

Address Protected Neighbor Discovery for Low-power and Lossy Networks

[draft-sarikaya-6lo-ap-nd-02](#)

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SeND for 6LoWPAN?

Address Spoofing

Need for defense against spoofing like classical ND?

IEEE appears to think so (Dorothy's presentation Sunday)

Attack is not on NS lookup since we use not onlink model

Spoofing happens at registration time

From devices with a join key (misplaced trust, compromised)

Thus the need to ensure first come first serve registration

Proposal

Cryptographic token proving identify

Used as a replacement for the MAC address in ARO
State in 6LR/6LBR associates first come with token
Could be a RSA public key but that's at least 384 bits
That's potentially a lot of state at the 6LR

CGA has IPR

Suggestion: use private key on MAC address (SLLAO) and
ECC

What changed since 01

- Added <Updates: 6775 (if approved)>
- New/updated section 4.2. Updating RFC 6775
- Added comparison with SeND
=> this specification saves ~1Kbytes in every NS/NA
- Added crypto ID computation and a bit in the ARO indicating crypto ID


Questions


Do people see that address spoofing may occur in IOT?


Is this a valid approach?


Where do we go from here?


FIRST REGISTRATION

















Attacker

6LR

6LBR

NS (ARO)

DAR (ARO)

DAC (ARO)

Status= 5 (validate)

NA (ARO)

Status= 5 (validate)

NS (ARO)

Proof ~1Kb

Check Crypto proof

NA (ARO)

Status= 1 (dup)

Collision of binding state
Same UID for addr. LPN
Either original or this registration
indicates UID is a cryptoid
No state change at this time

Unlikely to occur