Use Cases for a Substrate Protocol for User Datagrams (SPUD)
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Abstract

This document identifies use cases for explicit cooperation between endpoints and middleboxes in the Internet under endpoint control. These use cases range from relatively low level applications (improving the ability for UDP-based protocols to traverse firewalls) through support for new transport services (in-flow prioritization for graceful in-network degradation of media streams). They are intended to provide background for deriving the requirements for a Substrate Protocol for User Datagrams (SPUD), as discussed at the IAB Stack Evolution in a Middlebox Internet (SEMI) workshop in January 2015 and the SPUD BoF session at IETF 92 in March 2015.

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1. Introduction

This document describes use cases for a common Substrate Protocol for User Datagrams (SPUD) that could be used by superstrate transport or application protocols to explicitly expose information to and exchange information with middleboxes about application traffic and network conditions.

For each use case, we first describe a problem that is difficult or impossible to solve with presently deployable protocols within the present Internet architecture. We then discuss which information is exposed by endpoints about the traffic sent, and/or by SPUD-aware middleboxes and routers about the path that traffic will traverse. We also suggest potential mechanisms to use that exposed information at middleboxes and/or endpoints, in order to demonstrate the feasibility of using the exposed information to the given use case. The described mechanisms are not necessarily proposals for moving forward, nor do they necessarily represent the best approach for applying the exposed information, but should illustrate and motivate the applicability of the exposed information. We further discuss incentives for deployment and any security, privacy, and trust issues that arise in exposing and/or making use of the information.

1.1. Principles and Assumptions

We make a few assumptions about first principles in elaborating these use cases.
1.1.1. Trust and Integrity

In this document, we assume no pre-existing trust relationship between the communication endpoints and any middlebox or router on the path. We must therefore always assume that information that is exposed can be incorrect, and/or that the information will be ignored.

This implies that while endpoints can verify the integrity of information exposed by remote endpoints, they cannot verify the integrity of information exposed by middleboxes. Middleboxes cannot verify the integrity of any information at all. In limited situations where a trust relationship can be established, e.g., between a managed end-user device in an enterprise network and a corporate firewall, this verifiability can be improved.

1.1.2. Endpoint Control

We further assume that all information exposure by middleboxes happens under explicit endpoint control. For that reason, the information exposed by middleboxes in this document takes only two forms. In the first form, "accumulation", the endpoint creates space in the header for middleboxes to use to signal to the remote endpoint, which then sends the information back to the originating endpoint via a feedback channel. In the second form, the middlebox sends a packed directly back to the endpoint with additional information about why a packet was dropped. Other communications patterns may be possible, depending on the first principles chosen; this is a subject of future work.

1.1.3. Least Exposure

Additionally, this document follows the principle of least exposure: in each use case, we attempt to define the minimum amount of information exposed by endpoints and middleboxes required by the proposed mechanism to solve the identified problem. In addition to being good engineering practice, this approach reduces the risk to privacy through inadvertent irrelevant metadata exposure, reduces the amount of information available for application fingerprinting, and reduces the risk that exposed information could otherwise be used for unintended purposes.

2. Firewall Traversal for UDP-Encapsulated Traffic

We presume, following an analysis of requirements in [I-D.trammell-spud-req], as well as trends in transport protocol development (e.g. QUIC, the RTCWEB data channel) that UDP encapsulation will prove a viable approach for deploying new
protocols in the Internet. This, however, leads us to a first problem that must be solved.

2.1. Problem Statement

UDP is often blocked by firewalls, or only enabled for a few well-known applications (e.g. DNS, NTP). Recent measurement work has shown that somewhere between 4% and 8% of Internet hosts may be affected by UDP impairment, depending on the population studied. Some networks (e.g. enterprise networks behind corporate firewalls) are far more likely to block UDP than others (e.g. residential wireline access networks).

In addition, some network operators assume that UDP is not often used for high-volume traffic, and is often a source of spoofing or reflected attack traffic, and is therefore safe to block or route-limit. This assumption is becoming less true than it once was: the volume of (good) UDP traffic is growing, mostly due to voice and video (real-time) services (e.g. RTCWEB) where TCP is not suitable.

Even if firewall vendors and administrators are willing to change firewall rules to allow more diverse UDP services, it is hard to track session state for UDP traffic. As UDP is unidirectional, it is unknown whether the receiver is willing to accept the connection. Further there is no way to figure how long state must be maintained once established. To efficiently establish state along the path we need an explicit contract, as is done implicitly with TCP today.

