports such a capability.

6. NVE-NVE Interaction

Individual NVEs will interact with each other for the purposes of tunneling and delivering traffic to remote TSs. At a minimum, a control protocol may be needed for tunnel setup and maintenance. For example, tunneled traffic may need to be encrypted or integrity protected, in which case it will be necessary to set up appropriate security associations between NVE peers. It may also be desirable to perform tunnel maintenance (e.g., continuity checks) on a tunnel in order to detect when a remote NVE becomes unreachable. Such generic tunnel setup and maintenance functions are not generally NVO3-specific. Hence, the NVO3 architecture expects to leverage existing tunnel maintenance protocols rather than defining new ones.

Some NVE-NVE interactions may be specific to NVO3 (and in particular be related to information kept in mapping tables) and agnostic to the specific tunnel type being used. For example, when tunneling traffic for TS-X to a remote NVE, it is possible that TS-X is not presently associated with the remote NVE. Normally, this should not happen, but there could be race conditions where the information an NVE has learned from the NVA is out-of-date relative to actual conditions. In such cases, the remote NVE could return an error or warning indication, allowing the sending NVE to attempt a recovery or otherwise attempt to mitigate the situation.

The NVE-NVE interaction could signal a range of indications, for example:

- "No such TS here", upon a receipt of a tunneled packet for an unknown TS.
When an NVE receives information from a remote NVE that conflicts with the information it has in its own mapping tables, it should consult with the NVA to resolve those conflicts. In particular, it should confirm that the information it has is up-to-date, and it might indicate the error to the NVA, so as to nudge the NVA into following up (as appropriate). While it might make sense for an NVE to update its mapping table temporarily in response to an error from a remote NVE, any changes must be handled carefully as doing so can raise security considerations if the received information cannot be authenticated. That said, a sending NVE might still take steps to mitigate a problem, such as applying rate limiting to data traffic towards a particular NVE or TS.

7. Network Virtualization Authority

Before sending to and receiving traffic from a virtual network, an NVE must obtain the information needed to build its internal forwarding tables and state as listed in Section 4.3. An NVE can obtain such information from a Network Virtualization Authority.

The Network Virtualization Authority (NVA) is the entity that is expected to provide address mapping and other information to NVEs. NVEs can interact with an NVA to obtain any required information they need in order to properly forward traffic on behalf of tenants. The term NVA refers to the overall system, without regards to its scope or how it is implemented.

7.1. How an NVA Obtains Information

There are two primary ways in which an NVA can obtain the address dissemination information it manages. The NVA can obtain information either from the VM orchestration system, and/or directly from the NVEs themselves.

On virtualized systems, the NVA may be able to obtain the address mapping information associated with VMs from the VM orchestration system itself. If the VM orchestration system contains a master database for all the virtualization information, having the NVA obtain information directly to the orchestration system would be a natural approach. Indeed, the NVA could effectively be co-located with the VM orchestration system itself. In such systems, the VM orchestration system communicates with the NVE indirectly through the hypervisor.
However, as described in Section 4 not all NVEs are associated with hypervisors. In such cases, NVAs cannot leverage VM orchestration protocols to interact with an NVE and will instead need to peer directly with them. By peering directly with an NVE, NVAs can obtain information about the TSs connected to that NVE and can distribute information to the NVE about the VNs those TSs are associated with. For example, whenever a Tenant System attaches to an NVE, that NVE would notify the NVA that the TS is now associated with that NVE. Likewise when a TS detaches from an NVE, that NVE would inform the NVA. By communicating directly with NVEs, both the NVA and the NVE are able to maintain up-to-date information about all active tenants and the NVEs to which they are attached.

7.2. Internal NVA Architecture

For reliability and fault tolerance reasons, an NVA would be implemented in a distributed or replicated manner without single points of failure. How the NVA is implemented, however, is not important to an NVE so long as the NVA provides a consistent and well-defined interface to the NVE. For example, an NVA could be implemented via database techniques whereby a server stores address mapping information in a traditional (possibly replicated) database. Alternatively, an NVA could be implemented in a distributed fashion using an existing (or modified) routing protocol to maintain and distribute mappings. So long as there is a clear interface between the NVE and NVA, how an NVA is architected and implemented is not important to an NVE.

A number of architectural approaches could be used to implement NVAs themselves. NVAs manage address bindings and distribute them to where they need to go. One approach would be to use Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [RFC4364] (possibly with extensions) and route reflectors. Another approach could use a transaction-based database model with replicated servers. Because the implementation details are local to an NVA, there is no need to pick exactly one solution technology, so long as the external interfaces to the NVEs (and remote NVAs) are sufficiently well defined to achieve interoperability.

7.3. NVA External Interface

Conceptually, from the perspective of an NVE, an NVA is a single entity. An NVE interacts with the NVA, and it is the NVA’s responsibility for ensuring that interactions between the NVE and NVA result in consistent behavior across the NVA and all other NVEs using the same NVA. Because an NVA is built from multiple internal components, an NVA will have to ensure that information flows to all internal NVA components appropriately.
One architectural question is how the NVA presents itself to the NVE. For example, an NVA could be required to provide access via a single IP address. If NVEs only have one IP address to interact with, it would be the responsibility of the NVA to handle NVA component failures, e.g., by using a "floating IP address" that migrates among NVA components to ensure that the NVA can always be reached via the one address. Having all NVA accesses through a single IP address, however, adds constraints to implementing robust failover, load balancing, etc.

In the NVO3 architecture, an NVA is accessed through one or more IP addresses (or IP address/port combination). If multiple IP addresses are used, each IP address provides equivalent functionality, meaning that an NVE can use any of the provided addresses to interact with the NVA. Should one address stop working, an NVE is expected to failover to another. While the different addresses result in equivalent functionality, one address may respond more quickly than another, e.g., due to network conditions, load on the server, etc.

To provide some control over load balancing, NVA addresses may have an associated priority. Addresses are used in order of priority, with no explicit preference among NVA addresses having the same priority. To provide basic load-balancing among NVAs of equal priorities, NVEs could use some randomization input to select among equal-priority NVAs. Such a priority scheme facilitates failover and load balancing, for example, allowing a network operator to specify a set of primary and backup NVAs.

It may be desirable to have individual NVA addresses responsible for a subset of information about an NV Domain. In such a case, NVEs would use different NVA addresses for obtaining or updating information about particular VNs or TS bindings. A key question with such an approach is how information would be partitioned, and how an NVE could determine which address to use to get the information it needs.

Another possibility is to treat the information on which NVA addresses to use as cached (soft-state) information at the NVEs, so that any NVA address can be used to obtain any information, but NVEs are informed of preferences for which addresses to use for particular information on VNs or TS bindings. That preference information would be cached for future use to improve behavior - e.g., if all requests for a specific subset of VNs are forwarded to a specific NVA component, the NVE can optimize future requests within that subset by sending them directly to that NVA component via its address.
8. NVE-to-NVA Protocol

As outlined in Section 4.3, an NVE needs certain information in order to perform its functions. To obtain such information from an NVA, an NVE-to-NVA protocol is needed. The NVE-to-NVA protocol provides two functions. First it allows an NVE to obtain information about the location and status of other TSs with which it needs to communicate. Second, the NVE-to-NVA protocol provides a way for NVEs to provide updates to the NVA about the TSs attached to that NVE (e.g., when a TS attaches or detaches from the NVE), or about communication errors encountered when sending traffic to remote NVEs. For example, an NVE could indicate that a destination it is trying to reach at a destination NVE is unreachable for some reason.

While having a direct NVE-to-NVA protocol might seem straightforward, the existence of existing VM orchestration systems complicates the choices an NVE has for interacting with the NVA.

8.1. NVE-NVA Interaction Models

An NVE interacts with an NVA in at least two (quite different) ways:

- NVEs embedded within the same server as the hypervisor can obtain necessary information entirely through the hypervisor-facing side of the NVE. Such an approach is a natural extension to existing VM orchestration systems supporting server virtualization because an existing protocol between the hypervisor and VM orchestration system already exists and can be leveraged to obtain any needed information. Specifically, VM orchestration systems used to create, terminate and migrate VMs already use well-defined (though typically proprietary) protocols to handle the interactions between the hypervisor and VM orchestration system. For such systems, it is a natural extension to leverage the existing orchestration protocol as a sort of proxy protocol for handling the interactions between an NVE and the NVA. Indeed, existing implementations can already do this.

- Alternatively, an NVE can obtain needed information by interacting directly with an NVA via a protocol operating over the data center underlay network. Such an approach is needed to support NVEs that are not associated with systems performing server virtualization (e.g., as in the case of a standalone gateway) or where the NVE needs to communicate directly with the NVA for other reasons.

The NVO3 architecture will focus on support for the second model above. Existing virtualization environments are already using the first model. But they are not sufficient to cover the case of
standalone gateways -- such gateways may not support virtualization and do not interface with existing VM orchestration systems.

8.2. Direct NVE-NVA Protocol

An NVE can interact directly with an NVA via an NVE-to-NVA protocol. Such a protocol can be either independent of the NVA internal protocol, or an extension of it. Using a purpose-specific protocol would provide architectural separation and independence between the NVE and NVA. The NVE and NVA interact in a well-defined way, and changes in the NVA (or NVE) do not need to impact each other. Using a dedicated protocol also ensures that both NVE and NVA implementations can evolve independently and without dependencies on each other. Such independence is important because the upgrade path for NVEs and NVAs is quite different. Upgrading all the NVEs at a site will likely be more difficult in practice than upgrading NVAs because of their large number — one on each end device. In practice, it would be prudent to assume that once an NVE has been implemented and deployed, it may be challenging to get subsequent NVE extensions and changes implemented and deployed, whereas an NVA (and its associated internal protocols) are more likely to evolve over time as experience is gained from usage and upgrades will involve fewer nodes.

Requirements for a direct NVE-NVA protocol can be found in [I-D.ietf-nvo3-nve-nva-cp-req]

8.3. Propagating Information Between NVEs and NVAs

Information flows between NVEs and NVAs in both directions. The NVA maintains information about all VNs in the NV Domain, so that NVEs do not need to do so themselves. NVEs obtain from the NVA information about where a given remote TS destination resides. NVAs in turn obtain information from NVEs about the individual TSs attached to those NVEs.

While the NVA could push information relevant to every virtual network to every NVE, such an approach scales poorly and is unnecessary. In practice, a given NVE will only need and want to know about VNs to which it is attached. Thus, an NVE should be able to subscribe to updates only for the virtual networks it is interested in receiving updates for. The NVO3 architecture supports a model where an NVE is not required to have full mapping tables for all virtual networks in an NV Domain.

Before sending unicast traffic to a remote TS (or TSES for broadcast or multicast traffic), an NVE must know where the remote TS(es) currently reside. When a TS attaches to a virtual network, the NVE
obtains information about that VN from the NVA. The NVA can provide that information to the NVE at the time the TS attaches to the VN, either because the NVE requests the information when the attach operation occurs, or because the VM orchestration system has initiated the attach operation and provides associated mapping information to the NVE at the same time.

There are scenarios where an NVE may wish to query the NVA about individual mappings within an VN. For example, when sending traffic to a remote TS on a remote NVE, that TS may become unavailable (e.g., because it has migrated elsewhere or has been shutdown, in which case the remote NVE may return an error indication). In such situations, the NVE may need to query the NVA to obtain updated mapping information for a specific TS, or verify that the information is still correct despite the error condition. Note that such a query could also be used by the NVA as an indication that there may be an inconsistency in the network and that it should take steps to verify that the information it has about the current state and location of a specific TS is still correct.

For very large virtual networks, the amount of state an NVE needs to maintain for a given virtual network could be significant. Moreover, an NVE may only be communicating with a small subset of the TSs on such a virtual network. In such cases, the NVE may find it desirable to maintain state only for those destinations it is actively communicating with. In such scenarios, an NVE may not want to maintain full mapping information about all destinations on a VN. Should it then need to communicate with a destination for which it does not have mapping information, however, it will need to be able to query the NVA on demand for the missing information on a per-destination basis.

The NVO3 architecture will need to support a range of operations between the NVE and NVA. Requirements for those operations can be found in [I-D.ietf-nvo3-nve-nva-cp-req].

9. Federated NVAs

An NVA provides service to the set of NVEs in its NV Domain. Each NVA manages network virtualization information for the virtual networks within its NV Domain. An NV domain is administered by a single entity.

In some cases, it will be necessary to expand the scope of a specific VN or even an entire NV domain beyond a single NVA. For example, multiple data centers managed by the same administrator may wish to operate all of its data centers as a single NV region. Such cases are handled by having different NVAs peer with each other to exchange
mapping information about specific VNs. NVAs operate in a federated manner with a set of NVAs operating as a loosely-coupled federation of individual NVAs. If a virtual network spans multiple NVAs (e.g., located at different data centers), and an NVE needs to deliver tenant traffic to an NVE that is part of a different NV Domain, it still interacts only with its NVA, even when obtaining mappings for NVEs associated with a different NV Domain.

Figure 3 shows a scenario where two separate NV Domains (1 and 2) share information about Virtual Network "1217". VM1 and VM2 both connect to the same Virtual Network 1217, even though the two VMs are in separate NV Domains. There are two cases to consider. In the first case, NV Domain B (NVB) does not allow NVE-A to tunnel traffic directly to NVE-B. There could be a number of reasons for this. For example, NV Domains 1 and 2 may not share a common address space (i.e., require traversal through a NAT device), or for policy reasons, a domain might require that all traffic between separate NV Domains be funneled through a particular device (e.g., a firewall). In such cases, NVA-2 will advertise to NVA-1 that VM1 on Virtual Network 1217 is available, and direct that traffic between the two nodes go through IP-G. IP-G would then decapsulate received traffic from one NV Domain, translate it appropriately for the other domain and re-encapsulate the packet for delivery.

![Diagram of VM1 and VM2 in different NV Domains](image)

**Figure 3:** VM1 and VM2 are in different NV Domains.

NVAs at one site share information and interact with NVAs at other sites, but only in a controlled manner. It is expected that policy and access control will be applied at the boundaries between different sites (and NVAs) so as to minimize dependencies on external NVAs that could negatively impact the operation within a site. It is an architectural principle that operations involving NVAs at one site...
not be immediately impacted by failures or errors at another site. (Of course, communication between NVEs in different NV domains may be impacted by such failures or errors.) It is a strong requirement that an NVA continue to operate properly for local NVEs even if external communication is interrupted (e.g., should communication between a local and remote NVA fail).

At a high level, a federation of interconnected NVAs has some analogies to BGP and Autonomous Systems. Like an Autonomous System, NVAs at one site are managed by a single administrative entity and do not interact with external NVAs except as allowed by policy. Likewise, the interface between NVAs at different sites is well defined, so that the internal details of operations at one site are largely hidden to other sites. Finally, an NVA only peers with other NVAs that it has a trusted relationship with, i.e., where a VN is intended to span multiple NVAs.

Reasons for using a federated model include:

- Provide isolation among NVAs operating at different sites at different geographic locations.
- Control the quantity and rate of information updates that flow (and must be processed) between different NVAs in different data centers.
- Control the set of external NVAs (and external sites) a site peers with. A site will only peer with other sites that are cooperating in providing an overlay service.
- Allow policy to be applied between sites. A site will want to carefully control what information it exports (and to whom) as well as what information it is willing to import (and from whom).
- Allow different protocols and architectures to be used for intra-vs. inter-NVA communication. For example, within a single data center, a replicated transaction server using database techniques might be an attractive implementation option for an NVA, and protocols optimized for intra-NVA communication would likely be different from protocols involving inter-NVA communication between different sites.
- Allow for optimized protocols, rather than using a one-size-fits all approach. Within a data center, networks tend to have lower-latency, higher-speed and higher redundancy when compared with WAN links interconnecting data centers. The design constraints and tradeoffs for a protocol operating within a data center network are different from those operating over WAN links. While a single
protocol could be used for both cases, there could be advantages to using different and more specialized protocols for the intra- and inter-NVA case.

9.1. Inter-NVA Peering

To support peering between different NVAs, an inter-NVA protocol is needed. The inter-NVA protocol defines what information is exchanged between NVAs. It is assumed that the protocol will be used to share addressing information between data centers and must scale well over WAN links.

10. Control Protocol Work Areas

The NVO3 architecture consists of two major distinct entities: NVEs and NVAs. In order to provide isolation and independence between these two entities, the NVO3 architecture calls for well defined protocols for interfacing between them. For an individual NVA, the architecture calls for a logically centralized entity that could be implemented in a distributed or replicated fashion. While the IETF may choose to define one or more specific architectural approaches to building individual NVAs, there is little need for it to pick exactly one approach to the exclusion of others. An NVA for a single domain will likely be deployed as a single vendor product and thus there is little benefit in standardizing the internal structure of an NVA.

Individual NVAs peer with each other in a federated manner. The NVO3 architecture calls for a well-defined interface between NVAs.

Finally, a hypervisor-to-NVE protocol is needed to cover the split-NVE scenario described in Section 4.2.

11. NVO3 Data Plane Encapsulation

When tunneling tenant traffic, NVEs add encapsulation header to the original tenant packet. The exact encapsulation to use for NVO3 does not seem to be critical. The main requirement is that the encapsulation support a Context ID of sufficient size. A number of encapsulations already exist that provide a VN Context of sufficient size for NVO3. For example, VXLAN [RFC7348] has a 24-bit VXLAN Network Identifier (VNI). NVGRE [RFC7637] has a 24-bit Tenant Network ID (TNI). MPLS-over-GRE provides a 20-bit label field. While there is widespread recognition that a 12-bit VN Context would be too small (only 4096 distinct values), it is generally agreed that 20 bits (1 million distinct values) and 24 bits (16.8 million distinct values) are sufficient for a wide variety of deployment scenarios.
12. Operations, Administration and Maintenance (OAM)

The simplicity of operating and debugging overlay networks will be critical for successful deployment.

Overlay networks are based on tunnels between NVEs, so the OAM (Operations, Administration and Maintenance) [RFC6291] framework for overlay networks can draw from prior IETF OAM work for tunnel-based networks, specifically L2VPN OAM [RFC6136]. RFC 6136 focuses on Fault Management and Performance Management as fundamental to L2VPN service delivery, leaving the Configuration, Management, Accounting Management and Security Management components of the OSI "FCAPS" taxonomy [M.3400] for further study. This section does likewise for NVO3 OAM, but those three areas continue to be important parts of complete OAM functionality for NVO3.

The relationship between the overlay and underlay networks is a consideration for fault and performance management - a fault in the underlay may manifest as fault and/or performance issues in the overlay. Diagnosing and fixing such issues are complicated by NVO3 abstracting the underlay network away from the overlay network (e.g., intermediate nodes on the underlay network path between NVEs are hidden from overlay VNs).

NVO3-specific OAM techniques, protocol constructs and tools are needed to provide visibility beyond this abstraction to diagnose and correct problems that appear in the overlay. Two examples are underlay-aware traceroute [I-D.nordmark-nvo3-transcending-traceroute], and ping protocol constructs for overlay networks [I-D.jain-nvo3-vxlan-ping] [I-D.kumar-nvo3-overlay-ping].

NVO3-specific tools and techniques are best viewed as complements to (i.e., not as replacements for) single-network tools that apply to the overlay and/or underlay networks. Coordination among the individual network tools (for the overlay and underlay networks) and NVO3-aware dual-network tools is required to achieve effective monitoring and fault diagnosis. For example, the defect detection intervals and performance measurement intervals ought to be coordinated among all tools involved in order to provide consistency and comparability of results.

For further discussion of NVO3 OAM requirements, see [I-D.ashwood-nvo3-oam-requirements].
13. Summary

This document presents the overall architecture for Network Virtualization Overlays (NVO3). The architecture calls for three main areas of protocol work:

1. A hypervisor-to-NVE protocol to support Split NVEs as discussed in Section 4.2.

2. An NVE to NVA protocol for disseminating VN information (e.g., inner to outer address mappings).

3. An NVA-to-NVA protocol for exchange of information about specific virtual networks between federated NVAs.

It should be noted that existing protocols or extensions of existing protocols are applicable.

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15. IANA Considerations

This memo includes no request to IANA.

16. Security Considerations

The data plane and control plane described in this architecture will need to address potential security threats.

For the data plane, tunneled application traffic may need protection against being misdelivered, modified, or having its content exposed to an inappropriate third party. In all cases, encryption between authenticated tunnel endpoints (e.g., via use of IPsec [RFC4301]) and enforcing policies that control which endpoints and VNs are permitted to exchange traffic can be used to mitigate risks.

For the control plane, between NVAs, the NVA and NVE as well as between different components of the split-NVE approach, a combination of authentication and encryption can be used. All entities will need to properly authenticate with each other and enable encryption for their interactions as appropriate to protect sensitive information.
Leakage of sensitive information about users or other entities associated with VMs whose traffic is virtualized can also be covered by using encryption for the control plane protocols and enforcing policies that control which NVO3 components are permitted to exchange control plane traffic.

Control plane elements such as NVEs and NVAs need to collect performance and other data in order to carry out their functions. This data can sometimes be unexpectedly sensitive, for example, allowing non-obvious inferences as to activity within a VM. This provides a reason to minimise the data collected in some environments in order to limit potential exposure of sensitive information. As noted briefly in RFC 6973 [RFC6973] and RFC 7258 [RFC7258] there is an inevitable tension between being privacy sensitive and network operations that needs to be taken into account in nvo3 protocol development.

See the NVO3 framework security considerations in RFC 7365 [RFC7365] for further discussion.

17. Informative References

[I-D.ashwood-nvo3-oam-requirements]

[I-D.ietf-nvo3-mcast-framework]

[I-D.ietf-nvo3-nve-nva-cp-req]

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[IEEE-802.1Q]


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Geneve: Generic Network Virtualization Encapsulation
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Abstract

Network virtualization involves the cooperation of devices with a wide variety of capabilities such as software and hardware tunnel endpoints, transit fabrics, and centralized control clusters. As a result of their role in tying together different elements in the system, the requirements on tunnels are influenced by all of these components. Flexibility is therefore the most important aspect of a tunnel protocol if it is to keep pace with the evolution of the system. This document describes Geneve, an encapsulation protocol designed to recognize and accommodate these changing capabilities and needs.

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1. Introduction

Networking has long featured a variety of tunneling, tagging, and other encapsulation mechanisms. However, the advent of network virtualization has caused a surge of renewed interest and a corresponding increase in the introduction of new protocols. The large number of protocols in this space, ranging all the way from VLANs [IEEE.802.1Q_2014] and MPLS [RFC3031] through the more recent VXLAN [RFC7348] (Virtual eXtensible Local Area Network) and NVGRE [RFC7637] (Network Virtualization Using Generic Routing Encapsulation), often leads to questions about the need for new encapsulation formats and what it is about network virtualization in particular that leads to their proliferation.

While many encapsulation protocols seek to simply partition the underlay network or bridge between two domains, network virtualization views the transit network as providing connectivity between multiple components of a distributed system. In many ways this system is similar to a chassis switch with the IP underlay network playing the role of the backplane and tunnel endpoints on the edge as line cards. When viewed in this light, the requirements placed on the tunnel protocol are significantly different in terms of the quantity of metadata necessary and the role of transit nodes.

Current work such as [VL2] (A Scalable and Flexible Data Center Network) and the NVO3 Data Plane Requirements [I-D.ietf-nvo3-dataplane-requirements] have described some of the properties that the data plane must have to support network virtualization. However, one additional defining requirement is the need to carry system state along with the packet data. The use of some metadata is certainly not a foreign concept - nearly all protocols used for virtualization have at least 24 bits of identifier space as a way to partition between tenants. This is often described as overcoming the limits of 12-bit VLANs, and when seen in that context, or any context where it is a true tenant identifier, 16 million possible entries is a large number. However, the reality is that the metadata is not exclusively used to identify tenants and encoding other information quickly starts to crowd the space. In
fact, when compared to the tags used to exchange metadata between line cards on a chassis switch, 24-bit identifiers start to look quite small. There are nearly endless uses for this metadata, ranging from storing input ports for simple security policies to service based context for interposing advanced middleboxes.

Existing tunnel protocols have each attempted to solve different aspects of these new requirements, only to be quickly rendered out of date by changing control plane implementations and advancements. Furthermore, software and hardware components and controllers all have different advantages and rates of evolution - a fact that should be viewed as a benefit, not a liability or limitation. This draft describes Geneve, a protocol which seeks to avoid these problems by providing a framework for tunneling for network virtualization rather than being prescriptive about the entire system.

1.1. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

1.2. Terminology

The NVO3 framework [RFC7365] defines many of the concepts commonly used in network virtualization. In addition, the following terms are specifically meaningful in this document:

Checksum offload. An optimization implemented by many NICs (Network Interface Controller) which enables computation and verification of upper layer protocol checksums in hardware on transmit and receive, respectively. This typically includes IP and TCP/UDP checksums which would otherwise be computed by the protocol stack in software.

Clos network. A technique for composing network fabrics larger than a single switch while maintaining non-blocking bandwidth across connection points. ECMP is used to divide traffic across the multiple links and switches that constitute the fabric. Sometimes termed "leaf and spine" or "fat tree" topologies.

ECMP. Equal Cost Multipath. A routing mechanism for selecting from among multiple best next hop paths by hashing packet headers in order to better utilize network bandwidth while avoiding reordering of packets within a flow.
Geneve. Generic Network Virtualization Encapsulation. The tunnel protocol described in this document.

LRO. Large Receive Offload. The receive-side equivalent function of LSO, in which multiple protocol segments (primarily TCP) are coalesced into larger data units.

NIC. Network Interface Controller. Also called as Network Interface Card or Network Adapter. A NIC could be part of a tunnel endpoint or transit device and can either process Geneve packets or aid in the processing of Geneve packets.

Transit device. A forwarding element (e.g. router or switch) along the path of the tunnel making up part of the Underlay Network. A transit device MAY be capable of understanding the Geneve packet format but does not originate or terminate Geneve packets.

LSO. Large Segmentation Offload. A function provided by many commercial NICs that allows data units larger than the MTU to be passed to the NIC to improve performance, the NIC being responsible for creating smaller segments of size less than or equal to the MTU with correct protocol headers. When referring specifically to TCP/IP, this feature is often known as TSO (TCP Segmentation Offload).

Tunnel endpoint. A component performing encapsulation and decapsulation of packets, such as Ethernet frames or IP datagrams, in Geneve headers. As the ultimate consumer of any tunnel metadata, tunnel endpoints have the highest level of requirements for parsing and interpreting tunnel headers. Tunnel endpoints may consist of either software or hardware implementations or a combination of the two. Tunnel endpoints are frequently a component of an NVE (Network Virtualization Edge) but may also be found in middleboxes or other elements making up an NVO3 Network.

VM. Virtual Machine.

2. Design Requirements

Geneve is designed to support network virtualization use cases, where tunnels are typically established to act as a backplane between the virtual switches residing in hypervisors, physical switches, or middleboxes or other appliances. An arbitrary IP network can be used as an underlay although Clos networks composed using ECMP links are a common choice to provide consistent bisectional bandwidth across all connection points. Many of the concepts of network virtualization overlays over Layer 3 IP networks are described in NVO3 Framework framework [RFC7365]. Figure 1 shows an example of a hypervisor, top of rack switch for connectivity to physical servers, and a WAN uplink.
connected using Geneve tunnels over a simplified Clos network. These
tunnels are used to encapsulate and forward frames from the attached
components such as VMs or physical links.

![Geneve Deployment Diagram]

Figure 1: Sample Geneve Deployment

To support the needs of network virtualization, the tunnel protocol
should be able to take advantage of the differing (and evolving)
capabilities of each type of device in both the underlay and overlay
networks. This results in the following requirements being placed on
the data plane tunneling protocol:

- The data plane is generic and extensible enough to support current
  and future control planes.
- Tunnel components are efficiently implementable in both hardware
  and software without restricting capabilities to the lowest common
denominator.
- High performance over existing IP fabrics.

These requirements are described further in the following
subsections.

2.1. Control Plane Independence

Although some protocols for network virtualization have included a
control plane as part of the tunnel format specification (most
notably, the VXLAN spec prescribed a multicast learning-based
control plane), these specifications have largely been treated as
describing only the data format. The VXLAN packet format has
actually seen a wide variety of control planes built on top of it.

There is a clear advantage in settling on a data format: most of the
protocols are only superficially different and there is little

advantage in duplicating effort. However, the same cannot be said of control planes, which are diverse in very fundamental ways. The case for standardization is also less clear given the wide variety in requirements, goals, and deployment scenarios.

As a result of this reality, Geneve is a pure tunnel format specification that is capable of fulfilling the needs of many control planes by explicitly not selecting any one of them. This simultaneously promotes a shared data format and reduces the chance of obsolescence by future control plane enhancements.

2.2. Data Plane Extensibility

Achieving the level of flexibility needed to support current and future control planes effectively requires an options infrastructure to allow new metadata types to be defined, deployed, and either finalized or retired. Options also allow for differentiation of products by encouraging independent development in each vendor’s core specialty, leading to an overall faster pace of advancement. By far the most common mechanism for implementing options is Type-Length-Value (TLV) format.

It should be noted that while options can be used to support non-wirespeed control packets, they are equally important on data packets as well to segregate and direct forwarding (for instance, the examples given before of input port based security policies and service interposition both require tags to be placed on data packets). Therefore, while it would be desirable to limit the extensibility to only control packets for the purposes of simplifying the datapath, that would not satisfy the design requirements.

2.2.1. Efficient Implementation

There is often a conflict between software flexibility and hardware performance that is difficult to resolve. For a given set of functionality, it is obviously desirable to maximize performance. However, that does not mean new features that cannot be run at a desired speed today should be disallowed. Therefore, for a protocol to be efficiently implementable means that a set of common capabilities can be reasonably handled across platforms along with a graceful mechanism to handle more advanced features in the appropriate situations.

The use of a variable length header and options in a protocol often raises questions about whether it is truly efficiently implementable in hardware. To answer this question in the context of Geneve, it is important to first divide "hardware" into two categories: tunnel endpoints and transit devices.
Tunnel endpoints must be able to parse the variable header, including any options, and take action. Since these devices are actively participating in the protocol, they are the most affected by Geneve.

However, as tunnel endpoints are the ultimate consumers of the data, transmitters can tailor their output to the capabilities of the recipient. As new functionality becomes sufficiently well defined to add to tunnel endpoints, supporting options can be designed using ordering restrictions and other techniques to ease parsing.

Options, if present in the packet, MUST only be generated and terminated by tunnel endpoints. Transit devices MAY be able to interpret the options, however, as non-terminating devices, transit devices do not originate or terminate the Geneve packet, hence MUST NOT modify Geneve headers and MUST NOT insert or delete options, which is the responsibility of tunnel endpoints. The participation of transit devices in interpreting options is OPTIONAL.

Further, either tunnel endpoints or transit devices MAY use offload capabilities of NICs such as checksum offload to improve the performance of Geneve packet processing. The presence of a Geneve variable length header SHOULD NOT prevent the tunnel endpoints and transit devices from using such offload capabilities.

2.3. Use of Standard IP Fabrics

IP has clearly cemented its place as the dominant transport mechanism and many techniques have evolved over time to make it robust, efficient, and inexpensive. As a result, it is natural to use IP fabrics as a transit network for Geneve. Fortunately, the use of IP encapsulation and addressing is enough to achieve the primary goal of delivering packets to the correct point in the network through standard switching and routing.

In addition, nearly all underlay fabrics are designed to exploit parallelism in traffic to spread load across multiple links without introducing reordering in individual flows. These equal cost multipathing (ECMP) techniques typically involve parsing and hashing the addresses and port numbers from the packet to select an outgoing link. However, the use of tunnels often results in poor ECMP performance without additional knowledge of the protocol as the encapsulated traffic is hidden from the fabric by design and only tunnel endpoint addresses are available for hashing.

Since it is desirable for Geneve to perform well on these existing fabrics, it is necessary for entropy from encapsulated packets to be exposed in the tunnel header. The most common technique for this is
3. Geneve Encapsulation Details

The Geneve packet format consists of a compact tunnel header encapsulated in UDP over either IPv4 or IPv6. A small fixed tunnel header provides control information plus a base level of functionality and interoperability with a focus on simplicity. This header is then followed by a set of variable options to allow for future innovation. Finally, the payload consists of a protocol data unit of the indicated type, such as an Ethernet frame. Section 3.1 and Section 3.2 illustrate the Geneve packet format transported (for example) over Ethernet along with an Ethernet payload.

3.1. Geneve Packet Format Over IPv4

```
0                   1                   2                   3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
Outer Ethernet Header:
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|                 Outer Destination MAC Address                 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Outer Destination MAC Address |   Outer Source MAC Address |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|                   Outer Source MAC Address                    |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|Optional Ethertype=C-Tag 802.1Q|  Outer VLAN Tag Information |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|       Ethertype=0x0800        |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Outer IPv4 Header:
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|Version|  IHL  |Type of Service|          Total Length         |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|         Identification        |Flags|      Fragment Offset    |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|  Time to Live |Protocol=17 UDP|         Header Checksum       |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|                     Outer Source IPv4 Address                 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|                   Outer Destination IPv4 Address              |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Outer UDP Header:
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|       Source Port = xxxx      |       Dest Port = 6081        |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
```
Geneve Header:

Geneve Header:

Inner Ethernet Header (example payload):

Payload:

Frame Check Sequence:

3.2. Geneve Packet Format Over IPv6

Internet-Draft               Geneve Protocol              September 2019

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outer Source MAC Address</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Optional Ethertype=C-Tag 802.1Q</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethertype=0x86DD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Outer IPv6 Header:

| Version | Traffic Class | Flow Label |
|-----------------------------|------------------|
| Payload Length | NxtHdr=17 UDP | Hop Limit |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outer Source IPv6 Address</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outer Destination IPv6 Address</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Outer UDP Header:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source Port = xxxx</th>
<th>Dest Port = 6081</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UDP Length</td>
<td>UDP Checksum</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Geneve Header:

| Ver | Opt Len | O | C | Rsvd. | Protocol Type |
|----------------------------|
| Virtual Network Identifier (VNI) | Reserved |
| Variable Length Options |

Inner Ethernet Header (example payload):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.3. UDP Header

The use of an encapsulating UDP [RFC0768] header follows the connectionless semantics of Ethernet and IP in addition to providing entropy to routers performing ECMP. The header fields are therefore interpreted as follows:

Source port: A source port selected by the originating tunnel endpoint. This source port SHOULD be the same for all packets belonging to a single encapsulated flow to prevent reordering due to the use of different paths. To encourage an even distribution of flows across multiple links, the source port SHOULD be calculated using a hash of the encapsulated packet headers using, for example, a traditional 5-tuple. Since the port represents a flow identifier rather than a true UDP connection, the entire 16-bit range MAY be used to maximize entropy.

Dest port: IANA has assigned port 6081 as the fixed well-known destination port for Geneve. Although the well-known value should be used by default, it is RECOMMENDED that implementations make this configurable. The chosen port is used for identification of Geneve packets and MUST NOT be reversed for different ends of a connection as is done with TCP.

UDP length: The length of the UDP packet including the UDP header.
In order to protect the Geneve header, options and payload from potential data corruption, UDP checksum SHOULD be generated as specified in [RFC0768] and [RFC1112] when Geneve is encapsulated in IPv4. To protect the IP header, Geneve header, options and payload from potential data corruption, the UDP checksum MUST be generated by default as specified in [RFC0768] and [RFC2460] when Geneve is encapsulated in IPv6. Upon receiving such packets with non-zero UDP checksum, the receiving tunnel endpoints MUST validate the checksum. If the checksum is not correct, the packet MUST be dropped, otherwise the packet MUST be accepted for decapsulation.

Under certain conditions, the UDP checksum MAY be set to zero on transmit for packets encapsulated in both IPv4 and IPv6 [RFC6935]. See Section 4.3 for additional requirements that apply for using zero UDP checksum with IPv4 and IPv6. Disabling the use of UDP checksums is an operational consideration that should take into account the risks and effects of packet corruption.

3.4. Tunnel Header Fields

Ver (2 bits): The current version number is 0. Packets received by a tunnel endpoint with an unknown version MUST be dropped. Transit devices interpreting Geneve packets with an unknown version number MUST treat them as UDP packets with an unknown payload.

Opt Len (6 bits): The length of the options fields, expressed in four byte multiples, not including the eight byte fixed tunnel header. This results in a minimum total Geneve header size of 8 bytes and a maximum of 260 bytes. The start of the payload headers can be found using this offset from the end of the base Geneve header.

O (1 bit): Control packet. This packet contains a control message. Control messages are sent between tunnel endpoints. Tunnel Endpoints MUST NOT forward the payload and transit devices MUST NOT attempt to interpret it. Since these are infrequent control messages, it is RECOMMENDED that tunnel endpoints direct these packets to a high-priority control queue (for example, to direct the packet to a general purpose CPU from a forwarding ASIC or to separate out control traffic on a NIC). Transit devices MUST NOT alter forwarding behavior on the basis of this bit, such as ECMP link selection.

C (1 bit): Critical options present. One or more options has the critical bit set (see Section 3.5). If this bit is set then tunnel endpoints MUST parse the options list to interpret any
critical options. On tunnel endpoints where option parsing is not supported the packet MUST be dropped on the basis of the 'C' bit in the base header. If the bit is not set tunnel endpoints MAY strip all options using ‘Opt Len’ and forward the decapsulated packet. Transit devices MUST NOT drop packets on the basis of this bit.

The critical bit allows hardware implementations the flexibility to handle options processing in the hardware fastpath or in the exception (slow) path without the need to process all the options. For example, a critical option such as secure hash to provide Geneve header integrity check must be processed by tunnel endpoints and typically processed in the hardware fastpath.

Rsvd. (6 bits): Reserved field, which MUST be zero on transmission and MUST be ignored on receipt.

Protocol Type (16 bits): The type of the protocol data unit appearing after the Geneve header. This follows the EtherType [ETYPES] convention with Ethernet itself being represented by the value 0x6558.

Virtual Network Identifier (VNI) (24 bits): An identifier for a unique element of a virtual network. In many situations this may represent an L2 segment, however, the control plane defines the forwarding semantics of decapsulated packets. The VNI MAY be used as part of ECMP forwarding decisions or MAY be used as a mechanism to distinguish between overlapping address spaces contained in the encapsulated packet when load balancing across CPUs.

Reserved (8 bits): Reserved field which MUST be zero on transmission and ignored on receipt.

Transit devices MUST maintain consistent forwarding behavior irrespective of the value of ‘Opt Len’, including ECMP link selection. These devices SHOULD be able to forward packets containing options without resorting to a slow path.

3.5. Tunnel Options
Geneve Option

The base Geneve header is followed by zero or more options in Type-Length-Value format. Each option consists of a four byte option header and a variable amount of option data interpreted according to the type.

Option Class (16 bits): Namespace for the ‘Type’ field. IANA will be requested to create a "Geneve Option Class" registry to allocate identifiers for organizations, technologies, and vendors that have an interest in creating types for options. Each organization may allocate types independently to allow experimentation and rapid innovation. It is expected that over time certain options will become well known and a given implementation may use option types from a variety of sources. In addition, IANA will be requested to reserve specific ranges for standardized and experimental options.

Type (8 bits): Type indicating the format of the data contained in this option. Options are primarily designed to encourage future extensibility and innovation and so standardized forms of these options will be defined in a separate document.

The high order bit of the option type indicates that this is a critical option. If the receiving tunnel endpoint does not recognize this option and this bit is set then the packet MUST be dropped. If the ‘C’ bit (critical bit) is set in any option then the ‘C’ bit in the Geneve base header MUST also be set. Transit devices MUST NOT drop packets on the basis of this bit. The following figure shows the location of the ‘C’ bit in the ‘Type’ field:

```
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|C|    Type     |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
```

The requirement to drop a packet with an unknown option with the ‘C’ bit set applies to the entire tunnel endpoint system and not a particular component of the implementation. For example, in a
system comprised of a forwarding ASIC and a general purpose CPU, this does not mean that the packet must be dropped in the ASIC. An implementation may send the packet to the CPU using a rate-limited control channel for slow-path exception handling.

R (3 bits): Option control flags reserved for future use. MUST be zero on transmission and ignored on receipt.

Length (5 bits): Length of the option, expressed in four byte multiples excluding the option header. The total length of each option may be between 4 and 128 bytes. A value of 0 in the Length field implies an option with only the option header without the variable option data. Packets in which the total length of all options is not equal to the ‘Opt Len’ in the base header are invalid and MUST be silently dropped if received by a tunnel endpoint that processes the options.

Variable Option Data: Option data interpreted according to ‘Type’.

3.5.1. Options Processing

Geneve options are intended to be originated and processed by tunnel endpoints. However, options MAY be interpreted by transit devices along the tunnel path. Transit devices not interpreting Geneve headers (that may or may not include options) MUST handle Geneve packets as any other UDP packet and maintain consistent forwarding behavior.

In tunnel endpoints, the generation and interpretation of options is determined by the control plane, which is out of the scope of this document. However, to ensure interoperability between heterogeneous devices some requirements are imposed on options and the devices that process them:

- Receiving tunnel endpoints MUST drop packets containing unknown options with the ‘C’ bit set in the option type. Conversely, transit devices MUST NOT drop packets as a result of encountering unknown options, including those with the ‘C’ bit set.

- Some options may be defined in such a way that the position in the option list is significant. Options MUST NOT be changed by transit devices.

- An option SHOULD NOT be dependent upon any other option in the packet, i.e., options can be processed independently of one another. Architecturally, options are intended to be self-
When designing a Geneve option, it is important to consider how the option will evolve in the future. Once an option is defined it is reasonable to expect that implementations may come to depend on a specific behavior. As a result, the scope of any future changes must be carefully described upfront.

Unexpectedly significant interoperability issues may result from changing the length of an option that was defined to be a certain size. A particular option is specified to have either a fixed length, which is constant, or a variable length, which may change over time or for different use cases. This property is part of the definition of the option and conveyed by the ‘Type’. For fixed length options, some implementations may choose to ignore the length field in the option header and instead parse based on the well known length associated with the type. In this case, redefining the length will impact not only parsing of the option in question but also any options that follow. Therefore, options that are defined to be fixed length in size MUST NOT be redefined to a different length. Instead, a new ‘Type’ should be allocated.

Options may be processed by NIC hardware utilizing offloads (e.g. LSO and LRO) as described in Section 4.6. Careful consideration should be given to how the offload capabilities outlined in Section 4.6 impact an option’s design.

4. Implementation and Deployment Considerations

4.1. Applicability Statement

Geneve is a network virtualization overlay encapsulation protocol designed to establish tunnels between NVEs over an existing IP network. It is intended for use in public or private data center environments, for deploying multi-tenant overlay networks over an existing IP underlay network.

Geneve is a UDP based encapsulation protocol transported over existing IPv4 and IPv6 networks. Hence, as a UDP based protocol, Geneve adheres to the UDP usage guidelines as specified in [RFC8085]. The applicability of these guidelines are dependent on the underlay IP network and the nature of Geneve payload protocol (example TCP/IP, IP/Ethernet).

[RFC8085] outlines two applicability scenarios for UDP applications, 1) general Internet and 2) controlled environment. The controlled environment means a single administrative domain or adjacent set of
cooperating domains. A network in a controlled environment can be managed to operate under certain conditions whereas in general Internet this cannot be done. Hence requirements for a tunnel protocol operating under a controlled environment can be less restrictive than the requirements of general internet.

Geneve is intended to be deployed in a data center network environment operated by a single operator or adjacent set of cooperating network operators that fits with the definition of controlled environments in [RFC8085].

For the purpose of this document, a traffic-managed controlled environment (TMCE) is defined as an IP network that is traffic-engineered and/or otherwise managed (e.g., via use of traffic rate limiters) to avoid congestion. The concept of TMCE is outlined in [RFC8086]. Significant portions of text in Section 4.1 through Section 4.3 are based on [RFC8086] as applicable to Geneve.

It is the responsibility of the operator to ensure that the guidelines/requirements in this section are followed as applicable to their Geneve deployment(s).

4.2. Congestion Control Functionality

Geneve does not natively provide congestion control functionality and relies on the payload protocol traffic for congestion control. As such Geneve MUST be used with congestion controlled traffic or within a network that is traffic managed to avoid congestion (TMCE). An operator of a traffic managed network (TMCE) may avoid congestion by careful provisioning of their networks, rate-limiting of user data traffic and traffic engineering according to path capacity.

4.3. UDP Checksum

In order to provide integrity of Geneve headers, options and payload, for example to avoid mis-delivery of payload to different tenant systems in case of data corruption, outer UDP checksum SHOULD be used with Geneve when transported over IPv4. The UDP checksum provides a statistical guarantee that a payload was not corrupted in transit. These integrity checks are not strong from a coding or cryptographic perspective and are not designed to detect physical-layer errors or malicious modification of the datagram (see Section 3.4 of [RFC8085]). In deployments where such a risk exists, an operator SHOULD use additional data integrity mechanisms such as offered by IPSec (see Section 6.2).

An operator MAY choose to disable UDP checksum and use zero checksum if Geneve packet integrity is provided by other data integrity
mechanisms such as IPsec or additional checksums or if one of the conditions in Section 4.3.1 a, b, c are met.

By default, UDP checksum MUST be used when Geneve is transported over IPv6. A tunnel endpoint MAY be configured for use with zero UDP checksum if additional requirements in Section 4.3.1 are met.

4.3.1. UDP Zero Checksum Handling with IPv6

When Geneve is used over IPv6, UDP checksum is used to protect IPv6 headers, UDP headers and Geneve headers, options and payload from potential data corruption. As such by default Geneve MUST use UDP checksum when transported over IPv6. An operator MAY choose to configure to operate with zero UDP checksum if operating in a traffic managed controlled environment as stated in Section 4.1 if one of the following conditions are met.

a. It is known that the packet corruption is exceptionally unlikely (perhaps based on knowledge of equipment types in their underlay network) and the operator is willing to take a risk of undetected packet corruption

b. It is judged through observational measurements (perhaps through historic or current traffic flows that use non zero checksum) that the level of packet corruption is tolerably low and where the operator is willing to take the risk of undetected corruption.

c. Geneve payload is carrying applications that are tolerant of misdelivered or corrupted packets (perhaps through higher layer checksum validation and/or reliability through retransmission)

In addition Geneve tunnel implementations using Zero UDP checksum MUST meet the following requirements:

1. Use of UDP checksum over IPv6 MUST be the default configuration for all Geneve tunnels.

2. If Geneve is used with zero UDP checksum over IPv6 then such tunnel endpoint implementation MUST meet all the requirements specified in section 4 of [RFC6936] and requirements 1 as specified in section 5 of [RFC6936].

3. The Geneve tunnel endpoint that decapsulates the tunnel SHOULD check the source and destination IPv6 addresses are valid for the Geneve tunnel that is configured to receive Zero UDP checksum and discard other packets for which such check fails.
4. The Geneve tunnel endpoint that encapsulates the tunnel MAY use different IPv6 source addresses for each Geneve tunnel that uses Zero UDP checksum mode in order to strengthen the decapsulator’s check of the IPv6 source address (i.e., the same IPv6 source address is not to be used with more than one IPv6 destination address, irrespective of whether that destination address is a unicast or multicast address). When this is not possible, it is RECOMMENDED to use each source address for as few Geneve tunnels that use zero UDP checksum as is feasible.

5. Measures SHOULD be taken to prevent Geneve traffic over IPv6 with zero UDP checksum from escaping into the general Internet. Examples of such measures include employing packet filters at the Gateways or edge of Geneve network and/or keeping logical or physical separation of Geneve network from networks carrying General Internet.

The above requirements do not change either the requirements specified in [RFC2460] as modified by [RFC6935] or the requirements specified in [RFC6936].

The requirement to check the source IPv6 address in addition to the destination IPv6 address, plus the recommendation against reuse of source IPv6 addresses among Geneve tunnels collectively provide some mitigation for the absence of UDP checksum coverage of the IPv6 header. A traffic-managed controlled environment that satisfies at least one of three conditions listed at the beginning of this section provides additional assurance.

Editorial Note (The following paragraph to be removed by the RFC Editor before publication)

It was discussed during TSVART early review if the level of requirement for using different IPv6 source addresses for different tunnel destinations would need to be "MAY" or "SHOULD". The discussion concluded that it was appropriate to keep this as "MAY", since it was considered not realistic for control planes having to maintain a high level of state on a per tunnel destination basis. In addition, the text above provides sufficient guidance to operators and implementors on possible mitigations.

4.4. Encapsulation of Geneve in IP

As an IP-based tunnel protocol, Geneve shares many properties and techniques with existing protocols. The application of some of these are described in further detail, although in general most concepts applicable to the IP layer or to IP tunnels generally also function in the context of Geneve.
4.4.1. IP Fragmentation

It is strongly RECOMMENDED that Path MTU Discovery ([RFC1191], [RFC8201]) be used by setting the DF bit in the IP header when Geneve packets are transmitted over IPv4 (this is the default with IPv6). The use of Path MTU Discovery on the transit network provides the encapsulating tunnel endpoint with soft-state about the link that it may use to prevent or minimize fragmentation depending on its role in the virtualized network. The NVE control plane MAY use configuration mechanism or path discovery information to maintain the MTU size of the tunnel link(s) associated with the tunnel endpoint, so if a tenant system sends large packets that when encapsulated exceed the MTU size of the tunnel link, the tunnel endpoint can discard such packets and send exception messages to the tenant system(s). If the tunnel endpoint is associated with a routing or forwarding function and/or has the capability to send ICMP messages, the encapsulating tunnel endpoint MAY send ICMP fragmentation needed [RFC0792] or Packet Too Big [RFC4443] messages to the tenant system(s). For example, recommendations/guidance for handling fragmentation in similar overlay encapsulation services like PWE3 are provided in section 5.3 of [RFC3985].

Note that some implementations may not be capable of supporting fragmentation or other less common features of the IP header, such as options and extension headers. For example, some of the issues associated with MTU size and fragmentation in IP tunneling and use of ICMP messages is outlined in section 4.2 of [I-D.ietf-intarea-tunnels].

Editorial Note (The following paragraph to be removed by the RFC Editor before publication)

It was discussed during TSVART early review if the level of requirement for maintaining tunnel MTU at the ingress has to be "MAY" or "SHOULD". The discussion concluded that it was appropriate to leave this as "MAY", considering the high level of state to be maintained.

4.4.2. DSCP, ECN and TTL

When encapsulating IP (including over Ethernet) packets in Geneve, there are several considerations for propagating DSCP and ECN bits from the inner header to the tunnel on transmission and the reverse on reception.

[RFC2983] provides guidance for mapping DSCP between inner and outer IP headers. Network virtualization is typically more closely aligned with the Pipe model described, where the DSCP value on the tunnel
header is set based on a policy (which may be a fixed value, one based on the inner traffic class, or some other mechanism for grouping traffic). Aspects of the Uniform model (which treats the inner and outer DSCP value as a single field by copying on ingress and egress) may also apply, such as the ability to remark the inner header on tunnel egress based on transit marking. However, the Uniform model is not conceptually consistent with network virtualization, which seeks to provide strong isolation between encapsulated traffic and the physical network.

[RFC6040] describes the mechanism for exposing ECN capabilities on IP tunnels and propagating congestion markers to the inner packets. This behavior MUST be followed for IP packets encapsulated in Geneve.

Though Uniform or Pipe models could be used for TTL (or Hop Limit in case of IPv6) handling when tunneling IP packets, Pipe model is more aligned with network virtualization. [RFC2003] provides guidance on handling TTL between inner IP header and outer IP tunnels; this model is more aligned with the Pipe model and is recommended for use with Geneve for network virtualization applications.

4.4.3. Broadcast and Multicast

Geneve tunnels may either be point-to-point unicast between two tunnel endpoints or may utilize broadcast or multicast addressing. It is not required that inner and outer addressing match in this respect. For example, in physical networks that do not support multicast, encapsulated multicast traffic may be replicated into multiple unicast tunnels or forwarded by policy to a unicast location (possibly to be replicated there).

With physical networks that do support multicast it may be desirable to use this capability to take advantage of hardware replication for encapsulated packets. In this case, multicast addresses may be allocated in the physical network corresponding to tenants, encapsulated multicast groups, or some other factor. The allocation of these groups is a component of the control plane and therefore outside of the scope of this document. When physical multicast is in use, the 'C' bit in the Geneve header may be used with groups of devices with heterogeneous capabilities as each device can interpret only the options that are significant to it if they are not critical.

In addition, [RFC8293] provides examples of various mechanisms that can be used for multicast handling in network virtualization overlay networks.
4.4.4. Unidirectional Tunnels

Generally speaking, a Geneve tunnel is a unidirectional concept. IP is not a connection oriented protocol and it is possible for two tunnel endpoints to communicate with each other using different paths or to have one side not transmit anything at all. As Geneve is an IP-based protocol, the tunnel layer inherits these same characteristics.

It is possible for a tunnel to encapsulate a protocol, such as TCP, which is connection oriented and maintains session state at that layer. In addition, implementations MAY model Geneve tunnels as connected, bidirectional links, such as to provide the abstraction of a virtual port. In both of these cases, bidirectionality of the tunnel is handled at a higher layer and does not affect the operation of Geneve itself.

4.5. Constraints on Protocol Features

Geneve is intended to be flexible to a wide range of current and future applications. As a result, certain constraints may be placed on the use of metadata or other aspects of the protocol in order to optimize for a particular use case. For example, some applications may limit the types of options which are supported or enforce a maximum number or length of options. Other applications may only handle certain encapsulated payload types, such as Ethernet or IP. This could be either globally throughout the system or, for example, restricted to certain classes of devices or network paths.

These constraints may be communicated to tunnel endpoints either explicitly through a control plane or implicitly by the nature of the application. As Geneve is defined as a data plane protocol that is control plane agnostic, the exact mechanism is not defined in this document.

4.5.1. Constraints on Options

While Geneve options are more flexible, a control plane may restrict the number of option TLVs as well as the order and size of the TLVs, between tunnel endpoints, to make it simpler for a data plane implementation in software or hardware to handle [I-D.ietf-nvo3-encap]. For example, there may be some critical information such as a secure hash that must be processed in a certain order to provide lowest latency.

A control plane may negotiate a subset of option TLVs and certain TLV ordering, as well may limit the total number of option TLVs present in the packet, for example, to accommodate hardware capable of
processing fewer options [I-D.ietf-nvo3-encap]. Hence, a control plane needs to have the ability to describe the supported TLVs subset and their order to the tunnel endpoints. In the absence of a control plane, alternative configuration mechanisms may be used for this purpose. The exact mechanism is not defined in this document.

4.6. NIC Offloads

Modern NICs currently provide a variety of offloads to enable the efficient processing of packets. The implementation of many of these offloads requires only that the encapsulated packet be easily parsed (for example, checksum offload). However, optimizations such as LSO and LRO involve some processing of the options themselves since they must be replicated/merged across multiple packets. In these situations, it is desirable to not require changes to the offload logic to handle the introduction of new options. To enable this, some constraints are placed on the definitions of options to allow for simple processing rules:

- When performing LSO, a NIC MUST replicate the entire Geneve header and all options, including those unknown to the device, onto each resulting segment. However, a given option definition may override this rule and specify different behavior in supporting devices. Conversely, when performing LRO, a NIC MAY assume that a binary comparison of the options (including unknown options) is sufficient to ensure equality and MAY merge packets with equal Geneve headers.

- Options MUST NOT be reordered during the course of offload processing, including when merging packets for the purpose of LRO.

- NICs performing offloads MUST NOT drop packets with unknown options, including those marked as critical, unless explicitly configured.

There is no requirement that a given implementation of Geneve employ the offloads listed as examples above. However, as these offloads are currently widely deployed in commercially available NICs, the rules described here are intended to enable efficient handling of current and future options across a variety of devices.

4.7. Inner VLAN Handling

Geneve is capable of encapsulating a wide range of protocols and therefore a given implementation is likely to support only a small subset of the possibilities. However, as Ethernet is expected to be widely deployed, it is useful to describe the behavior of VLANs inside encapsulated Ethernet frames.
As with any protocol, support for inner VLAN headers is OPTIONAL. In many cases, the use of encapsulated VLANs may be disallowed due to security or implementation considerations. However, in other cases trunking of VLAN frames across a Geneve tunnel can prove useful. As a result, the processing of inner VLAN tags upon ingress or egress from a tunnel endpoint is based upon the configuration of the tunnel endpoint and/or control plane and not explicitly defined as part of the data format.

5. Interoperability Issues

Viewed exclusively from the data plane, Geneve does not introduce any interoperability issues as it appears to most devices as UDP packets. However, as there are already a number of tunnel protocols deployed in network virtualization environments, there is a practical question of transition and coexistence.

Since Geneve is a superset of the functionality of the most common protocols used for network virtualization (VXLAN, NVGRE) it should be straightforward to port an existing control plane to run on top of it with minimal effort. With both the old and new packet formats supporting the same set of capabilities, there is no need for a hard transition - tunnel endpoints directly communicating with each other use any common protocol, which may be different even within a single overall system. As transit devices are primarily forwarding packets on the basis of the IP header, all protocols appear similar and these devices do not introduce additional interoperability concerns.

To assist with this transition, it is strongly suggested that implementations support simultaneous operation of both Geneve and existing tunnel protocols as it is expected to be common for a single node to communicate with a mixture of other nodes. Eventually, older protocols may be phased out as they are no longer in use.

6. Security Considerations

As encapsulated within a UDP/IP packet, Geneve does not have any inherent security mechanisms. As a result, an attacker with access to the underlay network transporting the IP packets has the ability to snoop or inject packets. Compromised tunnel endpoints may also spoof identifiers in the tunnel header to gain access to networks owned by other tenants.

Within a particular security domain, such as a data center operated by a single service provider, the most common and highest performing security mechanism is isolation of trusted components. Tunnel traffic can be carried over a separate VLAN and filtered at any untrusted boundaries. In addition, tunnel endpoints should only be
operated in environments controlled by the service provider, such as the hypervisor itself rather than within a customer VM.

When crossing an untrusted link, such as the public Internet, IPsec [RFC4301] may be used to provide authentication and/or encryption of the IP packets formed as part of Geneve encapsulation.

Geneve does not otherwise affect the security of the encapsulated packets. As per the guidelines of BCP 72 [RFC3552], the following sections describe potential security risks that may be applicable to Geneve deployments and approaches to mitigate such risks. It is also noted that not all such risks are applicable to all Geneve deployment scenarios, i.e., only a subset may be applicable to certain deployments. So an operator has to make an assessment based on their network environment and determine the risks that are applicable to their specific environment and use appropriate mitigation approaches as applicable.

6.1. Data Confidentiality

Geneve is a network virtualization overlay encapsulation protocol designed to establish tunnels between NVEs over an existing IP network. It can be used to deploy multi-tenant overlay networks over an existing IP underlay network in a public or private data center. The overlay service is typically provided by a service provider, for example a cloud services provider or a private data center operator, this may or not may be the same provider as an underlay service provider. Due to the nature of multi-tenancy in such environments, a tenant system may expect data confidentiality to ensure its packet data is not tampered with (active attack) in transit or a target of unauthorized monitoring (passive attack). A tenant may expect the overlay service provider to provide data confidentiality as part of the service or a tenant may bring its own data confidentiality mechanisms like IPsec or TLS to protect the data end to end between its tenant systems.

If an operator determines data confidentiality is necessary in their environment based on their risk analysis, for example as in multi-tenant environments, then an encryption mechanism SHOULD be used to encrypt the tenant data end to end between the NVEs. The NVEs may use existing well established encryption mechanisms such as IPsec, DTLS, etc.

6.1.1. Inter-Data Center Traffic

A tenant system in a customer premises (private data center) may want to connect to tenant systems on their tenant overlay network in a public cloud data center or a tenant may want to have its tenant
systems located in multiple geographically separated data centers for high availability. Geneve data traffic between tenant systems across such separated networks should be protected from threats when traversing public networks. Any Geneve overlay data leaving the data center network beyond the operator’s security domain SHOULD be secured by encryption mechanisms such as IPsec or other VPN mechanisms to protect the communications between the NVEs when they are geographically separated over untrusted network links. Specification of data protection mechanisms employed between data centers is beyond the scope of this document.

6.2. Data Integrity

Geneve encapsulation is used between NVEs to establish overlay tunnels over an existing IP underlay network. In a multi-tenant data center, a rogue or compromised tenant system may try to launch a passive attack such as monitoring the traffic of other tenants, or an active attack such as trying to inject unauthorized Geneve encapsulated traffic such as spoofing, replay, etc., into the network. To prevent such attacks, an NVE MUST NOT propagate Geneve packets beyond the NVE to tenant systems and SHOULD employ packet filtering mechanisms so as not to forward unauthorized traffic between TSs in different tenant networks.

A compromised network node or a transit device within a data center may launch an active attack trying to tamper with the Geneve packet data between NVEs. Malicious tampering of Geneve header fields may cause the packet from one tenant to be forwarded to a different tenant network. If an operator determines the possibility of such threat in their environment, the operator may choose to employ data integrity mechanisms between NVEs. In order to prevent such risks, a data integrity mechanism SHOULD be used in such environments to protect the integrity of Geneve packets including packet headers, options and payload on communications between NVE pairs. A cryptographic data protection mechanism such as IPsec may be used to provide data integrity protection. A data center operator may choose to deploy any other data integrity mechanisms as applicable and supported in their underlay networks.

6.3. Authentication of NVE peers

A rogue network device or a compromised NVE in a data center environment might be able to spoof Geneve packets as if it came from a legitimate NVE. In order to mitigate such a risk, an operator SHOULD use an authentication mechanism, such as IPsec to ensure that the Geneve packet originated from the intended NVE peer, in environments where the operator determines spoofing or rogue devices is a potential threat. Other simpler source checks such as ingress
filtering for VLAN/MAC/IP address, reverse path forwarding checks, etc., may be used in certain trusted environments to ensure Geneve packets originated from the intended NVE peer.

6.4. Options Interpretation by Transit Devices

Options, if present in the packet, are generated and terminated by tunnel endpoints. As indicated in Section 2.2.1, transit devices may interpret the options. However, if the packet is protected by tunnel endpoint to tunnel endpoint encryption, for example through IPsec, transit devices will not have visibility into the Geneve header or options in the packet. In such cases transit devices MUST handle Geneve packets as any other IP packet and maintain consistent forwarding behavior. In cases where options are interpreted by transit devices, the operator MUST ensure that transit devices are trusted and not compromised. Implementation of a mechanism to ensure this trust is beyond the scope of this document.

6.5. Multicast/Broadcast

In typical data center networks where IP multicasting is not supported in the underlay network, multicasting may be supported using multiple unicast tunnels. The same security requirements as described in the above sections can be used to protect Geneve communications between NVE peers. If IP multicasting is supported in the underlay network and the operator chooses to use it for multicast traffic among tunnel endpoints, then the operator in such environments may use data protection mechanisms such as IPsec with Multicast extensions [RFC5374] to protect multicast traffic among Geneve NVE groups.

6.6. Control Plane Communications

A Network Virtualization Authority (NVA) as outlined in [RFC8014] may be used as a control plane for configuring and managing the Geneve NVEs. The data center operator is expected to use security mechanisms to protect the communications between the NVA to NVEs and use authentication mechanisms to detect any rogue or compromised NVEs within their administrative domain. Data protection mechanisms for control plane communication or authentication mechanisms between the NVA and the NVEs is beyond the scope of this document.

7. IANA Considerations

IANA has allocated UDP port 6081 as the well-known destination port for Geneve. Upon publication, the registry should be updated to cite this document. The original request was:
In addition, IANA is requested to create a "Geneve Option Class" registry to allocate Option Classes. This shall be a registry of 16-bit hexadecimal values along with descriptive strings. The identifiers 0x0-0xFF are to be reserved for standardized options for allocation by IETF Review [RFC8126] and 0xFFFF0-0xFFFFF for Experimental Use. Otherwise, identifiers are to be assigned to any organization with an interest in creating Geneve options on a First Come First Served basis. The registry is to be populated with the following initial values:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option Class</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0x0000..0x00FF</td>
<td>Unassigned - IETF Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x0100</td>
<td>Linux</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x0101</td>
<td>Open vSwitch (OVS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x0102</td>
<td>Open Virtual Networking (OVN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x0103</td>
<td>In-band Network Telemetry (INT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x0104</td>
<td>VMware, Inc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x0105</td>
<td>Amazon.com, Inc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x0106</td>
<td>Cisco Systems, Inc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x0107</td>
<td>Oracle Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x0108..0x110</td>
<td>Amazon.com, Inc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x0111..0xFFEF</td>
<td>Unassigned - First Come First Served</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0xFFF0..FFFFF</td>
<td>Experimental</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8. Contributors

The following individuals were authors of an earlier version of this document and made significant contributions:
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Generic UDP Encapsulation
draft-ietf-nvo3-gue-05

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Abstract

This specification describes Generic UDP Encapsulation (GUE), which is a scheme for using UDP to encapsulate packets of different IP protocols for transport across layer 3 networks. By encapsulating packets in UDP, specialized capabilities in networking hardware for efficient handling of UDP packets can be leveraged. GUE specifies basic encapsulation methods upon which higher level constructs, such as tunnels and overlay networks for network virtualization, can be constructed. GUE is extensible by allowing optional data fields as part of the encapsulation, and is generic in that it can encapsulate packets of various IP protocols.

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1. Introduction

This specification describes Generic UDP Encapsulation (GUE) which is a general method for encapsulating packets of arbitrary IP protocols within User Datagram Protocol (UDP) [RFC0768] packets. Encapsulating packets in UDP facilitates efficient transport across networks. Networking devices widely provide protocol specific processing and optimizations for UDP (as well as TCP) packets. Packets for atypical IP protocols (those not usually parsed by networking hardware) can be encapsulated in UDP packets to maximize deliverability and to leverage flow specific mechanisms for routing and packet steering.

GUE provides an extensible header format for including optional data in the encapsulation header. This data potentially covers items such as virtual networking identifier, security data for validating or authenticating the GUE header, congestion control data, etc. GUE also allows private optional data in the encapsulation header. This feature can be used by a site or implementation to define local custom optional data, and allows experimentation of options that may eventually become standard.

This document does not define any specific GUE extensions. [GUEEXTENS] specifies a set of core extensions and [GUE4NVO3] defines an extension for using GUE with network virtualization.

The motivation for the GUE protocol is described in section 6.

1.1 Terminology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GUE</td>
<td>Generic UDP Encapsulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GUE Header</td>
<td>A variable length protocol header that is composed of a primary four byte</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>header and zero or more four byte words for optional header data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GUE packet</td>
<td>A UDP/IP packet that contains a GUE header and GUE payload within the UDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>payload</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encapsulator</td>
<td>A network node that encapsulates a packet in GUE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decapsulator</td>
<td>A network node that decapsulates and processes packets encapsulated in GUE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data message</td>
<td>An encapsulated packet in the GUE payload that is addressed to the protocol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>stack for an associated protocol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control message</td>
<td>A formatted message in the GUE payload that is</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
implicitly addressed to a decapsulator to monitor or control the state or behavior of a tunnel

**Flags**
A set of bit flags in the primary GUE header

**Extension field**
An optional field in a GUE header whose presence is indicated by corresponding flag(s)

**C-bit**
A single bit flag in the primary GUE header that indicates whether the GUE packet contains a control message or not.

**Hlen**
A field in the primary GUE header that gives the length of the GUE header

**Proto/cctype**
A field in the GUE header that holds either the IP protocol number for a data message or a type for a control message

**Private data**
Optional data in the GUE header that may be used for private purposes

**Outer IP header**
Refers to the outer most IP header of a packet when encapsulating a packet over IP

**Inner IP header**
Refers to an encapsulated IP header when an IP packets is encapsulated

**Outer packet**
Refers to an encapsulating packet

**Inner packet**
Refers to a packet that is encapsulated

**Tunnel**
An abstraction of a path across a network that ships packets or protocols across a network that normally wouldn’t support them. Tunnels provide communication paths between two endpoints. Encapsulation is one common technique used to actualize tunnels

**Overlay network**
A computer network that is built on top of another network

**Underlay network**
A network over which an overlay network is built
2. Base packet format

A GUE packet is comprised of a UDP packet whose payload is a GUE header followed by a payload which is either an encapsulated packet of some IP protocol or a control message (like an OAM message). A GUE packet has the general format:

```
+-------------------------------+
<p>| |
|                               |
|        UDP/IP header          |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GUE Header</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encapsulated packet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>or control message</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
+-------------------------------+
```

The GUE header is variable length as determined by the presence of optional extension fields.

2.1. GUE version

The first two bits of the GUE header contain the GUE protocol version number. The rest of the fields after the GUE version number are defined based on the version number. Versions 0 and 1 are described in this specification; versions 2 and 3 are reserved.

3. Version 0

Version 0 of GUE defines a generic extensible format to encapsulate packets by Internet protocol number.
3.1. Header format

The header format for version 0 of GUE in UDP is:

```
+-----------------------------------------------+
| Source port                          | Destination port |
+-----------------------------------------------+
| Length                               | Checksum          |
+-----------------------------------------------+
| 0 | C | Hlen | Proto/ctype | Flags |
+-----------------------------------------------+
| Extensions Fields (optional)              |
+-----------------------------------------------+
| Private data (optional)                  |
+-----------------------------------------------+
```

The contents of the UDP header are:

- Source port: If connection semantics (section 5.6.1) are applied to an encapsulation, this is set to the source port in the local tuple. When connection semantics are not applied this should be set to a flow entropy value for use with ECMP; the properties of flow entropy are described in section 5.11.

- Destination port: If connection semantics (section 5.6.1) are applied to an encapsulation, this is set to the destination port for the tuple. If connection semantics are not applied this is set to the GUE assigned port number, 6080.

- Length: Canonical length of the UDP packet (length of UDP header and payload).

- Checksum: Standard UDP checksum (handling is described in section 5.7).

The GUE header consists of:

- Ver: GUE protocol version (0).

- C: C-bit. When set indicates a control message, not set indicates a data message.
3.2. Proto/ctype field

The proto/ctype field contains the type of the GUE payload. This can either be an IP protocol number or a control message type number. Intermediate devices may parse the GUE payload per the number in the proto/ctype field, and header flags cannot affect the interpretation of the proto/ctype field.

3.2.1 Proto field

When the C-bit is not set the proto/ctype field contains an IANA Internet Protocol Number. The protocol number is interpreted relative to the IP protocol that encapsulates the UDP packet (i.e. protocol of the outer IP header).

When the outer IP protocol is IPv4 the proto field may be set to any number except for those that refer to IPv6 extension headers or ICMPv6 options (number 58). An exception is that the destination options extension header using the PadN option may be used with IPv4 as described in section 3.6. The "no next header" protocol number (59) may be used with IPv4 as described below.
When the outer IP protocol is IPv6 the proto field may be set to any defined protocol number except Hop-by-hop options (number 0). If a received GUE packet in IPv6 contains a protocol number that is an extension header (e.g. Destination Options) then the extension header is processed after the GUE header as though the GUE header itself were an extension header.

IP protocol number 59 ("No next header") may be set to indicate that the GUE payload does not begin with the header of an IP protocol. This would be the case, for instance, if the GUE payload were a fragment when performing GUE level fragmentation. The interpretation of the payload is performed through other means (such as flags and extension fields), and intermediate devices must not parse packets based on the IP protocol number in this case.

3.2.2 Ctype field

When the C-bit is set, the proto/ctype field must be set to a valid control message type. A value of zero indicates that the GUE payload requires further interpretation to deduce the control type. This might be the case when the payload is a fragment of a control message, where only the reassembled packet can be interpreted as a control message.

Control message types 1 through 127 may be defined in standards. Types 128 through 255 are reserved to be user defined for experimentation or private control messages.

This document does not specify any standard control message types other than type 0.

3.3. Flags and extension fields

Flags and associated extension fields are the primary mechanism of extensibility in GUE. As mentioned in section 3.1 GUE header flags may indicate the presence of optional extension fields in the GUE header. [GUEXTENS] defines a basic set of GUE extensions.

3.3.1. Requirements

There are sixteen flag bits in the GUE header. A flag may indicate presence of an extension fields. The size of an extension field indicated by a flag must be fixed.

Flags may be paired together to allow different lengths for an extension field. For example, if two flag bits are paired, a field may possibly be three different lengths. Regardless of how flag bits may be paired, the lengths and offsets of optional fields...
corresponding to a set of flags must be well defined.

Extension fields are placed in order of the flags. New flags are to be allocated from high to low order bit contiguously without holes. Flags allow random access, for instance to inspect the field corresponding to the Nth flag bit, an implementation only considers the previous N-1 flags to determine the offset. Flags after the Nth flag are not pertinent in calculating the offset of an extension field indicated by the Nth flag. Random access of flags and fields permits processing of optional extensions in an order that is independent of their position in the packet. The processing order of extensions defined in [GUEEXTENS] demonstrates this property.

Flags (or paired flags) are idempotent such that new flags must not cause reinterpretation of old flags. Also, new flags should not alter interpretation of other elements in the GUE header nor how the message is parsed (for instance, in a data message the proto/ctype field always holds an IP protocol number as an invariant).

The set of available flags may be extended in the future by defining a "flag extensions bit" that refers to a field containing a new set of flags.

3.3.2. Example GUE header with extension fields

An example GUE header for a data message encapsulating an IPv4 packet and containing the VNID and Security extension fields (both defined in [GUEEXTENS]) is shown below:

0                   1                   2                   3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| 0 |0|    3    |      94       |1|0 0 1|          0            |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|                             VNID                             |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|                                                               |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|                           Security                           |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
In the above example, the first flag bit is set which indicates that the VNID extension is present; this is a 32 bit field. The second through fourth bits of the flags are paired flags that indicate the presence of a security field with seven possible sizes. In this example 001 indicates a sixty-four bit security field.
3.4. Private data

An implementation may use private data for its own use. The private data immediately follows the last extension field in the GUE header and is not a fixed length. This data is considered part of the GUE header and must be accounted for in header length (Hlen). The length of the private data must be a multiple of four and is determined by subtracting the offset of private data in the GUE header from the header length. Specifically:

\[ \text{Private_length} = (\text{Hlen} * 4) - \text{Length(flags)} \]

Where "Length(flags)" returns the sum of lengths of all the extension fields present in the GUE header. When there is no private data present, the length of the private data is zero.

The semantics and interpretation of private data are implementation specific. The private data may be structured as necessary, for instance it might contain its own set of flags and extension fields.

An encapsulator and decapsulator MUST agree on the meaning of private data before using it. The mechanism to achieve this agreement is outside the scope of this document but could include implementation-defined behavior, coordinated configuration, in-band communication using GUE control messages, or out-of-band messages.

If a decapsulator receives a GUE packet with private data, it MUST validate the private data appropriately. If a decapsulator does not expect private data from an encapsulator the packet MUST be dropped. If a decapsulator cannot validate the contents of private data per the provided semantics the packet MUST also be dropped. An implementation may place security data in GUE private data which must be verified for packet acceptance.

3.5. Message types

3.5.1. Control messages

Control messages carry formatted message that are implicitly addressed to the decapsulator to monitor or control the state or behavior of a tunnel (OAM). For instance, an echo request and corresponding echo reply message may be defined to test for liveness.

Control messages are indicated in the GUE header when the C-bit is set. The payload is interpreted as a control message with type specified in the proto/ctype field. The format and contents of the control message are indicated by the type and can be variable length.
Other than interpreting the proto/ctype field as a control message type, the meaning and semantics of the rest of the elements in the GUE header are the same as that of data messages. Forwarding and routing of control messages should be the same as that of a data message with the same outer IP and UDP header and GUE flags—this ensures that control messages can be created that follow the same path as data messages.

3.5.2. Data messages

Data messages carry encapsulated packets that are addressed to the protocol stack for the associated protocol. Data messages are a primary means of encapsulation and can be used to create tunnels for overlay networks.

Data messages are indicated in GUE header when the C-bit is not set. The payload of a data message is interpreted as an encapsulated packet of an Internet protocol indicated in the proto/ctype field. The encapsulated packet immediately follows the GUE header.

3.6. Hiding the transport layer protocol number

The GUE header indicates the Internet protocol of the encapsulated packet. This is either contained in the Proto/ctype field of the primary GUE header, or is contained in the Payload Type field of a GUE Transform Field (used to encrypt the payload with DTLS, [GUESEC]). If the protocol number must be obfuscated, that is the transport protocol in use must be hidden from the network, then a trivial destination options can be used at the beginning of the payload.

The PadN destination option can be used to encode the transport protocol as a next header of an extension header (and maintain alignment of encapsulated transport headers). The Proto/ctype field or Payload Type field of the GUE Transform field is set to 60 to indicate that the first encapsulated header is a Destination Options extension header.

The format of the extension header is below:

```
+---------------------------------------------------+
| Next Header | 2 | 1 | 0 |
+---------------------------------------------------+
```

For IPv4, it is permitted in GUE to use this precise destination option to contain the obfuscated protocol number. In this case next header must refer to a valid IP protocol for IPv4. No other extension headers or destination options are permitted with IPv4.
4. Version 1

Version 1 of GUE allows direct encapsulation of IPv4 and IPv6 in UDP. In this version there is no GUE header; a UDP packet encapsulates an IP packet. The first two bits of the UDP payload for GUE are the GUE version and coincide with the first two bits of the version number in the IP header. The first two version bits of IPv4 and IPv6 are 01, so we use GUE version 1 for direct IP encapsulation which makes two bits of GUE version to also be 01.

This technique is effectively a means to compress out the GUE header when encapsulating IPv4 or IPv6 packets and there are no flags or extension fields present. This method is compatible to use on the same port number as packets with the GUE header (GUE version 0 packets). This technique saves encapsulation overhead on costly links for the common use of IP encapsulation, and also obviates the need to allocate a separate port number for IP-over-UDP encapsulation.

