



RESTENA

Réseau Téléinformatique de l'Education Nationale et de la Recherche

A Configuration File Format for Network Services on Leaf Devices

Preventing security and privacy threats for end users

(draft-winter-opsec-netconfig-metadata-00)

IETF 95, Buenos Aires, AR

Stefan Winter <stefan.winter@restena.lu>

Preface: why at opsec?

- Operational component: configure things on hosts correctly – make things work
- Security component: configure things securely on hosts
 - STARTTLS “if available”?
 - Enable server cert check – unchecked?
- Presented at opsawg (IETF 91) and saag (IETF 93) as draft-winter-opsawg-eap-metadata
- New draft extended significantly
 - Following opsawg and saag recommendations

Use Case Enterprise-Security Networks

- Wi-Fi: IEEE 802.11i (WPA2/AES with IEEE 802.1X)
- Wired: IEEE 802.1X
- Authentication
 - first, user devices authenticates the network (typically server certificate; PKIX with expected server name)
 - then, presents client credential to the known-good server
 - Protocol to get this done: EAP, the Extensible Authentication Protocol
 - Nothing can possibly go wrong.
- Nice theory.

Enterprise-Security Networks, Practice


- Client devices are often configured by **endusers** (argh!)
 - Lengthy PDF instructions are the norm, especially in BYOD
 - UIs typically make it easier to be insecure than secure (« Don't validate server certificate » ; « do you trust this fingerprint ? »)
- **The best auth protocol can't deliver if its users get it wrong.**
 - Main Problem: config is good enough to connect – but with insufficient security
 - Like: username+password correct, but would tell anyone who's asking

Who killed the pig?


Protocol Designers



Grunt!
Squeak!



DEAD!



Unsuspecting User

How bad is it, really?

- „A Practical Investigation of Identity Theft Vulnerabilities in Eduroam“ (sic)
(http://syssec.rub.de/media/infsec/veroeffentlichungen/2015/05/07/eduroam_WiSec2015.pdf)
- „a share of **52 %** wrongly configured devices existed in our study,“ [...] „ A total 20 % of the vulnerable devices were leaking authentication data in unencrypted form“ [majority of the rest: MSCHAPv2 – easily breakable]
- That's with 'loving and caring admins' – complete setup instructions; educational event explaining the importance
- But then again ...

Automatic Configuration to the Rescue

- „The comparatively small share of **13 %** of wrongly configured **Apple** devices might be due to simplifications of the Wi-Fi configuration by importing **pre-built configuration profiles**.“
- Apple has (proprietary) config format that wraps all EAP config details into one XML file; double-click and be happy
- Difference: getting to a secure config is easy then
- There is no IETF equivalent
 - devices like Android could implement it if it existed!
- Coverage beyond EAP-based Wi-Fi desirable

Coverage of current draft

- draft-winter-opsec-netconfig-metadata-00
 - Follow-up of draft-winter-opsawg-eap-metadata
- Configuration components are re-used between network services → design for that!
 - CA certificate can be trust anchor for Wi-Fi && VPN
 - Same username/password good for Wi-Fi, VPN, IMAP, ...
 - Draft assigns UUIDs to all components and allows for cross-references
- Extensible to cover items beyond network config
 - By using YANG
 - I'm a Wi-Fi person → only component that is defined in full detail
 - Plug in more!

Elements covered

NetworkConfiguration

ProviderInfo (Logo, Terms of Use, Helpdesk Info)

Certificates (CA or client certificates)

ClientSideCredentials (usernames, passwords, private keys, ...)

IPSettingsList (static IP, DHCP, SLAAC, ...)

EAPIdentityProviderList (EAP methods and their config params)

WiFiNetwork (Open, EAP, maybe even capport!)

TBD: Signature/Encryption

- YANG produces XML and JSON data formats
- Signing of config files: is the data from a trusted supplier?
 - XMLDSIG? S/MIME signature? JOSE?
- Encryption of config files if they carry private information
 - They don't have to; e.g. could ask for username/password interactively
 - XMLENC? JOSE again?

Next steps?

- More modules for service configs...
- Adoption as WG item?