2.2. Information Exposed

To maintain state in the network, it must be possible to easily assign each packet to a session that is passing a certain network node. This state should be bound to something beyond the five-tuple to link packets together. In [I-D.trammell-spud-req], we propose the use of identifiers for groups of packets, called ("tubes"). This allows for differential treatment of different packets within one five-tuple flow, presuming the application has control over segmentation and can provide requirements on a per-tube basis. Tube IDs must be hard to guess: a tube ID in addition to a five-tuple as an identifier, given significant entropy in the tube ID, provides an additional assurance that only devices along the path or devices cooperating with devices along the path can send packets that will be recognized by middleboxes and endpoints as valid.

Further, to maintain state, the sender must explicitly indicate the start and end of a tube to the path, while the receiver must confirm connection establishment. This, together with the first packet following the confirmation, provides a guarantee of return
routability; i.e. that the sender is actually at the address it says it is. This implies all SPUD tubes must be bidirectional, or at least support a feedback channel for this confirmation. Even though UDP is not a bidirectional transport protocol, often services on top of UDP are bidirectional anyway. Even if not, we only require one packet to acknowledge a new connection. This is low overhead for this basic security feature. This connection set-up should not impose any additional start-up latency, so the sender must be also able to send payload data in the first packet.

If a firewall blocks a SPUD packet, it can be beneficial for the sender to know why the packet was blocked. Therefore a SPUD-aware middlebox should be able to send error messages. Such an error message can either be sent directly to the sender itself, or alternatively to the receiver that can decide to forward the error message to a sender or not.

2.3. Mechanism

A firewall or middlebox can use the tube ID as an identifier for its session state information. If the tube ID is large enough it will be hard for a non-eavesdropping attacker to guess the ID.

If a firewall receives a SPUD message that signals the start of a connection, it can decide to establish new state for this tube. Alternatively, it can also forward the packet to the receiver and wait if the connection is wanted before establishing state. To not require forwarding of unknown payload, a firewall might want to forward the initial SPUD packet without payload and only send the full packet if the connection has be accepted by the receiver.

The firewall must still maintain a timer to delete the state of a tube if no packets were received for a while. However, if an end signal is received the firewall can remove the state information faster.

If a firewall receives a SPUD message which does not indicate the start of a new tube and no state is available for this tube, it may decide to block the traffic. This can happen if the state has already timed out or if the traffic was rerouted. In addition a firewall may send an error message to the sender or the receiver indicating that no state information is available. If the sender receives such a message it can resend a start signal (potentially together with other tube state information) and continue its transmission.
2.4. Deployment Incentives

The ability to use existing firewall management best practices with new transport services over SPUD is necessary to ensure the deployability of SPUD. In today’s Internet, application developers really only have two choices for transport protocols: TCP, or transports implemented at the application layer and encapsulated over UDP. SPUD provides a common shim layer for the second case, and the firewall traversal facility it provides makes these transports more likely to deploy.

It is not expected that the information provided by SPUD will enable all generic UDP-encapsulated transports to safely pass firewalls. However, it does make state handling easier for new services that a firewall administrator is willing to allow.

2.5. Security, Privacy, and Trust

The tube ID is scoped to the five-tuple. While this makes the tube ID useless for session mobility, it does mean that the valid ID space is sufficiently sparse to maintain the "hard to guess" property, and prevents tube IDs from being misused to track flows from the same endpoint across multiple addresses. This limitation may need further discussion.

By providing information about connection setup, SPUD exposes information equivalent to that available in the TCP header. It makes connection lifetime information explicit and accessible without specific higher-layer/application-level knowledge.

3. On-Path State Lifetime Discovery and Management

Once the problem of connection setup is solved, the problem arises of managing the lifetime of state associated with that connection at various devices along the path: NAT and stateful firewall state timeouts are a common cause of connectivity issues in the Internet.

3.1. Problem Statement

Devices along the path that must keep state in order to function cannot assume that signals tearing down a connection are provided reliably. This is also the case for current TCP traffic. Therefore, all stateful on-path devices must implement a mechanism to remove the state if no traffic is seen for a given flow or tube for a while. Usually this is implemented by maintaining a timeout since the last observed packet.
If the timeouts are set too low, on-path state might be discarded while the endpoint connection is still alive; in the case of firewalls and NATs, this can lead to unreliable connectivity. The common solution to this problem is for applications or transport protocols that do not have any productive traffic to send to send "heartbeat" or "keep-alive" packets to reset the state timeout along the path. However, since the minimum timeout along the path is unknown to the endpoint, implementers of transport and application. A default value of 150ms is commonly used today. This represents a fairly rapid generation of nonproductive traffic, and is especially onerous on battery-powered mobile devices, which must wake up radios and switch to a higher-power mode to transmit these nonproductive packets, leading to suboptimal power usage and shorter battery life.