4.1. Direct encapsulation of IPv4

The format for encapsulating IPv4 directly in UDP is demonstrated below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

```
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|        Source port            |      Destination port         | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|           Length              |          Checksum             | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|0|1|0|0|  IHL  |Type of Service|          Total Length         |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|         Identification        |Flags|      Fragment Offset    |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|  Time to Live |   Protocol    |   Header Checksum             |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|                       Source IPv4 Address                     |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|                     Destination IPv4 Address                  |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
```

Note that 0100 value IP version field expresses the GUE version as 1 (bits 01) and IP version as 4 (bits 0100).
4.2. Direct encapsulation of IPv6

The format for encapsulating IPv4 directly in UDP is demonstrated below:

```
0                   1                   2                   3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|        Source port            |      Destination port         | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ UDP
|           Length              |          Checksum             | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+/
|0|1|1|0| Traffic Class |           Flow Label                  |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Payload Length |     NextHdr   |   Hop Limit   |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                   Outer Source IPv6 Address                   |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
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|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                   Outer Destination IPv6 Address              |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
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|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |

Note that 0110 value IP version field expresses the GUE version as 1 (bits 01) and IP version as 6 (bits 0110).

5. Operation

The figure below illustrates the use of GUE encapsulation between two hosts. Server 1 is sending packets to host 2. An encapsulator performs encapsulation of packets from host 1. These encapsulated packets traverse the network as UDP packets. At the decapsulator, packets are decapsulated and sent on to host 2. Packet flow in the reverse direction need not be symmetric; GUE encapsulation is not required in the reverse path.
The encapsulator and decapsulator may be co-resident with the corresponding hosts, or may be on separate nodes in the network.

5.1. Network tunnel encapsulation

Network tunneling can be achieved by encapsulating layer 2 or layer 3 packets. In this case the encapsulator and decapsulator nodes are the tunnel endpoints. These could be routers that provide network tunnels on behalf of communicating hosts.

5.2. Transport layer encapsulation

When encapsulating layer 4 packets, the encapsulator and decapsulator should be co-resident with the hosts. In this case, the encapsulation headers are inserted between the IP header and the transport packet. The addresses in the IP header refer to both the endpoints of the encapsulation and the endpoints for terminating the the transport protocol. Note that the transport layer ports in the encapsulated packet are independent of the UDP ports in the outer packet.

Details about performing transport layer encapsulation are discussed in [TOU].

5.3. Encapsulator operation

Encapsulators create GUE data messages, set the fields of the UDP header, set flags and optional extension fields in the GUE header, and forward packets to a decapsulator.

An encapsulator may be an end host originating the packets of a flow, or may be a network device performing encapsulation on behalf of hosts (routers implementing tunnels for instance). In either case, the intended target (decapsulator) is indicated by the outer destination IP address and destination port in the UDP header.
If an encapsulator is tunnelling packets, that is encapsulating packets of layer 2 or layer 3 protocols (e.g. EtherIP, IPIP, ESP tunnel mode), it should follow standard conventions for tunneling of one protocol over another. For instance, if an IP packet is being encapsulated in GUE then differentiated services interaction [RFC2983] and ECN propagation for tunnels [RFC6040] should be followed.

5.4. Decapsulator operation

A decapsulator performs decapsulation of GUE packets. A decapsulator is addressed by the outer destination IP address of a GUE packet. The decapsulator validates packets, including fields of the GUE header.

If a decapsulator receives a GUE packet with an unsupported version, unknown flag, bad header length (too small for included extension fields), unknown control message type, bad protocol number, an unsupported Proto/ctype, or an otherwise malformed header, it MUST drop the packet. Such events may be logged subject to configuration and rate limiting of logging messages. No error message is returned back to the encapsulator. Note that set flags in GUE that are unknown to a decapsulator MUST NOT be ignored. If a GUE packet is received by a decapsulator with unknown flags, the packet MUST be dropped.

5.4.1. Processing a received data message

If a valid data message is received the UDP and GUE headers are removed from the packet. The outer IP header remains in tact and the next protocol in the header is set to the protocol from the proto field in the GUE header. The resulting packet is then resubmitted into the protocol stack to process that packet as though it was received with the protocol in the GUE header.

As an example, consider that a data message is received where GUE encapsulates an IP packet. In this case proto field in the GUE header is set 94 for IPIP:

```
+-------------------------------------+
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IP header (next proto = 17,UDP)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GUE (proto = 94,IPIP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IP header and packet</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
+-------------------------------------+
```

The receiver removes the UDP and GUE headers and sets the next
protocol field in the IP packet to IPIP which is derived from the GUE proto field. The resultant packet would have the format:

+-------------------------------------+
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IP header (next proto = 94,IPIP)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IP header and packet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This packet is then resubmitted into the protocol stack to be processed as an IPIP packet.

5.4.2. Processing a received control message

If a valid control message is received the packet must be processed as a control message. The specific processing to be performed depends on the ctype in the GUE header.

5.5. Router and switch operation

Routers and switches should forward GUE packets as standard UDP/IP packets. The outer five-tuple should contain sufficient information to perform flow classification corresponding to the flow of the inner packet. A switch should not normally need to parse a GUE header, and none of the flags or extension fields in the GUE header should affect routing.

An intermediate node SHOULD NOT modify a GUE header or GUE payload when forwarding packets since correctly identifying GUE packets in the network based on port numbers is not robust (see [RFC7605]). An intermediate node may encapsulate a GUE packet in another GUE packet, for instance to implement a network tunnel (i.e. by encapsulating an IP packet with a GUE payload in another IP packet as a GUE payload). In this case the router takes the role of an encapsulator, and the corresponding decapsulator is the logical endpoint of the tunnel. When encapsulating a GUE packet within another GUE packet, there are no provisions to automatically copy flags or extension fields to the outer GUE header. Each layer of encapsulation is considered independent.

5.6. Middlebox interactions

A middle box may interpret some flags and extension fields of the GUE header for classification purposes, but is not required to understand any of the flags or extension fields in GUE packets. A middle box must not drop a GUE packet because there are flags unknown to it. The header length in the GUE header allows a middlebox to inspect the payload packet without needing to parse the flags or extension.
fields.

5.6.1. Connection semantics

A middlebox may infer bidirectional connection semantics for a UDP flow. For instance a stateful firewall may create a five-tuple rule to match flows on egress, and a corresponding five-tuple rule for matching ingress packets where the roles of source and destination are reversed for the IP addresses and UDP port numbers. To operate in this environment, a GUE tunnel must assume connected semantics defined by the UDP five tuple and the use of GUE encapsulation must be symmetric between both endpoints. The source port set in the UDP header must be the destination port the peer would set for replies. In this case the UDP source port for a tunnel would be a fixed value for a tunnel and not set to be flow entropy as described in section 5.11.

The selection of whether to make the UDP source port fixed or set to a flow entropy value for each packet sent should be configurable for a tunnel.

5.6.2. NAT

IP address and port translation can be performed on the UDP/IP headers adhering to the requirements for NAT with UDP [RFC4787]. In the case of stateful NAT, connection semantics must be applied to a GUE tunnel as described in section 5.6.1. GUE endpoints may also invoke STUN [RFC5389] or ICE [RFC5245] to manage NAT port mappings for encapsulations.

5.7. Checksum Handling

The potential for mis-delivery of packets due to corruption of IP, UDP, or GUE headers must be considered. Historically, the UDP checksum would be considered sufficient as a check against corruption of either the UDP header and payload or the IP addresses. Encapsulation protocols, such as GUE, may be originated or terminated on devices incapable of computing the UDP checksum for packet. This section discusses the requirements around checksum and alternatives that might be used when an endpoint does not support UDP checksum.

5.7.1. Requirements

One of the following requirements must be met:

- UDP checksums are enabled (for IPv4 or IPv6).
5.7.2. UDP Checksum with IPv4

For UDP in IPv4, the UDP checksum MUST be processed as specified in [RFC768] and [RFC1122] for both transmit and receive. An encapsulator MAY set the UDP checksum to zero for performance or implementation considerations. The IPv4 header includes a checksum that protects against mis-delivery of the packet due to corruption of IP addresses. The UDP checksum potentially provides protection against corruption of the UDP header, GUE header, and GUE payload. Enabling or disabling the use of checksums is a deployment consideration that should take into account the risk and effects of packet corruption, and whether the packets in the network are already adequately protected by other, possibly stronger mechanisms such as the Ethernet CRC. If an encapsulator sets a zero UDP checksum for IPv4 it SHOULD use the GUE header checksum as described in [GUEEXTENS].

When a decapsulator receives a packet, the UDP checksum field MUST be processed. If the UDP checksum is non-zero, the decapsulator MUST verify the checksum before accepting the packet. By default a decapsulator SHOULD accept UDP packets with a zero checksum. A node MAY be configured to disallow zero checksums per [RFC1122]; this may be done selectively, for instance disallowing zero checksums from certain hosts that are known to be sending over paths subject to packet corruption. If verification of a non-zero checksum fails, a decapsulator lacks the capability to verify a non-zero checksum, or a packet with a zero-checksum was received and the decapsulator is configured to disallow, the packet MUST be dropped.

5.7.3. UDP Checksum with IPv6

In IPv6 there is no checksum in the IPv6 header that protects against mis-delivery due to address corruption. Therefore, when GUE is used over IPv6, either the UDP checksum must be enabled, the GUE header checksum must be used, or a zero UDP checksum is used if applicable requirements are met. Setting a zero checksum may be desirable for performance or implementation reasons, in which case the GUE header checksum MUST be used or requirements for using zero UDP checksums in [RFC6935] and [RFC6936] MUST be met. If the UDP checksum is enabled, then the GUE header checksum should not be used since it is mostly redundant.

When a decapsulator receives a packet, the UDP checksum field MUST be
processed. If the UDP checksum is non-zero, the decapsulator MUST verify the checksum before accepting the packet. By default a decapsulator MUST only accept UDP packets with a zero checksum if the GUE header checksum is used and is verified. If verification of a non-zero checksum fails, a decapsulator lacks the capability to verify a non-zero checksum, or a packet with a zero-checksum and no GUE header checksum was received, the packet MUST be dropped.

5.8. MTU and fragmentation

Standard conventions for handling of MTU (Maximum Transmission Unit) and fragmentation in conjunction with networking tunnels (encapsulation of layer 2 or layer 3 packets) should be followed. Details are described in MTU and Fragmentation Issues with In-the-Network Tunneling [RFC4459]

If a packet is fragmented before encapsulation in GUE, all the related fragments must be encapsulated using the same UDP source port. An operator should set MTU to account for encapsulation overhead and reduce the likelihood of fragmentation.

Alternative to IP fragmentation, the GUE fragmentation extension can be used. GUE fragmentation is described in [GUEEXTENS].

5.9. Congestion control

Per requirements of [RFC5405], if the IP traffic encapsulated with GUE implements proper congestion control no additional mechanisms should be required.

In the case that the encapsulated traffic does not implement any or sufficient control, or it is not known whether a transmitter will consistently implement proper congestion control, then congestion control at the encapsulation layer MUST be provided per RFC5405. Note this case applies to a significant use case in network virtualization in which guests run third party networking stacks that cannot be implicitly trusted to implement conformant congestion control.

Out of band mechanisms such as rate limiting, Managed Circuit Breaker [CIRCBRK], or traffic isolation may be used to provide rudimentary congestion control. For finer grained congestion control that allows alternate congestion control algorithms, reaction time within an RTT, and interaction with ECN, in-band mechanisms may be warranted.

5.10. Multicast

GUE packets may be multicast to decapsulators using a multicast destination address in the encapsulating IP headers. Each receiving
host will decapsulate the packet independently following normal
decapsulator operations. The receiving decapsulators should agree on
the same set of GUE parameters and properties; how such an agreement
is reached is outside the scope of this document.

GUE allows encapsulation of unicast, broadcast, or multicast traffic.
Flow entropy (the value in the UDP source port) may be generated from
the header of encapsulated unicast or broadcast/multicast packets at
an encapsulator. The mapping mechanism between the encapsulated
multicast traffic and the multicast capability in the IP network is
transparent and independent of the encapsulation and is otherwise
outside the scope of this document.

5.11. Flow entropy for ECMP

5.11.1. Flow classification

A major objective of using GUE is that a network device can perform
flow classification corresponding to the flow of the inner
encapsulated packet based on the contents in the outer headers.

Hardware devices commonly perform hash computations on packet headers
to classify packets into flows or flow buckets. Flow classification
is done to support load balancing of flows across a set of networking
resources. Examples of such load balancing techniques are Equal Cost
Multipath routing (ECMP), port selection in Link Aggregation, and NIC
device Receive Side Scaling (RSS). Hashes are usually either a
three-tuple hash of IP protocol, source address, and destination
address; or a five-tuple hash consisting of IP protocol, source
address, destination address, source port, and destination port.
Typically, networking hardware will compute five-tuple hashes for TCP
and UDP, but only three-tuple hashes for other IP protocols. Since
the five-tuple hash provides more granularity, load balancing can be
finer grained with better distribution. When a packet is encapsulated
with GUE and connection semantics are not applied, the source port in
the outer UDP packet is set to a flow entropy value that corresponds
to the flow of the inner packet. When a device computes a five-tuple
hash on the outer UDP/IP header of a GUE packet, the resultant value
classifies the packet per its inner flow.

Examples of deriving flow entropy for encapsulation are:

- If the encapsulated packet is a layer 4 packet, TCP/IPv4 for
  instance, the flow entropy could be based on the canonical five-
tuple hash of the inner packet.

- If the encapsulated packet is an AH transport mode packet with
  TCP as next header, the flow entropy could be a hash over a
three-tuple: TCP protocol and TCP ports of the encapsulated packet.

- If a node is encrypting a packet using ESP tunnel mode and GUE encapsulation, the flow entropy could be based on the contents of clear-text packet. For instance, a canonical five-tuple hash for a TCP/IP packet could be used.

[RFC6438] discusses methods to compute and flow entropy value for IPv6 flow labels, those methods can also be used to create flow entropy values for GUE.

5.11.2. Flow entropy properties

The flow entropy is the value set in the UDP source port of a GUE packet. Flow entropy in the UDP source port should adhere to the following properties:

- The value set in the source port should be within the ephemeral port range (49152 to 65535 [RFC6335]). Since the high order two bits of the port are set to one this provides fourteen bits of entropy for the value.

- The flow entropy should have a uniform distribution across encapsulated flows.

- An encapsulator may occasionally change the flow entropy used for an inner flow per its discretion (for security, route selection, etc). To avoid thrashing or flapping the value, the flow entropy used for a flow should not change more than once every thirty seconds (or a configurable value).

- Decapsulators, or any networking devices, should not attempt to interpret flow entropy as anything more than an opaque value. Neither should they attempt to reproduce the hash calculation used by an encapsulator in creating a flow entropy value. They may use the value to match further receive packets for steering decisions, but cannot assume that the hash uniquely or permanently identifies a flow.

- Input to the flow entropy calculation is not restricted to ports and addresses; input could include flow label from an IPv6 packet, SPI from an ESP packet, or other flow related state in the encapsulator that is not necessarily conveyed in the packet.

- The assignment function for flow entropy should be randomly seeded to mitigate denial of service attacks. The seed may be changed periodically.
5.12. Negotiation of acceptable flags and extension fields

An encapsulator and decapsulator must achieve agreement about GUE parameters that will be used in communications. Parameters include GUE versions, flags and optional extension fields that can be used, security algorithms and keys, supported protocols and control messages, etc. This document proposes different general methods to accomplish this, the details of implementing these are considered out of scope.

General methods for this are:

- Configuration. The parameters used for a tunnel are configured at each endpoint.
- Negotiation. A tunnel negotiation can be performed. This could be accomplished in-band of GUE using control messages or private data.
- Via a control plane. Parameters for communicating with a tunnel endpoint can be set in a control plane protocol (such as that needed for nvo3).
- Via security negotiation. If security is used that would typically imply a key exchange between endpoints. Other GUE parameters may be conveyed as part of that process.

6. Motivation for GUE

This section presents the motivation for GUE with respect to other encapsulation methods.

6.1. Benefits of GUE

- GUE is a generic encapsulation protocol. GUE can encapsulate protocols that are represented by an IP protocol number. This includes layer 2, layer 3, and layer 4 protocols.
- GUE is an extensible encapsulation protocol. Standardized optional data such as security, virtual networking identifiers, fragmentation are being defined.
- GUE allows private data to be sent as part of the encapsulation. This permits experimentation or customization in deployment.
- GUE allows sending of control messages such as OAM using the same GUE header format (for routing purposes) as normal data messages.
* GUE maximizes deliverability of non-UDP and non-TCP protocols.
* GUE provides a means for exposing per flow entropy for ECMP for atypical protocols such as SCTP, DCCP, ESP, etc.

6.2. Comparison of GUE to other encapsulations

A number of different encapsulation techniques have been proposed for the encapsulation of one protocol over another. EtherIP [RFC3378] provides layer 2 tunneling of Ethernet frames over IP. GRE [RFC2784], MPLS [RFC4023], and L2TP [RFC2661] provide methods for tunneling layer 2 and layer 3 packets over IP. NVGRE [RFC7637] and VXLAN [RFC7348] are proposals for encapsulation of layer 2 packets for network virtualization. IPIP [RFC2003] and Generic packet tunneling in IPv6 [RFC2473] provide methods for tunneling IP packets over IP.

Several proposals exist for encapsulating packets over UDP including ESP over UDP [RFC3948], TCP directly over UDP [TCPUDP], VXLAN [RFC7348], LISP [RFC6830] which encapsulates layer 3 packets, MPLS/UDP [7510], and Generic UDP Encapsulation for IP Tunneling (GRE over UDP) [GREUDP]. Generic UDP tunneling [GUT] is a proposal similar to GUE in that it aims to tunnel packets of IP protocols over UDP.

GUE has the following discriminating features:

- **UDP encapsulation leverages specialized network device processing for efficient transport.** The semantics for using the UDP source port for flow entropy as input to ECMP are defined in section 5.11.
- **GUE permits encapsulation of arbitrary IP protocols, which includes layer 2, 3, and 4 protocols.**
- **Multiple protocols can be multiplexed over a single UDP port number.** This is in contrast to techniques to encapsulate protocols over UDP using a protocol specific port number (such as ESP/UDP, GRE/UDP, SCTP/UDP). GUE provides a uniform and extensible mechanism for encapsulating various IP protocols in UDP with minimal overhead (four bytes of additional header).
- **GUE is extensible.** New flags and extension fields can be defined.
- **The GUE header includes a header length field.** This allows a network node to inspect an encapsulated packet without needing to parse the full encapsulation header.
- **Private data in the encapsulation header allows local...**
customization and experimentation while being compatible with processing in network nodes (routers and middleboxes).

- GUE includes both data messages (encapsulation of packets) and control messages (such as OAM).

- The flags-field model facilitates efficient implementation of extensibility in hardware.

For instance a TCAM can be use to parse a known set of N flags where the number of entries in the TCAM is 2^N.

By comparison, the number of TCAM entries needed to parse a set of N arbitrarily ordered TLVS is:

\[ N! + (N - 1)(N-1)! + (N - 2)(N-2)! + \ldots + (2)2! + (1)1! \]

7. Security Considerations

There are two important considerations of security with respect to GUE.

- Authentication and integrity of the GUE header
- Authentication, integrity, and confidentiality of the GUE payload.

Security is integrated into GUE by the use of GUE security related extensions; these are defined in [GUEEXTENS]. These extensions include methods to authenticate the GUE header and encrypt the GUE payload.

IPsec in transport mode may be used to authenticate or encrypt GUE packets (GUE header and payload). Existing network security mechanisms, such as address spoofing detection, DDOS mitigation, and transparent encrypted tunnels can be applied to GUE packets.

A hash function for computing flow entropy (section 5.11) should be randomly seeded to mitigate some possible denial service attacks.
8. IANA Consideration

8.1. UDP source port

A user UDP port number assignment for GUE has been assigned:

Service Name: gue
Transport Protocol(s): UDP
Assignee: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com>
Contact: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com>
Description: Generic UDP Encapsulation
Reference: draft-herbert-gue
Port Number: 6080
Service Code: N/A
Known Unauthorized Uses: N/A
Assignment Notes: N/A

8.2. GUE version number

IANA is requested to set up a registry for the GUE version number. The GUE version number is 2 bits containing four possible values. This document defines version 0 and 1. New values are assigned via Standards Action [RFC5226].

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Version number</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Version 0</td>
<td>This document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Version 1</td>
<td>This document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2..3</td>
<td>Unassigned</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8.3. Control types

IANA is requested to set up a registry for the GUE control types. Control types are 8 bit values. New values for control types 1-127 are assigned via Standards Action [RFC5226].
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Control type</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Need further interpretation</td>
<td>This document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1..127</td>
<td>Unassigned</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>128..255</td>
<td>User defined</td>
<td>This document</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8.4. Flag-fields

IANA is requested to create a "GUE flag-fields" registry to allocate flags and extension fields used with GUE. This shall be a registry of bit assignments for flags, length of extension fields for corresponding flags, and descriptive strings. There are sixteen bits for primary GUE header flags (bit number 0-15). New values are assigned via Standards Action [RFC5226].

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Flags bits</th>
<th>Field size</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bit 0</td>
<td>4 bytes</td>
<td>VNID</td>
<td>[GUE4NVO3]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bit 1..3</td>
<td>001-&gt;8 bytes</td>
<td>Security</td>
<td>[GUEEXTENS]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>010-&gt;16 bytes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>011-&gt;32 bytes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bit 4</td>
<td>8 bytes</td>
<td>Fragmentation</td>
<td>[GUEEXTENS]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bit 5</td>
<td>4 bytes</td>
<td>Payload transform</td>
<td>[GUEEXTENS]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bit 6</td>
<td>4 bytes</td>
<td>Remote checksum offload</td>
<td>[GUEEXTENS]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bit 7</td>
<td>4 bytes</td>
<td>Checksum</td>
<td>[GUEEXTENS]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bit 8..15</td>
<td>Unassigned</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

New flags are to be allocated from high to low order bit contiguously without holes.
9. Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank David Liu, Erik Nordmark, Fred Templin, Adrian Farrel, and Bob Briscoe for valuable input on this draft.

10. References

10.1. Normative References


10.2. Informative References


Herbert, Yong, Zia Expires May 1, 2017 [Page 30]


Appendix A: NIC processing for GUE

This appendix provides some guidelines for Network Interface Cards (NICs) to implement common offloads and accelerations to support GUE. Note that most of this discussion is generally applicable to other methods of UDP based encapsulation.

This appendix is informational and does not constitute a normative part of this document.

A.1. Receive multi-queue

Contemporary NICs support multiple receive descriptor queues (multi-queue). Multi-queue enables load balancing of network processing for a NIC across multiple CPUs. On packet reception, a NIC must select the appropriate queue for host processing. Receive Side Scaling is a common method which uses the flow hash for a packet to index an indirection table where each entry stores a queue number. Flow
Director and Accelerated Receive Flow Steering (aRFS) allow a host to program the queue that is used for a given flow which is identified either by an explicit five-tuple or by the flow’s hash.

GUE encapsulation should be compatible with multi-queue NICs that support five-tuple hash calculation for UDP/IP packets as input to RSS. The flow entropy in the UDP source port ensures classification of the encapsulated flow even in the case that the outer source and destination addresses are the same for all flows (e.g. all flows are going over a single tunnel).

By default, UDP RSS support is often disabled in NICs to avoid out of order reception that can occur when UDP packets are fragmented. As discussed above, fragmentation of GUE packets should be mitigated by fragmenting packets before entering a tunnel, GUE fragmentation, path MTU discovery in higher layer protocols, or operator adjusting MTUs. Other UDP traffic may not implement such procedures to avoid fragmentation, so enabling UDP RSS support in the NIC should be a considered tradeoff during configuration.

A.2. Checksum offload

Many NICs provide capabilities to calculate standard ones complement payload checksum for packets in transmit or receive. When using GUE encapsulation there are at least two checksums that may be of interest: the encapsulated packet’s transport checksum, and the UDP checksum in the outer header.

A.2.1. Transmit checksum offload

NICs may provide a protocol agnostic method to offload transmit checksum (NETIF_F_HW_CSUM in Linux parlance) that can be used with GUE. In this method the host provides checksum related parameters in a transmit descriptor for a packet. These parameters include the starting offset of data to checksum, the length of data to checksum, and the offset in the packet where the computed checksum is to be written. The host initializes the checksum field to pseudo header checksum.

In the case of GUE, the checksum for an encapsulated transport layer packet, a TCP packet for instance, can be offloaded by setting the appropriate checksum parameters.

NICs typically can offload only one transmit checksum per packet, so simultaneously offloading both an inner transport packet’s checksum and the outer UDP checksum is likely not possible.

If an encapsulator is co-resident with a host, then checksum offload
may be performed using remote checksum offload (described in [GUEEXTENS]). Remote checksum offload relies on NIC offload of the simple UDP/IP checksum which is commonly supported even in legacy devices. In remote checksum offload the outer UDP checksum is set and the GUE header includes an option indicating the start and offset of the inner "offloaded" checksum. The inner checksum is initialized to the pseudo header checksum. When a decapsulator receives a GUE packet with the remote checksum offload option, it completes the offload operation by determining the packet checksum from the indicated start point to the end of the packet, and then adds this into the checksum field at the offset given in the option. Computing the checksum from the start to end of packet is efficient if checksum-complete is provided on the receiver.

Another alternative when an encapsulator is co-resident with a host is to perform Local Checksum Offload [LCO]. In this method the inner transport layer checksum is offloaded and the outer UDP checksum can be deduced based on the fact that the portion of the packet cover by the inner transport checksum will sum to zero (or at least the bitwise not of the inner pseudo header).

A.2.2. Receive checksum offload

GUE is compatible with NICs that perform a protocol agnostic receive checksum (CHECKSUM_COMPLETE in Linux parlance). In this technique, a NIC computes a ones complement checksum over all (or some predefined portion) of a packet. The computed value is provided to the host stack in the packet’s receive descriptor. The host driver can use this checksum to "patch up" and validate any inner packet transport checksum, as well as the outer UDP checksum if it is non-zero.

Many legacy NICs don’t provide checksum-complete but instead provide an indication that a checksum has been verified (CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY in Linux). Usually, such validation is only done for simple TCP/IP or UDP/IP packets. If a NIC indicates that a UDP checksum is valid, the checksum-complete value for the UDP packet is the "not" of the pseudo header checksum. In this way, checksum-unnecessary can be converted to checksum-complete. So if the NIC provides checksum-unnecessary for the outer UDP header in an encapsulation, checksum conversion can be done so that the checksum-complete value is derived and can be used by the stack to validate checksums in the encapsulated packet.

A.3. Transmit Segmentation Offload

Transmit Segmentation Offload (TSO) is a NIC feature where a host provides a large (>MTU size) TCP packet to the NIC, which in turn splits the packet into separate segments and transmits each one. This is useful to reduce CPU load on the host.
The process of TSO can be generalized as:

- Split the TCP payload into segments which allow packets with size less than or equal to MTU.

- For each created segment:
  1. Replicate the TCP header and all preceding headers of the original packet.
  2. Set payload length fields in any headers to reflect the length of the segment.
  3. Set TCP sequence number to correctly reflect the offset of the TCP data in the stream.
  4. Recompute and set any checksums that either cover the payload of the packet or cover header which was changed by setting a payload length.

Following this general process, TSO can be extended to support TCP encapsulation in GUE. For each segment the Ethernet, outer IP, UDP header, GUE header, inner IP header if tunneling, and TCP headers are replicated. Any packet length header fields need to be set properly (including the length in the outer UDP header), and checksums need to be set correctly (including the outer UDP checksum if being used).

To facilitate TSO with GUE it is recommended that extension fields should not contain values that must be updated on a per segment basis-- for example, extension fields should not include checksums, lengths, or sequence numbers that refer to the payload. If the GUE header does not contain such fields then the TSO engine only needs to copy the bits in the GUE header when creating each segment and does not need to parse the GUE header.

A.4. Large Receive Offload

Large Receive Offload (LRO) is a NIC feature where packets of a TCP connection are reassembled, or coalesced, in the NIC and delivered to the host as one large packet. This feature can reduce CPU utilization in the host.

LRO requires significant protocol awareness to be implemented correctly and is difficult to generalize. Packets in the same flow need to be unambiguously identified. In the presence of tunnels or network virtualization, this may require more than a five-tuple match (for instance packets for flows in two different virtual networks may have identical five-tuples). Additionally, a NIC needs to perform
validation over packets that are being coalesced, and needs to fabricate a single meaningful header from all the coalesced packets.

The conservative approach to supporting LRO for GUE would be to assign packets to the same flow only if they have identical five-tuple and were encapsulated the same way. That is the outer IP addresses, the outer UDP ports, GUE protocol, GUE flags and fields, and inner five tuple are all identical.

Appendix B: Implementation considerations

This appendix is informational and does not constitute a normative part of this document.

B.1. Privileged ports

Using the source port to contain a flow entropy value disallows the security method of a receiver enforcing that the source port be a privileged port. Privileged ports are defined by some operating systems to restrict source port binding. Unix, for instance, considered port number less than 1024 to be privileged.

Enforcing that packets are sent from a privileged port is widely considered an inadequate security mechanism and has been mostly deprecated. To approximate this behavior, an implementation could restrict a user from sending a packet destined to the GUE port without proper credentials.

B.2. Setting flow entropy as a route selector

An encapsulator generating flow entropy in the UDP source port may modulate the value to perform a type of multipath source routing. Assuming that networking switches perform ECMP based on the flow hash, a sender can affect the path by altering the flow entropy. For instance, a host may store a flow hash in its PCB for an inner flow, and may alter the value upon detecting that packets are traversing a lossy path. Changing the flow entropy for a flow should be subject to hysteresis (at most once every thirty seconds) to limit the number of out of order packets.

B.3. Hardware protocol implementation considerations

A low level protocol, such as GUE, is likely interesting to being supported by high speed network devices. Variable length header (VLH) protocols like GUE are often considered difficult to efficiently implement in hardware. In order to retain the important characteristics of an extensible and robust protocol, hardware vendors may practice "constrained flexibility". In this model, only
certain combinations or protocol header parameterizations are implemented in hardware fast path. Each such parameterization is fixed length so that the particular instance can be optimized as a fixed length protocol. In the case of GUE this constitutes specific combinations of GUE flags, fields, and next protocol. The selected combinations would naturally be the most common cases which form the "fast path", and other combinations are assumed to take the "slow path".

In time, needs and requirements of the protocol may change which may manifest themselves as new parameterizations to be supported in the fast path. To allow allow this extensibility, a device practicing constrained flexibility should allow the fast path parameterizations to be programmable.

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Abstract

This draft describes extending Virtual eXtensible Local Area Network (VXLAN), via changes to the VXLAN header, with three new capabilities: support for multi-protocol encapsulation, operations, administration and management (OAM) signaling and explicit versioning.

Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

Status of This Memo

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This Internet-Draft will expire on October 12, 2019.

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1. Introduction

Virtual eXtensible Local Area Network VXLAN [RFC7348] defines an encapsulation format that encapsulates Ethernet frames in an outer UDP/IP transport. As data centers evolve, the need to carry other protocols encapsulated in an IP packet is required, as well as the need to provide increased visibility and diagnostic capabilities.
within the overlay. The VXLAN header does not specify the protocol being encapsulated and therefore is currently limited to encapsulating only Ethernet frame payload, nor does it provide the ability to define OAM protocols. In addition, [RFC6335] requires that new transports not use transport layer port numbers to identify tunnel payload, rather it encourages encapsulations to use their own identifiers for this purpose. VXLAN GPE is intended to extend the existing VXLAN protocol to provide protocol typing, OAM, and versioning capabilities.

The Version and OAM bits are introduced in Section 3, and the choice of location for these fields is driven by minimizing the impact on existing deployed hardware.

In order to facilitate deployments of VXLAN GPE with hardware currently deployed to support VXLAN, changes from legacy VXLAN have been kept to a minimum. Section 5 provides a detailed discussion about how VXLAN GPE addresses the requirement for backward compatibility with VXLAN.

2. VXLAN Without Protocol Extension

VXLAN provides a method of creating multi-tenant overlay networks by encapsulating packets in IP/UDP along with a header containing a network identifier which is used to isolate tenant traffic in each overlay network from each other. This allows the overlay networks to run over an existing IP network.

Through this encapsulation, VXLAN creates stateless tunnels between VXLAN Tunnel End Points (VTEPs) which are responsible for adding/removing the IP/UDP/VXLAN headers and providing tenant traffic isolation based on the VXLAN Network Identifier (VNI). Tenant systems are unaware that their networking service is being provided by an overlay.

When encapsulating packets, a VTEP must know the IP address of the proper remote VTEP at the far end of the tunnel that can deliver the inner packet to the Tenant System corresponding to the inner destination address. In the case of tenant multicast or broadcast, the outer IP address may be an IP multicast group address, or the VTEP may replicate the packet and send it to all known VTEPs. If multicast is used in the underlay network to send encapsulated packets to remote VTEPs, Any Source Multicast is used and each VTEP serving a particular VNI must perform a (*, G) join to the same group IP address.
Inner to outer address mapping can be determined in two ways. One is source based learning in the data plane, and the other is distribution via a control plane.

Source based learning requires a receiving VTEP to create an inner to outer address mapping by gleaning the information from the received packets by correlating the inner source address to the outer source IP address. When a mapping does not exist, a VTEP forwards the packets to all remote VTEPs participating in the VNI by using IP multicast in the IP underlay network. Each VTEP must be configured with the IP multicast address to use for each VNI. How this occurs is out of scope.

The control plane used to distribute inner to outer mappings is also out of scope. It could use a centralized authority or be distributed, or use a hybrid.

The VXLAN Network Identifier (VNI) provides scoping for the addresses in the header of the encapsulated PDU. If the encapsulated packet is an Ethernet frame, this means the Ethernet MAC addresses are only unique within a given VNI and may overlap with MAC addresses within a different VNI. If the encapsulated packet is an IP packet, this means the IP addresses are only unique within that VNI.

![Figure 1: VXLAN Header](image)

3. Generic Protocol Extension for VXLAN (VXLAN GPE)

3.1. VXLAN GPE Header

![Figure 2: VXLAN GPE Header](image)
Flags (8 bits): The first 8 bits of the header are the flag field. The bits designated "R" above are reserved flags. These MUST be set to zero on transmission and ignored on receipt.

Version (Ver): Indicates VXLAN GPE protocol version. The initial version is 0. If a receiver does not support the version indicated it MUST drop the packet.

Instance Bit (I bit): The I bit MUST be set to indicate a valid VNI.

Next Protocol Bit (P bit): The P bit is set to indicate that the Next Protocol field is present.

BUM Traffic Bit (B bit): The B bit is set to indicate that this is ingress-replicated BUM Traffic (ie, Broadcast, Unknown unicast, or Multicast).

OAM Flag Bit (O bit): The O bit is set to indicate that the packet is an OAM packet.

Next Protocol: This 8 bit field indicates the protocol header immediately following the VXLAN GPE header.

VNI: This 24 bit field identifies the VXLAN overlay network the inner packet belongs to. Inner packets belonging to different VNIs cannot communicate with each other (unless explicitly allowed by policy).

Reserved: Reserved fields MUST be set to zero on transmission and ignored on receipt.

3.2. Multi Protocol Support

This draft defines the following two changes to the VXLAN header in order to support multi-protocol encapsulation:

P Bit: Flag bit 5 is defined as the Next Protocol bit. The P bit MUST be set to 1 to indicate the presence of the 8 bit next protocol field.

When UDP dest port=4790, P = 0 the "Next Protocol" field must be set to zero and the payload MUST be ETHERNET(L2) as defined by [RFC7348].

Flag bit 5 was chosen as the P bit because this flag bit is currently reserved in VXLAN.
Next Protocol Field: The lower 8 bits of the first word are used to carry a next protocol. This next protocol field contains the protocol of the encapsulated payload packet. A new protocol registry will be requested from IANA, see section 10.2.

This draft defines the following Next Protocol values:

0x1 :  IPv4
0x2 :  IPv6
0x3 :  Ethernet
0x4 :  Network Service Header [RFC8300]
0x5 :  Multiprotocol Label Switching [RFC3031]. See [I-D.ietf-idr-tunnel-encaps] for more details.
0x6:  Unassigned.
0x7:  virtual Broadband Network Gateway (vBNG)  [I-D.huang-nvo3-vxlan-gpe-extension-for-vbng].

0x8 to 0x7F:  Unassigned.
0x80:  Group-Based Policy (GBP) [I-D.lemon-vxlan-lisp-gpe-gbp]
0x81:  In-situ OAM Data (iOAM)[I-D.brockners-ippm-ioam-vxlan-gpe]
0x82 to 0xFF:  Unassigned.

Next protocol values from 0x80 to 0xFF are assigned to protocols encoded as generic "shim" headers. These protocols, when present, MUST be encapsulated before protocols identified by next protocol values from 0x0 to 0x7F.

Implementations that are not aware of a given shim header MUST ignore the header and proceed to parse the next protocol. Shim protocols MUST have the first 32 bits defined as:
Where:

Type: This field MAY be used to identify different messages of this protocol.

Length: The length, in bytes, of this protocol message not including the first 4 bytes.

Reserved: The use of this field is reserved to the protocol defined in this message.

Next Protocol Field: This next protocol field contains the protocol of the encapsulated payload. The protocol registry will be requested from IANA as per section 10.2.

3.3. Replicated BUM Traffic

Flag bit 6 is defined as the B bit. When the B bit is set to 1, the packet is marked as an ingress-replicated BUM Traffic (i.e. Broadcast, Unknown unicast, or Multicast) to help egress VTEP to differentiate between known and unknown unicast. The details of using the B bit are out of scope for this document, but please see [RFC8365] for an example in the EVPN context. As with the P-bit, bit 6 is currently a reserved flag in VXLAN.

3.4. OAM Support

Flag bit 7 is defined as the O bit. When the O bit is set to 1, the packet is an OAM packet and OAM processing MUST occur. Other header fields including Next Protocol MUST adhere to the definitions in Section 3. The OAM protocol details are out of scope for this document. As with the P-bit, bit 7 is currently a reserved flag in VXLAN.
3.5. Version Bits

VXLAN GPE bits 2 and 3 are defined as version bits. These bits are reserved in VXLAN. The version field is used to ensure backward compatibility going forward with future VXLAN GPE updates.

The initial version for VXLAN GPE is 0.

4. Outer Encapsulations

In addition to the VXLAN GPE header, the packet is further encapsulated in UDP and IP. Data centers based on Ethernet, will then send this IP packet over Ethernet.

Outer UDP Header:

Destination UDP Port: IANA has assigned the value 4790 for the VXLAN GPE UDP port. This well-known destination port is used when sending VXLAN GPE encapsulated packets.

Source UDP Port: The source UDP port is used as entropy for devices forwarding encapsulated packets across the underlay (ECMP for IP routers, or load splitting for link aggregation by bridges). Tenant traffic flows should all use the same source UDP port to lower the chances of packet reordering by the underlay for a given flow. It is recommended for VTEPs to generate this port number using a hash of the inner packet headers. Implementations MAY use the entire 16 bit source UDP port for entropy.

UDP Checksum: Source VTEPs MAY either calculate a valid checksum, or if this is not possible, set the checksum to zero. When calculating a checksum, it MUST be calculated across the entire packet (outer IP header, UDP header, VXLAN GPE header and payload packet). All receiving VTEPs must accept a checksum value of zero. If the receiving VTEP is capable of validating the checksum, it MAY validate a non-zero checksum and MUST discard the packet if the checksum is determined to be invalid.

Outer IP Header:

This is the header used by the underlay network to deliver packets between VTEPs. The destination IP address can be a unicast or a multicast IP address. The source IP address must be the source VTEP IP address which can be used to return tenant packets to the tenant system source address within the inner packet header.

When the outer IP header is IPv4, VTEPs MUST set the DF bit.
Outer Ethernet Header:

Most data centers networks are built on Ethernet. Assuming the outer IP packet is being sent across Ethernet, there will be an Ethernet header used to deliver the IP packet to the next hop, which could be the destination VTEP or be a router used to forward the IP packet towards the destination VTEP. If VLANs are in use within the data center, then this Ethernet header would also contain a VLAN tag.

The following figures show the entire stack of protocol headers that would be seen on an Ethernet link carrying encapsulated packets from a VTEP across the underlay network for both IPv4 and IPv6 based underlay networks.

```
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
```

Outer Ethernet Header:

```
+------------------+------------------+
| Outer Destination MAC Address |
|------------------+------------------|
| Outer Destination MAC Address | Outer Source MAC Address |
|------------------+------------------|
| Outer Source MAC Address |
|------------------+------------------|
| Opt Ethertype = C-Tag 802.1Q | Outer VLAN Tag |
|------------------+------------------|
| Ethertype = 0x0800 |
|------------------+------------------|
```

Outer IPv4 Header:

```
+------------------+------------------+
| Version | IHL | Type of Service | Total Length |
|------------------+------------------|
| Identification | Flags | Fragment Offset |
|------------------+------------------|
| Time to Live | Protocol=17(UDP) | Header Checksum |
|------------------+------------------|
| Outer Source IPv4 Address |
|------------------+------------------|
| Outer Destination IPv4 Address |
|------------------+------------------|
```

Outer UDP Header:

```
+------------------+------------------+
| Source Port | Dest Port = 4790 |
|------------------+------------------|
```
VXLAN GPE Header:

Payload:

Frame Check Sequence:

Figure 4: Outer Headers for VXLAN GPE over IPv4
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Payload Length</th>
<th>NxtHdr=17(UDP)</th>
<th>Hop Limit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>+---------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+---------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outer Source IPv6 Address</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+---------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+---------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+---------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outer Destination IPv6 Address</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+---------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+---------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+---------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Outer UDP Header:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source Port</th>
<th>Dest Port = 4790</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>+------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDP Length</td>
<td>UDP Checksum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

VXLAN GPE Header:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>R</th>
<th>R</th>
<th>Ver</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>P</th>
<th>R</th>
<th>O</th>
<th>Reserved</th>
<th>Next Protocol</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>+------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VXLAN Network Identifier (VNI)</td>
<td>Reserved</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>+------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Payload:

| Depends on VXLAN GPE Next Protocol field above. |
| Note that if the payload is Ethernet, then the original Ethernet Frame’s FCS is not included. |
| +--------------------------------------------------|
| +--------------------------------------------------|

Frame Check Sequence:

| New FCS (Frame Check Sequence) for Outer Ethernet Frame |
| +--------------------------------------------------|
| +--------------------------------------------------|

Figure 5: Outer Headers for VXLAN GPE over IPv6
4.1. Inner VLAN Tag Handling

If the inner packet (as indicated by the VXLAN GPE Next Protocol field) is an Ethernet frame, it is recommended that it does not contain a VLAN tag. In the most common scenarios, the tenant VLAN tag is translated into a VXLAN Network Identifier. In these scenarios, VTEPs should never send an inner Ethernet frame with a VLAN tag, and a VTEP performing decapsulation should discard any inner frames received with a VLAN tag. However, if the VTEPs are specifically configured to support it for a specific VXLAN Network Identifier, a VTEP may support transparent transport of the inner VLAN tag between all tenant systems on that VNI. The VTEP never looks at the value of the inner VLAN tag, but simply passes it across the underlay.

4.2. Fragmentation Considerations

VTEPs MUST never fragment an encapsulated VXLAN GPE packet, and when the outer IP header is IPv4, VTEPs MUST set the DF bit in the outer IPv4 header. It is recommended that the underlay network be configured to carry an MTU at least large enough to accommodate the added encapsulation headers. It is recommended that VTEPs perform Path MTU discovery [RFC1191] [RFC1981] to determine if the underlay network can carry the encapsulated payload packet.

5. Backward Compatibility

5.1. VXLAN VTEP to VXLAN GPE VTEP

A VXLAN VTEP conforms to VXLAN frame format and uses UDP destination port 4789 when sending traffic to VXLAN GPE VTEP. As per VXLAN, reserved bits 5 and 7, VXLAN GPE P and O-bits respectively must be set to zero. The remaining reserved bits must be zero, including the VXLAN GPE version field, bits 2 and 3. The encapsulated payload MUST be Ethernet.

5.2. VXLAN GPE VTEP to VXLAN VTEP

A VXLAN GPE VTEP MUST NOT encapsulate non-Ethernet frames to a VXLAN VTEP. When encapsulating Ethernet frames to a VXLAN VTEP, the VXLAN GPE VTEP MUST conform to VXLAN frame format and hence will set the P bit to 0, the Next Protocol to 0 and use UDP destination port 4789. A VXLAN GPE VTEP MUST also set O = 0 and Ver = 0 when encapsulating Ethernet frames to VXLAN VTEP. The receiving VXLAN VTEP will treat this packet as a VXLAN packet.

A method for determining the capabilities of a VXLAN VTEP (GPE or non-GPE) is out of the scope of this draft.
5.3. VXLAN GPE UDP Ports

VXLAN GPE uses a IANA assigned UDP destination port, 4790, when sending traffic to VXLAN GPE VTEPs.

5.4. VXLAN GPE and Encapsulated IP Header Fields

When encapsulating and decapsulating IPv4 and IPv6 packets, certain fields, such as IPv4 Time to Live (TTL) from the inner IP header need to be considered. VXLAN GPE IP encapsulation and decapsulation utilizes the techniques described in [RFC6830], section 5.3.

6. VXLAN GPE Examples

This section provides three examples of protocols encapsulated using the Generic Protocol Extension for VXLAN described in this document.

![Figure 6: IPv4 and VXLAN GPE](image6)

![Figure 7: IPv6 and VXLAN GPE](image7)
7. Security Considerations

VXLAN’s security is focused on issues around L2 encapsulation into L3. With VXLAN GPE, issues such as spoofing, flooding, and traffic redirection are dependent on the particular protocol payload encapsulated.

8. Contributors
9. Acknowledgments

A special thank you goes to Dino Farinacci for his guidance and detailed review.

10. IANA Considerations

10.1. UDP Port

UDP 4790 port has been assigned by IANA for VXLAN GPE.
10.2. VXLAN GPE Next Protocol

IANA is requested to set up a registry of "Next Protocol". These are 8-bit values. Next Protocol values in the table below are defined in this draft. New values are assigned via Standards Action [RFC5226].

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Next Protocol</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0x0</td>
<td>Reserved</td>
<td>This Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x1</td>
<td>IPv4</td>
<td>This Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x2</td>
<td>IPv6</td>
<td>This Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x3</td>
<td>Ethernet</td>
<td>This Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x4</td>
<td>NSH</td>
<td>This Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x5</td>
<td>MPLS</td>
<td>This Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x6</td>
<td>Unassigned</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x7</td>
<td>vBNG</td>
<td>This Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x8..0x7F</td>
<td>Unassigned</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x80</td>
<td>GBP</td>
<td>This Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x81</td>
<td>iOAM</td>
<td>This Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x82..0xFF</td>
<td>Unassigned</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10.3. VXLAN GPE Flag and Reserved Bits

There are ten flag bits at the beginning of the VXLAN GPE header, followed by 16 reserved bits and an 8-bit reserved field at the end of the header. New bits are assigned via Standards Action [RFC5226].

Bits 0-1 - Reserve6

Bits 2-3 - Version

Bit 4 - Instance ID (I bit)

Bit 5 - Next Protocol (P bit)

Bit 6 - Reserved

Bit 7 - OAM (O bit)

Bit 8-23 - Reserved

Bits 24-31 in the 2nd Word -- Reserved

Reserved bits-fields MUST be set to 0 by the sender and ignored by the receiver.
11. References

11.1. Normative References


11.2. Informative References

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Maino, Ed., et al. Expires October 12, 2019
Encapsulation Considerations
draft-ietf-rtgwg-dt-encap-02

Abstract

The IETF Routing Area director has chartered a design team to look at common issues for the different data plane encapsulations being discussed in the NVO3 and SFC working groups and also in the BIER BoF, and also to look at the relationship between such encapsulations in the case that they might be used at the same time. The purpose of this design team is to discover, discuss and document considerations across the different encapsulations in the different WGs/BoFs so that we can reduce the number of wheels that need to be reinvented in the future.

Status of This Memo

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Internet-Draft  Encapsulation Considerations  October 2016

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1. Design Team Charter

There have been multiple efforts over the years that have resulted in new or modified data plane behaviors involving encapsulations. That includes IETF efforts like MPLS, LISP, and TRILL but also industry efforts like VXLAN and NVGRE. These collectively can be seen as a source of insight into the properties that data planes need to meet. The IETF is currently working on potentially new encapsulations in NVO3 and SFC and considering working on BIER. In addition there is work on tunneling in the INT area.

This is a short term design team chartered to collect and construct useful advice to parties working on new or modified data plane behaviors that include additional encapsulations. The goal is for the group to document useful advice gathered from interacting with ongoing efforts. An Internet Draft will be produced for IETF92 to capture that advice, which will be discussed in RTGWG.

Data plane encapsulations face a set of common issues such as:

- How to provide entropy for ECMP
- Issues around packet size and fragmentation/reassembly
- OAM - what support is needed in an encapsulation format?
- Security and privacy.
- QoS
- Congestion Considerations
- IPv6 header protection (zero UDP checksum over IPv6 issue)
- Extensibility - e.g., for evolving OAM, security, and/or congestion control
- Layering of multiple encapsulations e.g., SFC over NVO3 over BIER

The design team will provide advice on those issues. The intention is that even where we have different encapsulations for different purposes carrying different information, each such encapsulation doesn’t have to reinvent the wheel for the above common issues.

The design team will look across the routing area in particular at SFC, NVO3 and BIER. It will not be involved in comparing or analyzing any particular encapsulation formats proposed in those WGs and BoFs but instead focus on common advice.
2. Overview

The references provide background information on NVO3, SFC, and BIER. In particular, NVO3 is introduced in [RFC7364], [RFC7365], and [I-D.ietf-nvo3-arch]. SFC is introduced in [I-D.ietf-sfc-architecture] and [I-D.ietf-sfc-problem-statement]. Finally, the information on BIER is in [I-D.shepherd-bier-problem-statement], [I-D.wijnands-bier-architecture], and [I-D.wijnands-mpls-bier-encapsulation]. We assume the reader has some basic familiarity with those proposed encapsulations. The Related Work section points at some prior work that relates to the encapsulation considerations in this document.

Encapsulation protocols typically have some unique information that they need to carry. In some cases that information might be modified along the path and in other cases it is constant. The in-flight modifications has impacts on what it means to provide security for the encapsulation headers.

- NVO3 carries a VNI Identifier edge to edge which is not modified. There has been OAM discussions in the WG and it isn’t clear whether some of the OAM information might be modified in flight.
- SFC carries Service Function Path identification and service meta-data. The meta-data might be modified as the packets follow the service path. SFC talks of some loop avoidance mechanism which is likely to result in modifications for each hop in the service chain even if the meta-data is unmodified.
- BIER carries a bitmap of egress ports to which a packet should be delivered, and as the packet is forwarded down different paths different bits are cleared in that bitmap.

Even if information isn’t modified in flight there might be devices that wish to inspect that information. For instance, one can envision future NVO3 security devices which filter based on the virtual network identifier.

The need for extensibility is different across the protocols

- NVO3 might need some extensions for OAM and security.
- SFC consists of Service Function Path identification plus carrying service meta-data along a path, and different services might need different types and amount of meta-data.
- BIER might need variable number of bits in their bitmaps, or other future schemes to scale up to larger network.

The extensibility needs and constraints might be different when considering hardware vs. software implementations of the
encapsulation headers. NIC hardware might have different constraints than switch hardware.

As the IETF designs these encapsulations the different WGs solve the issues for their own encapsulation. But there are likely to be future cases when the different encapsulations are combined in the same header. For instance, NVO3 might be a "transport" used to carry SFC between the different hops in the service chain.

Most of the issues discussed in this document are not new. The IETF and industry as specified and deployed many different encapsulation or tunneling protocols over time, ranging from simple IP-in-IP and GRE encapsulation, IPsec, pseudo-wires, session-based approached like L2TP, and the use of MPLS control and data planes. IEEE 802 has also defined layered encapsulation for Provider Backbone Bridges (PBB) and IEEE 802.1Qbp (ECMP). This document tries to leverage what we collectively have learned from that experience and summarize what would be relevant for new encapsulations like NVO3, SFC, and BIER.

3. Common Issues

[This section is mostly a repeat of the charter but with a few modifications and additions.]

Any new encapsulation protocol would need to address a large set of issues that are not central to the new information that this protocol intends to carry. The common issues explored in this document are:

- How to provide entropy for Equal Cost MultiPath (ECMP) routing
- Issues around packet size and fragmentation/reassembly
- Next header indication - each encapsulation might be able to carry different payloads
- OAM - what support is needed in an encapsulation format?
- Security and privacy
- QoS
- Congestion Considerations
- Header protection
- Extensibility - e.g., for evolving OAM, security, and/or congestion control
- Layering of multiple encapsulations e.g., SFC over NVO3 over BIER
- Importance of being friendly to hardware and software implementations

The degree to which these common issues apply to a particular encapsulation can differ based on the intended purpose of the encapsulation. But it is useful to understand all of them before determining which ones apply.
4.  Scope

It is important to keep in mind what we are trying to cover and not cover in this document and effort. This is:

- A look across the three new encapsulations, while taking lots of previous work into account.
- Focus on the class of encapsulations that would run over IP/UDP. That was done to avoid being distracted by the data-plane and control-plane interaction, which is more significant for protocols that are designed to run over "transports" that maintain session or path state.
- We later expanded the scope somewhat to consider how the encapsulations would play with MPLS "transport", which is important because SFC and BIER seem to target being independent of the underlying "transport"

However, this document and effort is NOT intended to:

- Design some new encapsulation header to rule them all
- Design yet another new NVO3 encapsulation header
- Try to select the best encapsulation header
- Evaluate any existing and proposed encapsulations

While the origin and focus of this document is the routing area and in particular NVO3, SFC, and BIER, the considerations apply to other encapsulations that are being defined in the IETF and elsewhere. There seems to be an increase in the number of encapsulations being defined to run over UDP, where there might already exist an encapsulation over IP or Ethernet. Feedback on how these considerations apply in those contexts is welcome.

5.  Assumptions

The design center for the new encapsulations is a well-managed network. That network can be a datacenter network (plus datacenter interconnect) or a service provider network. Based on the existing and proposed encapsulations in those environment it is reasonable to make these assumptions:

- The MTU is carefully managed and configured. Hence an encapsulation protocol can make the packets bigger without resulting in a requirement for fragmentation and reassembly between ingress and egress. (However, it might be useful to detecting MTU misconfigurations.)
- In general an encapsulation needs some approach for congestion management. But the assumptions are different than for arbitrary Internet paths in that the underlay might be well-provisioned and
better policed at the edge, and due to multi-tenancy, the congestion control in the endpoints might be even less trusted than on the Internet at large.

The goal is to implement these encapsulations in hardware and software hence we can’t assume that the needs of either implementation approach can trump the needs of the other. In particular, around extensibility the needs and constraints might be quite different.

6. Terminology

The capitalized keyword MUST is used as defined in http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Julmust

TBD: Refer to existing documents for at least NVO3 and SFC terminology. We use at least the VNI ID in this document.

7. Entropy

In many cases the encapsulation format needs to enable ECMP in unmodified routers. Those routers might use different fields in TCP/UDP packets to do ECMP without a risk of reordering a flow. Note that the same entropy might also be used at layer 2 e.g. for Link Aggregation (LAG).

The common way to do ECMP-enabled encapsulation over IP today is to add a UDP header and to use UDP with the UDP source port carrying entropy from the inner/original packet headers as in LISP [RFC6830]. The total entropy consists of 14 bits in the UDP source port (using the ephemeral port range) plus the outer IP addresses which seems to be sufficient for entropy; using outer IPv6 headers would give the option for more entropy should it be needed in the future.

In some environments it might be fine to use all 16 bits of the port range. However, middleboxes might make assumptions about the system ports or user ports. But they should not make any assumptions about the ports in the Dynamic and/or Private Port range, which have the two MSBs set to 11b.

The UDP source port might change over the lifetime of an encapsulated flow, for instance for DoS mitigation or re-balancing load across ECMP. Such changes need to consider reordering if there are packets in flight for the flow.

There is some interaction between entropy and OAM and extensibility mechanism. It is desirable to be able to send OAM packets to follow the same path as network packets. Hence OAM packets should use the
same entropy mechanism as data packets. While routers might use information in addition the entropy field and outer IP header, they can not use arbitrary parts of the encapsulation header since that might result in OAM frames taking a different path. Likewise if routers look past the encapsulation header they need to be aware of the extensibility mechanism(s) in the encapsulation format to be able to find the inner headers in the presence of extensions; OAM frames might use some extensions e.g. for timestamps.

Architecturally the entropy and the next header field are really part of enclosing delivery header. UDP with entropy goes hand-in-hand with the outer IP header. Thus the UDP entropy is present for the underlay IP routers the same way that an MPLS entropy label is present for LSRs. The entropy above is all about providing entropy for the outer delivery of the encapsulated packets.

It has been suggested that when IPv6 is used it would not be necessary to add a UDP header for entropy, since the IPv6 flow label can be used for entropy. (This assumes that there is an IP protocol number for the encapsulation in addition to a UDP destination port number since UDP would be used with IPv4 underlay. And any use of UDP checksums would need to be replaced by an encaps-specific checksum or secure hash.) While such an approach would save 8 bytes of headers when the underlay is IPv6, it does assume that the underlay routers use the flow label for ECMP, and it also would make the IPv6 approach different than the IPv4 approach. Currently the leaning is towards recommending using the UDP encapsulation for both IPv4 and IPv6 underlay. The IPv6 flow label can be used for additional entropy if need be. There is more detailed discussion for using the IPv6 flow label for tunnels in [RFC6438].

Note that in the proposed BIER encapsulation [I-D.wijnands-mpls-bier-encapsulation], there is an an 8-bit field which specifies an entropy value that can be used for load balancing purposes. This entropy is for the BIER forwarding decisions, which is independent of any outer delivery ECMP between BIER routers. Thus it is not part of the delivery ECMP discussed in this section.

[Note: For any given bit in BIER (that identifies an exit from the BIER domain) there might be multiple immediate next hops. The BIER entropy field is used to select that next hop as part of BIER processing. The BIER forwarding process may do equal cost load balancing, but the load balancing procedure MUST choose the same path for any two packets that have the same entropy value.]

In summary:
- The entropy is associated with the transport, that is an outer IP header or MPLS.
- In the case of IP transport use 14 or 16 bits of UDP source port, plus outer IPv6 flowid for entropy.

8. Next-protocol indication

Next-protocol indications appear in three different contexts for encapsulations.

Firstly, the transport delivery mechanism for the encapsulations we discuss in this document need some way to indicate which encapsulation header (or other payload) comes next in the packet. Some encapsulations might be identified by a UDP port; others might be identified by an Ethernet type or IP protocol number. Which approach is used is a function of the preceding header the same way as IPv4 is identified by both an Ethernet type and an IP protocol number (for IP-in-IP). In some cases the header type is implicit in some session (L2TP) or path (MPLS) setup. But this is largely beyond the control of the encapsulation protocol. For instance, if there is a requirement to carry the encapsulation after an Ethernet header, then an Ethernet type is needed. If required to be carried after an IP/UDP header, then a UDP port number is needed. For UDP port numbers there are considerations for port number conservation described in [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-port-use].

It is worth mentioning that in the MPLS case of no implicit protocol type many forwarding devices peek at the first nibble of the payload to determine whether to apply IPv4 or IPv6 L3/L4 hashes for load balancing [RFC7325]. That behavior places some constraints on other payloads carried over MPLS and some protocol define an initial control word in the payload with a value of zero in its first nibble [RFC4385] to avoid confusion with IPv4 and IPv6 payload headers.

Secondly, the encapsulation needs to indicate the type of its payload, which is in scope for the design of the encapsulation. We have existing protocols which use Ethernet types (such as GRE). Here each encapsulation header can potentially makes its own choices between:

- Use the Ethernet type space - makes it easy to carry existing L2 and L3 protocols including IPv4, IPv6, and Ethernet. Disadvantages are that it is a 16 bit number and we probably need far less than 100 values, and the number space is controlled by the IEEE 802 RAC with its own allocation policies.
- Use the IP protocol number space - makes it easy to carry e.g., ESP in addition to IP and Ethernet but brings in all existing protocol numbers many of which would never be used directly on top
of the encapsulation protocol. IANA managed eight bit values, presumably more difficult to get an assigned number than to get a transport port assignment.

- Define their own next-protocol number space, which can use fewer bits than an Ethernet type and give more flexibility, but at the cost of administering that numbering space (presumably by the IANA).

Thirdly, if the IETF ends up defining multiple encapsulations at about the same time, and there is some chance that multiple such encapsulations can be combined in the same packet, there is a question whether it makes sense to use a common approach and numbering space for the encapsulation across the different protocols. A common approach might not be beneficial as long as there is only one way to indicate e.g., SFC inside NVO3.

Many Internet protocols use fixed values (typically managed by the IANA function) for their next-protocol field. That facilitates interpretation of packets by middleboxes and e.g., for debugging purposes, but might make the protocol evolution inflexible. Our collective experience with MPLS shows an alternative where the label can be viewed as an index to a table containing processing instructions and the table content can be managed in different ways. Encapsulations might want to consider the tradeoffs between such more flexible versus more fixed approaches.

In summary:

- Would it be useful for the IETF come up with a common scheme for encapsulation protocols? If not each encapsulation can define its own scheme.

9. MTU and Fragmentation

A common approach today is to assume that the underlay have sufficient MTU to carry the encapsulated packets without any fragmentation and reassembly at the tunnel endpoints. That is sufficient when the operator of the ingress and egress have full control of the paths between those endpoints. And it makes for simpler (hardware) implementations if fragmentation and reassembly can be avoided.

However, even under that assumption it would be beneficial to be able to detect when there is some misconfiguration causing packets to be dropped due to MTU issues. One way to do this is to have the encapsulator set the don’t-fragment (DF) flag in the outer IPv4 header and receive and log any received ICMP "packet too big" (PTB)
Encapsulations could also define an optional tunnel fragmentation and reassembly mechanism which would be useful in the case when the operator doesn’t have full control of the path, or when the protocol gets deployed outside of its original intended context. Such a mechanism would be required if the underlay might have a path MTU which makes it impossible to carry at least 1518 bytes (if offering Ethernet service), or at least 1280 (if offering IPv6 service). The use of such a protocol mechanism could be triggered by receiving a PTB. But such a mechanism might not be implemented by all encapsulators and decapsulators. [Aerolink is one example of such a protocol.]

Depending on the payload carried by the encapsulation there are some additional possibilities:

- If payload is IPv4/6 then the underlay path MTU could be used to report end-to-end path MTU.
- If the payload service is Ethernet/L2, then there is no such per destination reporting mechanism. However, there is a LLDP TLV for reporting max frame size; might be useful to report minimum to end stations, but unmodified end stations would do nothing with that TLV since they assume that the MTU is at least 1518.

In summary:

- In some deployments an encapsulation can assume well-managed MTU hence no need for fragmentation and reassembly related to the encapsulation.
- Even so, it makes sense for ingress to track any ICMP packet too big addressed to ingress to be able to log any MTU misconfigurations.
- Should an encapsulation protocol be deployed outside of the original context it might very well need support for fragmentation and reassembly.

10. OAM

The OAM area is seeing active development in the IETF with discussions (at least) in NVO3 and SFC working groups, plus the new LIME WG looking at architecture and YANG models.

The design team has take a narrow view of OAM to explore the potential OAM implications on the encapsulation format.
In terms of what we have heard from the various working groups there seem to be needs to:

- Be able to send out-of-band OAM messages - that potentially should follow the same path through the network as some flow of data packets.
  * Such OAM messages should not accidentally be decapsulated and forwarded to the end stations.
- Be able to add OAM information to data packets that are encapsulated. Discussions have been around:
  * Using a bit in the OAM to synchronize sampling of counters between the encapsulator and decapsulator.
  * Optional timestamps, sequence numbers, etc for more detailed measurements between encapsulator and decapsulator.
- Usable for both proactive monitoring (akin to BFD) and reactive checks (akin to traceroute to pin-point a failure)

To ensure that the OAM messages can follow the same path the OAM messages need to get the same ECMP (and LAG hashing) results as a given data flow. An encapsulator can choose between one of:

- Limit ECMP hashing to not look past the UDP header i.e. the entropy needs to be in the source/destination IP and UDP ports
- Make OAM packets look the same as data packets i.e. the initial part of the OAM payload has the inner Ethernet, IP, TCP/UDP headers as a payload. (This approach was taken in TRILL out of necessity since there is no UDP header.) Any OAM bit in the encapsulation header must in any case be excluded from the entropy.

There can be several ways to prevent OAM packets from accidentally being forwarded to the end station using:

- A bit in the frame (as in TRILL) indicating OAM
- A next-protocol indication with a designated value for "none" or "oam".

This assumes that the bit or next protocol, respectively, would not affect entropy/ECMP in the underlay. However, the next-protocol field might be used to provide differentiated treatment of packets based on their payload; for instance a TCP vs. IPsec ESP payload might be handled differently. Based on that observation it might be undesirable to overload the next protocol with the OAM drop behavior, resulting in a preference for having a bit to indicate that the packet should be forwarded to the end station after decapsulation.
There has been suggestions that one (or more) marker bits in the 
encaps header would be useful in order to delineate measurement 
epochs on the encapsulator and decapsulator and use that to compare 
counters to determine packet loss.

A result of the above is that OAM is likely to evolve and needs some 
degree of extensibility from the encapsulation format; a bit or two 
plus the ability to define additional larger extensions.

An open question is how to handle error messages or other reports 
relating to OAM. One can think if such reporting as being associated 
with the encapsulation the same way ICMP is associated with IP. 
Would it make sense for the IETF to develop a common Encapsulation 
Error Reporting Protocol as part of OAM, which can be used for 
different encapsulations? And if so, what are the technical 
challenges. For instance, how to avoid it being filtered as ICMP 
often is?

A potential additional consideration for OAM is the possible future 
existence of gateways that "stitch" together different dataplane 
encapsulations and might want to carry OAM end-to-end across the 
different encapsulations.

In summary:

- It makes sense to reserve a bit for "drop after decapsulation" for 
  OAM out-of-band.
- An encapsulation needs sufficient extensibility for OAM (such as 
  bits, timestamps, sequence numbers). That might be motivated by 
in-band OAM but it would make sense to leverage the same 
extensions for out-of-band OAM.
- OAM places some constraints on use of entropy in forwarding 
devices.
- Should IETF look into error reporting that is independent of the 
specific encapsulation?

11. Security Considerations

Different encapsulation use cases will have different requirements 
around security. For instance, when encapsulation is used to build 
overlay networks for network virtualization, isolation between 
virtual networks may be paramount. BIER support of multicast may 
entail different security requirements than encapsulation for 
unicast.

In real deployment, the security of the underlying network may be 
considered for determining the level of security needed in the 
encapsulation layer. However for the purposes of this discussion, we
assume that network security is out of scope and that the underlying
network does not itself provide adequate or as least uniform security
mechanisms for encapsulation.

There are at least three considerations for security:

- Anti-spoofing/virtual network isolation
- Interaction with packet level security such as IPsec or DTLS
- Privacy (e.g., VNI ID confidentially for NVO3)

This section uses a VNI ID in NVO3 as an example. A SFC or BIER
encapsulation is likely to have fields with similar security and
privacy requirements.

11.1. Encapsulation-specific considerations

Some of these considerations appear for a new encapsulation, and
others are more specific to network virtualization in datacenters.

- New attack vectors:
  * DDOS on specific queued/paths by attempting to reproduce the
    5-tuple hash for targeted connections.
  * Entropy in outer 5-tuple may be too little or predictable.
  * Leakage of identifying information in the encapsulation header
    for an encrypted payload.
  * Vulnerabilities of using global values in fields like VNI ID.
- Trusted versus untrusted tenants in network virtualization:
  * The criticality of virtual network isolation depends on whether
    tenants are trusted or untrusted. In the most extreme cases,
    tenants might not only be untrusted but may be considered
    hostile.
  * For a trusted set of users (e.g. a private cloud) it may be
    sufficient to have just a virtual network identifier to provide
    isolation. Packets inadvertently crossing virtual networks
    should be dropped similar to a TCP packet with a corrupted port
    being received on the wrong connection.
  * In the presence of untrusted users (e.g. a public cloud) the
    virtual network identifier must be adequately protected against
    corruption and verified for integrity. This case may warrant
    keyed integrity.
- Different forms of isolation:
  * Isolation could be blocking all traffic between tenants (or
    except as allowed by some firewall)
  * Could also be about performance isolation i.e. one tenant can
    overload the network in a way that affects other tenants
Physical isolation of traffic for different tenants in network may be required, as well as required restrictions that tenants may have on where their packets may be routed.

- New attack vectors from untrusted tenants:
  - Third party VMs with untrusted tenants allows internally borne attacks within data centers
  - Hostile VMs inside the system may exist (e.g. public cloud)
  - Internally launched DDOS
  - Passive snooping for mis-delivered packets
  - Mitigate damage and detection in event that a VM is able to circumvent isolation mechanisms

- Tenant-provider relationship:
  - Tenant might not trust provider, hypervisors, network
  - Provider likely will need to provide SLA or a least a statement on security
  - Tenant may implement their own additional layers of security
  - Regulation and certification considerations

- Trend towards tighter security:
  - Tenants’ data in network increases in volume and value, attacks become more sophisticated
  - Large DCs already encrypt everything on disk
  - DCs likely to encrypt inter-DC traffic at this point, use TLS to Internet.
  - Encryption within DC is becoming more commonplace, becomes ubiquitous when cost is low enough.
  - Cost/performance considerations. Cost of support for strong security has made strong network security in DCs prohibitive.
  - Are there lessons from MacSec?

11.2. Virtual network isolation

The first requirement is isolation between virtual networks. Packets sent in one virtual network should never be illegitimately received by a node in another virtual network. Isolation should be protected in the presence of malicious attacks or inadvertent packet corruption.

The second requirement is sender authentication. Sender identity is authenticated to prevent anti-spoofing. Even if an attacker has access to the packets in the network, they cannot send packets into a virtual network. This may have two possibilities:

- Pairwise sender authentication. Any two communicating hosts negotiate a shared key.
- Group authentication. A group of hosts share a key (this may be more appropriate for multicast of encapsulation).

Possible security solutions:

- Security cookie: This is similar to L2TP cookie mechanism [RFC3931]. A shared plain text cookie is shared between encapsulator and decapsulator. A receiver validates a packet by evaluating if the cookie is correct for the virtual network and address of a sender. Validation function is \( F(\text{cookie}, \text{VNI ID}, \text{source address}) \). If cookie matches, accept packet, else drop. Since cookie is plain text this method does not protect against an eavesdropping. Cookies are set and may be rotated out of band.

- Secure hash: This is a stronger mechanism than simple cookies that borrows from IPsec and PPP authentication methods. In this model security field contains a secure hash of some fields in the packet using a shared key. Hash function may be something like \( H(\text{key, VNI ID, address, salt}) \). The salt ensures the hash is not the same for every packet, and if it includes a sequence number may also protect against replay attacks.

In any use of a shared key, periodic re-keying should be allowed. This could include use of techniques like generation numbers, key windows, etc. See [I-D.farrellll-mpls-opportunistic-encrypt] for an example application.

We might see firewalls that are aware of the encapsulation and can provide some defense in depth combined with the above example anti-spoofing approaches. An example would be an NVO3-aware firewall being able to check the VNI ID.

Separately and in addition to such filtering, there might be a desire to completely block an encapsulation protocol at certain places in the network, e.g., at the edge of a datacenter. Using a fixed standard UDP destination port number for each encapsulation protocol would facilitate such blocking.

11.3. Packet level security

An encapsulated packet may itself be encapsulated in IPsec (e.g. ESP). This should be straightforward and in fact is what would happen today in security gateways. In this case, there is no special consideration for the fact that packet is encapsulated, however since the encapsulation layer headers are included (part of encrypted data for instance) we lose visibility in the network of the encapsulation.

The more interesting case is when security is applied to the encapsulation payload. This will keep the encapsulation headers in
the outer header visible to the network (for instance in nvo3 we may way to firewall based on VNI ID even if the payload is encrypted). One possibility is to apply DTLS to the encapsulation payload. In this model the protocol stack may be something like IP|UDP|Encap|DTLS|encrypted_payload. The encapsulation and security should be done together at an encapsulator and resolved at the decapsulator. Since the encapsulation header is outside of the security coverage, this may itself require security (like described above).

In both of the above the security associations (SAs) may be between physical hosts, so for instance in nvo3 we can have packets of different virtual networks using the same SA-- this should not be an issue since it is the VNI ID that ensures isolation (which needs to be secured also).

11.4. In summary:

- Encapsulations need extensibility mechanisms to be able to add security features like cookies and secure hashes protecting the encapsulation header.
- NVO3 probably has specific higher requirements relating to isolation for network virtualization, which is in scope for the NVO3 WG.
- Our collective IETF experience is that successful protocols get deployed outside of the original intended context, hence the initial assumptions about the threat model might become invalid. That needs to be considered in the standardization of new encapsulations.

12. QoS

In the Internet architecture we support QoS using the Differentiated Services Code Points (DSCP) in the formerly named Type-of-Service field in the IPv4 header, and in the Traffic-Class field in the IPv6 header. The ToS and TC fields also contain the two ECN bits, which are discussed in Section 13.

We have existing specifications how to process those bits. See [RFC2983] for diffserv handling, which specifies how the received DSCP value is used to set the DSCP value in an outer IP header when encapsulating. (There are also existing specifications how DSCP can be mapped to layer2 priorities.)

Those specifications apply whether or not there is some intervening headers (e.g., for NVO3 or SFC) between the inner and outer IP headers. Thus the encapsulation considerations in this area are mainly about applying the framework in [RFC2983].
Note that the DSCP and ECN bits are not the only part of an inner packet that might potentially affect the outer packet. For example, [RFC2473] specifies handling of inner IPv6 hop-by-hop options that effectively result in copying some options to the outer header. It is simpler to not have future encapsulations depend on such copying behavior.

There are some other considerations specific to doing OAM for encapsulations. If OAM messages are used to measure latency, it would make sense to treat them the same as data payloads. Thus they need to have the same outer DSCP value as the data packets which they wish to measure.

Due to OAM there are constraints on middleboxes in general. If middleboxes inspect the packet past the outer IP+UDP and encapsulation header and look for inner IP and TCP/UDP headers, that might violate the assumption that OAM packets will be handled the same as regular data packets. That issue is broader than just QoS—applies to firewall filters etc.

In summary:

- Leverage the existing approach in [RFC2983] for DSCP handling.

13. Congestion Considerations

Additional encapsulation headers does not introduce anything new for Explicit Congestion Notification. It is just like IP-in-IP and IPsec tunnels which is specified in [RFC6040] in terms of how the ECN bits in the inner and outer header are handled when encapsulating and decapsulating packets. Thus new encapsulations can more or less include that by reference.

There are additional considerations around carrying non-congestion controlled traffic. These details have been worked out in [I-D.ietf-mpls-in-udp]. As specified in [RFC5405]: "IP-based traffic is generally assumed to be congestion-controlled, i.e., it is assumed that the transport protocols generating IP-based traffic at the sender already employ mechanisms that are sufficient to address congestion on the path. Consequently, a tunnel carrying IP-based traffic should already interact appropriately with other traffic sharing the path, and specific congestion control mechanisms for the tunnel are not necessary". Those considerations are being captured in [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-rfc5405bis].

For this reason, where an encapsulation method is used to carry IP traffic that is known to be congestion controlled, the UDP tunnels does not create an additional need for congestion control.
IP traffic is generally assumed to be congestion-controlled. Similarly, in general Layer 3 VPNs are carrying IP traffic that is similarly assumed to be congestion controlled.

However, some of the encapsulations (at least NVO3) will be able to carry arbitrary Layer 2 packets to provide an L2 service, in which case one can not assume that the traffic is congestion controlled.

One could handle this by adding some congestion control support to the encapsulation header (one instance of which would end up looking like DCCP). However, if the underlay is well-provisioned and managed as opposed to being arbitrary Internet path, it might be sufficient to have a slower reaction to congestion induced by that traffic. There is work underway on a notion of "circuit breakers" for this purpose. See [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-circuit-breaker]. Encapsulations which carry arbitrary Layer 2 packets want to consider that ongoing work.

If the underlay is provisioned in such a way that it can guarantee sufficient capacity for non-congestion controlled Layer 2 traffic, then such circuit breakers might not be needed.

Two other considerations appear in the context of these encapsulations as applied to overlay networks:

- Protect against malicious end stations
- Ensure fairness and/or measure resource usage across multiple tenants

Those issues are really orthogonal to the encapsulation, in that they are present even when no new encapsulation header is in use. However, the application of the new encapsulations are likely to be in environments where those issues are becoming more important. Hence it makes sense to consider them.

One could make the encapsulation header be extensible to that it can carry sufficient information to be able to measure resource usage, delays, and congestion. The suggestions in the OAM section about a single bit for counter synchronization, and optional timestamps and/or sequence numbers, could be part of such an approach. There might also be additional congestion-control extensions to be carried in the encapsulation. Overall this results in a consideration to support sufficient extensibility in the encapsulation to handle potential future developments in this space.

Coarse measurements are likely to suffice, at least for circuit-breaker-like purposes, see [I-D.wei-tsvwg-tunnel-congestion-feedback] and [I-D.briscoe-conex-data-centre] for examples on active work in
this area via use of ECN. [RFC6040] Appendix C is also relevant. The outer ECN bits seem sufficient (at least when everything uses ECN) to do this course measurements. Needs some more study for the case when there are also drops; might need to exchange counters between ingress and egress to handle drops.

Circuit breakers are not sufficient to make a network with different congestion control when the goal is to provide a predictable service to different tenants. The fallback would be to rate limit different traffic.

In summary:

- Leverage the existing approach in [RFC6040] for ECN handling.
- If the encapsulation can carry non-IP, hence non-congestion controlled traffic, then leverage the approach in [I-D.ietf-mpls-in-udp].
- "Watch this space" for circuit breakers.

14. Header Protection

Many UDP based encapsulations such as VXLAN [RFC7348] either discourage or explicitly disallow the use of UDP checksums. The reason is that the UDP checksum covers the entire payload of the packet and switching ASICs are typically optimized to look at only a small set of headers as the packet passes through the switch. In these case, computing a checksum over the packet is very expensive. (Software endpoints and the NICs used with them generally do not have the same issue as they need to look at the entire packet anyways.)

The lack a header checksum creates the possibility that bit errors can be introduced into any information carried by the new headers. Specifically, in the case of IPv6, the assumption is that a transport layer checksum - UDP in this case - will protect the IP addresses through the inclusion of a pseudo-header in the calculation. This is different from IPv4 on which many of these encapsulation protocols are initially deployed which contains its own header checksum. In addition to IP addresses, the encapsulation header often contains its own information which is used for addressing packets or other high value network functions. Without a checksum, this information is potentially vulnerable - an issue regardless of whether the packet is carried over IPv4 or IPv6.

Several protocols cite [RFC6935] and [RFC6936] as an exemption to the IPv6 checksum requirements. However, these are intended to be tailored to a fairly narrow set of circumstances - primarily relying on sparseness of the address space to detect invalid values and well managed networks - and are not a one size fits all solution. In
these cases, an analysis should be performed of the intended environment, including the probability of errors being introduced and the use of ECC memory in routing equipment.

Conceptually, the ideal solution to this problem is a checksum that covers only the newly added headers of interest. There is little value in the portion of the UDP checksum that covers the encapsulated packet because that would generally be protected by other checksums and this is the expensive portion to compute. In fact, this solution already exists in the form of UDP-Lite and UDP based encapsulations could be easily ported to run on top of it. Unfortunately, the main value in using UDP as part of the encapsulation header is that it is recognized by already deployed equipment for the purposes of ECMP, RSS, and middlebox operations. As UDP-Lite uses a different protocol number than UDP and it is not widely implemented in middleboxes, this value is lost. A possible solution is to incorporate the same partial-checksum concept as UDP-Lite or other header checksum protection into the encapsulation header and continue using UDP as the outer protocol. One potential challenge with this approach is the use of NAT or other form of translation on the outer header will result in an invalid checksum as the translator will not know to update the encapsulation header.

The method chosen to protect headers is often related to the security needs of the encapsulation mechanism. On one hand, the impact of a poorly protected header is not limited to only data corruption but can also introduce a security vulnerability in the form of misdirected packets to an unauthorized recipient. Conversely, high security protocols that already include a secure hash over the valuable portion of the header (such as by encrypting the entire IP packet using IPsec, or some secure hash of the encap header) do not require additional checksum protection as the hash provides stronger assurance than a simple checksum.

If the sender has included a checksum, then the receiver should verify that checksum or, if incapable, drop the packet. The assumption is that configuration and/or control-plane capability exchanges can be used when different receiver have different checksum validation capabilities.

In summary:

- Encapsulations need extensibility to be able to add checksum/CRC for the encapsulation header itself.
- When the encapsulation has a checksum/CRC, include the IPv6 pseudo-header in it.
- The checksum/CRC can potentially be avoided when cryptographic protection is applied to the encapsulation.
15. Extensibility Considerations

Protocol extensibility is the concept that a networking protocol may be extended to include new use cases or functionality that were not part of the original protocol specification. Extensibility may be used to add security, control, management, or performance features to a protocol. A solution may allow private extensions for customization or experimentation.

Extending a protocol often implies that a protocol header must carry new information. There are two usual methods to accomplish this:

1. Define or redefine the meaning of existing fields in a protocol header.
2. Add new (optional) fields to the protocol header.

It is also possible to create a new protocol version, but this is more associated with defining a protocol than extending it (IPv6 being a successor to IPv4 is an example of protocol versioning).

In some cases it might be more appropriate to define a new inner protocol which can carry the new functionality instead of extending the outer protocol. Examples where this works well is in the IP/transport split, where the earlier architecture had a single NCP [RFC0033] protocol which carried both the hop-by-hop semantics which are now in IP, and the end-to-end semantics which are now in TCP. Such a split is effective when different nodes need to act upon the different information. Applying this for general protocol extensibility through nesting is not well understood, and does result in longer header chains. Furthermore, our experience with IPv6 extension headers [RFC2460] in middleboxes indicates that the header chaining approach does not help with middlebox traversal.

Many protocol definitions include some number of reserved fields or bits which can be used for future extension. VXLAN is an example of a protocol that includes reserved bits which are subsequently being allocated for new purposes. Another technique employed is to re-purpose existing header fields with new meanings. A classic example of this is the definition of DSCP code point which redefines the ToS field originally specified in IPv4. When a field is redefined, some mechanism may be needed to ensure that all interested parties agree on the meaning of the field. The techniques of defining meaning for reserved bits or redefining existing fields have the advantage that a protocol header can be kept a fixed length. The disadvantage is that the extensibility is limited. For instance, the number reserved bits in a fixed protocol header is limited. For standard protocols the decision to commit to a definition for a field can be wrenching since it is difficult to retract later. Also, it is difficult to predict a
priori how many reserved fields or bits to put into a protocol header to satisfy the extensions create over the lifetime of the protocol.

Extending a protocol header with new fields can be done in several ways.

- **TLVs** are a very popular method used in such protocols as IP and TCP. Depending on the type field size and structure, TLVs can offer a virtually unlimited range of extensions. A disadvantage of TLVs is that processing them can be verbose, quite complicated, several validations must often be done for each TLV, and there is no deterministic ordering for a list of TLVs. TCP serves as an example of a protocol where TLVs have been successfully used (i.e. required for protocol operation). IP is an example of a protocol that allows TLVs but are rarely used in practice (router fast paths usually that assume no IP options). Note that TCP TLVs are implemented in software as well as (NIC) hardware handling various forms of TCP offload. Additional discussions about hardware implications for extensibility is captured in Section 18.

- **Extension headers** are closely related to TLVs. These also carry type/value information, but instead of being a list of TLVs within a single protocol header, each one is in its own protocol header. IPv6 extension headers and SFC NSH are examples of this technique. Similar to TLVs these offer a wide range of extensibility, but have similarly complex processing. Another difference with TLVs is that each extension header is idempotent. This is beneficial in cases where a protocol implements a push/pop model for header elements like service chaining, but makes it more difficult group correlated information within one protocol header.

- A particular form of extension headers are the tags used by IEEE 802 protocols. Those are similar to e.g., IPv6 extension headers but with the key difference that each tag is a fixed length header where the length is implicit in the tag value. Thus as long as a receiver can be programmed with a tag value to length map, it can skip those new tags.

- **Flag-fields** are a non-TLV like method of extending a protocol header. The basic idea is that the header contains a set of flags, where each set flags corresponds to optional field that is present in the header. GRE is an example of a protocol that employs this mechanism. The fields are present in the header in the order of the flags, and the length of each field is fixed. Flag-fields are simpler to process compared to TLVs, having fewer validations and the order of the optional fields is deterministic. A disadvantage is that range of possible extensions with flag-fields is smaller than TLVs.

The requirements for receiving unknown or unimplemented extensible elements in an encapsulation protocol (flags, TLVs, optional fields)
need to be specified. There are two parties to consider, middle
boxes and terminal endpoints of encapsulation (at the decapsulator).

A protocol may allow or expect nodes in a path to modify fields in an
encapsulation (example use of this is BIER). In this case, the
middleboxes should follow the same requirements as nodes terminating
the encapsulation. In the case that middle boxes do not modify the
encapsulation, we can assume that they may still inspect any fields
of the encapsulation. Missing or unknown fields should be accepted
per protocol specification, however it is permissible for a site to
implement a local policy otherwise (e.g. a firewall may drop packets
with unknown options).

For handling unknown options at terminal nodes, there are two
possibilities: drop packet or accept while ignoring the unknown
options. Many Internet protocols specify that reserved flags must be
set to zero on transmission and ignored on reception. L2TP is
example data protocol that has such flags. GRE is a notable
exception to this rule, reserved flag bits 1-5 cannot be ignored
[RFC2890]. For TCP and IPv4, implementations must ignore optional
TLVs with unknown type; however in IPv6 if a packet contains an
unknown extension header (unrecognized next header type) the packet
must be dropped with an ICMP error message returned. The IPv6
options themselves (encoded inside the destinations options or hop-
by-hop options extension header) have more flexibility. There are
bits in the option code are used to instruct the receiver whether to
ignore, silently drop, or drop and send error if the option is
unknown. Some protocols define a "mandatory bit" that can is set
with TLVs to indicate that an option must not be ignored.
Conceptually, optional data elements can only be ignored if they are
idempotent and do not alter how the rest of the packet is parsed or
processed.

Depending on what type of protocol evolution one can predict, it
might make sense to have a way for a sender to express that the
packet should be dropped by a terminal node which does not understand
the new information. In other cases it would make sense to have the
receiver silently ignore the new info. The former can be expressed
by having a version field in the encapsulation, or a notion of
"mandatory bit" as discussed above.

A security mechanism which use some form secure hash over the
encapsulation header would need to be able to know which extensions
can be changed in flight.

In summary:
Encapsulations need the ability to be extended to handle e.g., the OAM or security aspects discussed in this document.

Practical experience seems to tell us that extensibility mechanisms which are not in use on day one might result in immediate ossification by lack of implementation support. In some cases that has occurred in routers and in other cases in middleboxes. Hence devising ways where the extensibility mechanisms are in use seems important.

16. Layering Considerations

One can envision that SFC might use NVO3 as a delivery/transport mechanism. With more imagination that in turn might be delivered using BIER. Thus it is useful to think about what things look like when we have BIER+NVO3+SFC+payload. Also, if NVO3 is widely deployed there might be cases of NVO3 nesting where a customer uses NVO3 to provide network virtualization e.g., across departments. That customer uses a service provider which happens to use NVO3 to provide transport for their customers. Thus NVO3 in NVO3 might happen.

A key question we set out to answer is what the packets might look like in such a case, and in particular whether we would end up with multiple UDP headers for entropy.

Based on the discussion in the Entropy section, the entropy is associated with the outer delivery IP header. Thus if there are multiple IP headers there would be a UDP header for each one of the IP headers. But SFC does not require its own IP header. So a case of NVO3+SFC would be IP+UDP+NVO3+SFC. A nested NVO3 encapsulation would have independent IP+UDP headers.

The layering also has some implications for middleboxes.

- A device on the path between the ingress and egress is allowed to transparently inspect all layers of the protocol stack and drop or forward, but not transparently modify anything but the layer in which they operate. What this means is that an IP router is allowed modify the outer IP ttl and ECN bits, but not the encapsulation header or inner headers and payload. And a BIER router is allowed to modify the BIER header.

- Alternatively such a device can become visible at a higher layer. E.g., a middlebox could a middlebox could first decapsulate, perform some function then encapsulate; which means it will generate a new encapsulation header.

The design team asked itself some additional questions:
Would it make sense to have a common encapsulation base header (for OAM, security?, etc) and then followed by the specific information for NVO3, SFC, BIER? Given that there are separate proposals and the set of information needing to be carried differs, and the extensibility needs might be different, it would be difficult and not that useful to have a common base header.

With a base header in place, one could view the different functions (NVO3, SFC, and BIER) as different extensions to that base header resulting in encodings which are more space optimal by not repeating the same base header. The base header would only be repeated when there is an additional IP (and hence UDP) header. That could mean a single length field (to skip to get to the payload after all the encapsulation headers). That might be technically feasible, but it would create a lot of dependencies between different WGs making it harder to make progress. Compare with the potential savings in packet size.

17. Service model

The IP service is lossy and subject to reordering. In order to avoid a performance impact on transports like TCP the handling of packets is designed to avoid reordering packets that are in the same transport flow (which is typically identified by the 5-tuple). But across such flows the receiver can see different ordering for a given sender. That is the case for a unicast vs. a multicast flow from the same sender.

There is a general tussle between the desire for high capacity utilization across a multipath network and the impact on packet ordering within the same flow (which results in lower transport protocol performance). That isn’t affected by the introduction of an encapsulation. However, the encapsulation comes with some entropy, and there might be cases where folks want to change that in response to overload or failures. For instance, one might want to change UDP source port to try different ECMP route. Such changes can result in packet reordering within a flow, hence would need to be done infrequently and with care e.g., by identifying packet trains.

There might be some applications/services which are not able to handle reordering across flows. The IETF has defined pseudo-wires [RFC3985] which provides the ability to ensure ordering (implemented using sequence numbers and/or timestamps).

Architectural such services would make sense, but as a separate layer on top of an encapsulation protocol. They could be deployed between ingress and egress of a tunnel which uses some encaps. Potentially the tunnel control points at the ingress and egress could become a platform for fixing suboptimal behavior elsewhere in the network.
That would clearly be undesirable in the general case. However, handling encapsulation of non-IP traffic hence non-congestion-controlled traffic is likely to be required, which implies some fairness and/or QoS policing on the ingress and egress devices.

But the tunnels could potentially do more like increase reliability (retransmissions, FEC) or load spreading using e.g. MP-TCP between ingress and egress.

18. Hardware Friendly

Hosts, switches and routers often leverage capabilities in the hardware to accelerate packet encapsulation, decapsulation and forwarding.

Some design considerations in encapsulation that leverage these hardware capabilities may result in more efficiently packet processing and higher overall protocol throughput.

While "hardware friendliness" can be viewed as unnecessary considerations for a design, part of the motivation for considering this is ease of deployment; being able to leverage existing NIC and switch chips for at least a useful subset of the functionality that the new encapsulation provides. The other part is the ease of implementing new NICs and switch/router chips that support the encapsulation at ever increasing line rates.

[disclaimer] There are many different types of hardware in any given network, each maybe better at some tasks while worse at others. We would still recommend protocol designers to examine the specific hardware that are likely to be used in their networks and make decisions on a case by case basis.

Some considerations are:

- Keep the encap header small. Switches and routers usually only read the first small number of bytes into the fast memory for quick processing and easy manipulation. The bulk of the packets are usually stored in slow memory. A big encap header may not fit and additional read from the slow memory will hurt the overall performance and throughput.
- Put important information at the beginning of the encapsulation header. The reasoning is similar as explained in the previous point. If important information are located at the beginning of the encapsulation header, the packet may be processed with smaller number of bytes to be read into the fast memory and improve performance.
Avoid full packet checksums in the encapsulation if possible. Encapsulations should instead consider adding their own checksum which covers the encapsulation header and any IPv6 pseudo-header. The motivation is that most of the switch/router hardware make switching/forwarding decisions by reading and examining only the first certain number of bytes in the packet. Most of the body of the packet do not need to be processed normally. If we are concerned of preventing packet to be misdelivered due to memory errors, consider only perform header checksums. Note that NIC chips can typically already do full packet checksums for TCP/UDP, while adding a header checksum might require adding some hardware support.

Place important information at fixed offset in the encapsulation header. Packet processing hardware may be capable of parallel processing. If important information can be found at fixed offset, different part of the encapsulation header may be processed by different hardware units in parallel (for example multiple table lookups may be launched in parallel). It is easier for hardware to handle optional information when the information, if present, can be found in ideally one place, but in general, in as few places as possible. That facilitates parallel processing. TLV encoding with unconstrained order typically does not have that property.

Limit the number of header combinations. In many cases the hardware can explore different combinations of headers in parallel, however there is some added cost for this.

18.1. Considerations for NIC offload

This section provides guidelines to provide support of common offloads for encapsulation in Network Interface Cards (NICs). Offload mechanisms are techniques that are implemented separately from the normal protocol implementation of a host networking stack and are intended to optimize or speed up protocol processing. Hardware offload is performed within a NIC device on behalf of a host.

There are three basic offload techniques of interest:

- Receive multi queue
- Checksum offload
- Segmentation offload

18.1.1. Receive multi-queue

Contemporary NICs support multiple receive descriptor queues (multi-queue). Multi-queue enables load balancing of network processing for a NIC across multiple CPUs. On packet reception, a NIC must select...
Receive Side Scaling (RSS) is a common method which uses the flow hash for a packet to index an indirection table where each entry stores a queue number.

UDP encapsulation, where the source port is used for entropy, should be compatible with multi-queue NICs that support five-tuple hash calculation for UDP/IP packets as input to RSS. The source port ensures classification of the encapsulated flow even in the case that the outer source and destination addresses are the same for all flows (e.g. all flows are going over a single tunnel).

18.1.2. Checksum offload

Many NICs provide capabilities to calculate standard ones complement payload checksum for packets in transmit or receive. When using encapsulation over UDP there are at least two checksums that may be of interest: the encapsulated packet’s transport checksum, and the UDP checksum in the outer header.

18.1.2.1. Transmit checksum offload

NICs may provide a protocol agnostic method to offload transmit checksum (NETIF_F_HW_CSUM in Linux parlance) that can be used with UDP encapsulation. In this method the host provides checksum related parameters in a transmit descriptor for a packet. These parameters include the starting offset of data to checksum, the length of data to checksum, and the offset in the packet where the computed checksum is to be written. The host initializes the checksum field to pseudo header checksum. In the case of encapsulated packet, the checksum for an encapsulated transport layer packet, a TCP packet for instance, can be offloaded by setting the appropriate checksum parameters.

NICs typically can offload only one transmit checksum per packet, so simultaneously offloading both an inner transport packet’s checksum and the outer UDP checksum is likely not possible. In this case setting UDP checksum to zero (per above discussion) and offloading the inner transport packet checksum might be acceptable.

There is a proposal in [I-D.herbert-remotecsumoffload] to leverage NIC checksum offload when an encapsulator is co-resident with a host.

18.1.2.2. Receive checksum offload

Protocol encapsulation is compatible with NICs that perform a protocol agnostic receive checksum (CHECKSUM_COMPLETE in Linux parlance). In this technique, a NIC computes a ones complement checksum over all (or some predefined portion) of a packet. The
computed value is provided to the host stack in the packet’s receive descriptor. The host driver can use this checksum to "patch up" and validate any inner packet transport checksum, as well as the outer UDP checksum if it is non-zero.

Many legacy NICs don’t provide checksum-complete but instead provide an indication that a checksum has been verified (CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY in Linux). Usually, such validation is only done for simple TCP/IP or UDP/IP packets. If a NIC indicates that a UDP checksum is valid, the checksum-complete value for the UDP packet is the "not" of the pseudo header checksum. In this way, checksum-unnecessary can be converted to checksum-complete. So if the NIC provides checksum-unnecessary for the outer UDP header in an encapsulation, checksum conversion can be done so that the checksum-complete value is derived and can be used by the stack to validate an checksums in the encapsulated packet.

18.1.3. Segmentation offload

Segmentation offload refers to techniques that attempt to reduce CPU utilization on hosts by having the transport layers of the stack operate on large packets. In transmit segmentation offload, a transport layer creates large packets greater than MTU size (Maximum Transmission Unit). It is only at much lower point in the stack, or possibly the NIC, that these large packets are broken up into MTU sized packet for transmission on the wire. Similarly, in receive segmentation offload, small packets are coalesced into large, greater than MTU size packets at a point low in the stack receive path or possibly in a device. The effect of segmentation offload is that the number of packets that need to be processed in various layers of the stack is reduced, and hence CPU utilization is reduced.

18.1.3.1. Transmit Segmentation Offload

Transmit Segmentation Offload (TSO) is a NIC feature where a host provides a large (larger than MTU size) TCP packet to the NIC, which in turn splits the packet into separate segments and transmits each one. This is useful to reduce CPU load on the host.

The process of TSO can be generalized as:

- Split the TCP payload into segments which allow packets with size less than or equal to MTU.
- For each created segment:
  1. Replicate the TCP header and all preceding headers of the original packet.
2. Set payload length fields in any headers to reflect the length of the segment.
3. Set TCP sequence number to correctly reflect the offset of the TCP data in the stream.
4. Recompute and set any checksums that either cover the payload of the packet or cover header which was changed by setting a payload length.

Following this general process, TSO can be extended to support TCP encapsulation UDP. For each segment the Ethernet, outer IP, UDP header, encapsulation header, inner IP header if tunneling, and TCP headers are replicated. Any packet length header fields need to be set properly (including the length in the outer UDP header), and checksums need to be set correctly (including the outer UDP checksum if being used).

To facilitate TSO with encapsulation it is recommended that optional fields should not contain values that must be updated on a per segment basis-- for example an encapsulation header should not include checksums, lengths, or sequence numbers that refer to the payload. If the encapsulation header does not contain such fields then the TSO engine only needs to copy the bits in the encapsulation header when creating each segment and does not need to parse the encapsulation header.

18.1.3.2. Large Receive Offload

Large Receive Offload (LRO) is a NIC feature where packets of a TCP connection are reassembled, or coalesced, in the NIC and delivered to the host as one large packet. This feature can reduce CPU utilization in the host.

LRO requires significant protocol awareness to be implemented correctly and is difficult to generalize. Packets in the same flow need to be unambiguously identified. In the presence of tunnels or network virtualization, this may require more than a five-tuple match (for instance packets for flows in two different virtual networks may have identical five-tuples). Additionally, a NIC needs to perform validation over packets that are being coalesced, and needs to fabricate a single meaningful header from all the coalesced packets.

The conservative approach to supporting LRO for encapsulation would be to assign packets to the same flow only if they have identical five-tuple and were encapsulated the same way. That is the outer IP addresses, the outer UDP ports, encapsulated protocol, encapsulation headers, and inner five tuple are all identical.
18.1.3.3. In summary:

In summary, for NIC offload:

- The considerations for using full UDP checksums are different for NIC offload than for implementations in forwarding devices like routers and switches.
- Be judicious about encapsulations that change fields on a per-packet basis, since such behavior might make it hard to use TSO.

19. Middlebox Considerations

This document has touched upon middleboxes in different section. The reason for this is as encapsulations get widely deployed one would expect different forms of middleboxes might become aware of the encapsulation protocol just as middleboxes have been made aware of other protocols where there are business and deployment opportunities. Such middleboxes are likely to do more than just drop packets based on the UDP port number used by an encapsulation protocol.

We note that various forms of encapsulation gateways that stitch one encapsulation protocol together with another form of protocol could have similar effects.

An example of a middlebox that could see some use would be an NVO3-aware firewall that would filter on the VNI IDs to provide some defense in depth inside or across NVO3 datacenters.

A question for the IETF is whether we should document what to do or what not to do in such middleboxes. This document touches on areas of OAM and ECMP as it relates to middleboxes and it might make sense to document how encapsulation-aware middleboxes should avoid unintended consequences in those (and perhaps other) areas.

In summary:

- We are likely to see middleboxes that at least parse the headers for successful new encapsulations.
- Should the IETF document considerations for what not to do in such middleboxes?

20. Related Work

The IETF and industry has defined encapsulations for a long time, with examples like GRE [RFC2890], VXLAN [RFC7348], and NVGRE [I-D.sridharan-virtualization-nvgre] being able to carry arbitrary Ethernet payloads, and various forms of IP-in-IP and IPsec
encapsulations that can carry IP packets. As part of NVO3 there has been additional proposals like Geneve [I-D.gross-geneve] and GUE [I-D.herbert-gue] which look at more extensibility. NSH [I-D.quinn-sfc-nsh] is an example of an encapsulation that tries to provide extensibility mechanisms which target both hardware and software implementations.

There is also a large body of work around MPLS encapsulations [RFC3032]. The MPLS-in-UDP work [I-D.ietf-mpls-in-udp] and GRE over UDP [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-gre-in-udp-encap] have worked on some of the common issues around checksum and congestion control. MPLS also introduced a entropy label [RFC6790]. There is also a proposal for MPLS encryption [I-D.farrelll-mpls-opportunistic-encrypt].

The idea to use a UDP encapsulation with a UDP source port for entropy for the underlay routers’ ECMP dates back to LIISP [RFC6830].

The pseudo-wire work [RFC3985] is interesting in the notion of layering additional services/characteristics such as ordered delivery or timely deliver on top of an encapsulation. That layering approach might be useful for the new encapsulations as well. For instance, the control word [RFC4385]. There is also material on congestion control for pseudo-wires in [I-D.ietf-pwe3-congcons].

Both MPLS and L2TP [RFC3931] rely on some control or signaling to establish state (for the path/labels in the case of MPLS, and for the session in the case of L2TP). The NVO3, SFC, and BIER encapsulations will also have some separation between the data plane and control plane, but the type of separation appears to be different.

IEEE 802.1 has defined encapsulations for L2 over L2, in the form of Provider backbone Bridging (PBB) [IEEE802.1Q-2014] and Equal Cost Multipath (ECMP) [IEEE802.1Q-2014]. The latter includes something very similar to the way the UDP source port is used as entropy: "The flow hash, carried in an F-TAG, serves to distinguish frames belonging to different flows and can be used in the forwarding process to distribute frames over equal cost paths".

TRILL, which is also a L2 over L2 encapsulation, took a different approach to entropy but preserved the ability for OAM frames [RFC7174] to use the same entropy hence ECMP path as data frames. In [I-D.ietf-trill-oam-fm] there 96 bytes of headers for entropy in the OAM frames, followed by the actual OAM content. This ensures that any headers, which fit in those 96 bytes except the OAM bit in the TRILL header, can be used for ECMP hashing.
As encapsulations evolve there might be a desire to fit multiple inner packets into one outer packet. The work in [I-D.saldana-tsvwg-simplemux] might be interesting for that purpose.

21. Acknowledgements

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22. Open Issues

- Middleboxes:
  * Due to OAM there are constraints on middleboxes in general. If middleboxes inspect the packet past the outer IP+UDP and encapsulation header and look for inner IP and TCP/UDP headers, that might violate the assumption that OAM packets will be handled the same as regular data packets. That issue is broader than just QoS - applies to firewall filters etc.
  * Firewalls looking at inner payload? How does that work for OAM frames? Even if it only drops ... TRILL approach might be an option? Would that encourage more middleboxes making the network more fragile?
  * Editorially perhaps we should pull the above two into a separate section about middlebox considerations?

- Next-protocol indication - should it be common across different encapsulation headers? We will have different ways to indicate the presence of the first encapsulation header in a packet (could be a UDP destination port, an Ethernet type, etc depending on the outer delivery header). But for the next protocol past an encapsulation header one could envision creating or adoption a common scheme. Such a would also need to be able to identify following headers like Ethernet, IPv4/IPv6, ESP, etc.

- Common OAM error reporting protocol?

- There is discussion about timestamps, sequence numbers, etc in three different parts of the document. OAM, Congestion Considerations, and Service Model, where the latter argues that a pseudo-wire service should really be layered on top of the encapsulation using its own header. Those recommendations seem to be at odds with each other. Do we envision sequence numbers, timestamps, etc as potential extensions for OAM and CC? If so, those extensions could be used to provide a service which doesn’t reorder packets.
23. Change Log

The changes from draft-rtg-dt-encap-01 based on feedback at the Dallas IETF meeting:

- Setting the context that not all common issues might apply to all encapsulations, but that they should all be understood before being dismissed.
- Clarified that IPv6 flow label is useful for entropy in combination with a UDP source port.
- Editorially added a "summary" set of bullets to most sections.
- Editorial clarifications in the next protocol section to more clearly state the three areas.
- Folded the two next protocol sections into one.
- Mention the MPLS first nibble issue in the next protocol section.
- Mention that viewing the next protocol as an index to a table with processing instructions can provide additional flexibility in the protocol evolution.
- For the OAM "don’t forward to end stations" added that defining a bit seems better than using a special next-protocol value.
- Added mention of DTLS in addition to IPsec for security.
- Added some mention of IPv6 hob-by-hop options of other headers than potentially can be copied from inner to outer header.
- Added text on architectural considerations when it might make sense to define an additional header/protocol as opposed to using the extensibility mechanism in the existing encapsulation protocol.
- Clarified the "unconstrained TLVs" in the hardware friendly section.
- Clarified the text around checksum verification and full vs. header checksums.
- Added wording that the considerations might apply for encaps outside of the routing area.
- Added references to draft-ietf-pwe3-congcons, draft-ietf-tsvwg-rfc5405bis, RFC2473, and RFC7325
- Removed reference to RFC3948.
- Updated the acknowledgements section.
- Added this change log section.

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Network Address Translation (NAT) Behavioral Requirements Updates
draft-ietf-tsvwg-behave-requirements-update-08

Abstract

This document clarifies and updates several requirements of RFC4787, RFC5382, and RFC5508 based on operational and development experience. The focus of this document is NAT44.

This document updates RFCs 4787, 5382, and 5508.

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1. Introduction

[RFC4787], [RFC5382], and [RFC5508] contributed to enhance Network Address Translation (NAT) interoperability and conformance. Operational experience gained through widespread deployment and evolution of NAT indicates that some areas of the original documents need further clarification or updates. This document provides such clarifications and updates.

1.1. Scope

The goal of this document is to clarify and update the set of requirements listed in [RFC4787], [RFC5382], and [RFC5508]. The document focuses exclusively on NAT44.

The scope of this document has been set so that it does not create new requirements beyond those specified in the documents cited above. Carrier-Grade NAT (CGN) related requirements are defined in [RFC6888].

1.2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

The reader is assumed to be familiar with the terminology defined in: [RFC2663],[RFC4787],[RFC5382], and [RFC5508].

In this document, the term "NAT" refers to both "Basic NAT" and "Network Address/Port Translator (NAPT)" (see Section 3 of [RFC4787]). As a reminder, Basic NAT and NAPT are two variations of traditional NAT, in that translation in Basic NAT is limited to IP addresses alone, whereas translation in NAPT is extended to include IP address and Transport identifier (such as TCP/UDP port or ICMP query ID) (refer to Section 2 of [RFC3022]).

2. TCP Session Tracking

[RFC5382] specifies TCP timers associated with various connection states but does not specify the TCP state machine a NAT44 should follow as a basis to apply such timers.

Update: The TCP state machine depicted in Figure 1, adapted from [RFC6146], SHOULD be implemented by a NAT for TCP session tracking purposes.
Figure 1: Simplified version of the TCP State Machine

Legend:
* Messages sent or received from the server are prefixed with "Server".
* Messages sent or received from the client are prefixed with "Client".
* "C" means "Client-side"
* "S" means "Server-side"
* TCP_EST T.O: refers to the established connection idle timeout as defined in [RFC5382].
* TCP_TRANS T.O: refers to the transitory connection idle timeout as defined in [RFC5382].
2.1. TCP Transitory Connection Idle-Timeout

The transitory connection idle-timeout is defined as the minimum time a TCP connection in the partially open or closing phases must remain idle before the NAT considers the associated session a candidate for removal (REQ-5 of [RFC5382]). But [RFC5382] does not clearly state whether these can be configured separately.

Clarification: This document clarifies that a NAT SHOULD provide different configurable parameters for configuring the open and closing idle timeouts.

To accommodate deployments that consider a partially open timeout of 4 minutes as being excessive from a security standpoint, a NAT MAY allow the configured timeout to be less than 4 minutes. However, a minimum default transitory connection idle-timeout of 4 minutes is RECOMMENDED.

2.2. TCP RST

[RFC5382] leaves the handling of TCP RST packets unspecified.

Update: This document adopts a similar default behavior as in [RFC6146]. Concretely, when the NAT receives a TCP RST matching an existing mapping, it MUST translate the packet according to the NAT mapping entry. Moreover, the NAT SHOULD wait for 4 minutes before deleting the session and removing any state associated with it if no packets are received during that 4 minutes timeout.

Notes:

* Admittedly, the NAT has to verify whether received TCP RST packets belong to a connection. This verification check is required to avoid off-path attacks.

* If the NAT removes immediately the NAT mapping upon receipt of a TCP RST message, stale connections may be maintained by endpoints if the first RST message is lost between the NAT and the recipient.

3. Port Overlapping Behavior

REQ-1 from [RFC4787] and REQ-1 from [RFC5382] specify a specific port overlapping behavior; that is the external IP address and port can be reused for connections originating from the same internal source IP address and port irrespective of the destination. This is known as endpoint-independent mapping (EIM).
Update: This document clarifies that this port overlapping behavior may be extended to connections originating from different internal source IP addresses and ports as long as their destinations are different.

The following mechanism MAY be implemented by a NAT:

If destination addresses and ports are different for outgoing connections started by local clients, a NAT MAY assign the same external port as the source ports for the connections. The port overlapping mechanism manages mappings between external packets and internal packets by looking at and storing their 5-tuple (protocol, source address, source port, destination address, destination port).

This enables concurrent use of a single NAT external port for multiple transport sessions, which allows a NAT to successfully process packets in an IP address resource limited network (e.g., deployment with high address space multiplicative factor (refer to Appendix B. of [RFC6269])).

4. Address Pooling Paired (APP)

The "IP address pooling" behavior of "Paired" (APP) was recommended in REQ-2 from [RFC4787], but the behavior when an external IPv4 runs out of ports was left undefined.

Clarification: This document clarifies that if APP is enabled, new sessions from a host that already has a mapping associated with an external IP that ran out of ports SHOULD be dropped. A configuration parameter MAY be provided to allow a NAT to starting using ports from another external IP address when the one that anchored the APP mapping ran out of ports. Tweaking this configuration parameter is a trade-off between service continuity and APP strict enforcement. Note, this behavior is sometimes referred as 'soft-APP'.

As a reminder, the recommendation for the particular case of a CGN is that an implementation must use the same external IP address mapping for all sessions associated with the same internal IP address, be they TCP, UDP, ICMP, something else, or a mix of different protocols [RFC6888].

Update: This behavior SHOULD apply also for TCP.
5. Endpoint-Independent Mapping (EIM) Protocol Independence

REQ-1 from [RFC4787] and REQ-1 from [RFC5382] do not specify whether EIM are protocol-dependent or protocol-independent. For example, if an outbound TCP SYN creates a mapping, it is left undefined whether outbound UDP packets can reuse such mapping.

Update: EIM mappings SHOULD be protocol-dependent. A configuration parameter MAY be provided to allow protocols that multiplex TCP and UDP over the same source IP address and port number to use a single mapping. The default value of this configuration parameter MUST be protocol-dependent EIM.

This update is consistent with the stateful NAT64 [RFC6146] that clearly specifies three binding information bases (TCP, UDP, ICMP).


REQ-8 from [RFC4787] and REQ-3 from [RFC5382] do not specify whether mappings with endpoint-independent filtering (EIF) are protocol-independent or protocol-dependent. For example, if an outbound TCP SYN creates a mapping, it is left undefined whether inbound UDP packets matching that mapping should be accepted or rejected.

Update: EIF filtering SHOULD be protocol-dependent. A configuration parameter MAY be provided to make it protocol-independent. The default value of this configuration parameter MUST be protocol-dependent EIF.

This behavior is aligned with the update in Section 5.

Applications that can be transported over a variety of transport protocols and/or support transport fall back schemes won’t experience connectivity failures if the NAT is configured with protocol-independent EIM and protocol-independent EIF.

7. Endpoint-Independent Filtering (EIF) Mapping Refresh

The NAT mapping Refresh direction may have a "NAT Inbound refresh behavior" of "True" according to REQ-6 from [RFC4787], but [RFC4787] does not clarify how this behavior applies to EIF mappings. The issue in question is whether inbound packets that match an EIF mapping but do not create a new session due to a security policy should refresh the mapping timer.

Clarification: This document clarifies that even when a NAT has an inbound refresh behavior set to ‘TRUE’, such packets SHOULD NOT
refresh the mapping. Otherwise a simple attack of a packet every 2 minutes can keep the mapping indefinitely.

Update: This behavior SHOULD apply also for TCP.

7.1. Outbound Mapping Refresh and Error Packets

Update: In the case of NAT outbound refresh behavior, ICMP Errors or TCP RST outbound packets, sent as response to inbound packets, SHOULD NOT refresh the mapping. Other packets which indicate the host is not interested in receiving packets MAY be configurable to also not refresh state, such as STUN error response [RFC5389] or IKE INVALID_SYNTAX [RFC7296].

8. Port Parity

Update: A NAT MAY disable port parity preservation for all dynamic mappings. Nevertheless, a NAT SHOULD support means to explicitly request to preserve port parity (e.g., [RFC7753]).

Note: According to [RFC6887], dynamic mappings are said to be dynamic in the sense that they are created on demand, either implicitly or explicitly:

1. Implicit dynamic mappings refer to mappings that are created as a side effect of traffic such as an outgoing TCP SYN or outgoing UDP packet. Implicit dynamic mappings usually have a finite lifetime, though this lifetime is generally not known to the client using them.

2. Explicit dynamic mappings refer to mappings that are created as a result, for example, of explicit Port Control Protocol (PCP) MAP and PEER requests. Explicit dynamic mappings have a finite lifetime, and this lifetime is communicated to the client.

9. Port Randomization

Update: A NAT SHOULD follow the recommendations specified in Section 4 of [RFC6056], especially:

"A NAPT that does not implement port preservation [RFC4787] [RFC5382] SHOULD obfuscate selection of the ephemeral port of a packet when it is changed during translation of that packet. A NAPT that does implement port preservation SHOULD obfuscate the ephemeral port of a packet only if the port must be changed as a result of the port being already in use for some other session. A NAPT that performs parity preservation and that
must change the ephemeral port during translation of a packet
SHOULD obfuscate the ephemeral ports. The algorithms described
in this document could be easily adapted such that the parity
is preserved (i.e., force the lowest order bit of the resulting
port number to 0 or 1 according to whether even or odd parity
is desired)."

10. IP Identification (IP ID)

Update: A NAT SHOULD handle the Identification field of translated
IPv4 packets as specified in Section 5.3.1 of [RFC6864].

11. ICMP Query Mappings Timeout

Section 3.1 of [RFC5508] specifies that ICMP Query Mappings are to be
maintained by a NAT. However, the specification doesn’t discuss
Query Mapping timeout values. Section 3.2 of [RFC5508] only
discusses ICMP Query Session Timeouts.

Update: ICMP Query Mappings MAY be deleted once the last session
using the mapping is deleted.

12. Hairpinning Support for ICMP Packets

REQ-7 from [RFC5508] specifies that a NAT enforcing ‘Basic NAT’ must
support traversal of hairpinned ICMP Query sessions.

Clarification: This implicitly means that address mappings from
external address to internal address (similar to Endpoint
Independent Filters) must be maintained to allow inbound ICMP
Query sessions. If an ICMP Query is received on an external
address, a NAT can then translate to an internal IP.

REQ-7 from [RFC5508] specifies that all NATs must support the
traversal of hairpinned ICMP Error messages.

Clarification: This behavior requires a NAT to maintain address
mappings from external IP address to internal IP address in
addition to the ICMP Query Mappings described in Section 3.1 of
[RFC5508].

13. IANA Considerations

This document does not require any IANA action.
14. Security Considerations

NAT behavioral considerations are discussed in [RFC4787], [RFC5382], and [RFC5508].

Because some of the clarifications and updates (e.g., Section 2) are inspired from NAT64, the security considerations discussed in Section 5 of [RFC6146] apply also for this specification.

The update in Section 3 allows for an optimized NAT resource usage. In order to avoid service disruption, the NAT must not invoke this functionality unless the packets are to be sent to distinct destination addresses.

Some of the updates (e.g., Section 7, Section 9, and Section 11) allow for an increased security compared to [RFC4787], [RFC5382], and [RFC5508]. Particularly:

- The updates in Section 7 and Section 11 prevent an illegitimate node to maintain mappings activated in the NAT while these mappings should be cleared.

- Port randomization (Section 9) complicates tracking hosts located behind a NAT.

Section 4 and Section 12 propose updates that increase the serviceability of a host located behind a NAT. These updates do not introduce any additional security concerns to [RFC4787], [RFC5382], and [RFC5508].

The updates in Section 5 and Section 6 allow for a better NAT transparency from an application standpoint. Hosts that require a restricted filtering behavior should enable specific policies (e.g., access control list (ACL)) either locally or by soliciting a dedicated security device (e.g., firewall). How a host updates its filtering policies is out of scope of this document.

The update in Section 8 induces security concerns that are specific to the protocol used to interact with the NAT. For example, if PCP is used to explicitly request parity preservation for a given mapping, the security considerations discussed in [RFC6887] should be taken into account.

The update in Section 10 may have undesired effects on the performance of the NAT in environments in which fragmentation is massively experienced. Such issue may be used as an attack vector against NATs.
15. References

15.1. Normative References


15.2. Informative References

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Dan Wing proposed some text for the configurable errors in Section 7.1.
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Abstract

This document explains what is meant by the term "network transport Circuit Breaker" (CB). It describes the need for circuit breakers for network tunnels and applications when using non-congestion-controlled traffic, and explains where circuit breakers are, and are not, needed. It also defines requirements for building a circuit breaker and the expected outcomes of using a circuit breaker within the Internet.

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1. Introduction

The term "Circuit Breaker" originates in electricity supply, and has nothing to do with network circuits or virtual circuits. In electricity supply, a Circuit Breaker is intended as a protection mechanism of last resort. Under normal circumstances, a Circuit Breaker ought not to be triggered; it is designed to protect the supply network and attached equipment when there is overload. People do not expect an electrical circuit-breaker (or fuse) in their home to be triggered, except when there is a wiring fault or a problem with an electrical appliance.
In networking, the Circuit Breaker (CB) principle can be used as a protection mechanism of last resort to avoid persistent excessive congestion impacting other flows that share network capacity. Persistent congestion was a feature of the early Internet of the 1980s. This resulted in excess traffic starving other connections from access to the Internet. It was countered by the requirement to use congestion control (CC) in the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) [Jacobsen88]. These mechanisms operate in Internet hosts to cause TCP connections to "back off" during congestion. The addition of a congestion control to TCP (currently documented in [RFC5681] ensured the stability of the Internet, because it was able to detect congestion and promptly react. This was effective in an Internet where most TCP flows were long-lived (ensuring that they could detect and respond to congestion before the flows terminated). Although TCP was by far the dominant traffic, this is no longer the always the case, and non-congestion-controlled traffic, including many applications using the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), can form a significant proportion of the total traffic traversing a link. The current Internet therefore requires that non-congestion-controlled traffic is considered to avoid persistent excessive congestion.

A network transport Circuit Breaker is an automatic mechanism that is used to continuously monitor a flow or aggregate set of flows. The mechanism seeks to detect when the flow(s) experience persistent excessive congestion. When this is detected, a Circuit Breaker terminates (or significantly reduce the rate of) the flow(s). This is a safety measure to prevent starvation of network resources denying other flows from access to the Internet. Such measures are essential for an Internet that is heterogeneous and for traffic that is hard to predict in advance. Avoiding persistent excessive congestion is important to reduce the potential for "Congestion Collapse" [RFC2914].

There are important differences between a transport Circuit Breaker and a congestion control method. Congestion control (as implemented in TCP, SCTP, and DCCP) operates on a timescale on the order of a packet round-trip-time (RTT), the time from sender to destination and return. Congestion at a network link can also be detected using Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) [RFC3168], which allows the network to signal congestion by marking ECN-capable packets with a Congestion Experienced (CE) mark. Both loss and reception of CE-marked packets are treated as congestion events. Congestion control methods are able to react to a congestion event by continuously adapting to reduce their transmission rate. The goal is usually to limit the transmission rate to a maximum rate that reflects a fair use of the available capacity across a network path. These methods typically operate on individual traffic flows (e.g., a 5-tuple that includes the IP addresses, protocol, and ports).
In contrast, Circuit Breakers are recommended for non-congestion-controlled Internet flows and for traffic aggregates, e.g., traffic sent using a network tunnel. They operate on timescales much longer than the packet RTT, and trigger under situations of abnormal (excessive) congestion. People have been implementing what this document characterizes as circuit breakers on an ad hoc basis to protect Internet traffic. This document therefore provides guidance on how to deploy and use these mechanisms. Later sections provide examples of cases where circuit-breakers may or may not be desirable.

A Circuit Breaker needs to measure (meter) some portion of the traffic to determine if the network is experiencing congestion and needs to be designed to trigger robustly when there is persistent excessive congestion.

A Circuit Breaker trigger will often utilize a series of successive sample measurements metered at an ingress point and an egress point (either of which could be a transport endpoint). The trigger needs to operate on a timescale much longer than the path round trip time (e.g., seconds to possibly many tens of seconds). This longer period is needed to provide sufficient time for transport congestion control (or applications) to adjust their rate following congestion, and for the network load to stabilize after any adjustment. Congestion events can be common when a congestion-controlled transport is used over a network link operating near capacity. Each event results in reduction in the rate of the transport flow experiencing congestion. The longer period seeks to ensure that a Circuit Breaker does not accidentally trigger following a single (or even successive) congestion events.

Once triggered, the Circuit Breaker needs to provide a control function (called the "reaction"). This removes traffic from the network, either by disabling the flow or by significantly reducing the level of traffic. This reaction provides the required protection to prevent persistent excessive congestion being experienced by other flows that share the congested part of the network path.

Section 4 defines requirements for building a Circuit Breaker.

The operational conditions that cause a Circuit Breaker to trigger ought to be regarded as abnormal. Examples of situations that could trigger a Circuit Breaker include:

- anomalous traffic that exceeds the provisioned capacity (or whose traffic characteristics exceed the threshold configured for the Circuit Breaker);
o traffic generated by an application at a time when the provisioned network capacity is being utilised for other purposes;

o routing changes that cause additional traffic to start using the path monitored by the Circuit Breaker;

o misconfiguration of a service/network device where the capacity available is insufficient to support the current traffic aggregate;

o misconfiguration of an admission controller or traffic policer that allows more traffic than expected across the path monitored by the Circuit Breaker.

Other mechanisms could also be available to network operators to detect excessive congestion (e.g., an observation of excessive utilisation for a port on a network device). Utilising such information, operational mechanisms could react to reduce network load over a shorter timescale than those of a network transport Circuit Breaker. The role of the Circuit Breaker over such paths remains as a method of last resort. Because it acts over a longer timescale, the Circuit Breaker ought to trigger only when other reactions did not succeed in reducing persistent excessive congestion.

In many cases, the reason for triggering a Circuit Breaker will not be evident to the source of the traffic (user, application, endpoint, etc). A Circuit Breaker can be used to limit traffic from applications that are unable, or choose not, to use congestion control, or where the congestion control properties of the traffic cannot be relied upon (e.g., traffic carried over a network tunnel). In such circumstances, it is all but impossible for the Circuit Breaker to signal back to the impacted applications. In some cases applications could therefore have difficulty in determining that a Circuit Breaker has triggered, and where in the network this happened.

Application developers are therefore advised, where possible, to deploy appropriate congestion control mechanisms. An application that uses congestion control will be aware of congestion events in the network. This allows it to regulate the network load under congestion, and is expected to avoid triggering a network Circuit Breaker. For applications that can generate elastic traffic, this will often be a preferred solution.
1.1. Types of Circuit Breaker

There are various forms of network transport circuit breaker. These are differentiated mainly on the timescale over which they are triggered, but also in the intended protection they offer:

- **Fast-Trip Circuit Breakers**: The relatively short timescale used by this form of circuit breaker is intended to provide protection for network traffic from a single flow or related group of flows.

- **Slow-Trip Circuit Breakers**: This circuit breaker utilizes a longer timescale and is designed to protect network traffic from congestion by traffic aggregates.

- **Managed Circuit Breakers**: Utilize the operations and management functions that might be present in a managed service to implement a circuit breaker.

Examples of each type of circuit breaker are provided in section 4.

2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

3. Design of a Circuit-Breaker (What makes a good circuit breaker?)

Although circuit breakers have been talked about in the IETF for many years, there has not yet been guidance on the cases where circuit breakers are needed or upon the design of circuit breaker mechanisms. This document seeks to offer advice on these two topics.

Circuit Breakers are RECOMMENDED for IETF protocols and tunnels that carry non-congestion-controlled Internet flows and for traffic aggregates. This includes traffic sent using a network tunnel. Designers of other protocols and tunnel encapsulations also ought to consider the use of these techniques as a last resort to protect traffic that shares the network path being used.

This document defines the requirements for design of a Circuit Breaker and provides examples of how a Circuit Breaker can be constructed. The specifications of individual protocols and tunnel encapsulations need to detail the protocol mechanisms needed to implement a Circuit Breaker.
Section 3.1 describes the functional components of a circuit breaker and section 3.2 defines requirements for implementing a Circuit Breaker.

3.1. Functional Components

The basic design of a Circuit Breaker involves communication between an ingress point (a sender) and an egress point (a receiver) of a network flow or set of flows. A simple picture of operation is provided in figure 1. This shows a set of routers (each labelled R) connecting a set of endpoints.

A Circuit Breaker is used to control traffic passing through a subset of these routers, acting between the ingress and a egress point network devices. The path between the ingress and egress could be provided by a tunnel or other network-layer technique. One expected use would be at the ingress and egress of a service, where all traffic being considered terminates beyond the egress point, and hence the ingress and egress carry the same set of flows.

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Figure 1: A CB controlling the part of the end-to-end path between an ingress point and an egress point. (Note: In some cases, the trigger

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and measurement functions could alternatively be located at other locations (e.g., at a network operations centre.)

In the context of a Circuit Breaker, the ingress and egress functions could be implemented in different places. For example, they could be located in network devices at a tunnel ingress and at the tunnel egress. In some cases, they could be located at one or both network endpoints (see figure 2), implemented as components within a transport protocol.

