

**draft-ietf-acme-acme**



IETF 95

**Closed since last  
IETF meeting**

# We did some stuff!



**52** pull requests merged since IETF 94, with **14** different authors!

Highlights...

# We deleted some stuff!

**#108 Remove account recovery**

**#106 Revert #102**

**#102 Replace in-band account recovery with `meta`**

No replacement defined for now (despite “meta” proposal)

Might come back (see below)

**#101 Remove proof-of-possession challenge**

Probably only makes sense to come back in an extension

# We improved account management!

## #39 Add roll-over for account keys

**Both keys** indicate agreement with the transaction  
Roll-over request signed by new key, then old key  
Potential revision (see below)

## #98 Add deletion of accounts and authz

```
POST /reg/asdf HTTP/1.1
{ "resource": "reg", "delete": true }
/* signed as JWS */
```

# We fixed a security issue!

## #71 Change TLS-SNI to require hostname not specified by validator

Observation by Jehiah Czebotar that the structure of tls-sni-01 allows a careless server operator to create an insecure configuration

- Validation response can be created based on validation request

- Validation server could just respond to any request

Created tls-sni-02 that follows the same pattern as http-01 and dns-01 challenges

- Server needs to be explicitly configured for each challenge

# We added more metadata!

## #72 Add metadata to directory

```
GET /acme/directory HTTP/1.1
200 OK
{"meta": {"terms": "https://example.com/acme/terms", ...}, ...}
```

## #37 Add an SCT link relation

For better support of Certificate Transparency

```
Link: <https://example.com/acme/sct/asdf>;rel="ct-sct"
```

**Open issues**



# Miscellaneous

#77 Add conditional authz creation/search [PR]

**merge**

#104 Add section about rate limits [PR]

**merge**

#47 Clarify how to handle bad new-certificate requests

**implement?**

When should CA error vs. modify request?

Proposal: MUST error if it cannot deliver as specified

# Challenges

#111 Out-of-band challenge

**implement**

#89 dns-01 walk-up

**defer**

#88 http-01 and dns-01 challenges: just use account key

**defer**

#4 Define a new challenge type that runs on a dedicated port

**defer**

# Karthik's Analysis

Karthik Bhargavan posted some analysis to the list, from which I made a few issues:

#112 Replace "resource" field with "url"

**implement**

```
OLD: { "resource": "new-authz", ... }
```

```
NEW: { "url": "https://example.com/acme/new-authz", ... }
```

#113 Reverse the order of signatures in roll-over

**implement**

```
OLD: Sign(K_old_priv, Sign(K_new_priv, Fingerprint(K_old_pub)))
```

```
NEW: Sign(K_new_priv, Sign(K_old_priv, Fingerprint(K_new_pub)))
```

#114 Specify MAC-based recovery (assuming MAC key)

**implement?**

```
NEW: Sign(K_new_priv, MAC(K_recovery_priv, Fingerprint(K_new_pub)))
```

# Wildcards

#73 Support authorizations for wildcard names

#74 Wildcard support [PR]

Current text forbids the use of wildcard identifiers in new-authz requests

How can we enable wildcard issuance?

# Preconditions?



412

Precondition Failed

Current ACME is proactive: Get authz before you ask for a cert

We could also have a way for the CA to say “That’s not quite right, please do X”

1. ~~Client sends new-authz request~~
2. Client sends new-cert request
3. Server responds with a list of things the client needs to do (e.g., authz)

# ACME for pre-ACME CAs

To what degree do we want to support legacy CAs in this iteration of ACME?

Rough proposal [posted to the mailing list](#) in December

Pro: Could allow some current CAs to move to ACME

Con: Significantly more complex

Solve now or punt?

# The Original Proposal

## Registration

|

+--\* Authorization

|

+--\* Certificate

## Registration

|

+--\* Authorization

|

+--\* Order

|

+--\* Authorization

|

+--\* CertificateRequest

|

+--\* CertificateInstance

# Deaggregating

*“I think there is a high risk of putting too much policy into the protocol” — pzb*

Maybe we can address this with a few smaller issues:

- Preconditions
- Scoping for authorizations
- Grouping of new-cert requests / multiple CSRs

Is this something we want to tackle now, or defer to a possible v2?



**Where do we go  
from here?**

# Rough Proposal

Clear out issue list by ~May / early June

Get at least two clients and two servers interoperating (ideally with a high degree of test coverage for the spec)

Last Call before IETF 96

At IETF 96, discuss LC comments, any extensions