3.2. Information Exposed

SPUD can be used to request that SPUD-aware middleboxes along the path expose their minimum state timeout value. Here, the sending endpoint sends a "accumulate minimum timeout" request along with some scratch space for middleboxes to place their timeout information in. Each middlebox inspects this value, and writes its own timeout only if lower than the present value.

Applications may also send a "timeout proposal" to devices along the path using a SPUD declaration that a given tube will send a packet at least once per interval, and if no packet is seen within that interval, it is safe to tear down state.

These two declarations may be used together, with middleboxes willing to use the application’s value setting their timeouts on a per-tube basis, or exposing a lower timeout value to allow the application to adjust.

3.3. Mechanism

If a SPUD-aware middlebox that uses a timeout to clean up per-tube state receives a SPUD minimum timeout accumulation, it should expose its own timeout value if smaller than the one already given. Alternatively, if a value is already given, it might decide to use the given value as timeout for the state information of this tube. An endpoint receiving an accumulated minimum timeout should send it back to its remote peer via a feedback channel. Timeouts on each direction of a connection between two endpoints may, of course, be different, and are handled separately by this mechanism.

If a SPUD-aware middlebox that uses a timeout to clean up per-tube state receives a timeout proposal, it should set its timeout accordingly, subject to its own policy and configuration.
These mechanisms are of course completely advisory: there may be non-SPUD aware middleboxes on path which will ignore any proposed timeout and not expose their timeout information, and middleboxes must be configured with maximum timeout proposal they will accept in order to defend against state exhaustion attacks.

Endpoints must therefore be combine the use of these signals endpoint with a dynamic timeout discovery and adaptation mechanism, which uses the signals to set initial guesses as to the path timeout.

3.4. Deployment Incentives

Initially, if not widely deployed, there will be not much benefit to using this extension.

However, we can assume that there are usually only a small number of middleboxes on a given network path that hold per-tube state information. Endpoints have an incentive to request minimum timeout and to propose timeouts to improve convergence time for dynamic timeout adaptation mechanisms, and middleboxes have an incentive to cooperate to improve reliability of connections as well as state management. It is therefore likely that if information is exposed by a middlebox, this information is correct and can be used.

The more SPUD gets deployed, the more often endpoints will be able to set the heartbeat interval correctly. This will reduce the amount of unproductive traffic as well as the number of reconnections that cause additional latency.

Likewise, SPUD-aware middleboxes that expose timeout information are able to handle timeouts more flexibly, e.g. announcing lower timeout values when they have less space available for new state. Further if an endpoint announces a low pre-set value because the endpoint knows that it will only have short idle periods, the timeout interval could be reduced.

3.5. Security, Privacy, and Trust

Timeout proposals increase the risk of state exhaustion attacks for SPUD-aware middleboxes that naively follow them. Likewise, accumulated minimum timeouts could be used by malicious middleboxes to induce floods of useless heartbeat traffic along the path, and/or exhaust resources on endpoints that naively follow them. All timeout proposals and minimum timeouts must therefore be inputs to a dynamic timeout selection process, both at endpoints and on-path devices, which use these signals as hints but clamp their timeouts to sane values set by local policy.
While device timeout and heartbeat interval are generally not linked to privacy-sensitive information, a timeout proposal may add a number of bits of entropy to an endpoint’s unique fingerprint. It is therefore advisable to suggest a small number of useful timeout proposals, in order to reduce this value’s contribution to an endpoint fingerprint.

4. Path MTU Discovery

Similar to the state timeout problem is the Path MTU problem: differing MTUs on different devices along the path can lead to fragmentation or connectivity issues. This problem is made worse by the increasing proliferation of tunnels in the Internet, which reduce the MTU by the amount required for tunnel headers.