```
+----------+                 +----------+
| Ingress  |  +-+  +-+  +-+  | Egress   |
| Endpoint +->+R++---R++---R++---Endpoint |
+--+----+--+  +-+  +-+  +-+  +----+-----+
    |                         |
   ^    |                       |
    | +--+------+             +----+----+
    | | Ingress |             | Egress  |
    | | Meter   |             | Meter   |
    | +----+----+             +----+----+
    |      |                       |
    | +--- +----+                  |
    | | Measure +<-----------------+ |
    | | Measure +<-----------------+ |
    | +--- +----+      Reported    |
    | | Measurement |             | Egress |
    | +----+----+      Measurement |
    |      |                      |
    | +----+----+      Reaction   |
```

Figure 2: An endpoint CB implemented at the sender (ingress) and receiver (egress).

The set of components needed to implement a Circuit Breaker are:

1. An ingress meter (at the sender or tunnel ingress) that records the number of packets/bytes sent in each measurement interval. This measures the offered network load for a flow or set of flows. For example, the measurement interval could be many seconds (or every few tens of seconds or a series of successive shorter measurements that are combined by the Circuit Breaker Measurement function).

2. An egress meter (at the receiver or tunnel egress) that records the number/bytes received in each measurement interval. This measures the supported load for the flow or set of flows, and
could utilize other signals to detect the effect of congestion (e.g., loss/congestion marking [RFC3168] experienced over the path). The measurements at the egress could be synchronised (including an offset for the time of flight of the data, or referencing the measurements to a particular packet) to ensure any counters refer to the same span of packets.

3. A method that communicates the measured values at the ingress and egress to the Circuit Breaker Measurement function. This could use several methods including: Sending return measurement packets (or control messages) from a receiver to a trigger function at the sender; an implementation using Operations, Administration and Management (OAM); or sending an in-band signalling datagram to the trigger function. This could also be implemented purely as a control plane function, e.g., using a software-defined network controller.

4. A measurement function that combines the ingress and egress measurements to assess the present level of network congestion. (For example, the loss rate for each measurement interval could be deduced from calculating the difference between ingress and egress counter values.) Note the method does not require high accuracy for the period of the measurement interval (or therefore the measured value, since isolated and/or infrequent loss events need to be disregarded.)

5. A trigger function that determines whether the measurements indicate persistent excessive congestion. This function defines an appropriate threshold for determining that there is persistent excessive congestion between the ingress and egress. This preferably considers a rate or ratio, rather than an absolute value (e.g., more than 10% loss, but other methods could also be based on the rate of transmission as well as the loss rate). The Circuit Breaker is triggered when the threshold is exceeded in multiple measurement intervals (e.g., 3 successive measurements). Designs need to be robust so that single or spurious events do not trigger a reaction.

6. A reaction that is applied at the Ingress when the Circuit Breaker is triggered. This seeks to automatically remove the traffic causing persistent excessive congestion.

7. A feedback control mechanism that triggers when either the receive or ingress and egress measurements are not available, since this also could indicate a loss of control packets (also a symptom of heavy congestion or inability to control the load).
3.2. Other network topologies

A Circuit Breaker can be deployed in networks with topologies different to that presented in figures 1 and 2. This section describes examples of such usage, and possible places where functions can be implemented.

3.2.1. Use with a multicast control/routing protocol

Figure 3: An example of a multicast CB controlling the end-to-end path between an ingress endpoint and an egress endpoint.

Figure 3 shows one example of how a multicast Circuit Breaker could be implemented at a pair of multicast endpoints (e.g., to implement a Fast-Trip Circuit Breaker, Section 5.1). The ingress endpoint (the sender that sources the multicast traffic) meters the ingress load, generating an ingress measurement (e.g., recording timestamped packet counts), and sends this measurement to the multicast group together with the traffic it has measured.

Routers along a multicast path forward the multicast traffic (including the ingress measurement) to all active endpoint receivers. Each last hop (egress) router forwards the traffic to one or more egress endpoint(s).
In this figure, each endpoint includes a meter that performs a local egress load measurement. An endpoint also extracts the received ingress measurement from the traffic, and compares the ingress and egress measurements to determine if the Circuit Breaker ought to be triggered. This measurement has to be robust to loss (see previous section). If the Circuit Breaker is triggered, it generates a multicast leave message for the egress (e.g., an IGMP or MLD message sent to the last hop router), which causes the upstream router to cease forwarding traffic to the egress endpoint [RFC1112].

Any multicast router that has no active receivers for a particular multicast group will prune traffic for that group, sending a prune message to its upstream router. This starts the process of releasing the capacity used by the traffic and is a standard multicast routing function (e.g., using Protocol Independent Multicast Sparse Mode (PIM-SM) routing protocol [RFC4601]). Each egress operates autonomously, and the Circuit Breaker "reaction" is executed by the multicast control plane (e.g., by PIM) requiring no explicit signalling by the Circuit Breaker along the communication path used for the control messages. Note: there is no direct communication with the Ingress, and hence a triggered Circuit Breaker only controls traffic downstream of the first hop multicast router. It does not stop traffic flowing from the sender to the first hop router; this is common practice for multicast deployment.

The method could also be used with a multicast tunnel or subnetwork (e.g., Section 5.2, Section 5.3), where a meter at the ingress generates additional control messages to carry the measurement data towards the egress where the egress metering is implemented.

3.2.2. Use with control protocols supporting pre-provisioned capacity

Some paths are provisioned using a control protocol, e.g., flows provisioned using the Multi-Protocol Label Switching (MPLS) services, paths provisioned using the resource reservation protocol (RSVP), networks utilizing Software Defined Network (SDN) functions, or admission-controlled Differentiated Services. Figure 1 shows one expected use case, where in this usage a separate device could be used to perform the measurement and trigger functions. The reaction generated by the trigger could take the form of a network control message sent to the ingress and/or other network elements causing these elements to react to the Circuit Breaker. Examples of this type of use are provided in section Section 5.3.
3.2.3. Unidirectional Circuit Breakers over Controlled Paths

A Circuit Breaker can be used to control unidirectional UDP traffic, providing that there is a communication path that can be used for control messages to connect the functional components at the Ingress and Egress. This communication path for the control messages can exist in networks for which the traffic flow is purely unidirectional. For example, a multicast stream that sends packets across an Internet path and can use multicast routing to prune flows to shed network load. Some other types of subnetwork also utilize control protocols that can be used to control traffic flows.

4. Requirements for a Network Transport Circuit Breaker

The requirements for implementing a Circuit Breaker are:

1. There needs to be a communication path for control messages to carry measurement data from the ingress meter and from the egress meter to the point of measurement. (Requirements 16-18 relate to the transmission of control messages.)

2. A CB is REQUIRED to define a measurement period over which the CB Measurement function measures the level of congestion or loss. This method does not have to detect individual packet loss, but MUST have a way to know that packets have been lost/marked from the traffic flow.

3. An egress meter can also count ECN [RFC3168] congestion marks as a part of measurement of congestion, but in this case, loss MUST also be measured to provide a complete view of the level of congestion. For tunnels, [ID-ietf-tswwg-tunnel-congestion-feedback] describes a way to measure both loss and ECN-marking; these measurements could be used on a relatively short timescale to drive a congestion control response and/or aggregated over a longer timescale with a higher trigger threshold to drive a CB. Subsequent bullet items in this section discuss the necessity of using a longer timescale and a higher trigger threshold.

4. The measurement period used by a CB Measurement function MUST be longer than the time that current Congestion Control algorithms need to reduce their rate following detection of congestion. This is important because end-to-end Congestion Control algorithms require at least one RTT to notify and adjust the traffic when congestion is experienced, and congestion bottlenecks can share traffic with a diverse range of RTTs. The measurement period is therefore expected to be significantly longer than the RTT experienced by the CB itself.
5. If necessary, a CB MAY combine successive individual meter samples from the ingress and egress to ensure observation of an average measurement over a sufficiently long interval. (Note when meter samples need to be combined, the combination needs to reflect the sum of the individual sample counts divided by the total time/volume over which the samples were measured. Individual samples over different intervals can not be directly combined to generate an average value.)

6. A CB MUST be constructed so that it does not trigger under light or intermittent congestion (see requirements 7-9).

7. A CB is REQUIRED to define a threshold to determine whether the measured congestion is considered excessive.

8. A CB is REQUIRED to define the triggering interval, defining the period over which the trigger uses the collected measurements. CBs need to trigger over a sufficiently long period to avoid additionally penalizing flows with a long path RTT (e.g., many path RTTs).

9. A CB MUST be robust to multiple congestion events. This usually will define a number of measured persistent congestion events per triggering period. For example, a CB MAY combine the results of several measurement periods to determine if the CB is triggered (e.g., it is triggered when persistent excessive congestion is detected in 3 of the measurements within the triggering interval).

10. The normal reaction to a trigger SHOULD disable all traffic that contributed to congestion (otherwise, see requirements 11,12).

11. The reaction MUST be much more severe than that of a Congestion Control algorithm (such as TCP’s congestion control [RFC5681] or TCP-Friendly Rate Control, TFRC [RFC5348]), because the CB reacts to more persistent congestion and operates over longer timescales (i.e., the overload condition will have persisted for a longer time before the CB is triggered).

12. A reaction that results in a reduction SHOULD result in reducing the traffic by at least an order of magnitude. A response that achieves the reduction by terminating flows, rather than randomly dropping packets, will often be more desirable to users of the service. A CB that reduces the rate of a flow, MUST continue to monitor the level of congestion and MUST further react to reduce the rate if the CB is again triggered.
13. The reaction to a triggered CB MUST continue for a period that is at least the triggering interval. Operator intervention will usually be required to restore a flow. If an automated response is needed to reset the trigger, then this needs to not be immediate. The design of an automated reset mechanism needs to be sufficiently conservative that it does not adversely interact with other mechanisms (including other CB algorithms that control traffic over a common path). It SHOULD NOT perform an automated reset when there is evidence of continued congestion.

14. A CB trigger SHOULD be regarded as an abnormal network event. As such, this event SHOULD be logged. The measurements that lead to triggering of the CB SHOULD also be logged.

15. The control communication needs to carry measurements (requirement 1) and, in some uses, also needs to transmit trigger messages to the ingress. This control communication may be in-band or out-of-band. The use of in-band communication is RECOMMENDED when either design would be possible. The preferred CB design is one that triggers when it fails to receive measurement reports that indicate an absence of congestion, in contrast to relying on the successful transmission of a "congested" signal back to the sender. (The feedback signal could itself be lost under congestion).

in-Band: An in-band control method SHOULD assume that loss of control messages is an indication of potential congestion on the path, and repeated loss ought to cause the CB to be triggered. This design has the advantage that it provides fate-sharing of the traffic flow(s) and the control communications. This fate-sharing property is weaker when some or all of the measured traffic is sent using a path that differs from the path taken by the control traffic (e.g., where traffic and control messages follow a different path due to use of equal-cost multipath routing, traffic engineering, or tunnels for specific types of traffic).

Out-of-Band: An out-of-band control method SHOULD NOT trigger CB reaction when there is loss of control messages (e.g., a loss of measurements). This avoids failure amplification/propagation when the measurement and data paths fail independently. A failure of an out-of-band communication path SHOULD be regarded as abnormal network event and be handled as appropriate for the network, e.g., this event SHOULD be logged, and additional network operator action might be appropriate, depending on the network and the traffic involved.
16. The control communication MUST be designed to be robust to packet loss. A control message can be lost if there is a failure of the communication path used for the control messages, loss is likely to also be experienced during congestion/overload. This does not imply that it is desirable to provide reliable delivery (e.g., over TCP), since this can incur additional delay in responding to congestion. Appropriate mechanisms could be to duplicate control messages to provide increased robustness to loss, or/and to regard a lack of control traffic as an indication that excessive congestion could be being experienced [ID-ietf-tsvwg-RFC5405.bis]. If control messages traffic are sent over a shared path, it is RECOMMENDED that this control traffic is prioritized to reduce the probability of loss under congestion. Control traffic also needs to be considered when provisioning a network that uses a Circuit Breaker.

17. There are security requirements for the control communication between endpoints and/or network devices (Section 7). The authenticity of the source and integrity of the control messages (measurements and triggers) MUST be protected from off-path attacks. When there is a risk of on-path attack, a cryptographic authentication mechanism for all control/measurement messages is RECOMMENDED.

5. Examples of Circuit Breakers

There are multiple types of Circuit Breaker that could be defined for use in different deployment cases. There could be cases where a flow become controlled by multiple Circuit Breakers (e.g., when the traffic of an end-to-end flow is carried in a tunnel within the network). This section provides examples of different types of Circuit Breaker:

5.1. A Fast-Trip Circuit Breaker

[RFC2309] discusses the dangers of congestion-unresponsive flows and states that "all UDP-based streaming applications should incorporate effective congestion avoidance mechanisms". Some applications do not use a full-featured transport (TCP, SCTP, DCCP). These applications (e.g., using UDP and its UDP-Lite variant) need to provide appropriate congestion avoidance. Guidance for applications that do not use congestion-controlled transports is provided in [ID-ietf-tsvwg-RFC5405.bis]. Such mechanisms can be designed to react on much shorter timescales than a Circuit Breaker, that only observes a traffic envelope. Congestion control methods can also interact with an application to more effectively control its sending rate.
A fast-trip Circuit Breaker is the most responsive form of Circuit Breaker. It has a response time that is only slightly larger than that of the traffic that it controls. It is suited to traffic with well-understood characteristics (and could include one or more trigger functions specifically tailored to the type of traffic for which it is designed). It is not suited to arbitrary network traffic and could be unsuitable for traffic aggregates, since it could prematurely trigger (e.g., when the combined traffic from multiple congestion-controlled flows leads to short-term overload).

Although the mechanisms can be implemented in RTP-aware network devices, these mechanisms are also suitable for implementation in endpoints (e.g., as a part of the transport system) where they can also compliment end-to-end congestion control methods. A shorter response time enables these mechanisms to trigger before other forms of Circuit Breaker (e.g., Circuit Breakers operating on traffic aggregates at a point along the network path).

5.1.1. A Fast-Trip Circuit Breaker for RTP

A set of fast-trip Circuit Breaker methods have been specified for use together by a Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) flow using the RTP/AVP Profile [RTP-CB]. It is expected that, in the absence of severe congestion, all RTP applications running on best-effort IP networks will be able to run without triggering these Circuit Breakers. A fast-trip RTP Circuit Breaker is therefore implemented as a fail-safe that when triggered will terminate RTP traffic.

The sending endpoint monitors reception of in-band RTP Control Protocol (RTCP) reception report blocks, as contained in SR or RR packets, that convey reception quality feedback information. This is used to measure (congestion) loss, possibly in combination with ECN [RFC6679].

The Circuit Breaker action (shutdown of the flow) is triggered when any of the following trigger conditions are true:

1. An RTP Circuit Breaker triggers on reported lack of progress.
2. An RTP Circuit Breaker triggers when no receiver reports messages are received.
3. An RTP Circuit Breaker triggers when the long-term RTP throughput (over many RTTs) exceeds a hard upper limit determined by a method that resembles TCP-Friendly Rate Control (TFRC).
4. An RTP Circuit Breaker includes the notion of Media Usability. This Circuit Breaker is triggered when the quality of the
transported media falls below some required minimum acceptable quality.

5.2. A Slow-trip Circuit Breaker

A slow-trip Circuit Breaker could be implemented in an endpoint or network device. This type of Circuit Breaker is much slower at responding to congestion than a fast-trip Circuit Breaker. This is expected to be more common.

One example where a slow-trip Circuit Breaker is needed is where flows or traffic-aggregates use a tunnel or encapsulation and the flows within the tunnel do not all support TCP-style congestion control (e.g., TCP, SCTP, TFRC), see [ID-ietf-tsvwg-RFC5405.bis] section 3.1.3. A use case is where tunnels are deployed in the general Internet (rather than "controlled environments" within an Internet service provider or enterprise network), especially when the tunnel could need to cross a customer access router.

5.3. A Managed Circuit Breaker

A managed Circuit Breaker is implemented in the signalling protocol or management plane that relates to the traffic aggregate being controlled. This type of Circuit Breaker is typically applicable when the deployment is within a "controlled environment".

A Circuit Breaker requires more than the ability to determine that a network path is forwarding data, or to measure the rate of a path - which are often normal network operational functions. There is an additional need to determine a metric for congestion on the path and to trigger a reaction when a threshold is crossed that indicates persistent excessive congestion.

The control messages can use either in-band or out-of-band communications.

5.3.1. A Managed Circuit Breaker for SAToP Pseudo-Wires

[RFC4553], SAToP Pseudo-Wires (PWE3), section 8 describes an example of a managed Circuit Breaker for isochronous flows.

If such flows were to run over a pre-provisioned (e.g., Multi-Protocol Label Switching, MPLS) infrastructure, then it could be expected that the Pseudowire (PW) would not experience congestion, because a flow is not expected to either increase (or decrease) their rate. If, instead, PW traffic is multiplexed with other traffic over the general Internet, it could experience congestion. [RFC4553] states: "If SAToP PWs run over a PSN providing best-effort service,
they SHOULD monitor packet loss in order to detect "severe congestion". The currently recommended measurement period is 1 second, and the trigger operates when there are more than three measured Severely Errored Seconds (SES) within a period. If such a condition is detected, a SAToP PW ought to shut down bidirectionally for some period of time...

The concept was that when the packet loss ratio (congestion) level increased above a threshold, the PW was by default disabled. This use case considered fixed-rate transmission, where the PW had no reasonable way to shed load.

The trigger needs to be set at the rate that the PW was likely to experience a serious problem, possibly making the service non-compliant. At this point, triggering the Circuit Breaker would remove the traffic preventing undue impact on congestion-responsive traffic (e.g., TCP). Part of the rationale, was that high loss ratios typically indicated that something was "broken" and ought to have already resulted in operator intervention, and therefore need to trigger this intervention.

An operator-based response to triggering of a Circuit Breaker provides an opportunity for other action to restore the service quality, e.g., by shedding other loads or assigning additional capacity, or to consciously avoid reacting to the trigger while engineering a solution to the problem. This could require the trigger function to send a control message to a third location (e.g., a network operations centre, NOC) that is responsible for operation of the tunnel ingress, rather than the tunnel ingress itself.

5.3.2. A Managed Circuit Breaker for Pseudowires (PWs)

Pseudowires (PWs) [RFC3985] have become a common mechanism for tunneling traffic, and could compete for network resources both with other PWs and with non-PW traffic, such as TCP/IP flows.

[ID-ietf-pals-congcons] discusses congestion conditions that can arise when PWs compete with elastic (i.e., congestion responsive) network traffic (e.g., TCP traffic). Elastic PWs carrying IP traffic (see [RFC4488]) do not raise major concerns because all of the traffic involved responds, reducing the transmission rate when network congestion is detected.

In contrast, inelastic PWs (e.g., a fixed bandwidth Time Division Multiplex, TDM) [RFC4553] [RFC5086] [RFC5087]) have the potential to harm congestion responsive traffic or to contribute to excessive congestion because inelastic PWs do not adjust their transmission rate in response to congestion. [ID-ietf-pals-congcons] analyses TDM
PWs, with an initial conclusion that a TDM PW operating with a degree of loss that could result in congestion-related problems is also operating with a degree of loss that results in an unacceptable TDM service. For that reason, the document suggests that a managed Circuit Breaker that shuts down a PW when it persistently fails to deliver acceptable TDM service is a useful means for addressing these congestion concerns. (See Appendix A of [ID-ietf-pals-congcons] for further discussion.)

6. Examples where circuit breakers may not be needed.

A Circuit Breaker is not required for a single congestion-controlled flow using TCP, SCTP, TFRC, etc. In these cases, the congestion control methods are already designed to prevent persistent excessive congestion.

6.1. CBs over pre-provisioned Capacity

One common question is whether a Circuit Breaker is needed when a tunnel is deployed in a private network with pre-provisioned capacity.

In this case, compliant traffic that does not exceed the provisioned capacity ought not to result in persistent congestion. A Circuit Breaker will hence only be triggered when there is non-compliant traffic. It could be argued that this event ought never to happen - but it could also be argued that the Circuit Breaker equally ought never to be triggered. If a Circuit Breaker were to be implemented, it will provide an appropriate response if persistent congestion occurs in an operational network.

Implementing a Circuit Breaker will not reduce the performance of the flows, but in the event that persistent excessive congestion occurs it protects network traffic that shares network capacity with these flows. It also protects network traffic from a failure when Circuit Breaker traffic is (re)routed to cause additional network load on a non-pre-provisioned path.

6.2. CBs with tunnels carrying Congestion-Controlled Traffic

IP-based traffic is generally assumed to be congestion-controlled, i.e., it is assumed that the transport protocols generating IP-based traffic at the sender already employ mechanisms that are sufficient to address congestion on the path. A question therefore arises when people deploy a tunnel that is thought to only carry an aggregate of TCP traffic (or traffic using some other congestion control method): Is there advantage in this case in using a Circuit Breaker?
TCP (and SCTP) traffic in a tunnel is expected to reduce the transmission rate when network congestion is detected. Other transports (e.g., using UDP) can employ mechanisms that are sufficient to address congestion on the path [ID-ietf-tsvwg-RFC5405.bis]. However, even if the individual flows sharing a tunnel each implement a congestion control mechanism, and individually reduce their transmission rate when network congestion is detected, the overall traffic resulting from the aggregate of the flows does not necessarily avoid persistent congestion. For instance, most congestion control mechanisms require long-lived flows to react to reduce the rate of a flow. An aggregate of many short flows could result in many flows terminating before they experience congestion. It is also often impossible for a tunnel service provider to know that the tunnel only contains congestion-controlled traffic (e.g., inspecting packet headers might not be possible). Some IP-based applications might not implement adequate mechanisms to address congestion. The important thing to note is that if the aggregate of the traffic does not result in persistent excessive congestion (impacting other flows), then the Circuit Breaker will not trigger. This is the expected case in this context – so implementing a Circuit Breaker ought not to reduce performance of the tunnel, but in the event that persistent excessive congestion occurs the Circuit Breaker protects other network traffic that shares capacity with the tunnel traffic.

6.3. CBs with Uni-directional Traffic and no Control Path

A one-way forwarding path could have no associated communication path for sending control messages, and therefore cannot be controlled using a Circuit Breaker (compare with Section 3.2.3).

A one-way service could be provided using a path with dedicated pre-provisioned capacity that is not shared with other elastic Internet flows (i.e., flows that vary their rate). A forwarding path could also be shared with other flows. One way to mitigate the impact of traffic on the other flows is to manage the traffic envelope by using ingress policing. Supporting this type of traffic in the general Internet requires operator monitoring to detect and respond to persistent excessive congestion.

7. Security Considerations

All Circuit Breaker mechanisms rely upon coordination between the ingress and egress meters and communication with the trigger function. This is usually achieved by passing network control information (or protocol messages) across the network. Timely operation of a Circuit Breaker depends on the choice of measurement period. If the receiver has an interval that is overly long, then
the responsiveness of the Circuit Breaker decreases. This impacts the ability of the Circuit Breaker to detect and react to congestion. If the interval is too short the Circuit Breaker could trigger prematurely resulting in insufficient time for other mechanisms to act, potentially resulting in unnecessary disruption to the service.

A Circuit Breaker could potentially be exploited by an attacker to mount a Denial of Service (DoS) attack against the traffic being controlled by the Circuit Breaker. Mechanisms therefore need to be implemented to prevent attacks on the network control information that would result in DoS.

The authenticity of the source and integrity of the control messages (measurements and triggers) MUST be protected from off-path attacks. Without protection, it could be trivial for an attacker to inject fake or modified control/measurement messages (e.g., indicating high packet loss rates) causing a Circuit Breaker to trigger and to therefore mount a DoS attack that disrupts a flow.

Simple protection can be provided by using a randomized source port, or equivalent field in the packet header (such as the RTP SSRC value and the RTP sequence number) expected not to be known to an off-path attacker. Stronger protection can be achieved using a secure authentication protocol to mitigate this concern.

An attack on the control messages is relatively easy for an attacker on the control path when the messages are neither encrypted nor authenticated. Use of a cryptographic authentication mechanism for all control/measurement messages is RECOMMENDED to mitigate this concern, and would also provide protection from off-path attacks. There is a design trade-off between the cost of introducing cryptographic security for control messages and the desire to protect control communication. For some deployment scenarios the value of additional protection from DoS attack will therefore lead to a requirement to authenticate all control messages.

Transmission of network control messages consumes network capacity. This control traffic needs to be considered in the design of a Circuit Breaker and could potentially add to network congestion. If this traffic is sent over a shared path, it is RECOMMENDED that this control traffic is prioritized to reduce the probability of loss under congestion. Control traffic also needs to be considered when provisioning a network that uses a Circuit Breaker.

The Circuit Breaker MUST be designed to be robust to packet loss that can also be experienced during congestion/overload. Loss of control messages could be a side-effect of a congested network, but also could arise from other causes Section 4.
The security implications depend on the design of the mechanisms, the type of traffic being controlled and the intended deployment scenario. Each design of a Circuit Breaker MUST therefore evaluate whether the particular Circuit Breaker mechanism has new security implications.

8. IANA Considerations

This document makes no request from IANA.

9. Acknowledgments

There are many people who have discussed and described the issues that have motivated this document. Contributions and comments included: Lars Eggert, Colin Perkins, David Black, Matt Mathis, Andrew McGregor, Bob Briscoe and Eliot Lear. This work was part-funded by the European Community under its Seventh Framework Programme through the Reducing Internet Transport Latency (RITE) project (ICT-317700).

10. Revision Notes

XXX RFC-Editor: Please remove this section prior to publication XXX

Draft 00

This was the first revision. Help and comments are greatly appreciated.

Draft 01

Contained clarifications and changes in response to received comments, plus addition of diagram and definitions. Comments are welcome.

WG Draft 00

Approved as a WG work item on 28th Aug 2014.

WG Draft 01

Incorporates feedback after Dallas IETF TSVWG meeting. This version is thought ready for WGLC comments. Definitions of abbreviations.

WG Draft 02

Minor fixes for typos. Rewritten security considerations section.
Updates following WGLC comments (see TSV mailing list). Comments from C Perkins; D Black and off-list feedback.

A clear recommendation of intended scope.

Changes include: Improvement of language on timescales and minimum measurement period; clearer articulation of endpoint and multicast examples - with new diagrams; separation of the controlled network case; updated text on position of trigger function; corrections to RTP-CB text; clarification of loss v ECN metrics; checks against submission checklist 9use of keywords, added meters to diagrams).

Added section on PW CB for TDM - a newly adopted draft (D. Black).

Added clarifications requested during AD review.

Fixed some remaining typos.

Update following detailed review by Bob Briscoe, and comments by D. Black.

Additional update following review by Bob Briscoe.

Updated text on the response to lack of meter measurements with managed circuit breakers. Additional comments from Eliot Lear (APPs area).

Updated text on applications from Eliot Lear. Additional feedback from Bob Briscoe.
Updated text following comments by D Black including a rewritten ECN requirements bullet with a reference to a tunnel measurement method in [ID-ietf-tpug-tunnel-congestion-feedback].

WG Draft 11

Minor corrections after second WGLC.

WG Draft 12

Update following Gen-ART, RTG, and OPS review comments.

WG Draft 13

Fixed a typo.

WG Draft 14

Update after IESG discussion, including:

Reworded introduction. Added definition of ECN.

Requirement

Addressed inconsistency between requirements for control messages. Removed a "MUST" following WG feedback on an earlier version of the draft that "SHOULD" is more appropriate.

Addressed comment about grouping requirements to help show they were inter-related. This reordered some requirements.

Reworded the security considerations.

Corrections to wording to improve clarity.

WG Draft 15 (incorporating pending corrections)

Corrected /applications might be implement/applications might not implement/

Corrected /Inspecting packet headers could/Inspecting packet headers might/

Removed Requirement 9, now duplicated (and renumbered remaining items).

Added "(See Appendix A of [ID-ietf-pals-congcons] for further discussion.)" to end of 5.3.2 - missed comment.
Simplified a sentence in section 6.1, without intended change of meaning.

Added a linking sentence to the second para of Section 6.3.

11. References

11.1. Normative References

[ID-ietf-tsvwg-RFC5405.bis]


11.2. Informative References

[ID-ietf-pals-congcons]

[ID-ietf-tsvwg-tunnel-congestion-feedback]

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Diffserv-Interconnection classes and practice
draft-ietf-tsvwg-diffserv-intercon-14

Abstract

This document defines a limited common set of Diffserv Per Hop Behaviours (PHBs) and codepoints (DSCPs) to be applied at (inter)connections of two separately administered and operated networks, and explains how this approach can simplify network configuration and operation. Many network providers operate Multi Protocol Label Switching (MPLS) using Treatment Aggregates for traffic marked with different Diffserv Per Hop Behaviors, and use MPLS for interconnection with other networks. This document offers a simple interconnection approach that may simplify operation of Diffserv for network interconnection among providers that use MPLS and apply the Short-Pipe tunnel mode. While motivated by the requirements of MPLS network operators that use Short-Pipe tunnels, this document is applicable to other networks, both MPLS and non-MPLS.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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This Internet-Draft will expire on June 18, 2017.
1. Introduction

Diffserv has been deployed in many networks; it provides differentiated traffic forwarding based on the Diffserv Codepoint (DSCP) field, which is part of the IP header [RFC2474]. This document defines a set of common Diffserv classes (Per Hop Behaviors, PHBs) and code points for use at interconnection points to which and from which locally used classes and code points should be mapped.
As described by section 2.3.4.2 of RFC2475, remarking of packets at domain boundaries is a Diffserv feature [RFC2475]. If traffic marked with unknown or unexpected DSCPs is received, RFC2474 recommends forwarding that traffic with default (best effort) treatment without changing the DSCP markings to better support incremental Diffserv deployment in existing networks as well as with routers that do not support Diffserv or are not configured to support it. Many networks do not follow this recommendation, and instead remark unknown or unexpected DSCPs to zero upon receipt for default (best effort) forwarding in accordance with the guidance in RFC2475 [RFC2475] to ensure that appropriate DSCPs are used within a Diffserv domain. This draft is based on the latter approach, and defines additional DSCPs that are known and expected at network interconnection interfaces in order to reduce the amount of traffic whose DSCPs are remarked to zero.

This document is motivated by requirements for IP network interconnection with Diffserv support among providers that operate Multi Protocol Label Switching (MPLS) in their backbones, but is also applicable to other technologies. The operational simplifications and methods in this document help align IP Diffserv functionality with MPLS limitations resulting from the widely deployed Short Pipe tunnel model for operation [RFC3270]. Further, limiting Diffserv to a small number of Treatment Aggregates can enable network traffic to leave a network with the DSCP value with which it was received, even if a different DSCP is used within the network, thus providing an opportunity to extend consistent Diffserv treatment across network boundaries.

In isolation, use of a defined set of interconnection PHBs and DSCPs may appear to be additional effort for a network operator. The primary offsetting benefit is that mapping from or to the interconnection PHBs and DSCPs is specified once for all of the interconnections to other networks that can use this approach. Absent this approach, the PHBs and DSCPs have to be negotiated and configured independently for each network interconnection, which has poor administrative and operational scaling properties. Further, consistent end-to-end Diffserv treatment is more likely to result when an interconnection code point scheme is used because traffic is remarked to the same PHBs at all network interconnections.

The interconnection approach described in this document (referred to as Diffserv-Intercon) uses a set of PHBs (mapped to four corresponding MPLS treatment aggregates) along with a set of interconnection DSCPs allowing straightforward rewriting to domain-internal DSCPs and defined DSCP markings for traffic forwarded to interconnected domains. The solution described here can be used in
other contexts benefitting from a defined Diffserv interconnection interface.

The basic idea is that traffic sent with a Diffserv-Interconnect PHB and DSCP is restored to that PHB and DSCP at each network interconnection, even though a different PHB and DSCP may be used by each network involved. The key requirement is that the network ingress interconnect DSCP be restored at network egress, and a key observation is that this is only feasible in general for a small number of DSCPs. Traffic sent with other DSCPs can be remarked to an interconnect DSCP or dealt with via additional agreement(s) among the operators of the interconnected networks; use of the MPLS Short Pipe model favors remarking unexpected DSCPs to zero in the absence of additional agreement(s), as explained further in this document.

In addition to the common interconnecting PHBs and DSCPs, interconnecting operators need to further agree on the tunneling technology used for interconnection (e.g., MPLS, if used) and control or mitigate the impacts of tunneling on reliability and MTU.

1.1. Related work

In addition to the activities that triggered this work, there are additional RFCs and Internet-drafts that may benefit from an interconnection PHB and DSCP scheme. RFC5160 suggests Meta-QoS-Classes to help enabling deployment of standardized end to end QoS classes [RFC5160]. The Diffserv-Intercon class- and codepoint scheme is intended to complement that work (e.g., by enabling a defined set of interconnection DSCPs and PHBs).

Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) signaling Class of Service at interconnection interfaces by BGP [I-D.knoll-idr-cos-interconnect], [ID.ietf-idr-sla] is complementary to Diffserv-Intercon. These two BGP documents focus on exchanging Service Level Agreement (SLA) and traffic conditioning parameters and assume that common PHBs identified by the signaled DSCPs have been established (e.g., via use of the Diffserv-Intercon DSCPs) prior to BGP signaling of PHB id codes.

1.2. Applicability Statement

This document is applicable to use of Differentiated Services for interconnection traffic between networks, and is particularly suited to interconnection of MPLS-based networks that use MPLS Short-pipe tunnels. This document is also applicable to other network technologies, but it is not intended for use within an individual network, where the approach specified in RFC5127 [RFC5127] is among the possible alternatives; see Section 3 for further discussion.
The Diffserv-Intercon approach described in this document simplifies IP based interconnection to domains operating the MPLS Short Pipe model for IP traffic, both terminating within the domain and transiting onward to another domain. Transiting traffic is received and sent with the same PHB and DSCP. Terminating traffic maintains the PHB with which it was received, however the DSCP may change.

Diffserv-Intercon is also applicable to the Pipe tunneling model [RFC2983], [RFC3270], but it is not applicable to the Uniform tunneling model [RFC2983], [RFC3270].

The Diffserv-Intercon approach defines a set of four PHBs for support at interconnections (or network boundaries in general). Corresponding DSCPs for use at an interconnection interface are added. Diffserv-intercon allows for a simple mapping of PHBs and DSCPs to MPLS Treatment Aggregates. It is extensible by IETF standardisation and this allows additional PHBs and DSCPs to be specified for the Diffserv-intercon scheme. Coding space for private interconnection agreements or provider internal services is left too.

1.3. Document Organization

This document is organized as follows: section 2 reviews the MPLS Short Pipe tunnel model for Diffserv Tunnels [RFC3270], because effective support for that model is a crucial goal of Diffserv-Intercon. Section 3 provides background on RFC5127’s approach to traffic class aggregation within a Diffserv network domain and contrasts it with the Diffserv-Intercon approach. Section 4 introduces Diffserv-Interconnection Treatment Aggregates, along with the PHBs and DSCPs that they use, and explains how other PHBs (and associated DSCPs) may be mapped to these Treatment Aggregates. Section 4 also discusses treatment of IP traffic, MPLS VPN Diffserv considerations and handling of high-priority Network Management traffic. Appendix A describes how the MPLS Short Pipe model (penultimate hop popping) impacts DSCP marking for IP interconnections.

2. MPLS and the Short Pipe tunnel model

This section provides a summary of the implications of the MPLS Short Pipe tunnels, and in particular their use of Penultimate Hop Popping (PHP, see RFC3270) on the Diffserv tunnel framework described in RFC2983. The Pipe and Uniform models for Differentiated Services and Tunnels are defined in [RFC2983]. RFC3270 adds the Short Pipe model to reflect the impact of MPLS PHP, primarily for MPLS-based IP tunnels and VPNs. The Short Pipe model and PHP have subsequently become popular with network providers that operate MPLS networks and
are now widely used to transport unencapsulated IP traffic. This has important implications for Diffserv functionality in MPLS networks.

RFC2474’s recommendation to forward traffic with unrecognized DSCPs with Default (best effort) service without rewriting the DSCP has not been widely deployed in practice. Network operation and management are simplified when there is a 1-1 match between the DSCP marked on the packet and the forwarding treatment (PHB) applied by network nodes. When this is done, CS0 (the all-zero DSCP) is the only DSCP used for Default forwarding of best effort traffic, and a common practice is to remark to CS0 any traffic received with unrecognized or unsupported DSCPs at network edges.

MPLS networks are more subtle in this regard, as it is possible to encode the provider’s DSCP in the MPLS Traffic Class (TC) field and allow that to differ from the PHB indicated by the DSCP in the MPLS-encapsulated IP packet. If the MPLS label with the provider’s TC field is present at all hops within the provider network, this approach would allow an unrecognized DSCP to be carried edge-to-edge over an MPLS network, because the effective DSCP used by the provider’s MPLS network would be encoded in the MPLS label TC field (and also carried edge-to-edge). Unfortunately this is only true for the Pipe tunnel model.

The Short Pipe tunnel model and PHP behave differently because PHP removes and discards the MPLS provider label carrying the provider’s TC field before the traffic exits the provider’s network. That discard occurs one hop upstream of the MPLS tunnel endpoint (which is usually at the network edge), resulting in no provider TC info being available at tunnel egress. To ensure consistent handling of traffic at the tunnel egress, the DSCP field in the MPLS-encapsulated IP header has to contain a DSCP that is valid for the provider’s network, so that IP header cannot be used to carry a different DSCP edge-to-edge. See Appendix A for a more detailed discussion.

3. Relationship to RFC5127

This document draws heavily upon RFC5127’s approach to aggregation of Diffserv traffic classes for use within a network, but there are important differences caused by characteristics of network interconnects that differ from links within a network.

3.1. RFC5127 Background

Many providers operate MPLS-based backbones that employ backbone traffic engineering to ensure that if a major link, switch, or router fails, the result will be a routed network that continues to function. Based on that foundation, [RFC5127] introduced the concept
of Diffserv Treatment Aggregates, which enable traffic marked with multiple DSCPs to be forwarded in a single MPLS Traffic Class (TC) based on robust provider backbone traffic engineering. This enables differentiated forwarding behaviors within a domain in a fashion that does not consume a large number of MPLS Traffic Classes.

RFC5127 provides an example aggregation of Diffserv service classes into 4 Treatment Aggregates. A small number of aggregates are used because:

- The available coding space for carrying Traffic Class information (e.g., Diffserv PHB) in MPLS (and Ethernet) is only 3 bits in size, and is intended for more than just Diffserv purposes (see, e.g., [RFC5129]).
- The common interconnection DSCPs ought not to use all 8 possible values. This leaves space for future standards, for private bilateral agreements and for local use PHBs and DSCPs.
- Migrations from one Diffserv code point scheme to a different one is another possible application of otherwise unused DSCPs.

3.2. Differences from RFC5127

Like RFC5127, this document also uses four traffic aggregates, but differs from RFC5127 in some important ways:

- It follows RFC2475 in allowing the DSCPs used within a network to differ from those to exchange traffic with other networks (at network edges), but provides support to restore ingress DSCP values if one of the recommended interconnect DSCPs in this draft is used. This results in DSCP remarking at both network ingress and network egress, and this draft assumes that such remarking at network edges is possible for all interface types.

- Diffserv-Intercon suggests limiting the number of interconnection PHBs per Treatment Aggregate to the minimum required. As further discussed below, the number of PHBs per Treatment Aggregate is no more than two. When two PHBs are specified for a Diffserv-Intercon treatment aggregate, the expectation is that the provider network supports DSCPs for both PHBs, but uses a single MPLS TC for the Treatment Aggregate that contains the two PHBs.

- Diffserv-Intercon suggests mapping other PHBs and DSCPs into the interconnection Treatment Aggregates as further discussed below.

- Diffserv-Intercon treats network control traffic as a special case. Within a provider’s network, the CS6 DSCP is used for local
network control traffic (routing protocols and Operations, Administration, and Maintenance (OAM) traffic that is essential to network operation administration, control and management) that may be destined for any node within the network. In contrast, network control traffic exchanged between networks (e.g., BGP) usually terminates at or close to a network edge, and is not forwarded through the network because it is not part of internal routing or OAM for the receiving network. In addition, such traffic is unlikely to be covered by standard interconnection agreements; rather, it is more likely to be specifically configured (e.g., most networks impose restrictions on use of BGP with other networks for obvious reasons). See Section 4.2 for further discussion.

- Because RFC5127 used a Treatment Aggregate for network control traffic, Diffserv-Intercon can instead define a fourth traffic aggregate to be defined for use at network interconnections instead of the Network Control aggregate in RFC5127. Network Control traffic may still be exchanged across network interconnections as further discussed in Section 4.2. Diffserv-Intercon uses this fourth traffic aggregate for VoIP traffic, where network-provided service differentiation is crucial, as even minor glitches are immediately apparent to the humans involved in the conversation.

4. The Diffserv-Intercon Interconnection Classes

At an interconnection, the networks involved need to agree on the PHBs used for interconnection and the specific DSCP for each PHB. This document defines a set of 4 interconnection Treatment Aggregates with well-defined DCSPs to be aggregated by them. A sending party remarks DSCPs from internal schemes to the interconnection code points. The receiving party remarks DSCPs to their internal scheme. The interconnect SLA defines the set of DSCPs and PHBs supported across the two interconnected domains and the treatment of PHBs and DSCPs that are not recognized by the receiving domain.

Similar approaches that use a small number of traffic aggregates (including recognition of the importance of VoIP traffic) have been taken in related standards and recommendations from outside the IETF, e.g., Y.1566 [Y.1566], GSMA IR.34 [IR.34] and MEF23.1 [MEF23.1].

The list of the four Diffserv-Interconnect traffic aggregates follows, highlighting differences from RFC5127 and suggesting mappings for all RFC4594 traffic classes to Diffserv-Intercon Treatment Aggregates:
Telephony Service Treatment Aggregate: PHB EF, DSCP 101 110 and PHB VOICE-ADMIT, DSCP 101 100, see [RFC3246], [RFC4594] and [RFC5865]. This Treatment Aggregate corresponds to RFC5127’s real time Treatment Aggregate definition regarding the queuing (both delay and jitter should be minimized), but this aggregate is restricted to transport Telephony Service Class traffic in the sense of RFC4594 [RFC4594].

Bulk Real-Time Treatment Aggregate: This Treatment Aggregate is designed to transport PHB AF41, DSCP 100 010 (the other AF4 PHB group PHBs and DSCPs may be used for future extension of the set of DSCPs carried by this Treatment Aggregate). This Treatment Aggregate is intended for Diffserv-Intercon network interconnection of the portions of RFC5127’s Real Time Treatment Aggregate, that consume significant bandwidth. This traffic is expected to consist of the RFC4594 classes Broadcast Video, Real-Time Interactive and Multimedia Conferencing. This treatment aggregate should be configured with a rate queue (consistent with RFC4594’s recommendation for the transported traffic classes). By comparison to RFC5127, the number of DSCPs has been reduced to one (initially). The AF42 and AF43 PHBs could be added if there is a need for three-color marked Multimedia Conferencing traffic.

Assured Elastic Treatment Aggregate This Treatment Aggregate consists of PHBs AF31 and AF32 (i.e., DSCPs 011 010 and 011 100). By comparison to RFC5127, the number of DSCPs has been reduced to two. This document suggests to transport signaling marked by AF31 (e.g., as recommended by GSMA IR.34 [IR.34]). AF33 is reserved for extension of PHBs to be aggregated by this TA. For Diffserv-Intercon network interconnection, the following RFC4594 service classes should be mapped to the Assured Elastic Treatment Aggregate: the Signaling Service Class (being marked for lowest loss probability), Multimedia Streaming Service Class, the Low-Latency Data Service Class and the High-Throughput Data Service Class.

Default / Elastic Treatment Aggregate: transports the default PHB, CS0 with DSCP 000 000. RFC5127 example refers to this Treatment Aggregate as Aggregate Elastic. An important difference from RFC5127 is that any traffic with unrecognized or unsupported DSCPs may be remarked to this DSCP. For Diffserv-Intercon network interconnection, the RFC4594 standard service class and Low-priority Data service class should be mapped to this Treatment Aggregate. This document does not specify an interconnection class for RFC4594 Low-
priority data. This data may be forwarded by a Lower Effort PHB in one domain (like the PHB proposed by Informational [RFC3662]), but using the methods specified in this document will be remarked with DSCP CS0 at a Diffserv-Intercon network interconnection. This has the effect that Low-priority data is treated the same as data sent using the default class. (Note: In a network that implements RFC2474, Low-priority traffic marked as CS1 would otherwise receive better treatment than traffic using the default class.)

RFC2475 states that Ingress nodes must condition all inbound traffic to ensure that the DS codepoints are acceptable; packets found to have unacceptable codepoints must either be discarded or must have their DS codepoints modified to acceptable values before being forwarded. For example, an ingress node receiving traffic from a domain with which no enhanced service agreement exists may reset the DS codepoint to CS0. As a consequence, an interconnect SLA needs to specify not only the treatment of traffic that arrives with a supported interconnect DSCP, but also the treatment of traffic that arrives with unsupported or unexpected DSCPs; remarking to CS0 is a widely deployed behavior.

During the process of setting up a Diffserv interconnection, both networks should define the set of acceptable and unacceptable DSCPs and specify the treatment of traffic marked with each DSCP.

While Diffserv-Intercon allows modification of unacceptable DSCPs, if traffic using one or more of the PHBs in a PHB group (e.g., AF3x, consisting of AF31, AF32 and AF33) is accepted as part of a supported Diffserv-Intercon Treatment Aggregate, then traffic using other PHBs from the same PHB group should not be modified to use PHBs outside of that PHB group, and in particular should not be remarked to CS0 unless the entire PHB group is remarked to CS0. This avoids unexpected forwarding behavior (and potential reordering, see also [RFC7657]) when using Assured Forwarding (AF) PHBs [RFC2597].

4.1. Diffserv-Intercon Example

The overall approach to DSCP marking at network interconnections is illustrated by the following example. Provider O and provider W are peered with provider T. They have agreed upon a Diffserv interconnection SLA.

Traffic of provider O terminates within provider T’s network, while provider W’s traffic transits through the network of provider T to provider F. This example assumes that all providers use their own internal PHB and codepoint (DSCP) that correspond to the AF31 PHB in
the Diffserv-Intercon Assured Elastic Treatment Aggregate (AF21 and CS2 are used in the example).
Figure 1

Diffserv-Intercon example
Providers only need to deploy mappings of internal DSCPs to/from Diffserv-Intercon DSCP so that they can exchange traffic using the desired PHBs. In the example, provider O has decided that the properties of his internal class AF21 are best met by the Diffserv-Intercon Assured Elastic Treatment Aggregate, PHB AF31. At the outgoing peering interface connecting provider O with provider T the former’s peering router remarks AF21 traffic to AF31. The domain internal PHB of provider T meeting the requirement of Diffserv-Intercon Assured Elastic Treatment Aggregate are from AF2x PHB group. Hence AF31 traffic received at the interconnection with provider T is remarked to AF21 by the peering router of domain T, and domain T has chosen to use MPLS Traffic Class value 2 for this aggregate. At the penultimate MPLS node, the top MPLS label is removed and exposes the IP header marked by the DSCP that has been set at the network ingress. The peering router connecting domain T with domain F classifies the packet by its domain-T-internal DSCP AF21. As the packet leaves domain T on the interface to domain F, this causes the packet’s DSCP to be remarked to AF31. The peering router of domain F classifies the packet for domain-F-internal PHB AF11, as this is the PHB with properties matching Diffserv-Intercon’s Assured Elastic Treatment Aggregate.

This example can be extended. The figure shows Provider-W using CS2 for traffic that corresponds to Diffserv-Intercon Assured Elastic Treatment Aggregate PHB AF31; that traffic is mapped to AF31 at the Diffserv-Intercon interconnection to Provider-T. In addition, suppose that Provider-O supports a PHB marked by AF22 and this PHB is supposed to obtain Diffserv transport within Provider-T domain. Then Provider-O will remark it with DSCP AF32 for interconnection to Provider-T.

Finally suppose that Provider-W supports CS3 for internal use only. Then no Diffserv-Intercon DSCP mapping needs to be configured at the peering router. Traffic, sent by Provider-W to Provider-T marked by CS3 due to a misconfiguration may be remarked to CS0 by Provider-T.

4.2. End-to-end PHB and DSCP Transparency

This section briefly discusses end-to-end Diffserv approaches related to the Uniform, Pipe and Short Pipe tunnel models ([RFC2983], [RFC3270]), when used edge-to-edge in a network.

- With the Uniform model, neither the DSCP nor the PHB change. This implies that a network management packet received with a CS6 DSCP would be forwarded with an MPLS Traffic Class corresponding to CS6. The uniform model is outside the scope of this document.
With the Pipe model, the inner tunnel DSCP remains unchanged, but an outer tunnel DSCP and the PHB could change. For example a packet received with a (network specific) CS1 DSCP would be transported by default PHB and if MPLS is applicable, forwarded with an MPLS Traffic Class corresponding to Default PHB. The CS1 DSCP is not rewritten. Transport of a large variety (much greater than 4) DSCPs may be required across an interconnected network operating MPLS Short pipe transport for IP traffic. In that case, a tunnel based on the Pipe model is among the possible approaches. The Pipe model is outside the scope of this document.

With the Short Pipe model, the DSCP likely changes and the PHB might change. This document describes a method to simplify Diffserv network interconnection when a DSCP rewrite can’t be avoided.

### 4.3. Treatment of Network Control traffic at carrier interconnection interfaces

As specified by RFC4594, section 3.2, Network Control (NC) traffic marked by CS6 is expected at some interconnection interfaces. This document does not change RFC4594, but observes that network control traffic received at network ingress is generally different from network control traffic within a network that is the primary use of CS6 envisioned by RFC4594. A specific example is that some CS6 traffic exchanged across carrier interconnections is terminated at the network ingress node, e.g., when BGP is used between the two routers on opposite ends of an interconnection link; in this case the operators would enter into a bilateral agreement to use CS6 for that BGP traffic.

The end-to-end discussion in the previous section (4.2) is generally inapplicable to network control traffic – network control traffic is generally intended to control a network, not be transported between networks. One exception is that network control traffic makes sense for a purchased transit agreement, and preservation of the CS6 DSCP marking for network control traffic that is transited is reasonable in some cases, although it is generally inappropriate to use CS6 for forwarding that traffic within the network that provides transit. Use of an IP tunnel is suggested in order to conceal the CS6 markings on transiting network control traffic from the network that provides the transit. In this case, Pipe model for Diffserv tunneling is used.

If the MPLS Short Pipe model is deployed for unencapsulated IPv4 traffic, an IP network provider should limit access to the CS6 and CS7 DSCPs so that they are only used for network control traffic for the provider’s own network.
Interconnecting carriers should specify treatment of CS6 marked traffic received at a carrier interconnection which is to be forwarded beyond the ingress node. An SLA covering the following cases is recommended when a provider wishes to send CS6 marked traffic across an interconnection link and that traffic’s destination is beyond the interconnected ingress node:

- classification of traffic that is network control traffic for both domains. This traffic should be classified and marked for the CS6 DSCP.

- classification of traffic that is network control traffic for the sending domain only. This traffic should be forwarded with a PHB that is appropriate for the NC service class [RFC4594], e.g., AF31 as specified by this document. As an example GSMA IR.34 recommends an Interactive class / AF31 to carry SIP and DIAMETER traffic. While this is service control traffic of high importance to interconnected Mobile Network Operators, it is certainly not Network Control traffic for a fixed network providing transit among such operators, and hence should not receive CS6 treatment in such a transit network.

- any other CS6 marked traffic should be remarked or dropped.

5. Acknowledgements

Bob Briscoe and Gorry Fairhurst reviewed the draft and provided rich feedback. Brian Carpenter, Fred Baker, Al Morton and Sebastien Jobert discussed the draft and helped improving it. Mohamed Boucadair and Thomas Knoll helped adding awareness of related work. James Polk’s discussion during IETF 89 helped to improve the text on the relation of this draft to RFC4594 and RFC5127.

6. IANA Considerations

This memo includes no request to IANA.

7. Security Considerations

The DSCP field in the IP header can expose additional traffic classification information at network interconnections by comparison to use of a zero DSCP for all interconnect traffic. If traffic classification info is sensitive, the DSCP field could be remarked to zero to hide the classification as a countermeasure, at the cost of loss of Diffserv info and differentiated traffic handling on the interconnect and subsequent networks. When AF PHBs are used, any such remarking should respect AF PHB group boundaries as further discussed at the end of Section 4.
This document does not introduce new features; it describes how to use existing ones. The Diffserv security considerations in [RFC2475] and [RFC4594] apply.

8. References

8.1. Normative References


8.2. Informative References

[ID.ietf-idr-sla]


Geib & Black Expires June 18, 2017 [Page 17]
Appendix A. Appendix A The MPLS Short Pipe Model and IP traffic

The MPLS Short Pipe Model (or penultimate Hop Label Popping) is widely deployed in carrier networks. If unencapsulated IP traffic is transported using MPLS Short Pipe, IP headers appear inside the last section of the MPLS domain. This impacts the number of PHBs and DSCPs that a network provider can reasonably support. See Figure 2 (below) for an example.

For encapsulated IP traffic, only the outer tunnel header is relevant for forwarding. If the tunnel does not terminate within the MPLS network section, only the outer tunnel DSCP is involved, as the inner DSCP does not affect forwarding behavior; in this case all DSCPs could be used in the inner IP header without affecting network behavior based on the outer MPLS header. Here the Pipe model applies.

Layer 2 and Layer 3 VPN traffic all use an additional MPLS label; in this case, the MPLS tunnel follows the Pipe model. Classification and queuing within an MPLS network is always based on an MPLS label, as opposed to the outer IP header.

Carriers often select PHBs and DSCP without regard to interconnection. As a result PHBs and DSCPs typically differ between network carriers. With the exception of best effort traffic, a DSCP change should be expected at an interconnection at least for unencapsulated IP traffic, even if the PHB is suitably mapped by the carriers involved.

Although RFC3270 suggests that the Short Pipe Model is only applicable to VPNs, current networks also use it to transport non-tunneled IPv4 traffic. This is shown in figure 2 where Diffserv-Intercon is not used, resulting in exposure of the internal DSCPs of the upstream network to the downstream network across the interconnection.
The packets IP DSCP must be in a well understood Diffserv context for schedulers and classifiers on the interfaces of the ultimate MPLS link (last link traversed before leaving the network). The necessary Diffserv context is network-internal and a network operating in this mode enforces DSCP usage in order to obtain robust differentiated forwarding behavior.

Without Diffserv-Intercon treatment, the traffic is likely to leave each network marked with network-internal DSCP. DSCP_send in the

Figure 2
figure above has to be remarked into the first network’s Diffserv scheme at the ingress MPLS Edge Router, to DSCP_d in the example. For that reason, the traffic leaves this domain marked by the network-internal DSCP_d. This structure requires that every carrier deploys per-peer PHB and DSCP mapping schemes.

If Diffserv-Intercon is applied DSCPs for traffic transiting the domain can be mapped from and remapped to an original DSCP. This is shown in figure 3. Internal traffic may continue to use internal DSCPs (e.g., DSCP_d) and they may also be used between a carrier and its direct customers.
Short-Pipe example with Diffserv-Intercon

Figure 3

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Guidelines for Adding Congestion Notification to Protocols that Encapsulate IP

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Abstract

The purpose of this document is to guide the design of congestion notification in any lower layer or tunnelling protocol that encapsulates IP. The aim is for explicit congestion signals to propagate consistently from lower layer protocols into IP. Then the IP internetwork layer can act as a portability layer to carry congestion notification from non-IP-aware congested nodes up to the transport layer (L4). Following these guidelines should assure interworking among IP layer and lower layer congestion notification mechanisms, whether specified by the IETF or other standards bodies. This document updates the advice to subnetwork designers about ECN in RFC 3819.

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1. Introduction

The benefits of Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) described in [RFC8087] and summarized below can only be fully realized if support for ECN is added to the relevant subnetwork technology, as well as to IP. When a lower layer buffer drops a packet obviously it does not just drop at that layer; the packet disappears from all layers. In contrast, when active queue management (AQM) at a lower layer marks a packet with ECN, the marking needs to be explicitly propagated up the layers. The same is true if AQM marks the outer header of a packet that encapsulates inner tunnelled headers. Forwarding ECN is not as straightforward as other headers because it has to be assumed ECN may be only partially deployed. If a lower layer header that contains ECN congestion indications is stripped off by a subnet egress that is not ECN-aware, or if the ultimate receiver or sender is not ECN-aware, congestion needs to be indicated by dropping a packet, not marking it.

The purpose of this document is to guide the addition of congestion notification to any subnet technology or tunnelling protocol, so that lower layer AQM algorithms can signal congestion explicitly and it will propagate consistently into encapsulated (higher layer) headers, otherwise the signals will not reach their ultimate destination.

ECN is defined in the IP header (v4 and v6) [RFC3168] to allow a resource to notify the onset of queue build-up without having to drop packets, by explicitly marking a proportion of packets with the congestion experienced (CE) codepoint.

Given a suitable marking scheme, ECN removes nearly all congestion loss and it cuts delays for two main reasons:

- It avoids the delay when recovering from congestion losses, which particularly benefits small flows or real-time flows, making their delivery time predictably short [RFC2884];

- As ECN is used more widely by end-systems, it will gradually remove the need to configure a degree of delay into buffers before they start to notify congestion (the cause of bufferbloat). This is because drop involves a trade-off between sending a timely signal and trying to avoid impairment, whereas ECN is solely a signal not an impairment, so there is no harm triggering it earlier.

Some lower layer technologies (e.g. MPLS, Ethernet) are used to form subnetworks with IP-aware nodes only at the edges. These networks
are often sized so that it is rare for interior queues to overflow. However, until recently this was more due to the inability of TCP to saturate the links. For many years, fixes such as window scaling [RFC1323] (now [RFC7323]) proved hard to deploy. And the Reno variant of TCP has remained in widespread use despite its inability to scale to high flow rates. However, now that modern operating systems are finally capable of saturating interior links, even the buffers of well-provisioned interior switches will need to signal episodes of queuing.

Propagation of ECN is defined for MPLS [RFC5129], and is being defined for TRILL [RFC7780], [I-D.ietf-trill-ecn-support], but it remains to be defined for a number of other subnetwork technologies.

Similarly, ECN propagation is yet to be defined for many tunnelling protocols. [RFC6040] defines how ECN should be propagated for IP-in-IPv4 [RFC2003], IP-in-IPv6 [RFC2473] and IPsec [RFC4301] tunnels, but there are numerous other tunnelling protocols with a shim and/or a layer 2 header between two IP headers (v4 or v6). Some address ECN propagation between the IP headers, but many do not. This document gives guidance on how to address ECN propagation for future tunnelling protocols, and a companion standards track specification [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-rfc6040update-shim] updates those existing IP-shim-(L2)-IP protocols that are under IETF change control and still widely used.

Incremental deployment is the most delicate aspect when adding support for ECN. The original ECN protocol in IP [RFC3168] was carefully designed so that a congested buffer would not mark a packet (rather than drop it) unless both source and destination hosts were ECN-capable. Otherwise its congestion markings would never be detected and congestion would just build up further. However, to support congestion marking below the IP layer or within tunnels, it is not sufficient to only check that the two layer 4 transport end-points support ECN; correct operation also depends on the decapsulator at each subnet or tunnel egress faithfully propagating congestion notifications to the higher layer. Otherwise, a legacy decapsulator might silently fail to propagate any ECN signals from the outer to the forwarded header. Then the lost signals would never be detected and again congestion would build up further. The guidelines given later require protocol designers to carefully consider incremental deployment, and suggest various safe approaches for different circumstances.

Of course, the IETF does not have standards authority over every link layer protocol. So this document gives guidelines for designing propagation of congestion notification across the interface between IP and protocols that may encapsulate IP (i.e. that can be layered
beneath IP). Each lower layer technology will exhibit different issues and compromises, so the IETF or the relevant standards body must be free to define the specifics of each lower layer congestion notification scheme. Nonetheless, if the guidelines are followed, congestion notification should interwork between different technologies, using IP in its role as a 'portability layer'.

Therefore, the capitalized terms 'SHOULD' or 'SHOULD NOT' are often used in preference to 'MUST' or 'MUST NOT', because it is difficult to know the compromises that will be necessary in each protocol design. If a particular protocol design chooses not to follow a 'SHOULD (NOT)' given in the advice below, it MUST include a sound justification.

It has not been possible to give common guidelines for all lower layer technologies, because they do not all fit a common pattern. Instead they have been divided into a few distinct modes of operation: feed-forward-and-upward; feed-upward-and-forward; feed-backward; and null mode. These modes are described in Section 3, then in the subsequent sections separate guidelines are given for each mode.

1.1. Update to RFC 3819

This document updates the brief advice to subnetwork designers about ECN in [RFC3819], by replacing the last two paragraphs of Section 13 with the following sentence:

By following the guidelines in [RFCXXX], subnetwork designers can enable a layer-2 protocol to participate in congestion control without dropping packets via propagation of explicit congestion notification (ECN [RFC3168]) to receivers.

and adding [RFCXXX] as an informative reference. (RFC Editor: Please replace both instances of XXXX above with the number of this RFC when published.)

1.2. Scope

This document only concerns wire protocol processing of explicit notification of congestion. It makes no changes or recommendations concerning algorithms for congestion marking or for congestion response, because algorithm issues should be independent of the layer the algorithm operates in.

The default ECN semantics are described in [RFC3168] and updated by [RFC8311]. Also the guidelines for AQM designers [RFC7567] clarify the semantics of both drop and ECN signals from AQM algorithms.
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[RFC4774] is the appropriate best current practice specification of how algorithms with alternative semantics for the ECN field can be partitioned from Internet traffic that uses the default ECN semantics. There are two main examples for how alternative ECN semantics have been defined in practice:

- RFC 4774 suggests using the ECN field in combination with a Diffserv codepoint such as in PCN [RFC6660], Voice over 3G [UTRAN] or Voice over LTE (VoLTE) [LTE-RA];
- RFC 8311 suggests using the ECT(1) codepoint of the ECN field to indicate alternative semantics such as for the experimental Low Latency Low Loss Scalable throughput (L4S) service ([I-D.ietf-tsvwg-ecn-l4s-id]).

The aim is that the default rules for encapsulating and decapsulating the ECN field are sufficiently generic that tunnels and subnets will encapsulate and decapsulate packets without regard to how algorithms elsewhere are setting or interpreting the semantics of the ECN field. [RFC6040] updates RFC 4774 to allow alternative encapsulation and decapsulation behaviours to be defined for alternative ECN semantics. However it reinforces the same point – that it is far preferable to try to fit within the common ECN encapsulation and decapsulation behaviours, because expecting all lower layer technologies and tunnels to be updated is likely to be completely impractical.

Alternative semantics for the ECN field can be defined to depend on the traffic class indicated by the DSCP. Therefore correct propagation of congestion signals could depend on correct propagation of the DSCP between the layers and along the path. For instance, if the meaning of the ECN field depends on the DSCP (as in PCN or VoLTE) and if the outer DSCP is stripped on descapsulation, as in the pipe model of [RFC2983], the special semantics of the ECN field would be lost. Similarly, if the DSCP is changed at the boundary between Diffserv domains, the special ECN semantics would also be lost. This is an important implication of the localized scope of most Diffserv arrangements. In this document, correct propagation of traffic class information is assumed, while what ‘correct’ means and how it is achieved is covered elsewhere (e.g. RFC 2983) and is outside the scope of the present document.

The guidelines in this document do ensure that common encapsulation and decapsulation rules are sufficiently generic to cover cases where ECT(1) is used instead of ECT(0) to identify alternative ECN semantics (as in L4S [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-ecn-l4s-id]) and where ECN marking algorithms use ECT(1) to encode 3 severity levels into the ECN field (e.g. PCN [RFC6660]) rather than the default of 2. All these different semantics for the ECN field work because it has been
possible to define common default decapsulation rules that allow for all cases.

Note that the guidelines in this document do not necessarily require the subnet wire protocol to be changed to add support for congestion notification. For instance, the Feed-Up-and-Forward Mode (Section 3.2) and the Null Mode (Section 3.4) do not. Another way to add congestion notification without consuming header space in the subnet protocol might be to use a parallel control plane protocol.

This document focuses on the congestion notification interface between IP and lower layer or tunnel protocols that can encapsulate IP, where the term ‘IP’ includes v4 or v6, unicast, multicast or anycast. However, it is likely that the guidelines will also be useful when a lower layer protocol or tunnel encapsulates itself, e.g. Ethernet MAC in MAC ([IEEE802.1Q]; previously 802.1ah) or when it encapsulates other protocols. In the feedback mode, propagation of congestion signals for multicast and anycast packets is out-of-scope (because the complexity would make it unlikely to be attempted).

2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

Further terminology used within this document:

Protocol data unit (PDU): Information that is delivered as a unit among peer entities of a layered network consisting of protocol control information (typically a header) and possibly user data (payload) of that layer. The scope of this document includes layer 2 and layer 3 networks, where the PDU is respectively termed a frame or a packet (or a cell in ATM). PDU is a general term for any of these. This definition also includes a payload with a shim header lying somewhere between layer 2 and 3.

Transport: The end-to-end transmission control function, conventionally considered at layer-4 in the OSI reference model. Given the audience for this document will often use the word transport to mean low level bit carriage, whenever the term is used it will be qualified, e.g. ‘L4 transport’.

Encapsulator: The link or tunnel endpoint function that adds an outer header to a PDU (also termed the ‘link ingress’, the ‘subnet
ingress', the 'ingress tunnel endpoint' or just the 'ingress' where the context is clear).

Decapsulator: The link or tunnel endpoint function that removes an outer header from a PDU (also termed the 'link egress', the 'subnet egress', the 'egress tunnel endpoint' or just the 'egress' where the context is clear).

Incoming header: The header of an arriving PDU before encapsulation.

Outer header: The header added to encapsulate a PDU.

Inner header: The header encapsulated by the outer header.

Outgoing header: The header forwarded by the decapsulator.

CE: Congestion Experienced [RFC3168]

ECT: ECN-Capable (L4) Transport [RFC3168]

Not-ECT: Not ECN-Capable (L4) Transport [RFC3168]

Load Regulator: For each flow of PDUs, the transport function that is capable of controlling the data rate. Typically located at the data source, but in-path nodes can regulate load in some congestion control arrangements (e.g. admission control, policing nodes or transport circuit-breakers [RFC8084]). Note the term "a function capable of controlling the load" deliberately includes a transport that does not actually control the load responsively but ideally it ought to (e.g. a sending application without congestion control that uses UDP).

ECN-PDU: A PDU at the IP layer or below with a capacity to signal congestion that is part of a congestion control feedback loop within which all the nodes necessary to propagate the signal back to the Load Regulator are capable of doing that propagation. An IP packet with a non-zero ECN field implies that the endpoints are ECN-capable, so this would be an ECN-PDU. However, ECN-PDU is intended to be a general term for a PDU at lower layers, as well as at the IP layer.

Not-ECN-PDU: A PDU at the IP layer or below that is part of a congestion control feedback-loop within which at least one node necessary to propagate any explicit congestion notification signals back to the Load Regulator is not capable of doing that propagation.
3. Modes of Operation

This section sets down the different modes by which congestion information is passed between the lower layer and the higher one. It acts as a reference framework for the following sections, which give normative guidelines for designers of explicit congestion notification protocols, taking each mode in turn:

Feed-Forward-and-Up: Nodes feed forward congestion notification towards the egress within the lower layer then up and along the layers towards the end-to-end destination at the transport layer. The following local optimisation is possible:

Feed-Up-and-Forward: A lower layer switch feeds-up congestion notification directly into the higher layer (e.g. into the ECN field in the IP header), irrespective of whether the node is at the egress of a subnet.

Feed-Backward: Nodes feed back congestion signals towards the ingress of the lower layer and (optionally) attempt to control congestion within their own layer.

Null: Nodes cannot experience congestion at the lower layer except at ingress nodes (which are IP-aware or equivalently higher-layer-aware).

3.1. Feed-Forward-and-Up Mode

Like IP and MPLS, many subnet technologies are based on self-contained protocol data units (PDUs) or frames sent unreliably. They provide no feedback channel at the subnetwork layer, instead relying on higher layers (e.g. TCP) to feed back loss signals.

In these cases, ECN may best be supported by standardising explicit notification of congestion into the lower layer protocol that carries the data forwards. Then a specification is needed for how the egress of the lower layer subnet propagates this explicit signal into the forwarded upper layer (IP) header. This signal continues forwards until it finally reaches the destination transport (at L4). Then typically the destination will feed this congestion notification back to the source transport using an end-to-end protocol (e.g. TCP). This is the arrangement that has already been used to add ECN to IP-in-IP tunnels [RFC6040], IP-in-MPLS and MPLS-in-MPLS [RFC5129].

This mode is illustrated in Figure 1. Along the middle of the figure, layers 2, 3 and 4 of the protocol stack are shown, and one packet is shown along the bottom as it progresses across the network from source to destination, crossing two subnets connected by a
router, and crossing two switches on the path across each subnet. Congestion at the output of the first switch (shown as *) leads to a congestion marking in the L2 header (shown as C in the illustration of the packet). The chevrons show the progress of the resulting congestion indication. It is propagated from link to link across the subnet in the L2 header, then when the router removes the marked L2 header, it propagates the marking up into the L3 (IP) header. The router forwards the marked L3 header into subnet 2, and when it adds a new L2 header it copies the L3 marking into the L2 header as well, as shown by the ‘C’ s in both layers (assuming the technology of subnet 2 also supports explicit congestion marking).

Note that there is no implication that each ‘C’ marking is encoded the same; a different encoding might be used for the ‘C’ marking in each protocol.

Finally, for completeness, we show the L3 marking arriving at the destination, where the host transport protocol (e.g. TCP) feeds it back to the source in the L4 acknowledgement (the ‘C’ at L4 in the packet at the top of the diagram).

Figure 1: Feed-Forward-and-Up Mode

Of course, modern networks are rarely as simple as this textbook example, often involving multiple nested layers. For example, a 3GPP mobile network may have two IP-in-IP (GTP [GTPv1]) tunnels in series and an MPLS backhaul between the base station and the first router. Nonetheless, the example illustrates the general idea of feeding congestion notification forward then upward whenever a header is removed at the egress of a subnet.
Note that the FECN (forward ECN) bit in Frame Relay [Buck00] and the explicit forward congestion indication (EFCI [ITU-T.I.371]) bit in ATM user data cells follow a feed-forward pattern. However, in ATM, this arrangement is only part of a feed-forward-and-backward pattern at the lower layer, not feed-forward-and-up out of the lower layer—the intention was never to interface to IP ECN at the subnet egress. To our knowledge, Frame Relay FECN is solely used to detect where more capacity should be provisioned.

3.2. Feed-Up-and-Forward Mode

Ethernet is particularly difficult to extend incrementally to support explicit congestion notification. One way to support ECN in such cases has been to use so-called ‘layer-3 switches’. These are Ethernet switches that dig into the Ethernet payload to find an IP header and manipulate or act on certain IP fields (specifically DiffServ & ECN). For instance, in Data Center TCP [RFC8257], layer-3 switches are configured to mark the ECN field of the IP header within the Ethernet payload when their output buffer becomes congested. With respect to switching, a layer-3 switch acts solely on the addresses in the Ethernet header; it does not use IP addresses, and it does not decrement the TTL field in the IP header.

By comparing Figure 2 with Figure 1, it can be seen that subnet E (perhaps a subnet of layer-3 Ethernet switches) works in feed-up-and-forward mode by notifying congestion directly into L3 at the point of congestion, even though the congested switch does not otherwise act at L3. In this example, the technology in subnet F (e.g. MPLS) does...
support ECN natively, so when the router adds the layer-2 header it copies the ECN marking from L3 to L2 as well.

3.3. Feed-Backward Mode

In some layer 2 technologies, explicit congestion notification has been defined for use internally within the subnet with its own feedback and load regulation, but typically the interface with IP for ECN has not been defined.

For instance, for the available bit-rate (ABR) service in ATM, the relative rate mechanism was one of the more popular mechanisms for managing traffic, tending to supersede earlier designs. In this approach ATM switches send special resource management (RM) cells in both the forward and backward directions to control the ingress rate of user data into a virtual circuit. If a switch buffer is approaching congestion or is congested it sends an RM cell back towards the ingress with respectively the No Increase (NI) or Congestion Indication (CI) bit set in its message type field [ATM-TM-ABR]. The ingress then holds or decreases its sending bit-rate accordingly.

ATM’s feed-backward approach does not fit well when layered beneath IP’s feed-forward approach—unless the initial data source is the same node as the ATM ingress. Figure 3 shows the feed-backward approach being used in subnet H. If the final switch on the path is congested (*), it does not feed-forward any congestion indications on packet (U). Instead it sends a control cell (V) back to the router at the ATM ingress.

However, the backward feedback does not reach the original data source directly because IP does not support backward feedback (and subnet G is independent of subnet H). Instead, the router in the middle throttles down its sending rate but the original data sources don’t reduce their rates. The resulting rate mismatch causes the middle router’s buffer at layer 3 to back up until it becomes congested, which it signals forwards on later data packets at layer 3 (e.g. packet W). Note that the forward signal from the middle router is not triggered directly by the backward signal. Rather, it is triggered by congestion resulting from the middle router’s mismatched rate response to the backward signal.
In response to this later forward signalling, end-to-end feedback at layer-4 finally completes the tortuous path of congestion indications back to the origin data source, as before.

Quantized congestion notification (QCN [IEEE802.1Q]) would suffer from similar problems if extended to multiple subnets. However, from the start QCN was clearly characterized as solely applicable to a single subnet (see Section 6).

3.4. Null Mode

Often link and physical layer resources are ‘non-blocking’ by design. In these cases congestion notification may be implemented but it does not need to be deployed at the lower layer; ECN in IP would be sufficient.

A degenerate example is a point-to-point Ethernet link. Excess loading of the link merely causes the queue from the higher layer to back up, while the lower layer remains immune to congestion. Even a whole meshed subnetwork can be made immune to interior congestion by limiting ingress capacity and sufficient sizing of interior links, e.g. a non-blocking fat-tree network [Leiserson85]. An alternative to fat links near the root is numerous thin links with multi-path routing to ensure even worst-case patterns of load cannot congest any link, e.g. a Clos network [Clos53].

4. Feed-Forward-and-Up Mode: Guidelines for Adding Congestion Notification

Feed-forward-and-up is the mode already used for signalling ECN up the layers through MPLS into IP [RFC5129] and through IP-in-IP tunnels [RFC6040], whether encapsulating with IPv4 [RFC2003], IPv6 [RFC2473] or IPsec [RFC4301]. These RFCs take a consistent approach and the following guidelines are designed to ensure this consistency continues as ECN support is added to other protocols that encapsulate IP. The guidelines are also designed to ensure compliance with the more general best current practice for the design of alternate ECN schemes given in [RFC4774] and extended by [RFC8311].

The rest of this section is structured as follows:

- Section 4.1 addresses the most straightforward cases, where [RFC6040] can be applied directly to add ECN to tunnels that are effectively IP-in-IP tunnels, but with shim header(s) between the IP headers.
- The subsequent sections give guidelines for adding ECN to a subnet technology that uses feed-forward-and-up mode like IP, but it is
not so similar to IP that [RFC6040] rules can be applied directly. Specifically:

* Sections 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 respectively address how to add ECN support to the wire protocol and to the encapsulators and decapsulators at the ingress and egress of the subnet.

* Section 4.5 deals with the special, but common, case of sequences of tunnels or subnets that all use the same technology.

* Section 4.6 deals with the question of reframing when IP packets do not map 1:1 into lower layer frames.

4.1. IP-in-IP Tunnels with Shim Headers

A common pattern for many tunnelling protocols is to encapsulate an inner IP header with shim header(s) then an outer IP header. A shim header is defined as one that is not sufficient alone to forward the packet as an outer header. Another common pattern is for a shim to encapsulate a layer 2 (L2) header, which in turn encapsulates (or might encapsulate) an IP header. [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-rfc6040update-shim] clarifies that RFC 6040 is just as applicable when there are shim(s) and possibly a L2 header between two IP headers.

However, it is not always feasible or necessary to propagate ECN between IP headers when separated by a shim. For instance, it might be too costly to dig to arbitrary depths to find an inner IP header, there may be little or no congestion within the tunnel by design (see null mode in Section 3.4 above), or a legacy implementation might not support ECN. In cases where a tunnel does not support ECN, it is important that the ingress does not copy the ECN field from an inner IP header to an outer. Therefore section 4 of [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-rfc6040update-shim] requires network operators to configure the ingress of a tunnel that does not support ECN so that it zeros the ECN field in the outer IP header.

Nonetheless, in many cases it is feasible to propagate the ECN field between IP headers separated by shim header(s) and/or a L2 header. Particularly in the typical case when the outer IP header and the shim(s) are added (or removed) as part of the same procedure. Even if the shim(s) encapsulate a L2 header, it is often possible to find an inner IP header within the L2 PDU and propagate ECN between that and the outer IP header. This can be thought of as a special case of the feed-up-and-forward mode (Section 3.2), so the guidelines for this mode apply (Section 5).
Numerous shim protocols have been defined for IP tunnelling. More recent ones e.g. Generic UDP Encapsulation (GUE) [I-D.ietf-intarea-gue] and Geneve [I-D.ietf-nvo3-geneve] cite and follow RFC 6040. And some earlier ones, e.g. CAPWAP [RFC5415] and LISP [RFC6830], cite RFC 3168, which is compatible with RFC 6040.

However, as Section 9.3 of RFC 3168 pointed out, ECN support needs to be defined for many earlier shim-based tunnelling protocols, e.g. L2TPv2 [RFC2661], L2TPv3 [RFC3931], GRE [RFC2784], PPTP [RFC2637], GTP [GTPv1], [GTPv1-U], [GTPv2-C] and Teredo [RFC4380] as well as some recent ones, e.g. VXLAN [RFC7348], NVGRE [RFC7637] and NSH [RFC8300].

All these IP-based encapsulations can be updated in one shot by simple reference to RFC 6040. However, it would not be appropriate to update all these protocols from within the present guidance document. Instead a companion specification [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-rfc6040update-shim] has been prepared that has the appropriate standards track status to update standards track protocols. For those that are not under IETF change control [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-rfc6040update-shim] can only recommend that the relevant body updates them.

4.2. Wire Protocol Design: Indication of ECN Support

This section is intended to guide the redesign of any lower layer protocol that encapsulate IP to add native ECN support at the lower layer. It reflects the approaches used in [RFC6040] and in [RFC5129]. Therefore IP-in-IP tunnels or IP-in-MPLS or MPLS-in-MPLS encapsulations that already comply with [RFC6040] or [RFC5129] will already satisfy this guidance.

A lower layer (or subnet) congestion notification system:

1. SHOULD NOT apply explicit congestion notifications to PDUs that are destined for legacy layer-4 transport implementations that will not understand ECN, and

2. SHOULD NOT apply explicit congestion notifications to PDUs if the egress of the subnet might not propagate congestion notifications onward into the higher layer.

We use the term ECN-PDUs for a PDU on a feedback loop that will propagate congestion notification properly because it meets both the above criteria. And a Not-ECN-PDU is a PDU on a feedback loop that does not meet at least one of the criteria, and will therefore not propagate congestion notification properly. A
corollary of the above is that a lower layer congestion notification protocol:

3. SHOULD be able to distinguish ECN-PDUs from Not-ECN-PDUs.

Note that there is no need for all interior nodes within a subnet to be able to mark congestion explicitly. A mix of ECN and drop signals from different nodes is fine. However, if _any_ interior nodes might generate ECN markings, guideline 2 above says that all relevant egress node(s) SHOULD be able to propagate those markings up to the higher layer.

In IP, if the ECN field in each PDU is cleared to the Not-ECT (not ECN-capable transport) codepoint, it indicates that the L4 transport will not understand congestion markings. A congested buffer must not mark these Not-ECT PDUs, and therefore drops them instead.

The mechanism a lower layer uses to distinguish the ECN-capability of PDUs need not mimic that of IP. The above guidelines merely say that the lower layer system, as a whole, should achieve the same outcome. For instance, ECN-capable feedback loops might use PDUs that are identified by a particular set of labels or tags. Alternatively, logical link protocols that use flow state might determine whether a PDU can be congestion marked by checking for ECN-support in the flow state. Other protocols might depend on out-of-band control signals.

The per-domain checking of ECN support in MPLS [RFC5129] is a good example of a way to avoid sending congestion markings to L4 transports that will not understand them, without using any header space in the subnet protocol.

In MPLS, header space is extremely limited, therefore RFC5129 does not provide a field in the MPLS header to indicate whether the PDU is an ECN-PDU or a Not-ECN-PDU. Instead, interior nodes in a domain are allowed to set explicit congestion indications without checking whether the PDU is destined for a L4 transport that will understand them. Nonetheless, this is made safe by requiring that the network operator upgrades all decapsulating edges of a whole domain at once, as soon as even one switch within the domain is configured to mark rather than drop during congestion. Therefore, any edge node that might decapsulate a packet will be capable of checking whether the higher layer transport is ECN-capable. When decapsulating a CE-marked packet, if the decapsulator discovers that the higher layer (inner header) indicates the transport is not ECN-capable, it drops the packet—effectively on behalf of the earlier congested node (see Decapsulation Guideline 1 in Section 4.4).
It was only appropriate to define such an incremental deployment strategy because MPLS is targeted solely at professional operators, who can be expected to ensure that a whole subnetwork is consistently configured. This strategy might not be appropriate for other link technologies targeted at zero-configuration deployment or deployment by the general public (e.g. Ethernet). For such 'plug-and-play' environments it will be necessary to invent a failsafe approach that ensures congestion markings will never fall into black holes, no matter how inconsistently a system is put together. Alternatively, congestion notification relying on correct system configuration could be confined to flavours of Ethernet intended only for professional network operators, such as Provider Backbone Bridges (PBB [IEEE802.1Q]; previously 802.1ah).

ECN support in TRILL [I-D.ietf-trill-ecn-support] provides a good example of how to add ECN to a lower layer protocol without relying on careful and consistent operator configuration. TRILL provides an extension header word with space for flags of different categories depending on whether logic to understand the extension is critical. The congestion experienced marking has been defined as a 'critical ingress-to-egress' flag. So if a transit RBridge sets this flag and an egress RBridge does not have any logic to process it, it will drop it; which is the desired default action anyway. Therefore TRILL RBridges can be updated with support for ECN in no particular order and, at the egress of the TRILL campus, congestion notification will be propagated to IP as ECN whenever ECN logic has been implemented, or as drop otherwise.

QCN [IEEE802.1Q] is not intended to extend beyond a single subnet, or to interoperate with ECN. Nonetheless, the way QCN indicates to lower layer devices that the end-points will not understand QCN provides another example that a lower layer protocol designer might be able to mimic for their scenario. An operator can define certain 802.1p classes of service to indicate non-QCN frames and an ingress bridge is required to map arriving not-QCN-capable IP packets to one of these non-QCN 802.1p classes.

4.3. Encapsulation Guidelines

This section is intended to guide the redesign of any node that encapsulates IP with a lower layer header when adding native ECN support to the lower layer protocol. It reflects the approaches used in [RFC6040] and in [RFC5129]. Therefore IP-in-IP tunnels or IP-in-MPLS or MPLS-in-MPLS encapsulations that already comply with [RFC6040] or [RFC5129] will already satisfy this guidance.

1. Egress Capability Check: A subnet ingress needs to be sure that the corresponding egress of a subnet will propagate any
congestion notification added to the outer header across the subnet. This is necessary in addition to checking that an incoming PDU indicates an ECN-capable (L4) transport. Examples of how this guarantee might be provided include:

* by configuration (e.g. if any label switches in a domain support ECN marking, [RFC5129] requires all egress nodes to have been configured to propagate ECN)

* by the ingress explicitly checking that the egress propagates ECN (e.g. an early attempt to add ECN support to TRILL used IS-IS to check path capabilities before adding ECN extension flags to each frame [RFC7780]).

* by inherent design of the protocol (e.g. by encoding ECN marking on the outer header in such a way that a legacy egress that does not understand ECN will consider the PDU corrupt or invalid and discard it, thus at least propagating a form of congestion signal).

2. Egress Fails Capability Check: If the ingress cannot guarantee that the egress will propagate congestion notification, the ingress SHOULD disable ECN at the lower layer when it forwards the PDU. An example of how the ingress might disable ECN at the lower layer would be by setting the outer header of the PDU to identify it as a Not-ECN-PDU, assuming the subnet technology supports such a concept.

3. Standard Congestion Monitoring Baseline: Once the ingress to a subnet has established that the egress will correctly propagate ECN, on encapsulation it SHOULD encode the same level of congestion in outer headers as is arriving in incoming headers. For example it might copy any incoming congestion notification into the outer header of the lower layer protocol.

This ensures that bulk congestion monitoring of outer headers (e.g. by a network management node monitoring ECN in passing frames) will measure congestion accumulated along the whole upstream path - since the Load Regulator not just since the ingress of the subnet. A node that is not the Load Regulator SHOULD NOT re-initialize the level of CE markings in the outer to zero.

It would still also be possible to measure congestion introduced across one subnet (or tunnel) by subtracting the level of CE markings on inner headers from that on outer headers (see Appendix C of [RFC6040]). For example:
If this guideline has been followed and if the level of CE markings is 0.4% on the outer and 0.1% on the inner, 0.4% congestion has been introduced across all the networks since the load regulator, and 0.3% (= 0.4% - 0.1%) has been introduced since the ingress to the current subnet (or tunnel);

* Without this guideline, if the subnet ingress had re-initialized the outer congestion level to zero, the outer and inner would measure 0.1% and 0.3%. It would still be possible to infer that the congestion introduced since the Load Regulator was 0.4% (= 0.1% + 0.3%). But only if the monitoring system somehow knows whether the subnet ingress re-initialized the congestion level.

As long as subnet and tunnel technologies use the standard congestion monitoring baseline in this guideline, monitoring systems will know to use the former approach, rather than having to "somehow know" which approach to use.

4.4. Decapsulation Guidelines

This section is intended to guide the redesign of any node that decapsulates IP from within a lower layer header when adding native ECN support to the lower layer protocol. It reflects the approaches used in [RFC6040] and in [RFC5129]. Therefore IP-in-IP tunnels or IP-in-MPLS or MPLS-in-MPLS encapsulations that already comply with [RFC6040] or [RFC5129] will already satisfy this guidance.

A subnet egress SHOULD NOT simply copy congestion notification from outer headers to the forwarded header. It SHOULD calculate the outgoing congestion notification field from the inner and outer headers using the following guidelines. If there is any conflict, rules earlier in the list take precedence over rules later in the list:

1. If the arriving inner header is a Not-ECN-PDU it implies the L4 transport will not understand explicit congestion markings. Then:

   * If the outer header carries an explicit congestion marking, drop is the only indication of congestion that the L4 transport will understand. If the congestion marking is the most severe possible, the packet MUST be dropped. However, if congestion can be marked with multiple levels severity and the packet’s marking is not the most severe, the packet MAY be forwarded, but it SHOULD be dropped.
* If the outer is an ECN-PDU that carries no indication of congestion or a Not-ECN-PDU the PDU SHOULD be forwarded, but still as a Not-ECN-PDU.

2. If the outer header does not support explicit congestion notification (a Not-ECN-PDU), but the inner header does (an ECN-PDU), the inner header SHOULD be forwarded unchanged.

3. In some lower layer protocols congestion may be signalled as a numerical level, such as in the control frames of quantized congestion notification (QCN [IEEE802.1Q]). If such a multi-bit encoding encapsulates an ECN-capable IP data packet, a function will be needed to convert the quantized congestion level into the frequency of congestion markings in outgoing IP packets.

4. Congestion indications might be encoded by a severity level. For instance increasing levels of congestion might be encoded by numerically increasing indications, e.g. pre-congestion notification (PCN) can be encoded in each PDU at three severity levels in IP or MPLS [RFC6660] and the default encapsulation and decapsulation rules [RFC6040] are compatible with this interpretation of the ECN field.

   If the arriving inner header is an ECN-PDU, where the inner and outer headers carry indications of congestion of different severity, the more severe indication SHOULD be forwarded in preference to the less severe.

5. The inner and outer headers might carry a combination of congestion notification fields that should not be possible given any currently used protocol transitions. For instance, if Encapsulation Guideline 3 in Section 4.3 had been followed, it should not be possible to have a less severe indication of congestion in the outer than in the inner. It MAY be appropriate to log unexpected combinations of headers and possibly raise an alarm.

   If a safe outgoing codepoint can be defined for such a PDU, the PDU SHOULD be forwarded rather than dropped. Some implementers discard PDUs with currently unused combinations of headers just in case they represent an attack. However, an approach using alarms and policy-mediated drop is preferable to hard-coded drop, so that operators can keep track of possible attacks but currently unused combinations are not precluded from future use through new standards actions.
4.5. Sequences of Similar Tunnels or Subnets

In some deployments, particularly in 3GPP networks, an IP packet may traverse two or more IP-in-IP tunnels in sequence that all use identical technology (e.g. GTP).

In such cases, it would be sufficient for every encapsulation and decapsulation in the chain to comply with RFC 6040. Alternatively, as an optimisation, a node that decapsulates a packet and immediately re-encapsulates it for the next tunnel MAY copy the incoming outer ECN field directly to the outgoing outer and the incoming inner ECN field directly to the outgoing inner. Then the overall behavior across the sequence of tunnel segments would still be consistent with RFC 6040.

Appendix C of RFC6040 describes how a tunnel egress can monitor how much congestion has been introduced within a tunnel. A network operator might want to monitor how much congestion had been introduced within a whole sequence of tunnels. Using the technique in Appendix C of RFC6040 at the final egress, the operator could monitor the whole sequence of tunnels, but only if the above optimisation were used consistently along the sequence of tunnels, in order to make it appear as a single tunnel. Therefore, tunnel endpoint implementations SHOULD allow the operator to configure whether this optimisation is enabled.

When ECN support is added to a subnet technology, consideration SHOULD be given to a similar optimisation between subnets in sequence if they all use the same technology.

4.6. Reframing and Congestion Markings

The guidance in this section is worded in terms of framing boundaries, but it applies equally whether the protocol data units are frames, cells, packets or fragments.

Where an AQM marks the ECN field of IP packets as they queue into a layer-2 link, there will be no problem with framing boundaries, because the ECN markings would be applied directly to IP packets. The guidance in this section is only applicable where an ECN capability is being added to a layer-2 protocol so that layer-2 frames can be ECN-marked by an AQM at layer-2. This would only be necessary where AQM will be applied at pure layer-2 nodes (without IP-awareness). Where framing boundaries do not necessarily align with packet boundaries, the following guidance will be needed. It explains how to propagate ECN markings from layer-2 frame headers when they are stripped off and IP PDUs with different boundaries are reassembled for forwarding.
Congestion indications SHOULD be propagated on the basis that a congestion indication on a PDU applies to all the octets in the PDU. On average, an encapsulator or decapsulator SHOULD approximately preserve the number of marked octets arriving and leaving (counting the size of inner headers, but not encapsulating headers that are being added or stripped).

The next departing frame SHOULD be immediately marked even if only enough incoming marked octets have arrived for part of the departing frame. This ensures that any outstanding congestion marked octets are propagated immediately, rather than held back waiting for a frame no bigger than the outstanding marked octets—which might involve a long wait.

For instance, an algorithm for marking departing frames could maintain a counter representing the balance of arriving marked octets minus departing marked octets. It adds the size of every marked frame that arrives and if the counter is positive it marks the next frame to depart and subtracts its size from the counter. This will often leave a negative remainder in the counter, which is deliberate.

5. Feed-Up-and-Forward Mode: Guidelines for Adding Congestion Notification

The guidance in this section is applicable, for example, when IP packets:

- are encapsulated in Ethernet headers, which have no support for ECN;
- are forwarded by the eNode-B (base station) of a 3GPP radio access network, which is required to apply ECN marking during congestion, [LTE-RA], [UTRAN], but the Packet Data Convergence Protocol (PDCP) that encapsulates the IP header over the radio access has no support for ECN.

This guidance also generalizes to encapsulation by other subnet technologies with no native support for explicit congestion notification at the lower layer, but with support for finding and processing an IP header. It is unlikely to be applicable or necessary for IP-in-IP encapsulation, where feed-forward-and-up mode based on [RFC6040] would be more appropriate.

Marking the IP header while switching at layer-2 (by using a layer-3 switch) or while forwarding in a radio access network seems to represent a layering violation. However, it can be considered as a benign optimisation if the guidelines below are followed. Feed-up-
and-forward is certainly not a general alternative to implementing feed-forward congestion notification in the lower layer, because:

- IPv4 and IPv6 are not the only layer-3 protocols that might be encapsulated by lower layer protocols.
- Link-layer encryption might be in use, making the layer-2 payload inaccessible.
- Many Ethernet switches do not have ‘layer-3 switch’ capabilities so they cannot read or modify an IP payload.
- It might be costly to find an IP header (v4 or v6) when it may be encapsulated by more than one lower layer header, e.g. Ethernet MAC in MAC ([IEEE802.1Q]; previously 802.1ah).

Nonetheless, configuring lower layer equipment to look for an ECN field in an encapsulated IP header is a useful optimisation. If the implementation follows the guidelines below, this optimisation does not have to be confined to a controlled environment such as within a data centre; it could usefully be applied on any network—even if the operator is not sure whether the above issues will never apply:

1. If a native lower-layer congestion notification mechanism exists for a subnet technology, it is safe to mix feed-up-and-forward with feed-forward-and-up on other switches in the same subnet. However, it will generally be more efficient to use the native mechanism.
2. The depth of the search for an IP header SHOULD be limited. If an IP header is not found soon enough, or an unrecognized or unreadable header is encountered, the switch SHOULD resort to an alternative means of signalling congestion (e.g. drop, or the native lower layer mechanism if available).
3. It is sufficient to use the first IP header found in the stack; the egress of the relevant tunnel can propagate congestion notification upwards to any more deeply encapsulated IP headers later.

6. Feed-Backward Mode: Guidelines for Adding Congestion Notification

It can be seen from Section 3.3 that congestion notification in a subnet using feed-backward mode has generally not been designed to be directly coupled with IP layer congestion notification. The subnet attempts to minimize congestion internally, and if the incoming load at the ingress exceeds the capacity somewhere through the subnet, the layer 3 buffer into the ingress backs up. Thus, a feed-backward mode
subnet is in some sense similar to a null mode subnet, in that there is no need for any direct interaction between the subnet and higher layer congestion notification. Therefore no detailed protocol design guidelines are appropriate. Nonetheless, a more general guideline is appropriate:

A subnetwork technology intended to eventually interface to IP SHOULD NOT be designed using only the feed-backward mode, which is certainly best for a stand-alone subnet, but would need to be modified to work efficiently as part of the wider Internet, because IP uses feed-forward-and-up mode.

The feed-backward approach at least works beneath IP, where the term ‘works’ is used only in a narrow functional sense because feed-backward can result in very inefficient and sluggish congestion control—except if it is confined to the subnet directly connected to the original data source, when it is faster than feed-forward. It would be valid to design a protocol that could work in feed-backward mode for paths that only cross one subnet, and in feed-forward-and-up mode for paths that cross subnets.

In the early days of TCP/IP, a similar feed-backward approach was tried for explicit congestion signalling, using source-quench (SQ) ICMP control packets. However, SQ fell out of favour and is now formally deprecated [RFC6633]. The main problem was that it is hard for a data source to tell the difference between a spoofed SQ message and a quench request from a genuine buffer on the path. It is also hard for a lower layer buffer to address an SQ message to the original source port number, which may be buried within many layers of headers, and possibly encrypted.

QCN (also known as backward congestion notification, BCN; see Sections 30--33 of [IEEE802.1Q]; previously known as 802.1Qau) uses a feed-backward mode structurally similar to ATM’s relative rate mechanism. However, QCN confines its applicability to scenarios such as some data centres where all endpoints are directly attached by the same Ethernet technology. If a QCN subnet were later connected into a wider IP-based internetwork (e.g. when attempting to interconnect multiple data centres) it would suffer the inefficiency shown in Figure 3.

7. IANA Considerations (to be removed by RFC Editor)

This memo includes no request to IANA.
8. Security Considerations

If a lower layer wire protocol is redesigned to include explicit congestion signalling in-band in the protocol header, care SHOULD be taken to ensure that the field used is specified as mutable during transit. Otherwise interior nodes signalling congestion would invalidate any authentication protocol applied to the lower layer header--by altering a header field that had been assumed as immutable.

The redesign of protocols that encapsulate IP in order to propagate congestion signals between layers raises potential signal integrity concerns. Experimental or proposed approaches exist for assuring the end-to-end integrity of in-band congestion signals, e.g.:

o Congestion exposure (ConEx) for networks to audit that their congestion signals are not being suppressed by other networks or by receivers, and for networks to police that senders are responding sufficiently to the signals, irrespective of the L4 transport protocol used [RFC7713].

o A test for a sender to detect whether a network or the receiver is suppressing congestion signals (for example see 2nd para of Section 20.2 of [RFC3168]).

Given these end-to-end approaches are already being specified, it would make little sense to attempt to design hop-by-hop congestion signal integrity into a new lower layer protocol, because end-to-end integrity inherently achieves hop-by-hop integrity.

Section 6 gives vulnerability to spoofing as one of the reasons for deprecating feed-backward mode.

9. Conclusions

Following the guidance in the document enables ECN support to be extended to numerous protocols that encapsulate IP (v4 & v6) in a consistent way, so that IP continues to fulfil its role as an end-to-end interoperability layer. This includes:

o A wide range of tunnelling protocols including those with various forms of shim header between two IP headers, possibly also separated by a L2 header;

o A wide range of subnet technologies, particularly those that work in the same ‘feed-forward-and-up’ mode that is used to support ECN in IP and MPLS.
Guidelines have been defined for supporting propagation of ECN between Ethernet and IP on so-called Layer-3 Ethernet switches, using a ‘feed-up-and-forward’ mode. This approach could enable other subnet technologies to pass ECN signals into the IP layer, even if they do not support ECN natively.

Finally, attempting to add ECN to a subnet technology in feed-backward mode is deprecated except in special cases, due to its likely sluggish response to congestion.

10. Acknowledgements

Thanks to Gorry Fairhurst and David Black for extensive reviews. Thanks also to the following reviewers: Joe Touch, Andrew McGregor, Richard Scheffenegger, Ingemar Johansson, Piers O’Hanlon and Michael Welzl, who pointed out that lower layer congestion notification signals may have different semantics to those in IP. Thanks are also due to the tsvwg chairs, TSV ADs and IETF liaison people such as Eric Gray, Dan Romascanu and Gonzalo Camarillo for helping with the liaisons with the IEEE and 3GPP. And thanks to Georg Mayer and particularly to Erik Guttman for the extensive search and categorisation of any 3GPP specifications that cite ECN specifications.

Bob Briscoe was part-funded by the European Community under its Seventh Framework Programme through the Trilogy project (ICT-216372) for initial drafts and through the Reducing Internet Transport Latency (RITE) project (ICT-317700) subsequently. The views expressed here are solely those of the authors.

11. Comments Solicited

Comments and questions are encouraged and very welcome. They can be addressed to the IETF Transport Area working group mailing list <tsvwg@ietf.org>, and/or to the authors.

12. References

12.1. Normative References

12.2. Informative References


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[ITU-T.I.371]

[Leiserson85]


Appendix A. Changes in This Version (to be removed by RFC Editor)

From ietf-12 to ietf-13

* Following 3rd tsvwg WGLC:
  + Formalized update to RFC 3819 in its own subsection (1.1) and referred to it in the abstract
  + Scope: Clarified that the specification of alternative ECN semantics using ECT(1) was not in RFC 4774, but rather in RFC 8311, and that the problem with using a DSCP to indicate alternative semantics has issues at domain boundaries as well as tunnels.
  + Terminology: tightened up definitions of ECN-PDU and Not-ECN-PDU, and removed definition of Congestion Baseline, given it was only used once.
  + Mentioned QCN where feedback is first introduced (S.3), referring forward to where it is discussed more deeply (S.4).
  + Clarified that IS-IS solution to adding ECN support to TRILL was not pursued
  + Completely rewrote the rationale for the guideline about a Standard Congestion Monitoring Baseline, to focus on standardization of the otherwise unknown scenario used, rather than the relative usefulness of the info in each approach
  + Explained the re-framing problem better and added fragmentation as another possible cause of the problem
  + Acknowledged new reviewers
  + Updated references, replaced citations of 802.1Qau and 802.1ah with rolled up 802.1Q, and added citations of Fat trees and Clos Networks
  + Numerous other editorial improvements

From ietf-11 to ietf-12

* Updated references

From ietf-10 to ietf-11
* Removed short section (was 3) ‘Guidelines for All Cases’ because it was out of scope, being covered by RFC 4774. Expanded the Scope section (1.2) to explain all this. Explained that the default encap/decap rules already support certain alternative semantics, particularly all three of the alternative semantics for ECT(1): equivalent to ECT(0), higher severity than ECT(0), and unmarked but implying different marking semantics from ECT(0).

* Clarified why the QCN example was being given even though not about increment deployment of ECN.

* Pointed to the spoofing issue with feed-backward mode from the Security Considerations section, to aid security review.

* Removed any ambiguity in the word ‘transport’ throughout.

From ietf-09 to ietf-10

* Updated section 5.1 on "IP-in-IP tunnels with Shim Headers" to be consistent with updates to draft-ietf-tsvwg-rfc6040update-shim.

* Removed reference to the ECN nonce, which has been made historic by RFC 8311.

* Removed "Open Issues" Appendix, given all have been addressed.

From ietf-08 to ietf-09

* Updated para in Intro that listed all the IP-in-IP tunnelling protocols, to instead refer to draft-ietf-tsvwg-rfc6040update-shim.

* Updated section 5.1 on "IP-in-IP tunnels with Shim Headers" to summarize guidance that has evolved as rfc6040update-shim has developed.

From ietf-07 to ietf-08: Refreshed to avoid expiry. Updated references.

From ietf-06 to ietf-07:

* Added the people involved in liaisons to the acknowledgements.

From ietf-05 to ietf-06:
* Introduction: Added GUE and Geneve as examples of tightly coupled shims between IP headers that cite RFC 6040. And added VXLAN to list of those that do not.

* Replaced normative text about tightly coupled shims between IP headers, with reference to new draft-ietf-tsvwg-rfc6040update-shim

* Wire Protocol Design: Indication of ECN Support: Added TRILL as an example of a well-design protocol that does not need an indication of ECN support in the wire protocol.

* Encapsulation Guidelines: In the case of a Not-ECN-PDU with a CE outer, replaced SHOULD be dropped, with explanations of when SHOULD or MUST are appropriate.

* Feed-Up-and-Forward Mode: Explained examples more carefully, referred to PDCP and cited UTRAN spec as well as E-UTRAN.

* Updated references.

* Marked open issues as resolved, but did not delete Open Issues Appendix (yet).

From ietf-04 to ietf-05:

* Explained why tightly coupled shim headers only "SHOULD" comply with RFC 6040, not "MUST".

* Updated references

From ietf-03 to ietf-04:

* Addressed Richard Scheffenegger’s review comments: primarily editorial corrections, and addition of examples for clarity.

From ietf-02 to ietf-03:

* Updated references, ad cited RFC4774.

From ietf-01 to ietf-02:

* Added Section for guidelines that are applicable in all cases.

* Updated references.

From ietf-00 to ietf-01: Updated references.
From briscoe-04 to ietf-00: Changed filename following tsvwg adoption.

From briscoe-03 to 04:

* Re-arranged the introduction to describe the purpose of the document first before introducing ECN in more depth. And clarified the introduction throughout.

* Added applicability to 3GPP TS 36.300.

From briscoe-02 to 03:

* Scope section:
  + Added dependence on correct propagation of traffic class information
  + For the feed-forward mode, deemed multicast and anycast out of scope

* Ensured all guidelines referring to subnet technologies also refer to tunnels and vice versa by adding applicability sentences at the start of sections 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.6 and 5.

* Added Security Considerations on ensuring congestion signal fields are classed as immutable and on using end-to-end congestion signal integrity technologies rather than hop-by-hop.

From briscoe-01 to 02:

* Added authors: JK & PT

* Added
  + Section 4.1 "IP-in-IP Tunnels with Tightly Coupled Shim Headers"
  + Section 4.5 "Sequences of Similar Tunnels or Subnets"
  + roadmap at the start of Section 4, given the subsections have become quite fragmented.
  + Section 9 "Conclusions"
* Clarified why transports are starting to be able to saturate interior links

* Under Section 1.1, addressed the question of alternative signal semantics and included multicast & anycast.

* Under Section 3.1, included a 3GPP example.

* Section 4.2. "Wire Protocol Design":
  + Altered guideline 2. to make it clear that it only applies to the immediate subnet egress, not later ones
  + Added a reminder that it is only necessary to check that ECN propagates at the egress, not whether interior nodes mark ECN
  + Added example of how QCN uses 802.1p to indicate support for QCN.

* Added references to Appendix C of RFC6040, about monitoring the amount of congestion signals introduced within a tunnel

* Appendix A: Added more issues to be addressed, including plan to produce a standards track update to IP-in-IP tunnel protocols.

* Updated acks and references

From briscoe-00 to 01:

* Intended status: BCP (was Informational) & updates 3819 added.

* Briefer Introduction: Introductory para justifying benefits of ECN. Moved all but a brief enumeration of modes of operation to their own new section (from both Intro & Scope). Introduced incr. deployment as most tricky part.

* Tightened & added to terminology section

* Structured with Modes of Operation, then Guidelines section for each mode.

* Tightened up guideline text to remove vagueness / passive voice / ambiguity and highlight main guidelines as numbered items.

* Added Outstanding Document Issues Appendix
* Updated references

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Abstract

This document specifies a method of encapsulating network protocol packet within GRE and UDP headers. This GRE-in-UDP encapsulation allows the UDP source port field to be used as an entropy field. This may be used for load balancing of GRE traffic in transit networks using existing ECMP mechanisms. There are two applicability scenarios for GRE-in-UDP with different requirements: (1) general Internet; (2) a traffic-managed controlled environment. The controlled environment has less restrictive requirements than the general Internet.
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1. Introduction

This document specifies a generic GRE-in-UDP encapsulation for tunneling network protocol packets across an IP network based on Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE) [RFC2784][RFC7676] and User Datagram Protocol (UDP) [RFC768] headers. The GRE header indicates the payload protocol type via an EtherType [RFC7042] in the protocol type field, and the source port field in the UDP header may be used to provide additional entropy.

A GRE-in-UDP tunnel offers the possibility of better performance for load balancing GRE traffic in transit networks using existing Equal-Cost Multi-Path (ECMP) mechanisms that use a hash of the five-tuple of source IP address, destination IP address, UDP/TCP source port, UDP/TCP destination port. While such hashing distributes UDP and Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) [RFC793] traffic between a common pair of IP addresses across paths, it uses a single path for corresponding GRE traffic because only the two IP addresses and protocol/next header fields participate in the ECMP hash. Encapsulating GRE in UDP enables use of the UDP source port to provide entropy to ECMP hashing.

In addition, GRE-in-UDP enables extending use of GRE across networks that otherwise disallow it; for example, GRE-in-UDP may be used to bridge two islands where GRE is not supported natively across the middleboxes.

GRE-in-UDP encapsulation may be used to encapsulate already tunneled traffic, i.e., tunnel-in-tunnel. In this case, GRE-in-UDP tunnels treat the endpoints of the outer tunnel as the end hosts; the presence of an inner tunnel does not change the outer tunnel’s handling of network traffic.

A GRE-in-UDP tunnel is capable of carrying arbitrary traffic and behaves as a UDP application on an IP network. However, a GRE-in-UDP tunnel carrying certain types of traffic does not satisfy the requirements for UDP applications on the Internet [RFC5405bis]. GRE-in-UDP tunnels that do not satisfy these requirements MUST NOT be deployed to carry such traffic over the Internet. For this reason, this document specifies two deployment scenarios for GRE-in-UDP tunnels with GRE-in-UDP tunnel requirements for each of them: (1) general Internet; (2) a traffic-managed controlled environment (TMCE). The TMCE scenario has less restrictive technical requirements for the protocol but more restrictive management and operation requirements for the network by comparison to the general Internet scenario.
To provide security for traffic carried by a GRE-in-UDP tunnel, this document also specifies Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) for GRE-in-UDP tunnels, which SHOULD be used when security is a concern.

GRE-in-UDP encapsulation usage requires no changes to the transit IP network. ECMP hash functions in most existing IP routers may utilize and benefit from the additional entropy enabled by GRE-in-UDP tunnels without any change or upgrade to their ECMP implementation. The encapsulation mechanism is applicable to a variety of IP networks including Data Center and Wide Area Networks, as well as both IPv4 and IPv6 networks.

1.1. Terminology

The terms defined in [RFC768] and [RFC2784] are used in this document. Following are additional terms used in this draft.

Decapsulator: a component performing packet decapsulation at tunnel egress.

ECMP: Equal-Cost Multi-Path.

Encapsulator: a component performing packet encapsulation at tunnel egress.

Flow Entropy: The information to be derived from traffic or applications and to be used by network devices in ECMP process [RFC6438].

Default GRE-in-UDP Tunnel: A GRE-in-UDP tunnel that can apply to the general Internet.

TMCE: A Traffic-managed controlled environment, i.e. an IP network that is traffic-engineered and/or otherwise managed (e.g., via use of traffic rate limiters) to avoid congestion, as defined in Section 2.

TMCE GRE-in-UDP Tunnel: A GRE-in-UDP tunnel that can only apply to a traffic-managed controlled environment that is defined in Section 2.

Tunnel Egress: A tunnel end point that performs packet decapsulation.

Tunnel Ingress: A tunnel end point that performs packet encapsulation.
1.2. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

2. Applicability Statement

GRE-in-UDP encapsulation applies to IPv4 and IPv6 networks; in both cases, encapsulated packets are treated as UDP datagrams. Therefore, a GRE-in-UDP tunnel needs to meet the UDP usage requirements specified in [RFC5405bis]. These requirements depend on both the delivery network and the nature of the encapsulated traffic. For example, the GRE-in-UDP tunnel protocol does not provide any congestion control functionality beyond that of the encapsulated traffic. Therefore, a GRE-in-UDP tunnel MUST be used only with congestion controlled traffic (e.g., IP unicast traffic) and/or within a network that is traffic-managed to avoid congestion.

[RFC5405bis] describes two applicability scenarios for UDP applications: 1) General Internet and 2) A controlled environment. The controlled environment means a single administrative domain or bilaterally agreed connection between domains. A network forming a controlled environment can be managed/operated to meet certain conditions while the general Internet cannot be; thus the requirements for a tunnel protocol operating under a controlled environment can be less restrictive than the requirements in the general Internet.

For the purpose of this document, a traffic-managed controlled environment (TMCE) is defined as an IP network that is traffic-engineered and/or otherwise managed (e.g., via use of traffic rate limiters) to avoid congestion.

This document specifies GRE-in-UDP tunnel usage in the general Internet and GRE-in-UDP tunnel usage in a traffic-managed controlled environment and uses "default GRE-in-UDP tunnel" and "TMCE GRE-in-UDP tunnel" terms to refer to each usage.

NOTE: Although this document specifies two different sets of GRE-in-UDP tunnel requirements based on tunnel usage, the tunnel implementation itself has no ability to detect how and where it is deployed. Therefore it is the responsibility of the user or operator who deploys a GRE-in-UDP tunnel to ensure that it meets the appropriate requirements.
2.1. GRE-in-UDP Tunnel Requirements

This section states out the requirements for a GRE-in-UDP tunnel. Section 2.1.1 describes the requirements for a default GRE-in-UDP tunnel that is suitable for the general Internet; Section 2.1.2 describes a set of relaxed requirements for a TMCE GRE-in-UDP tunnel used in a traffic-managed controlled environment. Both Sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 are applicable to an IPv4 or IPv6 delivery network.

2.1.1. Requirements for Default GRE-in-UDP Tunnel

The following is a summary of the default GRE-in-UDP tunnel requirements:

1. A UDP checksum SHOULD be used when encapsulating in IPv4.

2. A UDP checksum MUST be used when encapsulating in IPv6.

3. GRE-in-UDP tunnel MUST NOT be deployed or configured to carry traffic that is not congestion controlled. As stated in [RFC5405bis], IP-based unicast traffic is generally assumed to be congestion-controlled, i.e., it is assumed that the transport protocols generating IP-based traffic at the sender already employ mechanisms that are sufficient to address congestion on the path. A default GRE-in-UDP tunnel is not appropriate for traffic that is not known to be congestion-controlled (e.g., most IP multicast traffic).

4. UDP source port values that are used as a source of flow entropy SHOULD be chosen from the ephemeral port range (49152-65535) [RFC5405bis].

5. The use of the UDP source port MUST be configurable so that a single value can be set for all traffic within the tunnel (this disables use of the UDP source port to provide flow entropy). When a single value is set, a random port SHOULD be selected in order to minimize the vulnerability to off-path attacks [RFC6056].

6. For IPv6 delivery networks, the flow entropy SHOULD also be placed in the flow label field for ECMP per [RFC6438].

7. At the tunnel ingress, any fragmentation of the incoming packet (e.g., because the tunnel has a Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU) that is smaller than the packet) SHOULD be performed before encapsulation. In addition, the tunnel ingress MUST apply the UDP checksum to all encapsulated fragments so that the tunnel egress can validate reassembly of the fragments; it MUST set the same Differentiated Services Code Point (DSCP) value as in the Differentiated Services
2.1.2. Requirements for TMCE GRE-in-UDP Tunnel

The section contains the TMCE GRE-in-UDP tunnel requirements. It lists the changed requirements, compared with a Default GRE-in-UDP Tunnel, for a TMCE GRE-in-UDP Tunnel, which corresponds to the requirements 1-3 listed in Section 2.1.1.

1. A UDP checksum SHOULD be used when encapsulating in IPv4. A tunnel endpoint sending GRE-in-UDP MAY disable the UDP checksum, since GRE has been designed to work without a UDP checksum [RFC2784]. However, a checksum also offers protection from mis-delivery to another port.

2. Use of UDP checksum MUST be the default when encapsulating in IPv6. This default MAY be overridden via configuration of UDP zero-checksum mode. All usage of UDP zero-checksum mode with IPv6 is subject to the additional requirements specified in Section 6.2.

3. A GRE-in-UDP tunnel MAY encapsulate traffic that is not congestion controlled.

The requirements 4-7 listed in Section 2.1.1 also apply to a TMCE GRE-in-UDP Tunnel.

3. GRE-in-UDP Encapsulation

The GRE-in-UDP encapsulation format contains a UDP header [RFC768] and a GRE header [RFC2890]. The format is shown as follows:

(presented in bit order)
IPv4 Header:

