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Privacy considerations for IP broadcast and multicast protocol designers
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Abstract

A number of application-layer protocols make use of IP broadcasts or multicast messages for functions such as local service discovery or name resolution. Some of these functions can only be implemented efficiently using such mechanisms. When using broadcasts or multicast messages, a passive observer in the same broadcast domain can trivially record these messages and analyze their content. Therefore, broadcast/multicast protocol designers need to take special care when designing their protocols.

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1. Introduction

Broadcast and multicast messages have a large receiver group by design. Because of that, these two mechanisms are vital for a number of basic network functions such as auto-configuration. Application developers use broadcast/multicast messages to implement things like local service or peer discovery and it appears that an increasing number of applications make use of it [TRAC2016].

Using broadcast/multicast can become problematic if the information that is being distributed can be regarded as sensitive or when the information that is distributed by multiple of these protocols can be correlated in a way that sensitive data can be derived. This is clearly true for any protocol, but broadcast/multicast is special in at least two respects: a) the aforementioned large receiver group which makes it trivial for anybody on a LAN to collect the information without special privileges or a special location in the network and b) encryption is more difficult when broadcasting/multicasting messages.

Privacy considerations of IETF-specified protocols have received some attention in the recent past(e.g. [RFC7721] or [I-D.ietf-dhc-dhcp-privacy]). This draft documents a number of privacy considerations for broadcast/multicast protocol designers that are intended to reduce the likelihood that a broadcast protocol can be misused to collect sensitive data about devices, users and

groups of users on a LAN. These considerations particularly apply to protocols designed outside the IETF for two reasons. For one, non-standard protocols will likely not receive operational attention and support in making them more secure such as e.g. DHCP snooping does for DHCP because they typically are not documented. The other reason is that these protocols have been designed in isolation, where a set of considerations to follow is useful in the absence of a larger community providing feedback. In particular, carelessly designed broadcast/multicast protocols can break privacy efforts at different layers of the protocol stack such as MAC address or IP address randomization [RFC4941].

1.1. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

2. Privacy considerations

There are a few obvious and a few not necessarily obvious things designers of broadcast/multicast protocols should consider in respect to the privacy implications of their protocol. Most of these items are based on protocol behaviour observed as part of experiments on operational networks [TRAC2016].

2.1. Message frequency

Frequent broadcast/multicast traffic caused by an application can give user behaviour and online times away. This allows a passive observer to potentially deduce a user's current activity (e.g. a game) and it allows to create an online profile (i.e. times the user is on the network). The higher the frequency of these messages, the more accurate this profile will be. Given that broadcasts are only visible in the same broadcast domain, these messages also give the rough location of the user away (e.g. a campus or building).

Besides the privacy implications of frequent broadcasting, it also represents a performance problem. In particular in certain wireless technologies such as 802.11, broadcast and multicast are transmitted at a much lower rate (the lowest common denominator rate) compared to unicast and therefore have a much bigger impact on the overall available airtime. Further, it will limit the ability for devices to go to sleep if frequent broadcasts are being sent. A similar problem in respect to Router Advertisements is addressed in [I-D.ietf-v6ops-reducing-ra-energy-consumption].

If a protocol relies on frequent or periodic broadcast/multicast messages, the frequency SHOULD be chosen conservatively, in particular if the messages contain persistent identifiers (see next subsection). Also, intelligent message suppression mechanisms such as the ones employed in mDNS [RFC6762] SHOULD be implemented.

2.2. Persistent identifiers

A few broadcast/multicast protocols observed in the wild make use of persistent identifiers. This includes the use of hostnames or more abstract persistent identifiers such as a UUID or similar. These IDs, which e.g. identify the installation of a certain application might not change across updates of the software and are therefore extremely long lived. This allows a passive observer to track a user precisely if broadcast/multicast messages are frequent. This is even true in case the IP and/or MAC address changes. Such identifiers also allow two different interfaces (e.g. Wifi and Ethernet) to be correlated to the same device. If the application makes use of persistent identifiers for multiple installations of the same application for the same user, this even allows to infer that different devices belong to the same user.

If a broadcast/multicast protocol relies on IDs to be transmitted, it SHOULD be considered if frequent ID rotations are possible in order to make user tracking more difficult. Persistent IDs are considered bad practice in general as persistent application layer IDs will make efforts on lower layers to randomize identifiers (e.g. [I-D.huitema-6man-random-addresses]) useless or at least much more difficult.

2.3. Anticipate user behaviour

A large number of users name their device after themselves, either using their first name, last name or both. Often a hostname includes the type, model or maker of a device, its function or includes language specific information. Based on gathered data, this appears currently to be prevalent user behaviour [TRAC2016]. For protocols using the hostname as part of the messages, this clearly will reveal personally identifiable information to everyone on the local network.

Where possible, the use of hostnames in broadcast/multicast protocols SHOULD be avoided. If only a persistent ID is needed, this can be generated. An application might want to display the information it will broadcast on the LAN at install/config time, so the user is at least aware of the application's behaviour. More hostname considerations can be found in [I-D.ietf-intarea-hostname-practice].

2.4. Consider potential correlation

A large number of services and applications make use of the broadcast/multicast mechanism. That means there are various sources of information that are easily accessible by a passive observer. In isolation, the information these protocols reveal might seem harmless, but given multiple such protocols, it might be possible to correlate this information. E.g. a protocol that uses frequent messages including a UUID to identify the particular installation does not give the identity of the user away. But a single message including the user's hostname might just do that and it can be correlated using e.g. the MAC address of the device's interface.

A broadcast protocol designer should be aware of the fact that even if - in isolation - the information a protocol leaks seems harmless, there might be ways to correlate that information with other broadcast protocol information to reveal sensitive information about a user.

2.5. Configurability

A lot of applications and services using broadcast protocols do not include the means to declare "safe" environments (e.g. based on the SSID of a WiFi network). E.g. a device connected to a public WiFi will likely broadcast the same information as when connected to the home network. It would be beneficial if certain behaviour could be restricted to "safe" environments.

An application developer making use of broadcasts as part of the application SHOULD make the broadcast feature, if possible, configurable, so that potentially sensitive information does not leak on public networks.

3. Operational considerations

Besides changing end-user behavior, choosing sensible defaults as an operating system vendor (e.g. for suggesting host names) and the considerations for protocol designers mentioned in this document, there are things that the network administrators/operators can do to limit the above mentioned problems.

A feature not uncommonly found on access points e.g. is to filter broadcast and multicast traffic. This will potentially break certain applications or some of their functionality but will also protect the users from potentially leaking sensitive information.

4. Acknowledgements

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5. IANA Considerations

This memo includes no request to IANA.

6. Security Considerations

This document deals with privacy-related considerations of broadcast- and multicast-based protocols. It contains advice for designers of such protocols to minimize the leakage of privacy-sensitive information. The intent of the advice is to make sure that identities will remain anonymous and user tracking will be made difficult.

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