4.1. Problem Statement

In order to efficiently send packets along a path end to end, they must be sized to fit in the MTU of the "narrowest" link along the path. Algorithms for path MTU discovery have been defined and standardized for a quarter century, in [RFC1191] for IPv4 and [RFC1981] for IPv6, but they are not often implemented due in part to widespread impairment of ICMP. Packetization Layer Path MTU Discovery [RFC4821] (PLPMTUD) is a more recent attempt to solve the problem, which has the advantage of being transport-protocol independent and functional without ICMP feedback. SPUD, as a shim between UDP and superstrate transport protocols, is at the right place in the stack to implement PLPMTUD, and explicit cooperation can enhance its operation.

4.2. Information Exposed

SPUD can be used to request that SPUD-aware middleboxes along the path expose their next-hop path MTU value. Here, the sending endpoint sends a "accumulate minimum MTU" request along with some scratch space for middleboxes to place the next-hop MTU for the given tube. Each middlebox inspects this value, and writes its own next-hop MTU only if lower than the present value.

A SPUD-aware middlebox that receives a packet that is too big for the next-hop MTU can send back a signal associated with the tube directly to the sender, including the next-hop MTU.

4.3. Mechanism

PLPMTUD functions by dynamically increasing the size of packets sent, and reacting to the loss of the first "too large" packet as an MTU reduction signal, instead of a congestion signal. This must be
implemented in cooperation with the superstrate transport protocol, as it is responsible for how non-MTU-related loss is treated.

When an endpoint receives an accumulated minimum MTU, it should send it back to its remote peer via a feedback channel. The minimum of this value and any direct next-hop MTU signals received from SPUD-aware middleboxes can be used as a hint to the sender’s PLPMTUD process, as a likely upper bound for path MTU associated with a tube.

4.4. Deployment Incentives

As with state lifetime discovery, these signals are of little initial utility to endpoints before SPUD-aware middleboxes are deployed. However, SPUD-aware middleboxes that sit at potential MTU breakpoints along a path, either those which terminate tunnels or bridge networks with two different link types, have an incentive to improve reliability by responding to accumulation requests and sending next-hop MTU messages to SPUD-aware endpoints.

4.5. Security, Privacy, and Trust

As with state lifetime discovery, Minimum MTU and next-hop MTU signals could be used by malicious middleboxes to set the endpoint’s maximum packet size to inefficiently small sizes, if the endpoint follows them naively. For that reason, endpoints should use this information only as hints to improve the operation of PLPMTUD, and may probe above the value derived from the SPUD-supplied information when deemed appropriate by endpoint policy or transport protocol requirements.

5. Low-Latency Service

5.1. Problem Statement

Networks are often optimized for low loss rates and high throughput by providing large buffers that can absorb traffic spikes and rate variations while holding enough data to keep the link full. This is beneficial for applications like high-priority bulk transfer, where only the total transfer time is of interest. High-volume interactive applications, such as videoconferencing, however, have very different requirements. Usually these applications can tolerate higher loss rates, while having hard latency requirements.

Large network buffers may induce high queuing delays due to cross traffic using loss-based congestion control, which must periodically fill the buffer to induce loss during probing for additional bandwidth. This queuing delay can negatively impact the quality of
experience for competing interactive applications, even making them unusable.

5.2. Information Exposed

The simplest mechanism for solving this problem is to separate loss-sensitive from latency-sensitive traffic, as proposed using DSCP codepoints in [I-D.you-tsvwg-latency-loss-tradeoff]. This signal could also be emitted as a per-packet signal within SPUD, since DSCP codepoints are often used for internal traffic engineering and therefore cleared at network borders. This indication does not prioritize one kind of traffic over the other: while loss-sensitive traffic might face larger buffer delay but lower loss rate, latency-sensitive traffic has to make exactly the opposite tradeoff.

An endpoint can also indicate a maximum acceptable single-hop queueing delay per tube, expressed in milliseconds. While this mechanism does not guarantee that sent packets will experience less than the requested delay due to queueing delay, it can significantly reduce the amount of traffic uselessly sitting in queues, since at any given instance only a small number of queues along a path (usually only zero or one) will be full.

5.3. Mechanism

A middlebox may use the loss-/latency tradeoff signal to assign packet to the appropriate type of service, if different services are implemented at this middlebox. Traffic not indicating a low loss or low latency preference would still be assigned to today’s best-effort service, while a new low latency service would be introduced in addition.

The simplest implementation of such a low latency service (without disturbing existing traffic) is to manage traffic with the latency-sensitive flag set in a separate queue. This queue either, in itself, provides only a short buffer which induces a hard limit for the maximum (per-queue) delay or uses an AQM (such as PIE/CoDel) that is configured to keep the queueing delay low.