```
+---------------+-----------------+--------------------+
| Version | IHL | Type of Service | Total Length       |
+---------------+-----------------+--------------------+
| Identification | Flags | Fragment Offset |
+---------------+-----------------+--------------------+
| Time to Live | Protocol=17(UDP) | Header Checksum    |
+---------------+-----------------+--------------------+
| Source IPv4 Address |
+---------------+-----------------+--------------------+
| Destination IPv4 Address |
+---------------+-----------------+--------------------+
```

UDP Header:

```
+---------------+-----------------+--------------------+
| Source Port = Entropy Value | Dest. Port = TBD1/TBD2 |
+---------------+-----------------+--------------------+
| UDP Length |
+---------------+-----------------+--------------------+
| UDP Checksum |
+---------------+-----------------+--------------------+
```

GRE Header:

```
+---------------+-----------------+--------------------+
| C | K|S| Reserved0 | Ver | Protocol Type |
+---------------+-----------------+--------------------+
| Checksum (optional) | Reserved1 (Optional) |
+---------------+-----------------+--------------------+
| Key (optional) |
+---------------+-----------------+--------------------+
| Sequence Number (optional) |
+---------------+-----------------+--------------------+
```

Figure 1  UDP+GRE Headers in IPv4
IPv6 Header:

```
+---------------------------------+-------------------+
| Version | Traffic Class | Flow Label |
+---------------------------------+-------------------+
| Payload Length | NxtHdr=17(UDP) | Hop Limit |
+---------------------------------+-------------------+
+---------------------------------+-------------------+
| Outer Source IPv6 Address |
+-------------------+
+-------------------+
| Outer Destination IPv6 Address |
+-------------------+
```

UDP Header:

```
+-------------------+-------------------+
| Source Port = entropy value | Dest. Port = TBD1/TBD2 |
+-------------------+-------------------+
| UDP Length | UDP Checksum |
+-------------------+-------------------+
```

GRE Header:

```
+-------------------+-------------------+-------------------+-------------------+
| C | K | S | Reserved0 | Ver | Protocol Type |
+-------------------+-------------------+-------------------+-------------------+
| Checksum (optional) | Reserved1 (Optional) |
+-------------------+-------------------+-------------------+-------------------+
| Key (optional) |
+-------------------+-------------------+-------------------+-------------------+
| Sequence Number (optional) |
+-------------------+-------------------+-------------------+-------------------+
```

Figure 2  UDP+GRE Headers in IPv6
The contents of the IP, UDP, and GRE headers that are relevant in this encapsulation are described below.

3.1. IP Header

An encapsulator MUST encode its own IP address as the source IP address and the decapsulator’s IP address as the destination IP address. A sufficiently large value is needed in the IPv4 TTL field or IPv6 Hop Count field to allow delivery of the encapsulated packet to the peer of the encapsulation.

3.2. UDP Header

3.2.1. Source Port

GRE-in-UDP permits the UDP source port value to be used to encode an entropy value. The UDP source port contains a 16-bit entropy value that is generated by the encapsulator to identify a flow for the encapsulated packet. The port value SHOULD be within the ephemeral port range, i.e., 49152 to 65535, where the high order two bits of the port are set to one. This provides fourteen bits of entropy for the inner flow identifier. In the case that an encapsulator is unable to derive flow entropy from the payload header or the entropy usage has to be disabled to meet operational requirements (see Section 7), to avoid reordering with a packet flow, the encapsulator SHOULD use the same UDP source port value for all packets assigned to a flow e.g., the result of an algorithm that perform a hash of the tunnel ingress and egress IP address.

The source port value for a flow set by an encapsulator MAY change over the lifetime of the encapsulated flow. For instance, an encapsulator may change the assignment for Denial of Service (DOS) mitigation or as a means to effect routing through the ECMP network. An encapsulator SHOULD NOT change the source port selected for a flow more than once every thirty seconds.

An IPv6 GRE-in-UDP tunnel endpoint SHOULD copy a flow entropy value in the IPv6 flow label field (requirement 6). This permits network equipment to inspect this value and utilize it during forwarding, e.g. to perform ECMP [RFC6438].

This document places requirements on the generation of the flow entropy value [RFC5405bis] but does not specify the algorithm that an implementation should use to derive this value.
3.2.2. Destination Port

The destination port of the UDP header is set either GRE-in-UDP (TBD1) or GRE-UDP-DTLS (TBD2) (see Section 5).

3.2.3. Checksum

The UDP checksum is set and processed per [RFC768] and [RFC1122] for IPv4, and [RFC2460] for IPv6. Requirements for checksum handling and use of zero UDP checksums are detailed in Section 6.

3.2.4. Length

The usage of this field is in accordance with the current UDP specification in [RFC768]. This length will include the UDP header (eight bytes), GRE header, and the GRE payload (encapsulated packet).

3.3. GRE Header

An encapsulator sets the protocol type (EtherType) of the packet being encapsulated in the GRE Protocol Type field.

An encapsulator MAY set the GRE Key Present, Sequence Number Present, and Checksum Present bits and associated fields in the GRE header as defined by [RFC2784] and [RFC2890]. Usage of the reserved bits, i.e., Reserved0, is specified in [RFC2784].

The GRE checksum MAY be enabled to protect the GRE header and payload. When the UDP checksum is enabled, it protects the GRE payload, resulting in the GRE checksum being mostly redundant. Enabling both checksums may result in unnecessary processing. Since the UDP checksum covers the pseudo-header and the packet payload, including the GRE header and its payload, the UDP checksum SHOULD be used in preference to using the GRE checksum.

An implementation MAY use the GRE keyid to authenticate the encapsulator. (See Security Considerations Section) In this model, a shared value is either configured or negotiated between an encapsulator and decapsulator. When a decapsulator determines a presented keyid is not valid for the source, the packet MUST be dropped.

Although GRE-in-UDP encapsulation protocol uses both UDP header and GRE header, it is one tunnel encapsulation protocol. GRE and UDP headers MUST be applied and removed as a pair at the encapsulation and decapsulation points. This specification does not support UDP encapsulation of a GRE header where that GRE header is applied or
removal of GRE-in-UDP encapsulated packets. This removal is performed at a network node other than the UDP tunnel ingress or egress.

4. Encapsulation Process Procedures

The procedures specified in this section apply to both a default GRE-in-UDP tunnel and a TMCE GRE-in-UDP tunnel.

The GRE-in-UDP encapsulation allows encapsulated packets to be forwarded through "GRE-in-UDP tunnels". The encapsulator MUST set the UDP and GRE header according to Section 3.

Intermediate routers, upon receiving these UDP encapsulated packets, could load balance these packets based on the hash of the five-tuple of UDP packets.

Upon receiving these UDP encapsulated packets, the decapsulator decapsulates them by removing the UDP and GRE headers and then processes them accordingly.

GRE-in-UDP can encapsulate traffic with unicast, IPv4 broadcast, or multicast (see requirement 3 in Section 2.1.1). However a default GRE-in-UDP tunnel MUST NOT be deployed or configured to carry traffic that is not congestion-controlled (See requirement 3 in Section 2.1.1). Entropy may be generated from the header of encapsulated packets at an encapsulator. The mapping mechanism between the encapsulated multicast traffic and the multicast capability in the IP network is transparent and independent of the encapsulation and is otherwise outside the scope of this document.

To provide entropy for ECMP, GRE-in-UDP does not rely on GRE keep-alive. It is RECOMMENDED not to use GRE keep-alive in the GRE-in-UDP tunnel. This aligns with middlebox traversal guidelines in Section 3.5 of [RFC5405bis].

4.1. MTU and Fragmentation

Regarding packet fragmentation, an encapsulator/decapsulator SHOULD perform fragmentation before the encapsulation. The size of fragments SHOULD be less or equal to the Path MTU (PMTU) associated with the path between the GRE ingress and the GRE egress tunnel endpoints minus the GRE and UDP overhead, assuming the egress MTU for reassembled packets is larger than PMTU. When applying payload fragmentation, the UDP checksum MUST be used so that the receiving endpoint can validate reassembly of the fragments; the same source UDP port SHOULD be used for all packet fragments to ensure the transit routers will forward the fragments on the same path.
If the operator of the transit network supporting the tunnel is able to control the payload MTU size, the MTU SHOULD be configured to avoid fragmentation, i.e., sufficient for the largest supported size of packet, including all additional bytes introduced by the tunnel overhead [RFC5405bis].

4.2. Differentiated Services and ECN Marking

To ensure that tunneled traffic receives the same treatment over the IP network as traffic that is not tunneled, prior to the encapsulation process, an encapsulator processes the tunneled IP packet headers to retrieve appropriate parameters for the encapsulating IP packet header such as DiffServ [RFC2983]. Encapsulation end points that support Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) must use the method described in [RFC6040] for ECN marking propagation. The congestion control process is outside of the scope of this document.

Additional information on IP header processing is provided in Section 3.1.

5. Use of DTLS

Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) [RFC6347] can be used for application security and can preserve network and transport layer protocol information. Specifically, if DTLS is used to secure the GRE-in-UDP tunnel, the destination port of the UDP header MUST be set to an IANA-assigned value (TBD2) indicating GRE-in-UDP with DTLS, and that UDP port MUST NOT be used for other traffic. The UDP source port field can still be used to add entropy, e.g., for load-sharing purposes. DTLS applies to a default GRE-in-UDP tunnel and a TMCE GRE-in-UDP tunnel.

Use of DTLS is limited to a single DTLS session for any specific tunnel encapsulator/decapsulator pair (identified by source and destination IP addresses). Both IP addresses MUST be unicast addresses - multicast traffic is not supported when DTLS is used. A GRE-in-UDP tunnel decapsulator that supports DTLS is expected to be able to establish DTLS sessions with multiple tunnel encapsulators, and likewise a GRE-in-UDP tunnel encapsulator is expected to be able to establish DTLS sessions with multiple decapsulators. Different source and/or destination IP addresses will be involved (see Section 6.2) for discussion of one situation where use of different source IP addresses is important.

When DTLS is used for a GRE-in-UDP tunnel, if a packet is received from the tunnel and that packet is not protected by the DTLS session
or part of DTLS negotiation (e.g., a DTLS handshake message [RFC6347]), the tunnel receiver MUST discard that packet and SHOULD log that discard event and information about the discarded packet.

DTLS SHOULD be used for a GRE-in-UDP tunnel to meet security requirements of the original traffic that is delivered by a GRE-in-UDP tunnel. There are cases where no additional security is required, e.g., the traffic to be encapsulated is already encrypted or the tunnel is deployed within an operationally secured network. Use of DTLS for a GRE-in-UDP tunnel requires both tunnel endpoints to configure use of DTLS.

6. UDP Checksum Handling

6.1. UDP Checksum with IPv4

For UDP in IPv4, when a non-zero UDP checksum is used, the UDP checksum MUST be processed as specified in [RFC768] and [RFC1122] for both transmit and receive. The IPv4 header includes a checksum that protects against mis-delivery of the packet due to corruption of IP addresses. The UDP checksum potentially provides protection against corruption of the UDP header, GRE header, and GRE payload. Disabling the use of checksums is a deployment consideration that should take into account the risk and effects of packet corruption.

When a decapsulator receives a packet, the UDP checksum field MUST be processed. If the UDP checksum is non-zero, the decapsulator MUST verify the checksum before accepting the packet. By default a decapsulator SHOULD accept UDP packets with a zero checksum. A node MAY be configured to disallow zero checksums per [RFC1122]; this may be done selectively, for instance disallowing zero checksums from certain hosts that are known to be sending over paths subject to packet corruption. If verification of a non-zero checksum fails, a decapsulator lacks the capability to verify a non-zero checksum, or a packet with a zero-checksum was received and the decapsulator is configured to disallow, the packet MUST be dropped and an event MAY be logged.

6.2. UDP Checksum with IPv6

For UDP in IPv6, the UDP checksum MUST be processed as specified in [RFC768] and [RFC2460] for both transmit and receive.

When UDP is used over IPv6, the UDP checksum is relied upon to protect both the IPv6 and UDP headers from corruption. As such, a default GRE-in-UDP Tunnel MUST perform UDP checksum; A TMCE GRE-in-UDP Tunnel MAY be configured with the UDP zero-checksum mode if the
traffic-managed controlled environment or a set of closely cooperate
traffic-managed controlled environments (such as by
network operators who have agreed to work together in order to
jointly provide specific services) meet at least one of following
conditions:

a. It is known (perhaps through knowledge of equipment types and
lower layer checks) that packet corruption is exceptionally
unlikely and where the operator is willing to take the risk of
undetected packet corruption.

b. It is judged through observational measurements (perhaps of
historic or current traffic flows that use a non-zero checksum)
that the level of packet corruption is tolerably low and where
the operator is willing to take the risk of undetected packet
corruption.

c. Carrying applications that are tolerant of mis-delivered or
corrupted packets (perhaps through higher layer checksum,
validation, and retransmission or transmission redundancy) where
the operator is willing to rely on the applications using the
tunnel to survive any corrupt packets.

The following requirements apply to a TMCE GRE-in-UDP tunnel that
uses UDP zero-checksum mode:

a. Use of the UDP checksum with IPv6 MUST be the default
configuration of all GRE-in-UDP tunnels.

b. The GRE-in-UDP tunnel implementation MUST comply with all
requirements specified in Section 4 of [RFC6936] and with
requirement 1 specified in Section 5 of [RFC6936].

c. The tunnel decapsulator SHOULD only allow the use of UDP zero-
checksum mode for IPv6 on a single received UDP Destination
Port regardless of the encapsulator. The motivation for this
requirement is possible corruption of the UDP Destination Port,
which may cause packet delivery to the wrong UDP port. If that
other UDP port requires the UDP checksum, the mis-delivered
packet will be discarded.

d. It is RECOMMENDED that the UDP zero-checksum mode for IPv6 is
only enabled for certain selected source addresses. The tunnel
decapsulator MUST check that the source and destination IPv6
addresses are valid for the GRE-in-UDP tunnel on which the
packet was received if that tunnel uses UDP zero-checksum mode
and discard any packet for which this check fails.
e. The tunnel encapsulator SHOULD use different IPv6 addresses for each GRE-in-UDP tunnel that uses UDP zero-checksum mode regardless of the decapsulator in order to strengthen the decapsulator’s check of the IPv6 source address (i.e., the same IPv6 source address SHOULD NOT be used with more than one IPv6 destination address, independent of whether that destination address is a unicast or multicast address). When this is not possible, it is RECOMMENDED to use each source IPv6 address for as few UDP zero-checksum mode GRE-in-UDP tunnels as is feasible.

f. When any middlebox exists on the path of a GRE-in-UDP tunnel, it is RECOMMENDED to use the default mode, i.e. use UDP checksum, to reduce the chance that the encapsulated packets will be dropped.

g. Any middlebox that allows the UDP zero-checksum mode for IPv6 MUST comply with requirement 1 and 8-10 in Section 5 of [RFC6936].

h. Measures SHOULD be taken to prevent IPv6 traffic with zero UDP checksums from "escaping" to the general Internet; see Section 8 for examples of such measures.

i. IPv6 traffic with zero UDP checksums MUST be actively monitored for errors by the network operator. For example, the operator may monitor Ethernet layer packet error rates.

j. If a packet with a non-zero checksum is received, the checksum MUST be verified before accepting the packet. This is regardless of whether the tunnel encapsulator and decapsulator have been configured with UDP zero-checksum mode.

The above requirements do not change either the requirements specified in [RFC2460] as modified by [RFC6935] or the requirements specified in [RFC6936].

The requirement to check the source IPv6 address in addition to the destination IPv6 address, plus the strong recommendation against reuse of source IPv6 addresses among GRE-in-UDP tunnels collectively provide some mitigation for the absence of UDP checksum coverage of the IPv6 header. A traffic-managed controlled environment that satisfies at least one of three conditions listed at the beginning of this section provides additional assurance.

A GRE-in-UDP tunnel is suitable for transmission over lower layers in the traffic-managed controlled environments that are allowed by the exceptions stated above and the rate of corruption of the inner
IP packet on such networks is not expected to increase by comparison
to GRE traffic that is not encapsulated in UDP. For these reasons,
GRE-in-UDP does not provide an additional integrity check except
when GRE checksum is used when UDP zero-checksum mode is used with
IPv6, and this design is in accordance with requirements 2, 3 and 5
specified in Section 5 of [RFC6936].

Generic Router Encapsulation (GRE) does not accumulate incorrect
transport layer state as a consequence of GRE header corruption. A
corrupt GRE packet may result in either packet discard or forwarding
of the packet without accumulation of GRE state. Active monitoring
of GRE-in-UDP traffic for errors is REQUIRED as occurrence of errors
will result in some accumulation of error information outside the
protocol for operational and management purposes. This design is in
accordance with requirement 4 specified in Section 5 of [RFC6936].

The remaining requirements specified in Section 5 of [RFC6936] are
not applicable to GRE-in-UDP. Requirements 6 and 7 do not apply
because GRE does not include a control feedback mechanism.
Requirements 8-10 are middlebox requirements that do not apply to
GRE-in-UDP tunnel endpoints (see Section 7.1 for further middlebox
discussion).

It is worth mentioning that the use of a zero UDP checksum should
present the equivalent risk of undetected packet corruption when
sending similar packet using GRE-in-IPv6 without UDP [RFC7676] and
without GRE checksums.

In summary, a TMCE GRE-in-UDP Tunnel is allowed to use UDP-zero-
checksum mode for IPv6 when the conditions and requirements stated
above are met. Otherwise the UDP checksum need to be used for IPv6
as specified in [RFC768] and [RFC2460]. Use of GRE checksum is
RECOMMENDED when the UDP checksum is not used.

7. Middlebox Considerations

Many middleboxes read or update UDP port information of the packets
that they forward. Network Address/Port Translator (NAPT) is the
most commonly deployed Network Address Translation (NAT) device
[RFC4787]. An NAPT device establishes a NAT session to translate the
(Private IP address, private source port number) tuple to a (public
IP address, public source port number) tuple, and vice versa, for
the duration of the UDP session. This provides a UDP application
with the "NAT-pass-through" function. NAPT allows multiple internal
hosts to share a single public IP address. The port number, i.e.,
the UDP Source Port number, is used as the demultiplexer of the
multiple internal hosts. However, the above NAPT behaviors conflict
with the behavior a GRE-in-UDP tunnel that is configured to use the UDP source port value to provide entropy.

A GRE-in-UDP tunnel is unidirectional; the tunnel traffic is not expected to be returned back to the UDP source port values used to generate entropy. However some middleboxes (e.g., firewall) assume that bidirectional traffic uses a common pair of UDP ports. This assumption also conflicts with the use of the UDP source port field as entropy.

Hence, use of the UDP source port for entropy may impact middleboxes behavior. If a GRE-in-UDP tunnel is expected to be used on a path with a middlebox, the tunnel can be configured to either disable use of the UDP source port for entropy or to configure middleboxes to pass packets with UDP source port entropy.

7.1. Middlebox Considerations for Zero Checksums

IPv6 datagrams with a zero UDP checksum will not be passed by any middlebox that updates the UDP checksum field or simply validates the checksum based on [RFC2460], such as firewalls. Changing this behavior would require such middleboxes to be updated to correctly handle datagrams with zero UDP checksums. The GRE-in-UDP encapsulation does not provide a mechanism to safely fall back to using a checksum when a path change occurs redirecting a tunnel over a path that includes a middlebox that discards IPv6 datagrams with a zero UDP checksum. In this case the GRE-in-UDP tunnel will be black-holed by that middlebox.

As such, when any middlebox exists on the path of GRE-in-UDP tunnel, use of the UDP checksum is RECOMMENDED to increase the probability of successful transmission of GRE-in-UDP packets. Recommended changes to allow firewalls and other middleboxes to support use of an IPv6 zero UDP checksum are described in Section 5 of [RFC6936].

8. Congestion Considerations

Section 3.1.9 of [RFC5405bis] discusses the congestion considerations for design and use of UDP tunnels; this is important because other flows could share the path with one or more UDP tunnels, necessitating congestion control [RFC2914] to avoid distractive interference.

Congestion has potential impacts both on the rest of the network containing a UDP tunnel, and on the traffic flows using the UDP tunnels. These impacts depend upon what sort of traffic is carried over the tunnel, as well as the path of the tunnel. The GRE-in-UDP
tunnel protocol does not provide any congestion control and GRE-in-UDP packets are regular UDP packets. Therefore, a GRE-in-UDP tunnel MUST NOT be deployed to carry non-congestion controlled traffic over the Internet [RFC5405bis].

Within a TMCE network, GRE-in-UDP tunnels are appropriate for carrying traffic that is not known to be congestion controlled. For example, a GRE-in-UDP tunnel may be used to carry Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS) traffic such as pseudowires or VPNs where specific bandwidth guarantees are provided to each pseudowire or VPN. In such cases, operators of TMCE networks avoid congestion by careful provisioning of their networks, rate limiting of user data traffic, and traffic engineering according to path capacity.

When a GRE-in-UDP tunnel carries traffic that is not known to be congestion controlled in a TMCE network, the tunnel MUST be deployed entirely within that network, and measures SHOULD be taken to prevent the GRE-in-UDP traffic from "escaping" the network to the general Internet, e.g.:

- Physical or logical isolation of the links carrying GRE-in-UDP from the general Internet.
- Deployment of packet filters that block the UDP ports assigned for GRE-in-UDP.
- Imposition of restrictions on GRE-in-UDP traffic by software tools used to set up GRE-in-UDP tunnels between specific end systems (as might be used within a single data center) or by tunnel ingress nodes for tunnels that don’t terminate at end systems.

9. Backward Compatibility

In general, tunnel ingress routers have to be upgraded in order to support the encapsulations described in this document.

No change is required at transit routers to support forwarding of the encapsulation described in this document.

If a tunnel endpoint (a host or router) that is intended for use as a decapsulator does not support or enable the GRE-in-UDP encapsulation described in this document, that endpoint will not listen on the destination port assigned to the GRE-encapsulation (TBD1 and TBD2). In these cases, the endpoint will perform normal UDP processing and respond to an encapsulator with an ICMP message...
indicating "port unreachable" according to [RFC792]. Upon receiving this ICMP message, the node MUST NOT continue to use GRE-in-UDP encapsulation toward this peer without management intervention.

10. IANA Considerations

IANA is requested to make the following allocations:

One UDP destination port number for the indication of GRE,

```
Service Name: GRE-in-UDP
Transport Protocol(s): UDP
Assignee: IESG <iesg@ietf.org>
Contact: IETF Chair <chair@ietf.org>
Description: GRE-in-UDP Encapsulation
Reference: [This.I-D]
Port Number: TBD1
Service Code: N/A
Known Unauthorized Uses: N/A
Assignment Notes: N/A
```

Editor Note: replace "TBD1" in section 3 and 9 with IANA assigned number.

One UDP destination port number for the indication of GRE with DTLS,

```
Service Name: GRE-UDP-DTLS
Transport Protocol(s): UDP
Assignee: IESG <iesg@ietf.org>
Contact: IETF Chair <chair@ietf.org>
Description: GRE-in-UDP Encapsulation with DTLS
Reference: [This.I-D]
Port Number: TBD2
Service Code: N/A
Known Unauthorized Uses: N/A
Assignment Notes: N/A
```

Editor Note: replace "TBD2" in section 3, 5, and 9 with IANA assigned number.
11. Security Considerations

GRE-in-UDP encapsulation does not affect security for the payload protocol. The security considerations for GRE apply to GRE-in-UDP, see [RFC2784].

To secure traffic carried by a GRE-in-UDP tunnel, DTLS SHOULD be used as specified in Section 5.

In the case that UDP source port for entropy usage is disabled, a random port SHOULD be selected in order to minimize the vulnerability to off-path attacks [RFC6056]. The random port may also be periodically changed to mitigate certain denial of service attacks as mentioned in Section 3.2.1.

Using one standardized value as the UDP destination port to indicate an encapsulation may increase the vulnerability of off-path attack. To overcome this, an alternate port may be agreed upon to use between an encapsulator and decapsulator [RFC6056]. How the encapsulator end points communicate the value is outside scope of this document.

This document does not require that a decapsulator validates the IP source address of the tunneled packets (with the exception that the IPv6 source address MUST be validated when UDP zero-checksum mode is used with IPv6), but it should be understood that failure to do so presupposes that there is effective destination-based (or a combination of source-based and destination-based) filtering at the boundaries.

Corruption of GRE headers can cause security concerns for applications that rely on the GRE key field for traffic separation or segregation. When the GRE key field is used for this purpose such as an application of a Network Virtualization Using Generic Routing Encapsulation (NVGRE) [RFC7637], GRE header corruption is a concern. In such situations, at least one of the UDP and GRE checksums MUST be used for both IPv4 and IPv6 GRE-in-UDP tunnels.

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14. References

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14.2. Informative References


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Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) Network Address Translation Support
draft-ietf-tsvwg-natsupp-13.txt

Abstract

The Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) provides a reliable communications channel between two end-hosts in many ways similar to the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP). With the widespread deployment of Network Address Translators (NAT), specialized code has been added to NAT for TCP that allows multiple hosts to reside behind a NAT and yet use only a single globally unique IPv4 address, even when two hosts (behind a NAT) choose the same port numbers for their connection. This additional code is sometimes classified as Network Address and Port Translation (NAPT).

This document describes the protocol extensions required for the SCTP endpoints and the mechanisms for NAT devices necessary to provide similar features of NAPT in the single-point and multi-point traversal scenario.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on January 9, 2020.
1. Introduction

Stream Control Transmission Protocol [RFC4960] provides a reliable communications channel between two end-hosts in many ways similar to TCP [RFC0793]. With the widespread deployment of Network Address Translators (NAT), specialized code has been added to NAT for TCP that allows multiple hosts to reside behind a NAT using private addresses (see [RFC6890]) and yet use only a single globally unique IPv4 address, even when two hosts (behind a NAT) choose the same port numbers for their connection. This additional code is sometimes classified as Network Address and Port Translation (NAPT). Please note that this document focuses on the case where the NAT maps multiple private addresses to a single public address. To date, specialized code for SCTP has not yet been added to most NAT devices so that only true NAT is available. The end result of this is that only one SCTP capable host can be behind a NAT and this host can only be single-homed. The only alternative for supporting legacy NAT devices is to use UDP encapsulation as specified in [RFC6951].

This document specifies procedures allowing a NAT to support SCTP by providing similar features to those provided by a NAPT for TCP and other supported protocols. The document also specifies a set of data formats for SCTP packets and a set of SCTP endpoint procedures to support NAT traversal. An SCTP implementation supporting these procedures can assure that in both single-homed and multi-homed cases
a NAT will maintain the proper state without needing to change port numbers.

It is possible and desirable to make these changes for a number of reasons:

- It is desirable for SCTP internal end-hosts on multiple platforms to be able to share a NAT’s public IP address in the same way that a TCP session can use a NAT.

- If a NAT does not need to change any data within an SCTP packet it will reduce the processing burden of NAT’ing SCTP by NOT needing to execute the CRC32c checksum required by SCTP.

- Not having to touch the IP payload makes the processing of ICMP messages in NAT devices easier.

An SCTP-aware NAT will need to follow these procedures for generating appropriate SCTP packet formats.

When considering this feature it is possible to have multiple levels of support. At each level, the Internal Host, External Host and NAT may or may not support the features described in this document. The following table illustrates the results of the various combinations of support and if communications can occur between two endpoints.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Internal Host</th>
<th>NAT Device</th>
<th>External Host</th>
<th>Communication</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>Support</td>
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<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Communication possibilities

From the table it can be seen that when a NAT device does not support the extension no communication can occur. This assumes that the NAT device does not handle SCTP packets at all and all SCTP packets sent externally from behind a NAT device are discarded by the NAT. In some cases, where the NAT device supports the feature but one of the two hosts does not support the feature, communication may occur but
in a limited way. For example only one host may be able to have a connection when a collision case occurs.

2. Conventions

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

3. Terminology

This document uses the following terms, which are depicted in Figure 1. Familiarity with the terminology used in [RFC4960] and [RFC5061] is assumed.

Private-Address (Priv-Addr): The private address that is known to the internal host.

Internal-Port (Int-Port): The port number that is in use by the host holding the Private-Address.

Internal-VTag (Int-VTag): The SCTP Verification Tag (VTag) that the internal host has chosen for its communication. The VTag is a unique 32-bit tag that must accompany any incoming SCTP packet for this association to the Private-Address.

External-Address (Ext-Addr): The address that an internal host is attempting to contact.

External-Port (Ext-Port): The port number of the peer process at the External-Address.

External-VTag (Ext-VTag): The Verification Tag that the host holding the External-Address has chosen for its communication. The VTag is a unique 32-bit tag that must accompany any incoming SCTP packet for this association to the External-Address.

Public-Address (Pub-Addr): The public address assigned to the NAT device that it uses as a source address when sending packets towards the External-Address.
4. Motivation

4.1. SCTP NAT Traversal Scenarios

This section defines the notion of single and multi-point NAT traversal.

4.1.1. Single Point Traversal

In this case, all packets in the SCTP association go through a single NAT, as shown below:

```
+--------+ Address +-----+ Address +--------+
|  SCTP  |         | NAT   | Internet |  SCTP  |
|endpoint|=========|=======|=========|endpoint|
|    A   |         |       |         |    B   |
+--------+ Internal Port +--------+
|  VTag  |                  |  VTag |
```

Figure 1: Basic network setup

A variation of this case is shown below, i.e., multiple NAT devices in a single path:
Serial NAT Devices scenario

Although one of the main benefits of SCTP multi-homing is redundant paths, in this single point traversal scenario the NAT function represents a single point of failure in the path of the SCTP multi-home association. However, the rest of the path may still benefit from path diversity provided by SCTP multi-homing.

The two SCTP endpoints in this case can be either single-homed or multi-homed. However, the important thing is that the NAT device (or NAT devices) in this case sees all the packets of the SCTP association.

4.1.2. Multi Point Traversal

This case involves multiple NAT devices and each NAT device only sees some of the packets in the SCTP association. An example is shown below:

Parallel NAT devices scenario

This case does NOT apply to a single-homed SCTP association (i.e., BOTH endpoints in the association use only one IP address). The advantage here is that the existence of multiple NAT traversal points can preserve the path diversity of a multi-homed association for the entire path. This in turn can improve the robustness of the communication.
4.2. Limitations of Classical NAPT for SCTP

Using classical NAPT may result in changing one of the SCTP port numbers during the processing which requires the recomputation of the transport layer checksum. Whereas for UDP and TCP this can be done very efficiently, for SCTP the checksum (CRC32c) over the entire packet needs to be recomputed. This would considerably add to the NAT computational burden, however hardware support may mitigate this in some implementations.

An SCTP endpoint may have multiple addresses but only has a single port number. To make multipoint traversal work, all the NAT devices involved must recognize the packets they see as belonging to the same SCTP association and perform port number translation in a consistent way. One possible way of doing this is to use pre-defined table of ports and addresses configured within each NAT. Other mechanisms could make use of NAT to NAT communication. Such mechanisms are not to be deployable on a wide scale base and thus not a recommended solution. Therefore the SCTP variant of NAT has been developed.

4.3. The SCTP Specific Variant of NAT

In this section it is assumed that there are multiple SCTP capable hosts behind a NAT that has one Public-Address. Furthermore this section focuses on the single point traversal scenario.

The modification of SCTP packets sent to the public Internet is simple: the source address of the packet has to be replaced with the Public-Address. It may also be necessary to establish some state in the NAT device to later handle incoming packets.

For the SCTP NAT processing the NAT device has to maintain a table of Internal-VTag, Internal-Port, External-VTag, External-Port, Private-Address, and whether the restart procedure is disabled or not. An entry in that table is called a NAT state control block. The function Create() obtains the just mentioned parameters and returns a NAT-State control block.

For SCTP packets coming from the public Internet the destination address of the packets has to be replaced with the Private-Address of the host the packet has to be delivered to. The lookup of the Private-Address is based on the External-VTag, External-Port, Internal-VTag and the Internal-Port.

The entries in the table fulfill some uniqueness conditions. There must not be more than one entry with the same pair of Internal-Port and External-Port. This rule can be relaxed, if all entries with the same Internal-Port and External-Port have the support for the restart
procedure enabled. In this case there must be no more than one entry with the same Internal-Port, External-Port and Ext-VTag and no more than one entry with the same Internal-Port, External-Port and Int-VTag.

The processing of outgoing SCTP packets containing an INIT-chunk is described in the following figure. The scenario shown is valid for all message flows in this section.

```
+--------+          +-----+           /        \/          +--------+
| Host A | <------> | NAT | <------> | Internet | <------> | Host B |
\--------/          \-----/           \         /          \--------/  
INIT[Initiate-Tag]
Priv-Addr:Int-Port -----> Ext-Addr:Ext-Port
Ext-VTag=0
Create(Initiate-Tag, Int-Port, 0, Ext-Port, Priv-Addr, RestartSupported)
Returns(NAT-State control block)
Translate To:
INIT[Initiate-Tag]
Pub-Addr:Int-Port -----> Ext-Addr:Ext-Port
Ext-VTag=0
```

Normally a NAT control block will be created. However, it is possible that there is already a NAT control block with the same External-Address, External-Port, Internal-Port, and Internal-VTag but different Private-Address. In this case the INIT MUST be dropped by the NAT and an ABORT MUST be sent back to the SCTP host with the M-Bit set and an appropriate error cause (see Section 5.1.1 for the format). The source address of the packet containing the ABORT chunk MUST be the destination address of the packet containing the INIT chunk.

It is also possible that a connection to External-Address and External-Port exists without an Internal-VTag conflict but the External-Address does not support the DISABLE_RESTART feature (noted in the NAT control block when the prior connection was established). In such a case the INIT SHOULD be dropped by the NAT and an ABORT
SHOULD be sent back to the SCTP host with the M-Bit set and an appropriate error cause (see Section 5.1.1 for the format).

The processing of outgoing SCTP packets containing no INIT-chunk is described in the following figure.

```
+--------+          +-----+           /        \
| Host A | <------> | NAT | <------> | Internet | <------> | Host B |
\--------/          \-----/           \       /          \--------+
\--\---/          \--\---/          \--\---/
Priv-Addr:Int-Port ------> Ext-Addr:Ext-Port
Ext-VTag

Translate To:

Pub-Addr:Int-Port ------> Ext-Addr:Ext-Port
Ext-VTag

The processing of incoming SCTP packets containing INIT-ACK chunks is described in the following figure. The Lookup() function getting as input the Internal-VTag, Internal-Port, External-VTag, and External-Port, returns the corresponding entry of the NAT table and updates the External-VTag by substituting it with the value of the Initiate-VTag of the INIT-ACK chunk. The wildcard character signifies that the parameter’s value is not considered in the Lookup() function or changed in the Update() function, respectively.
In the case Lookup fails, the SCTP packet is dropped. The Update routine inserts the External-VTag (the Initiate-Tag of the INIT-ACK chunk) in the NAT state control block.

The processing of incoming SCTP packets containing an ABORT or SHUTDOWN-COMPLETE chunk with the T-Bit set is described in the following figure.

In the case Lookup fails, the SCTP packet is dropped. The Update routine inserts the External-VTag (the Initiate-Tag of the INIT-ACK chunk) in the NAT state control block.

The processing of other incoming SCTP packets is described in the following figure.
For an incoming packet containing an INIT-chunk a table lookup is made only based on the addresses and port numbers. If an entry with an External-VTag of zero is found, it is considered a match and the External-VTag is updated.

This allows the handling of INIT-collision through NAT.

5. Data Formats

This section defines the formats used to support NAT traversal. Section 5.1 and Section 5.2 describe chunks and error causes sent by NAT devices and received by SCTP endpoints. Section 5.3 describes parameters sent by SCTP endpoints and used by NAT devices and SCTP endpoints.

5.1. Modified Chunks

This section presents existing chunks defined in [RFC4960] that are modified by this document.

5.1.1. Extended ABORT Chunk

```
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
| Type = 6 | Reserved |M|T|           Length              |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
| zero or more Error Causes |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
```
The ABORT chunk is extended to add the new ‘M-bit’. The M-bit indicates to the receiver of the ABORT chunk that the chunk was not generated by the peer SCTP endpoint, but instead by a middle box.

[NOTE to RFC-Editor:
Assignment of M-bit to be confirmed by IANA.
]

5.1.2. Extended ERROR Chunk

```
+-----------------+--------------------------+---------------------+---------------------+
| Type = 9        |  Reserved | M | T | Length |
+-----------------+--------------------------+---------------------+---------------------+
```

The ERROR chunk defined in [RFC4960] is extended to add the new ‘M-bit’. The M-bit indicates to the receiver of the ERROR chunk that the chunk was not generated by the peer SCTP endpoint, but instead by a middle box.

[NOTE to RFC-Editor:
Assignment of M-bit to be confirmed by IANA.
]

5.2. New Error Causes

This section defines the new error causes added by this document.

5.2.1. VTag and Port Number Collision Error Cause

```
+-----------------+--------------------------+---------------------+---------------------+
| Cause Code = 0x00B0 | Cause Length = Variable |
+-----------------+--------------------------+---------------------+---------------------+
```

Stewart, et al. Expires January 9, 2020
Cause Code: 2 bytes (unsigned integer)
This field holds the IANA defined cause code for the 'VTag and Port Number Collision' Error Cause. IANA is requested to assign the value 0x00B0 for this cause code.

Cause Length: 2 bytes (unsigned integer)
This field holds the length in bytes of the error cause. The value MUST be the length of the Cause-Specific Information plus 4.

Chunk: variable length
The Cause-Specific Information is filled with the chunk that caused this error. This can be an INIT, INIT-ACK, or ASCONF chunk. Note that if the entire chunk will not fit in the ERROR chunk or ABORT chunk being sent then the bytes that do not fit are truncated.

[NOTE to RFC-Editor:
Assignment of cause code to be confirmed by IANA.
]

5.2.2. Missing State Error Cause

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1</th>
<th>0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>++------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cause Code = 0x00B1</td>
<td>Cause Length = Variable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>++------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\</td>
<td>Incoming Packet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cause Code: 2 bytes (unsigned integer)
This field holds the IANA defined cause code for the 'Missing State' Error Cause. IANA is requested to assign the value 0x00B1 for this cause code.

Cause Length: 2 bytes (unsigned integer)
This field holds the length in bytes of the error cause. The value MUST be the length of the Cause-Specific Information plus 4.

Incoming Packet: variable length
The Cause-Specific Information is filled with the IPv4 or IPv6 packet that caused this error. The IPv4 or IPv6 header MUST be included. Note that if the packet will not fit in the ERROR chunk or ABORT chunk being sent then the bytes that do not fit are truncated.
5.2.3. Port Number Collision Error Cause

Cause Code: 2 bytes (unsigned integer)
This field holds the IANA defined cause code for the ‘Port Number Collision’ Error Cause. IANA is requested to assign the value 0x00B2 for this cause code.

Cause Length: 2 bytes (unsigned integer)
This field holds the length in bytes of the error cause. The value MUST be the length of the Cause-Specific Information plus 4.

Chunk: variable length
The Cause-Specific Information is filled with the chunk that caused this error. This can be an INIT, INIT-ACK, or ASCONF chunk. Note that if the entire chunk will not fit in the ERROR chunk or ABORT chunk being sent then the bytes that do not fit are truncated.

5.3. New Parameters

This section defines new parameters and their valid appearance defined by this document.
5.3.1. Disable Restart Parameter

This parameter is used to indicate that the RESTART procedure is requested to be disabled. Both endpoints of an association MUST include this parameter in the INIT chunk and INIT-ACK chunk when establishing an association and MUST include it in the ASCONF chunk when adding an address to successfully disable the restart procedure.

Parameter Type: 2 bytes (unsigned integer)
   This field holds the IANA defined parameter type for the Disable Restart Parameter. IANA is requested to assign the value 0xC007 for this parameter type.

Parameter Length: 2 bytes (unsigned integer)
   This field holds the length in bytes of the parameter. The value MUST be 4.

[NOTE to RFC-Editor:
   Assignment of parameter type to be confirmed by IANA.
]

This parameter MAY appear in INIT, INIT-ACK and ASCONF chunks and MUST NOT appear in any other chunk.

5.3.2. VTags Parameter

This parameter is used to help a NAT recover from state loss.
Parameter Type: 2 bytes (unsigned integer)
This field holds the IANA defined parameter type for the VTags Parameter. IANA is requested to assign the value 0xC008 for this parameter type.

Parameter Length: 2 bytes (unsigned integer)
This field holds the length in bytes of the parameter. The value MUST be 16.

ASCONF-Request Correlation ID: 4 bytes (unsigned integer)
This is an opaque integer assigned by the sender to identify each request parameter. The receiver of the ASCONF Chunk will copy this 32-bit value into the ASCONF Response Correlation ID field of the ASCONF-ACK response parameter. The sender of the ASCONF can use this same value in the ASCONF-ACK to find which request the response is for. Note that the receiver MUST NOT change this 32-bit value.

Internal Verification Tag: 4 bytes (unsigned integer)
The Verification Tag that the internal host has chosen for its communication. The Verification Tag is a unique 32-bit tag that must accompany any incoming SCTP packet for this association to the Private-Address.

External Verification Tag: 4 bytes (unsigned integer)
The Verification Tag that the host holding the External-Address has chosen for its communication. The VTag is a unique 32-bit tag that must accompany any incoming SCTP packet for this association to the External-Address.

[NOTE to RFC-Editor:
Assignment of parameter type to be confirmed by IANA.
]

This parameter MAY appear in ASCONF chunks and MUST NOT appear in any other chunk.

6. Procedures for SCTP Endpoints and NAT Devices

When an SCTP endpoint is behind an SCTP-aware NAT a number of problems may arise as it tries to communicate with its peer:

- IP addresses can not not be included in the SCTP packet. This is discussed in Section 6.1.
o More than one host behind a NAT device could select the same VTag and source port when talking to the same peer server. This creates a situation where the NAT will not be able to tell the two associations apart. This situation is discussed in Section 6.2.

o When an SCTP endpoint is a server communicating with multiple peers and the peers are behind the same NAT, then the two endpoints cannot be distinguished by the server. This case is discussed in Section 6.3.

o A restart of a NAT during a conversation could cause a loss of its state. This problem and its solution is discussed in Section 6.4.

o NAT devices need to deal with SCTP packets being fragmented at the IP layer. This is discussed in Section 6.5.

o An SCTP endpoint may be behind two NAT devices providing redundancy. The method to set up this scenario is discussed in Section 6.6.

Each of these mechanisms requires additional chunks and parameters, defined in this document, and possibly modified handling procedures from those specified in [RFC4960].

6.1. Association Setup Considerations for Endpoints

The association setup procedure defined in [RFC4960] allows multi-homed SCTP endpoints to exchange its IP-addresses by using IPv4 or IPv6 address parameters in the INIT and INIT-ACK chunks. However, this doesn't work when NAT devices are present.

Every association MUST initially be set up single-homed. There MUST NOT be any IPv4 Address parameter, IPv6 Address parameter, or Supported Address Types parameter in the INIT-chunk. The INIT-ACK chunk MUST NOT contain any IPv4 Address parameter or IPv6 Address parameter.

If the association should finally be multi-homed, the procedure in Section 6.6 MUST be used.

The INIT and INIT-ACK chunk SHOULD contain the Disable Restart parameter defined in Section 5.3.1.

6.2. Handling of Internal Port Number and Verification Tag Collisions

Consider the case where two hosts in the Private-Address space want to set up an SCTP association with the same service provided by some hosts in the Internet. This means that the External-Port is the
same. If they both choose the same Internal-Port and Internal-VTag, the NAT device cannot distinguish between incoming packets anymore. But this is very unlikely. The Internal-VTags are chosen at random and if the Internal-Ports are also chosen from the ephemeral port range at random this gives a 46-bit random number which has to match. In the TCP-like NAPT case the NAT device can control the 16-bit Natted Port and therefore avoid collisions deterministically.

The same can happen with the External-VTag when an INIT-ACK chunk or an ASCONF chunk is processed by the NAT.

6.2.1. NAT Device Considerations

However, in this unlikely event the NAT device MUST send an ABORT chunk with the M-bit set if the collision is triggered by an INIT or INIT-ACK chunk or send an ERROR chunk with the M-bit set if the collision is triggered by an ASCONF chunk. The M-bit is a new bit defined by this document to express to SCTP that the source of this packet is a "middle" box, not the peer SCTP endpoint (see Section 5.1.1). If a packet containing an INIT-ACK chunk triggers the collision, the corresponding packet containing the ABORT chunk MUST contain the same source and destination address and port numbers as the packet containing the INIT-ACK chunk. In the other two cases, the source and destination address and port numbers MUST be swapped.

The sender of the ERROR or ABORT chunk MUST include the error cause with cause code ‘VTag and Port Number Collision’ (see Section 5.2.1).

6.2.2. Endpoint Considerations

The sender of the packet containing the INIT chunk or the receiver of the INIT-ACK chunk, upon reception of an ABORT chunk with M-bit set and the appropriate error cause code for colliding NAT table state is included, MUST reinitiate the association setup procedure after choosing a new initiate tag, if the association is in COOKIE-WAIT state. In any other state, the SCTP endpoint MUST NOT respond.

The sender of the ASCONF chunk, upon reception of an ERROR chunk with M-bit set, MUST stop adding the path to the association.

6.3. Handling of Internal Port Number Collisions

When two SCTP hosts are behind an SCTP-aware NAT it is possible that two SCTP hosts in the Private-Address space will want to set up an SCTP association with the same server running on the same host in the Internet. For the NAT, appropriate tracking may be performed by assuring that the VTags are unique between the two hosts.
6.3.1. NAT Device Considerations

The NAT, when processing the INIT-ACK, should note in its internal table that the association supports the Disable Restart extension. This note is used when establishing future associations (i.e. when processing an INIT from an internal host) to decide if the connection should be allowed. The NAT device does the following when processing an INIT:

- If the INIT is destined to an external address and port for which the NAT device has no outbound connection, it MUST allow the INIT creating an internal mapping table.

- If the INIT matches the external address and port of an already existing connection, it MUST validate that the external server supports the Disable Restart feature and, if it does, allow the INIT to be forwarded.

- If the external server does not support the Disable Restart extension the NAT device MUST send an ABORT with the M-bit set.

The ‘Port Number Collision’ error cause (see Section 5.2.3) MUST be included in the ABORT chunk.

If the collision is triggered by an ASCONF chunk, a packet containing an ERROR chunk with the ‘Port Number Collision’ error cause MUST be sent back.

6.3.2. Endpoint Considerations

For the external SCTP server on the Internet this means that the External-Port and the External-Address are the same. If they both have chosen the same Internal-Port the server cannot distinguish between both associations based on the address and port numbers. For the server it looks like the association is being restarted. To overcome this limitation the client sends a Disable Restart parameter in the INIT-chunk.

When the server receives this parameter it does the following:

- It MUST include a Disable Restart parameter in the INIT-ACK to inform the client that it will support the feature.

- It MUST Disable the restart procedures defined in [RFC4960] for this association.
Servers that support this feature will need to be capable of maintaining multiple connections to what appears to be the same peer (behind the NAT) differentiated only by the VTags.

6.4. Handling of Missing State

6.4.1. NAT Device Considerations

If the NAT device receives a packet from the internal network for which the lookup procedure does not find an entry in the NAT table, a packet containing an ERROR chunk is sent back with the M-bit set. The source address of the packet containing the ERROR chunk MUST be the destination address of the incoming SCTP packet. The verification tag is reflected and the T-bit is set. Please note that such a packet containing an ERROR chunk SHOULD NOT be sent if the received packet contains an ABORT, SHUTDOWN-COMPLETE or INIT-ACK chunk. An ERROR chunk MUST NOT be sent if the received packet contains an ERROR chunk with the M-bit set.

When sending the ERROR chunk, the new error cause 'Missing State' (see Section 5.2.2) MUST be included and the new M-bit of the ERROR chunk MUST be set (see Section 5.1.2).

If the NAT device receives a packet for which it has no NAT table entry and the packet contains an ASCONF chunk with the VTags parameter, the NAT device MUST update its NAT table according to the verification tags in the VTags parameter and the optional Disable Restart parameter.

6.4.2. Endpoint Considerations

Upon reception of this ERROR chunk by an SCTP endpoint the receiver takes the following actions:

- It SHOULD validate that the verification tag is reflected by looking at the VTag that would have been included in the outgoing packet.
- It SHOULD validate that the peer of the SCTP association supports the dynamic address extension, if it does not discard the incoming ERROR chunk.
- It SHOULD generate a new ASCONF chunk containing the VTags parameter (see Section 5.3.2) and the Disable Restart parameter if the association is using the disabled restart feature. By processing this packet the NAT device can recover the appropriate state. The procedures for generating an ASCONF chunk can be found in [RFC5061].
The peer SCTP endpoint receiving such an ASCONF chunk SHOULD either add the address and respond with an acknowledgment, if the address is new to the association (following all procedures defined in [RFC5061]). Or, if the address is already part of the association, the SCTP endpoint MUST NOT respond with an error, but instead should respond with an ASCONF-ACK chunk acknowledging the address but take no action (since the address is already in the association).

Note that it is possible that upon receiving an ASCONF chunk containing the VTags parameter the NAT will realize that it has an ‘Internal Port Number and Verification Tag collision’. In such a case the NAT MUST send an ERROR chunk with the error cause code set to ‘VTag and Port Number Collision’ (see Section 5.2.1).

If an SCTP endpoint receives an ERROR with ‘Internal Port Number and Verification Tag collision’ as the error cause and the packet in the Error Chunk contains an ASCONF with the VTags parameter, careful examination of the association is required. The endpoint does the following:

- It MUST validate that the verification tag is reflected by looking at the VTag that would have been included in the outgoing packet.
- It MUST validate that the peer of the SCTP association supports the dynamic address extension. If the peer does not support it, the NAT Device MUST discard the incoming ERROR chunk.
- If the association is attempting to add an address (i.e. following the procedures in Section 6.6) then the endpoint MUST NOT consider the address part of the association and SHOULD make no further attempt to add the address (i.e. cancel any ASCONF timers and remove any record of the path), since the NAT device has a VTag collision and the association cannot easily create a new VTag (as it would if the error occurred when sending an INIT).
- If the endpoint has no other path, i.e. the procedure was executed due to missing a state in the NAT device, then the endpoint MUST abort the association. This would occur only if the local NAT device restarted and accepted a new association before attempting to repair the missing state (Note that this is no different than what happens to all TCP connections when a NAT device looses its state).

6.5. Handling of Fragmented SCTP Packets by NAT Devices

A NAT device MUST support IP reassembly of received fragmented SCTP packets. The fragments may arrive in any order.
When an SCTP packet has to be fragmented by the NAT device and the IP header forbids fragmentation a corresponding ICMP packet SHOULD be sent.

6.6. Multi-Point Traversal Considerations for Endpoints

If a multi-homed SCTP endpoint behind a NAT connects to a peer, it SHOULD first set up the association single-homed with only one address causing the first NAT to populate its state. Then it SHOULD add each IP address using ASCONF chunks sent via their respective NAT devices. The address to add is the wildcard address and the lookup address SHOULD also contain the VTags parameter and optionally the Disable Restart parameter as illustrated above.

7. Various Examples of NAT Traversals

Please note that this section is informational only.

The addresses being used in the following examples are IPv4 addresses for private-use networks and for documentation as specified in [RFC6890]. However, the method described here is not limited to this NAT44 case.

7.1. Single-homed Client to Single-homed Server

The internal client starts the association with the external server via a four-way-handshake. Host A starts by sending an INIT chunk.

```
+--------+          +-----+           /        \
| Host A | <------> | NAT | <------> | Internet | <------> | Host B |
\--------+          +-----+           \         /          +--------+
\--/
\--/
+---------+--------+----------+--------+-----------+
NAT    |  Int    |  Int   |   Ext    |   Ext  |    Priv   |
        |  VTag   |  Port  |   VTag   |   Port |    Addr   |
+---------+--------+----------+--------+-----------+

INIT[Initiate-Tag = 1234]
10.0.0.1:1 -------> 203.0.113.1:2
Ext-VTag = 0
```

A NAT entry is created, the source address is substituted and the packet is sent on:
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NAT creates entry:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Int VTag</th>
<th>Int Port</th>
<th>Ext VTag</th>
<th>Ext Port</th>
<th>Priv Addr</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1234</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10.0.0.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

INIT[Initiate-Tag = 1234]
192.0.2.1:1 ------------------------> 203.0.113.1:2
Ext-VTag = 0

Host B receives the INIT and sends an INIT-ACK with the NAT’s external address as destination address.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Int VTag</th>
<th>Int Port</th>
<th>Ext VTag</th>
<th>Ext Port</th>
<th>Priv Addr</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1234</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5678</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10.0.0.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

INIT-ACK[Initiate-Tag = 5678]
10.0.0.1:1 <------ 203.0.113.1:2
Int-VTag = 1234

The handshake finishes with a COOKIE-ECHO acknowledged by a COOKIE-ACK.
7.2. Single-homed Client to Multi-homed Server

The internal client is single-homed whereas the external server is multi-homed. The client (Host A) sends an INIT like in the single-homed case.
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INIT[Initiate-Tag = 1234]
10.0.0.1:1 ---> 203.0.113.1:2
Ext-VTag = 0

NAT creates entry:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Int VTag</th>
<th>Int Port</th>
<th>Ext VTag</th>
<th>Ext Port</th>
<th>Priv Addr</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1234</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10.0.0.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

INIT[Initiate-Tag = 1234]
192.0.2.1:1 --------------------------> 203.0.113.1:2
Ext-VTag = 0

The server (Host B) includes its two addresses in the INIT-ACK chunk, which results in two NAT entries.
NAT does need to change the table for second address:

```
+---------+--------+----------+--------+-----------+
| NAT     |  Int    |  Int     |   Ext   |   Ext     |    Priv   |
| VTag    |  Port   |   VTag   |   Port  |    Addr   |-----------|
+---------+--------+----------+--------+-----------+
| 1234    |    1   |    5678  |    2   |  10.0.0.1 |
+---------+--------+----------+--------+-----------+
```

INIT-ACK[Initiate-Tag = 5678]
10.0.0.1:1 <--- 203.0.113.1:2
Int-VTag = 1234

The handshake finishes with a COOKIE-ECHO acknowledged by a COOKIE-ACK.
7.3. Multihomed Client and Server

The client (Host A) sends an INIT to the server (Host B), but does not include the second address.
NAT 1  |  Int VTag |  Int Port |  Ext VTag |  Ext Port |  Priv Addr |
|-------+---+-------+---+-------+---------|
| 1234 | 1  |   0  | 2 | 10.0.0.1|

INIT[Initiate-Tag = 1234]
192.0.2.1:1 ------------------> 203.0.113.1:2
Ext-VTag = 0

Host B includes its second address in the INIT-ACK, which results in two NAT entries in NAT 1.
NAT 1 does not need to update the table for second address:

| Host A | ---+--- | ---+--- | ---+--- | ---+--- |
| NAT 1  | Int VTag | Int Port | Ext VTag | Ext Port | Priv Addr |
| 1234   | 1       | 5678     | 2       | 10.0.0.1 |

INIT-ACK[Initiate-Tag = 5678]  
10.0.0.1:1 <-------- 203.0.113.1:2  
Int-VTag = 1234

The handshake finishes with a COOKIE-ECHO acknowledged by a COOKIE-ACK.
Host A announces its second address in an ASCONF chunk. The address parameter contains an undefined address (0) to indicate that the source address should be added. The lookup address parameter within the ASCONF chunk will also contain the pair of VTags (external and internal) so that the NAT may populate its table completely with this single packet.

```
++---+ /--------| NAT 1 |--------\ /--\--\ 
| Host === +--------+ \ /+-------+ 
|   A \+-------+ \---|--\--/ 
| \-------+ \--------\ /--\--/ 

ASCONF [ADD-IP=0.0.0.0, INT-VTag=1234, Ext-VTag = 5678]
10.1.0.1:1 --------> 203.0.113.129:2
Ext-VTag = 5678
```

NAT 2 creates complete entry:
Association is already established between Host A and Host B, when the NAT loses its state and obtains a new public address. Host A sends a DATA chunk to Host B.

The NAT device cannot find entry for the association. It sends ERROR message with the M-Bit set and the cause "NAT state missing".
On reception of the ERROR message, Host A sends an ASCONF chunk indicating that the former information has to be deleted and the source address of the actual packet added.

```
+---------+--------+----------+--------+-----------+          
| HOST A  | <------- | NAT      | <------ | INT       |          
| Int VTag| Int Port| Ext VTag | Ext Port| Priv Addr  |          
| 1234    | 1       | 5678     | 2       | 10.0.0.1   |          
```

ASCONF [ADD-IP, DELETE-IP, Int-VTag=1234, Ext-VTag = 5678]
10.0.0.1:1 ----------> 203.0.113.129:2
Ext-VTag = 5678

Host B adds the new source address and deletes all former entries.
7.5. Peer-to-Peer Communication

If two hosts are behind NAT devices, they have to get knowledge of the peer’s public address. This can be achieved with a so-called rendezvous server. Afterwards the destination addresses are public, and the association is set up with the help of the INIT collision. The NAT devices create their entries according to their internal peer’s point of view. Therefore, NAT A’s Internal-VTag and Internal-Port are NAT B’s External-VTag and External-Port, respectively. The naming of the verification tag in the packet flow is done from the sending peer’s point of view.
INIT\[Initiate-Tag = 1234\]
10.0.0.1:1 --> 203.0.113.1:2
Ext-VTag = 0

NAT A creates entry:

NAT B processes INIT, but cannot find an entry. The SCTP packet is silently discarded and leaves the NAT table of NAT B unchanged.
Now Host B sends INIT, which is processed by NAT B. Its parameters are used to create an entry.

```
    Internal | External        External | Internal
    +--------+--------+          |--------+--------+     +-------+     +--------+
    | Host A |<--->| NAT A |<-->| Internet |<-->| NAT B |<--->| Host B |
    +--------+        |        |          |        |        |        |
    \--/
    INIT[Initiate-Tag = 5678]
    192.0.2.1:1 <-- 10.1.0.1:2
    Ext-VTag = 0
```

NAT B processes INIT. As the outgoing INIT of Host A has already created an entry, the entry is found and updated:

```
NAT B   | Int   | Int     | Priv   | Ext    | Ext    |
--------+-------+---------+--------+--------+--------+
        | VTag  | Port    | Addr   | VTag   | Port   |
        | 5678  | 2       | 10.1.0.1| 0      | 1      |
        +--------+---------+--------+--------+--------+
INIT[Initiate-Tag = 5678]
192.0.2.1:1  <----------------- 203.0.113.1:2
Ext-VTag = 0
```

NAT A processes INIT. As the outgoing INIT of Host A has already created an entry, the entry is found and updated:
VTag != Int-VTag, but Ext-VTag == 0, find entry.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAT A</th>
<th>Int VTag</th>
<th>Int Port</th>
<th>Ext VTag</th>
<th>Ext Port</th>
<th>Priv Addr</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1234</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5678</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10.0.0.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

INIT[Initiate-tag = 5678]
10.0.0.1:1 <-- 203.0.113.1:2
Ext-VTag = 0

Host A send INIT-ACK, which can pass through NAT B:
Internal | External | External | Internal

+---------+--------+----------+--------+-----------+
| NAT B   |  Int VTag |  Int Port | Ext VTag | Ext Port | Priv Addr |
+---------+--------+----------+--------+--------+-----------+
|  5678   |    2   |  1234    |   1    |  10.1.0.1 |
+---------+--------+----------+--------+--------+-----------+

INIT-ACK[Initiate-Tag = 1234]
192.0.2.1:1 --> 10.1.0.1:2
Ext-VTag = 5678

The lookup for COOKIE-ECHO and COOKIE-ACK is successful.
8. Socket API Considerations

This section describes how the socket API defined in [RFC6458] is extended to provide a way for the application to control NAT friendliness.

Please note that this section is informational only.

A socket API implementation based on [RFC6458] is extended by supporting one new read/write socket option.
8.1. Get or Set the NAT Friendliness (SCTP_NAT_FRIENDLY)

This socket option uses the option_level IPPROTO_SCTP and the option_name SCTP_NAT_FRIENDLY. It can be used to enable/disable the NAT friendliness for future associations and retrieve the value for future and specific ones.

```c
struct sctp_assoc_value {
    sctp_assoc_t assoc_id;
    uint32_t assoc_value;
};
```

assoc_id: This parameter is ignored for one-to-one style sockets. For one-to-many style sockets the application may fill in an association identifier or SCTP_FUTURE_ASSOC for this query. It is an error to use SCTP_{CURRENT|ALL}_ASSOC in assoc_id.

assoc_value: A non-zero value indicates a NAT-friendly mode.

9. IANA Considerations

[NOTE to RFC-Editor:

"RFCXXXX" is to be replaced by the RFC number you assign this document.

]

[NOTE to RFC-Editor:

The requested values for the chunk type and the chunk parameter types are tentative and to be confirmed by IANA.

]

This document (RFCXXXX) is the reference for all registrations described in this section. The requested changes are described below.

9.1. New Chunk Flags for Two Existing Chunk Types

As defined in [RFC6096] two chunk flags have to be assigned by IANA for the ERROR chunk. The requested value for the T bit is 0x01 and for the M bit is 0x02.

This requires an update of the "ERROR Chunk Flags" registry for SCTP:
### ERROR Chunk Flags

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chunk Flag Value</th>
<th>Chunk Flag Name</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0x01</td>
<td>T bit</td>
<td>[RFCX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x02</td>
<td>M bit</td>
<td>[RFCX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x04</td>
<td>Unassigned</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x08</td>
<td>Unassigned</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x10</td>
<td>Unassigned</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x20</td>
<td>Unassigned</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x40</td>
<td>Unassigned</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x80</td>
<td>Unassigned</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As defined in [RFC6096] one chunk flag has to be assigned by IANA for the ABORT chunk. The requested value of the M bit is 0x02.

This requires an update of the "ABORT Chunk Flags" registry for SCTP:

#### ABORT Chunk Flags

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chunk Flag Value</th>
<th>Chunk Flag Name</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0x01</td>
<td>T bit</td>
<td>[RFC4960]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x02</td>
<td>M bit</td>
<td>[RFCX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x04</td>
<td>Unassigned</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x08</td>
<td>Unassigned</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x10</td>
<td>Unassigned</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x20</td>
<td>Unassigned</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x40</td>
<td>Unassigned</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x80</td>
<td>Unassigned</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9.2. Three New Error Causes

Three error causes have to be assigned by IANA. It is requested to use the values given below.

This requires three additional lines in the "Error Cause Codes" registry for SCTP:
Error Cause Codes

| Value | Cause Code                     | Reference |
|-------+--------------------------------+-----------|
| 176   | VTag and Port Number Collision | [RFCXXXX] |
| 177   | Missing State                  | [RFCXXXX] |
| 178   | Port Number Collision          | [RFCXXXX] |

9.3. Two New Chunk Parameter Types

Two chunk parameter types have to be assigned by IANA. It is requested to use the values given below. IANA should assign these values from the pool of parameters with the upper two bits set to ‘11’.

This requires two additional lines in the "Chunk Parameter Types" registry for SCTP:

| ID Value | Chunk Parameter Type     | Reference |
|----------+--------------------------+-----------|
| 49159    | Disable Restart (0xC007)  | [RFCXXXX] |
| 49160    | VTags (0xC008)            | [RFCXXXX] |

10. Security Considerations

State maintenance within a NAT is always a subject of possible Denial Of Service attacks. This document recommends that at a minimum a NAT runs a timer on any SCTP state so that old association state can be cleaned up.

For SCTP endpoints, this document does not add any additional security considerations to the ones given in [RFC4960], [RFC4895], and [RFC5061]. In particular, SCTP is protected by the verification tags and the usage of [RFC4895] against off-path attackers.

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12. References

12.1. Normative References


12.2. Informative References


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UDP Usage Guidelines
draft-ietf-tsvwg-rfc5405bis-19

Abstract

The User Datagram Protocol (UDP) provides a minimal message-passing transport that has no inherent congestion control mechanisms. This document provides guidelines on the use of UDP for the designers of applications, tunnels and other protocols that use UDP. Congestion control guidelines are a primary focus, but the document also provides guidance on other topics, including message sizes, reliability, checksums, middlebox traversal, the use of ECN, DSCPs, and ports.

Because congestion control is critical to the stable operation of the Internet, applications and other protocols that choose to use UDP as an Internet transport must employ mechanisms to prevent congestion collapse and to establish some degree of fairness with concurrent traffic. They may also need to implement additional mechanisms, depending on how they use UDP.

Some guidance is also applicable to the design of other protocols (e.g., protocols layered directly on IP or via IP-based tunnels), especially when these protocols do not themselves provide congestion control.

This document obsoletes RFC5405 and adds guidelines for multicast UDP usage.

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1. Introduction

The User Datagram Protocol (UDP) [RFC0768] provides a minimal, unreliable, best-effort, message-passing transport to applications and other protocols (such as tunnels) that desire to operate over IP. Both are simply called "applications" in the remainder of this document.

Compared to other transport protocols, UDP and its UDP-Lite variant [RFC3828] are unique in that they do not establish end-to-end connections between communicating end systems. UDP communication consequently does not incur connection establishment and teardown overheads, and there is minimal associated end system state. Because of these characteristics, UDP can offer a very efficient communication transport to some applications.

A second unique characteristic of UDP is that it provides no inherent congestion control mechanisms. On many platforms, applications can send UDP datagrams at the line rate of the platform’s link interface, which is often much greater than the available end-to-end path capacity, and doing so contributes to congestion along the path. [RFC2914] describes the best current practice for congestion control in the Internet. It identifies two major reasons why congestion control mechanisms are critical for the stable operation of the Internet:

1. The prevention of congestion collapse, i.e., a state where an increase in network load results in a decrease in useful work done by the network.

2. The establishment of a degree of fairness, i.e., allowing multiple flows to share the capacity of a path reasonably equitably.

Because UDP itself provides no congestion control mechanisms, it is up to the applications that use UDP for Internet communication to employ suitable mechanisms to prevent congestion collapse and establish a degree of fairness. [RFC2309] discusses the dangers of congestion-unresponsive flows and states that "all UDP-based streaming applications should incorporate effective congestion avoidance mechanisms." [RFC7567] reaffirms this statement. This is an important requirement, even for applications that do not use UDP for streaming. In addition, congestion-controlled transmission is of benefit to an application itself, because it can reduce self-induced packet loss, minimize retransmissions, and hence reduce delays. Congestion control is essential even at relatively slow transmission.
rates. For example, an application that generates five 1500-byte UDP datagrams in one second can already exceed the capacity of a 56 Kb/s path. For applications that can operate at higher, potentially unbounded data rates, congestion control becomes vital to prevent congestion collapse and establish some degree of fairness. Section 3 describes a number of simple guidelines for the designers of such applications.

A UDP datagram is carried in a single IP packet and is hence limited to a maximum payload of 65,507 bytes for IPv4 and 65,527 bytes for IPv6. The transmission of large IP packets usually requires IP fragmentation. Fragmentation decreases communication reliability and efficiency and should be avoided. IPv6 allows the option of transmitting large packets ("jumbograms") without fragmentation when all link layers along the path support this [RFC2675]. Some of the guidelines in Section 3 describe how applications should determine appropriate message sizes. Other sections of this document provide guidance on reliability, checksums, middlebox traversal and use of multicast.

This document provides guidelines and recommendations. Although most UDP applications are expected to follow these guidelines, there do exist valid reasons why a specific application may decide not to follow a given guideline. In such cases, it is RECOMMENDED that application designers cite the respective section(s) of this document in the technical specification of their application or protocol and explain their rationale for their design choice.

[RFC5405] was scoped to provide guidelines for unicast applications only, whereas this document also provides guidelines for UDP flows that use IP anycast, multicast, broadcast, and applications that use UDP tunnels to support IP flows.

Finally, although this document specifically refers to usage of UDP, the spirit of some of its guidelines also applies to other message-passing applications and protocols (specifically on the topics of congestion control, message sizes, and reliability). Examples include signaling, tunnel, or control applications that choose to run directly over IP by registering their own IP protocol number with IANA. This document is expected to provide useful background reading to the designers of such applications and protocols.

2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
3. UDP Usage Guidelines

Internet paths can have widely varying characteristics, including transmission delays, available bandwidths, congestion levels, reordering probabilities, supported message sizes, or loss rates. Furthermore, the same Internet path can have very different conditions over time. Consequently, applications that may be used on the Internet MUST NOT make assumptions about specific path characteristics. They MUST instead use mechanisms that let them operate safely under very different path conditions. Typically, this requires conservatively probing the current conditions of the Internet path they communicate over to establish a transmission behavior that it can sustain and that is reasonably fair to other traffic sharing the path.

These mechanisms are difficult to implement correctly. For most applications, the use of one of the existing IETF transport protocols is the simplest method of acquiring the required mechanisms. Doing so also avoids issues that protocols using a new IP protocol number face when being deployed over the Internet, where middleboxes that only support TCP and UDP are sometimes present. Consequently, the RECOMMENDED alternative to the UDP usage described in the remainder of this section is the use of an IETF transport protocol such as TCP [RFC0793], Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) [RFC4960], and SCTP Partial Reliability Extension (SCTP-PR) [RFC3758], or Datagram Congestion Control Protocol (DCCP) [RFC4340] with its different congestion control types [RFC4341][RFC4342][RFC5622], or transport protocols specified by the IETF in the future. (UDP-encapsulated SCTP [RFC6951] and DCCP [RFC6773] can offer support for traversing firewalls and other middleboxes where the native protocols are not supported.)

If used correctly, these more fully-featured transport protocols are not as "heavyweight" as often claimed. For example, the TCP algorithms have been continuously improved over decades, and have reached a level of efficiency and correctness that custom application-layer mechanisms will struggle to easily duplicate. In addition, many TCP implementations allow connections to be tuned by an application to its purposes. For example, TCP's "Nagle" algorithm [RFC1122] can be disabled, improving communication latency at the expense of more frequent -- but still congestion-controlled -- packet transmissions. Another example is the TCP SYN cookie mechanism [RFC4987], which is available on many platforms. TCP with SYN cookies does not require a server to maintain per-connection state until the connection is established. TCP also requires the end that closes a connection to maintain the TIME-WAIT state that prevents delayed segments from one connection instance from interfering with a later one. Applications that are aware of and designed for this
behavior can shift maintenance of the TIME-WAIT state to conserve resources by controlling which end closes a TCP connection [FABER]. Finally, TCP’s built-in capacity-probing and awareness of the maximum transmission unit supported by the path (PMTU) results in efficient data transmission that quickly compensates for the initial connection setup delay, in the case of transfers that exchange more than a few segments.

3.1. Congestion Control Guidelines

If an application or protocol chooses not to use a congestion-controlled transport protocol, it SHOULD control the rate at which it sends UDP datagrams to a destination host, in order to fulfill the requirements of [RFC2914]. It is important to stress that an application SHOULD perform congestion control over all UDP traffic it sends to a destination, independently from how it generates this traffic. For example, an application that forks multiple worker processes or otherwise uses multiple sockets to generate UDP datagrams SHOULD perform congestion control over the aggregate traffic.

Several approaches to perform congestion control are discussed in the remainder of this section. The section describes generic topics with an intended emphasis on unicast and anycast [RFC1546] usage. Not all approaches discussed below are appropriate for all UDP-transmitting applications. Section 3.1.2 discusses congestion control options for applications that perform bulk transfers over UDP. Such applications can employ schemes that sample the path over several subsequent round-trips during which data is exchanged to determine a sending rate that the path at its current load can support. Other applications only exchange a few UDP datagrams with a destination. Section 3.1.3 discusses congestion control options for such "low data-volume" applications. Because they typically do not transmit enough data to iteratively sample the path to determine a safe sending rate, they need to employ different kinds of congestion control mechanisms. Section 3.1.11 discusses congestion control considerations when UDP is used as a tunneling protocol. Section 4 provides additional recommendations for broadcast and multicast usage.

It is important to note that congestion control should not be viewed as an add-on to a finished application. Many of the mechanisms discussed in the guidelines below require application support to operate correctly. Application designers need to consider congestion control throughout the design of their application, similar to how they consider security aspects throughout the design process.
In the past, the IETF has also investigated integrated congestion control mechanisms that act on the traffic aggregate between two hosts, i.e., a framework such as the Congestion Manager [RFC3124], where active sessions may share current congestion information in a way that is independent of the transport protocol. Such mechanisms have currently failed to see deployment, but would otherwise simplify the design of congestion control mechanisms for UDP sessions, so that they fulfill the requirements in [RFC2914].

3.1.1. Protocol Timer Guidelines

Understanding the latency between communicating endpoints is usually a crucial part of effective congestion control implementations for protocols and applications. Latency estimation can be used in a number of protocol functions, such as calculating a congestion-controlled transmission rate, triggering retransmission, and detecting packet loss. Additional protocol functions, for example, determining an interval for probing a path, determining an interval between keep-alive messages, determining an interval for measuring the quality of experience, or determining if a remote endpoint has responded to a request to perform an action typically operate over longer timescales than congestion control and therefore are not covered in this section.

The general recommendation in this document is that applications SHOULD leverage existing congestion control techniques and the latency estimators specified therein (see next subsection). The following guidelines are provided for applications that need to design their own latency estimation mechanisms.

The guidelines are framed in terms of "latency" and not "round-trip time" because some situations require characterizing only the network-based latency (e.g., TCP-Friendly Rate Control [RFC5348]), while other cases necessitate inclusion of the time required by the remote endpoint to provide feedback (e.g., developing an understanding of when to retransmit a message).

The latency between endpoints is generally a dynamic property. Therefore, estimates SHOULD represent some sort of averaging of multiple recent measurement samples to account for variance. Leveraging an Exponentially Weighted Moving Average (EWMA) has proven useful for this purpose (e.g., in TCP [RFC6298] and TCP-Friendly Rate Control (TFRC) [RFC5348]).

Independent latency estimates SHOULD be maintained for each destination with which an endpoint communicates.
Latency samples MUST NOT be derived from ambiguous transactions. The canonical example is in a protocol that retransmits data, but subsequently cannot determine which copy is being acknowledged. This ambiguity makes correct computation of the latency problematic. See the discussion of Karn’s algorithm in [RFC6298]. This requirement ensures a sender establishes a sound estimate of the latency without relying on mis-leading measurements.

When a latency estimate is used to arm a timer that provides loss detection — with or without retransmission — expiry of the timer MUST be interpreted as an indication of congestion in the network, causing the sending rate to be adapted to a safe conservative rate (e.g., TCP collapses the congestion window to one segment [RFC5681]).

Some applications require an initial latency estimate before the latency between endpoints can be empirically sampled. For instance, when arming a retransmission timer an initial value is needed to protect the messages sent before the endpoints sample the latency. This initial latency estimate SHOULD generally be as conservative (large) as possible for the given application. For instance, in the absence of any knowledge about the latency of a path, TCP requires the initial Retransmission Timeout (RTO) to be set to no less than 1 second [RFC6298]. UDP applications SHOULD similarly use an initial latency estimate of 1 second. Values shorter than 1 second can be problematic (see the data analysis in the appendix of [RFC6298]).

### 3.1.2. Bulk Transfer Applications

Applications that perform bulk transmission of data to a peer over UDP, i.e., applications that exchange more than a few UDP datagrams per round-trip time (RTT), SHOULD implement TFRC [RFC5348], window-based TCP-like congestion control, or otherwise ensure that the application complies with the congestion control principles.

TFRC has been designed to provide both congestion control and fairness in a way that is compatible with the IETF’s other transport protocols. If an application implements TFRC, it need not follow the remaining guidelines in Section 3.1.2, because TFRC already addresses them, but SHOULD still follow the remaining guidelines in the subsequent subsections of Section 3.

Bulk transfer applications that choose not to implement TFRC or TCP-like windowing SHOULD implement a congestion control scheme that results in bandwidth (capacity) use that competes fairly with TCP within an order of magnitude.

Section 2 of [RFC3551] suggests that applications SHOULD monitor the packet loss rate to ensure that it is within acceptable parameters.
Packet loss is considered acceptable if a TCP flow across the same network path under the same network conditions would achieve an average throughput, measured on a reasonable timescale, that is not less than that of the UDP flow. The comparison to TCP cannot be specified exactly, but is intended as an "order-of-magnitude" comparison in timescale and throughput. The recommendations for managing timers specified in Section 3.1.1 also apply.

Finally, some bulk transfer applications may choose not to implement any congestion control mechanism and instead rely on transmitting across reserved path capacity (see Section 3.1.9). This might be an acceptable choice for a subset of restricted networking environments, but is by no means a safe practice for operation over the wider Internet. When the UDP traffic of such applications leaks out into unprovisioned Internet paths, it can significantly degrade the performance of other traffic sharing the path and even result in congestion collapse. Applications that support an uncontrolled or unadaptive transmission behavior SHOULD NOT do so by default and SHOULD instead require users to explicitly enable this mode of operation, and they SHOULD verify that sufficient path capacity has been reserved for them.

3.1.3. Low Data-Volume Applications

When applications that at any time exchange only a few UDP datagrams with a destination implement TFRC or one of the other congestion control schemes in Section 3.1.2, the network sees little benefit, because those mechanisms perform congestion control in a way that is only effective for longer transmissions.

Applications that at any time exchange only a few UDP datagrams with a destination SHOULD still control their transmission behavior by not sending on average more than one UDP datagram per RTT to a destination. Similar to the recommendation in [RFC1536], an application SHOULD maintain an estimate of the RTT for any destination with which it communicates using the methods specified in Section 3.1.1.

Some applications cannot maintain a reliable RTT estimate for a destination. These applications do not need to or are unable to use protocol timers to measure the RTT (Section 3.1.1). Two cases can be identified:

1. The first case is that of applications that exchange too few UDP datagrams with a peer to establish a statistically accurate RTT estimate, but can monitor the reliability of transmission (Section 3.3). Such applications MAY use a predetermined transmission interval that is exponentially backed-off when
packets are found to be lost. TCP specifies an initial value of 1 second [RFC6298], which is also RECOMMENDED as an initial value for UDP applications. Some low data-volume applications, e.g., SIP [RFC3261] and GIST [RFC5971] use an interval of 500 ms, and shorter values are likely problematic in many cases. As in the previous case, note that the initial timeout is not the maximum possible timeout, see Section 3.1.1.

2. A second case of applications cannot maintain an RTT estimate for a destination, because the destination does not send return traffic. Such applications SHOULD NOT send more than one UDP datagram every 3 seconds, and SHOULD use an even less aggressive rate when possible. Shorter values are likely problematic in many cases. Note that the sending rate in this case must be more conservative than in the previous cases, because the lack of return traffic prevents the detection of packet loss, i.e., congestion, and the application therefore cannot perform exponential back-off to reduce load.

3.1.4. Applications supporting bidirectional communications

Applications that communicate bidirectionally SHOULD employ congestion control for both directions of the communication. For example, for a client-server, request-response-style application, clients SHOULD congestion-control their request transmission to a server, and the server SHOULD congestion-control its responses to the clients. Congestion in the forward and reverse direction is uncorrelated, and an application SHOULD either independently detect and respond to congestion along both directions, or limit new and retransmitted requests based on acknowledged responses across the entire round-trip path.

3.1.5. Implications of RTT and Loss Measurements on Congestion Control

Transports such as TCP, SCTP and DCCP provide timely detection of congestion that results in an immediate reduction of their maximum sending rate when congestion is experienced. This reaction is typically completed 1-2 RTTs after loss/congestion is encountered. Applications using UDP SHOULD implement a congestion control scheme that provides a prompt reaction to signals indicating congestion (e.g., by reducing the rate within the next RTT following a congestion signal).

The operation of a UDP congestion control algorithm can be very different to the way TCP operates. This includes congestion controls that respond on timescales that fit applications that cannot usefully work within the "change rate every RTT" model of TCP. Applications that experience a low or varying RTT are particularly vulnerable to...
sampling errors (e.g., due to measurement noise, or timer accuracy). This suggests the need to average loss/congestion and RTT measurements over a longer interval, however this also can contribute additional delay in detecting congestion. Some applications may not react by reducing their sending rate immediately for various reasons, including: RTT and loss measurements are only made periodically (e.g., using RTCP), additional time is required to filter information, or the application is only able to change its sending rate at predetermined interval (e.g., some video codecs).

When designing a congestion control algorithm, the designer therefore needs to consider the total time taken to reduce the load following a lack of feedback or a congestion event. An application where the most recent RTT measurement is smaller than the actual RTT or the measured loss rate is smaller than the current rate, can result in over estimating the available capacity. Such over estimation can result in a sending rate that creates congestion to the application or other flows sharing the path capacity, and can contribute to congestion collapse - both of these need to be avoided.

A congestion control designed for UDP SHOULD respond as quickly as possible when it experiences congestion, and SHOULD take into account both the loss rate and the response time when choosing a new rate. The implemented congestion control scheme SHOULD result in bandwidth (capacity) use that is comparable to that of TCP within an order of magnitude, so that it does not starve other flows sharing a common bottleneck.

3.1.6. Burst Mitigation and Pacing

UDP applications SHOULD provide mechanisms to regulate the bursts of transmission that the application may send to the network. Many TCP and SCTP implementations provide mechanisms that prevent a sender from generating long bursts at line-rate, since these are known to induce early loss to applications sharing a common network bottleneck. The use of pacing with TCP [ALLMAN] has also been shown to improve the coexistence of TCP flows with other flows. The need to avoid excessive transmission bursts is also noted in specifications for applications (e.g., [RFC7143]).

Even low data-volume UDP flows may benefit from packet pacing, e.g., an application that sends three copies of a packet to improve robustness to loss is RECOMMENDED to pace out those three packets over several RTTs, to reduce the probability that all three packets will be lost due to the same congestion event (or other event, such as burst corruption).
3.1.7. Explicit Congestion Notification

Internet applications can use Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) [RFC3168] to gain benefits for the services they support [I-D.ietf-aqm-ecn-benefits].

Internet transports, such as TCP, provide a set of mechanisms that are needed to utilize ECN. ECN operates by setting an ECN-capable codepoint (ECT(0) or ECT(1)) in the IP header of packets that are sent. This indicates to ECN-capable network devices (routers, and other devices) that they may mark (set the congestion experienced, CE codepoint), rather than drop the IP packet as a signal of incipient congestion.

UDP applications can also benefit from enabling ECN, providing that the API supports ECN and that they implement the required protocol mechanisms to support ECN.

The set of mechanisms required for an application to use ECN over UDP are:

- A sender MUST provide a method to determine (e.g., negotiate) that the corresponding application is able to provide ECN feedback using a compatible ECN method.

- A receiver that enables the use of ECN for a UDP port MUST check the ECN field at the receiver for each UDP datagram that it receives on this port.

- The receiving application needs to provide feedback of congestion information to the sending application. This MUST report the presence of datagrams received with a CE-mark by providing a mechanism to feed this congestion information back to the sending application. The feedback MAY also report the presence of ECT(1) and ECT(0)/Not-ECT packets [RFC7560]. ([RFC3168] and [RFC7560] specify methods for TCP.)

- An application sending ECN-capable datagrams MUST provide an appropriate congestion reaction when it receives feedback indicating that congestion has been experienced. This ought to result in reduction of the sending rate by the UDP congestion control method (see Section 3.1) that is not less than the reaction of TCP under equivalent conditions.

- A sender SHOULD detect network paths that do not support the ECN field correctly. When detected they need to either conservatively react to congestion or even fall back to not using ECN [I-D.ietf-aqm-ecn-benefits]. This method needs to be robust to
changes within the network path that may occur over the lifetime of a session.

- A sender is encouraged to provide a mechanism to detect and react appropriately to misbehaving receivers that fail to report CE-marked packets [I-D.ietf-aqm-ecn-benefits].

[RFC6679] provides guidance and an example of this support, by describing a method to allow ECN to be used for UDP-based applications using the Real-Time Protocol (RTP). Applications that cannot provide this set of mechanisms, but wish to gain the benefits of using ECN, are encouraged to use a transport protocol that already supports ECN (such as TCP).

3.1.8. Differentiated Services Model

An application using UDP can use the differentiated services (DiffServ) Quality of Service (QoS) framework. To enable differentiated services processing, a UDP sender sets the Differentiated Services Code Point (DSCP) field [RFC2475] in packets sent to the network. Normally, a UDP source/destination port pair will set a single DSCP value for all packets belonging to a flow, but multiple DSCPs can be used as described later in this section. A DSCP may be chosen from a small set of fixed values (the class selector code points), or from a set of recommended values defined in the Per Hop Behavior (PHB) specifications, or from values that have purely local meanings to a specific network that supports DiffServ.

In general, packets may be forwarded across multiple networks between source and destination.

In setting a non-default DSCP value, an application must be aware that DSCP markings may be changed or removed between the traffic source and destination. This has implications on the design of applications that use DSCPs. Specifically, applications SHOULD be designed to not rely on implementation of a specific network treatment, they need instead to implement congestion control methods to determine if their current sending rate is inducing congestion in the network.

[RFC7657] describes the implications of using DSCPs and provides recommendations on using multiple DSCPs within a single network five-tuple (source and destination addresses, source and destination ports, and the transport protocol used, in this case, UDP or UDP-Lite), and particularly the expected impact on transport protocol interactions, with congestion control or reliability functionality (e.g., retransmission, reordering). Use of multiple DSCPs can result in reordering by increasing the set of network forwarding resources.
used by a sender. It can also increase exposure to resource
depletion or failure.

3.1.9. QoS, Pre-Provisioned or Reserved Capacity

The IETF usually specifies protocols for use within the Best Effort
General Internet. Sometimes it is relevant to specify protocols with
a different applicability. An application using UDP can use the
integrated services QoS framework. This framework is usually made
available within controlled environments (e.g., within a single
administrative domain or bilaterally agreed connection between
domains). Applications intended for the Internet SHOULD NOT assume
that QoS mechanisms are supported by the networks they use, and
therefore need to provide congestion control, error recovery, etc. in
case the actual network path does not provide provisioned service.

Some UDP applications are only expected to be deployed over network
paths that use pre-provisioned capacity or capacity reserved using
dynamic provisioning, e.g., through the Resource Reservation Protocol
(RSVP). Multicast applications are also used with pre-provisioned
capacity (e.g., IPTV deployments within access networks). These
applications MAY choose not to implement any congestion control
mechanism and instead rely on transmitting only on paths where the
capacity is provisioned and reserved for this use. This might be an
acceptable choice for a subset of restricted networking environments,
but is by no means a safe practice for operation over the wider
Internet. Applications that choose this option SHOULD carefully and
in detail describe the provisioning and management procedures that
result in the desired containment.

Applications that support an uncontrolled or unadaptive transmission
behavior SHOULD NOT do so by default and SHOULD instead require users
to explicitly enable this mode of operation.

Applications designed for use within a controlled environment (see
Section 3.6) may be able to exploit network management functions to
detect whether they are causing congestion, and react accordingly.
If the traffic of such applications leaks out into unprovisioned
Internet paths, it can significantly degrade the performance of other
traffic sharing the path and even result in congestion collapse.
Protocols designed for such networks SHOULD provide mechanisms at the
network edge to prevent leakage of traffic into unprovisioned
Internet paths (e.g., [RFC7510]). To protect other applications
sharing the same path, applications SHOULD also deploy an appropriate
circuit breaker, as described in Section 3.1.10.
An IETF specification targeting a controlled environment is expected to provide an applicability statement that restricts the application to the controlled environment (see Section 3.6).

3.1.10. Circuit Breaker Mechanisms

A transport circuit breaker is an automatic mechanism that is used to estimate the congestion caused by a flow, and to terminate (or significantly reduce the rate of) the flow when excessive congestion is detected [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-circuit-breaker]. This is a safety measure to prevent congestion collapse (starvation of resources available to other flows), essential for an Internet that is heterogeneous and for traffic that is hard to predict in advance.

A circuit breaker is intended as a protection mechanism of last resort. Under normal circumstances, a circuit breaker should not be triggered; it is designed to protect things when there is severe overload. The goal is usually to limit the maximum transmission rate that reflects the available capacity of a network path. Circuit breakers can operate on individual UDP flows or traffic aggregates, e.g., traffic sent using a network tunnel.


Applications used in the general Internet SHOULD implement a transport circuit breaker if they do not implement congestion control or operate a low volume data service (see Section 3.6). All applications MAY implement a transport circuit breaker [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-circuit-breaker] and are encouraged to consider implementing at least a slow-acting transport circuit breaker to provide a protection of last resort for their network traffic.

3.1.11. UDP Tunnels

One increasingly popular use of UDP is as a tunneling protocol [I-D.ietf-intarea-tunnels], where a tunnel endpoint encapsulates the packets of another protocol inside UDP datagrams and transmits them to another tunnel endpoint, which decapsulates the UDP datagrams and forwards the original packets contained in the payload. One example of such a protocol is Teredo [RFC4380]. Tunnels establish virtual links that appear to directly connect locations that are distant in the physical Internet topology and can be used to create virtual (private) networks. Using UDP as a tunneling protocol is attractive when the payload protocol is not supported by middleboxes that may exist along the path, because many middleboxes support transmission using UDP.

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Well-implemented tunnels are generally invisible to the endpoints that happen to transmit over a path that includes tunneled links. On the other hand, to the routers along the path of a UDP tunnel, i.e., the routers between the two tunnel endpoints, the traffic that a UDP tunnel generates is a regular UDP flow, and the encapsulator and decapsulator appear as regular UDP-sending and -receiving applications. Because other flows can share the path with one or more UDP tunnels, congestion control needs to be considered.

Two factors determine whether a UDP tunnel needs to employ specific congestion control mechanisms -- first, whether the payload traffic is IP-based; second, whether the tunneling scheme generates UDP traffic at a volume that corresponds to the volume of payload traffic carried within the tunnel.

IP-based unicast traffic is generally assumed to be congestion-controlled, i.e., it is assumed that the transport protocols generating IP-based unicast traffic at the sender already employ mechanisms that are sufficient to address congestion on the path. Consequently, a tunnel carrying IP-based unicast traffic should already interact appropriately with other traffic sharing the path, and specific congestion control mechanisms for the tunnel are not necessary.

However, if the IP traffic in the tunnel is known to not be congestion-controlled, additional measures are RECOMMENDED to limit the impact of the tunneled traffic on other traffic sharing the path. For the specific case of a tunnel that carries IP multicast traffic, see Section 4.1.

The following guidelines define these possible cases in more detail:

1. A tunnel generates UDP traffic at a volume that corresponds to the volume of payload traffic, and the payload traffic is IP-based and congestion-controlled.

This is arguably the most common case for Internet tunnels. In this case, the UDP tunnel SHOULD NOT employ its own congestion control mechanism, because congestion losses of tunneled traffic will already trigger an appropriate congestion response at the original senders of the tunneled traffic. A circuit breaker mechanism may provide benefit by controlling the envelope of the aggregated traffic.

Note that this guideline is built on the assumption that most IP-based communication is congestion-controlled. If a UDP tunnel is used for IP-based traffic that is known to not be congestion-controlled, the next set of guidelines applies.
2. A tunnel generates UDP traffic at a volume that corresponds to the volume of payload traffic, and the payload traffic is not known to be IP-based, or is known to be IP-based but not congestion-controlled.

This can be the case, for example, when some link-layer protocols are encapsulated within UDP (but not all link-layer protocols; some are congestion-controlled). Because it is not known that congestion losses of tunneled non-IP traffic will trigger an appropriate congestion response at the senders, the UDP tunnel SHOULD employ an appropriate congestion control mechanism or circuit breaker mechanism designed for the traffic it carries. Because tunnels are usually bulk-transfer applications as far as the intermediate routers are concerned, the guidelines in Section 3.1.2 apply.

3. A tunnel generates UDP traffic at a volume that does not correspond to the volume of payload traffic, independent of whether the payload traffic is IP-based or congestion-controlled.

Examples of this class include UDP tunnels that send at a constant rate, increase their transmission rates under loss, for example, due to increasing redundancy when Forward Error Correction is used, or are otherwise unconstrained in their transmission behavior. These specialized uses of UDP for tunneling go beyond the scope of the general guidelines given in this document. The implementer of such specialized tunnels SHOULD carefully consider congestion control in the design of their tunneling mechanism and SHOULD consider use of a circuit breaker mechanism.

The type of encapsulated payload might be identified by a UDP port; identified by an Ethernet Type or IP protocol number. A tunnel SHOULD provide mechanisms to restrict the types of flows that may be carried by the tunnel. For instance, a UDP tunnel designed to carry IP needs to filter out non-IP traffic at the ingress. This is particularly important when a generic tunnel encapsulation is used (e.g., one that encapsulates using an EtherType value). Such tunnels SHOULD provide a mechanism to restrict the types of traffic that are allowed to be encapsulated for a given deployment (see [I-D.ietf-intarea-tunnels]).

Designing a tunneling mechanism requires significantly more expertise than needed for many other UDP applications, because tunnels are usually intended to be transparent to the endpoints transmitting over them, so they need to correctly emulate the behavior of an IP link [I-D.ietf-intarea-tunnels], e.g.:
o Requirements for tunnels that carry or encapsulate using ECN code points [RFC6040].

o Usage of the IP DSCP field by tunnel endpoints [RFC2983].

o Encapsulation considerations in the design of tunnels [I-D.ietf-rtgwg-dt-encap].

o Usage of ICMP messages [I-D.ietf-intarea-tunnels].

o Handling of fragmentation and packet size for tunnels [I-D.ietf-intarea-tunnels].

o Source port usage for tunnels designed to support equal cost multipath (ECMP) routing (see Section 5.1.1).

o Guidance on the need to protect headers [I-D.ietf-intarea-tunnels] and the use of checksums for IPv6 tunnels (see Section 3.4.1).

o Support for operations and maintenance [I-D.ietf-intarea-tunnels].

At the same time, the tunneled traffic is application traffic like any other from the perspective of the networks the tunnel transmits over. This document only touches upon the congestion control considerations for implementing UDP tunnels; a discussion of other required tunneling behavior is out of scope.

3.2. Message Size Guidelines

IP fragmentation lowers the efficiency and reliability of Internet communication. The loss of a single fragment results in the loss of an entire fragmented packet, because even if all other fragments are received correctly, the original packet cannot be reassembled and delivered. This fundamental issue with fragmentation exists for both IPv4 and IPv6.

In addition, some network address translators (NATs) and firewalls drop IP fragments. The network address translation performed by a NAT only operates on complete IP packets, and some firewall policies also require inspection of complete IP packets. Even with these being the case, some NATs and firewalls simply do not implement the necessary reassembly functionality, and instead choose to drop all fragments. Finally, [RFC4963] documents other issues specific to IPv4 fragmentation.

Due to these issues, an application SHOULD NOT send UDP datagrams that result in IP packets that exceed the Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU) along the path to the destination. Consequently, an
application SHOULD either use the path MTU information provided by the IP layer or implement Path MTU Discovery (PMTUD) itself [RFC1191][RFC1981][RFC4821] to determine whether the path to a destination will support its desired message size without fragmentation. However, the ICMP messages that enable path MTU discovery are being increasingly filtered by middleboxes (including Firewalls) [RFC4890]. When the path includes a tunnel, some devices acting as a tunnel ingress discard ICMP messages that originate from network devices over which the tunnel passes, preventing these reaching the UDP endpoint.

Packetization Layer Path MTU Discovery (PLPMTUD) [RFC4821] does not rely upon network support for ICMP messages and is therefore considered more robust than standard PMTUD. It is not susceptible to "black holing" of ICMP message. To operate, PLPMTUD requires changes to the way the transport is used, both to transmit probe packets, and to account for the loss or success of these probes. This updates not only the PMTU algorithm, it also impacts loss recovery, congestion control, etc. These updated mechanisms can be implemented within a connection-oriented transport (e.g., TCP, SCTP, DCCP), but are not a part of UDP, but this type of feedback is not typically present for unidirectional applications.

PLPMTUD therefore places additional design requirements on a UDP application that wishes to use this method. This is especially true for UDP tunnels, because the overhead of sending probe packets needs to be accounted for and may require adding a congestion control mechanism to the tunnel (see Section 3.1.11) as well as complicating the data path at a tunnel decapsulator.

Applications that do not follow this recommendation to do PMTU/PLPMTUD discovery SHOULD still avoid sending UDP datagrams that would result in IP packets that exceed the path MTU. Because the actual path MTU is unknown, such applications SHOULD fall back to sending messages that are shorter than the default effective MTU for sending (EMTU_S in [RFC1122]). For IPv4, EMTU_S is the smaller of 576 bytes and the first-hop MTU [RFC1122]. For IPv6, EMTU_S is 1280 bytes [RFC2460]. The effective PMTU for a directly connected destination (with no routers on the path) is the configured interface MTU, which could be less than the maximum link payload size. Transmission of minimum-sized UDP datagrams is inefficient over paths that support a larger PMTU, which is a second reason to implement PMTU discovery.

To determine an appropriate UDP payload size, applications MUST subtract the size of the IP header (which includes any IPv4 optional headers or IPv6 extension headers) as well as the length of the UDP header (8 bytes) from the PMTU size. This size, known as the Maximum Segment Size (MSS), can be obtained from the TCP/IP stack [RFC1122].
Applications that do not send messages that exceed the effective PMTU of IPv4 or IPv6 need not implement any of the above mechanisms. Note that the presence of tunnels can cause an additional reduction of the effective PMTU [I-D.ietf-intarea-tunnels], so implementing PMTU discovery may be beneficial.

Applications that fragment an application-layer message into multiple UDP datagrams SHOULD perform this fragmentation so that each datagram can be received independently, and be independently retransmitted in the case where an application implements its own reliability mechanisms.

3.3. Reliability Guidelines

Application designers are generally aware that UDP does not provide any reliability, e.g., it does not retransmit any lost packets. Often, this is a main reason to consider UDP as a transport protocol. Applications that do require reliable message delivery MUST implement an appropriate mechanism themselves.

UDP also does not protect against datagram duplication, i.e., an application may receive multiple copies of the same UDP datagram, with some duplicates arriving potentially much later than the first. Application designers SHOULD handle such datagram duplication gracefully, and may consequently need to implement mechanisms to detect duplicates. Even if UDP datagram reception triggers only idempotent operations, applications may want to suppress duplicate datagrams to reduce load.

Applications that require ordered delivery MUST reestablish datagram ordering themselves. The Internet can significantly delay some packets with respect to others, e.g., due to routing transients, intermittent connectivity, or mobility. This can cause reordering, where UDP datagrams arrive at the receiver in an order different from the transmission order.

Applications that use multiple transport ports need to be robust to reordering between sessions. Load-balancing techniques within the network, such as Equal Cost Multipath (ECMP) forwarding can also result in a lack of ordering between different transport sessions, even between the same two network endpoints.

It is important to note that the time by which packets are reordered or after which duplicates can still arrive can be very large. Even more importantly, there is no well-defined upper boundary here. [RFC0793] defines the maximum delay a TCP segment should experience -- the Maximum Segment Lifetime (MSL) -- as 2 minutes. No other RFC defines an MSL for other transport protocols or IP itself. The MSL
value defined for TCP is conservative enough that it SHOULD be used by other protocols, including UDP. Therefore, applications SHOULD be robust to the reception of delayed or duplicate packets that are received within this 2-minute interval.

Retransmission of lost packets or messages is a common reliability mechanism. Such retransmissions can increase network load in response to congestion, worsening that congestion. Any application that uses retransmission is responsible for congestion control of its retransmissions (as well as the application’s original traffic), and hence is subject to the Congestion Control guidelines in Section 3.1. Guidance on the appropriate measurement of RTT in Section 3.1.1 also applies for timers used for retransmission packet loss detection.

Instead of implementing these relatively complex reliability mechanisms by itself, an application that requires reliable and ordered message delivery SHOULD whenever possible choose an IETF standard transport protocol that provides these features.

3.4. Checksum Guidelines

The UDP header includes an optional, 16-bit one’s complement checksum that provides an integrity check. These checks are not strong from a coding or cryptographic perspective, and are not designed to detect physical-layer errors or malicious modification of the datagram [RFC3819]. Application developers SHOULD implement additional checks where data integrity is important, e.g., through a Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) or keyed or non-keyed cryptographic hash included with the data to verify the integrity of an entire object/file sent over the UDP service.

The UDP checksum provides a statistical guarantee that the payload was not corrupted in transit. It also allows the receiver to verify that it was the intended destination of the packet, because it covers the IP addresses, port numbers, and protocol number, and it verifies that the packet is not truncated or padded, because it covers the size field. It therefore protects an application against receiving corrupted payload data in place of, or in addition to, the data that was sent. More description of the set of checks performed using the checksum field is provided in Section 3.1 of [RFC6396].

Applications SHOULD enable UDP checksums [RFC1122]. For IPv4, [RFC0768] permits an option to disable their use, by setting a zero checksum value. An application is permitted to optionally discard UDP datagrams with a zero checksum [RFC1122].

When UDP is used over IPv6, the UDP checksum is relied upon to protect both the IPv6 and UDP headers from corruption (because IPv6...
lacks a checksum) and MUST be used as specified in [RFC2460]. Under specific conditions a UDP application is allowed to use a zero UDP zero-checksum mode with a tunnel protocol (see Section 3.4.1).

Applications that choose to disable UDP checksums MUST NOT make assumptions regarding the correctness of received data and MUST behave correctly when a UDP datagram is received that was originally sent to a different destination or is otherwise corrupted.

3.4.1. IPv6 Zero UDP Checksum

[RFC6935] defines a method that enables use of a zero UDP zero-checksum mode with a tunnel protocol, providing that the method satisfies the requirements in [RFC6936]. The application MUST implement mechanisms and/or usage restrictions when enabling this mode. This includes defining the scope for usage and measures to prevent leakage of traffic to other UDP applications (see Appendix A Section 3.6). These additional design requirements for using a zero IPv6 UDP checksum are not present for IPv4, since the IPv4 header validates information that is not protected in an IPv6 packet. Key requirements are:

- Use of the UDP checksum with IPv6 MUST be the default configuration for all implementations [RFC6935]. The receiving endpoint MUST only allow the use of UDP zero-checksum mode for IPv6 on a UDP destination port that is specifically enabled.

- An application that support a checksum different to that in [RFC2460] MUST comply with all implementation requirements specified in Section 4 of [RFC6936] and with the usage requirements specified in Section 5 of [RFC6936].

- A UDP application MUST check that the source and destination IPv6 addresses are valid for any packets with a UDP zero-checksum and MUST discard any packet for which this check fails. To protect from misdelivery, new encapsulation designs SHOULD include an integrity check at the transport layer that includes at least the IPv6 header, the UDP header and the shim header for the encapsulation, if any [RFC6936].

- One way to help satisfy the requirements of [RFC6936] may be to limit the usage of such tunnels, e.g., to constrain traffic to an operator network, as discussed in Section 3.6. The encapsulation defined for MPLS in UDP [RFC7510] chooses this approach.

As in IPv4, IPv6 applications that choose to disable UDP checksums MUST NOT make assumptions regarding the correctness of received data.
and MUST behave correctly when a UDP datagram is received that was originally sent to a different destination or is otherwise corrupted.

IPv6 datagrams with a zero UDP checksum will not be passed by any middlebox that validates the checksum based on [RFC2460] or that updates the UDP checksum field, such as NATs or firewalls. Changing this behavior would require such middleboxes to be updated to correctly handle datagrams with zero UDP checksums. To ensure end-to-end robustness, applications that may be deployed in the general Internet MUST provide a mechanism to safely fall back to using a checksum when a path change occurs that redirects a zero UDP checksum flow over a path that includes a middlebox that discards IPv6 datagrams with a zero UDP checksum.

3.4.2. UDP-Lite

A special class of applications can derive benefit from having partially-damaged payloads delivered, rather than discarded, when using paths that include error-prone links. Such applications can tolerate payload corruption and MAY choose to use the Lightweight User Datagram Protocol (UDP-Lite) [RFC3828] variant of UDP instead of basic UDP. Applications that choose to use UDP-Lite instead of UDP should still follow the congestion control and other guidelines described for use with UDP in Section 3.

UDP-Lite changes the semantics of the UDP "payload length" field to that of a "checksum coverage length" field. Otherwise, UDP-Lite is semantically identical to UDP. The interface of UDP-Lite differs from that of UDP by the addition of a single (socket) option that communicates the checksum coverage length: at the sender, this specifies the intended checksum coverage, with the remaining unprotected part of the payload called the "error-insensitive part." By default, the UDP-Lite checksum coverage extends across the entire datagram. If required, an application may dynamically modify this length value, e.g., to offer greater protection to some messages. UDP-Lite always verifies that a packet was delivered to the intended destination, i.e., always verifies the header fields. Errors in the insensitive part will not cause a UDP datagram to be discarded by the destination. Applications using UDP-Lite therefore MUST NOT make assumptions regarding the correctness of the data received in the insensitive part of the UDP-Lite payload.

A UDP-Lite sender SHOULD select the minimum checksum coverage to include all sensitive payload information. For example, applications that use the Real-Time Protocol (RTP) [RFC3550] will likely want to protect the RTP header against corruption. Applications, where appropriate, MUST also introduce their own appropriate validity
checks for protocol information carried in the insensitive part of
the UDP-Lite payload (e.g., internal CRCs).

A UDP-Lite receiver MUST set a minimum coverage threshold for
incoming packets that is not smaller than the smallest coverage used
by the sender [RFC3828]. The receiver SHOULD select a threshold that
is sufficiently large to block packets with an inappropriately short
coverage field. This may be a fixed value, or may be negotiated by
an application. UDP-Lite does not provide mechanisms to negotiate
the checksum coverage between the sender and receiver. This
therefore needs to be performed by the application.

Applications can still experience packet loss when using UDP-Lite.
The enhancements offered by UDP-Lite rely upon a link being able to
intercept the UDP-Lite header to correctly identify the partial
coverage required. When tunnels and/or encryption are used, this can
result in UDP-Lite datagrams being treated the same as UDP datagrams,
i.e., result in packet loss. Use of IP fragmentation can also
prevent special treatment for UDP-Lite datagrams, and this is another
reason why applications SHOULD avoid IP fragmentation (Section 3.2).

UDP-Lite is supported in some endpoint protocol stacks. Current
support for middlebox traversal using UDP-Lite is poor, because UDP-
Lite uses a different IPv4 protocol number or IPv6 "next header"
value than that used for UDP; therefore, few middleboxes are
currently able to interpret UDP-Lite and take appropriate actions
when forwarding the packet. This makes UDP-Lite less suited for
applications needing general Internet support, until such time as
UDP-Lite has achieved better support in middleboxes.

3.5. Middlebox Traversal Guidelines

Network address translators (NATs) and firewalls are examples of
intermediary devices ("middleboxes") that can exist along an end-to-
end path. A middlebox typically performs a function that requires it
to maintain per-flow state. For connection-oriented protocols, such
as TCP, middleboxes snoop and parse the connection-management
information, and create and destroy per-flow state accordingly. For
a connectionless protocol such as UDP, this approach is not possible.
Consequently, middleboxes can create per-flow state when they see a
packet that -- according to some local criteria -- indicates a new
flow, and destroy the state after some time during which no packets
belonging to the same flow have arrived.

Depending on the specific function that the middlebox performs, this
behavior can introduce a time-dependency that restricts the kinds of
UDP traffic exchanges that will be successful across the middlebox.
For example, NATs and firewalls typically define the partial path on
one side of them to be interior to the domain they serve, whereas the partial path on their other side is defined to be exterior to that domain. Per-flow state is typically created when the first packet crosses from the interior to the exterior, and while the state is present, NATs and firewalls will forward return traffic. Return traffic that arrives after the per-flow state has timed out is dropped, as is other traffic that arrives from the exterior.

Many applications that use UDP for communication operate across middleboxes without needing to employ additional mechanisms. One example is the Domain Name System (DNS), which has a strict request-response communication pattern that typically completes within seconds.

Other applications may experience communication failures when middleboxes destroy the per-flow state associated with an application session during periods when the application does not exchange any UDP traffic. Applications SHOULD be able to gracefully handle such communication failures and implement mechanisms to re-establish application-layer sessions and state.

For some applications, such as media transmissions, this re-synchronization is highly undesirable, because it can cause user-perceivable playback artifacts. Such specialized applications MAY send periodic keep-alive messages to attempt to refresh middlebox state (e.g., [RFC7675]). It is important to note that keep-alive messages are not recommended for general use -- they are unnecessary for many applications and can consume significant amounts of system and network resources.

An application that needs to employ keep-alive messages to deliver useful service over UDP in the presence of middleboxes SHOULD NOT transmit them more frequently than once every 15 seconds and SHOULD use longer intervals when possible. No common timeout has been specified for per-flow UDP state for arbitrary middleboxes. NATs require a state timeout of 2 minutes or longer [RFC4787]. However, empirical evidence suggests that a significant fraction of currently deployed middleboxes unfortunately use shorter timeouts. The timeout of 15 seconds originates with the Interactive Connectivity Establishment (ICE) protocol [RFC5245]. When an application is deployed in a controlled environment, the deployer SHOULD investigate whether the target environment allows applications to use longer intervals, or whether it offers mechanisms to explicitly control middlebox state timeout durations, for example, using the Port Control Protocol (PCP) [RFC6887], Middlebox Communications (MIDCOM) [RFC3303], Next Steps in Signaling (NSIS) [RFC5973], or Universal Plug and Play (UPnP) [UPnP]. It is RECOMMENDED that applications apply slight random variations ("jitter") to the timing of keep-alive messages.
transmissions, to reduce the potential for persistent synchronization between keep-alive transmissions from different hosts [RFC7675].

Sending keep-alive messages is not a substitute for implementing a mechanism to recover from broken sessions. Like all UDP datagrams, keep-alive messages can be delayed or dropped, causing middlebox state to time out. In addition, the congestion control guidelines in Section 3.1 cover all UDP transmissions by an application, including the transmission of middlebox keep-alive messages. Congestion control may thus lead to delays or temporary suspension of keep-alive transmission.

Keep-alive messages are NOT RECOMMENDED for general use. They are unnecessary for many applications and may consume significant resources. For example, on battery-powered devices, if an application needs to maintain connectivity for long periods with little traffic, the frequency at which keep-alive messages are sent can become the determining factor that governs power consumption, depending on the underlying network technology.

Because many middleboxes are designed to require keep-alive messages for TCP connections at a frequency that is much lower than that needed for UDP, this difference alone can often be sufficient to prefer TCP over UDP for these deployments. On the other hand, there is anecdotal evidence that suggests that direct communication through middleboxes, e.g., by using ICE [RFC5245], does succeed less often with TCP than with UDP. The trade-offs between different transport protocols -- especially when it comes to middlebox traversal -- deserve careful analysis.

UDP applications that could be deployed in the Internet need to be designed understanding that there are many variants of middlebox behavior, and although UDP is connectionless, middleboxes often maintain state for each UDP flow. Using multiple UDP flows can consume available state space and also can lead to changes in the way the middlebox handles subsequent packets (either to protect its internal resources, or to prevent perceived misuse). The probability of path failure can increase when applications use multiple UDP flows in parallel (see Section 5.1.2 for recommendations on usage of multiple ports).

3.6. Limited Applicability and Controlled Environments

Two different types of applicability have been identified for the specification of IETF applications that utilize UDP:

General Internet. By default, IETF specifications target deployment on the general Internet. Experience has shown that successful
protocols developed in one specific context or for a particular application tend to become used in a wider range of contexts. For example, a protocol with an initial deployment within a local area network may subsequently be used over a virtual network that traverses the Internet, or in the Internet in general. Applications designed for general Internet use may experience a range of network device behaviors, and in particular should consider whether applications need to operate over paths that may include middleboxes.

Controlled Environment. A protocol/encapsulation/tunnel could be designed to be used only within a controlled environment. For example, an application designed for use by a network operator might only be deployed within the network of that single network operator or on networks of an adjacent set of cooperating network operators. The application traffic may then be managed to avoid congestion, rather than relying on built-in mechanisms, which are required when operating over the general Internet. Applications that target a limited applicability use case may be able to take advantage of specific hardware (e.g., carrier-grade equipment) or underlying protocol features of the subnetwork over which they are used.

Specifications addressing a limited applicability use case or a controlled environment SHOULD identify how in their restricted deployment a level of safety is provided that is equivalent to that of a protocol designed for operation over the general Internet (e.g., a design based on extensive experience with deployments of particular methods that provide features that cannot be expected in general Internet equipment and the robustness of the design of MPLS to corruption of headers both helped justify use of an alternate UDP integrity check [RFC7510]).

An IETF specification targeting a controlled environment is expected to provide an applicability statement that restricts the application traffic to the controlled environment, and would be expected to describe how methods can be provided to discourage or prevent escape of corrupted packets from the environment (for example, section 5 of [RFC7510]).

4. Multicast UDP Usage Guidelines

This section complements Section 3 by providing additional guidelines that are applicable to multicast and broadcast usage of UDP.

Multicast and broadcast transmission [RFC1112] usually employ the UDP transport protocol, although they may be used with other transport protocols (e.g., UDP-Lite).
There are currently two models of multicast delivery: the Any-Source Multicast (ASM) model as defined in [RFC1112] and the Source-Specific Multicast (SSM) model as defined in [RFC4607]. ASM group members will receive all data sent to the group by any source, while SSM constrains the distribution tree to only one single source.

Specialized classes of applications also use UDP for IP multicast or broadcast [RFC0919]. The design of such specialized applications requires expertise that goes beyond simple, unicast-specific guidelines, since these senders may transmit to potentially very many receivers across potentially very heterogeneous paths at the same time, which significantly complicates congestion control, flow control, and reliability mechanisms.

This section provides guidance on multicast and broadcast UDP usage. Use of broadcast by an application is normally constrained by routers to the local subnetwork. However, use of tunneling techniques and proxies can and does result in some broadcast traffic traversing Internet paths. These guidelines therefore also apply to broadcast traffic.

The IETF has defined a reliable multicast framework [RFC3048] and several building blocks to aid the designers of multicast applications, such as [RFC3738] or [RFC4654].

Senders to anycast destinations must be aware that successive messages sent to the same anycast IP address may be delivered to different anycast nodes, i.e., arrive at different locations in the topology.

Most UDP tunnels that carry IP multicast traffic use a tunnel encapsulation with a unicast destination address, such as Automatic Multicast Tunneling [RFC7450]. These MUST follow the same requirements as a tunnel carrying unicast data (see Section 3.1.11). There are deployment cases and solutions where the outer header of a UDP tunnel contains a multicast destination address, such as [RFC6513]. These cases are primarily deployed in controlled environments over reserved capacity, often operating within a single administrative domain, or between two domains over a bi-laterally agreed upon path with reserved capacity, and so congestion control is OPTIONAL, but circuit breaker techniques are still RECOMMENDED in order to restore some degree of service should the offered load exceed the reserved capacity (e.g., due to misconfiguration).
4.1. Multicast Congestion Control Guidelines

Unicast congestion-controlled transport mechanisms are often not applicable to multicast distribution services, or simply do not scale to large multicast trees, since they require bi-directional communication and adapt the sending rate to accommodate the network conditions to a single receiver. In contrast, multicast distribution trees may fan out to massive numbers of receivers, which limits the scalability of an in-band return channel to control the sending rate, and the one-to-many nature of multicast distribution trees prevents adapting the rate to the requirements of an individual receiver. For this reason, generating TCP-compatible aggregate flow rates for Internet multicast data, either native or tunneled, is the responsibility of the application implementing the congestion control.

Applications using multicast SHOULD provide appropriate congestion control. Multicast congestion control needs to be designed using mechanisms that are robust to the potential heterogeneity of both the multicast distribution tree and the receivers belonging to a group. Heterogeneity may manifest itself in some receivers experiencing more loss that others, higher delay, and/or less ability to respond to network conditions. Congestion control is particularly important for any multicast session where all or part of the multicast distribution tree spans an access network (e.g., a home gateway). Two styles of congestion control have been defined in the RFC-series:

- Feedback-based congestion control, in which the sender receives multicast or unicast UDP messages from the receivers allowing it to assess the level of congestion and then adjust the sender rate(s) (e.g., [RFC5740], [RFC4654]). Multicast methods may operate on longer timescales than for unicast (e.g., due to the higher group RTT of a heterogeneous group). A control method could decide not to reduce the rate of the entire multicast group in response to a control message received from a single receiver (e.g., a sender could set a minimum rate and decide to request a congested receiver to leave the multicast group and could also decide to distribute content to these congested receivers at a lower rate using unicast congestion control).

- Receiver-driven congestion control, which does not require a receiver to send explicit UDP control messages for congestion control (e.g., [RFC3738], [RFC5775]). Instead, the sender distributes the data across multiple IP multicast groups (e.g., using a set of {S,G} channels). Each receiver determines its own level of congestion and controls its reception rate using only multicast join/leave messages sent in the network control plane. This method scales to arbitrarily large groups of receivers.
Any multicast-enabled receiver may attempt to join and receive traffic from any group. This may imply the need for rate limits on individual receivers or the aggregate multicast service. Note there is no way at the transport layer to prevent a join message propagating to the next-hop router.

Some classes of multicast applications support applications that can monitor the user-level quality of the transfer at the receiver. Applications that can detect a significant reduction in user quality SHOULD regard this as a congestion signal (e.g., to leave a group using layered multicast encoding) or, if not, SHOULD use this signal to provide a circuit breaker to terminate the flow by leaving the multicast group.

4.1.1. Bulk Transfer Multicast Applications

Applications that perform bulk transmission of data over a multicast distribution tree, i.e., applications that exchange more than a few UDP datagrams per RTT, SHOULD implement a method for congestion control. The currently RECOMMENDED IETF methods are: Asynchronous Layered Coding (ALC) [RFC5775], TCP-Friendly Multicast Congestion Control (TFMCC) [RFC4654], Wave and Equation Based Rate Control (WEBRC) [RFC3738], NACK-Oriented Reliable Multicast (NORM) transport protocol [RFC5740], File Delivery over Unidirectional Transport (FLUTE) [RFC6726], Real Time Protocol/Control Protocol (RTP/RTCP) [RFC3550].

An application can alternatively implement another congestion control schemes following the guidelines of [RFC2887] and utilizing the framework of [RFC3048]. Bulk transfer applications that choose not to implement [RFC4654], [RFC5775], [RFC3738], [RFC5740], [RFC6726], or [RFC3550] SHOULD implement a congestion control scheme that results in bandwidth use that competes fairly with TCP within an order of magnitude.

Section 2 of [RFC3551] states that multimedia applications SHOULD monitor the packet loss rate to ensure that it is within acceptable parameters. Packet loss is considered acceptable if a TCP flow across the same network path under the same network conditions would achieve an average throughput, measured on a reasonable timescale, that is not less than that of the UDP flow. The comparison to TCP cannot be specified exactly, but is intended as an "order-of-magnitude" comparison in timescale and throughput.
4.1.2. Low Data-Volume Multicast Applications

All the recommendations in Section 3.1.3 are also applicable to low data-volume multicast applications.

4.2. Message Size Guidelines for Multicast

A multicast application SHOULD NOT send UDP datagrams that result in IP packets that exceed the effective MTU as described in section 3 of [RFC6807]. Consequently, an application SHOULD either use the effective MTU information provided by the Population Count Extensions to Protocol Independent Multicast [RFC6807] or implement path MTU discovery itself (see Section 3.2) to determine whether the path to each destination will support its desired message size without fragmentation.

5. Programming Guidelines

The de facto standard application programming interface (API) for TCP/IP applications is the "sockets" interface [POSIX]. Some platforms also offer applications the ability to directly assemble and transmit IP packets through "raw sockets" or similar facilities. This is a second, more cumbersome method of using UDP. The guidelines in this document cover all such methods through which an application may use UDP. Because the sockets API is by far the most common method, the remainder of this section discusses it in more detail.

Although the sockets API was developed for UNIX in the early 1980s, a wide variety of non-UNIX operating systems also implement it. The sockets API supports both IPv4 and IPv6 [RFC3493]. The UDP sockets API differs from that for TCP in several key ways. Because application programmers are typically more familiar with the TCP sockets API, this section discusses these differences. [STEVENS] provides usage examples of the UDP sockets API.

UDP datagrams may be directly sent and received, without any connection setup. Using the sockets API, applications can receive packets from more than one IP source address on a single UDP socket. Some servers use this to exchange data with more than one remote host through a single UDP socket at the same time. Many applications need to ensure that they receive packets from a particular source address; these applications MUST implement corresponding checks at the application layer or explicitly request that the operating system filter the received packets.

Many operating systems also allow a UDP socket to be connected, i.e., to bind a UDP socket to a specific pair of addresses and ports. This
is similar to the corresponding TCP sockets API functionality. However, for UDP, this is only a local operation that serves to simplify the local send/receive functions and to filter the traffic for the specified addresses and ports. Binding a UDP socket does not establish a connection -- UDP does not notify the remote end when a local UDP socket is bound. Binding a socket also allows configuring options that affect the UDP or IP layers, for example, use of the UDP checksum or the IP Timestamp option. On some stacks, a bound socket also allows an application to be notified when ICMP error messages are received for its transmissions [RFC1122].

If a client/server application executes on a host with more than one IP interface, the application SHOULD send any UDP responses with an IP source address that matches the IP destination address of the UDP datagram that carried the request (see [RFC1122], Section 4.1.3.5). Many middleboxes expect this transmission behavior and drop replies that are sent from a different IP address, as explained in Section 3.5.

A UDP receiver can receive a valid UDP datagram with a zero-length payload. Note that this is different from a return value of zero from a read() socket call, which for TCP indicates the end of the connection.

UDP provides no flow-control, i.e., the sender at any given time does not know whether the receiver is able to handle incoming transmissions. This is another reason why UDP-based applications need to be robust in the presence of packet loss. This loss can also occur within the sending host, when an application sends data faster than the line rate of the outbound network interface. It can also occur at the destination, where receive calls fail to return all the data that was sent when the application issues them too infrequently (i.e., such that the receive buffer overflows). Robust flow control mechanisms are difficult to implement, which is why applications that need this functionality SHOULD consider using a full-featured transport protocol such as TCP.

When an application closes a TCP, SCTP or DCCP socket, the transport protocol on the receiving host is required to maintain TIME-WAIT state. This prevents delayed packets from the closed connection instance from being mistakenly associated with a later connection instance that happens to reuse the same IP address and port pairs. The UDP protocol does not implement such a mechanism. Therefore, UDP-based applications need to be robust to reordering and delay. One application may close a socket or terminate, followed in time by another application receiving on the same port. This later application may then receive packets intended for the first application that were delayed in the network.
5.1. Using UDP Ports

The rules and procedures for the management of the Service Name and Transport Protocol Port Number Registry are specified in [RFC6335]. Recommendations for use of UDP ports are provided in [RFC7605].

A UDP sender SHOULD NOT use a source port value of zero. A source port number that cannot be easily determined from the address or payload type provides protection at the receiver from data injection attacks by off-path devices. A UDP receiver SHOULD NOT bind to port zero.

Applications SHOULD implement receiver port and address checks at the application layer or explicitly request that the operating system filter the received packets to prevent receiving packets with an arbitrary port. This measure is designed to provide additional protection from data injection attacks from an off-path source (where the port values may not be known).

Applications SHOULD provide a check that protects from off-path data injection, avoiding an application receiving packets that were created by an unauthorized third party. TCP stacks commonly use a randomized source port to provide this protection [RFC6056]; UDP applications should follow the same technique. Middleboxes and end systems often make assumptions about the system ports or user ports, hence it is recommended to use randomized ports in the Dynamic and/or Private Port range. Setting a "randomized" source port also provides greater assurance that reported ICMP errors originate from network systems on the path used by a particular flow. Some UDP applications choose to use a predetermined value for the source port (including some multicast applications), these applications need to therefore employ a different technique. Protection from off-path data attacks can also be provided by randomizing the initial value of another protocol field within the datagram payload, and checking the validity of this field at the receiver (e.g., RTP has random initial sequence number and random media timestamp offsets [RFC3550]).

When using multicast, IP routers perform a reverse-path forwarding (RPF) check for each multicast packet. This provides protection from off-path data injection. When a receiver joins a multicast group and filters based on the source address the filter verifies the sender’s IP address. This is always the case when using a SSM (S,G) channel.

5.1.1. Usage of UDP for source port entropy and the IPv6 Flow Label

Some applications use the UDP datagram header as a source of entropy for network devices that implement ECMP [RFC6438]. A UDP tunnel application targeting this usage, encapsulates an inner packet using
UDP, where the UDP source port value forms a part of the entropy that can be used to balance forwarding of network traffic by the devices that use ECMP. A sending tunnel endpoint selects a source port value in the UDP datagram header that is computed from the inner flow information (e.g., the encapsulated packet headers). To provide sufficient entropy the sending tunnel endpoint maps the encapsulated traffic to one of a range of UDP source values. The value SHOULD be within the ephemeral port range, i.e., 49152 to 65535, where the high order two bits of the port are set to one. The available source port entropy of 14 bits (using the ephemeral port range) plus the outer IP addresses seems sufficient for entropy for most ECMP applications [I-D.ietf-rtgwg-dt-encap].

To avoid reordering within an IP flow, the same UDP source port value SHOULD be used for all packets assigned to an encapsulated flow (e.g., using a hash of the relevant headers). The entropy mapping for a flow MAY change over the lifetime of the encapsulated flow [I-D.ietf-rtgwg-dt-encap]. For instance, this could be changed as a Denial of Service (DOS) mitigation, or as a means to effect routing through the ECMP network. However, the source port selected for a flow SHOULD NOT change more than once in every thirty seconds (e.g., as in [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-gre-in-udp-encap]).

The use of the source port field for entropy has several side-effects that need to be considered, including:

- It can increase the probability of misdelivery of corrupted packets, which increases the need for checksum computation or an equivalent mechanism to protect other UDP applications from misdelivery errors Section 3.4.

- It is expected to reduce the probability of successful middlebox traversal Section 3.5. This use of the source port field will often not be suitable for applications targeting deployment in the general Internet.

- It can prevent the field being usable to protect from off-path attacks (described in Section 5.1). Designers therefore need to consider other mechanisms to provide equivalent protection (e.g., to restrict use to a controlled environment [RFC7510] Section 3.6).

The UDP source port number field has also been leveraged to produce entropy with IPv6. However, in the case of IPv6, the "flow label" [RFC6437] may also alternatively be used as entropy for load balancing [RFC6438]. This use of the flow label for load balancing is consistent with the definition of the field, although further clarity was needed to ensure the field can be consistently used for...
this purpose. Therefore, an updated IPv6 flow label [RFC6437] and ECMP routing [RFC6438] usage was specified.

To ensure future opportunities to use the flow label, UDP applications SHOULD set the flow label field, even when an entropy value is also set in the source port field (e.g., An IPv6 tunnel endpoint could copy the source port flow entropy value to the IPv6 flow label field [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-gre-in-udp-encap]). Router vendors are encouraged to start using the IPv6 flow label as a part of the flow hash, providing support for IP-level ECMP without requiring use of UDP. The end-to-end use of flow labels for load balancing is a long-term solution. Even if the usage of the flow label has been clarified, there will be a transition time before a significant proportion of endpoints start to assign a good quality flow label to the flows that they originate. The use of load balancing using the transport header fields will likely continue until widespread deployment is finally achieved.

5.1.2. Applications using Multiple UDP Ports

A single application may exchange several types of data. In some cases, this may require multiple UDP flows (e.g., multiple sets of flows, identified by different five-tuples). [RFC6335] recommends application developers not to apply to IANA to be assigned multiple well-known ports (user or system). This does not discuss the implications of using multiple flows with the same well-known port or pairs of dynamic ports (e.g., identified by a service name or signaling protocol).

Use of multiple flows can affect the network in several ways:

- Starting a series of successive connections can increase the number of state bindings in middleboxes (e.g., NAPT or Firewall) along the network path. UDP-based middlebox traversal usually relies on timeouts to remove old state, since middleboxes are unaware when a particular flow ceases to be used by an application.

- Using several flows at the same time may result in seeing different network characteristics for each flow. It cannot be assumed both follow the same path (e.g., when ECMP is used, traffic is intentionally hashed onto different parallel paths based on the port numbers).

- Using several flows can also increase the occupancy of a binding or lookup table in a middlebox (e.g., NAPT or Firewall), which may cause the device to change the way it manages the flow state.
o Further, using excessive numbers of flows can degrade the ability of a unicast congestion control to react to congestion events, unless the congestion state is shared between all flows in a session. A receiver-driven multicast congestion control requires the sending application to distribute its data over a set of IP multicast groups, each receiver is therefore expected to receive data from a modest number of simultaneously active UDP ports.

Therefore, applications MUST NOT assume consistent behavior of middleboxes when multiple UDP flows are used; many devices respond differently as the number of used ports increases. Using multiple flows with different QoS requirements requires applications to verify that the expected performance is achieved using each individual flow (five-tuple), see Section 3.1.9.

5.2. ICMP Guidelines

Applications can utilize information about ICMP error messages that the UDP layer passes up for a variety of purposes [RFC1122]. Applications SHOULD appropriately validate the payload of ICMP messages to ensure these are received in response to transmitted traffic (i.e., a reported error condition that corresponds to a UDP datagram actually sent by the application). This requires context, such as local state about communication instances to each destination, that although readily available in connection-oriented transport protocols is not always maintained by UDP-based applications. Note that not all platforms have the necessary APIs to support this validation, and some platforms already perform this validation internally before passing ICMP information to the application.

Any application response to ICMP error messages SHOULD be robust to temporary routing failures (sometimes called "soft errors"), e.g., transient ICMP "unreachable" messages ought to not normally cause a communication abort.

ICMP messages are being increasingly filtered by middleboxes. A UDP application therefore SHOULD NOT rely on their delivery for correct and safe operation.

6. Security Considerations

UDP does not provide communications security. Applications that need to protect their communications against eavesdropping, tampering, or message forgery SHOULD employ end-to-end security services provided by other IETF protocols.
UDP applications SHOULD provide protection from off-path data injection attacks using a randomized source port or equivalent technique (see Section 5.1).

Applications that respond to short requests with potentially large responses are a potential vector for amplification attacks, and SHOULD take steps to minimize their potential for being abused as part of a DoS attack. That could mean authenticating the sender before responding; noting that the source IP address of a request is not a useful authenticator, because it can easily be spoofed. Or it may mean otherwise limiting the cases where short unauthenticated requests produce large responses. Applications MAY also want to offer ways to limit the number of requests they respond to in a time interval, in order to cap the bandwidth they consume.

One option for securing UDP communications is with IPsec [RFC4301], which can provide authentication for flows of IP packets through the Authentication Header (AH) [RFC4302] and encryption and/or authentication through the Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) [RFC4303]. Applications use the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) [RFC7296] to configure IPsec for their sessions. Depending on how IPsec is configured for a flow, it can authenticate or encrypt the UDP headers as well as UDP payloads. If an application only requires authentication, ESP with no encryption but with authentication is often a better option than AH, because ESP can operate across middleboxes. An application that uses IPsec requires the support of an operating system that implements the IPsec protocol suite, and the network path must permit IKE and IPsec traffic. This may become more common with IPv6 deployments [RFC6092].

Although it is possible to use IPsec to secure UDP communications, not all operating systems support IPsec or allow applications to easily configure it for their flows. A second option for securing UDP communications is through Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) [RFC6347][RFC7525]. DTLS provides communication privacy by encrypting UDP payloads. It does not protect the UDP headers. Applications can implement DTLS without relying on support from the operating system.

Many other options for authenticating or encrypting UDP payloads exist. For example, the GSS-API security framework [RFC2743] or Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC5652] could be used to protect UDP payloads. There exist a number of security options for RTP [RFC3550] over UDP, especially to accomplish key-management, see [RFC7201]. These options covers many usages, including point-to-point, centralized group communication as well as multicast. In some applications, a better solution is to protect larger stand-alone objects, such as files or messages, instead of individual UDP
payloads. In these situations, CMS [RFC5652], S/MIME [RFC5751] or OpenPGP [RFC4880] could be used. In addition, there are many non-IETF protocols in this area.

Like congestion control mechanisms, security mechanisms are difficult to design and implement correctly. It is hence RECOMMENDED that applications employ well-known standard security mechanisms such as DTLS or IPsec, rather than inventing their own.

The Generalized TTL Security Mechanism (GTSM) [RFC5082] may be used with UDP applications when the intended endpoint is on the same link as the sender. This lightweight mechanism allows a receiver to filter unwanted packets.

In terms of congestion control, [RFC2309] and [RFC2914] discuss the dangers of congestion-unresponsive flows to the Internet. [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-circuit-breaker] describes methods that can be used to set a performance envelope that can assist in preventing congestion collapse in the absence of congestion control or when the congestion control fails to react to congestion events. This document provides guidelines to designers of UDP-based applications to congestion-control their transmissions, and does not raise any additional security concerns.

Some network operators have experienced surges of UDP attack traffic that are multiple orders of magnitude above the baseline traffic rate for UDP. This can motivate operators to limit the data rate or packet rate of UDP traffic. This may in turn limit the throughput that an application can achieve using UDP and could also result in higher packet loss for UDP traffic that would not be experienced if other transport protocols had been used.

A UDP application with a long-lived association between the sender and receiver, ought to be designed so that the sender periodically checks that the receiver still wants ("consents") to receive traffic and need to be designed to stop if there is no explicit confirmation of this [RFC7675]. Applications that require communications in two directions to implement protocol functions (such as reliability or congestion control) will need to independently check both directions of communication, and may have to exchange keep-alive messages to traverse middleboxes (see Section 3.5).

7. Summary

This section summarizes the key guidelines made in Sections 3 - 6 in a tabular format (Table 1) for easy referencing.
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHOULD measure RTT and transmit max. 1 datagram/RTT</td>
<td>3.1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>else, SHOULD send at most 1 datagram every 3 seconds</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHOULD back-off retransmission timers following loss</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHOULD provide mechanisms to regulate the bursts of transmission</td>
<td>3.1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAY implement ECN; a specific set of application mechanisms are REQUIRED if ECN is used.</td>
<td>3.1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>for DiffServ, SHOULD NOT rely on implementation of PHBs</td>
<td>3.1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>for QoS-enabled paths, MAY choose not to use CC</td>
<td>3.1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHOULD NOT rely solely on QoS for their capacity</td>
<td>3.1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-CC controlled flows SHOULD implement a transport circuit breaker</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAY implement a circuit breaker for other applications</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>for tunnels carrying IP traffic,</td>
<td>3.1.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHOULD NOT perform congestion control</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MUST correctly process the IP ECN field</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>for non-IP tunnels or rate not determined by traffic,</td>
<td>3.1.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHOULD perform CC or use circuit breaker</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHOULD restrict types of traffic transported by the tunnel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHOULD NOT send datagrams that exceed the PMTU, i.e.,</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHOULD discover PMTU or send datagrams &lt; minimum PMTU;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific application mechanisms are REQUIRED if PLPMTUD is used.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHOULD handle datagram loss, duplication, reordering</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHOULD be robust to delivery delays up to 2 minutes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1: Summary of recommendations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Section</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SHOULD enable IPv4 UDP checksum</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHOULD enable IPv6 UDP checksum; Specific application mechanisms are REQUIRED if a zero IPv6 UDP checksum is used.</td>
<td>3.4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHOULD provide protection from off-path attacks</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>else, MAY use UDP-Lite with suitable checksum coverage</td>
<td>3.4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHOULD NOT always send middlebox keep-alive messages</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAY use keep-alives when needed (min. interval 15 sec)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Applications specified for use in limited use (or controlled environments) SHOULD identify equivalent mechanisms and describe their use-case.</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulk multicast apps SHOULD implement congestion control</td>
<td>4.1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low volume multicast apps SHOULD implement congestion control</td>
<td>4.1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multicast apps SHOULD use a safe PMTU</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHOULD avoid using multiple ports MUST check received IP source address</td>
<td>5.1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHOULD validate payload in ICMP messages</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHOULD use a randomized source port or equivalent technique, and, for client/server applications, SHOULD send responses from source address matching request</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHOULD use standard IETF security protocols when needed</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8. IANA Considerations

Note to RFC-Editor: please remove this entire section prior to publication.

This document raises no IANA considerations.
9. Acknowledgments

The middlebox traversal guidelines in Section 3.5 incorporate ideas from Section 5 of [I-D.ford-behave-app] by Bryan Ford, Pyda Srisuresh, and Dan Kegel. The protocol timer guidelines in Section 3.1.1 were largely contributed by Mark Allman.

G. Fairhurst received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program 2014-2018 under grant agreement No. 644334 (NEAT). Lars Eggert has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program 2014-2018 under grant agreement No. 644866 (SSICLOPS). This document reflects only the authors’ views and the European Commission is not responsible for any use that may be made of the information it contains.

10. References

10.1. Normative References

[I-D.ietf-tsvwg-circuit-breaker]


10.2. Informative References


Appendix A. Case Study of the Use of IPv6 UDP Zero-Checksum Mode

This appendix provides a brief review of MPLS-in-UDP as an example of a UDP Tunnel Encapsulation that defines a UDP encapsulation. The purpose of the appendix is to provide a concrete example of which mechanisms were required in order to safely use UDP zero-checksum mode for MPLS-in-UDP tunnels over IPv6.

By default, UDP requires a checksum for use with IPv6. An option has been specified that permits a zero IPv6 UDP checksum when used in specific environments, specified in [RFC7510], and defines a set of operational constraints for use of this mode. These are summarized below:

A UDP tunnel or encapsulation using a zero-checksum mode with IPv6 must only be deployed within a single network (with a single network operator) or networks of an adjacent set of co-operating network operators where traffic is managed to avoid congestion, rather than over the Internet where congestion control is required. MPLS-in-UDP has been specified for networks under single administrative control (such as within a single operator’s network) where it is known (perhaps through knowledge of equipment types and lower layer checks) that packet corruption is exceptionally unlikely and where the operator is willing to take the risk of undetected packet corruption.

The tunnel encapsulator SHOULD use different IPv6 addresses for each UDP tunnel that uses the UDP zero-checksum mode, regardless of the decapsulator, to strengthen the decapsulator’s check of the IPv6 source address (i.e., the same IPv6 source address SHOULD NOT be used with more than one IPv6 destination address, independent of whether that destination address is a unicast or multicast address). Use of MPLS-in-UDP may be extended to networks within a set of closely cooperating network administrations (such as network operators who have agreed to work together to jointly provide specific services) [RFC7510].

The requirement for MPLS-in-UDP endpoints to check the source IPv6 address in addition to the destination IPv6 address, plus the strong recommendation against reuse of source IPv6 addresses among MPLS-in-UDP tunnels collectively provide some mitigation for the absence of UDP checksum coverage of the IPv6 header. In addition, the MPLS data plane only forwards packets with valid labels (i.e., labels that have been distributed by the tunnel egress Label Switched Router, LSR), providing some additional opportunity to detect MPLS-in-UDP packet misdelivery when the misdelivered packet contains a label that is not valid for forwarding at the receiving LSR. The expected result for IPv6 UDP zero-checksum mode for MPLS-in-UDP is that corruption of the destination IPv6 address will usually cause packet discard, as

offsetting corruptions to the source IPv6 and/or MPLS top label are unlikely.

Additional assurance is provided by the restrictions in the above exceptions that limit usage of IPv6 UDP zero-checksum mode to well-managed networks for which MPLS packet corruption has not been a problem in practice. Hence, MPLS-in-UDP is suitable for transmission over lower layers in well-managed networks that are allowed by the exceptions stated above and the rate of corruption of the inner IP packet on such networks is not expected to increase by comparison to MPLS traffic that is not encapsulated in UDP. For these reasons, MPLS-in-UDP does not provide an additional integrity check when UDP zero-checksum mode is used with IPv6, and this design is in accordance with requirements 2, 3 and 5 specified in Section 5 of [RFC6936].

The MPLS-in-UDP encapsulation does not provide a mechanism to safely fall back to using a checksum when a path change occurs that redirects a tunnel over a path that includes a middlebox that discards IPv6 datagrams with a zero UDP checksum. In this case, the MPLS-in-UDP tunnel will be black-holed by that middlebox. Recommended changes to allow firewalls, NATs and other middleboxes to support use of an IPv6 zero UDP checksum are described in Section 5 of [RFC6936]. MPLS does not accumulate incorrect state as a consequence of label stack corruption. A corrupt MPLS label results in either packet discard or forwarding (and forgetting) of the packet without accumulation of MPLS protocol state. Active monitoring of MPLS-in-UDP traffic for errors is REQUIRED because the occurrence of errors will result in some accumulation of error information outside the MPLS protocol for operational and management purposes. This design is in accordance with requirement 4 specified in Section 5 of [RFC6936]. In addition, IPv6 traffic with a zero UDP checksum MUST be actively monitored for errors by the network operator.

Operators SHOULD also deploy packet filters to prevent IPv6 packets with a zero UDP checksum from escaping from the network due to misconfiguration or packet errors. In addition, IPv6 traffic with a zero UDP checksum MUST be actively monitored for errors by the network operator.

Appendix B. Revision Notes

Note to RFC-Editor: please remove this entire section prior to publication.

Changes in draft-ietf-tsvwg-rfc5405bis-19:

- Addressed IESG review comments.
Changes in draft-ietf-tsvwg-rfc5405bis-18:
  o Fix a nit.

Changes in draft-ietf-tsvwg-rfc5405bis-17:
  o Incorporated text from Mark Allman for the section on "Protocol Timer Guidelines".

Changes in draft-ietf-tsvwg-rfc5405bis-16:
  o Addressed suggestions by David Black.

Changes in draft-ietf-tsvwg-rfc5405bis-15:
  o Addressed more suggestions by Takeshi Takahashi.

Changes in draft-ietf-tsvwg-rfc5405bis-14:
  o Addressed SEC_DIR review by Takeshi Takahashi.
  o Addressed Gen-ART review by Paul Kyzivat.
  o Addressed OPS-DIR review by Tim Chown.
  o Addressed some of Mark Allman’s comments regarding RTTs and RTOs.
  o Addressed some of Brian Trammell’s comments regarding new IETF transports.

Changes in draft-ietf-tsvwg-rfc5405bis-13:
  o Minor corrections.
  o Changes recommended by Spencer Dawkins.
  o Placed the recommendations on timers within section 3.1
  o Updated the recommendations on reliability to also reference the recommendations on timers.

Changes in draft-ietf-tsvwg-rfc5405bis-12:
  o Introduced a separate section on the usage of timers to avoid repeating similar guidance in multiple sections.
  o Updated RTT measurement text to align with revised min RTO recommendation for TCP.
- Updated text based on draft-ietf-tcpm-rto-consider-03 and to now cite this draft.
- Fixed inconsistency in term used for keep-alive messages (keep-alive packet, keep-alives).

Changes in draft-ietf-tsvwg-rfc5405bis-11:
- Address some issues that idnits found.

Changes in draft-ietf-tsvwg-rfc5405bis-10:
- Restored changes from -08 that -09 accidentally rolled back.

Changes in draft-ietf-tsvwg-rfc5405bis-09:
- Fix to cross reference in summary table.

Changes in draft-ietf-tsvwg-rfc5405bis-08:
- This update introduces new text in the following sections:
  - The ID from RTGWG on encap Section 7 makes recommendations on entropy. Section 5.1 of the 5405bis draft had a single sentence on use of the UDP source port to inject entropy. Related work such as UDP-in-MPLS and GRE-in-UDP have also made recommendations on entropy usage. A new section has been added to address this.
  - Added reference to RFC2983 on DSCP with tunnels.
  - New text after comment from David Black on needing to improve the header protection text.
  - Replaced replace /controlled network environment/ with /controlled environment/ to be more consistent with other drafts.
  - Section 3.1.7 now explicitly refers to the applicability subsection describing controlled environments.
  - PLPMTUD section updated.
  - Reworded checksum text to place IPv6 UDP zero checksum text in a separate subsection (this became too long in the main section)
  - Updated summary table

Changes in draft-ietf-tsvwg-rfc5405bis-07:
This update introduces new text in the following sections:

- Addressed David Black’s review during WG LC.

Changes in draft-ietf-tsvwg-rfc5405bis-06:

This update introduces new text in the following sections:

- Multicast Congestion Control Guidelines (Section rewritten by Greg and Gorry to differentiate sender-driven and receiver-driven CC)
- Using UDP Ports (Added a short para on RPF checks protecting from off-path attacks)
- Applications using Multiple UDP Ports (Added text on layered multicast)

Changes in draft-ietf-tsvwg-rfc5405bis-05:

- Amended text in section discussing RTT for CC (feedback from Colin)

Changes in draft-ietf-tsvwg-rfc5405bis-04:

- Added text on consent freshness (STUN) - (From Colin)
- Reworked text on ECN (From David)
- Reworked text on RTT with CC (with help from Mirja)
- Added references to [RFC7675], [I-D.ietf-rtgwg-dt-encap], [I-D.ietf-intarea-tunnels] and [RFC7510]

Changes in draft-ietf-tsvwg-rfc5405bis-03:

- Mention crypto hash in addition to CRC for integrity protection. (From Magnus.)
- Mention PCP. (From Magnus.)
- More accurate text on secure RTP (From Magnus.)
- Reordered abstract to reflect .bis focus (Gorry)
- Added a section on ECN, with actual ECN requirements (Gorry, help from Mirja)
- Added section on Implications of RTT on Congestion Control (Gorry)
o Added note that this refers to other protocols over IP (E Nordmark, rtg enc caps guidance)

o Added reordering text between sessions (consistent with use of ECMP, rtg enc caps guidance)

o Reworked text on off-path data protection (port usage)

o Updated summary table

Changes in draft-ietf-tsvwg-rfc5405bis-02:

o Added note that guidance may be applicable beyond UDP to abstract (from Erik Nordmark).

o Small editorial changes to fix English nits.

o Added a circuit may provide benefit to CC tunnels by controlling envelope.

o Added tunnels should ingress-filter by packet type (from Erik Nordmark).

o Added tunnels should perform IETF ECN processing when supporting ECN.

o Multicast apps may employ CC or a circuit breaker.

o Added programming guidance on off-path attacks (with C. Perkins).

o Added reference to ECN benefits.

Changes in draft-ietf-tsvwg-rfc5405bis-01:

o Added text on DSCP-usage.

o More guidance on use of the checksum, including an example of how MPLS/UDP allowed support of a zero IPv6 UDP Checksum in some cases.

o Added description of diffuse usage.

o Clarified usage of the source port field.

draft-eggert-tsvwg-rfc5405bis-01 was adopted by the TSVWG and resubmitted as draft-ietf-tsvwg-rfc5405bis-00. There were no technical changes.
Changes in draft-eggert-tsvwg-rfc5405bis-01:

- Added Greg Shepherd as a co-author, based on the multicast guidelines that originated with him.

Changes in draft-eggert-tsvwg-rfc5405bis-00 (relative to RFC5405):

- The words "application designers" were removed from the draft title and the wording of the abstract was clarified.
- New text to clarify various issues and set new recommendations not previously included in RFC 5405. These include new recommendations for multicast, the use of checksums with IPv6, ECMP, recommendations on port usage, use of ECN, use of DiffServ, circuit breakers (initial text), etc.

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Abstract

Many networks, such as service provider and enterprise networks, can provide different forwarding treatments for individual packets based on Differentiated Services Code Point (DSCP) values on a per-hop basis. This document provides the recommended DSCP values for web browsers to use for various classes of WebRTC traffic.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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1. Introduction

Differentiated Services Code Point (DSCP) [RFC2474] packet marking can help provide QoS in some environments. This specification provides default packet marking for browsers that support WebRTC applications, but does not change any advice or requirements in other IETF RFCs. The contents of this specification are intended to be a simple set of implementation recommendations based on the previous RFCs.

Networks where these DSCP markings are beneficial (likely to improve QoS for WebRTC traffic) include:

1. Private, wide-area networks. Network administrators have control over remarking packets and treatment of packets.

2. Residential Networks. If the congested link is the broadband uplink in a cable or DSL scenario, often residential routers/NAT support preferential treatment based on DSCP.

3. Wireless Networks. If the congested link is a local wireless network, marking may help.

There are cases where these DSCP markings do not help, but, aside from possible priority inversion for "less than best effort traffic"
(see Section 5), they seldom make things worse if packets are marked appropriately.

DSCP values are in principle site specific, with each site selecting its own code points for controlling per-hop-behavior to influence the QoS for transport-layer flows. However in the WebRTC use cases, the browsers need to set them to something when there is no site specific information. This document describes a subset of DSCP code point values drawn from existing RFCs and common usage for use with WebRTC applications. These code points are intended to be the default values used by a WebRTC application. While other values could be used, using a non-default value may result in unexpected per-hop behavior. It is RECOMMENDED that WebRTC applications use non-default values only in private networks that are configured to use different values.

This specification defines inputs that are provided by the WebRTC application hosted in the browser that aid the browser in determining how to set the various packet markings. The specification also defines the mapping from abstract QoS policies (flow type, priority level) to those packet markings.

2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

The terms "browser" and "non-browser" are defined in [RFC7742] and carry the same meaning in this document.

3. Relation to Other Specifications

This document is a complement to [RFC7657], which describes the interaction between DSCP and real-time communications. That RFC covers the implications of using various DSCP values, particularly focusing on Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) [RFC3550] streams that are multiplexed onto a single transport-layer flow.

There are a number of guidelines specified in [RFC7657] that apply to marking traffic sent by WebRTC applications, as it is common for multiple RTP streams to be multiplexed on the same transport-layer flow. Generally, the RTP streams would be marked with a value as appropriate from Table 1. A WebRTC application might also multiplex data channel [I-D.ietf-rtcweb-data-channel] traffic over the same 5-tuple as RTP streams, which would also be marked as per that table. The guidance in [RFC7657] says that all data channel traffic would be marked with a single value that is typically different than the
value(s) used for RTP streams multiplexed with the data channel traffic over the same 5-tuple, assuming RTP streams are marked with a value other than default forwarding (DF). This is expanded upon further in the next section.

This specification does not change or override the advice in any other IETF RFCs about setting packet markings. Rather, it simply selects a subset of DSCP values that is relevant in the WebRTC context.

The DSCP value set by the endpoint is not trusted by the network. In addition, the DSCP value may be remarked at any place in the network for a variety of reasons to any other DSCP value, including default forwarding (DF) value to provide basic best effort service. Even so, there is benefit in marking traffic even if it only benefits the first few hops. The implications are discussed in Section 3.2 of [RFC7657]. Further, a mitigation for such action is through an authorization mechanism. Such an authorization mechanism is outside the scope of this document.

4. Inputs

WebRTC applications send and receive two types of flows of significance to this document:

- media flows which are RTP streams [I-D.ietf-rtcweb-rtp-usage]
- data flows which are data channels [I-D.ietf-rtcweb-data-channel]

Each of the RTP streams and distinct data channels consists of all of the packets associated with an independent media entity, so an RTP stream or distinct data channel is not always equivalent to a transport-layer flow defined by a 5-tuple (source address, destination address, source port, destination port, and protocol). There may be multiple RTP streams and data channels multiplexed over the same 5-tuple, with each having a different level of importance to the application and, therefore, potentially marked using different DSCP values than another RTP stream or data channel within the same transport-layer flow. (Note that there are restrictions with respect to marking different data channels carried within the same SCTP association as outlined in Section 5.)

The following are the inputs provided by the WebRTC application to the browser:

- Flow Type: The application provides this input because it knows if the flow is audio, interactive video [RFC4594] [G.1010] with or without audio, or data.
Application Priority: Another input is the relative importance of an RTP stream or data channel. Many applications have multiple flows of the same Flow Type and often some flows are more important than others. For example, in a video conference where there are usually audio and video flows, the audio flow may be more important than the video flow. JavaScript applications can tell the browser whether a particular flow is high, medium, low or very low importance to the application.

[I-D.ietf-rtcweb-transports] defines in more detail what an individual flow is within the WebRTC context and priorities for media and data flows.

Currently in WebRTC, media sent over RTP is assumed to be interactive [I-D.ietf-rtcweb-transports] and browser APIs do not exist to allow an application to differentiate between interactive and non-interactive video.

5. DSCP Mappings

The DSCP values for each flow type of interest to WebRTC based on application priority are shown in Table 1. These values are based on the framework and recommended values in [RFC4594]. A web browser SHOULD use these values to mark the appropriate media packets. More information on EF can be found in [RFC3246]. More information on AF can be found in [RFC2597]. DF is default forwarding which provides the basic best effort service [RFC2474].

WebRTC use of multiple DSCP values may encounter network blocking of packets with certain DSCP values. See section 4.2 of [I-D.ietf-rtcweb-transports] for further discussion, including how WebRTC implementations establish and maintain connectivity when such blocking is encountered.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Flow Type</th>
<th>Very Low</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>High</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Audio</td>
<td>CS1 (8)</td>
<td>DF</td>
<td>EF (46)</td>
<td>EF (46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interactive Video with or without Audio</td>
<td>CS1 (8)</td>
<td>DF</td>
<td>AF42, AF43 (36, 38)</td>
<td>AF41, AF42 (34, 36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Interactive Video with or without Audio</td>
<td>CS1 (8)</td>
<td>DF</td>
<td>AF32, AF33 (28, 30)</td>
<td>AF31, AF32 (26, 28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data</td>
<td>CS1 (8)</td>
<td>DF</td>
<td>AF11</td>
<td>AF21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Recommended DSCP Values for WebRTC Applications

The application priority, indicated by the columns "very low", "low", "Medium", and "high", signifies the relative importance of the flow within the application. It is an input that the browser receives to assist in selecting the DSCP value and adjusting the network transport behavior.

The above table assumes that packets marked with CS1 are treated as "less than best effort", such as the LE behavior described in [RFC3662]. However, the treatment of CS1 is implementation dependent. If an implementation treats CS1 as other than "less than best effort", then the actual priority (or, more precisely, the per-hop-behavior) of the packets may be changed from what is intended. It is common for CS1 to be treated the same as DF, so applications and browsers using CS1 cannot assume that CS1 will be treated differently than DF [RFC7657]. However, it is also possible per [RFC2474] for CS1 traffic to be given better treatment than DF, thus caution should be exercised when electing to use CS1. This is one of the cases where marking packets using these recommendations can make things worse.

Implementers should also note that excess EF traffic is dropped. This could mean that a packet marked as EF may not get through, although the same packet marked with a different DSCP value would have gotten through. This is not a flaw, but how excess EF traffic is intended to be treated.

The browser SHOULD first select the flow type of the flow. Within the flow type, the relative importance of the flow SHOULD be used to select the appropriate DSCP value.
Currently, all WebRTC video is assumed to be interactive [I-D.ietf-rtcweb-transports], for which the Interactive Video DSCP values in Table 1 SHOULD be used. Browsers MUST NOT use the AF3x DSCP values (for Non-Interactive Video in Table 1) for WebRTC applications. Non-browser implementations of WebRTC MAY use the AF3x DSCP values for video that is known not to be interactive, e.g., all video in a WebRTC video playback application that is not implemented in a browser.

The combination of flow type and application priority provides specificity and helps in selecting the right DSCP value for the flow. All packets within a flow SHOULD have the same application priority. In some cases, the selected application priority cell may have multiple DSCP values, such as AF41 and AF42. These offer different drop precedences. The different drop precedence values provides additional granularity in classifying packets within a flow. For example, in a video conference the video flow may have medium application priority, thus either AF42 or AF43 may be selected. More important video packets (e.g., a video picture or frame encoded without any dependency on any prior pictures or frames) might be marked with AF42 and less important packets (e.g., a video picture or frame encoded based on the content of one or more prior pictures or frames) might be marked with AF43 (e.g., receipt of the more important packets enables a video renderer to continue after one or more packets are lost).

It is worth noting that the application priority is utilized by the coupled congestion control mechanism for media flows per [I-D.ietf-rmcat-coupled-cc] and the SCTP scheduler for data channel traffic per [I-D.ietf-rtcweb-data-channel].

For reasons discussed in Section 6 of [RFC7657], if multiple flows are multiplexed using a reliable transport (e.g., TCP) then all of the packets for all flows multiplexed over that transport-layer flow MUST be marked using the same DSCP value. Likewise, all WebRTC data channel packets transmitted over an SCTP association MUST be marked using the same DSCP value, regardless of how many data channels (streams) exist or what kind of traffic is carried over the various SCTP streams. In the event that the browser wishes to change the DSCP value in use for an SCTP association, it MUST reset the SCTP congestion controller after changing values. Frequent changes in the DSCP value used for an SCTP association are discouraged, though, as this would defeat any attempts at effectively managing congestion. It should also be noted that any change in DSCP value that results in a reset of the congestion controller puts the SCTP association back into slow start, which may have undesirable effects on application performance.
For the data channel traffic multiplexed over an SCTP association, it is RECOMMENDED that the DSCP value selected be the one associated with the highest priority requested for all data channels multiplexed over the SCTP association. Likewise, when multiplexing multiple flows over a TCP connection, the DSCP value selected should be the one associated with the highest priority requested for all multiplexed flows.

If a packet enters a network that has no support for a flow type-application priority combination specified in Table 1, then the network node at the edge will remark the DSCP value based on policies. This could result in the flow not getting the network treatment it expects based on the original DSCP value in the packet. Subsequently, if the packet enters a network that supports a larger number of these combinations, there may not be sufficient information in the packet to restore the original markings. Mechanisms for restoring such original DSCP is outside the scope of this document.

In summary, DSCP marking provides neither guarantees nor promised levels of service. However, DSCP marking is expected to provide a statistical improvement in real-time service as a whole. The service provided to a packet is dependent upon the network design along the path, as well as the network conditions at every hop.

6. Security Considerations

Since the JavaScript application specifies the flow type and application priority that determine the media flow DSCP values used by the browser, the browser could consider application use of a large number of higher priority flows to be suspicious. If the server hosting the JavaScript application is compromised, many browsers within the network might simultaneously transmit flows with the same DSCP marking. The DiffServ architecture requires ingress traffic conditioning for reasons that include protecting the network from this sort of attack.

Otherwise, this specification does not add any additional security implications beyond those addressed in the following DSCP-related specifications. For security implications on use of DSCP, please refer to Section 7 of [RFC7657] and Section 6 of [RFC4594]. Please also see [I-D.ietf-rtcweb-security] as an additional reference.

7. IANA Considerations

This specification does not require any actions from IANA.
8. Downward References

This specification contains a downwards reference to [RFC4594] and [RFC7657]. However, the parts of the former RFC used by this specification are sufficiently stable for this downward reference. The guidance in the latter RFC is necessary to understand the Diffserv technology used in this document and the motivation for the recommended DSCP values and procedures.

9. Acknowledgements

Thanks to David Black, Magnus Westerlund, Paolo Severini, Jim Hasselbrook, Joe Marcus, Erik Nordmark, Michael Tuexen, and Brian Carpenter for their invaluable input.

10. Dedication

This document is dedicated to the memory of James Polk, a long-time friend and colleague. James made important contributions to this specification, including serving initially as one of the primary authors. The IETF global community mourns his loss and he will be missed dearly.

11. Document History

Note to RFC Editor: Please remove this section.

This document was originally an individual submission in RTCWeb WG. The RTCWeb working group selected it to be become a WG document. Later the transport ADs requested that this be moved to the TSVWG WG as that seemed to be a better match.

12. References

12.1. Normative References

[I-D.ietf-rtcweb-data-channel]

[I-D.ietf-rtcweb-rtp-usage]

Jones, et al. Expires February 20, 2017
12.2. Informative References


[I-D.ietf-rmcat-coupled-cc]


12.2. Informative References


[I-D.ietf-rmcat-coupled-cc]


12.2. Informative References


[I-D.ietf-rmcat-coupled-cc]


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DTLS Encapsulation of SCTP Packets
draft-ietf-tsvwg-sctp-dtls-encaps-09.txt

Abstract

The Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) is a transport protocol originally defined to run on top of the network protocols IPv4 or IPv6. This document specifies how SCTP can be used on top of the Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol. Using the encapsulation method described in this document, SCTP is unaware of the protocols being used below DTLS; hence explicit IP addresses cannot be used in the SCTP control chunks. As a consequence, the SCTP associations carried over DTLS can only be single homed.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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This Internet-Draft will expire on July 28, 2015.

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1. Overview

The Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) as defined in [RFC4960] is a transport protocol running on top of the network protocols IPv4 [RFC0791] or IPv6 [RFC2460]. This document specifies how SCTP is used on top of the Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol. DTLS 1.0 is defined in [RFC4347] and the latest version when this RFC was published, DTLS 1.2, is defined in [RFC6347]. This encapsulation is used for example within the WebRTC protocol suite (see [I-D.ietf-rtcweb-overview] for an overview) for transporting non-SRTP data between browsers. The architecture of this stack is described in [I-D.ietf-rtcweb-data-channel].

[NOTE to RFC-Editor:

Please ensure that the authors double check the above statement about DTLS 1.2 during AUTH48 and then remove this note before publication.
]

This encapsulation of SCTP over DTLS over UDP or ICE/UDP (see [RFC5245]) can provide a NAT traversal solution in addition to confidentiality, source authentication, and integrity protected transfers. Please note that using ICE does not necessarily imply that a different packet format is used on the wire.

Please note that the procedures defined in [RFC6951] for dealing with the UDP port numbers do not apply here. When using the encapsulation defined in this document, SCTP is unaware about the protocols used below DTLS.

2. Conventions

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

3. Encapsulation and Decapsulation Procedure

When an SCTP packet is provided to the DTLS layer, the complete SCTP packet, consisting of the SCTP common header and a number of SCTP chunks, is handled as the payload of the application layer protocol of DTLS. When the DTLS layer has processed a DTLS record containing a message of the application layer protocol, the payload is passed to the SCTP layer. The SCTP layer expects an SCTP common header followed by a number of SCTP chunks.

4. General Considerations

An implementation of SCTP over DTLS MUST implement and use a path maximum transmission unit (MTU) discovery method that functions without ICMP to provide SCTP/DTLS with an MTU estimate. An implementation of "Packetization Layer Path MTU Discovery" [RFC4821] either in SCTP or DTLS is RECOMMENDED.

The path MTU discovery is performed by SCTP when SCTP over DTLS is used for data channels (see Section 5 of [I-D.ietf-rtcweb-data-channel]).
5. DTLS Considerations

The DTLS implementation MUST support DTLS 1.0 [RFC4347] and SHOULD support the most recently published version of DTLS, which was DTLS 1.2 [RFC6347] when this RFC was published. In the absence of a revision to this document, the latter requirement applies to all future versions of DTLS when they are published as RFCs. This document will only be revised if a revision to DTLS or SCTP makes a revision to the encapsulation necessary.

[NOTE to RFC-Editor:

Please ensure that the authors double check the above statement about DTLS 1.2 during AUTH40 and then remove this note before publication.
]

SCTP performs segmentation and reassembly based on the path MTU. Therefore the DTLS layer MUST NOT use any compression algorithm.

The DTLS MUST support sending messages larger than the current path MTU. This might result in sending IP level fragmented messages.

If path MTU discovery is performed by the DTLS layer, the method described in [RFC4821] MUST be used. For probe packets, the extension defined in [RFC6520] MUST be used.

If path MTU discovery is performed by the SCTP layer and IPv4 is used as the network layer protocol, the DTLS implementation SHOULD allow the DTLS user to enforce that the corresponding IPv4 packet is sent with the Don’t Fragment (DF) bit set. If controlling the DF bit is not possible, for example due to implementation restrictions, a safe value for the path MTU has to be used by the SCTP stack. It is RECOMMENDED that the safe value does not exceed 1200 bytes. Please note that [RFC1122] only requires end hosts to be able to reassemble fragmented IP packets up to 576 bytes in length.

The DTLS implementation SHOULD allow the DTLS user to set the Differentiated services code point (DSCP) used for IP packets being sent (see [RFC2474]). This requires the DTLS implementation to pass the value through and the lower layer to allow setting this value. If the lower layer does not support setting the DSCP, then the DTLS user will end up with the default value used by protocol stack. Please note that only a single DSCP value can be used for all packets belonging to the same SCTP association.
Using explicit congestion notifications (ECN) in SCTP requires the DTLS layer to pass the ECN bits through and its lower layer to expose access to them for sent and received packets (see [RFC3168]). The implementation of DTLS and its lower layer have to provide this support. If this is not possible, for example due to implementation restrictions, ECN can’t be used by SCTP.

6. SCTP Considerations

This section describes the usage of the base protocol and the applicability of various SCTP extensions.

6.1. Base Protocol

This document uses SCTP [RFC4960] with the following restrictions, which are required to reflect that the lower layer is DTLS instead of IPv4 and IPv6 and that SCTP does not deal with the IP addresses or the transport protocol used below DTLS:

- A DTLS connection MUST be established before an SCTP association can be set up.

- Multiple SCTP associations MAY be multiplexed over a single DTLS connection. The SCTP port numbers are used for multiplexing and demultiplexing the SCTP associations carried over a single DTLS connection.

- All SCTP associations are single-homed, because DTLS does not expose any address management to its upper layer. Therefore it is RECOMMENDED to set the SCTP parameter path.max.retrans to association.max.retrans.

- The INIT and INIT-ACK chunk MUST NOT contain any IPv4 Address or IPv6 Address parameters. The INIT chunk MUST NOT contain the Supported Address Types parameter.

- The implementation MUST NOT rely on processing ICMP or ICMPv6 packets, since the SCTP layer most likely is unable to access the SCTP common header in the plain text of the packet, which triggered the sending of the ICMP or ICMPv6 packet. This applies in particular to path MTU discovery when performed by SCTP.

- If the SCTP layer is notified about a path change by its lower layers, SCTP SHOULD retest the Path MTU and reset the congestion state to the initial state. The window-based congestion control method specified in [RFC4960], resets the congestion window and slow start threshold to their initial values.
6.2. Padding Extension

When the SCTP layer performs path MTU discovery as specified in [RFC4821], the padding extension defined in [RFC4820] MUST be supported and used for probe packets (HEARTBEAT chunks bundled with PADDING chunks [RFC4820]).

6.3. Dynamic Address Reconfiguration Extension

If the dynamic address reconfiguration extension defined in [RFC5061] is used, ASCONF chunks MUST use wildcard addresses only.

6.4. SCTP Authentication Extension

The SCTP authentication extension defined in [RFC4895] can be used with DTLS encapsulation, but does not provide any additional benefit.

6.5. Partial Reliability Extension

Partial reliability as defined in [RFC3758] can be used in combination with DTLS encapsulation. It is also possible to use additional PR-SCTP policies, for example the ones defined in [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-sctp-prpolicies].

6.6. Stream Reset Extension

The SCTP stream reset extension defined in [RFC6525] can be used with DTLS encapsulation. It is used to reset SCTP streams and add SCTP streams during the lifetime of the SCTP association.

6.7. Interleaving of Large User Messages

SCTP as defined in [RFC4960] does not support the interleaving of large user messages that need to be fragmented and reassembled by the SCTP layer. The protocol extension defined in [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-sctp-ndata] overcomes this limitation and can be used with DTLS encapsulation.

7. IANA Considerations

This document requires no actions from IANA.

8. Security Considerations

Security considerations for DTLS are specified in [RFC4347] and for SCTP in [RFC4960], [RFC3758], and [RFC6525]. The combination of SCTP and DTLS introduces no new security considerations.
SCTP should not process the IP addresses used for the underlying communication since DTLS provides no guarantees about them.

It should be noted that the inability to process ICMP or ICMPv6 messages does not add any security issue. When SCTP is carried over a connection-less lower layer like IPv4, IPv6, or UDP, processing of these messages is required to protect other nodes not supporting SCTP. Since DTLS provides a connection-oriented lower layer, this kind of protection is not necessary.

9. Acknowledgments

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10. References

10.1. Normative References


10.2. Informative References


Appendix A.  NOTE to the RFC-Editor

Although the references to [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-sctp-prpolicies] and [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-sctp-ndata] are informative, put this document in REF-HOLD until these two references have been approved and update these references to the corresponding RFCs.

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SCTP-PF: Quick Failover Algorithm in SCTP
draft-ietf-tsvwg-sctp-failover-16.txt

Abstract

SCTP supports multi-homing. However, when the failover operation specified in RFC4960 is followed, there can be significant delay and performance degradation in the data transfer path failover. To overcome this problem this document specifies a quick failover algorithm (SCTP-PF) based on the introduction of a Potentially Failed (PF) state in SCTP Path Management.

The document also specifies a dormant state operation of SCTP. This dormant state operation is required to be followed by an SCTP-PF implementation, but it may equally well be applied by a standard RFC4960 SCTP implementation.

Additionally, the document introduces an alternative switchback operation mode called Primary Path Switchover that will be beneficial in certain situations. This mode of operation applies to both a standard RFC4960 SCTP implementation as well as to an SCTP-PF implementation.

The procedures defined in the document require only minimal modifications to the RFC4960 specification. The procedures are sender-side only and do not impact the SCTP receiver.

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1. Introduction

The Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) specified in [RFC4960] supports multi-homing at the transport layer. SCTP’s multi-homing features include failure detection and failover procedures to provide network interface redundancy and improved end-to-end fault tolerance. In SCTP’s current failure detection procedure, the sender must experience Path.Max.Retran (PMR) number of consecutive failed timer-based retransmissions on a destination address before detecting a path failure. Until detecting the path failure, the sender continues to transmit data on the failed path. The prolonged time in which [RFC4960] SCTP continues to use a failed path severely degrades the performance of the protocol. To address this problem, this document specifies a quick failover algorithm (SCTP-PF) based on the introduction of a new Potentially Failed (PF) path state in SCTP path management. The performance deficiencies of the [RFC4960] failover operation, and the improvements obtainable from the introduction of a Potentially Failed state in SCTP, were proposed and documented in [NATARAJAN09] for Concurrent Multipath Transfer SCTP [IYENGAR06].

While SCTP-PF can accelerate failover process and improve performance, the risks that an SCTP endpoint enters the dormant state where all destination addresses are inactive can be increased. [RFC4960] leaves the protocol operation during dormant state to implementations and encourages to avoid entering the state as much as possible by careful tuning of the Path.Max.Retran (PMR) and Association.Max.Retran (AMR) parameters. We specify a dormant state operation for SCTP-PF which makes SCTP-PF provide the same disruption tolerance as [RFC4960] despite that the dormant state may be entered more quickly. The dormant state operation may equally well be applied by an [RFC4960] implementation and will here serve to provide added fault tolerance for situations where the tuning of the Path.Max.Retran (PMR) and Association.Max.Retran (AMR) parameters fail to provide adequate prevention of the entering of the dormant state.

The operation after the recovery of a failed path also impacts the performance of the protocol. With the procedures specified in
[RFC4960] SCTP will, after a failover from the primary path, switch back to use the primary path for data transfer as soon as this path becomes available again. From a performance perspective such a forced switchback of the data transmission path can be suboptimal as the CWND towards the original primary destination address has to be rebuilt once data transfer resumes, [CAR002]. As an optional alternative to the switchback operation of [RFC4960], this document specifies an alternative Primary Path Switchover procedure which avoid such forced switchbacks of the data transfer path. The Primary Path Switchover operation was originally proposed in [CAR002].

While SCTP-PF primarily is motivated by a desire to improve the multi-homed operation, the feature applies also to SCTP single-homed operation. Here the algorithm serves to provide increased failure detection on idle associations, whereas the failover or switchback aspects of the algorithm will not be activated. This is discussed in more detail in Appendix C.

A brief description of the motivation for the introduction of the Potentially Failed state including a discussion of alternative approaches to mitigate the deficiencies of the [RFC4960] failover operation are given in the Appendices. Discussion of path bouncing effects that might be caused by frequent switchovers, are also provided there.

2. Conventions and Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

3. SCTP with Potentially Failed Destination State (SCTP-PF)

3.1. Overview

To minimize the performance impact during failover, the sender should avoid transmitting data to a failed destination address as early as possible. In the [RFC4960] SCTP path management scheme, the sender stops transmitting data to a destination address only after the destination address is marked inactive. This process takes a significant amount of time as it requires the error counter of the destination address to exceed the Path.Max.Retrans (PMR) threshold. The issue cannot simply be mitigated by lowering of the PMR threshold because this may result in spurious failure detection and unnecessary prevention of the usage of a preferred primary path. Also due to the coupled tuning of the Path.Max.Retrans (PMR) and the Association.Max.Retrans (AMR) parameter values in [RFC4960], lowering
of the PMR threshold may result in lowering of the AMR threshold, which would result in decrease of the fault tolerance of SCTP.

The solution provided in this document is to extend the SCTP path management scheme of [RFC4960] by the addition of the Potentially Failed (PF) state as an intermediate state in between the active and inactive state of a destination address in the [RFC4960] path management scheme, and let the failover of data transfer away from a destination address be driven by the entering of the PF state instead of by the entering of the inactive state. Thereby SCTP may perform quick failover without negatively impacting the overall fault tolerance of [RFC4960] SCTP. At the same time, RTO-based HEARTBEAT probing is initiated towards a destination address once it enters PF state. Thereby SCTP may quickly ascertain whether network connectivity towards the destination address is broken or whether the failover was spurious. In the case where the failover was spurious data transfer may quickly resume towards the original destination address.

The new failure detection algorithm assumes that loss detected by a timeout implies either severe congestion or network connectivity failure. It recommends that by default a destination address is classified as PF at the occurrence of the first timeout.

3.2. Specification of the SCTP-PF Procedures

The SCTP-PF operation is specified as follows:

1. The sender maintains a new tunable SCTP Protocol Parameter called PotentiallyFailed.Max.Retrans (PFMR). The PFMR defines the new intermediate PF threshold on the destination address error counter. When this threshold is exceeded the destination address is classified as PF. The RECOMMENDED value of PFMR is 0. If PFMR is set to be greater than or equal to Path.Max.Retrans (PMR), the resulting PF threshold will be so high that the destination address will reach the inactive state before it can be classified as PF.

2. The error counter of an active destination address is incremented or cleared as specified in [RFC4960]. This means that the error counter of the destination address in active state will be incremented each time the T3-rtx timer expires, or each time a HEARTBEAT chunk is sent when idle and not acknowledged within an RTO. When the value in the destination address error counter exceeds PFMR, the endpoint MUST mark the destination address as in the PF state.
3. A SCTP-PF sender SHOULD NOT send data to destination addresses in PF state when alternative destination addresses in active state are available. Specifically this means that:

i. When there is outbound data to send and the destination address presently used for data transmission is in PF state, the sender SHOULD choose a destination address in active state, if one exists, and use this destination address for data transmission.

ii. As specified in [RFC4960] section 6.4.1, when the sender retransmits data that has timed out, it should attempt to pick a new destination address for data retransmission. In this case, the sender SHOULD choose an alternate destination transport address in active state if one exists.

iii. When there is outbound data to send and the SCTP user explicitly requests to send data to a destination address in PF state, the sender SHOULD send the data to an alternate destination address in active state if one exists.

When choosing among multiple destination addresses in active state an SCTP sender will follow the guiding principles of section 6.4.1 of [RFC4960] of choosing most divergent source-destination pairs compared with, for i.: the destination address in PF state that it performs a failover from, and for ii.: the destination address towards which the data timed out. Rules for picking the most divergent source-destination pair are an implementation decision and are not specified within this document.

In all cases, the sender MUST NOT change the state of chosen destination address, whether this state be active or PF, and it MUST NOT clear the error counter of the destination address as a result of choosing the destination address for data transmission.

4. When the destination addresses are all in PF state or some in PF state and some in inactive state, the sender MUST choose one destination address in PF state and SHOULD transmit or retransmit data to this destination address using the following rules:

A. The sender SHOULD choose the destination in PF state with the lowest error count (fewest consecutive timeouts) for data transmission and transmit or retransmit data to this destination.
B. When there are multiple destination addresses in PF state with same error count, the sender should let the choice among the multiple destination addresses in PF state with equal error count be based on the [RFC4960], section 6.4.1, principles of choosing most divergent source-destination pairs when executing (potentially consecutive) retransmission. Rules for picking the most divergent source-destination pair are an implementation decision and are not specified within this document.

The sender MUST NOT change the state and the error counter of any destination addresses as the result of the selection.

5. The HB.interval of the Path Heartbeat function of [RFC4960] MUST be ignored for destination addresses in PF state. Instead HEARTBEAT chunks are sent to destination addresses in PF state once per RTO. HEARTBEAT chunks SHOULD be sent to destination addresses in PF state, but the sending of HEARTBEATS MUST honor whether the Path Heartbeat function (Section 8.3 of [RFC4960]) is enabled for the destination address or not. I.e., if the Path Heartbeat function is disabled for the destination address in question, HEARTBEATS MUST NOT be sent. Note that when Heartbeat function is disabled, it may take longer to transition a destination address in PF state back to active state.

6. HEARTBEATs are sent when a destination address reaches the PF state. When a HEARTBEAT chunk is not acknowledged within the RTO, the sender increments the error counter and exponentially backs off the RTO value. If the error counter is less than PMR, the sender transmits another packet containing the HEARTBEAT chunk immediately after timeout expiration on the previous HEARTBEAT. When data is being transmitted to a destination address in the PF state, the transmission of a HEARTBEAT chunk MAY be omitted in case where the receipt of a SACK of the data or a T3-rtx timer expiration on the data can provide equivalent information, such as the case where the data chunk has been transmitted to a single destination address only. Likewise, the timeout of a HEARTBEAT chunk MAY be ignored if data is outstanding towards the destination address.

7. When the sender receives a HEARTBEAT ACK from a HEARTBEAT sent to a destination address in PF state, the sender SHOULD clear the error counter of the destination address and transition the destination address back to active state. However, there may be a situation where HEARTBEAT chunks can go through while DATA chunks cannot. Hence, in a situation where a HEARTBEAT ACK arrives while there is data outstanding towards the destination address to which the HEARTBEAT was sent, then an implementation
MAY choose to not have the HEARTBEAT ACK reset the error counter, but have the error counter reset await the fate of the outstanding data transmission. This situation can happen when data is sent to a destination address in PF state. When the sender resumes data transmission on a destination address after a transition of the destination address from PF to active state, it MUST do this following the prescriptions of Section 7.2 of [RFC4960).

8. Additional (PMR - PFMR) consecutive timeouts on a destination address in PF state confirm the path failure, upon which the destination address transitions to the inactive state. As described in [RFC4960], the sender (i) SHOULD notify the ULP about this state transition, and (ii) transmit HEARTBEAT chunks to the inactive destination address at a lower HB.interval frequency as described in Section 8.3 of [RFC4960] (when the Path Heartbeat function is enabled for the destination address).

9. Acknowledgments for chunks that have been transmitted to multiple destinations (i.e., a chunk which has been retransmitted to a different destination address than the destination address to which the chunk was first transmitted) SHOULD NOT clear the error count for an inactive destination address and SHOULD NOT move a destination address in PF state back to active state, since a sender cannot disambiguate whether the ACK was for the original transmission or the retransmission(s). A SCTP sender MAY clear the error counter and move a destination address back to active state by information other than acknowledgments, when it can uniquely determine which destination, among multiple destination addresses, the chunk reached. This document makes no reference to what such information could consist of, nor how such information could be obtained.

10. Acknowledgments for data chunks that have been transmitted to one destination address only MUST clear the error counter for the destination address and MUST transition a destination address in PF state back to active state. This situation can happen when new data is sent to a destination address in the PF state. It can also happen in situations where the destination address is in the PF state due to the occurrence of a spurious T3-rtx timer and acknowledgments start to arrive for data sent prior to occurrence of the spurious T3-rtx and data has not yet been retransmitted towards other destinations. This document does not specify special handling for detection of or reaction to spurious T3-rtx timeouts, e.g., for special operation vis-a-vis the congestion control handling or data retransmission operation towards a destination address which undergoes a transition from
active to PF to active state due to a spurious T3-rtx timeout. But it is noted that this is an area which would benefit from additional attention, experimentation and specification for single-homed SCTP as well as for multi-homed SCTP protocol operation.

11. When all destination addresses are in inactive state, and SCTP protocol operation thus is said to be in dormant state, the prescriptions given in Section 4 shall be followed.

12. The SCTP stack SHOULD expose the PF state of its destination addresses to the ULP as well as provide the means to notify the ULP of state transitions of its destination addresses from active to PF, and vice-versa. However it is recommended that an SCTP stack implementing SCTP-PF also allows for that the ULP is kept ignorant of the PF state of its destinations and the associated state transitions, thus allowing for retain of the simpler state transition model of RFC4960 in the ULP. For this reason it is recommended that an SCTP stack implementing SCTP-PF also provides the ULP with the means to suppress exposure of the PF state and the associated state transitions.

4. Dormant State Operation

In a situation with complete disruption of the communication in between the SCTP Endpoints, the aggressive HEARTBEAT transmissions of SCTP-PF on destination addresses in PF state may make the association enter dormant state faster than a standard [RFC4960] SCTP implementation given the same setting of Path.Max.Retrans (PMR) and Association.Max.Retrs (AMR). For example, an SCTP association with two destination addresses typically would reach dormant state in half the time of an [RFC4960] SCTP implementation in such situations. This is because a SCTP PF sender will send HEARTBEATS and data retransmissions in parallel with RTO intervals when there are multiple destinations addresses in PF state. This argument presumes that RTO << HB.interval of [RFC4960]. With the design goal that SCTP-PF shall provide the same level of disruption tolerance as an [RFC4960] SCTP implementation with the same Path.Max.Retrans (PMR) and Association.Max.Retrs (AMR) setting, we prescribe for that an SCTP-PF implementation SHOULD operate as described below in Section 4.1 during dormant state.

An SCTP-PF implementation MAY choose a different dormant state operation than the one described below in Section 4.1 provided that the solution chosen does not decrease the fault tolerance of the SCTP-PF operation.
The below prescription for SCTP-PF dormant state handling MUST NOT be
coupled to the value of the PFMR, but solely to the activation of
SCTP-PF logic in an SCTP implementation.

It is noted that the below dormant state operation is considered to
provide added disruption tolerance also for an [RFC4960] SCTP
implementation, and that it can be sensible for an [RFC4960] SCTP
implementation to follow this mode of operation. For an [RFC4960]
SCTP implementation the continuation of data transmission during
dormant state makes the fault tolerance of SCTP be more robust
towards situations where some, or all, alternative paths of an SCTP
association approach, or reach, inactive state before the primary
path used for data transmission observes trouble.

4.1. SCTP Dormant State Procedure

   a. When the destination addresses are all in inactive state and data
      is available for transfer, the sender MUST choose one destination
      and transmit data to this destination address.

   b. The sender MUST NOT change the state of the chosen destination
      address (it remains in inactive state) and it MUST NOT clear the
      error counter of the destination address as a result of choosing
      the destination address for data transmission.

   c. The sender SHOULD choose the destination in inactive state with
      the lowest error count (fewest consecutive timeouts) for data
      transmission. When there are multiple destinations with same
      error count in inactive state, the sender SHOULD attempt to pick
      the most divergent source-destination pair from the last source-
      destination pair where failure was observed. Rules for picking
      the most divergent source-destination pair are an implementation
decision and are not specified within this document. To support
      differentiation of inactive destination addresses based on their
      error count SCTP will need to allow for increment of the
destination address error counters up to some reasonable limit
above PMR+1, thus changing the prescriptions of [RFC4960],
section 8.3, in this respect. The exact limit to apply is not
specified in this document but it is considered reasonable to
require for the limit to be an order of magnitude higher than the
PMR value. A sender MAY choose to deploy other strategies that
the strategy defined here. The strategy to prioritize the last
active destination address, i.e., the destination address with
the fewest error counts is optimal when some paths are
permanently inactive, but suboptimal when a path instability is
transient.
5. Primary Path Switchover

The objective of the Primary Path Switchover operation is to allow the SCTP sender to continue data transmission on a new working path even when the old primary destination address becomes active again. This is achieved by having SCTP perform a switchover of the primary path to the new working path if the error counter of the primary path exceeds a certain threshold. This mode of operation can be applied not only to SCTP-PF implementations, but also to [RFC4960] implementations.

The Primary Path Switchover operation requires only sender side changes. The details are:

1. The sender maintains a new tunable parameter, called Primary.Switchover.Max.Retrans (PSMR). For SCTP-PF implementations, the PSMR MUST be set greater or equal to the PFMR value. For [RFC4960] implementations the PSMR MUST be set greater or equal to the PMR value. Implementations MUST reject any other values of PSMR.

2. When the path error counter on a set primary path exceeds PSMR, the SCTP implementation MUST autonomously select and set a new primary path.

3. The primary path selected by the SCTP implementation MUST be the path which at the given time would be chosen for data transfer. A previously failed primary path can be used as data transfer path as per normal path selection when the present data transfer path fails.

4. For SCTP-PF, the recommended value of PSMR is PFMR when Primary Path Switchover operation mode is used. This means that no forced switchback to a previously failed primary path is performed. An SCTP-PF implementation of Primary Path Switchover MUST support the setting of PSMR = PFMR. A SCTP-PF implementation of Primary Path Switchover MAY support setting of PSMR > PFMR.

5. For [RFC4960] SCTP, the recommended value of PSMR is PMR when Primary Path Switchover is used. This means that no forced switchback to a previously failed primary path is performed. A [RFC4960] SCTP implementation of Primary Path Switchover MUST support the setting of PSMR = PMR. An [RFC4960] SCTP implementation of Primary Path Switchover MAY support larger settings of PSMR > PMR.
6. It MUST be possible to disable the Primary Path Switchover operation and obtain the standard switchback operation of [RFC4960].

The manner of switchover operation that is most optimal in a given scenario depends on the relative quality of a set primary path versus the quality of alternative paths available as well as on the extent to which it is desired for the mode of operation to enforce traffic distribution over a number of network paths. I.e., load distribution of traffic from multiple SCTP associations may be sought to be enforced by distribution of the set primary paths with [RFC4960] switchback operation. However as [RFC4960] switchback behavior is suboptimal in certain situations, especially in scenarios where a number of equally good paths are available, an SCTP implementation MAY support also, as alternative behavior, the Primary Path Switchover mode of operation and MAY enable it based on applications’ requests.

For an SCTP implementation that implements the Primary Path Switchover operation, this specification RECOMMENDS that the standard RFC4960 switchback operation is retained as the default operation.

6. Suggested SCTP Protocol Parameter Values

This document does not alter the [RFC4960] value recommendation for the SCTP Protocol Parameters defined in [RFC4960].

The following protocol parameter is RECOMMENDED:

PotentiallyFailed.Max.Retrans (PFMR) - 0

7. Socket API Considerations

This section describes how the socket API defined in [RFC6458] is extended to provide a way for the application to control and observe the SCTP-PF behavior as well as the Primary Path Switchover function.

Please note that this section is informational only.

A socket API implementation based on [RFC6458] is, by means of the existing SCTP_PEER_ADDR_CHANGE event, extended to provide the event notification when a peer address enters or leaves the potentially failed state as well as the socket API implementation is extended to expose the potentially failed state of a peer address in the existing SCTP_GET_PEER_ADDR_INFO structure.

Furthermore, two new read/write socket options for the level IPPROTO_SCTP and the name SCTP_PEER_ADDR_THLDS and
SCTP_EXPOSE_POTENTIALLY_FAILED_STATE are defined as described below. The first socket option is used to control the values of the FFMR and PSMR parameters described in Section 3 and in Section 5. The second one controls the exposition of the potentially failed path state.

Support for the SCTP_PEER_ADDR_THLDS and SCTP_EXPOSE_POTENTIALLY_FAILED_STATE socket options need also to be added to the function sctp_opt_info().

7.1. Support for the Potentially Failed Path State

As defined in [RFC6458], the SCTP_PEER_ADDR_CHANGE event is provided if the status of a peer address changes. In addition to the state changes described in [RFC6458], this event is also provided, if a peer address enters or leaves the potentially failed state. The notification as defined in [RFC6458] uses the following structure:

```c
struct sctp_paddr_change {
    uint16_t spc_type;
    uint16_t spc_flags;
    uint32_t spc_length;
    struct sockaddr_storage spc_aaddr;
    uint32_t spc_state;
    uint32_t spc_error;
    sctp_assoc_t spc_assoc_id;
}
```

[RFC6458] defines the constants SCTP_ADDR_AVAILABLE, SCTP_ADDR_UNREACHABLE, SCTP_ADDR_REMOVED, SCTP_ADDR_ADDED, and SCTP_ADDR_MAKE_PRIM to be provided in the spc_state field. This document defines in addition to that the new constant SCTP_ADDR_POTENTIALLY_FAILED, which is reported if the affected address becomes potentially failed.

The SCTP_GET_PEER_ADDR_INFO socket option defined in [RFC6458] can be used to query the state of a peer address. It uses the following structure:

```c
struct sctp_paddrinfo {
    sctp_assoc_t spinfo_assoc_id;
    struct sockaddr_storage spinfo_address;
    int32_t spinfo_state;
    uint32_t spinfo_cwnd;
    uint32_t spinfo_srtt;
    uint32_t spinfo_rto;
    uint32_t spinfo_mtu;
};
```
[RFC6458] defines the constants SCTP_UNCONFIRMED, SCTP_ACTIVE, and SCTP_INACTIVE to be provided in the spinfo_state field. This document defines in addition to that the new constant SCTP_POTENTIALLY_FAILED, which is reported if the peer address is potentially failed.

7.2. Peer Address Thresholds (SCTP_PEER_ADDR_THLDS) Socket Option

Applications can control the SCTP-PF behavior by getting or setting the number of consecutive timeouts before a peer address is considered potentially failed or unreachable. The same socket option is used by applications to set and get the number of timeouts before the primary path is changed automatically by the Primary Path Switchover function. This socket option uses the level IPPROTO_SCTP and the name SCTP_PEER_ADDR_THLDS.

The following structure is used to access and modify the thresholds:

```c
struct sctp_paddrthlds {
    sctp_assoc_t spt_assoc_id;
    struct sockaddr_storage spt_address;
    uint16_t spt_pathmaxrxt;
    uint16_t spt_pathpfthld;
    uint16_t spt_pathcpthld;
};
```

- `spt_assoc_id`: This parameter is ignored for one-to-one style sockets. For one-to-many style sockets the application may fill in an association identifier or SCTP_FUTURE_ASSOC. It is an error to use SCTP_(CURRENT|ALL)_ASSOC in `spt_assoc_id`.

- `spt_address`: This specifies which peer address is of interest. If a wild card address is provided, this socket option applies to all current and future peer addresses.

- `spt_pathmaxrxt`: Each peer address of interest is considered unreachable, if its path error counter exceeds `spt_pathmaxrxt`.

- `spt_pathpfthld`: Each peer address of interest is considered Potentially Failed, if its path error counter exceeds `spt_pathpfthld`.

- `spt_pathcpthld`: Each peer address of interest is not considered the primary remote address anymore, if its path error counter exceeds `spt_pathcpthld`. Using a value of 0xffff disables the selection of a new primary peer address. If an implementation does not support the automatically selection of a new primary address, it should indicate an error with errno set to EINVAL if a value different
from 0xffff is used in spt_pathcpthld. For SCTP-PF, the setting of spt_pathcpthld < spt_pathpfthld should be rejected with errno set to EINVAL. For [RFC4960] SCTP, the setting of spt_pathcpthld < spt_pathmaxrxt should be rejected with errno set to EINVAL. A SCTP-PF implementation may support only setting of spt_pathcpthld = spt_pathpfthld and spt_pathcpthld = 0xffff and a [RFC4960] SCTP implementation may support only setting of spt_pathcpthld = spt_pathmaxrxt and spt_pathcpthld = 0xffff. In these cases SCTP shall reject setting of other values with errno set to EINVAL.

7.3. Exposing the Potentially Failed Path State (SCTP_EXPOSE_POTENTIALLY_FAILED_STATE) Socket Option

Applications can control the exposure of the potentially failed path state in the SCTP_PEER_ADDR_CHANGE event and the SCTP_GET_PEER_ADDR_INFO as described in Section 7.1. The default value is implementation specific.

This socket option uses the level IPPROTO_SCTP and the name SCTP_EXPOSE_POTENTIALLY_FAILED_STATE.

The following structure is used to control the exposition of the potentially failed path state:

```c
struct sctp_assoc_value {
    scnt_assoc_t assoc_id;
    uint32_t assoc_value;
};
```

assoc_id: This parameter is ignored for one-to-one style sockets. For one-to-many style sockets the application may fill in an association identifier or SCTP_FUTURE_ASSOC. It is an error to use SCTP_{CURRENT|ALL}_ASSOC in assoc_id.

assoc_value: The potentially failed path state is exposed if and only if this parameter is non-zero.

8. Security Considerations

Security considerations for the use of SCTP and its APIs are discussed in [RFC4960] and [RFC6458].

The logic introduced by this document does not impact existing SCTP messages on the wire. Also, this document does not introduce any new SCTP messages on the wire that require new security considerations.

SCTP-PF makes SCTP not only more robust during primary path failure/congestion but also more vulnerable to network connectivity/
congestion attacks on the primary path. SCTP-PF makes it easier for an attacker to trick SCTP to change data transfer path, since the duration of time that an attacker needs to negatively influence the network connectivity is much shorter than [RFC4960]. However, SCTP-PF does not constitute a significant change in the duration of time and effort an attacker needs to keep SCTP away from the primary path. With the standard switchback operation [RFC4960] SCTP resumes data transfer on its primary path as soon as the next HEARTBEAT succeeds.

On the other hand, usage of the Primary Path Switchover mechanism, does change the threat analysis. This is because on-path attackers can force a permanent change of the data transfer path by blocking the primary path until the switchover of the primary path is triggered by the Primary Path Switchover algorithm. This especially will be the case when the Primary Path Switchover is used together with SCTP-PF with the particular setting of PSMR = PFMR = 0, as Primary Path Switchover here happens already at the first RTO timeout experienced. Users of the Primary Path Switchover mechanism should be aware of this fact.

The event notification of path state transfer from active to potentially failed state and vice versa gives attackers an increased possibility to generate more local events. However, it is assumed that event notifications are rate-limited in the implementation to address this threat.

9. MIB Considerations

SCTP-PF introduces new SCTP algorithms for failover and switchback with associated new state parameters. It is recommended that the SCTP-MIB defined in [RFC3873] is updated to support the management of the SCTP-PF implementation. This can be done by extending the sctpAssocRemAddrActive field of the SCTPAssocRemAddrTable to include information of the PF state of the destination address and by adding new fields to the SCTPAssocRemAddrTable supporting PotentiallyFailed.Max.Retrans (PFMR) and Primary.Switchover.Max.Retrans (PSMR) parameters.

10. IANA Considerations

This document does not create any new registries or modify the rules for any existing registries managed by IANA.

11. Acknowledgements

The authors wish to thank Michael Tuexen for his many invaluable comments and for his very substantial support with the making of this document.
12. Proposed Change of Status (to be Deleted before Publication)

Initially this work looked to entail some changes of the Congestion Control (CC) operation of SCTP and for this reason the work was proposed as Experimental. These intended changes of the CC operation have since been judged to be irrelevant and are no longer part of the specification. As the specification entails no other potential harmful features, consensus exists in the WG to bring the work forward as PS.

Initially concerns have been expressed about the possibility for the mechanism to introduce path bouncing with potential harmful network impacts. These concerns are believed to be unfounded. This issue is addressed in Appendix B.

It is noted that the feature specified by this document is implemented by multiple SCTP SW implementations and furthermore that various variants of the solution have been deployed in telephony signaling environments for several years with good results.

13. References

13.1. Normative References


13.2. Informative References


References


Appendix A. Discussions of Alternative Approaches

This section lists alternative approaches for the issues described in this document. Although these approaches do not require to update RFC4960, we do not recommend them from the reasons described below.

A.1. Reduce Path.Max.Retrans (PMR)

Smaller values for Path.Max.Retrans shorten the failover duration and in fact this is recommended in some research results [JUNGMAIER02] [GRINNEMO04] [FALLON08]. However to significantly reduce the failover time it is required to go down (as with PFMR) to Path.Max.Retrans=0 and with this setting SCTP switches to another
destination address already on a single timeout which may result in
spurious failover. Spurious failover is a problem in [RFC4960] SCTP
as the transmission of HEARTBEATS on the left primary path, unlike in
SCTP-PF, is governed by ‘HB.interval’ also during the failover
process. ‘HB.interval’ is usually set in the order of seconds
(recommended value is 30 seconds) and when the primary path becomes
inactive, the next HEARTBEAT may be transmitted only many seconds
later. Indeed as recommended, only 30 secs later. Meanwhile, the
primary path may since long have recovered, if it needed recovery at
all (indeed the failover could be truly spurious). In such
situations, post failover, an endpoint is forced to wait in the order
of many seconds before the endpoint can resume transmission on the
primary path and furthermore once it returns on the primary path the
CWND needs to be rebuild anew - a process which the throughput
already have had to suffer from on the alternate path. Using a
smaller value for ‘HB.interval’ might help this situation, but it
would result in a general waste of bandwidth as such more frequent
HEARTBEATING would take place also when there are no observed
troubles. The bandwidth overhead may be diminished by having the ULP
use a smaller ‘HB.interval’ only on the path which at any given time
is set to be the primary path, but this adds complication in the ULP.

In addition, smaller Path.Max.Retrans values also affect the
‘Association.Max.Retrans’ value. When the SCTP association’s error
count exceeds Association.Max.Retrans threshold, the SCTP sender
considers the peer endpoint unreachable and terminates the
association. Section 8.2 in [RFC4960] recommends that
Association.Max.Retrans value should not be larger than the summation
of the Path.Max.Retrans of each of the destination addresses. Else
the SCTP sender considers its peer reachable even when all
destinations are INACTIVE and to avoid this dormant state operation,
accordingly whenever it reduces Path.Max.Retrans. However, smaller
Association.Max.Retrans value decreases the fault tolerance of SCTP
as it increases the chances of association termination during minor
congestion events.

A.2. Adjust RTO related parameters

As several research results indicate, we can also shorten the
duration of failover process by adjusting RTO related parameters
[JUNGMAIER02] [FALLON08]. During failover process, RTO keeps being
doubled. However, if we can choose smaller value for RTO.max, we can
stop the exponential growth of RTO at some point. Also, choosing
smaller values for RTO.initial or RTO.min can contribute to keep the
RTO value small.
Similar to reducing Path.Max.Retrans, the advantage of this approach is that it requires no modification to the current specification, although it needs to ignore several recommendations described in the Section 15 of [RFC4960]. However, this approach requires to have enough knowledge about the network characteristics between end points. Otherwise, it can introduce adverse side-effects such as spurious timeouts.

The significant issue with this approach, however, is that even if the RTO.max is lowered to an optimal low value, then as long as the Path.Max.Retrans is kept at the [RFC4960] recommended value, the reduction of the RTO.max doesn’t reduce the failover time sufficiently enough to prevent severe performance degradation during failover.

Appendix B. Discussions for Path Bouncing Effect

The methods described in the document can accelerate the failover process. Hence, they might introduce the path bouncing effect where the sender keeps changing the data transmission path frequently. This sounds harmful to the data transfer, however several research results indicate that there is no serious problem with SCTP in terms of path bouncing effect [CARO04] [CARO05].

There are two main reasons for this. First, SCTP is basically designed for multipath communication, which means SCTP maintains all path related parameters (CWND, ssthresh, RTT, error count, etc) per each destination address. These parameters cannot be affected by path bouncing. In addition, when SCTP migrates the data transfer to another path, it starts with the minimal or the initial CWND. Hence, there is little chance for packet reordering or duplicating.

Second, even if all communication paths between the end-nodes share the same bottleneck, the SCTP-PF results in a behavior already allowed by [RFC4960].

Appendix C. SCTP-PF for SCTP Single-homed Operation

For a single-homed SCTP association the only tangible effect of the activation of SCTP-PF operation is enhanced failure detection in terms of potential notification of the PF state of the sole destination address as well as, for idle associations, more rapid entering, and notification, of inactive state of the destination address and more rapid end-point failure detection. It is believed that neither of these effects are harmful, provided adequate dormant state operation is implemented, and furthermore that they may be particularly useful for applications that deploys multiple SCTP associations for load balancing purposes. The early notification of
the PF state may be used for preventive measures as the entering of
the PF state can be used as a warning of potential congestion.
Depending on the PMR value, the aggressive HEARTBEAT transmission in
PF state may speed up the end-point failure detection (exceed of AMR
threshold on the sole path error counter) on idle associations in
case where relatively large HB.interval value compared to RTO (e.g.
30secs) is used.

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Abstract

The Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) is a message oriented transport protocol supporting arbitrarily large user messages. This document adds a new chunk to SCTP for carrying payload data. This allows a sender to interleave different user messages that would otherwise result in head of line blocking at the sender. The interleaving of user messages is required for WebRTC Datachannels.

Whenever an SCTP sender is allowed to send user data, it may choose from multiple outgoing SCTP streams. Multiple ways for performing this selection, called stream schedulers, are defined in this document. A stream scheduler can choose to either implement, or not implement, user message interleaving.

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1. Introduction

1.1. Overview

When SCTP [RFC4960] was initially designed it was mainly envisioned for the transport of small signaling messages. Late in the design stage it was decided to add support for fragmentation and reassembly of larger messages with the thought that someday Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [RFC3261] style signaling messages may also need to use SCTP and a single Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU) sized message would be too small. Unfortunately this design decision, though valid at the time, did not account for other applications that might send large messages over SCTP. The sending of such large messages over SCTP as specified in [RFC4960] can result in a form of sender side head of line blocking (e.g., when the transmission of a message is blocked from transmission because the sender has started the transmission of another, possibly large, message). This head of line blocking is caused by the use of the Transmission Sequence Number (TSN) for three different purposes:

1. As an identifier for DATA chunks to provide a reliable transfer.

2. As an identifier for the sequence of fragments to allow reassembly.

3. As a sequence number allowing up to $2^{16} - 1$ Stream Sequence Numbers (SSNs) outstanding.

The protocol requires all fragments of a user message to have consecutive TSNs. This document allows an SCTP sender to interleave different user messages.

This document also defines several stream schedulers for general SCTP associations allowing different relative stream treatments. The stream schedulers may behave differently depending on whether user message interleaving has been negotiated for the association or not.

Figure 1 illustrates the behaviour of a round robin stream scheduler using DATA chunks when three streams with the Stream Identifiers...
(SIDs) 0, 1, and 2 are used. Each queue for SID 0 and SID 2 contains a single user message requiring three chunks, the queue for SID 1 contains three user messages each requiring a single chunk. It is shown how these user messages are encapsulated in chunk using TSN 0 to TSN 8. Please note that the use of such a scheduler implies late TSN assignment but it can be used with an [RFC4960] compliant implementation that does not support user message interleaving. Late TSN assignment means that the sender generates chunks from user messages and assigns the TSN as late as possible in the process of sending the user messages.

```
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
|    0/0    | ---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
```

Figure 1: Round Robin Scheduler without User Message Interleaving

This document describes a new chunk carrying payload data called I-DATA. This chunk incorporates the properties of the current SCTP DATA chunk, all the flags and fields except the Stream Sequence Number (SSN), but also adds two new fields in its chunk header, the Fragment Sequence Number (FSN) and the Message Identifier (MID). The FSN is only used for reassembling all fragments having the same MID and ordering property. The TSN is only used for the reliable transfer in combination with Selective Acknowledgment (SACK) chunks.

In addition, the MID is also used for ensuring ordered delivery instead of using the stream sequence number (The I-DATA chunk omits a SSN.).

Figure 2 illustrates the behaviour of an interleaving round robin stream scheduler using I-DATA chunks.
Figure 2: Round Robin Scheduler with User Message Interleaving

The support of the I-DATA chunk is negotiated during the association setup using the Supported Extensions Parameter as defined in [RFC5061]. If I-DATA support has been negotiated for an association, I-DATA chunks are used for all user-messages. DATA chunks are not permitted when I-DATA support has been negotiated. It should be noted that an SCTP implementation supporting I-DATA chunks needs to allow the coexistence of associations using DATA chunks and associations using I-DATA chunks.

In Section 2 this document specifies the user message interleaving by defining the I-DATA chunk, the procedures to use it and its interactions with other SCTP extensions. Multiple stream schedulers are defined in Section 3 followed in Section 4 by describing an extension to the socket API for using what is specified in this document.

1.2. Conventions

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

2. User Message Interleaving

The protocol mechanisms described in this document allow the interleaving of user messages sent on different streams. They do not support the interleaving of multiple messages (ordered or unordered) sent on the same stream.
The interleaving of user messages is required for WebRTC Datachannels as specified in [I-D.ietf-rtcweb-data-channel].

An SCTP implementation supporting user message interleaving is REQUIRED to support the coexistence of associations using DATA chunks and associations using I-DATA chunks. If an SCTP implementation supports user message interleaving and the Partial Reliability extension described in [RFC3758] or the Stream Reconfiguration Extension described in [RFC6525], it is REQUIRED to implement the corresponding changes specified in Section 2.3.

2.1. The I-DATA Chunk Supporting User Message Interleaving

The following Figure 3 shows the new I-DATA chunk allowing user message interleaving.

```
0                   1                   2                   3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|   Type = 64   |  Res  |I|U|B|E|       Length = Variable       |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|                              TSN                              |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|        Stream Identifier      |           Reserved            |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|                      Message Identifier                       |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|    Payload Protocol Identifier / Fragment Sequence Number     |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
\                           User Data                           /
\                                                               \
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
```

Figure 3: I-DATA chunk format

The only differences between the I-DATA chunk in Figure 3 and the DATA chunk defined in [RFC4960] and [RFC7053] are the addition of the new Message Identifier (MID) and the new Fragment Sequence Number (FSN) and the removal of the Stream Sequence Number (SSN). The Payload Protocol Identifier (PPID) already defined for DATA chunks in [RFC4960] and the new FSN are stored at the same location of the packet using the B bit to determine which value is stored at the location. The length of the I-DATA chunk header is 20 bytes, which is 4 bytes more than the length of the DATA chunk header defined in [RFC4960] and [RFC7053].

The old fields are:
Res: 4 bits
These bits are reserved. They MUST be set to 0 by the sender and
MUST be ignored by the receiver.

I bit: 1 bit
The (I)mediate Bit, if set, indicates that the receiver SHOULD
NOT delay the sending of the corresponding SACK chunk. Same as
the I bit for DATA chunks as specified in [RFC7053].

U bit: 1 bit
The (U)nordered bit, if set, indicates the user message is
unordered. Same as the U bit for DATA chunks as specified in
[RFC4960].

B bit: 1 bit
The (B)eginning fragment bit, if set, indicates the first fragment
of a user message. Same as the B bit for DATA chunks as specified
in [RFC4960].

E bit: 1 bit
The (E)nding fragment bit, if set, indicates the last fragment of
a user message. Same as the E bit for DATA chunks as specified in
[RFC4960].

Length: 16 bits (unsigned integer)
This field indicates the length of the DATA chunk in bytes from
the beginning of the type field to the end of the User Data field
excluding any padding. Similar to the Length for DATA chunks as
specified in [RFC4960].

TSN: 32 bits (unsigned integer)
This value represents the TSN for this I-DATA chunk. Same as the
TSN for DATA chunks as specified in [RFC4960].

Stream Identifier: 16 bits (unsigned integer)
Identifies the stream to which the user data belongs. Same as the
Stream Identifier for DATA chunks as specified in [RFC4960].

The new fields are:

Reserved: 16 bits (unsigned integer)
This field is reserved. It MUST be set to 0 by the sender and
MUST be ignored by the receiver.

Message Identifier (MID): 32 bits (unsigned integer)
The MID is the same for all fragments of a user message, it is
used to determine which fragments (enumerated by the FSN) belong
to the same user message. For ordered user messages, the MID is
also used by the SCTP receiver to deliver the user messages in the
correct order to the upper layer (similar to the SSN of the DATA
chunk defined in [RFC4960]). The sender uses for each outgoing
stream two counters, one for ordered messages, one for unordered
messages. All of these counters are independent and initially 0.
They are incremented by 1 for each user message. Please note that
the serial number arithmetic defined in [RFC1982] using
SERIAL_BITS = 32 applies. Therefore, the sender MUST NOT have
more than 2**31 - 1 ordered messages for each outgoing stream in
flight and MUST NOT have more than 2**31 - 1 unordered messages
for each outgoing stream in flight. A message is considered in
flight, if at least on of its I-DATA chunks is not acknowledged in
a non-renegable way (i.e. not acknowledged by the cumulative TSN
Ack). Please note that the MID is in "network byte order", a.k.a.
Big Endian.

Payload Protocol Identifier (PPID) / Fragment Sequence Number (FSN):
32 bits (unsigned integer)
If the B bit is set, this field contains the PPID of the user
message. Note that in this case, this field is not touched by an
SCTP implementation; therefore, its byte order is not necessarily
in network byte order. The upper layer is responsible for any
byte order conversions to this field, similar to the PPID of DATA
chunks. In this case the FSN is implicitly considered to be 0.
If the B bit is not set, this field contains the FSN. The FSN is
used to enumerate all fragments of a single user message, starting
from 0 and incremented by 1. The last fragment of a message MUST
have the E bit set. Note that the FSN MAY wrap completely
multiple times allowing arbitrarily large user messages. For the
FSN the serial number arithmetic defined in [RFC1982] applies with
SERIAL_BITS = 32. Therefore, a sender MUST NOT have more than
2**31 - 1 fragments of a single user message in flight. A
fragment is considered in flight, if it is not acknowledged in a
non-renegable way. Please note that the FSN is in "network byte
order", a.k.a. Big Endian.

2.2. Procedures

This subsection describes how the support of the I-DATA chunk is
negotiated and how the I-DATA chunk is used by the sender and
receiver.

The handling of the I bit for the I-DATA chunk corresponds to the
handling of the I bit for the DATA chunk described in [RFC7053].
2.2.1. Negotiation

An SCTP end point indicates user message interleaving support by listing the I-DATA Chunk within the Supported Extensions Parameter as defined in [RFC5061]. User message interleaving has been negotiated for an association if both end points have indicated I-DATA support.

If user message interleaving support has been negotiated for an association, I-DATA chunks MUST be used for all user messages and DATA-chunks MUST NOT be used. If user message interleaving support has not been negotiated for an association, DATA chunks MUST be used for all user messages and I-DATA chunks MUST NOT be used.

An end point implementing the socket API specified in [RFC6458] MUST NOT indicate user message interleaving support unless the user has requested its use (e.g. via the socket API, see Section 4.3). This constraint is made since the usage of this chunk requires that the application is capable of handling interleaved messages upon reception within an association. This is not the default choice within the socket API (see the SCTP_FRAGMENT_INTERLEAVE socket option in Section 8.1.20 of [RFC6458]) thus the user MUST indicate to the SCTP implementation its support for receiving completely interleaved messages.

Note that stacks that do not implement [RFC6458] may use other methods to indicate interleaved message support and thus indicate the support of user message interleaving. The crucial point is that the SCTP stack MUST know that the application can handle interleaved messages before indicating the I-DATA support.

2.2.2. Sender Side Considerations

The sender side usage of the I-DATA chunk is quite simple. Instead of using the TSN for fragmentation purposes, the sender uses the new FSN field to indicate which fragment number is being sent. The first fragment MUST have the B bit set. The last fragment MUST have the E bit set. All other fragments MUST NOT have the B bit or E bit set. All other properties of the existing SCTP DATA chunk also apply to the I-DATA chunk, i.e. congestion control as well as receiver window conditions MUST be observed as defined in [RFC4960].

Note that the usage of this chunk implies the late assignment of the actual TSN to any chunk being sent. Each I-DATA chunk uses a single TSN. This way messages from other streams may be interleaved with the fragmented message. Please note that this is the only form of interleaving support. For example, it is not possible to interleave multiple ordered or unordered user messages from the same stream.
The sender MUST NOT process (move user data into I-DATA chunks and assign a TSN to it) more than one user message in any given stream at any time. At any time, a sender MAY process multiple user messages, each of them on different streams.

The sender MUST assign TSNs to I-DATA chunks in a way that the receiver can make progress. One way to achieve this is to assign a higher TSN to the later fragments of a user message and send out the I-DATA chunks such that the TSNs are in sequence.

2.2.3. Receiver Side Considerations

Upon reception of an SCTP packet containing an I-DATA chunk whose user message needs to be reassembled, the receiver MUST first use the SID to identify the stream, consider the U bit to determine if it is part of an ordered or unordered message, find the user message identified by the MID and finally use the FSN for reassembly of the message and not the TSN. The receiver MUST NOT make any assumption about the TSN assignments of the sender. Note that a non-fragmented message is indicated by the fact that both the E and B bits are set. A message (either ordered or unordered) may be identified as being fragmented whose E and B bits are not both set.

If I-DATA support has been negotiated for an association, the reception of a DATA chunk is a violation of the above rules and therefore the receiver of the DATA chunk MUST abort the association by sending an ABORT chunk. The ABORT chunk MAY include the ‘ProtocolViolation’ error cause. The same applies if I-DATA support has not been negotiated for an association and an I-DATA chunk is received.

2.3. Interaction with other SCTP Extensions

The usage of the I-DATA chunk might interfere with other SCTP extensions. Future SCTP extensions MUST describe if and how they interfere with the usage of I-DATA chunks. For the SCTP extensions already defined when this document was published, the details are given in the following subsections.

2.3.1. SCTP Partial Reliability Extension

When the SCTP extension defined in [RFC3758] is used in combination with the user message interleaving extension, the new I-FORWARD-TSN chunk MUST be used instead of the FORWARD-TSN chunk. The difference between the FORWARD-TSN and the I-FORWARD-TSN chunk is that the 16-bit Stream Sequence Number (SSN) has been replaced by the 32-bit Message Identifier (MID) and the largest skipped MID can also be provided for unordered messages. Therefore, the principle applied to
ordered message when using FORWARD-TSN chunks is applied to ordered and unordered messages when using I-FORWARD-TSN chunks.

Figure 4: I-FORWARD-TSN chunk format

The old fields are:

Flags: 8-bits (unsigned integer)
These bits are reserved. They MUST be set to 0 by the sender and MUST be ignored by the receiver. Same as the Flags for FORWARD TSN chunks as specified in [RFC3758].

Length: 16-bits (unsigned integer)
This field holds the length of the chunk. Similar to the Length for FORWARD TSN chunks as specified in [RFC3758].

New Cumulative TSN: 32-bits (unsigned integer)
This indicates the new cumulative TSN to the data receiver. Same as the New Cumulative TSN for FORWARD TSN chunks as specified in [RFC3758].

The new fields are:

Stream Identifier (SID): 16-bits (unsigned integer)
This field holds the stream number this entry refers to.

Reserved: 15 bits
This field is reserved. It MUST be set to 0 by the sender and MUST be ignored by the receiver.
U bit: 1 bit
The U bit specifies if the Message Identifier of this entry refers to unordered messages (U bit is set) or ordered messages (U bit is not set).

Message Identifier (MID): 32 bits (unsigned integer)
This field holds the largest Message Identifier for ordered or unordered messages indicated by the U bit that was skipped for the stream specified by the Stream Identifier. For ordered messages this is similar to the FORWARD-TSN chunk, just replacing the 16-bit SSN by the 32-bit MID.

Support for the I-FORWARD-TSN chunk is negotiated during the SCTP association setup via the Supported Extensions Parameter as defined in [RFC5061]. Only if both end points indicated their support of user message interleaving and the I-FORWARD-TSN chunk, the partial reliability extension is negotiated and can be used in combination with user message interleaving.

The FORWARD-TSN chunk MUST be used in combination with the DATA chunk and MUST NOT be used in combination with the I-DATA chunk. The I-FORWARD-TSN chunk MUST be used in combination with the I-DATA chunk and MUST NOT be used in combination with the DATA chunk.

If I-FORWARD-TSN support has been negotiated for an association, the reception of a FORWARD-TSN chunk is a violation of the above rules and therefore the receiver of the FORWARD-TSN chunk MUST abort the association by sending an ABORT chunk. The ABORT chunk MAY include the ‘Protocol Violation’ error cause. The same applies if I-FORWARD-TSN support has not been negotiated for an association and a FORWARD-TSN chunk is received.

2.3.2. SCTP Stream Reconfiguration Extension

When an association resets the SSN using the SCTP extension defined in [RFC6525], the two counters (one for the ordered messages, one for the unordered messages) used for the MIDs MUST be reset to 0.

Since most schedulers, especially all schedulers supporting user message interleaving, require late TSN assignment, it should be noted that the implementation of [RFC6525] needs to handle this.

3. Stream Schedulers

This section defines several stream schedulers. The stream schedulers may behave differently depending on whether user message interleaving has been negotiated for the association or not. An implementation MAY implement any subset of them. If the
The selection of the stream scheduler is done at the sender side. There is no mechanism provided for signalling the stream scheduler being used to the receiver side or even let the receiver side influence the selection of the stream scheduler used at the sender side.

3.1. First Come First Served Scheduler (SCTP_SS_FCFS)

The simple first-come, first-served scheduler of user messages is used. It just passes through the messages in the order in which they have been delivered by the application. No modification of the order is done at all. The usage of user message interleaving does not affect the sending of the chunks, except that I-DATA chunks are used instead of DATA chunks.

3.2. Round Robin Scheduler (SCTP_SS_RR)

When not using user message interleaving, this scheduler provides a fair scheduling based on the number of user messages by cycling around non-empty stream queues. When using user message interleaving, this scheduler provides a fair scheduling based on the number of I-DATA chunks by cycling around non-empty stream queues.

3.3. Round Robin Scheduler per Packet (SCTP_SS_RR_PKT)

This is a round-robin scheduler, which only switches streams when starting to fill a new packet. It bundles only DATA or I-DATA chunks referring to the same stream in a packet. This scheduler minimizes head-of-line blocking when a packet is lost because only a single stream is affected.

3.4. Priority Based Scheduler (SCTP_SS_PRIO)

Scheduling of user messages with strict priorities is used. The priority is configurable per outgoing SCTP stream. Streams having a higher priority will be scheduled first and when multiple streams have the same priority, the scheduling between them is implementation dependent. When using user message interleaving, the sending of large lower priority user messages will not delay the sending of higher priority user messages.
3.5. Fair Capacity Scheduler (SCTP_SS_FC)

A fair capacity distribution between the streams is used. This scheduler considers the lengths of the messages of each stream and schedules them in a specific way to maintain an equal capacity for all streams. The details are implementation dependent. Using user message interleaving allows for a better realization of the fair capacity usage.

3.6. Weighted Fair Queueing Scheduler (SCTP_SS_WFQ)

A weighted fair queueing scheduler between the streams is used. The weight is configurable per outgoing SCTP stream. This scheduler considers the lengths of the messages of each stream and schedules them in a specific way to use the capacity according to the given weights. If the weight of stream S1 is \(n\) times the weight of stream S2, the scheduler should assign to stream S1 \(n\) times the capacity it assigns to stream S2. The details are implementation dependent. Using user message interleaving allows for a better realization of the capacity usage according to the given weights.

This scheduler in combination with user message interleaving is used for WebRTC Datachannels as specified in [I-D.ietf-rtcweb-data-channel].

4. Socket API Considerations

This section describes how the socket API defined in [RFC6458] is extended to allow applications to use the extension described in this document.

Please note that this section is informational only.

4.1. Exposure of the Stream Sequence Number (SSN)

The socket API defined in [RFC6458] defines several structures in which the SSN of a received user message is exposed to the application. The list of these structures includes:

- struct sctp_sndrcvinfo
  Specified in Section 5.3.2 SCTP Header Information Structure (SCTP_SNDRCV) of [RFC6458] and marked as deprecated.

- struct sctp_extrcvinfo
  Specified in Section 5.3.3 Extended SCTP Header Information Structure (SCTP_EXTRCV) of [RFC6458] and marked as deprecated.

- struct sctp_rcvinfo
4.2. SCTP_ASSOC_CHANGE Notification

When an SCTP_ASSOC_CHANGE notification (specified in Section 6.1.1 of [RFC6458]) is delivered indicating a sac_state of SCTP_COMM_UP or SCTP_RESTART for an SCTP association where both peers support the I-DATA chunk, SCTP_ASSOC_SUPPORTS_INTERLEAVING should be listed in the sac_info field.

4.3. Socket Options

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>option name</th>
<th>data type</th>
<th>get</th>
<th>set</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SCTP_INTERLEAVING_SUPPORTED</td>
<td>struct sctp_assoc_value</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCTP_STREAM_SCHEDULER</td>
<td>struct sctp_assoc_value</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCTP_STREAM_SCHEDULER_VALUE</td>
<td>struct sctp_stream_value</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.3.1. Enable or Disable the Support of User Message Interleaving (SCTP_INTERLEAVING_SUPPORTED)

This socket option allows the enabling or disabling of the negotiation of user message interleaving support for future associations. For existing associations it allows to query whether user message interleaving support was negotiated or not on a particular association.

This socket option uses IPPROTO_SCTP as its level and SCTP_INTERLEAVING_SUPPORTED as its name. It can be used with getsockopt() and setsockopt(). The socket option value uses the following structure defined in [RFC6458]:

```c
struct sctp_assoc_value {
    sctp_assoc_t assoc_id;
    uint32_t assoc_value;
};
```

assoc_id: This parameter is ignored for one-to-one style sockets. For one-to-many style sockets, this parameter indicates upon which association the user is performing an action. The special
sctp_assoc_t SCTP_FUTURE_ASSOC can also be used, it is an error to use SCTP_{CURRENT|ALL}_ASSOC in assoc_id.

assoc_value: A non-zero value encodes the enabling of user message interleaving whereas a value of 0 encodes the disabling of user message interleaving.

sctp_opt_info() needs to be extended to support SCTP_INTERLEAVING_SUPPORTED.

An application using user message interleaving should also set the fragment interleave level to 2 by using the SCTP_FRAGMENT_INTERLEAVE socket option specified in Section 8.1.20 of [RFC6458]. This allows the interleaving of user messages from different streams. Please note that it does not allow the interleaving of user messages (ordered or unordered) on the same stream. Failure to set this option can possibly lead to application deadlock. Some implementations might therefore put some restrictions on setting combinations of these values. Setting the interleaving level to at least 2 before enabling the negotiation of user message interleaving should work on all platforms. Since the default fragment interleave level is not 2, user message interleaving is disabled per default.

4.3.2. Get or Set the Stream Scheduler (SCTP_STREAM_SCHEDULER)

A stream scheduler can be selected with the SCTP_STREAM_SCHEDULER option for setsockopt(). The struct sctp_assoc_value is used to specify the association for which the scheduler should be changed and the value of the desired algorithm.

The definition of struct sctp_assoc_value is the same as in [RFC6458]:

```
struct sctp_assoc_value {
    sctp_assoc_t assoc_id;
    uint32_t assoc_value;
};
```

assoc_id: Holds the identifier for the association of which the scheduler should be changed. The special SCTP_{FUTURE|CURRENT|ALL}_ASSOC can also be used. This parameter is ignored for one-to-one style sockets.

assoc_value: This specifies which scheduler is used. The following constants can be used:

- **SCTP_SS_DEFAULT**: The default scheduler used by the SCTP implementation. Typical values are SCTP_SS_FCFS or SCTP_SS_RR.
SCTP_SS_FCFS: Use the scheduler specified in Section 3.1.

SCTP_SS_RR: Use the scheduler specified in Section 3.2.

SCTP_SS_RR_PKT: Use the scheduler specified in Section 3.3.

SCTP_SS_PRIO: Use the scheduler specified in Section 3.4. The priority can be assigned with the sctp_stream_value struct. The higher the assigned value, the lower the priority, that is the default value 0 is the highest priority and therefore the default scheduling will be used if no priorities have been assigned.

SCTP_SS_FB: Use the scheduler specified in Section 3.5.

SCTP_SS_WFQ: Use the scheduler specified in Section 3.6. The weight can be assigned with the sctp_stream_value struct.

sctp_opt_info() needs to be extended to support SCTP_STREAM_SCHEDULER.

4.3.3. Get or Set the Stream Scheduler Parameter
(SCTP_STREAM_SCHEDULER_VALUE)

Some schedulers require additional information to be set for individual streams as shown in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>name</th>
<th>per stream info</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SCTP_SS_DEFAULT</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCTP_SS_FCFS</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCTP_SS_RR</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCTP_SS_RR_PKT</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCTP_SS_PRIO</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCTP_SS_FB</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCTP_SS_WFQ</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This is achieved with the SCTP_STREAM_SCHEDULER_VALUE option and the corresponding struct sctp_stream_value. The definition of struct sctp_stream_value is as follows:

```c
struct sctp_stream_value {
    sctp_assoc_t assoc_id;
    uint16_t stream_id;
    uint16_t stream_value;
};
```
assoc_id: Holds the identifier for the association of which the scheduler should be changed. The special SCTP_{FUTURE|CURRENT|ALL}_ASSOC can also be used. This parameter is ignored for one-to-one style sockets.

stream_id: Holds the stream id of the stream for which additional information has to be provided.

stream_value: The meaning of this field depends on the scheduler specified. It is ignored when the scheduler does not need additional information.

sctp_opt_info() needs to be extended to support SCTP_STREAM_SCHEDULER_VALUE.

4.4. Explicit EOR Marking

Using explicit End of Record (EOR) marking for an SCTP association supporting user message interleaving allows the user to interleave the sending of user messages on different streams.

5. IANA Considerations

[NOTE to RFC-Editor:

"RFCXXXX" is to be replaced by the RFC number you assign this document.

]

[NOTE to RFC-Editor:

The suggested values for the chunk types and the chunk flags are tentative and to be confirmed by IANA.

]

This document (RFCXXXX) is the reference for all registrations described in this section.

Two new chunk types have to be assigned by IANA.

5.1. I-DATA Chunk

IANA should assign the chunk type for this chunk from the pool of chunks with the upper two bits set to ‘01’. This requires an additional line in the "Chunk Types" registry for SCTP:
### ID Value | Chunk Type | Reference
---|---|---
64 | Payload Data supporting Interleaving (I-DATA) | [RFCXXXX]

The registration table as defined in [RFC6096] for the chunk flags of this chunk type is initially given by the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chunk Flag Value</th>
<th>Chunk Flag Name</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0x01</td>
<td>E bit</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x02</td>
<td>B bit</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x04</td>
<td>U bit</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x08</td>
<td>I bit</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x10</td>
<td>Unassigned</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x20</td>
<td>Unassigned</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x40</td>
<td>Unassigned</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x80</td>
<td>Unassigned</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 5.2. I-FORWARD-TSN Chunk

IANA should assign the chunk type for this chunk from the pool of chunks with the upper two bits set to '11'. This requires an additional line in the "Chunk Types" registry for SCTP:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ID Value</th>
<th>Chunk Type</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>194</td>
<td>I-FORWARD-TSN</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The registration table as defined in [RFC6096] for the chunk flags of this chunk type is initially empty.

### 6. Security Considerations

This document does not add any additional security considerations in addition to the ones given in [RFC4960] and [RFC6458].

It should be noted that the application has to consent that it is willing to do the more complex reassembly support required for user message interleaving. When doing so, an application has to provide a reassembly buffer for each incoming stream. It has to protect itself against these buffers taking too many resources. If user message
interleaving is not used, only a single reassembly buffer needs to be provided for each association. But the application has to protect itself for excessive resource usages there too.

7. Acknowledgments

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8. References

8.1. Normative References


8.2. Informative References

[I-D.ietf-rtcweb-data-channel]


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Abstract

This memo outlines the challenge that 4G and 5G access brings for transport protocol congestion control and also outlines a few simple examples that can improve transport protocol congestion control performance in 4G and 5G access.

Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

Status of This Memo

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1. Introduction

Wireless access is becoming more and more widely used, 4G (LTE) access is one wireless access technology that has built in support for seamless mobility that gives the end user a feeling of being always connected. Transport endpoints may even be unaware of the existence of the 4G access. Everyday use for 4G access includes web, chat, streaming video and lately also WebRTC. These use cases pose different requirements on the underlying access. Evolving existing radio-access technologies like LTE, and new 5G technologies will all be part of a future flexible and dynamic 5G system. 5G has potential to offer lower latency and higher peak throughput. The goal of this document is to provide sufficient input to guide the development of congestion control that is better suited for 4G and 5G access, without an explicit need to know about the presence of 4G or 5G access along the transmission path.
2. The 4G protocol stack impact on transport protocols

This section will go into the different layers in the 4G protocol stack. It will not delve in the very details, recommended reading for more details is found in [LTE]. Rather this section will illustrate what effect each layer can have on the transport protocol efficiency. The description is focused mainly on default radio access bearers, which are commonly used for OTT (Over The Top) services, these bearers typically use Acknowledged Mode (AM), which means that packet loss only occurs as the result of packet drops in AQM (Active Queue manager). Specialized services like VoLTE (Voice over LTE) use different bearer configurations, this is however outside the scope of this document. The concept of bearer is mentioned throughout the document, a bearer is to be seen as a data channel for a given terminal or UE (User Equipment), there could be many bearers with different priorities for a given terminal.

```
------------
|    IP    |
|          |
------------
|    PDCP  |
|          |
------------
|    RLC    |
|          |
------------
|    MAC    |
|          |
------------
|    PHY    |
------------
```

LTE protocol stack

2.1. PDCP layer

The PDCP (Packet Data Convergence Protocol Layer), ensures that intra-RAT (Radio Access Type) handover, i.e. LTE to LTE is reasonably seamless. The PDCP layer makes sure that packets pending transmission in one cell to terminal connection, are transmitted in the new cell to terminal connection. This way all packets will be ensured to be delivered to the endpoint. PDCP also ensures that all packets are delivered in order up to higher layers.

Packet retransmission typically means that the amount of data to transmit increases immediately after the handover, first the retransmission data needs to be transmitted, then the incoming data needs to be transmitted. Depending on the available link throughput after the handover, an increased RTT may be experienced at a handover.
event. In addition, a small temporal delay increase can occur as packet transmission is inhibited at the handover event. Unnecessary, retransmission at handover can be minimized by means of PDCP status reports, but this is not always implemented. Because of the above it is a good practice to keep the amount of data in flight as small as possible, without sacrificing throughput. Excessive amounts of data in flight means potentially more data to retransmit at handover and thus an even more increased RTT.

Packets are typically not lost at handover in a 4G/LTE system. Reliable delivery at handover may however be turned off or is simply not implemented, this means that packets may be lost at handover. The amount of lost packets is then proportional to the number of packets in flight, it is therefore instrumental that the amount of packets in flight is as small as possible, with the objective to reach full link utilization, nothing more. Bufferbloat [REF] can for instance lead to that 1000s of packets are lost at handover, which is of course undesired as it can affect media quality quite considerably.

2.2. RLC layer

The role of the RLC (Radio Link Control) layer is to ensure that packets are delivered in order up to the higher layers, in addition the RLC layer corrects errors that can occur on the MAC layer. The in order delivery constraint means that additional HoL (Head of Line) blocking delay can occur due to errors on the MAC layer.

The throughput on lower layers can vary quite considerably, this manifests itself as a varying size of the available transport. The transport block size depends on how much of the available resources is allocated to a given bearer at a given time instant and also on the channel quality. Because of this the size of the transport blocks can vary from tens of bytes, up to more than 10000 bytes. The rate of change in transport block size also varies with terminal mobility as higher terminal mobility means faster changing channel fading and thus a faster changing channel quality.

For optimal spectrum efficiency, it is important that a sufficient amount of data is available to fill the transport blocks, this data needs to be available already when a bearer is scheduled, in practice within a fraction of a millisecond. To satisfy this requirement, packets need to be queued up and ready for immediate transmission, either on the RLC or the PDCP layer. The transport protocol server (TCP, QUIC) is typically too far away to satisfy this need.

The need to instantly provide sufficient data for optimal spectrum efficiency, given the variability in transport block sizes and
scheduling opportunities for a given bearer, quite naturally leads to a variation in queuing delay and this variation can be larger than what is to be expected from e.g. fixed line access.

The requirement above to have data available can be seen something that contradicts the strive for low latency, and there is indeed a balance to be struck here. What to aim for, maximum throughput or low latency, is something that depends on the requirements from the application. A desire for very low latency comes generally at the cost of reduced peak throughput, this applies to default radio access bearers. QoS classed bearers can have different characteristics and may well be able to deliver both very low latency and high throughput.

2.3. MAC layer

The MAC (Media Access Control) layer handles transmission of transport blocks, the outcome of a transmission attempt can be either success or failure. The signaling of the success is handled with a single ACK/NAK bit. Upon indicated failure, the transport block is retransmitted (with a different channel coding), soft decoding is utilized and the softbits of the first transmission and the retransmission are combined, hopefully with a successful result, if not the case a 3rd retransmission can occur and so on. This is referred to as HARQ (Hybrid Automatic Repeat Request). The maximum number of retransmissions is configurable, if the maximum number of retransmission is reached without successful transmission then the RLC layer will have to handle the retransmission instead.

Errors may also happen in the transmission of the ACK/NAK bit. The event that ACK is decoded as NAK will only lead to that an extra superfluous retransmission occur. The event that a NAK is decoded as an ACK will be handled by the RLC layer as the result of a detected RLC checksum error.

MAC layer retransmissions naturally lead to out of order delivery up to higher layers as some transport blocks are transmitted error free while others need retransmission. The role of the RLC layer is to ensure in order delivery, the effect of this is that HARQ retransmissions and HARQ failures lead to additional delays.

Scheduling of many bearers has the effect that available resources have to be shared between two or more bearers. When new bearers with data to transmit are added in a cell (either handover, or new traffic), it means that the amount of resources need to be shared with an additional party. This can give a large drop in available throughput for already existing users, with the effect of an
increased queuing delay that decreased only when the transmission rate over the bearer is reduced.

The downlink and uplink scheduling differs in some details which are described in the following sub-sections.

2.3.1. Downlink scheduling

Downlink scheduling, or scheduling of packets to terminals, is controlled by the base station. For each TTI (1ms interval) a decision is made on which bearer is to become scheduled, i.e. packets are forwarded from the queue to the terminal in question. The scheduling decision is based on channel quality, and possibly historic bitrate for the given bearers, or it may be just a simple round robin scheduler. The very details of the scheduling algorithms are vendor specific.

DRX (Discontinuous Reception) is a feature implemented to save battery power, in which the terminal sleeps and only checks for the presence on downlink data only at regular intervals. Given the facts above, downlink data cannot always be transmitted immediately, this has the effect that additional jitter may be added (in the order of 10-20ms). Congestion control algorithms that are tuned with a high sensitivity to delay can by mistake treat this jitter as congestion.

2.3.2. Uplink scheduling

As is the case with downlink scheduling, uplink scheduling is controlled by the base station. A terminal that has data to transmit will first transmit a scheduling request to the base station. The scheduling request does not indicate how many bytes that are in the uplink queue. The base station transmits a scheduling grant back, with a delay that depends on the overall load level. The scheduling grant indicates how many bytes that can be transmitted by the terminal. After this the terminal can transmit the allowed number of bytes, if there is still data in the queue, then a BSR (Buffer Status Report) is attached to the uplink transmission which will in turn trigger an additional scheduling grant from the base station to the terminal and so on until all the data in the queue is transmitted. The uplink scheduling regime outlined above can break up packet trains, for instance a set of 10 ACKs in the uplink may be broken up to an initial transmission of 2 ACKs followed by the transmission of the remaining 8 ACKs, the HARQ RTT is typically 8ms, which means that the remaining 8 ACKs are delivered upstream 8ms later. This can cause problems for congestion control algorithms that depend on e.g. packet train based estimation of throughput. Also, algorithms that depend on precise RTT estimates may by mistake treat the occurrence above as emerging congestion in the downlink.
This behavior can also trigger coalescing issues similar to those experienced when ACK compression occur. Worth notice is also that the above effects can occur at low as well as high network load levels.

ACK traffic in uplink can also be delayed due to for instance lack of signaling channel resources for instance if many terminals generate ACK traffic that is so sparse that scheduling requests need to be generated with high frequency. A transport protocol design that tries to limit the amount of ACK traffic can have a performance benefit under such circumstances as the limitation is then more controlled and the protocol can be optimized for this. Reduced ACKs can unfortunately cause coalescing, something that may be mitigated to some extent by means of packet pacing.

3. 4G and 5G evolution

It is currently unclear in what aspect a 5G protocol stack will affect transport protocol performance. Listed below are however some features of evolved 4G and 5G that have relevance in this context:

- Shorter TTIs (Transmission Time Interval) has the potential to reduce the latency. Given that shorter TTIs have impact on the scheduling and also the retransmissions, the impact of shorter TTIs is that errors on the MAC layer will cause less jitter.

- Larger throughput variations can occur as a result of techniques like carrier aggregation and dual connectivity. Carrier aggregation means that additional carriers (possibly in very high frequency bands) are added. Dual connectivity can combine two similar or different radio access technologies on lower layers (below IP). Both technologies mentioned above can lead to large variations in available throughput.

- ECN is specified in 3GPP 36.300 [TS_36300]. ECN can provide with prompt indication of congestion without the need for packet drop caused by normal AQM operation, this can provide with a benefit for e.g. latency sensitive traffic. ECN also gives a explicit indication of congestion, opposed to the implicit congestion indications that loss and delay gives.

The shorter TTI feature is part of the 5G standardization, it should however be stated that the
4. Requirements for improved performance

The above considerations lead to a few things to consider when congestion control is designed for optimal performance in 4G and 5G networks:

- Avoid dependencies on precise RTT estimates: A typical real life case is the Hybrid Slowstart algorithm bundled with the Cubic congestion control. Uplink scheduling can break up transmission of ACKs which will in turn lead to increased RTTs that can falsely be interpreted as congestion.

- Use timestamps: Related to RTT estimate issue above. For instance a modified Hybrid Slowstart algorithm can take timestamp values into account and thus limit the effect of uplink scheduling effects that can distort the transmission of ACKs.

- Minimize latency under load: The quickly changing throughput in 4G/5G calls for a sensible balance between latency and throughput. Some amount of bufferbloat needs to be accepted in order to have enough data to utilize the radio resources optimally and get a high spectrum efficiency, this can however make the reaction to reduced throughput more sluggish. Hybrid loss/delay based congestion control can here be used to find a good balance between latency and throughput.

- ECN support: The transport protocols should support negotiation and use of ECN.

- Faster congestion window increase: Traditional AIMD (Additive Increase Multiplicative Decrease) based congestion avoidance algorithms are too slow to gain the benefits of e.g added carriers, therefore, more high speed alternatives should be considered, that are still reactive to congestion.

- Packet pacing: ACK compression effects can easily occur in 4G/5G networks, packet pacing should be encouraged to mitigate the coalescing effects caused by ACK compression, and will at the same time make ECN detection algorithms more robust.

- ACK reduction: Consider if it is possible to reduce the intensity of acknowledgements, especially in the uplink. Packet pacing may here be beneficial as it can mitigate the coalescing effects that can occur due to reduced ACK intensity.
5. Congestion control examples

This section lists a few examples of algorithm that can be useful:

- Default slowstart algorithms generally only operate at flow start-up and after a retransmission timeout. The drawback with this approach is that the congestion control cannot quickly grab new available capacity due to e.g. the addition of an extra carrier. Fast Increase is a simple add-on to Cubic that resumes slowstart if it is detected that the bottleneck is underutilized for a while. A similar approach can be used for other congestion control algorithms.

- Hybrid Cubic borrows the queue delay estimation from LEDBAT [RFC6817]. With this addition it is possible to set a target queuing delay that adds a limit to the congestion window based on network queuing delay in addition to the already existing loss based control of the congestion window.

- Various High Speed congestion control algorithms such as SIAD (Scalable Increase Adaptive Decrease) [TCP_SIAD] can provide with improved performance in the presence of large changes in available throughput resulting from e.g. added carriers.

The Fast Increase and Hybrid Cubic algorithms are described in more detail below. The code samples are shown with the Linux kernel 4.4 version of tcp_cubic.c as basis.

5.1. Fast Increase

The idea behind Fast Increase is simply to allow the Cubic congestion control to rapidly increase the congestion window if the RTT has been only marginally higher than the min RTT for a number of round trips, this is realised by forcing the ca->cnt variable to a low value. The HyStart delay algorithm used for this purpose. Code for this is shown below with the code from Linux tcp_cubic.c as basis.

```
Function bictcp_acked(..) is modified according to the code snippet below
New state variables are added, all initialized to 0
u32 last_rtt_high
u32 last_fast_increase
u8 do_fast_increase
New constants
#define N_RTT_LOW 5
#define N_RTT_FAST_INCREASE 20
```
/** Old code **/
/* first time call or link delay decreases */
if (ca->delay_min == 0 || ca->delay_min > delay)
  ca->delay_min = delay;

/** New code **/
/*
 * Function bictcp_acked is modified to initiate fast increase when
 * RTT is lower than a given value for a given number of RTTs
 * srtt_l is a long term average of srtt
 */
if (ca->curr_rtt - ca->delay_min > (srtt_l-ca->delay_min)/2) {
  ca->last_rtt_high = bictcp_clock();
} else {
  u32 now = bictcp_clock();
  if (now - ca->last_rtt_high > N_RTT_LOW*ca->delay_min &&
      now - ca->last_fast_increase > N_RTT_FAST_INCREASE*ca->delay_min) {
    ca->do_fast_increase = 1;
    ca->last_fast_increase = now;
  }
}
/** End of new code **/

=======================
Function bictcp_update(...) is updated with a code snippet after
tcp_friendliness
/*
 * Enable fast increase of the CWND
 */
if (ca->do_fast_increase)
  ca->cnt = min(ca->cnt,2);

=======================
Function bictcp_recalc_ssthresh(...) is modified
/*
 * Reset do_fast_increase flag
 */
ca->do_fast_increase = 0;

Fast Increase code
ca->last_fast_increase should be updated to current time whenever a
loss or ECN event is detected.
5.2. Hybrid Cubic

The Hybrid Cubic algorithm adds delay sensitivity to the Cubic congestion avoidance algorithm. It is, in the description below assumed that the timestamp option is enabled and that queue delay samples are computed, according to the description in LEDBAT [RFC6817]. Furthermore it is assumed than the timestamp clock frequency in sender and receiver are identical or that the sender can infer the timestamp clock frequency of the receiver and recompute timestamp values based on this information.

The function bictcp_update is updated according to the code snippet below.

```c
New state variables
float queue_delay
u32 last_hycubic_cwnd_reduced
New constants
#define QUEUE_DELAY_TARGET 0.1
#define QUEUE_DELAY_GAIN_UP 100.0
#define QUEUE_DELAY_GAIN_DOWN 0.2

/** New code, inserted before tcp_friendliness: **/
*/
if (ca->owd < QUEUE_DELAY_TARGET) {
    float tmp = ca->queue_delay/QUEUE_DELAY_TARGET;
    int cnt_d = (int) (tmp*QUEUE_DELAY_GAIN_UP);
    /*
     * q is less than QUEUE_DELAY target
     * Increase cnt as OWD is approaching target
     * This will slow down congestion window growth
     * when owd increases
     */
    ca->cnt += cnt_d;
} else {
    /*
     * Set cnt to a high value, to prevent further growth
     */
    ca->cnt = 1000;
}
/** End of new code **/
```
/* TCP Friendly */
if (tcp_friendliness) {
    u32 scale = beta_scale;
    delta = (cwnd * scale) >> 3;
    /* New code */
    if (ca->queue_delay < QUEUE_DELAY_TARGET) {
        /** End of new code */
        while (ca->ack_cnt > delta) { /* update tcp cwnd */
            ca->ack_cnt -= delta;
            ca->tcp_cwnd++;
        }
        /** New code */
        else {
            u32 now = bictcp_clock();
            if (now-ca->last_hycubic_cwnd_reduced > delay) {
                /* At most one reduction per RTT
                float overshoot = (ca->queue_delay-QUEUE_DELAY_TARGET)/delay;
                float alpha = min(0.5,overshoot*QUEUE_DELAY_GAIN_DOWN);
                ca->tcp_cwnd = (int)(ca->tcp_cwnd*(1.0-alpha));
                ca->ssthresh = ca->tcp_cwnd;
                ca->epoch_start = 0;
                ca->last_hycubic_cwnd_reduced = now;
            }
        }
        /** End of new code */
    }
    /* if bic is slower than tcp */
    if (ca->tcp_cwnd > cwnd) {
        delta = ca->tcp_cwnd - cwnd;
        max_cnt = cwnd / delta;
        if (ca->cnt > max_cnt)
            ca->cnt = max_cnt;
    }
}

Hybrid Cubic

Note that the code is not fully functional, for instance the floating point arithmetic need to be converted to fixed point ditto.

6. IANA Considerations

This document makes no request of IANA.
7. Security Considerations

The possible outcome of this work has the same possible security considerations as other work around congestion control.

8. Acknowledgements

The following persons have contributed with comments and suggestions for improvements: Kristofer Sandlund, Mats Nordberg, Hans Hannu, Torsten Dudda and Szilveszter Nadas.

9. References

9.1. Normative References


9.2. Informative References


TCP Alternative Backoff with ECN (ABE)
draft-khademi-alternativebackoff-ecn-03

Abstract

This memo provides an experimental update to RFC3168. It updates the TCP sender-side reaction to a congestion notification received via Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN). The updated method reduces cwnd by a smaller amount than TCP does in reaction to loss. The intention is to achieve good throughput when the queue at the bottleneck is smaller than the bandwidth-delay-product of the connection. This is more likely when an Active Queue Management (AQM) mechanism has used ECN to CE-mark a packet, than when a packet was lost. Future versions of this document will discuss SCTP as well as other transports using ECN.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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1. Introduction

Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) is specified in [RFC3168]. It allows a network device that uses Active Queue Management (AQM) to set the congestion experienced, CE, codepoint in the ECN field of the IP packet header, rather than drop ECN-capable packets when incipient congestion is detected. When an ECN-capable transport is used over a path that supports ECN, it provides the opportunity for flows to improve their performance in the presence of incipient congestion [I-D.AQM-ECN-benefits].

[RFC3168] not only specifies the router use of the ECN field, it also specifies a TCP procedure for using ECN. This states that a TCP sender should treat the ECN indication of congestion in the same way as that of a non-ECN-Capable TCP flow experiencing loss, by halving the congestion window "cwnd" and by reducing the slow start threshold "ssthresh". [RFC5681] stipulates that TCP congestion control sets "ssthresh" to max(FlightSize / 2, 2*SMSS) in response to packet loss. Consequently, a standard TCP flow using this reaction needs significant network queue space: it can only fully utilise a
bottleneck when the length of the link queue (or the AQM dropping threshold) is at least the bandwidth-delay product (BDP) of the flow.

A backoff multiplier of 0.5 (halving cwnd and sssthresh after packet loss) is not the only available strategy. As defined in [ID.CUBIC], CUBIC multiplies the current cwnd by 0.8 in response to loss (although the Linux implementation of CUBIC has used a multiplier of 0.7 since kernel version 2.6.25 released in 2008). Consequently, CUBIC utilise paths well even when the bottleneck queue is shorter than the bandwidth-delay product of the flow. However, in the case of a DropTail (FIFO) queue without AQM, such less-aggressive backoff increases the risk of creating a standing queue [CODEL2012].

Devices implementing AQM are likely to be the dominant (and possibly only) source of ECN CE-marking for packets from ECN-capable senders. AQM mechanisms typically strive to maintain a small queue length, regardless of the bandwidth-delay product of flows passing through them. Receipt of an ECN CE-mark might therefore reasonably be taken to indicate that a small bottleneck queue exists in the path, and hence the TCP flow would benefit from using a less aggressive backoff multiplier.

Results reported in [ABE2015] show significant benefits (improved throughput) when reacting to ECN-Echo by multiplying cwnd and sssthresh with a value in the range [0.7..0.85]. Section 2 describes the rationale for this change. Section 3 specifies a change to the TCP sender backoff behaviour in response to an indication that CE-marks have been received by the receiver.

2. Discussion

Much of the background to this proposal can be found in [ABE2015]. Using a mix of experiments, theory and simulations with standard NewReno and CUBIC, [ABE2015] recommends enabling ECN and "...letting individual TCP senders use a larger multiplicative decrease factor in reaction to ECN CE-marks from AQM-enabled bottlenecks." Such a change is noted to result in "...significant performance gains in lightly-multiplexed scenarios, without losing the delay-reduction benefits of deploying CoDel or PIE."

2.1. Why use ECN to vary the degree of backoff?

The classic rule-of-thumb dictates a BDP of bottleneck buffering if a TCP connection wishes to optimise path utilisation. A single TCP connection running through such a bottleneck will have opened cwnd up to 2*BDP by the time packet loss occurs. [RFC5681]’s halving of cwnd and sssthresh pushes the TCP connection back to allowing only a BDP of...
packets in flight -- just enough to maintain 100% utilisation of the network path.

AQM schemes like CoDel [I-D.CoDel] and PIE [I-D.PIE] use congestion notifications to constrain the queuing delays experienced by packets, rather than in response to impending or actual bottleneck buffer exhaustion. With current default delay targets, CoDel and PIE both effectively emulate a shallow buffered bottleneck (section II, [ABE2015]) while allowing short traffic bursts into the queue. This interacts acceptably for TCP connections over low BDP paths, or highly multiplexed scenarios (many concurrent TCP connections). However, it interacts badly with lightly-multiplexed cases (few concurrent connections) over high BDP paths. Conventional TCP backoff in such cases leads to gaps in packet transmission and under-utilisation of the path.

In an ideal world, the TCP sender would adapt its backoff strategy to match the effective depth at which a bottleneck begins indicating congestion. In the practical world, [ABE2015] proposes using the existence of ECN CE-marks to infer whether a path’s bottleneck is AQM-enabled (shallow queue) or classic DropTail (deep queue), and adjust backoff accordingly. This results in a change to [RFC3168], which recommended that TCP senders respond in the same way following indication of a received ECN CE-mark and a packet loss, making these equivalent signals of congestion. (The idea to change this behaviour pre-dates ABE. [ICC2002] also proposed using ECN CE-marks to modify TCP congestion control behaviour, using a larger multiplicative decrease factor in conjunction with a smaller additive increase factor to deal with RED-based bottlenecks that were not necessarily configured to emulate a shallow queue.)

[RFC7567] states that "deployed AQM algorithms SHOULD support Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) as well as loss to signal congestion to endpoints" and [I-D.AQM-ECN-benefits] encourages this deployment. Apple recently announced their intention to enable ECN in iOS 9 and OS X 10.11 devices [WWDC2015]. By 2014, server-side ECN negotiation was observed to be provided by the majority of the top million web servers [PAM2015], and only 0.5% of websites incurred additional connection setup latency using RFC3168-compliant ECN-fallback mechanisms.

2.2. Choice of ABE multiplier

ABE decouples a TCP sender’s reaction to loss and ECN CE-marks. The description respectively uses beta_{loss} and beta_{ecn} to refer to the multiplicative decrease factors applied in response to packet loss and in response to an indication of a received CN CE-mark on an ECN-enabled TCP connection (based on the terms used in [ABE2015]).
For non-ECN-enabled TCP connections, no ECN CE-marks are received and only $\beta_{\text{loss}}$ applies.

In other words, in response to detected loss:

$$\text{FlightSize}_{(n+1)} = \text{FlightSize}_n \times \beta_{\text{loss}}$$

and in response to an indication of a received ECN CE-mark:

$$\text{FlightSize}_{(n+1)} = \text{FlightSize}_n \times \beta_{\text{ecn}}$$

where, as in [RFC5681], FlightSize is the amount of outstanding data in the network, upper-bounded by the sender’s congestion window ($cwnd$) and the receiver’s advertised window ($rwnd$). The higher the values of $\beta_*$, the less aggressive the response of any individual backoff event.

The appropriate choice for $\beta_{\text{loss}}$ and $\beta_{\text{ecn}}$ values is a balancing act between path utilisation and draining the bottleneck queue. More aggressive backoff (smaller $\beta_*$) risks underutilising the path, while less aggressive backoff (larger $\beta_*$) can result in slower draining of the bottleneck queue.

The Internet has already been running with at least two different $\beta_{\text{loss}}$ values for several years: the value in [RFC5681] is 0.5, and Linux CUBIC uses 0.7. ABE proposes no change to $\beta_{\text{loss}}$ used by any current TCP implementations.

$\beta_{\text{ecn}}$ depends on how we want to optimise the response of a TCP connection to shallow AQM marking thresholds. $\beta_{\text{loss}}$ reflects the preferred response of each TCP algorithm when faced with exhaustion of buffers (of unknown depth) signalled by packet loss. Consequently, for any given TCP algorithm the choice of $\beta_{\text{ecn}}$ is likely to be algorithm-specific, rather than a constant multiple of the algorithm’s existing $\beta_{\text{loss}}$.

A range of experiments (section IV, [ABE2015]) with NewReno and CUBIC over CoDel and PIE in lightly multiplexed scenarios have explored this choice of parameter. These experiments indicate that CUBIC connections benefit from $\beta_{\text{ecn}}$ of 0.85 (cf. $\beta_{\text{loss}} = 0.7$), and NewReno connections see improvements with $\beta_{\text{ecn}}$ in the range 0.7 to 0.85 (c.f., $\beta_{\text{loss}} = 0.5$).

3. NEW: Updating the Sender-side ECN Reaction

This section specifies an experimental update to [RFC3168].
3.1. RFC 2119

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

3.2. Update to RFC 3168

This document specifies an update to the TCP sender reaction that follows when the TCP receiver signals that ECN CE-marked packets have been received.

The first paragraph of Section 6.1.2, "The TCP Sender", in [RFC3168] contains the following text:

"If the sender receives an ECN-Echo (ECE) ACK packet (that is, an ACK packet with the ECN-Echo flag set in the TCP header), then the sender knows that congestion was encountered in the network on the path from the sender to the receiver. The indication of congestion should be treated just as a congestion loss in non-ECN-Capable TCP. That is, the TCP source halves the congestion window "cwnd" and reduces the slow start threshold "ssthresh"."

This memo updates this by replacing it with the following text:

"If the sender receives an ECN-Echo (ECE) ACK packet (that is, an ACK packet with the ECN-Echo flag set in the TCP header), then the sender knows that congestion was encountered in the network on the path from the sender to the receiver. This indication of congestion could be treated in the same way as a congestion loss, however reception of the ECN-Echo flag SHOULD produce a reduction in FlightSize that is less than the reduction had the flow experienced loss. The reduction needs to be sufficient to allow flows sharing a bottleneck to increase their share of the capacity. This reduction MUST be less than 0.85 (at least a 15% reduction).

An ECN-capable network device cannot eliminate the possibility of loss, because a drop may occur due to a traffic burst exceeding the instantaneous available capacity of a network buffer or as a result of the AQM algorithm (overload protection mechanisms, etc [RFC7567]). Whatever the cause of loss, detection of a missing packet needs to trigger the standard loss-based congestion control response. This explicitly does not update this behaviour.

In addition, this document RECOMMENDS that experimental deployments method multiply the FlightSize by 0.8 and reduce the slow start threshold 'ssthresh' in response to reception of a TCP segment that sets the ECN-Echo flag."
3.3. Status of the Update

This update is a sender-side only change. Like other changes to congestion-control algorithms it does not require any change to the TCP receiver or to network devices (except to enable an ECN-marking algorithm [RFC3168] [RFC7567]). If the method is only deployed by some TCP senders, and not by others, the senders that use this method can gain advantage, possibly at the expense of other flows that do not use this updated method. This advantage applies only to ECN-marked packets and not to loss indications. Hence, the new method can not lead to congestion collapse.

The present specification has been assigned an Experimental status, to provide Internet deployment experience before being proposed as a Standards-Track update.

4. Acknowledgements

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The authors would like to thank feedback on the congestion control behaviour specified in this update received from the IRTF Internet Congestion Control Research Group (ICCRG).

5. IANA Considerations

XX RFC ED - PLEASE REMOVE THIS SECTION XXX

This memo includes no request to IANA.

6. Security Considerations

The described method is a sender-side only transport change, and does not change the protocol messages exchanged. The security considerations of RFC 3819 therefore still apply.

This document describes a change to TCP congestion control with ECN that will typically lead to a change in the capacity achieved when flows share a network bottleneck. Similar unfairness in the way that
capacity is shared is also exhibited by other congestion control mechanisms that have been in use in the Internet for many years (e.g., CUBIC [ID.CUBIC]). Unfairness may also be a result of other factors, including the round trip time experienced by a flow. This advantage applies only to ECN-marked packets and not to loss indications, and will therefore not lead to congestion collapse.

7. References

7.1. Normative References


7.2. Informative References


[I-D.AQM-ECN-benefits]

[I-D.CoDel]

[I-D.PIE]

[ICC2002]

[ID.CUBIC]

[PAM2015]

[WWDC2015]

Authors’ Addresses

Use Cases for a Substrate Protocol for User Datagrams (SPUD)
draft-kuehlewind-spud-use-cases-01

Abstract

This document identifies use cases for explicit cooperation between endpoints and middleboxes in the Internet under endpoint control. These use cases range from relatively low level applications (improving the ability for UDP-based protocols to traverse firewalls) through support for new transport services (in-flow prioritization for graceful in-network degradation of media streams). They are intended to provide background for deriving the requirements for a Substrate Protocol for User Datagrams (SPUD), as discussed at the IAB Stack Evolution in a Middlebox Internet (SEMI) workshop in January 2015 and the SPUD BoF session at IETF 92 in March 2015.

Status of This Memo

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1. Introduction

This document describes use cases for a common Substrate Protocol for User Datagrams (SPUD) that could be used by superstrate transport or application protocols to explicitly expose information to and exchange information with middleboxes about application traffic and network conditions.

For each use case, we first describe a problem that is difficult or impossible to solve with presently deployable protocols within the present Internet architecture. We then discuss which information is exposed by endpoints about the traffic sent, and/or by SPUD-aware middleboxes and routers about the path that traffic will traverse. We also suggest potential mechanisms to use that exposed information at middleboxes and/or endpoints, in order to demonstrate the feasibility of using the exposed information to the given use case. The described mechanisms are not necessarily proposals for moving forward, nor do they necessarily represent the best approach for applying the exposed information, but should illustrate and motivate the applicability of the exposed information. We further discuss incentives for deployment and any security, privacy, and trust issues that arise in exposing and/or making use of the information.

1.1. Principles and Assumptions

We make a few assumptions about first principles in elaborating these use cases...
1.1.1. Trust and Integrity

In this document, we assume no pre-existing trust relationship between the communication endpoints and any middlebox or router on the path. We must therefore always assume that information that is exposed can be incorrect, and/or that the information will be ignored.

This implies that while endpoints can verify the integrity of information exposed by remote endpoints, they cannot verify the integrity of information exposed by middleboxes. Middleboxes cannot verify the integrity of any information at all. In limited situations where a trust relationship can be established, e.g., between a managed end-user device in an enterprise network and a corporate firewall, this verifiability can be improved.

1.1.2. Endpoint Control

We further assume that all information exposure by middleboxes happens under explicit endpoint control. For that reason, the information exposed by middleboxes in this document takes only two forms. In the first form, “accumulation”, the endpoint creates space in the header for middleboxes to use to signal to the remote endpoint, which then sends the information back to the originating endpoint via a feedback channel. In the second form, the middlebox sends a packed directly back to the endpoint with additional information about why a packet was dropped. Other communications patterns may be possible, depending on the first principles chosen; this is a subject of future work.

1.1.3. Least Exposure

Additionally, this document follows the principle of least exposure: in each use case, we attempt to define the minimum amount of information exposed by endpoints and middleboxes required by the proposed mechanism to solve the identified problem. In addition to being good engineering practice, this approach reduces the risk to privacy through inadvertent irrelevant metadata exposure, reduces the amount of information available for application fingerprinting, and reduces the risk that exposed information could otherwise be used for unintended purposes.

2. Firewall Traversal for UDP-Encapsulated Traffic

We presume, following an analysis of requirements in [I-D.trammell-spud-req], as well as trends in transport protocol development (e.g. QUIC, the RTCWEB data channel) that UDP encapsulation will prove a viable approach for deploying new
protocols in the Internet. This, however, leads us to a first problem that must be solved.

2.1. Problem Statement

UDP is often blocked by firewalls, or only enabled for a few well-known applications (e.g. DNS, NTP). Recent measurement work has shown that somewhere between 4% and 8% of Internet hosts may be affected by UDP impairment, depending on the population studied. Some networks (e.g. enterprise networks behind corporate firewalls) are far more likely to block UDP than others (e.g. residential wireline access networks).

In addition, some network operators assume that UDP is not often used for high-volume traffic, and is often a source of spoofing or reflected attack traffic, and is therefore safe to block or route-limit. This assumption is becoming less true than it once was: the volume of (good) UDP traffic is growing, mostly due to voice and video (real-time) services (e.g. RTCWEB) where TCP is not suitable.

Even if firewall vendors and administrators are willing to change firewall rules to allow more diverse UDP services, it is hard to track session state for UDP traffic. As UDP is unidirectional, it is unknown whether the receiver is willing to accept the connection. Further there is no way to figure how long state must be maintained once established. To efficiently establish state along the path we need an explicit contract, as is done implicitly with TCP today.

2.2. Information Exposed

To maintain state in the network, it must be possible to easily assign each packet to a session that is passing a certain network node. This state should be bound to something beyond the five-tuple to link packets together. In [I-D.trammell-spud-req], we propose the use of identifiers for groups of packets, called ("tubes"). This allows for differential treatment of different packets within one five-tuple flow, presuming the application has control over segmentation and can provide requirements on a per-tube basis. Tube IDs must be hard to guess: a tube ID in addition to a five-tuple as an identifier, given significant entropy in the tube ID, provides an additional assurance that only devices along the path or devices cooperating with devices along the path can send packets that will be recognized by middleboxes and endpoints as valid.

Further, to maintain state, the sender must explicitly indicate the start and end of a tube to the path, while the receiver must confirm connection establishment. This, together with the first packet following the confirmation, provides a guarantee of return.
routability; i.e. that the sender is actually at the address it says it is. This implies all SPUD tubes must be bidirectional, or at least support a feedback channel for this confirmation. Even though UDP is not a bidirectional transport protocol, often services on top of UDP are bidirectional anyway. Even if not, we only require one packet to acknowledge a new connection. This is low overhead for this basic security feature. This connection set-up should not impose any additional start-up latency, so the sender must be also able to send payload data in the first packet.

If a firewall blocks a SPUD packet, it can be beneficial for the sender to know why the packet was blocked. Therefore a SPUD-aware middlebox should be able to send error messages. Such an error message can either be sent directly to the sender itself, or alternatively to the receiver that can decide to forward the error message to a sender or not.

2.3. Mechanism

A firewall or middlebox can use the tube ID as an identifier for its session state information. If the tube ID is large enough it will be hard for a non-eavesdropping attacker to guess the ID.

If a firewall receives a SPUD message that signals the start of a connection, it can decide to establish new state for this tube. Alternatively, it can also forward the packet to the receiver and wait if the connection is wanted before establishing state. To not require forwarding of unknown payload, a firewall might want to forward the initial SPUD packet without payload and only send the full packet if the connection has been accepted by the receiver.

The firewall must still maintain a timer to delete the state of a tube if no packets were received for a while. However, if an end signal is received the firewall can remove the state information faster.

If a firewall receives a SPUD message which does not indicate the start of a new tube and no state is available for this tube, it may decide to block the traffic. This can happen if the state has already timed out or if the traffic was rerouted. In addition a firewall may send an error message to the sender or the receiver indicating that no state information is available. If the sender receives such a message it can resend a start signal (potentially together with other tube state information) and continue its transmission.
2.4. Deployment Incentives

The ability to use existing firewall management best practices with new transport services over SPUD is necessary to ensure the deployability of SPUD. In today’s Internet, application developers really only have two choices for transport protocols: TCP, or transports implemented at the application layer and encapsulated over UDP. SPUD provides a common shim layer for the second case, and the firewall traversal facility it provides makes these transports more likely to deploy.

It is not expected that the information provided by SPUD will enable all generic UDP-encapsulated transports to safely pass firewalls. However, it does make state handling easier for new services that a firewall administrator is willing to allow.

2.5. Security, Privacy, and Trust

The tube ID is scoped to the five-tuple. While this makes the tube ID useless for session mobility, it does mean that the valid ID space is sufficiently sparse to maintain the "hard to guess" property, and prevents tube IDs from being misused to track flows from the same endpoint across multiple addresses. This limitation may need further discussion.

By providing information about connection setup, SPUD exposes information equivalent to that available in the TCP header. It makes connection lifetime information explicit and accessible without specific higher-layer/application-level knowledge.

3. On-Path State Lifetime Discovery and Management

Once the problem of connection setup is solved, the problem arises of managing the lifetime of state associated with that connection at various devices along the path: NAT and stateful firewall state timeouts are a common cause of connectivity issues in the Internet.

3.1. Problem Statement

Devices along the path that must keep state in order to function cannot assume that signals tearing down a connection are provided reliably. This is also the case for current TCP traffic. Therefore, all stateful on-path devices must implement a mechanism to remove the state if no traffic is seen for a given flow or tube for a while. Usually this is implemented by maintaining a timeout since the last observed packet.
If the timeouts are set too low, on-path state might be discarded while the endpoint connection is still alive; in the case of firewalls and NATs, this can lead to unreliable connectivity. The common solution to this problem is for applications or transport protocols that do not have any productive traffic to send to send "heartbeat" or "keep-alive" packets to reset the state timeout along the path. However, since the minimum timeout along the path is unknown to the endpoint, implementers of transport and application. A default value of 150ms is commonly used today. This represents a fairly rapid generation of nonproductive traffic, and is especially onerous on battery-powered mobile devices, which must wake up radios and switch to a higher-power mode to transmit these nonproductive packets, leading to suboptimal power usage and shorter battery life.

3.2. Information Exposed

SPUD can be used to request that SPUD-aware middleboxes along the path expose their minimum state timeout value. Here, the sending endpoint sends a "accumulate minimum timeout" request along with some scratch space for middleboxes to place their timeout information in. Each middlebox inspects this value, and writes its own timeout only if lower than the present value.

Applications may also send a "timeout proposal" to devices along the path using a SPUD declaration that a given tube will send a packet at least once per interval, and if no packet is seen within that interval, it is safe to tear down state.

These two declarations may be used together, with middleboxes willing to use the application’s value setting their timeouts on a per-tube basis, or exposing a lower timeout value to allow the application to adjust.

3.3. Mechanism

If a SPUD-aware middlebox that uses a timeout to clean up per-tube state receives a SPUD minimum timeout accumulation, it should expose its own timeout value if smaller than the one already given. Alternatively, if a value is already given, it might decide to use the given value as timeout for the state information of this tube. An endpoint receiving an accumulated minimum timeout should send it back to its remote peer via a feedback channel. Timeouts on each direction of a connection between two endpoints may, of course, be different, and are handled separately by this mechanism.

If a SPUD-aware middlebox that uses a timeout to clean up per-tube state receives a timeout proposal, it should set its timeout accordingly, subject to its own policy and configuration.
These mechanisms are of course completely advisory: there may be non-SPUD aware middleboxes on path which will ignore any proposed timeout and not expose their timeout information, and middleboxes must be configured with maximum timeout proposal they will accept in order to defend against state exhaustion attacks.

Endpoints must therefore be combine the use of these signals endpoint with a dynamic timeout discovery and adaptation mechanism, which uses the signals to set initial guesses as to the path timeout.

3.4. Deployment Incentives

Initially, if not widely deployed, there will be not much benefit to using this extension.

However, we can assume that there are usually only a small number of middleboxes on a given network path that hold per-tube state information. Endpoints have an incentive to request minimum timeout and to propose timeouts to improve convergence time for dynamic timeout adaptation mechanisms, and middleboxes have an incentive to cooperate to improve reliability of connections as well as state management. It is therefore likely that if information is exposed by a middlebox, this information is correct and can be used.

The more SPUD gets deployed, the more often endpoints will be able to set the heartbeat interval correctly. This will reduce the amount of unproductive traffic as well as the number of reconnections that cause additional latency.

Likewise, SPUD-aware middleboxes that expose timeout information are able to handle timeouts more flexibly, e.g. announcing lower timeout values when they have less space available for new state. Further if an endpoint announces a low pre-set value because the endpoint knows that it will only have short idle periods, the timeout interval could be reduced.

3.5. Security, Privacy, and Trust

Timeout proposals increase the risk of state exhaustion attacks for SPUD-aware middleboxes that naively follow them. Likewise, accumulated minimum timeouts could be used by malicious middleboxes to induce floods of useless heartbeat traffic along the path, and/or exhaust resources on endpoints that naively follow them. All timeout proposals and minimum timeouts must therefore be inputs to a dynamic timeout selection process, both at endpoints and on-path devices, which use these signals as hints but clamp their timeouts to sane values set by local policy.
While device timeout and heartbeat interval are generally not linked to privacy-sensitive information, a timeout proposal may add a number of bits of entropy to an endpoint’s unique fingerprint. It is therefore advisable to suggest a small number of useful timeout proposals, in order to reduce this value’s contribution to an endpoint fingerprint.

4. Path MTU Discovery

Similar to the state timeout problem is the Path MTU problem: differing MTUs on different devices along the path can lead to fragmentation or connectivity issues. This problem is made worse by the increasing proliferation of tunnels in the Internet, which reduce the MTU by the amount required for tunnel headers.

4.1. Problem Statement

In order to efficiently send packets along a path end to end, they must be sized to fit in the MTU of the "narrowest" link along the path. Algorithms for path MTU discovery have been defined and standardized for a quarter century, in [RFC1191] for IPv4 and [RFC1981] for IPv6, but they are not often implemented due in part to widespread impairment of ICMP. Packetization Layer Path MTU Discovery [RFC4821] (PLPMTUD) is a more recent attempt to solve the problem, which has the advantage of being transport-protocol independent and functional without ICMP feedback. SPUD, as a shim between UDP and superstrate transport protocols, is at the right place in the stack to implement PLPMTUD, and explicit cooperation can enhance its operation.

4.2. Information Exposed

SPUD can be used to request that SPUD-aware middleboxes along the path expose their next-hop path MTU value. Here, the sending endpoint sends a "accumulate minimum MTU" request along with some scratch space for middleboxes to place the next-hop MTU for the given tube. Each middlebox inspects this value, and writes its own next-hop MTU only if lower than the present value.

A SPUD-aware middlebox that receives a packet that is too big for the next-hop MTU can send back a signal associated with the tube directly to the sender, including the next-hop MTU.

4.3. Mechanism

PLPMTUD functions by dynamically increasing the size of packets sent, and reacting to the loss of the first "too large" packet as an MTU reduction signal, instead of a congestion signal. This must be
implemented in cooperation with the superstrate transport protocol, as it is responsible for how non-MTU-related loss is treated.

When an endpoint receives an accumulated minimum MTU, it should send it back to its remote peer via a feedback channel. The minimum of this value and any direct next-hop MTU signals received from SPUD-aware middleboxes can be used as a hint to the sender’s PLPMTUD process, as a likely upper bound for path MTU associated with a tube.

4.4. Deployment Incentives

As with state lifetime discovery, these signals are of little initial utility to endpoints before SPUD-aware middleboxes are deployed. However, SPUD-aware middleboxes that sit at potential MTU breakpoints along a path, either those which terminate tunnels or bridge networks with two different link types, have an incentive to improve reliability by responding to accumulation requests and sending next-hop MTU messages to SPUD-aware endpoints.

4.5. Security, Privacy, and Trust

As with state lifetime discovery, Minimum MTU and next-hop MTU signals could be used by malicious middleboxes to set the endpoint’s maximum packet size to inefficiently small sizes, if the endpoint follows them naively. For that reason, endpoints should use this information only as hints to improve the operation of PLPMTUD, and may probe above the value derived from the SPUD-supplied information when deemed appropriate by endpoint policy or transport protocol requirements.

5. Low-Latency Service

5.1. Problem Statement

Networks are often optimized for low loss rates and high throughput by providing large buffers that can absorb traffic spikes and rate variations while holding enough data to keep the link full. This is beneficial for applications like high-priority bulk transfer, where only the total transfer time is of interest. High-volume interactive applications, such as videoconferencing, however, have very different requirements. Usually these applications can tolerate higher loss rates, while having hard latency requirements.

Large network buffers may induce high queuing delays due to cross traffic using loss-based congestion control, which must periodically fill the buffer to induce loss during probing for additional bandwidth. This queueing delay can negatively impact the quality of
experience for competing interactive applications, even making them unusable.

5.2. Information Exposed

The simplest mechanism for solving this problem is to separate loss-sensitive from latency-sensitive traffic, as proposed using DSCP codepoints in [I-D.you-tsvwg-latency-loss-tradeoff]. This signal could also be emitted as a per-packet signal within SPUD, since DSCP codepoints are often used for internal traffic engineering and therefore cleared at network borders. This indication does not prioritize one kind of traffic over the other: while loss-sensitive traffic might face larger buffer delay but lower loss rate, latency-sensitive traffic has to make exactly the opposite tradeoff.

An endpoint can also indicate a maximum acceptable single-hop queueing delay per tube, expressed in milliseconds. While this mechanism does not guarantee that sent packets will experience less than the requested delay due to queueing delay, it can significantly reduce the amount of traffic uselessly sitting in queues, since at any given instance only a small number of queues along a path (usually only zero or one) will be full.

5.3. Mechanism

A middlebox may use the loss-/latency tradeoff signal to assign packet to the appropriate type of service, if different services are implemented at this middlebox. Traffic not indicating a low loss or low latency preference would still be assigned to today’s best-effort service, while a new low latency service would be introduced in addition.

The simplest implementation of such a low latency service (without disturbing existing traffic) is to manage traffic with the latency-sensitive flag set in a separate queue. This queue either, in itself, provides only a short buffer which induces a hard limit for the maximum (per-queue) delay or uses an AQM (such as PIE/CoDel) that is configured to keep the queueing delay low.

In such a two-queue system the network provider must decide about bandwidth sharing between both services, and might or might not expose this information. Initially there will only be a few flows that indicate low latency preference. Therefore at the beginning this service might have a low maximum bandwidth share assigned in the scheduler. However, the sharing ratio should be adapted to the traffic load/number of flows in each service class over long timescales.
Applications and endpoints setting the latency sensitivity flag on a tube must be prepared to experience relatively higher loss rates on that tube, and should use techniques such as Forward Error Correction (FEC) to cope with these losses.

If a maximum per-hop delay is indicated by the sender, a SPUD-aware router might drop any packet which would be placed in a queue that has more than the maximum single-hop delay at that point in time before queue admission. Thereby the overall congestion can be reduced early instead of withdrawing the packet at the receiver after it has blocked network resources for other traffic.

A transport protocol at an endpoint indicating the maximum per-hop delay must be aware that it might face higher loss rates under congestion than competing traffic on the same bottleneck.

5.4. Deployment Incentives

Application developers go to a great deal of effort to make latency-sensitive traffic work over today’s Internet. However, if large delays are induced by the network, an application at the endpoint cannot do much. Therefore applications can benefit from further support by the network.

Network operators have already realized a need to better support low latency services. However, they want to avoid any service degradation for existing traffic as well as risking stability due to large configuration changes. Introducing an additional service for latency-sensitive traffic that can exist in parallel to today’s network service helps this problem.

5.5. Security, Privacy, and Trust

An application cannot benefit from wrongly indicating loss- or latency- sensitivity, as it has to make a tradeoff between low loss and potential high delay or low delay and potential high loss.

A simple classification of traffic as loss- or latency-sensitive does not expose privacy-critical information about the user’s behavior; indeed, it exposes far less than presently used by DPI-based traffic classifiers that would be used to determine the latency sensitivity of traffic passing a middlebox.

6. Reordering Sensitivity
6.1. Problem Statement

TCP’s fast retransmit mechanism interprets the reception of three duplicated acknowledgement (where the acknowledgement number is the same than in the previous acknowledgement) as a signal for loss detection. However, a missing packet in the sequence number space must not always be lost. Simple reordering where one packet takes a longer path than (at least three) subsequent packets can have the same effect.

In addition in TCP, loss is an implicit signal for network congestion. Therefore the reception of three duplicated acknowledgement will cause a TCP sender to reduce its sending rate. To avoid unnecessary performance decreases, today’s in-network mechanisms usually aim to avoid reordering. However, this complicates these mechanism significantly and usually requires per-flow state, e.g. in case of Equal Cost Multipath (ECMP) routing where a hash of the 5 tuple would need to be mapped to the right path.

Even though the majority of traffic in the Internet is still TCP, it is likely that new protocols will be design such that they are (more) robust to reordering. Further with an increasing deployment of ECN, even TCP’s congestion control reaction based on duplicated acknowledgements could be relaxed (e.g. by reducing the sending rate gradually depending on the number of lost packets).

However, as middlebox can not know if a certain traffic flow is sensitive to reordering or not, they have to treat all traffic as equally and try to always avoid reordering. (This does not only complicate these mechanism but might also block the deployment of new services.)

6.2. Information Exposed

Reordering-sensitivity is a per tube signal (as reordering can only happen with a flow multiple packets). However, to avoid state in middlebox, it would be beneficial to have a reordering-sensitive flag in each packet.

A transport should set the bit if it is not sensitive to reordering, e.g. if it uses a more advance mechanism (than duplicated acknowledgement) for loss detection, or if the congestion control reaction to this signal imposes only a small performances penalty, or if the flow is short enough that it will not impact its performance.
6.3. Mechanism

A middlebox that implement an in-network function that could lead to varying end-to-end delay and reordering (as packets might overtake each other on different paths or within the network device), do not need to perform any additional action if the reordering-sensitivity flag is not set. However, if the flag is set, the middlebox should avoid reordering by e.g. holding per-tube state and make sure that all packets belonging to the same tube will not be re-ordered.

6.4. Deployment Incentives

Today by default middlebox assume that all traffic is reordering-sensitive which complicates certain in-network mechanism or might also block the deployment of new services. If a middlebox would know that certain traffic is not reordering-sensitive, it could reduce state, speed-up processing, or even implement new services.

Applications that are not loss-sensitive (because they e.g. uses FEC) usually are also not reordering-sensitive. At the same time these application are often sensitive to latency. If the transport handles reordering appropriately and signal this semantic information to the network, the appropriate network treatment can likely also result in lower end-to-end or at least enables the network device to impose any additional delay (e.g. to set up state) on these packets.

6.5. Security, Privacy, and Trust

No trust relationship is needed as the provided information do not results in a preferential treatment. Only transport semantics are exposed that to not contain any private information.

7. Application-Limited Flows

7.1. Problem Statement

Many flows are application-limited, where the application itself adapts the limit to changing traffic conditions or link characteristics, such as with unicast adaptive bitrate streaming video. This adaptation is difficult, since TCP cross-traffic will often probe for available bandwidth more aggressively than the application’s control loop. Further complicating the situation is the fact that rate adaptation may have negative effects on the user’s quality of experience, and should therefore be done infrequently.
7.2. Information Exposed

A SPUD endpoint sending application-limited traffic can provide an explicit per-tube indication of the maximum intended data rate needed by the current encoding or data source. If the bottleneck device is SPUD-aware, it can use this information to decide how to correctly treat the tube, e.g. setting a rate limit or scheduling weight if served from its own queue.

A SPUD endpoint could also send a "minimum rate limit accumulation" request, similar to the other accumulation requests outlined above, where SPUD-aware routers and middleboxes could note the maximum bandwidth available to a tube. Receiving this signal on a feedback channel could allow a sender to more quickly adapt its sending rate. This rate limit information might be derived from local per-flow or per-tube rate limit policy, as well as from current information about load at the router.

These signals can be sent throughout the lifetime of the flow, to help adapt to changing application demands and/or network conditions.

7.3. Mechanism

Maximum expected data rate exposed by the endpoints could be used to make routing decisions and queue selection decisions at SPUD-aware routers, if different paths or queues with different capacity, delay, and load characteristics are available.

A SPUD-aware router that indicates a rate limit can be used by the sender to choose an encoding. However, the sender should still implement a mechanism to probe for available bandwidth to verify the provided information. As a certain rate limit is expected, the sender should probe carefully around this rate.

These mechanisms can also be used for rate increases. If a sender receives an indication that more bandwidth is available it should probe carefully, instead of switching to the higher rate immediately, and decrease its sensitivity to loss (e.g. through the use of additional FEC) which will provide additional protection as soon as the new capacity limit is reached. Likewise, a SPUD-aware router that receives an indication that a flow intends to increase its might prioritize this flow for a certain (short) time to enable a smoother transition.
7.4. Deployment Incentives

Endpoints that indicate maximum sending rate for application-limited traffic on SPUD-aware networks allow the operators of those networks to better handle traffic. This can benefit the service quality and increase the user’s satisfaction with the provided network service.

Currently applications have no good indication when to change their coding rate. Rate increases are especially hard. Further, frequent rate changes should be avoided for quality of experience. Cooperative indication of intended and available sending rate for application-limited flows can simplify probing, and provide signals beyond loss to react effectively to congestion.

7.5. Security, Privacy, and Trust

Both endpoints and SPUD-aware middleboxes should react defensively to rate limit and rate intention information. Endpoints and middleboxes should use measurement and probing to verify that rate information is accurate, but the exposed rate information can be used as hints to routing, scheduling, and rate determination processes.

8. Priority Multiplexing

8.1. Problem Statement

Many services require multiple parallel transmissions to transfer different kinds of data which have clear priority relationships among them. For example, in WebRTC, audio frames should be prioritized over video frames. Sometimes these transmissions happen in different flows, and sometimes some packets within a flow have higher priority than others, for example I-frames in video transmissions. However, current networks will treat all packets the same in case of congestion and might e.g. drop audio packets while video and control traffic are still transmitted.

8.2. Information Exposed

A SPUD sender may indicate a that one tube should "yield" to another, i.e. that it should have lower relative priority than another tube in the same flow. Similarly, individual packets within a tube could be marked as having lower priority. This information can be used to preferentially drop less important packets e.g. carrying information that could be recovered by FEC.

With a stronger integration of codec and transport protocols, SPUD could even indicate more fine-grained priority levels to provide automatic graceful degradation of service within the network itself.
8.3. Mechanism

Designing a general-purpose mechanism that maps relative priorities from the yield information exposed via SPUD to correct per-tube and per-packet treatment at any point in the Internet, is an extremely hard problem and a possible subject for future research. It appears impossible at this writing to design a straightforward mapping function from these relative priorities per-flow to absolute priorities across flows in a fair way.

However, in the not-uncommon case that exists in many access networks, where the bottleneck link has per-user queues and can enforce per-user fairness, the relative priorities can be mapped to absolute priorities, and simple priority queueing at the bottleneck can be used. Lower priority packets within a tube, however, should be assigned to the tube’s priority class, and preferentially dropped instead, e.g. using a different drop threshold at the queue.

8.4. Deployment Incentives

Deployment incentives for priority multiplexing are similar to those for bandwidth declaration for app-limited flows as in Section 7.4: endpoints that correctly declare priority information will experience better quality of service on SPUD-enabled networks, and SPUD-enabled networks get information that allows them to better manage traffic.

8.5. Security, Privacy, and Trust

Since yield information can only be used to disadvantage an application’s traffic relative to its own traffic, there is no incentive for applications to declare incorrect yielding.

The pattern and relative volume of traffic in different yield classes may be used to "fingerprint" certain applications, though it is not clear whether this provides additional information beyond that contained inter-packet delay and volume patterns.

9. In-Band Measurement

9.1. Problem Statement

The current Internet protocol stack has very limited facilities for network measurement and diagnostics. The only explicit measurement feature built into the stack is ICMP Echo ("ping"). In the meantime, the Internet measurement community has defined many inference- and assumption-based approaches for getting better information out of the network: traceroute and BGP looking glasses for topology information, TCP sequence number and TCP timestamp based approaches for latency
and loss estimation, and so on. Each of these uses values placed on
the wire for the internal use of the protocol, not for measurement
purposes, and do not necessarily apply to the deployment of new
protocols or changes to the use of those values by protocol
implementations. Approaches involving the encryption of transport
protocol and application headers (indeed, including that the authors
advance in [I-D.trammell-spud-req]) will break most of these, as
well.

Replacing the information used for measurement with values defined
explicitly to be used for measurement in a transport protocol
independent way allows explicit endpoint control of measurability and
measurement overhead.

We note that current work in IPPM [I-D.ietf-ippm-6man-pdm-option]
proposes a roughly equivalent, IPv6-only, kernel-implementation-only
facility.

9.2. Information Exposed

The "big five" metrics - latency, loss, jitter, data rate / goodput,
and reordering - can be measured using a relatively simple set of
primitives. Packet receipt acknowledgment using a cumulative nonce
echo allows both endpoint and on-path measurement of loss and
reordering as well as goodput (when combined with layer 3 packet
length headers). A timestamp echo facility, analogous to TCP’s
timestamp option but using an explicitly defined, constant-rate clock
and exposure of local delta (time between receipt and subsequent
transmission).

The cumulative nonce echo consists of two values: a number
identifying a given packet (nonce), which also identifies all
retransmissions of the packet, and a number which is the sum of all
packet identifiers received from the remote endpoint (echo), modulo
the maximum value of the echo field. Nonces need not be sequential,
or even monotonic, but two packets with the same nonce should not be
simultaneously in flight. These are exposed on a per-packet basis,
but need not appear on every packet in the tube or flow, with the
caveat that lower sampling rates lead to lower sensitivity.

The timestamp echo consists of three values: The time in terms of
ticks of a constant rate clock that a packet is sent, the echo of the
last such timestamp received from the remote endpoint, and the number
of ticks of the sender’s clock between the receipt of the last
timestamp from the remote endpoint and the transmission of the packet
containing the echo. This last delta value is the missing link in
TCP sequence number based and timestamp option based latency
estimation.
The information exposed is roughly equivalent than that currently exposed by TCP as a side effect of its operation, but defined such that they are explicitly useful for measurement, useful regardless of transport protocol, and such that information exposure is in the explicit control of the endpoint (when the superstrate transport protocol’s headers are encrypted).

9.3. Mechanism

The nonce and timestamp echo information, emitted as per-packet signals in the SPUD header, can be used by any device which can see it to estimate performance metrics on a per-tube basis. This includes both remote endpoints, as well as passive performance measurement devices colocated with network gateways.

9.4. Deployment Incentives

Initial deployment of this facility is most likely in closed networks such as enterprise data centers, where a single administrative entity owns the network and the endpoints, can control which flows and tubes are annotated with measurement information, and can benefit from the additional insight given during network troubleshooting by explicit measurement headers.

Further, since the provided measurement information is exposed by SPUD to the far-endpoint, it can be used for performance enhancement on these layers. Once the facility is deployed in SPUD-aware endpoints, it can also be used for inter-network and cross-Internet performance measurement and debugging (replacing today’s processing-intensive DPI mechanisms).

9.5. Security, Privacy, and Trust

The cumulative nonce and timestamp echo leaks no more information about the traffic than the TCP header does. Indeed, since the cumulative nonce does not include sequence number information or other protocol-internal information, it allows passive measurement of loss and latency without giving measurement devices access to information they could use to spoof valid packets within a transport layer connection.

In order to prevent middleboxes from modifying measurement-relevant information, these per-packet signals will need to be integrity protected by SPUD.

Performance measurement boxes at gateways which observe and aggregate these signals will necessarily need to trust their accuracy, but can
verify their plausibility by calculating nonce sums and synchronizing timing clocks.

10. IANA Considerations

This document has no actions for IANA.

11. Security Considerations

Security and privacy considerations for each use case are given in the corresponding Security, Privacy, and Trust subsection.

12. Acknowledgments

This document grew in part out of discussions of initial use cases for middlebox cooperation at the IAB SEMI Workshop and the IETF 92 SPUD BoF; thanks to the participants. Some use case details came out of discussions with the authors of the [I-D.trammell-spud-req]: in addition to the editors of this document, David Black, Ken Calvert, Ted Hardie, Joe Hildebrand, Jana Iyengar, and Eric Rescorla. Section 9 is based in part on discussions and ongoing work with Mark Allman and Rob Beverly.

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[I-D.trammell-spud-req]
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Update of the List of Configurable SCTP Protocol Parameters
draft-morand-tsvwg-sctp-parameters-update-00

Abstract

In the SCTP protocol stack implementations available for deployment in operational networks, it has been usually observed that the list of parameters that can be configured by the operators is often restricted to the list of SCTP protocol parameter values that are recommended for SCTP given in the IETF RFC 4960. However, this list is not exhaustive.

This document updates the IETF RFC 4960 by including the SACK delay as part of the list of SCTP protocol parameters that can be configurable by an SCTP administrator. The associated recommended value is also given, according to the IETF RFC 4960

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1. Introduction

The Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) is specified in the IETF RFC 4960 [RFC4960], document that obsoletes IETF RFC 2960 and RFC 3309. In the section 15 of IETF RFC 4960 [RFC4960], there is a list of SCTP protocol parameter values that are recommended. This list is given below:

RTO.Initial - 3 seconds
RTO.Min - 1 second
RTO.Max - 60 seconds
Max.Burst - 4
RTO.Alpha - 1/8
RTO.Beta - 1/4
Valid.Cookie.Life - 60 seconds
Association.Max.Retrans - 10 attempts
Path.Max.Retrans - 5 attempts (per destination address)
Max.Init.Retransmits - 8 attempts
HB.interval - 30 seconds
HB.Max.Burst - 1

In the SCTP protocol stack implementations available in the operational field, it has been usually observed that the list of parameters that can be configured by the operators is often restricted to the list of parameters given in the section 15 of the IETF RFC 4960 [RFC4960]. However, this list is not exhaustive and therefore, depending on the SCTP stack implementations, some parameters may or may not be part of the list of parameters that can be configured by the SCTP administrators.

2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

This document uses terminology defined [RFC4960].

3. SACK Delay

As part of the parameters that are not listed as configurable parameters, a specific parameter is the Selective Acknowledgement (SACK) delay. In SCTP, the SACK (3) is sent to a peer endpoint to acknowledge received DATA chunks and to inform the peer endpoint of gaps in the received subsequences of DATA chunks as represented by their Transmission Sequence Numbers (TSNs). This SACK should be sent within a maximum delay. The following recommendation is given in the section 6.2 of the IETF RFC 4960 [RFC4960] "Acknowledgement on Reception of DATA Chunks":

Specifically, an acknowledgement SHOULD be generated for at least every second packet (not every second DATA chunk) received, and SHOULD be generated within 200 ms of the arrival of any unacknowledged DATA chunk.

Moreover, in the same section, there is the following implementation note:

IMPLEMENTATION NOTE: The maximum delay for generating an acknowledgement may be configured by the SCTP administrator, either statically or dynamically, in order to meet the specific timing requirement of the protocol being carried.

The following normative statement is also added:
An implementation MUST NOT allow the maximum delay to be configured to be more than 500 ms. In other words, an implementation MAY lower this value below 500 ms but MUST NOT raise it above 500 ms.

Based on the statements given in the section 6.2 of the IETF RFC 4960 [RFC4960], it is implied that the maximum delay for generating a SACK must also be configurable by the SCTP administrator. If the recommended delay for sending a SACK is 200ms, this delay must not exceed 500ms, which leaves latitudes for the setting of the SACK delay value. However, as SCTP stack implementers usually refer only to the section 15 of the IETF RFC 4960 [RFC4960] to identify the list of configurable SCTP parameters, the configuration of the maximum delay for generating a SACK is commonly not supported.

It is then proposed to update the IETF RFC 4960 [RFC4960] to include the SCTP protocol parameter "SACK.Delay" as one of the configurable SCTP protocol parameters, in addition to the existing parameters given in the section 15 of the IETF RFC 4960 [RFC4960].

4. List of Configurable SCTP Protocol parameters

This document updates the IETF RFC 4960 [RFC4960] by including the SACK delay as part of the list of SCTP protocol parameters that MUST be configurable. The updated list is given below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SCTP Parameters</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RTO.Initial</td>
<td>see section 6.3.1 [RC4960]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RTO.Min</td>
<td>see section 6.3.1 [RC4960]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RTO.Max</td>
<td>see section 6.3.1 [RC4960]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Max.Burst</td>
<td>see section 6.1 [RC4960]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RTO.Alpha</td>
<td>see section 6.3.1 [RC4960]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RTO.Beta</td>
<td>see section 6.3.1 [RC4960]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valid.Cookie.Life</td>
<td>see section 5.1.3 [RC4960]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association.Max.Retrans</td>
<td>see section 8.1 [RC4960]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Path.Max.Retrans</td>
<td>see section 8.2 [RC4960]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Max.Init.Retransmits</td>
<td>see section 4 [RC4960]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HB.interval</td>
<td>see section 8.3 [RC4960]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.Max.Burst</td>
<td>see section 5.4 [RC4960]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SACK.Delay</td>
<td>see section 6.2 [RC4960]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5. Suggested SCTP Protocol Parameter Values

This document updates the IETF RFC 4960 [RFC4960] by including the SACK delay recommended value in the list of suggested SCTP protocol parameter values. The updated list is given below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SCTP Parameters</th>
<th>Recommended Values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RTO.Initial</td>
<td>3 seconds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RTO.Min</td>
<td>1 second</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RTO.Max</td>
<td>60 seconds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Max.Burst</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RTO.Alpha</td>
<td>1/8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RTO.Beta</td>
<td>1/4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valid.Cookie.Life</td>
<td>60 seconds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association.Max.Retrans</td>
<td>10 attempts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Path.Max.Retrans</td>
<td>5 attempts (per destination address)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Max.Init.Retransmits</td>
<td>8 attempts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HB.interval</td>
<td>30 seconds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.Max.Burst</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SACK.Delay</td>
<td>200 milliseconds</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IMPLEMENTATION NOTE: The SCTP implementation may allow Upper Layer Protocol (ULP) to customize some of these protocol parameters (see Section 10 of the IETF RFC 4960 [RFC4960].

Note: RTO.Min SHOULD be set as recommended above.

6. IANA Considerations

This document makes no request for IANA.

Note to RFC Editor: this section may be removed on publication as an RFC.

7. Security Considerations

This document does not modify the security considerations given in section 11 of the IETF RFC 4960 [RFC4960].

8. Acknowledgments

The authors of this document want to thank... (TBC).
9. Normative References


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Transport Options for UDP
draft-touch-tsvwg-udp-options-09.txt

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Abstract

Transport protocols are extended through the use of transport header options. This document experimentally extends UDP by indicating the location, syntax, and semantics for UDP transport layer options.

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1. Introduction

Transport protocols use options as a way to extend their capabilities. TCP [RFC793], SCTP [RFC4960], and DCCP [RFC4340] include space for these options but UDP [RFC768] currently does not. This document defines an experimental extension to UDP that provides space for transport options including their generic syntax and
semantics for their use in UDP’s stateless, unreliable message protocol.

2. Conventions used in this document

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

In this document, these words will appear with that interpretation only when in ALL CAPS. Lowercase uses of these words are not to be interpreted as carrying significance described in RFC 2119.

In this document, the characters ">>" preceding an indented line(s) indicates a statement using the key words listed above. This convention aids reviewers in quickly identifying or finding the portions of this RFC covered by these key words.

3. Background

Many protocols include a default header and an area for header options. These options enable the protocol to be extended for use in particular environments or in ways unforeseen by the original designers. Examples include TCP’s Maximum Segment Size, Window Scale, Timestamp, and Authentication Options [RFC793][RFC5925][RFC7323].

These options are used both in stateful (connection-oriented, e.g., TCP [RFC793], SCTP [RFC4960], DCCP [RFC4340]) and stateless (connectionless, e.g., IPv4 [RFC791], IPv6 [RFC2460]) protocols. In stateful protocols they can help extend the way in which state is managed. In stateless protocols their effect is often limited to individual packets, but they can have an aggregate effect on a sequence as well. One example of such uses is Substrate Protocol for User Datagrams (SPUD) [Tr15], and this document is intended to provide an out-of-band option area as an alternative to the in-band mechanism currently proposed [Hi15].

UDP is one of the most popular protocols that lacks space for options [RFC768]. The UDP header was intended to be a minimal addition to IP, providing only ports and a data checksum for protection. This document experimentally extends UDP to provide a trailer area for options located after the UDP data payload.
4. The UDP Option Area

The UDP transport header includes demultiplexing and service identification (port numbers), a checksum, and a field that indicates the UDP datagram length (including UDP header). The UDP Length field is typically redundant with the size of the maximum space available as a transport protocol payload (see also discussion in Section 9).

For IPv4, IP Total Length field indicates the total IP datagram length (including IP header), and the size of the IP options is indicated in the IP header (in 4-byte words) as the "Internet Header Length" (IHL), as shown in Figure 1 [RFC791]. As a result, the typical (and largest valid) value for UDP Length is:

\[ \text{UDP\_Length} = \text{IPv4\_Total\_Length} - \text{IPv4\_IHL} \times 4 \]

For IPv6, the IP Payload Length field indicates the datagram after the base IPv6 header, which includes the IPv6 extension headers and space available for the transport protocol, as shown in Figure 2 [RFC2460]. Note that the Next HDR field in IPv6 might not indicate UDP (i.e., 17), e.g., when intervening IP extension headers are present. For IPv6, the lengths of any additional IP extensions are indicated within each extension [RFC2460], so the typical (and largest valid) value for UDP Length is:

\[ \text{UDP\_Length} = \text{IPv6\_Payload\_Length} - \text{sum(extension header lengths)} \]

In both cases, the space available for the UDP transport protocol data unit is indicated by IP, either completely in the base header (for IPv4) or adding information in the extensions (for IPv6). In either case, this document will refer to this available space as the "IP transport payload".
As a result of this redundancy, there is an opportunity to use the UDP Length field as a way to break up the IP transport payload into two areas – that intended as UDP user data and an additional "surplus area" (as shown in Figure 3).
In most cases, the IP transport payload and UDP Length point to the same location, indicating that there is no surplus area. It is important to note that this is not a requirement of UDP [RFC768] (discussed further in Section 9). UDP-Lite used the difference in these pointers to indicate the partial coverage of the UDP Checksum, such that the UDP user data, UDP header, and UDP pseudoheader (a subset of the IP header) are covered by the UDP checksum but additional user data in the surplus area is not covered [RFC3828]. This document uses the surplus area for UDP transport options.

The UDP option area is thus defined as the location between the end of the UDP payload and the end of the IP datagram as a trailing options area. This area can occur at any valid byte offset, i.e., it need not be 16-bit or 32-bit aligned. In effect, this document redefines the UDP "Length" field as a "trailer offset".

UDP options are defined using a TLV (type, length, and optional value) syntax similar to that of TCP [RFC793]. They are typically a minimum of two bytes in length as shown in Figure 4, excepting only the one byte options "No Operation" (NOP) and "End of Options List" (EOL) described below.

```
+--------+--------+
|  Kind  | Length |
+--------+--------+
```

Figure 4 UDP option default format

>> UDP options MAY occur at any UDP length offset.

>> The UDP length MUST be at least as large as the UDP header (8) and no larger than the IP transport payload. Values outside this range MUST be silently discarded as invalid and logged where rate-limiting permits.

Others have considered using values of the UDP Length that is larger than the IP transport payload as an additional type of signal. Using
a value smaller than the IP transport payload is expected to be backward compatible with existing UDP implementations, i.e., to deliver the UDP Length of user data to the application and silently ignore the additional surplus area data. Using a value larger than the IP transport payload would either be considered malformed (and be silently dropped) or could cause buffer overruns, and so is not considered silently and safely backward compatible. Its use is thus out of scope for the extension described in this document.

>> UDP options MUST be interpreted in the order in which they occur in the UDP option area.

5. UDP Options

The following UDP options are currently defined:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kind</th>
<th>Length</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>End of Options List (EOL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>No operation (NOP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2*</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Option checksum (OCS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Alternate checksum (ACS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Lite (LITE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Maximum segment size (MSS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Timestamps (TIME)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Fragmentation (FRAG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>(varies)</td>
<td>Authentication and Encryption (AE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-126</td>
<td>(varies)</td>
<td>UNASSIGNED (assignable by IANA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>127-253</td>
<td></td>
<td>RESERVED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>254</td>
<td>N(&gt;=4)</td>
<td>RFC 3692-style experiments (EXP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>255</td>
<td></td>
<td>RESERVED</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These options are defined in the following subsections.

>> An endpoint supporting UDP options MUST support those marked with a "*" above: EOL, NOP, and OCS.

[QUESTION: Should we extend these, e.g., through #7?]

>> All other options (without a "*") MAY be implemented, and their use SHOULD be determined either out-of-band or negotiated.

>> Receivers MUST silently ignore unknown options. That includes options whose length does not indicate the specified value.
Receivers cannot treat unexpected option lengths as invalid, as this would unnecessarily limit future revision of options (e.g., defining a new ACS that is defined by having a different length).

Option lengths MUST NOT exceed the IP length of the packet. If this occurs, the packet MUST be treated as malformed and dropped, and the event MAY be logged for diagnostics (logging SHOULD be rate limited).

Required options MUST come before other options. Each required option MUST NOT occur more than once (if they are repeated in a received segment, all except the first MUST be silently ignored).

The requirement that required options come before others is intended to allow for endpoints to implement DOS protection, as discussed further in Section 12.

5.1. End of Options List (EOL)

The End of Options List (EOL) option indicates that there are no more options. It is used to indicate the end of the list of options without needing to pad the options to fill all available option space.

```
+--------+
| Kind=0 |
+--------+
```

Figure 5 UDP EOL option format

When the UDP options do not consume the entire option area, the last non-NOP option SHOULD be EOL (vs. filling the entire option area with NOP values).

All bytes after EOL MUST be ignored by UDP option processing. As a result, there can only ever be one EOL option (even if other bytes were zero, they are ignored).

5.2. No Operation (NOP)

The No Operation (NOP) option is a one byte placeholder, intended to be used as padding, e.g., to align multi-byte options along 16-bit or 32-bit boundaries.
If options longer than one byte are used, NOP options SHOULD be used at the beginning of the UDP options area to achieve alignment as would be more efficient for active (i.e., non-NOP) options.

Segments SHOULD NOT use more than three consecutive NOPs. NOPs are intended to assist with alignment, not other padding or fill.

[NOTE: Tom Herbert suggested we declare "more than 3 consecutive NOPs" a fatal error to reduce the potential of using NOPs as a DOS attack, but IMO there are other equivalent ways (e.g., using RESERVED or other UNASSIGNED values) and the "no more than 3" creates its own DOS vulnerability]

5.3. Option Checksum (OCS)

The Option Checksum (OCS) is an 8-bit ones-complement sum (Ones8) that covers all of the UDP options. OCS is 8-bits to allow the entire option to occupy a total of 16 bits.

OCS can be calculated by computing the 16-bit ones-complement sum and "folding over" the result (using carry wraparound). Note that OCS is direct, i.e., it is not negated or adjusted if zero (unlike the Internet checksum as used in IPv4, TCP, and UDP headers). OCS protects the option area from errors in a similar way that the UDP checksum protects the UDP user data.

When present, the option checksum SHOULD occur as early as possible, preferably preceded by only NOP options for alignment and the LITE option if present.

OCS covers the entire UDP option, including the Lite option as formatted before swapping for transmission (or, equivalently, after the swap after reception).
If the option checksum fails, all options MUST be ignored and any trailing surplus data (and Lite data, if used) silently discarded.

UDP data that is validated by a correct UDP checksum MUST be delivered to the application layer, even if the UDP option checksum fails, unless the endpoints have negotiated otherwise for this segment’s socket pair.

5.4. Alternate Checksum (ACS)

The Alternate Checksum (ACS) is a 16-bit CRC of the UDP payload only (excluding the IP pseudoheader, UDP header, and UDP options). It does not include the IP pseudoheader or UDP header, and so need not be updated by NATs when IP addresses or UDP ports are rewritten. Its purpose is to detect errors that the UDP checksum might not detect. CRC-CCITT (polynomial \( x^{16} + x^{12} + x^5 + x \) or polynomial 0x1021) has been chosen because of its ubiquity and use in other packet protocols, such as X.25, HDLC, and Bluetooth.

```
+--------+--------+--------+--------+
| Kind=3 | Len=4  |    CRC16sum    |
+--------+--------+--------+--------+
```

Figure 8 UDP ACS option format

5.5. Lite (LITE)

The Lite option (LITE) is intended to provide equivalent capability to the UDP Lite transport protocol [RFC3828]. UDP Lite allows the UDP checksum to cover only a prefix of the UDP data payload, to protect critical information (e.g., application headers) but allow potentially erroneous data to be passed to the user. This feature helps protect application headers but allows for application data errors. Some applications are impacted more by a lack of data than errors in data, e.g., voice and video.

When LITE is active, it MUST come first in the UDP options list.

LITE is intended to support the same API as for UDP Lite to allow applications to send and receive data that has a marker indicating the portion protected by the UDP checksum and the portion not protected by the UDP checksum.

LITE includes a 2-byte offset that indicates the length of the portion of the UDP data that is not covered by the UDP checksum.
At the sender, the option is formed using the following steps:

1. Create a LITE option, ordered as the first UDP option (Figure 10).

2. Calculate the location of the start of the options as an absolute offset from the start of the UDP header and place that length in the last two bytes of the LITE option.

3. Swap all four bytes of the LITE option with the first 4 bytes of the LITE data area (Figure 11).

The resulting packet has the format shown in Figure 12. Note that the UDP length now points to the LITE option, and the LITE option points to the start of the option area.
A legacy endpoint receiving this packet will discard the LITE option and everything that follows, including the lite data and remainder of the UDP options. The UDP checksum will protect only the user data, not the LITE option or lite data.

Receiving endpoints capable of processing UDP options will do the following:

1. Process options as usual. This will start at the LITE option.

2. When the LITE option is encountered, record its location as the start of the LITE data area and swap the four bytes there with the four bytes at the location indicated inside the LITE option, which indicates the start of all of the options, including the LITE one (one past the end of the lite data area). This restores the format of the option as per Figure 10.

3. Continue processing the remainder of the options, which are now in the format shown in Figure 11.

The purpose of this swap is to support the equivalent of UDP Lite operation together with other UDP options without requiring the entire LITE data area to be moved after the UDP option area.

5.6. Maximum Segment Size (MSS)

The Maximum Segment Size (MSS, Kind = 3) is a 16-bit indicator of the largest UDP segment that can be received. As with the TCP MSS option [RFC793], the size indicated is the IP layer MTU decreased by the fixed IP and UDP headers only [RFC6691]. The space needed for IP and UDP options need to be adjusted by the sender when using the value indicated. The value transmitted is based on EMTU_R, the largest IP datagram that can be received (i.e., reassembled at the receiver) [RFC1122].
The UDP MSS option MAY be used for path MTU discovery [RFC1191], [RFC1981], but this may be difficult because of known issues with ICMP blocking [RFC2923] as well as UDP lacking automatic retransmission. It is more likely to be useful when coupled with IP source fragmentation to limit the largest reassembled UDP message, e.g., when EMTU_R is larger than the required minimums (576 for IPv4 [RFC791] and 1500 for IPv6 [RFC2460]).

5.7. Timestamps (TIME)

The UDP Timestamp option (TIME) exchanges two four-byte timestamp fields. It serves a similar purpose to TCP’s TS option [RFC7323], enabling UDP to estimate the round trip time (RTT) between hosts. For UDP, this RTT can be useful for establishing UDP fragment reassembly timeouts or transport-layer rate-limiting [RFC8085].

TS Value (TSval) and TS Echo (TSecr) are used in a similar manner to the TCP TS option [RFC7323]. A host using the Timestamp option sets TS Value on all UDP segments issued. Received TSval values are provided to the application, which passes this value as TSecr on UDP messages sent in response to such a message.

>> UDP MAY use an RTT estimate based on nonzero Timestamp values as a hint for fragmentation reassembly, rate limiting, or other mechanisms that benefit from such an estimate.

>> UDP SHOULD make this RTT estimate available to the user application.

5.8. Fragmentation (FRAG)

The Fragmentation option (FRAG) supports UDP fragmentation and reassembly, which can be used to transfer UDP messages larger than limited by the IP receive MTU (EMTU_R [RFC1122]). It is typically...
used with the UDP MSS option to enable more efficient use of large messages, both at the UDP and IP layers. FRAG is designed similar to the IPv6 Fragmentation Header [RFC2460], except that the UDP variant uses a 16-bit Offset measured in bytes, rather than IPv6’s 13-bit Fragment Offset measured in 8-byte units. This UDP variant avoids creating reserved fields.

```
          +--------+--------+--------+--------+
          | Kind=8 | Len=8  |  Frag. Offset   |
          +--------+--------+--------+--------+
          |          Identification           |
          +--------+--------+--------+--------+
```

Figure 15  UDP non-terminal FRAG option format

The FRAG option also lacks a "more" bit, zeroed for the terminal fragment of a set. This is possible because the terminal FRAG option is indicated as a longer, 12-byte variant, which includes an Internet checksum over the reassembled payload (omitting the IP pseudoheader and UDP header, as well as UDP options), as shown in Figure 16.

```
          +--------+--------+--------+--------+
          | Kind=8 | Len=12 |  Frag. Offset   |
          +--------+--------+--------+--------+
          |          Identification           |
          +--------+--------+--------+--------+
          |    Checksum     |
          +--------+--------+
```

Figure 16  UDP terminal FRAG option format

The Fragment Offset is 16 bits and indicates the location of the UDP payload fragment in bytes from the beginning of the original unfragmented payload. The Len field indicates whether there are more fragments (Len=8) or no more fragments (Len=12).

>> The Identification field is a 32-bit value that MUST be unique over the expected fragment reassembly timeout.

>> The Identification field SHOULD be generated in a manner similar to that of the IPv6 Fragment ID [RFC2460].
UDP fragments MUST NOT overlap.

FRAG needs to be used with extreme care because it will present incorrect datagram boundaries to a legacy receiver, unless encoded as LITE data (see Section 5.8.1).

A host SHOULD indicate FRAG support by transmitting an unfragmented datagram using the Fragmentation option (e.g., with Offset zero and length 12, i.e., including the checksum area), except when encoded as LITE.

A host MUST NOT transmit a UDP fragment before receiving recent confirmation from the remote host, except when FRAG is encoded as LITE.

UDP fragmentation relies on a fragment expiration timer, which can be preset or could use a value computed using the UDP Timestamp option.

The default UDP reassembly SHOULD be no more than 2 minutes.

Implementers are advised to limit the space available for UDP reassembly.

UDP reassembly space SHOULD be limited to reduce the impact of DOS attacks on resource use.

UDP reassembly space limits SHOULD NOT be implemented as an aggregate, to avoid cross-socketpair DOS attacks.

Individual UDP fragments MUST NOT be forwarded to the user. The reassembled datagram is received only after complete reassembly, checksum validation, and continued processing of the remaining options.

Any additional UDP options would follow the FRAG option in the final fragment, and would be included in the reassembled packet. Processing of those options would commence after reassembly.

UDP options MUST NOT follow the FRAG header in non-terminal fragments. Any data following the FRAG header in non-terminal fragments MUST be silently dropped. All other options that apply to a reassembled packet MUST follow the FRAG header in the terminal fragment.
5.8.1. Coupling FRAG with LITE

FRAG can be coupled with LITE to avoid impacting legacy receivers. Each fragment is sent as LITE un-checksummed data, where each UDP packet contains no legacy-compatible data. Legacy receivers interpret these as zero-payload packets, which would not affect the receiver unless the presence of the packet itself were a signal. The header of such a packet would appear as shown in Figure 17 and Figure 18.

```
+---------+--------------+---------+
| UDP Hdr |   LiteFrag   |LITE|FRAG|
+---------+--------------+----+----+

|                  ^^^^    ^^^^ |
Zero UDP Length   |
                 +----------+

Figure 17  Preparing FRAG as Lite data
```

```
+---------+--------------+----+
| UDP Hdr |LITE|LiteFrag |FRAG|
+---------+--------------+----+

|                  ^   |
Zero UDP Length   |
                 +-------------+

Figure 18  Lite option before transmission
```

When a packet is reassembled, it appears as a complete LITE data region. The UDP header of the reassembled packet is adjusted accordingly, so that the reassembled region now appears as conventional UDP user data, and processing of the UDP options continues, as with the non-LITE FRAG variant.

5.9. Authentication and Encryption (AE)

The Authentication and Encryption option (AE) is intended to allow UDP to provide a similar type of authentication as the TCP Authentication Option (TCP-AO) [RFC5925]. It uses the same format as specified for TCP-AO, except that it uses a Kind of 8. UDP-AO supports NAT traversal in a similar manner as TCP-AO [RFC6978]. UDP-AO can also be extended to provide a similar encryption capability as TCP-AO-ENC, in a similar manner [To17ao]. For these reasons, the option is known as UDP-AE.
Like TCP-AO, UDP-AE is not negotiated in-band. Its use assumes both endpoints have populated Master Key Tuples (MKTs), used to exclude non-protected traffic.

TCP-AO generates unique traffic keys from a hash of TCP connection parameters. UDP lacks a three-way handshake to coordinate connection-specific values, such as TCP’s Initial Sequence Numbers (ISNs) [RFC793], thus UDP-AE’s Key Derivation Function (KDF) uses zeroes as the value for both ISNs. This means that the UDP-AE reuses keys when socket pairs are reused, unlike TCP-AO.

5.10. Experimental (EXP)

The Experimental option (EXP) is reserved for experiments [RFC3692]. Only one such value is reserved because experiments are expected to use an Experimental ID (ExIDs) to differentiate concurrent use for different purposes, using UDP ExIDs registered with IANA according to the approach developed for TCP experimental options [RFC6994].

>> The length of the experimental option MUST be at least 4 to account for the Kind, Length, and the minimum 16-bit UDP ExID identifier (similar to TCP ExIDs [RFC6994]).

6. UDP API Extensions

UDP currently specifies an application programmer interface (API), summarized as follows (with Unix-style command as an example) [RFC768]:

- Method to create new receive ports
  - E.g., bind(handle, recvaddr(optional), recvport)

- Receive, which returns data octets, source port, and source address
  - E.g., recvfrom(handle, srcaddr, srcport, data)

- Send, which specifies data, source and destination addresses, and source and destination ports
  - E.g., sendto(handle, destaddr, destport, data)

This API is extended to support options as follows:
o Extend the method to create receive ports to include receive options that are required. Datagrams not containing these required options MUST be silently dropped and MAY be logged.

o Extend the receive function to indicate the options and their parameters as received with the corresponding received datagram.

o Extend the send function to indicate the options to be added to the corresponding sent datagram.

Examples of API instances for Linux and FreeBSD are provided in Appendix A, to encourage uniform cross-platform implementations.

7. Whose options are these?

UDP options are indicated in an area of the IP payload that is not used by UDP. That area is really part of the IP payload, not the UDP payload, and as such, it might be tempting to consider whether this is a generally useful approach to extending IP.

Unfortunately, the surplus area exists only for transports that include their own transport layer payload length indicator. TCP and SCTP include header length fields that already provide space for transport options by indicating the total length of the header area, such that the entire remaining area indicated in the network layer (IP) is transport payload. UDP-Lite already uses the UDP Length field to indicate the boundary between data covered by the transport checksum and data not covered, and so there is no remaining area where the length of the UDP-Lite payload as a whole can be indicated [RFC3828].

UDP options are intended for use only by the transport endpoints. They are no more (or less) appropriate to be modified in-transit than any other portion of the transport datagram.

UDP options are transport options. Generally, transport datagrams are not intended to be modified in-transit. However, the UDP option mechanism provides no specific protection against in-transit modification of the UDP header, UDP payload, or UDP option area, except as provided by the options selected (e.g., OCS, ACS, or AE).

8. UDP options vs. UDP-Lite

UDP-Lite provides partial checksum coverage, so that packets with errors in some locations can be delivered to the user [RFC3828]. It uses a different transport protocol number (136) than UDP (17) to
interpret the UDP Length field as the prefix covered by the UDP checksum.

UDP (protocol 17) already defines the UDP Length field as the limit of the UDP checksum, but by default also limits the data provided to the application as that which precedes the UDP Length. A goal of UDP-Lite is to deliver data beyond UDP Length as a default, which is why a separate transport protocol number was required.

UDP options do not need a separate transport protocol number because the data beyond the UDP Length offset (surplus data) is not provided to the application by default. That data is interpreted exclusively within the UDP transport layer.

UDP options support a similar service to UDP-Lite by terminating the UDP options with an EOL option. The additional data not covered by the UDP checksum follows that EOL option, and is passed to the user separately. The difference is that UDP-Lite provides the un-checksummed user data to the application by default, whereas UDP options can provide the same capability only for endpoints that are negotiated in advance (i.e., by default, UDP options would silently discard this non-checksummed data). Additionally, in UDP-Lite the checksummed and non-checksummed payload components are adjacent, whereas in UDP options they are separated by the option area - which, minimally, must consist of at least one EOL option.

UDP-Lite cannot support UDP options, either as proposed here or in any other form, because the entire payload of the UDP packet is already defined as user data and there is no additional field in which to indicate a separate area for options. The UDP Length field in UDP-Lite is already used to indicate the boundary between user data covered by the checksum and user data not covered.

9. Interactions with Legacy Devices

It has always been permissible for the UDP Length to be inconsistent with the IP transport payload length [RFC768]. Such inconsistency has been utilized in UDP-Lite using a different transport number. There are no known systems that use this inconsistency for UDP [RFC3828]. It is possible that such use might interact with UDP options, i.e., where legacy systems might generate UDP datagrams that appear to have UDP options. The UDP OCS provides protection against such events and is stronger than a static "magic number".

UDP options have been tested as interoperable with Linux, Max OS-X, and Windows Cygwin, and worked through NAT devices. These systems
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One reported embedded device passes the entire IP datagram to the
UDP application layer. Although this feature could enable
application-layer UDP option processing, it would require that
conventional UDP user applications examine only the UDP payload.
This feature is also inconsistent with the UDP application interface
[ RFC768 ] [ RFC1122 ].

It has been reported that Alcatel-Lucent’s "Brick" Intrusion
Detection System has a default configuration that interprets
inconsistencies between UDP Length and IP Length as an attack to be
reported. Note that other firewall systems, e.g., CheckPoint, use a
default "relaxed UDP length verification" to avoid falsely
interpreting this inconsistency as an attack.

(TBD: test with UDP checksum offload and UDP fragmentation offload)

10. Options in a Stateless, Unreliable Transport Protocol

There are two ways to interpret options for a stateless, unreliable
protocol — an option is either local to the message or intended to
affect a stream of messages in a soft-state manner. Either
interpretation is valid for defined UDP options.

It is impossible to know in advance whether an endpoint supports a
UDP option.

>> UDP options MUST allow for silent failure on first receipt.

>> UDP options that rely on soft-state exchange MUST allow for
message reordering and loss.

>> A UDP option MUST be silently optional until confirmed by
exchange with an endpoint.

The above requirements prevent using any option that cannot be
safely ignored unless that capability has been negotiated with an
endpoint in advance for a socket pair. Legacy systems would need to
be able to interpret the transport payload fragments as individual
transport datagrams.

11. UDP Option State Caching

Some TCP connection parameters, stored in the TCP Control Block, can
be usefully shared either among concurrent connections or between
connections in sequence, known as TCP Sharing [RFC2140][To17cb]. Although UDP is stateless, some of the options proposed herein may have similar benefit in being shared or cached. We call this UCB Sharing, or UDP Control Block Sharing, by analogy.

[TBD: extend this section to indicate which options MAY vs. MUST NOT be shared and how, e.g., along the lines of To17cb]

Updates to RFC 768

This document updates RFC 768 as follows:

- This document defines the meaning of the IP payload area beyond the UDP length but within the IP length.
- This document extends the UDP API to support the use of options.

12. Security Considerations

The use of UDP packets with inconsistent IP and UDP Length fields has the potential to trigger a buffer overflow error if not properly handled, e.g., if space is allocated based on the smaller field and copying is based on the larger. However, there have been no reports of such vulnerability and it would rely on inconsistent use of the two fields for memory allocation and copying.

UDP options are not covered by DTLS (datagram transport-layer security). Despite the name, neither TLS [RFC5246] (transport layer security, for TCP) nor DTLS [RFC6347] (TLS for UDP) protect the transport layer. Both operate as a shim layer solely on the payload of transport packets, protecting only their contents. Just as TLS does not protect the TCP header or its options, DTLS does not protect the UDP header or the new options introduced by this document. Transport security is provided in TCP by the TCP Authentication Option (TCP-AO [RFC5925]) or in UDP by the Authentication Extension option (Section 5.9). Transport headers are also protected as payload when using IP security (IPsec) [RFC4301].

UDP options use the TLV syntax similar to that of TCP. This syntax is known to require serial processing and may pose a DOS risk, e.g., if an attacker adds large numbers of unknown options that must be parsed in their entirety. Implementations concerned with the potential for this vulnerability MAY implement only the required options and MAY also limit NOPs (e.g., no more than three consecutive NOPs or some total number that might occur between the required options, if all are present). Because the required options
come first and at most once each (and all later duplicates silently ignored), this limits the DOS impact.

13. IANA Considerations

Upon publication, IANA is hereby requested to create a new registry for UDP Option Kind numbers, similar to that for TCP Option Kinds. Initial values of this registry are as listed in Section 5. Additional values in this registry are to be assigned by IESG Approval or Standards Action [RFC5226].

Upon publication, IANA is hereby requested to create a new registry for UDP Experimental Option Experiment Identifiers (UDP ExIDs) for use in a similar manner as TCP ExIDs [RFC6994]. This registry is initially empty. Values in this registry are to be assigned by IANA using first-come, first-served (FCFS) rules [RFC5226].

14. References

14.1. Normative References


14.2. Informative References


15. Acknowledgments

This work benefitted from feedback from Bob Briscoe, Ken Calvert, Ted Faber, Gorry Fairhurst, C. M. Heard (including the FRAG/LITE combination), Tom Herbert, and Mark Smith, as well as discussions on the IETF TSVWG and SPUD email lists.

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This document was prepared using 2-Word-v2.0.template.dot.
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Appendix A. Implementation Information

The following information is provided to encourage interoperable API implementations.

System-level variables (sysctl):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>default</th>
<th>meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>net.ipv4.udp_opt</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>UDP options available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>net.ipv4.udp_opt_ocs</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Default include OCS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>net.ipv4.udp_opt_acs</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Default include ACS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>net.ipv4.udp_opt_lite</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Default include LITE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>net.ipv4.udp_opt_mss</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Default include MSS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>net.ipv4.udp_opt_time</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Default include TIME</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>net.ipv4.udp_opt_frag</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Default include FRAG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>net.ipv4.udp_opt_ae</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Default include AE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Socket options (sockopt), cached for outgoing datagrams:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UDP_OPT</td>
<td>Enable UDP options (at all)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDP_OPT_OCS</td>
<td>Enable UDP OCS option</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDP_OPT_ACS</td>
<td>Enable UDP ACS option</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDP_OPT_LITE</td>
<td>Enable UDP LITE option</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDP_OPT_MSS</td>
<td>Enable UDP MSS option</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDP_OPT_TIME</td>
<td>Enable UDP TIME option</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDP_OPT_FRAG</td>
<td>Enable UDP FRAG option</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDP_OPT_AE</td>
<td>Enable UDP AE option</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Send/sendto parameters:

(TBD - currently using cached parameters)

Connection parameters (per-socketpair cached state, part UCB):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Initial value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>opts_enabled</td>
<td>net.ipv4.udp_opt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ocs_enabled</td>
<td>net.ipv4.udp_opt_ocs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following option is included for debugging purposes, and MUST NOT be enabled otherwise.

System variables
net.ipv4.udp_opt_junk  0

System-level variables (sysctl):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>default</th>
<th>meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>net.ipv4.udp_opt_junk</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Default use of junk</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Socket options (sockopt):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>params</th>
<th>meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UDP_JUNK</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Enable UDP junk option</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDP_JUNK_VAL</td>
<td>fillval</td>
<td>Value to use as junk fill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDP_JUNK_LEN</td>
<td>length</td>
<td>Length of junk payload in bytes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Connection parameters (per-socketpair cached state, part UCB):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Initial value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>junk_enabled</td>
<td>net.ipv4.udp_opt_junk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>junk_value</td>
<td>0xABCD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>junk_len</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Requirements for the design of a Substrate Protocol for User Datagrams (SPUD)
draft-trammell-spud-req-04

Abstract

We have identified the potential need for a UDP-based encapsulation protocol to allow explicit cooperation with middleboxes while using new, encrypted transport protocols. This document proposes an initial set of requirements for such a protocol, and discusses tradeoffs to be made in further refining these requirements.

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1. Motivation

A number of efforts to create new transport protocols or experiment with new network behaviors in the Internet have been built on top of UDP, as it traverses firewalls and other middleboxes more readily than new protocols do. Each such effort must, however, either manage its flows within common middlebox assumptions for UDP or train the middleboxes on the new protocol (thus losing the benefit of using UDP). A common Substrate Protocol for User Datagrams (SPUD) would allow each effort to re-use a set of shared methods for notifying middleboxes of the flows’ semantics, thus avoiding both the limitations of current flow semantics and the need to re-invent the mechanism for notifying the middlebox of the new semantics.

As a concrete example, it is common for some middleboxes to tear down required state (such as NAT bindings) very rapidly for UDP flows. By notifying the path that a particular transport using UDP maintains session state and explicitly signals session start and stop using the substrate, the using protocol may reduce or avoid the need for heartbeat traffic.

The intention of this work is to make it possible to define and deploy new transport protocols that use encryption to protect their own operation as well as the confidentiality, authenticity, integrity, and linkability resistance of their payloads. The accelerating deployment of encryption will render obsolete network operations techniques that rely on packet inspection and modification based upon assumptions about the protocols in use. This work will allow the replacement the current regime of middlebox inspection and modification of transport and application-layer headers and payload with one that allows inspection only of information explicitly exposed by the endpoints, and modification of such information only under endpoint control.

Any selective exposure of traffic metadata outside a relatively restricted trust domain must be advisory, non-negotiated, and declarative rather than imperative. As with other signaling systems, exposure of specific elements must be carefully assessed for privacy risks and the total of exposed elements must be so assessed. Each exposed parameter should also be independently verifiable, so that each entity can assign its own trust to other entities. Basic transport over the substrate must continue working even if signaling is ignored or stripped, to support incremental deployment. These restrictions on vocabulary are discussed further in [I-D.trammell-stackevo-explicit-coop]. This discussion includes privacy and trust concerns as well as the need for strong incentives for middlebox cooperation based on the information that are exposed.
Within this document, requirements are presented for a facility implementable as an encapsulation protocol, atop which new transports ("superstrates") can be built. Alternately, these could be viewed as a set of requirements for future transport protocol development without a layer separation between the transport and the superstrate.

This document defines a specific set of requirements for a SPUD facility, based on analysis on a target set of applications. It is intended as the basis for determining the next steps to make progress in this space, including possibly chartering a working group for specific protocol engineering work.

2. History

An outcome of the IAB workshop on Stack Evolution in a Middlebox Internet (SEMI) [RFC7663], held in Zurich in January 2015, was a discussion on the creation of a substrate protocol to support the deployment of new transport protocols in the Internet. Assuming that a way forward for transport evolution in user space would involve encapsulation in UDP datagrams, the workshop noted that it may be useful to have a facility built atop UDP to provide minimal signaling of the semantics of a flow that would otherwise be available in TCP. At the very least, indications of first and last packets in a flow may assist firewalls and NATs in policy decision and state maintenance. This facility could also provide minimal application-to-path and path-to-application signaling, though there was less agreement about what should or could be signaled here. Further transport semantics would be used by the protocol running atop this facility, but would only be visible to the endpoints, as the transport protocol headers themselves would be encrypted, along with the payload, to prevent inspection or modification. This encryption might be accomplished by using DTLS [RFC6347] as a subtransport [I-D.huitema-tls-dtls-as-subtransport] or by other suitable methods.

The Substrate Protocol for User Datagrams (SPUD) BoF was held at IETF 92 in Dallas in March 2015 to develop this concept further. Restrictions on vocabulary assumed in these requirements are derived from discussions during this BoF, based on experience with previous endpoint-to-middle and middle-to-endpoint signaling approaches as well as concerns about the privacy implications of endpoint-to-middle signaling.

3. Terminology

This document uses the following terms:

- Superstrate: The transport protocol or protocol stack "above" SPUD, that uses SPUD for explicit path cooperation and path
traversal. The superstrate usually consists of a security layer (e.g. TLS, DTLS) and a transport protocol, or a transport protocol with integrated security features, to protect headers and payload above SPUD.

- **Endpoint**: One end of a communication session, located on a single node that is a source or destination of packets in that session. In this document, this term may refer to either the SPUD implementation at the endpoint, the superstrate implementation running over SPUD, or the applications running over that superstrate.

- **Path**: The sequence of Internet Protocol nodes and links that a given packet traverses from endpoint to endpoint.

- **Middlebox**: As defined in [RFC3234], a middlebox is any intermediary device performing functions other than the normal, standard functions of an IP router on the datagram path between a source host and destination host; e.g. making decisions about forwarding behavior based on other than addressing information, and/or modifying a packet before forwarding.

### 4. Use Cases

Use cases are outlined in more detail in [I-D.kuehlewind-spud-use-cases]. We summarize some of the primary use cases below.

The primary use case for endpoint to path signaling in the Internet making use of packet grouping, as described in the use case document, is the binding of limited related semantics (start, ack, and stop) to a flow or a group of packets within a flow that are semantically related in terms of the application or superstrate. By explicitly signaling start and stop semantics, a flow allows middleboxes to use those signals for setting up and tearing down their relevant state (NAT bindings, firewall pinholes), rather than requiring the middlebox to infer this state from continued traffic. At best, this would allow the application to reduce heartbeat traffic, which might result in reduced radio utilization and thus greater battery life on mobile platforms.

SPUD could also be used to provide information relevant for network treatment for middleboxes as a replacement for deep packet inspection for traffic classification purposes, rendered ineffective by superstrate encryption. In this application, properties would be expressed in terms of network-relevant parameters (intended bandwidth, latency and loss sensitivity, etc.) as opposed to application-relevant semantics. See...
SPUD may also provide some facility for SPUD-aware nodes on the path to signal some property of the path to the endpoints and other SPUD-aware nodes on the path. The primary use case for path to application signaling is parallel to the use of ICMP [RFC0792] and ICMPv6 [RFC4443], in that it describes a set of conditions (including errors) that applies to the datagrams as they traverse the path. Since the signals here would traverse NATs in the same way as the traffic related to them, this use case would sidestep problems with ICMP availability in the deployed Internet.

Link-layer characteristics of use to the transport layer (e.g., whether a high-transient-delay, highly-buffered link such as LTE is present on the path) could also be signaled using this path-to-endpoint facility.

5. Functional Requirements

The following requirements detail the services that SPUD must provide to superstrates, endpoints, and middleboxes using SPUD.

5.1. Grouping of Packets (into "tubes")

Transport semantics and many properties of communication that endpoints may want to expose to middleboxes are bound to flows or groups of flows (5-tuples). SPUD must therefore provide a basic facility for associating packets together (into what we call a "tube", for lack of a better term) and associate information to these groups of packets. Each packet in a SPUD "flow" (determined by 5-tuple) belongs to exactly one tube. Notionally, a tube consists of a set of packets with a set of common properties, that should therefore receive equivalent treatment from the network; these tubes may or may not be related to separate semantic entities in the superstrate (e.g. SCTP streams), at the superstrate’s discretion.

The simplest mechanisms for association involve the addition of an identifier to each packet in a tube. Other mechanisms that don’t directly encode the identifier in a packet header, but instead provide it in a way that it is simple to derive from other information available in the packet at the endpoints along the path, are also possible. In any cases, for the purposes of this requirement we treat this identifier as a simple vector of N bits. The properties of the tube identifier are subject to tradeoffs on the requirements for privacy, security, ease of implementation, and header overhead efficiency.
In determining the optimal size and scope for this tube identifier, we first assume that the 5-tuple of source and destination IP address, UDP port, and IP protocol identifier (17 for UDP) is used in the Internet as an existing flow identifier, due to the widespread deployment of network address and port translation. We conclude that SPUD tube IDs should be scoped to this 5-tuple.

While a globally-unique identifier would allow easier state comparison and migration for mobility use cases, it would have two serious disadvantages. First, N would need to be sufficiently large to minimize the probability of collision among multiple tubes having the same identifier along the same path during some period of time. A 128-bit UUID [RFC4122] or an identifier of equivalent size generated using an equivalent algorithm would probably be sufficient, at the cost of 128 bits of header space in every packet. Second, globally unique tube identifiers would also introduce new possibilities for user and node tracking, with a serious negative impact on privacy. We note that global identifiers for mobility, when necessary to expose to the path, can be supported separately from the tube identification mechanism, by using a generic tube-grouping application-to-path signaling bound to the tube.

Even when tube IDs are scoped to 5-tuples, N must still be sufficiently large, and the bits in the identifier sufficiently random, that possession of a valid tube ID implies that a node can observe packets belonging to the tube. This reduces the chances of success of blind packet injection attacks of packets with guessed valid tube IDs.

5.2. Bidirectionality of Tubes

When scoped to 5-tuples, the forward and backward directions of a bidirectional connection will have different tube IDs, since these will necessarily take different paths and may interact with a different set of middleboxes due to asymmetric routing. SPUD will therefore require some facility to note that one tube is the "reverse" direction of another, a general case of the tube grouping signal above.

5.3. Signaling of Per-Tube Properties

SPUD must be able to provide information scoped to a tube from the end-point(s) to all SPUD-aware nodes on the path about the packets in that tube.

We note that in-band signaling would meet this requirement.
5.4. Path to Receiver Signaling under Sender Control

SPUD must be able to provide information about from a SPUD-aware middlebox to the endpoint. This information is associated with a tube, in terms of "the properties of the path(s) the packets in this tube will traverse". This signaling must happen only with explicit sender permission and be sent to the receiver of packets in the tube.

We note that in-band signaling would meet this requirement, if the sender created a "placeholder" in-band that could be filled in by the middlebox(es) on path. In-band signaling has the advantage that it does not require foreknowledge of the identity and addresses of devices along the path by endpoints and vice versa, but does add complexity to the signaling protocol. Piggybacked signaling uses some number of bits in each packet generated by the overlying transport. It requires either reducing the MTU available to the encapsulated transport and/or opportunistically using "headroom" as it is available: bits between the network-layer MTU and the bits actually used by the transport. For use cases that accumulate information from devices on path in the SPUD header, piggybacked signaling also requires a mechanism for endpoints to create "scratch space" for potential use of the on-path devices.

In contrast, interleaved signaling uses signaling packets on the same 5-tuple and tube ID, which don’t carry any superstrate data. These interleaved packets could also contain scratch space for on-path device use. This reduces complexity and sidesteps MTU problems, at the cost of sending more packets per flow.

5.5. Receiver to Sender Feedback

SPUD must be able send information collected from SPUD-aware middleboxes along the path to a receiver back to the sender that gave permission; see Section 6.4 for restrictions on this facility.

5.6. Direct Path to Sender Signaling

SPUD must provide a facility for a middlebox to send a packet directly in response to a sending endpoint, primarily to signal error conditions (e.g. "packet administratively prohibited" or "no route to destination", as in present ICMP).

In this case, the direct return packet generated by the middlebox uses the reversed end-to-end 5-tuple in order to receive equivalent NAT treatment, though the reverse path might not be the same as the forward path. Endpoints have control over this feature: A SPUD-aware middlebox must not emit a direct return packet unless it is in direct response to a packet from a sending endpoint, and must not forward a
packet for which it has sent a direct return packet; see Section 6.6 and Section 7.9.

5.7. Tube Start and End Signaling

SPUD must provide a facility for endpoints to signal that a tube has started, that the start of the tube has been acknowledged and accepted by the remote endpoint(s), and that a tube has ended and its state can be forgotten by the path. Given unreliable signaling (see Section 7.10), both endpoints and devices on the path must be resilient to the loss of any of these signals. Specifically, timeouts are still necessary to clean up stale state.

5.8. Transport Semantic Signaling

Similar to tube start and end signaling, SPUD must provide a facility for endpoints to signal that a superstrate transport session has been requested, set up, and/or torn down. This facility provides an explicit replacement for the common practice in TCP-aware middleboxes of modeling TCP state of flows by inspecting the TCP flags byte.

Given the fact that a superstrate transport session may consist of multiple tubes, this signaling must be separate from that for tube start and end.

5.9. Declarative signaling

All information signaled via SPUD is defined to be declarative (as opposed to imperative). A SPUD endpoint must function correctly even no middlebox along the path understands the signals it sends, or if sent signals from middleboxes it does not understand. It must also function correctly if the path (and thereby the set of middleboxes traversed) changes during the lifetime of a tube; endpoints cannot rely on the creation or maintenance of state even on cooperative middleboxes. Likewise, a SPUD-aware middlebox must function correctly if sent signals from endpoints it does not understand, or in the absence of expected signals from endpoints.

The declarative nature of this signaling removes any requirement that SPUD provide reliability for its signals.

5.10. Extensibility

SPUD must enable multiple new transport semantics and application/path declarations without requiring updates to SPUD implementations in middleboxes.
The use of SPUD for experimental signaling must be possible either without the registration of codepoints or namespaces with IANA, or with trivially easy (First Come, First Served [RFC5226] registration of such codepoints.

5.11. Common Vocabulary

For the interoperability of SPUD endpoints and middleboxes with each other, the use of SPUD for standard signaling must use a common vocabulary with registered codepoints allocated under relatively restrictive policy. This restrictive policy serves primarily security and privacy goals (i.e., reducing the risk of misuse of the extensibility provided by the protocol).

We note that an IANA registry requiring Standards Action (RFC5226) to modify would meet this requirement.

5.12. Additional Per-Packet Signaling

SPUD may provide a facility for signaling semantically simple information (similar to tube start and end) on a per-packet as opposed to a per-tube basis. Properties signaled per packet reduce state requirements at middleboxes, but also increase per-packet overhead. Small signal size (in bits of entropy) and encoding efficiency (in bits on the wire) is therefore more important for per-packet signaling that per-tube signaling. If per-packet signals need to be used by multiple hops along a path, these will need to be encoded in an efficiently-implementable way (i.e., using fixed-length, constant-offset data structures).

Given these constraints, per-packet signaling is necessary for certain use cases, it is likely that SPUD will provide a very limited set of per-packet signals using flags in a SPUD header, and require all more complex properties to be bound per-tube.

6. Security Requirements

6.1. Privacy

SPUD must allow endpoints to control the amount of information exposed to middleboxes, with the default being the minimum necessary for correct functioning. This includes the cryptographic protection of transport layer headers from inspection by devices on path, in order to prevent ossification of these headers.
6.2. Authentication

The basic SPUD protocol must not require any authentication or a priori trust relationship between endpoints and middleboxes to function. However, SPUD should interoperate with the presentation/exchange of authentication information in environments where a trust relationship already exists, or can be easily established, either in-band or out-of-band, and use this information where possible and appropriate.

Given the advisory nature of the signaling it supports, SPUD may also support eventual authentication: authentication of a signal after the reception of a packet after that containing the signal.

6.3. Integrity

SPUD must be able to provide integrity protection of information exposed by endpoints in SPUD-encapsulated packets, though the details of this integrity protection are still open.

Endpoints should be able to detect changes to headers SPUD uses for its own signaling (whether due to error, accidental modification, or malicious modification), as well as the injection of packets into a SPUD flow (defined by 5-tuple) or tube by nodes other than the remote endpoints. Errors and accidental modifications can be detected using a simple checksum over the SPUD header, while detecting malicious modifications requires cryptographic integrity protection. Similar to Section 6.2, cryptographic integrity protection may also be eventual.

Integrity protection of the superstrate is left up to the superstrate.

6.4. Encrypted Feedback

As feedback from a receiver to a sender (see Section 5.5) does not need to be exposed to the path, this feedback channel should be encrypted for confidentiality and authenticity, when available (see Section 6.2). This facility will rely on cooperation with the superstrate or some other out-of-band mechanism to provide these guarantees.

6.5. Preservation of Security Properties

The use of SPUD must not weaken the essential security properties of the superstrate: confidentiality, integrity, authenticity, and defense against linkability. If the superstrate includes payload encryption for confidentiality, for example, the use of SPUD must not
allow deep packet inspection systems to have access to the plaintext. Likewise, the use of SPUD must not create additional opportunities for linkability not already existing in the superstrate.

6.6. Protection against trivial abuse

Malicious background traffic is a serious problem for UDP-based protocols due to the ease of forging source addresses in UDP together with only limited deployment of network egress filtering [RFC2827]. Trivial abuse includes flooding and state exhaustion attacks, as well as reflection and amplification attacks. SPUD must provide minimal protection against this trivial abuse. This implies that SPUD should provide:

- a proof of return routability, that the endpoint identified by a packet’s source address receives packets sent to that address;
- a feedback channel between endpoints;
- a method to probabilistically discriminate legitimate SPUD traffic from reflected malicious traffic;
- a method to probabilistically discriminate SPUD traffic from on-path devices from devices off-path; and
- the ability to deploy mechanisms to protect against state exhaustion and other denial-of-service attacks against SPUD itself.

We note that using a "magic number" or other pattern of bits in an encapsulation-layer header not used in any widely deployed protocol has the nice property that no existing node in the Internet can be induced to reflect traffic containing it. This allows the magic number to provide probabilistic assurance that a given packet is not reflected, assisting in meeting this requirement.

If SPUD is implemented over UDP, see [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-rfc5405bis] for guidelines on the safe usage of UDP in the Internet, which addresses some of these issues.

6.7. Continuum of trust among endpoints and middleboxes

There are different security considerations for different security contexts. The end-to-end context is one; anything that only needs to be seen by the path shouldn’t be exposed in SPUD, but rather by the superstrate. There are multiple different types of end-to-middle context based on levels of trust between end and middle - is the middlebox on the same network as the endpoint, under control of the
same owner? Is there some contract between the application user and
the middlebox operator? SPUD should support different levels of
trust than the default ("untrusted, but presumed honest due to
limitations on the signaling vocabulary") and fully-authenticated;
how these points along the continuum are to be implemented and how
they relate to each other needs to be explored further.

In the Internet, it is not in the general case possible for the
endpoint to authenticate every middlebox that might see packets it
sends and receives. In this case information produced by middleboxes
may enjoy less integrity protection than that produced by endpoints.
In addition, endpoint authentication of middleboxes and vice-versa
may be better conducted out-of-band (treating the middlebox as an
endpoint for the authentication protocol) than in-band (treating the
middlebox as a participant in a 3+ party communication).

7. Technical Requirements

The following requirements detail the constraints on how the SPUD
facility must meet its functional requirements.

7.1. Middlebox Traversal

SPUD, including all path-to-endpoint and endpoint-to-path signaling
as well as superstrate and superstrate payload, should be able to
traverse existing middleboxes and firewalls, including those that are
not SPUD-aware. Therefore SPUD must be encapsulated in a transport
protocol that is known to be accepted on a large fraction of paths in
the Internet, or implement some form of probing to determine in
advance which transport protocols will be accepted on a certain path.
This encapsulation will require port numbers to support endpoints
connected via network address and port translation (NAPT). We note
that UDP encapsulation would meet these requirements.

7.2. Low Overhead in Network Processing

SPUD must be designed to have low overhead, specifically requiring
very little effort to recognize that a packet is a SPUD packet and to
determine the tube it is associated with. We note that a magic
number as in
Section 6.6 would also have a low probability of colliding with any
non-SPUD traffic, therefore meeting the recognition requirement.
Tube identifiers appearing directly in the encapsulation-layer header
would meet the tube association requirement.
7.3. Implementability in User-Space

To enable fast deployment SPUD and superstrates must be implementable without requiring kernel replacements or modules on the endpoints, and without having special privilege (such as is required for raw packet transmission, i.e. root or "jailbreak") on the endpoints.

We note here that UDP would meet this requirement, as nearly all operating systems and application development platforms allow a userspace application to open UDP sockets.

We additionally note that while TCP APIs are also widely available to userspace applications, they are bound to TCP transport semantics, and generally do not provide enough control over segmentation and transmission to successfully implement superstrate transports.

7.4. Incremental Deployability

SPUD must be designed to operate in the present Internet, and must be designed to encourage incremental deployment.

As endpoint implementations can change more quickly than middleboxes can be designed and deployed, a SPUD facility that was be useful between endpoints even before the deployment of middleboxes that understand it would stimulate deployment. The information exposed over SPUD must provide incentives for adoption by both endpoints and middleboxes.

SPUD must not be designed in such a way that precludes its deployability in multipath, multicast, and/or endpoint multi-homing environments.

7.5. No unnecessary restrictions on the superstrate

Beyond those restrictions deemed necessary as common features of any secure, responsible transport protocol (see Section 6.6), SPUD must impose only minimal restrictions on the transport protocols it encapsulates. However, to serve as a substrate, it is necessary to factor out the information that middleboxes commonly rely on and endpoints are commonly willing to expose. This information should be included in SPUD, and might itself impose additional restrictions to the superstrate.

7.6. Minimal additional start-up latency

SPUD should not introduce additional start-up latency for superstrates. Specifically, superstrates which can send data on an initial packet must be able to do so when encapsulated within SPUD.
7.7. Minimal header overhead

To avoid reducing network performance, the information and coding used in SPUD should be designed to use the minimum necessary amount of additional space in encapsulation headers.

7.8. Minimal non-productive traffic

SPUD should minimize additional non-productive traffic (e.g. keepalives), and should provide mechanisms to allow its superstrates to minimize their reliance on non-productive traffic.

7.9. Endpoint Control

Both endpoint-to-path and path-to-endpoint signaling happen completely under endpoint control.

7.10. On Reliability, Fragmentation, MTU, and Duplication

As any information provided by SPUD is anyway opportunistic, SPUD need not provide reliable signaling for the information associated with a tube. Signals must be idempotent; all middleboxes and endpoints must gracefully handle receiving duplicate signal information. SPUD must continue working in the presence of IPv4 fragmentation on path, but in order to reduce the impact of requiring fragments reassembly at middleboxes for signals to be intelligible, endpoints using SPUD should attempt to fit all signals into single MTU-sized packets.

Given the importance of good path MTU information to SPUD’s own signaling, SPUD should implement packetization layer path MTU discovery [RFC4821].

Any facilities requiring more than an MTU’s worth of data in a single signal should use an out-of-band method which does provide reliability - this method may be an existing transport or superstrate/SPUD combination, or a "minimal transport" defined by SPUD for its own use.

7.11. SPUD Support Discovery

If SPUD is not usable on a path to an endpoint, a SPUD sender needs to be able to fall back to some other approach to achieve the goals of the superstrate; a SPUD endpoint must be able to easily determine whether a remote endpoint with which it wants to communicate using SPUD as a substrate can support SPUD, and whether path to the remote endpoint as well as the return path from the remote endpoint will pass SPUD packets.
It is not clear whether this is a requirement of SPUD, or a requirement of the superstrate / application over SPUD.

8. Security Considerations

The security-relevant requirements for SPUD are outlined in Section 6. These will be further addressed in protocol definition work following from these requirements.

9. IANA Considerations

This document has no actions for IANA.

10. Contributors

In addition to the editors, this document is the work of David Black, Ken Calvert, Ted Hardie, Joe Hildebrand, Jana Iyengar, and Eric Rescorla.

11. Acknowledgments

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12. Informative References


Huitema, C., Rescorla, E., and J. Jana, "DTLS as Subtransport protocol", draft-huitema-tls-dtls-as-subtransport-00 (work in progress), March 2015.


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Abstract

This document is a compilation of issues found since the publication of RFC4960 in September 2007 based on experience with implementing, testing, and using SCTP along with the suggested fixes. This document provides deltas to RFC4960 and is organized in a time based way. The issues are listed in the order they were brought up. Because some text is changed several times the last delta in the text is the one which should be applied. In addition to the delta a description of the problem and the details of the solution are also provided.

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1. Introduction

This document contains a compilation of all defects found up until the publishing of this document for [RFC4960] specifying the Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP). These defects may be of an editorial or technical nature. This document may be thought of as a companion document to be used in the implementation of SCTP to clarify errors in the original SCTP document.

This document provides a history of the changes that will be compiled into a BIS document for [RFC4960]. It is structured similar to [RFC4460].

Each error will be detailed within this document in the form of:

- The problem description,
- The text quoted from [RFC4960],
- The replacement text that should be placed into an upcoming BIS document,
- A description of the solution.

Note that when reading this document one must use care to assure that a field or item is not updated further on within the document. Each section should be applied in sequence to the original [RFC4960] since this document is a historical record of the sequential changes that have been found necessary at various inter-op events and through discussion on the list.

2. Conventions

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

3. Corrections to RFC 4960

3.1. Path Error Counter Threshold Handling

3.1.1. Description of the Problem

The handling of the 'Path.Max.Retrans' parameter is described in Section 8.2 and Section 8.3 of [RFC4960] in an Inconsistent way. Whereas Section 8.2 describes that a path is marked inactive when the path error counter exceeds the threshold, Section 8.3 says the path is marked inactive when the path error counter reaches the threshold.
This issue was reported as an Errata for [RFC4960] with Errata ID 1440.

3.1.2. Text Changes to the Document

---------
Old text: (Section 8.3)
---------

When the value of this counter reaches the protocol parameter ‘Path.Max.Retrans’, the endpoint should mark the corresponding destination address as inactive if it is not so marked, and may also optionally report to the upper layer the change of reachability of this destination address. After this, the endpoint should continue HEARTBEAT on this destination address but should stop increasing the counter.

---------
New text: (Section 8.3)
---------

When the value of this counter exceeds the protocol parameter ‘Path.Max.Retrans’, the endpoint should mark the corresponding destination address as inactive if it is not so marked, and may also optionally report to the upper layer the change of reachability of this destination address. After this, the endpoint should continue HEARTBEAT on this destination address but should stop increasing the counter.

3.1.3. Solution Description

The intended state change should happen when the threshold is exceeded.

3.2. Upper Layer Protocol Shutdown Request Handling

3.2.1. Description of the Problem

Section 9.2 of [RFC960] describes the handling of received SHUTDOWN chunks in the SHUTDOWN-RECEIVED state instead of the handling of shutdown requests from its upper layer in this state.

This issue was reported as an Errata for [RFC4960] with Errata ID 1574.
3.2.2. Text Changes to the Document

---------
Old text: (Section 9.2)
---------

Once an endpoint has reached the SHUTDOWN-RECEIVED state, it MUST NOT
send a SHUTDOWN in response to a ULP request, and should discard
subsequent SHUTDOWN chunks.

---------
New text: (Section 9.2)
---------

Once an endpoint has reached the SHUTDOWN-RECEIVED state, it MUST NOT
send a SHUTDOWN in response to a ULP request, and should discard
subsequent ULP shutdown requests.

3.2.3. Solution Description

The text never intended the SCTP endpoint to ignore SHUTDOWN chunks
from its peer. If it did the endpoints could never gracefully
terminate associations in some cases.

3.3. Registration of New Chunk Types

3.3.1. Description of the Problem

Section 14.1 of [RFC4960] should deal with new chunk types, however,
the text refers to parameter types.

This issue was reported as an Errata for [RFC4960] with Errata ID
2592.

3.3.2. Text Changes to the Document
The assignment of new chunk type codes is done through an IETF Consensus action, as defined in [RFC2434]. Documentation of the chunk type MUST contain the following information:

3.3.3. Solution Description

Refer to chunk types as intended.

3.4. Variable Parameters for INIT Chunks

3.4.1. Description of the Problem

Newlines in wrong places break the layout of the table of variable parameters for the INIT chunk in Section 3.3.2 of [RFC4960].

This issue was reported as an Errata for [RFC4960] with Errata ID 3291 and Errata ID 3804.

3.4.2. Text Changes to the Document
Old text: (Section 3.3.2)

Variable Parameters                  Status     Type     Value
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
IPv4 Address (Note 1)               Optional    5 IPv6 Address
(Note 1)                          Optional    6 Cookie Preservative
Optional 9 Reserved for ECN Capable (Note 2) Optional
32768 (0x8000) Host Name Address (Note 3) Optional
11 Supported Address Types (Note 4) Optional 12

New text: (Section 3.3.2)

Variable Parameters                  Status     Type     Value
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
IPv4 Address (Note 1)               Optional    5 IPv6 Address
IPv6 Address (Note 1)               Optional    6 Cookie Preservative
Cookie Preservative                  Optional    9 Reserved for ECN Capable (Note 2) Optional
32768 (0x8000) Host Name Address (Note 3) Optional
11 Supported Address Types (Note 4) Optional 12

3.4.3. Solution Description

Fix the formatting of the table.

3.5. CRC32c Sample Code on 64-bit Platforms

3.5.1. Description of the Problem

The sample code for computing the CRC32c provided in [RFC4960] assumes that a variable of type unsigned long uses 32 bits. This is not true on some 64-bit platforms (for example the ones using LP64).

This issue was reported as an Errata for [RFC4960] with Errata ID 3423.

3.5.2. Text Changes to the Document

---------
Old text: (Appendix C)
---------

unsigned long
generate_crc32c(unsigned char *buffer, unsigned int length)
{
    unsigned int i;
    unsigned long crc32 = ^0L;

---------
New text: (Appendix C)
---------

unsigned long
generate_crc32c(unsigned char *buffer, unsigned int length)
{
    unsigned int i;
    unsigned long crc32 = 0xffffffffL;

3.5.3.  Solution Description

Use 0xffffffffL instead of ^0L which gives the same value on platforms using 32 bits or 64 bits for variables of type unsigned long.

3.6.  Endpoint Failure Detection

3.6.1.  Description of the Problem

The handling of the association error counter defined in Section 8.1 of [RFC4960] can result in an association failure even if the path used for data transmission is available, but idle.

This issue was reported as an Errata for [RFC4960] with Errata ID 3788.

3.6.2.  Text Changes to the Document
Old text: (Section 8.1)

An endpoint shall keep a counter on the total number of consecutive retransmissions to its peer (this includes retransmissions to all the destination transport addresses of the peer if it is multi-homed), including unacknowledged HEARTBEAT chunks.

New text: (Section 8.1)

An endpoint shall keep a counter on the total number of consecutive retransmissions to its peer (this includes data retransmissions to all the destination transport addresses of the peer if it is multi-homed), including the number of unacknowledged HEARTBEAT chunks observed on the path which currently is used for data transfer. Unacknowledged HEARTBEAT chunks observed on paths different from the path currently used for data transfer shall not increment the association error counter, as this could lead to association closure even if the path which currently is used for data transfer is available (but idle).

3.6.3. Solution Description

A more refined handling for the association error counter is defined.

3.7. Data Transmission Rules

3.7.1. Description of the Problem

When integrating the changes to Section 6.1 A) of [RFC2960] as described in Section 2.15.2 of [RFC4460] some text was duplicated and became the final paragraph of Section 6.1 A) of [RFC4960].

This issue was reported as an Errata for [RFC4960] with Errata ID 4071.

3.7.2. Text Changes to the Document
The sender MUST also have an algorithm for sending new DATA chunks to avoid silly window syndrome (SWS) as described in [RFC0813]. The algorithm can be similar to the one described in Section 4.2.3.4 of [RFC1122].

However, regardless of the value of rwnd (including if it is 0), the data sender can always have one DATA chunk in flight to the receiver if allowed by cwnd (see rule B below). This rule allows the sender to probe for a change in rwnd that the sender missed due to the SACK having been lost in transit from the data receiver to the data sender.

3.7.3. Solution Description

Last paragraph of Section 6.1 A) removed as intended in Section 2.15.2 of [RFC4460].

3.8. T1-Cookie Timer

3.8.1. Description of the Problem

Figure 4 of [RFC4960] illustrates the SCTP association setup. However, it incorrectly shows that the T1-init timer is used in the COOKIE-ECHOED state whereas the T1-cookie timer should have been used instead.

This issue was reported as an Errata for [RFC4960] with Errata ID 4400.

3.8.2. Text Changes to the Document
3.8.3. Solution Description

Change the figure such that the T1-cookie timer is used instead of the T1-init timer.

3.9. Miscellaneous Typos

3.9.1. Description of the Problem

While processing [RFC4960] some typos were not caught.

3.9.2. Text Changes to the Document
Old text: (Section 1.6)

Transmission Sequence Numbers wrap around when they reach $2^{32} - 1$. That is, the next TSN a DATA chunk MUST use after transmitting TSN = $2^{32} - 1$ is TSN = 0.

New text: (Section 1.6)

Transmission Sequence Numbers wrap around when they reach $2^{32} - 1$. That is, the next TSN a DATA chunk MUST use after transmitting TSN = $2^{32} - 1$ is TSN = 0.

Old text: (Section 3.3.10.9)

No User Data: This error cause is returned to the originator of a DATA chunk if a received DATA chunk has no user data.

New text: (Section 3.3.10.9)

No User Data: This error cause is returned to the originator of a DATA chunk if a received DATA chunk has no user data.
Old text: (Section 6.7, Figure 9)

Endpoint A                                    Endpoint Z (App sends 3 messages; strm 0) DATA [TSN=6,Strm=0,Seq=2] ---------------> (ack delayed) (Start T3-rtx timer)
DATA [TSN=7,Strm=0,Seq=3] ---------------> X (lost)
DATA [TSN=8,Strm=0,Seq=4] -----------------> (gap detected, immediately send ack)
                                      ----- SACK [TSN Ack=6,Block=1, Start=2,End=2]
                                          <------/ (remove 6 from out-queue, and mark 7 as "1" missing report)

New text: (Section 6.7, Figure 9)

Endpoint A                                    Endpoint Z
(App sends 3 messages; strm 0)
DATA [TSN=6,Strm=0,Seq=2] ---------------> (ack delayed)
(Start T3-rtx timer)
DATA [TSN=7,Strm=0,Seq=3] ---------------> X (lost)
DATA [TSN=8,Strm=0,Seq=4] -----------------> (gap detected, immediately send ack)
                                      ----- SACK [TSN Ack=6,Block=1, Start=2,End=2]
                                          <------/ (remove 6 from out-queue, and mark 7 as "1" missing report)
An endpoint bundles chunks by simply including multiple chunks in one outbound SCTP packet. The total size of the resultant IP datagram, including the SCTP packet and IP headers, MUST be less that or equal to the current Path MTU.

An endpoint bundles chunks by simply including multiple chunks in one outbound SCTP packet. The total size of the resultant IP datagram, including the SCTP packet and IP headers, MUST be less than or equal to the current Path MTU.

Receive Unacknowledged Message

Format: RECEIVE_UNACKED(data retrieval id, buffer address, buffer size, [,stream id] [,stream sequence number] [,partial flag] [,payload protocol-id])

Receive Unacknowledged Message

Format: RECEIVE_UNACKED(data retrieval id, buffer address, buffer size, [,stream id] [,stream sequence number] [,partial flag] [,payload protocol-id])
ICMP2) An implementation MAY ignore all ICMPv6 messages where the type field is not "Destination Unreachable", "Parameter Problem", or "Packet Too Big".

3.9.3. Solution Description

Typos fixed.

3.10. CRC32c Sample Code

3.10.1. Description of the Problem

The CRC32c computation is described in Appendix B of [RFC4960]. However, the corresponding sample code and its explanation appears at the end of Appendix C, which deals with ICMP handling.

3.10.2. Text Changes to the Document

Move the sample code related to CRC32c computation and its explanation from the end of Appendix C to the end of Appendix B.

3.10.3. Solution Description

Text moved to the appropriate location.

3.11. partial_bytes_acked after T3-rtx Expiration

3.11.1. Description of the Problem

Section 7.2.3 of [RFC4960] explicitly states that partial_bytes_acked should be reset to 0 after packet loss detecting from SACK but the same is missed for T3-rtx timer expiration.
3.11.2. Text Changes to the Document

----------
Old text: (Section 7.2.3)
----------

When the T3-rtx timer expires on an address, SCTP should perform slow start by:

\[ ssthresh = \max(cwnd/2, 4\times MTU) \]
\[ cwnd = 1\times MTU \]

----------
New text: (Section 7.2.3)
----------

When the T3-rtx timer expires on an address, SCTP should perform slow start by:

\[ ssthresh = \max(cwnd/2, 4\times MTU) \]
\[ cwnd = 1\times MTU \]
\[ \text{partial\_bytes\_acked} = 0 \]

3.11.3. Solution Description

Specify that \text{partial\_bytes\_acked} should be reset to 0 after T3-rtx timer expiration.

3.12. Order of Adjustments of \text{partial\_bytes\_acked} and \text{cwnd}

3.12.1. Description of the Problem

Section 7.2.2 of [RFC4960] is unclear about the order of adjustments applied to \text{partial\_bytes\_acked} and \text{cwnd} in the congestion avoidance phase.

3.12.2. Text Changes to the Document
3.12.3. Solution Description

The new text defines the exact order of adjustments of partial_bytes_acked and cwnd in the congestion avoidance phase.

3.13. HEARTBEAT ACK and the association error counter

3.13.1. Description of the Problem

Section 8.1 and Section 8.3 of [RFC4960] prescribe that the receiver of a HEARTBEAT ACK must reset the association overall error counter. In some circumstances, e.g., when a router discards DATA chunks but not HEARTBEAT chunks due to the larger size of the DATA chunk, it might be better to not clear the association error counter on reception of the HEARTBEAT ACK and reset it only on reception of the SACK to avoid stalling the association.

3.13.2. Text Changes to the Document
Old text: (Section 8.1)

The counter shall be reset each time a DATA chunk sent to that peer endpoint is acknowledged (by the reception of a SACK) or a HEARTBEAT ACK is received from the peer endpoint.

New text: (Section 8.1)

The counter shall be reset each time a DATA chunk sent to that peer endpoint is acknowledged (by the reception of a SACK). When a HEARTBEAT ACK is received from the peer endpoint, the counter should also be reset. The receiver of the HEARTBEAT ACK may choose not to clear the counter if there is outstanding data on the association. This allows for handling the possible difference in reachability based on DATA chunks and HEARTBEAT chunks.

Old text: (Section 8.3)

Upon the receipt of the HEARTBEAT ACK, the sender of the HEARTBEAT should clear the error counter of the destination transport address to which the HEARTBEAT was sent, and mark the destination transport address as active if it is not so marked. The endpoint may optionally report to the upper layer when an inactive destination address is marked as active due to the reception of the latest HEARTBEAT ACK. The receiver of the HEARTBEAT ACK must also clear the association overall error count as well (as defined in Section 8.1).

New text: (Section 8.3)

Upon the receipt of the HEARTBEAT ACK, the sender of the HEARTBEAT should clear the error counter of the destination transport address to which the HEARTBEAT was sent, and mark the destination transport address as active if it is not so marked. The endpoint may optionally report to the upper layer when an inactive destination address is marked as active due to the reception of the latest HEARTBEAT ACK. The receiver of the HEARTBEAT ACK should also clear the association overall error counter (as defined in Section 8.1).
3.13.3. Solution Description

The new text provides a possibility to not reset the association overall error counter when a HEARTBEAT ACK is received if there are valid reasons for it.

3.14. Path for Fast Retransmission

3.14.1. Description of the Problem

[RFC4960] clearly describes where to retransmit data that is timed out when the peer is multi-homed but the same is not stated for fast retransmissions.

3.14.2. Text Changes to the Document

---------
Old text: (Section 6.4)
---------

Furthermore, when its peer is multi-homed, an endpoint SHOULD try to retransmit a chunk that timed out to an active destination transport address that is different from the last destination address to which the DATA chunk was sent.

---------
New text: (Section 6.4)
---------

Furthermore, when its peer is multi-homed, an endpoint SHOULD try to retransmit a chunk that timed out to an active destination transport address that is different from the last destination address to which the DATA chunk was sent.

When its peer is multi-homed, an endpoint SHOULD send fast retransmissions to the same destination transport address where original data was sent to. If the primary path has been changed and original data was sent there before the fast retransmit, the implementation MAY send it to the new primary path.

3.14.3. Solution Description

The new text clarifies where to send fast retransmissions.
3.15. Transmittal in Fast Recovery

3.15.1. Description of the Problem

The Fast Retransmit on Gap Reports algorithm intends that only the very first packet may be sent regardless of cwnd in the Fast Recovery phase but rule 3) of [RFC4960], Section 7.2.4, misses this clarification.

3.15.2. Text Changes to the Document

---------
Old text: (Section 7.2.4)
---------

3) Determine how many of the earliest (i.e., lowest TSN) DATA chunks marked for retransmission will fit into a single packet, subject to constraint of the path MTU of the destination transport address to which the packet is being sent. Call this value K. Retransmit those K DATA chunks in a single packet. When a Fast Retransmit is being performed, the sender SHOULD ignore the value of cwnd and SHOULD NOT delay retransmission for this single packet.

---------
New text: (Section 7.2.4)
---------

3) If not in Fast Recovery, determine how many of the earliest (i.e., lowest TSN) DATA chunks marked for retransmission will fit into a single packet, subject to constraint of the path MTU of the destination transport address to which the packet is being sent. Call this value K. Retransmit those K DATA chunks in a single packet. When a Fast Retransmit is being performed, the sender SHOULD ignore the value of cwnd and SHOULD NOT delay retransmission for this single packet.

3.15.3. Solution Description

The new text explicitly specifies to send only the first packet in the Fast Recovery phase disregarding cwnd limitations.

3.16. Initial Value of ssthresh
3.16.1. Description of the Problem

The initial value of ssthresh should be set arbitrarily high. Using the advertised receiver window of the peer is inappropriate if the peer increases its window after the handshake. Furthermore, use a higher requirements level, since not following the advice may result in performance problems.

3.16.2. Text Changes to the Document

---------
Old text: (Section 7.2.1)
---------

o The initial value of ssthresh MAY be arbitrarily high (for example, implementations MAY use the size of the receiver advertised window).

---------
New text: (Section 7.2.1)
---------

o The initial value of ssthresh SHOULD be arbitrarily high (e.g., to the size of the largest possible advertised window).

3.16.3. Solution Description

Use the same value as suggested in [RFC5681], Section 3.1, as an appropriate initial value. Furthermore use the same requirements level.

3.17. Automatically Confirmed Addresses

3.17.1. Description of the Problem

The Path Verification procedure of [RFC4960] prescribes that any address passed to the sender of the INIT by its upper layer is automatically CONFIRMED. This however is unclear if only addresses in the request to initiate association establishment are considered or any addresses provided by the upper layer in any requests (e.g. in 'Set Primary').

3.17.2. Text Changes to the Document
Old text: (Section 5.4)

1) Any address passed to the sender of the INIT by its upper layer is automatically considered to be CONFIRMED.

New text: (Section 5.4)

1) Any addresses passed to the sender of the INIT by its upper layer in the request to initialize an association is automatically considered to be CONFIRMED.

3.17.3. Solution Description

The new text clarifies that only addresses provided by the upper layer in the request to initialize an association are automatically confirmed.

3.18. Only One Packet after Retransmission Timeout

3.18.1. Description of the Problem

[RFC4960] is not completely clear when it describes data transmission after T3-rtx timer expiration. Section 7.2.1 does not specify how many packets are allowed to be sent after T3-rtx timer expiration if more than one packet fit into cwnd. At the same time, Section 7.2.3 has the text without normative language saying that SCTP should ensure that no more than one packet will be in flight after T3-rtx timer expiration until successful acknowledgment. It makes the text inconsistent.

3.18.2. Text Changes to the Document
3.18.3. Solution Description

The new text clearly specifies that only one packet is allowed to be sent after T3-rtx timer expiration until successful acknowledgement.

3.19. INIT ACK Path for INIT in COOKIE-WAIT State

3.19.1. Description of the Problem

In case of an INIT received in the COOKIE-WAIT state [RFC4960] prescribes to send an INIT ACK to the same destination address to which the original INIT has been sent. This text does not address the possibility of the upper layer to provide multiple remote IP addresses while requesting the association establishment. If the upper layer has provided multiple IP addresses and only a subset of these addresses are supported by the peer then the destination address of the original INIT may be absent in the incoming INIT and sending INIT ACK to that address is useless.

3.19.2. Text Changes to the Document
Upon receipt of an INIT in the COOKIE-WAIT state, an endpoint MUST respond with an INIT ACK using the same parameters it sent in its original INIT chunk (including its Initiate Tag, unchanged). When responding, the following rules MUST be applied:

1) The INIT ACK MUST only be sent to an address passed by the upper layer in the request to initialize the association.

2) The INIT ACK MUST only be sent to an address reported in the incoming INIT.

3) The INIT ACK SHOULD be sent to the source address of the received INIT.

3.19.3. Solution Description

The new text requires sending INIT ACK to the destination address that is passed by the upper layer and reported in the incoming INIT. If the source address of the INIT fulfills it then sending the INIT ACK to the source address of the INIT is the preferred behavior.

3.20. Zero Window Probing and Unreachable Primary Path

3.20.1. Description of the Problem

Section 6.1 of [RFC4960] states that when sending zero window probes, SCTP should neither increment the association counter nor increment the destination address error counter if it continues to receive new packets from the peer. But receiving new packets from the peer does not guarantee peer’s accessibility and, if the destination address becomes unreachable during zero window probing, SCTP cannot get a changed rwnd until it switches the destination address for probes.
3.20.2. Text Changes to the Document

---------
Old text: (Section 6.1)
---------

If the sender continues to receive new packets from the receiver while doing zero window probing, the unacknowledged window probes should not increment the error counter for the association or any destination transport address. This is because the receiver MAY keep its window closed for an indefinite time. Refer to Section 6.2 on the receiver behavior when it advertises a zero window.

---------
New text: (Section 6.1)
---------

If the sender continues to receive SACKs from the peer while doing zero window probing, the unacknowledged window probes should not increment the error counter for the association or any destination transport address. This is because the receiver MAY keep its window closed for an indefinite time. Refer to Section 6.2 on the receiver behavior when it advertises a zero window.

3.20.3. Solution Description

The new text clarifies that if the receiver continues to send SACKs, the sender of probes should not increment the error counter of the association and the destination address even if the SACKs do not acknowledge the probes.

3.21. Normative Language in Section 10

3.21.1. Description of the Problem

Section 10 of [RFC4960] is informative and normative language such as MUST and MAY cannot be used there. However, there are several places in Section 10 where MUST and MAY are used.

3.21.2. Text Changes to the Document

---------
Old text: (Section 10.1)
---------

E) Send

Format: SEND(association id, buffer address, byte count [,context]
o no-bundle flag - instructs SCTP not to bundle this user data with other outbound DATA chunks. SCTP MAY still bundle even when this flag is present, when faced with network congestion.

---------
New text: (Section 10.1)
---------

E) Send

-> result

...

o no-bundle flag - instructs SCTP not to bundle this user data with other outbound DATA chunks. SCTP may still bundle even when this flag is present, when faced with network congestion.

---------
Old text: (Section 10.1)
---------

G) Receive

Format: RECEIVE(association id, buffer address, buffer size [,stream id])
...

o partial flag - if this returned flag is set to 1, then this Receive contains a partial delivery of the whole message. When this flag is set, the stream id and Stream Sequence Number MUST accompany this receive. When this flag is set to 0, it indicates that no more deliveries will be received for this Stream Sequence Number.
G) Receive

Format: RECEIVE(association id, buffer address, buffer size
[,stream id])
-> byte count [,transport address] [,stream id] [,stream sequence
number] [,partial flag] [,delivery number] [,payload protocol-id]
...

o partial flag - if this returned flag is set to 1, then this
Receive contains a partial delivery of the whole message. When
this flag is set, the stream id and Stream Sequence Number must
accompany this receive. When this flag is set to 0, it indicates
that no more deliveries will be received for this Stream Sequence
Number.

---------

Old text: (Section 10.1)
---------

N) Receive Unsent Message

Format: RECEIVE_UNSENT(data retrieval id, buffer address, buffer
size [,stream id] [,stream sequence number] [,partial
flag] [,payload protocol-id])
...

o partial flag - if this returned flag is set to 1, then this
message is a partial delivery of the whole message. When this
flag is set, the stream id and Stream Sequence Number MUST
accompany this receive. When this flag is set to 0, it indicates
that no more deliveries will be received for this Stream Sequence
Number.

---------

New text: (Section 10.1)
---------

N) Receive Unsent Message

Format: RECEIVE_UNSENT(data retrieval id, buffer address, buffer
size [,stream id] [,stream sequence number] [,partial
flag] [,payload protocol-id])
partial flag - if this returned flag is set to 1, then this message is a partial delivery of the whole message. When this flag is set, the stream id and Stream Sequence Number must accompany this receive. When this flag is set to 0, it indicates that no more deliveries will be received for this Stream Sequence Number.

Old text: (Section 10.1)

New text: (Section 10.1)
3.21.3. Solution Description

The normative language is removed from Section 10.

3.22. Increase of partial_bytes_acked in Congestion Avoidance

3.22.1. Description of the Problem

Two issues have been discovered with the partial_bytes_acked handling described in Section 7.2.2 of [RFC4960]:

- If the Cumulative TSN Ack Point is not advanced but the SACK chunk acknowledges new TSNs in the Gap Ack Blocks, these newly acknowledged TSNs are not considered for partial_bytes_acked although these TSNs were successfully received by the peer.
- Duplicate TSNs are not considered in partial_bytes_acked although they confirm that the DATA chunks were successfully received by the peer.

3.22.2. Text Changes to the Document

--------
Old text: (Section 7.2.2)
--------

- Whenever cwnd is greater than ssthresh, upon each SACK arrival that advances the Cumulative TSN Ack Point, increase partial_bytes_acked by the total number of bytes of all new chunks acknowledged in that SACK including chunks acknowledged by the new Cumulative TSN Ack and by Gap Ack Blocks.

--------
New text: (Section 7.2.2)
--------

- Whenever cwnd is greater than ssthresh, upon each SACK arrival, increase partial_bytes_acked by the total number of bytes of all new chunks acknowledged in that SACK including chunks acknowledged by the new Cumulative TSN Ack, by Gap Ack Blocks and by the number of bytes of duplicated chunks reported in Duplicate TSNs.

3.22.3. Solution Description

Now partial_bytes_acked is increased by TSNs reported as duplicated as well as TSNs newly acknowledged in Gap Ack Blocks even if the Cumulative TSN Ack Point is not advanced.
3.23. Inconsistency in Notifications Handling

3.23.1. Description of the Problem

[RFC4960] uses inconsistent normative and non-normative language when describing rules for sending notifications to the upper layer. E.g. Section 8.2 of [RFC4960] says that when a destination address becomes inactive due to an unacknowledged DATA chunk or HEARTBEAT chunk, SCTP SHOULD send a notification to the upper layer while Section 8.3 of [RFC4960] says that when a destination address becomes inactive due to an unacknowledged HEARTBEAT chunk, SCTP may send a notification to the upper layer.

This makes the text inconsistent.

3.23.2. Text Changes to the Document

The following change is based on the change described in Section 3.6.
An endpoint shall keep a counter on the total number of consecutive retransmissions to its peer (this includes data retransmissions to all the destination transport addresses of the peer if it is multi-homed), including the number of unacknowledged HEARTBEAT chunks observed on the path which currently is used for data transfer. Unacknowledged HEARTBEAT chunks observed on paths different from the path currently used for data transfer shall not increment the association error counter, as this could lead to association closure even if the path which currently is used for data transfer is available (but idle). If the value of this counter exceeds the limit indicated in the protocol parameter ‘Association.Max.Retrans’, the endpoint shall consider the peer endpoint unreachable and shall stop transmitting any more data to it (and thus the association enters the CLOSED state). In addition, the endpoint MAY report the failure to the upper layer and optionally report back all outstanding user data remaining in its outbound queue. The association is automatically closed when the peer endpoint becomes unreachable.

The following changes are based on [RFC4960].
When an outstanding TSN is acknowledged or a HEARTBEAT sent to that address is acknowledged with a HEARTBEAT ACK, the endpoint shall clear the error counter of the destination transport address to which the DATA chunk was last sent (or HEARTBEAT was sent). When the peer endpoint is multi-homed and the last chunk sent to it was a retransmission to an alternate address, there exists an ambiguity as to whether or not the acknowledgement should be credited to the address of the last chunk sent. However, this ambiguity does not seem to bear any significant consequence to SCTP behavior. If this ambiguity is undesirable, the transmitter may choose not to clear the error counter if the last chunk sent was a retransmission.

When the value of this counter reaches the protocol parameter ‘Path.Max.Retrans’, the endpoint should mark the corresponding destination address as inactive if it is not so marked, and may also optionally report to the upper layer the change of reachability of this destination address. After this, the endpoint should continue HEARTBEAT on this destination address but should stop increasing the counter.
When the value of this counter exceeds the protocol parameter ‘Path.Max.Retrans’, the endpoint should mark the corresponding destination address as inactive if it is not so marked, and SHOULD also report to the upper layer the change of reachability of this destination address. After this, the endpoint should continue HEARTBEAT on this destination address but should stop increasing the counter.

Old text: (Section 8.3)

Upon the receipt of the HEARTBEAT ACK, the sender of the HEARTBEAT should clear the error counter of the destination transport address to which the HEARTBEAT was sent, and mark the destination transport address as active if it is not so marked. The endpoint may optionally report to the upper layer when an inactive destination address is marked as active due to the reception of the latest HEARTBEAT ACK. The receiver of the HEARTBEAT ACK must also clear the association overall error count as well (as defined in Section 8.1).

New text: (Section 8.3)

Upon the receipt of the HEARTBEAT ACK, the sender of the HEARTBEAT should clear the error counter of the destination transport address to which the HEARTBEAT was sent, and mark the destination transport address as active if it is not so marked. The endpoint SHOULD report to the upper layer when an inactive destination address is marked as active due to the reception of the latest HEARTBEAT ACK. The receiver of the HEARTBEAT ACK should also clear the association overall error counter (as defined in Section 8.1).

Old text: (Section 9.2)

An endpoint should limit the number of retransmissions of the SHUTDOWN chunk to the protocol parameter ‘Association.Max.Retrans’. If this threshold is exceeded, the endpoint should destroy the TCB and MUST report the peer endpoint unreachable to the upper layer (and thus the association enters the CLOSED state).

New text: (Section 9.2)
An endpoint should limit the number of retransmissions of the SHUTDOWN chunk to the protocol parameter ‘Association.Max.Retrans’. If this threshold is exceeded, the endpoint should destroy the TCB and SHOULD report the peer endpoint unreachable to the upper layer (and thus the association enters the CLOSED state).

-----
Old text: (Section 9.2)
-----

The sender of the SHUTDOWN ACK should limit the number of retransmissions of the SHUTDOWN ACK chunk to the protocol parameter ‘Association.Max.Retrans’. If this threshold is exceeded, the endpoint should destroy the TCB and may report the peer endpoint unreachable to the upper layer (and thus the association enters the CLOSED state).

-----
New text: (Section 9.2)
-----

The sender of the SHUTDOWN ACK should limit the number of retransmissions of the SHUTDOWN ACK chunk to the protocol parameter ‘Association.Max.Retrans’. If this threshold is exceeded, the endpoint should destroy the TCB and SHOULD report the peer endpoint unreachable to the upper layer (and thus the association enters the CLOSED state).

3.23.3. Solution Description

The inconsistencies are removed by using consistently SHOULD.

3.24. SACK.Delay Not Listed as a Protocol Parameter

3.24.1. Description of the Problem

SCTP as specified in [RFC4960] supports delaying SACKs. The timer value for this is a parameter and Section 6.2 of [RFC4960] specifies a default and maximum value for it. However, defining a name for this parameter and listing it in the table of protocol parameters in Section 15 of [RFC4960] is missing.

This issue was reported as an Errata for [RFC4960] with Errata ID 4656.
3.24.2. Text Changes to the Document

---------
Old text: (Section 6.2)
---------

An implementation MUST NOT allow the maximum delay to be configured to be more than 500 ms. In other words, an implementation MAY lower this value below 500 ms but MUST NOT raise it above 500 ms.

---------
New text: (Section 6.2)
---------

An implementation MUST NOT allow the maximum delay (protocol parameter ‘SACK.Delay’) to be configured to be more than 500 ms. In other words, an implementation MAY lower the value of SACK.Delay below 500 ms but MUST NOT raise it above 500 ms.

---------
Old text: (Section 15)
---------

The following protocol parameters are RECOMMENDED:

    RTO.Initial – 3 seconds
    RTO.Min – 1 second
    RTO.Max – 60 seconds
    Max.Burst – 4
    RTO.Alpha – 1/8
    RTO.Beta – 1/4
    Valid.Cookie.Life – 60 seconds
    Association.Max.Retrans – 10 attempts
    Path.Max.Retrans – 5 attempts (per destination address)
    Max.Init.Retransmits – 8 attempts
    HB.interval – 30 seconds
    HB.Max.Burst – 1

---------
New text: (Section 15)
---------

The following protocol parameters are RECOMMENDED:

    RTO.Initial – 3 seconds
    RTO.Min – 1 second
    RTO.Max – 60 seconds
    Max.Burst – 4
RTO.Alpha - 1/8
RTO.Beta - 1/4
Valid.Cookie.Life - 60 seconds
Association.Max.Retrans - 10 attempts
Path.Max.Retrans - 5 attempts (per destination address)
Max.Init.Retransmits - 8 attempts
HB.interval - 30 seconds
HB.Max.Burst - 1
SACK.Delay - 200 milliseconds

3.24.3. Solution Description

The parameter was given a name and added to the list of protocol parameters.

3.25. Processing of Chunks in an Incoming SCTP Packet

3.25.1. Description of the Problem

There are a few places in [RFC4960] where the receiver of a packet must discard it while processing the chunks of the packet. It is unclear whether the receiver has to rollback state changes already performed while processing the packet or not.

The intention of [RFC4960] is to process an incoming packet chunk by chunk and do not perform any prescreening of chunks in the received packet so the receiver must only discard a chunk causing discard and all further chunks.

3.25.2. Text Changes to the Document

---------
Old text: (Section 3.2)
---------

00 - Stop processing this SCTP packet and discard it, do not process any further chunks within it.

01 - Stop processing this SCTP packet and discard it, do not process any further chunks within it, and report the unrecognized chunk in an ‘Unrecognized Chunk Type’.

---------
New text: (Section 3.2)
---------

00 - Stop processing this SCTP packet, discard the unrecognized chunk and all further chunks.

01 - Stop processing this SCTP packet, discard the unrecognized chunk and all further chunks, and report the unrecognized chunk in an 'Unrecognized Chunk Type'.

--------
Old text: (Section 11.3)
--------

It is helpful for some firewalls if they can inspect just the first fragment of a fragmented SCTP packet and unambiguously determine whether it corresponds to an INIT chunk (for further information, please refer to [RFC1858]). Accordingly, we stress the requirements, stated in Section 3.1, that (1) an INIT chunk MUST NOT be bundled with any other chunk in a packet, and (2) a packet containing an INIT chunk MUST have a zero Verification Tag. Furthermore, we require that the receiver of an INIT chunk MUST enforce these rules by silently discarding an arriving packet with an INIT chunk that is bundled with other chunks or has a non-zero verification tag and contains an INIT-chunk.

--------
New text: (Section 11.3)
--------

It is helpful for some firewalls if they can inspect just the first fragment of a fragmented SCTP packet and unambiguously determine whether it corresponds to an INIT chunk (for further information, please refer to [RFC1858]). Accordingly, we stress the requirements, stated in Section 3.1, that (1) an INIT chunk MUST NOT be bundled with any other chunk in a packet, and (2) a packet containing an INIT chunk MUST have a zero Verification Tag. Furthermore, we require that the receiver of an INIT chunk MUST enforce these rules by silently discarding the INIT chunk and all further chunks if the INIT chunk is bundled with other chunks or the packet has a non-zero verification tag.

3.25.3. Solution Description

The new text makes it clear that chunks can be processed from the beginning to the end and no rollback or pre-screening is required.

3.26. CWND Increase in Congestion Avoidance Phase

3.26.1. Description of the Problem

[RFC4960] in Section 7.2.2 prescribes to increase cwnd by 1*MTU per RTT if the sender has cwnd or more bytes of outstanding data to the corresponding address in the Congestion Avoidance phase. However,
this is described without normative language. Moreover, Section 7.2.2 includes an algorithm how an implementation can achieve it but this algorithm is underspecified and actually allows increasing cwnd by more than 1*MTU per RTT.

3.26.2. Text Changes to the Document

---

Old text: (Section 7.2.2)
---

When cwnd is greater than ssthresh, cwnd should be incremented by 1*MTU per RTT if the sender has cwnd or more bytes of data outstanding for the corresponding transport address.

---

New text: (Section 7.2.2)
---

When cwnd is greater than ssthresh, cwnd should be incremented by 1*MTU per RTT if the sender has cwnd or more bytes of data outstanding for the corresponding transport address. The basic guidelines for incrementing cwnd during congestion avoidance are:

- SCTP MAY increment cwnd by 1*MTU.

- SCTP SHOULD increment cwnd by one 1*MTU once per RTT when the sender has cwnd or more bytes of data outstanding for the corresponding transport address.

- SCTP MUST NOT increment cwnd by more than 1*MTU per RTT.

---

Old text: (Section 7.2.2)
---

- Whenever cwnd is greater than ssthresh, upon each SACK arrival that advances the Cumulative TSN Ack Point, increase partial_bytes_acked by the total number of bytes of all new chunks acknowledged in that SACK including chunks acknowledged by the new Cumulative TSN Ack and by Gap Ack Blocks.

- When partial_bytes_acked is equal to or greater than cwnd and before the arrival of the SACK the sender had cwnd or more bytes of data outstanding (i.e., before arrival of the SACK, flightsize was greater than or equal to cwnd), increase cwnd by MTU, and reset partial_bytes_acked to (partial_bytes_acked - cwnd).
New text: (Section 7.2.2)

```
o  Whenever cwnd is greater than ssthresh, upon each SACK arrival,
increase partial_bytes_acked by the total number of bytes of all
new chunks acknowledged in that SACK including chunks acknowledged
by the new Cumulative TSN Ack, by Gap Ack Blocks and by the number
of bytes of duplicated chunks reported in Duplicate TSNs.

o  When partial_bytes_acked is greater than cwnd and before the
arrival of the SACK the sender had less bytes of data outstanding
than cwnd (i.e., before arrival of the SACK, flightsize was less
than cwnd), reset partial_bytes_acked to cwnd.

o  When partial_bytes_acked is equal to or greater than cwnd and
before the arrival of the SACK the sender had cwnd or more bytes
of data outstanding (i.e., before arrival of the SACK, flightsize
was greater than or equal to cwnd), partial_bytes_acked is reset
to (partial_bytes_acked - cwnd). Next, cwnd is increased by MTU.
```

3.26.3. Solution Description

The basic guidelines for incrementing cwnd during congestion
avoidance phase are added into Section 7.2.2. The guidelines include
the normative language and are aligned with [RFC5681].

The algorithm from Section 7.2.2 is improved to not allow increasing
cwnd by more than 1*MTU per RTT.

3.27. Refresh of cwnd and ssthresh after Idle Period

3.27.1. Description of the Problem

[RFC4960] prescribes to adjust cwnd per RTO if the endpoint does not
transmit data on a given transport address. In addition to that, it
prescribes to set cwnd to the initial value after a sufficiently long
idle period. The latter is excessive. Moreover, it is unclear what
is a sufficiently long idle period.

[RFC4960] doesn’t specify the handling of ssthresh in the idle case.
If ssthresh is reduced due to a packet loss, ssthresh is never
recovered. So traffic can end up in Congestion Avoidance all the
time, resulting in a low sending rate and bad performance. The
problem is even more serious for SCTP because in a multi-homed SCTP
association traffic switch back to the previously failed primary path
will also lead to the situation where traffic ends up in Congestion
Avoidance.
3.27.2. Text Changes to the Document

Old text: (Section 7.2.1)

- The initial cwnd before DATA transmission or after a sufficiently long idle period MUST be set to \( \min(4 \cdot \text{MTU}, \max(2 \cdot \text{MTU}, 4380 \text{ bytes})) \).

New text: (Section 7.2.1)

- The initial cwnd before DATA transmission MUST be set to \( \min(4 \cdot \text{MTU}, \max(2 \cdot \text{MTU}, 4380 \text{ bytes})) \).

Old text: (Section 7.2.1)

- When the endpoint does not transmit data on a given transport address, the cwnd of the transport address should be adjusted to \( \max(\text{cwnd}/2, 4 \cdot \text{MTU}) \) per RTO.

New text: (Section 7.2.1)

- When the endpoint does not transmit data on a given transport address, the cwnd of the transport address should be adjusted to \( \max(\text{cwnd}/2, 4 \cdot \text{MTU}) \) per RTO. At the first cwnd adjustment, the ssthresh of the transport address should be adjusted to the cwnd.

3.27.3. Solution Description

A rule about cwnd adjustment after a sufficiently long idle period is removed.

The text is updated to refresh ssthresh after the idle period. When the idle period is detected, the cwnd value is stored to the ssthresh value.

3.28. Window Updates After Receiver Window Opens Up
3.28.1. Description of the Problem

The sending of SACK chunks for window updates is only indirectly referenced in [RFC4960], Section 6.2, where it is stated that an SCTP receiver must not generate more than one SACK for every incoming packet, other than to update the offered window.

However, the sending of window updates when the receiver window opens up is necessary to avoid performance problems.

3.28.2. Text Changes to the Document

Old text: (Section 6.2)

An SCTP receiver MUST NOT generate more than one SACK for every incoming packet, other than to update the offered window as the receiving application consumes new data.

New text: (Section 6.2)

An SCTP receiver MUST NOT generate more than one SACK for every incoming packet, other than to update the offered window as the receiving application consumes new data. When the window opens up, an SCTP receiver SHOULD send additional SACK chunks to update the window even if no new data is received. The receiver MUST avoid sending large burst of window updates.

3.28.3. Solution Description

The new text makes clear that additional SACK chunks for window updates may be sent as long as excessive bursts are avoided.

3.29. Path of DATA and Reply Chunks

3.29.1. Description of the Problem

Section 6.4 of [RFC4960] describes the transmission policy for multi-homed SCTP endpoints. However, there are the following issues with it:

- It states that a SACK should be sent to the source address of an incoming DATA. However, it is known that other SACK policies
(e.g. sending SACKs always to the primary path) may be more beneficial in some situations.

- Initially it states that an endpoint should always transmit DATA chunks to the primary path. Then it states that the rule for transmittal of reply chunks should also be followed if the endpoint is bundling DATA chunks together with the reply chunk which contradicts with the first statement to always transmit DATA chunks to the primary path. Some implementations were having problems with it and sent DATA chunks bundled with reply chunks to a different destination address than the primary path that caused many gaps.

3.29.2. Text Changes to the Document

---------
Old text: (Section 6.4)
---------

An endpoint SHOULD transmit reply chunks (e.g., SACK, HEARTBEAT ACK, etc.) to the same destination transport address from which it received the DATA or control chunk to which it is replying. This rule should also be followed if the endpoint is bundling DATA chunks together with the reply chunk.

However, when acknowledging multiple DATA chunks received in packets from different source addresses in a single SACK, the SACK chunk may be transmitted to one of the destination transport addresses from which the DATA or control chunks being acknowledged were received.

---------
New text: (Section 6.4)
---------

An endpoint SHOULD transmit reply chunks (e.g., INIT ACK, COOKIE ACK, HEARTBEAT ACK, etc.) in response to control chunks to the same destination transport address from which it received the control chunk to which it is replying.

The selection of the destination transport address for packets containing SACK chunks is implementation dependent. However, an endpoint SHOULD NOT vary the destination transport address of a SACK when it receives DATA chunks from the same source address.

When acknowledging multiple DATA chunks received in packets from different source addresses in a single SACK, the SACK chunk MAY be transmitted to one of the destination transport addresses from which the DATA or control chunks being acknowledged were received.
3.29.3. Solution Description

The SACK transmission policy is left implementation dependent but it is specified to not vary the destination address of a packet containing a SACK chunk unless there are reasons for it as it may negatively impact RTT measurement.

A confusing statement that prescribes to follow the rule for transmittal of reply chunks when the endpoint is bundling DATA chunks together with the reply chunk is removed.

4. IANA Considerations

This document does not require any actions from IANA.

5. Security Considerations

This document does not add any security considerations to those given in [RFC4960].

6. Acknowledgments

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7. References

7.1. Normative References


7.2. Informative References


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Additional Considerations for UDP Encapsulation of Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) Packets
draft-tuexen-tsvwg-sctp-udp-encaps-cons-02.txt

Abstract

RFC 6951 specifies the UDP encapsulation of SCTP packets. The described handling of received packets requires the check of the verification tag. However, RFC 6951 misses a specification for the handling of received packets for which this check is not possible.

This document updates RFC 6951 by specifying the handling of received packets where the verification tag can not be checked.

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1. Introduction

[RFC6951] specifies the UDP encapsulation of SCTP packets. To be able to adopt automatically to changes of the remote UDP encapsulation port number, it is updated automatically when processing received packets. This includes automatic enabling and disabling of UDP encapsulation.

Section 5.4 of [RFC6951] describes the processing of received packets and requires the check of the verification tag before updating the remote UDP encapsulation port and the possible enabling or disabling of UDP encapsulation.

[RFC6951] basically misses a description for the handling of received packets where this verification tag check is not possible. This includes packets for which no association can be found and packets containing an INIT chunk, since the verification tag for these packets must be 0.

2. Conventions

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
3. Handling of Out of the Blue Packets

If the processing of an out of the blue packet requires the sending of a packet in response according to the rules specified in Section 8.4 of [RFC4960], the following rules apply:

1. If the received packet was encapsulated in UDP, the response packets MUST also be encapsulated in UDP. The UDP source port and UDP destination port used for sending the response packet are the UDP destination port and UDP source port of the received packet.

2. If the receive packet was not encapsulated in UDP, the response packet MUST NOT be encapsulated in UDP.

Please note that in these cases a check of the of the verification tag is not possible.

4. Handling of SCTP Packets Containing an INIT Chunk Matching an Existing Association

SCTP packets containing an INIT chunk have the verification tag 0 in the common header. Therefore the verification can’t be checked.

The following rules apply when processing the received packet:

1. The remote UDP encapsulation port for the source address of the received SCTP packet MUST NOT be updated if the encapsulation of outgoing packets is enabled and the received SCTP packet is encapsulated.

2. The UDP encapsulation for outgoing packets towards the source address of the received SCTP packet MUST NOT be enabled, if it is disabled and the received SCTP packet is encapsulated.

3. The UDP encapsulation for outgoing packets towards the source address of the received SCTP packet MUST NOT be disabled, if it is enabled and the received SCTP packet is not encapsulated.

4. If the UDP encapsulation for outgoing packets towards the source address of the received SCTP packet is disabled and the received SCTP packet is encapsulated, an SCTP packet containing an ABORT chunk MUST be sent. The ABORT chunk MAY include the error cause defined below indicating an "Restart of an Association with New Encapsulation Port". This packet containing the ABORT chunk MUST be encapsulated in UDP. The UDP source port and UDP destination port used for sending the packet containing the ABORT chunk are
the UDP destination port and UDP source port of the received packet containing the INIT chunk.

5. If the UDP encapsulation for outgoing packets towards the source address of the received SCTP packet is disabled and the received SCTP packet is not encapsulated, the processing defined in [RFC4960] MUST be performed. If a packet is sent in response, it MUST NOT be encapsulated.

6. If the UDP encapsulation for outgoing packets towards the source address of the received SCTP packet is enabled and the received SCTP packet is not encapsulated, an SCTP packet containing an ABORT chunk MUST be sent. The ABORT chunk MAY include the error cause defined below indicating an "Restart of an Association with New Encapsulation Port". This packet containing the ABORT chunk MUST NOT be encapsulated in UDP.

7. If the UDP encapsulation for outgoing packets towards the source address of the received SCTP packet is enabled and the received SCTP packet is encapsulated, but the UDP source port of the received SCTP packet is not equal to the remote UDP encapsulation port for the source address of the received SCTP packet, an SCTP packet containing an ABORT chunk MUST be sent. The ABORT chunk MAY include the error cause defined below indicating an "Restart of an Association with New Encapsulation Port". This packet containing the ABORT chunk MUST be encapsulated in UDP. The UDP source port and UDP destination port used for sending the packet containing the ABORT chunk are the UDP destination port and UDP source port of the received packet containing the INIT chunk.

8. If the UDP encapsulation for outgoing packets towards the source address of the received SCTP packet is enabled and the received SCTP packet is encapsulated and the UDP source port of the received SCTP packet is equal to the remote UDP encapsulation port for the source address of the received SCTP packet, the processing defined in [RFC4960] MUST be performed. If a packet is sent in response, it MUST be encapsulated. The UDP source port and UDP destination port used for sending the packet containing the ABORT chunk are the UDP destination port and UDP source port of the received packet containing the INIT chunk.

The error cause indicating an "Restart of an Association with New Encapsulation Port" is defined by the following figure.
Cause Code: 2 bytes (unsigned integer)
This field MUST hold the IANA defined error cause code for the "Restart of an Association with New Encapsulation Port" error cause. The suggested value of this field for IANA is 14.

Cause Length: 2 bytes (unsigned integer)
This field holds the length in bytes of the error cause; the value MUST be 8.

Current Encapsulation Port: 2 bytes (unsigned integer)
This field holds the remote encapsulation port currently being used for the destination address the received packet containing the INIT chunk was sent from. If the UDP encapsulation for destination address is currently disabled, 0 is used.

New Encapsulation Port: 2 bytes (unsigned integer)
If the received SCTP packet containing the INIT chunk is encapsulated in UDP, this field holds the UDP source port number of the UDP packet. If the received SCTP packet is not encapsulated in UDP, this field is 0.

All transported integer numbers are in "network byte order" a.k.a., Big Endian.

5. Middlebox Considerations

Middleboxes often use different timeouts for UDP based flows than for other flows. Therefore the HEARTBEAT.Interval parameter SHOULD be lowered to 15 seconds when UDP encapsulation is used.

6. IANA Considerations

[NOTE to RFC-Editor:
"RFCXXXX" is to be replaced by the RFC number you assign this document.
]

[NOTE to RFC-Editor:
The suggested value for the error cause code is tentative and to be confirmed by IANA.

This document (RFCXXXX) is the reference for the registration described in this section.

A new error cause code has to be assigned by IANA. This requires an additional line in the "Error Cause Codes" registry for SCTP:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Cause Code</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Restart of an Association with New Encapsulation Port</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. Security Considerations

This document does not change the considerations given in [RFC6951].

However, not following the procedures given in this document might allow an attacker to take over SCTP associations. The attacker needs only to share the IP address of an existing SCTP association.

It should also be noted that if firewalls will be applied at the SCTP association level they have to take the UDP encapsulation into account.

8. Acknowledgments

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9. Normative References

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Abstract

This document defines a PHB (Per-Hop Behavior) group called Latency Loss Tradeoff (LLT). The LLT group is intended to provide delivery of IP packets in two classes of services: a low-loss service (Lo service) and a low-latency service (La service). The LLT group enables an application to request treatment for either low-loss or low-latency at a congested network link.

Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

Status of This Memo

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1. Introduction

Different applications have different communication requirements [QoS]. In interactive applications of real-time sound transmission, as well as in virtual reality, the overall one-way delay needs to be short in order to give the user an impression of a real-time response. Yet, these applications may be able to tolerate high loss rates. In conventional text and data networking, delay thresholds are the least stringent. The response time in these types of applications can increase from 2 to 5 seconds before becoming unacceptable. However, given that increased loss reduces the throughput of TCP, these applications desire minimal loss.

The network resources consist primarily of buffers and link bandwidth. Operators often favor high utilization of bottleneck links at the price of high queuing delay. This is beneficial for non-real time applications. However, this may be considered unacceptable for some real-time applications. The proposed LLT group enables an application to choose between low-latency and low-loss at a congested network link [ABE] [RD]. Typically, an interactive application with real-time deadlines, such as audio, will mark most of its packets as a low-latency service. In contrast, an application that transfers bulk data will mark most of its packets as a low-loss service. The LLT group can be thought of as allowing an application to trade loss for delay by marking packets low-latency service (La) or to trade delay for loss by marking packets low-loss service (Lo).

2. Terminology

This section contains definitions for terms used frequently throughout this document.

2.1. Abbreviations and acronyms

DS: Differentiated Service
PHB: Per-Hop Behavior
LLT: Latency Loss Tradeoff
TCA: Traffic Conditioning Agreement
TCP: Transmission Control Protocol
2.2. Definitions

DS-capable: capable of implementing differentiated services as described in this architecture; usually used in reference to a domain consisting of DS-compliant nodes.

DS codepoint: a specific value of the DSCP portion of the DS field, used to select a PHB.

DS-compliant: enabled to support differentiated services functions and behaviors as defined in [RFC2474], this document, and other differentiated services documents; usually used in reference to a node or device.

DS field: the IPv4 header TOS octet or the IPv6 Traffic Class octet when interpreted in conformance with the definition given in [RFC2474]. The bits of the DSCP field encode the DS codepoint, while the remaining bits are currently unused.

Low-latency service (La service): puts an emphasis on low queuing delay at a congested network link. It allows an application to trade loss for delay.

Low-loss service (Lo service): puts an emphasis on low packet loss rate at a congested network link. It allows an application to trade delay for loss.

Per-Hop-Behavior (PHB): the externally observable forwarding behavior applied at a DS-compliant node to a DS behavior aggregate.

PHB group: a set of one or more PHBs that can only be meaningfully specified and implemented simultaneously, due to a common constraint applying to all PHBs in the set such as a queue servicing or queue management policy. A PHB group provides a service building block that allows a set of related forwarding behaviors to be specified together (e.g., four dropping priorities). A single PHB is a special case of a PHB group.

Traffic Conditioning Agreement (TCA): an agreement specifying classifier rules and any corresponding traffic profiles and metering, marking, discarding and/or shaping rules which are to apply to the traffic streams selected by the classifier. A TCA encompasses all of the traffic conditioning rules explicitly specified within a SLA along with all of the rules implicit from the relevant service requirements and/or from a DS domain’s service provisioning policy.
3. Problem Statement

3.1. Existing DSCP PHBs

3.1.1. Default PHB

A default Per-Hop Behavior (PHB) [RFC2474] MUST be available in a DiffServ (DS)-compliant node. This is the common, best-effort forwarding behavior available in existing routers as standardized in [RFC1812]. Codepoint ‘000000’ from Pool 1 is used as the default PHB value. In this document, packets received with the Default PHB is treated as Lo service on the LLT-compliant router.

3.1.2. Class Selector PHB

The Class Selector (CS) PHB [RFC2474] is introduced for backwards compatibility with use of the IPv4 Precedence field. Any of the eight codepoints in the range ‘xxx000’ (where ‘x’ may equal ‘0’ or ‘1’) from Pool 1 is assigned as Class Selector codepoint. The CS PHB does not match the services that LLT PHB is trying to deliver.

3.1.3. Assured Forwarding PHB Group

The Assured Forwarding (AF) PHB group [RFC2597] allows the operator to provide assured forwarding of IP packets as long as the aggregate traffic does not exceed the subscribed rate. Traffic that exceeds the subscribed rate is not delivered with as high a probability as the traffic that is within the rate.

The AF PHB group provides delivery of IP packets in four independently forwarded AF classes. Within each AF class, an IP packet can be assigned one of three different levels of drop precedence. The combination of classes and drop precedence yields twelve separate DSCP encodings from AF11 through AF43 as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class 1</th>
<th>Class 2</th>
<th>Class 3</th>
<th>Class 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low Drop Prec</td>
<td>001010</td>
<td>010010</td>
<td>011010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium Drop Prec</td>
<td>001100</td>
<td>010100</td>
<td>011100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Drop Prec</td>
<td>001110</td>
<td>010110</td>
<td>011110</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The AF PHB does not match the services that LLT PHB is trying to deliver.
3.1.4. Expedited Forwarding PHB

Expedited Forwarding (EF) PHB [RFC3246] is intended to provide a building block for low delay, low jitter and low loss services by ensuring that the EF aggregate is served at a certain configured rate. EF traffic requires a strict admission control mechanism. Codepoint '101110' is recommended for the EF PHB. The EF PHB does not match the services that LLT PHB is trying to deliver.

3.1.5. Voice Admit PHB

The Voice Admit (VA) PHB [RFC5865] has identical characteristics to the Expedited Forwarding PHB. However Voice Admit traffic is also admitted by the network using a Call Admission Control (CAC) procedure. The recommended DSCP for Voice Admit is '101100', parallel with the existing EF codepoint '101110'. The VA PHB does not match the services that LLT PHB is trying to deliver.

3.1.6. Delay Bound PHB

The Delay Bound (DB) PHB [RFC3248] requires a bound on the delay of packets due to other traffic in the network. Two parameters - capped arrival rate (R) and a 'score' (S), are defined and related to the target delay variation bound. An experimental codepoint '101111' is suggested for DB behavior. In this document, there's no specific bound on the delay, the LLT PHB only indicates the tradeoff.

3.2. Incentives

The primary goal of differentiated services is to allow different levels of service to be provided for traffic streams on a common network infrastructure. Hence, an adversary may be able to obtain better service by modifying the DS field to codepoints indicating behaviors used for enhanced services or by injecting packets with the DS field set to such codepoints. Such theft-of-service ([RFC2474], [RFC2475]) becomes a denial-of-service attack when the modified or injected traffic depletes the resources available to forward it and other traffic streams.

DS ingress nodes must condition all traffic entering a DS domain to ensure that it has acceptable DS codepoints. This means that the codepoints must conform to the applicable TCA(s) (Traffic Conditioning Agreement) [RFC2475] and the domain’s service provisioning policy. Packets received with an unacceptable codepoints must either be discarded or must have their DS codepoints modified to acceptable values before being forwarded. For example, an ingress node receiving traffic from a domain with which no enhanced service agreement exists may reset the DS codepoint to the
Default PHB codepoint. However, the Default PHB (i.e. best-effort forwarding) cannot meet the diverse needs of different Internet applications.

The objective of the LLT PHB group is to retain the best-effort service while providing low delay to real-time applications at the expense of increased loss or providing low loss to non real-time applications at the expense of increased delay. This requires Internet applications to mark their traffic with appropriate codepoint values. Since the low-loss service is neither better nor worse than the low-latency service but is merely different, there is no incentive for Internet applications to abuse such codepoints, and no need for admission control.

4. Definition of LLT PHB

The LLT group provides forwarding of IP packets in two classes of service: a low-loss service (Lo) and a low-latency service (La). The LLT group enables an application to choose between low latency and low loss at a congested network link. The packets marked as low-latency service receive little queuing delay. The packets marked as low-loss service receive at least as much throughput as they would in a legacy best effort network. La-marked packets are more likely to be dropped during periods of congestion than the Lo-marked packets. Note that among the two services, neither of the two has priority over the other.

4.1. Goal and Scope of LLT

The LLT group may be used by a network operator in two distinct ways: either as a separate service, or as a replacement of the flat (existing) best-effort IP service.

A DS (Differentiated Services) node SHOULD implement the LLT group. It MAY allocate a configurable, minimum amount of forwarding resources (buffer space and bandwidth) to LLT group.

The LLT group MAY also be configurable to receive more forwarding resources than the minimum when excess resources are available from other PHB groups. This is beyond the scope of this document.

The LLT PHB definition does NOT mandate or recommend any particular method for achieving LLT behavior.
4.2. Description of LLT behavior

To support the LLT group on an output link, the router can maintain two FIFO (First-In First-Out) queues referred to as a Lo (Loss-sensitive) queue and La (Latency-sensitive) queue for packets destined to the link. Depending on whether an incoming packet is marked for the low-loss or low-latency service, the router appends the packet to the Lo or La queue respectively. The packets within each queue are served in the FIFO order. The scheduling is work-conserving.

A router can support the desired delay differentiation between the Lo and La services through buffer sizing for the Lo and La queues, and by ensuring that the La queue does not grow larger than the Lo queue. As common in current Internet routers, the size of the Lo buffer is chosen large enough so that the oscillating transmission of TCP (Transmission Control Protocol) and other legacy end-to-end congestion control protocols utilizes the available link rate fully. The La buffer is configured to a much smaller dynamic size to ensure that queuing delay for each forwarded packet of the La class is low. The assurance of low maximum queuing delay is attractive for delay-sensitive applications and easily verifiable by outside parties.

4.2.1. Implementation Considerations

This document does not specify any particular implementation method for achieving LLT behavior. Some LLT-like implementations may refer to [I-D.hurley-alternative-best-effort], [RD] and [I-D.briscoe- AQM-dualq-coupled].

[I-D.hurley-alternative-best-effort] marks every best effort packet as either green or blue. Green packets receive a low, bounded delay at every hop, the value of the per-hop delay bound configured by the operator. However, when transmitting more aggressively, the green users can enjoy both a higher rate and lower queuing delay than those of the blue users, which weakens the incentives for incremental deployment. [RD] proposes Rate-Delay (RD) service enabling a user to choose either a higher transmission rate or low queuing delay. The R (Rate) service is like Lo service while D (Delay) service is like La service.

Note that both classes defined in this document do not provide any absolute guarantees on the loss rate or delay a packet will experience. Using these classes only provides a relative treatment compared to the other class. Depending on the amount of traffic arriving per class, it is possible for traffic in the La class to experience more delay than traffic in the Lo class. However, this may be circumvented by using scheduling mechanisms, for example, by
adjusting the scheduling function that assigns traffic to the Lo and La queues, or by adjusting the scheduling weight based on the average load in each class. Moreover, the delay experienced by La traffic is always bounded by the length of the La queue. The particular implementation is beyond the scope of this document.

When a DS-compliant node claims to implement the LLT PHB, the implementation MUST conform to the specification given in this document.

4.3. Microflow misordering

The packets within each queue are served in the FIFO order. Packets belonging to a single microflow within the LLT aggregate SHOULD NOT experience re-ordering in normal operation of the device when passing through.

4.4. Recommended Codepoints

Recommended codepoints for the LLT PHB group are given below.

- Low-loss service: 000001
- Low-latency service: 000101

4.5. Mutability

Packets marked for LLT PHB MAY be remarked at a DS domain boundary only to other codepoints that satisfy the LLT PHB. Packets marked for LLT PHBs SHOULD NOT be demoted or promoted to another PHB by a DS domain.

4.6. Tunneling

When LLT packets are tunneled, the tunneling packets must be marked as LLT.

4.7. Interaction with other PHBs

Other PHBs and PHB groups may be deployed in the same DS node or domain with the LLT PHB.

Packets received with the Default PHB SHOULD be treated as Lo service as default by the LLT PHB aware device. [RD] has proved that La service does not hurt Lo service.

Packets received with the LLT PHB SHOULD be treated as Default PHB as default by the LLT PHB unaware device.
5. Security Considerations

Internet applications cannot benefit from wrongly indicating low-loss or low-latency as they have to pay the expense of high delay or high loss as a tradeoff. Hence there is no incentive for Internet applications to set the wrong codepoints.

6. IANA Considerations

This document suggests two experimental codepoints, 000001/000101, in Pool 3 of the code space defined by [RFC2474].

7. References

7.1. Normative References


7.2. Informative References


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