In such a two-queue system the network provider must decide about bandwidth sharing between both services, and might or might not expose this information. Initially there will only be a few flows that indicate low latency preference. Therefore at the beginning this service might have a low maximum bandwidth share assigned in the scheduler. However, the sharing ratio should be adapted to the traffic load/number of flows in each service class over long timescales.
Applications and endpoints setting the latency sensitivity flag on a tube must be prepared to experience relatively higher loss rates on that tube, and should use techniques such as Forward Error Correction (FEC) to cope with these losses.

If a maximum per-hop delay is indicated by the sender, a SPUD-aware router might drop any packet which would be placed in a queue that has more than the maximum single-hop delay at that point in time before queue admission. Thereby the overall congestion can be reduced early instead of withdrawing the packet at the receiver after it has blocked network resources for other traffic.

A transport protocol at an endpoint indicating the maximum per-hop delay must be aware that it might face higher loss rates under congestion than competing traffic on the same bottleneck.

5.4. Deployment Incentives

Application developers go to a great deal of effort to make latency-sensitive traffic work over today’s Internet. However, if large delays are induced by the network, an application at the endpoint cannot do much. Therefore applications can benefit from further support by the network.

Network operators have already realized a need to better support low latency services. However, they want to avoid any service degradation for existing traffic as well as risking stability due to large configuration changes. Introducing an additional service for latency-sensitive traffic that can exist in parallel to today’s network service helps this problem.

5.5. Security, Privacy, and Trust

An application cannot benefit from wrongly indicating loss- or latency-sensitivity, as it has to make a tradeoff between low loss and potential high delay or low delay and potential high loss.

A simple classification of traffic as loss- or latency-sensitive does not expose privacy-critical information about the user’s behavior; indeed, it exposes far less than presently used by DPI-based traffic classifiers that would be used to determine the latency sensitivity of traffic passing a middlebox.

6. Reordering Sensitivity
6.1. Problem Statement

TCP’s fast retransmit mechanism interprets the reception of three duplicated acknowledgement (where the acknowledgement number is the same than in the previous acknowledgement) as a signal for loss detection. However, a missing packet in the sequence number space must not always be lost. Simple reordering where one packet takes a longer path than (at least three) subsequent packets can have the same effect.

In addition in TCP, loss is an implicit signal for network congestion. Therefore the reception of three duplicated acknowledgement will cause a TCP sender to reduce its sending rate. To avoid unnecessary performance decreases, today’s in-network mechanisms usually aim to avoid reordering. However, this complicates these mechanism significantly and usually requires per-flow state, e.g. in case of Equal Cost Multipath (ECMP) routing where a hash of the 5 tuple would need to be mapped to the right path.

Even though the majority of traffic in the Internet is still TCP, it is likely that new protocols will be design such that they are (more) robust to reordering. Further with an increasing deployment of ECN, even TCP’s congestion control reaction based on duplicated acknowledgements could be relaxed (e.g. by reducing the sending rate gradually depending on the number of lost packets).

However, as middlebox can not know if a certain traffic flow is sensitive to reordering or not, they have to treat all traffic as equally and try to always avoid reordering. (This does not only complicate these mechanism but might also block the deployment of new services.)

6.2. Information Exposed

Reordering-sensitivity is a per tube signal (as reordering can only happen with a flow multiple packets). However, to avoid state in middlebox, it would be beneficial to have a reordering-sensitive flag in each packet.

A transport should set the bit if it is not sensitive to reordering, e.g. if it uses a more advance mechanism (than duplicated acknowledgement) for loss detection, or if the congestion control reaction to this signal imposes only a small performances penalty, or if the flow is short enough that it will not impact its performance.
6.3. Mechanism

A middlebox that implements an in-network function that could lead to varying end-to-end delay and reordering (as packets might overtake each other on different paths or within the network device), do not need to perform any additional action if the reordering-sensitivity flag is not set. However, if the flag is set, the middlebox should avoid reordering by e.g. holding per-tube state and make sure that all packets belonging to the same tube will not be re-ordered.

6.4. Deployment Incentives

Today by default middlebox assume that all traffic is reordering-sensitive which complicates certain in-network mechanism or might also block the deployment of new services. If a middlebox would know that certain traffic is not reordering-sensitive, it could reduce state, speed-up processing, or even implement new services.

Applications that are not loss-sensitive (because they e.g. uses FEC) usually are also not reordering-sensitive. At the same time these application are often sensitive to latency. If the transport handles reordering appropriately and signal this semantic information to the network, the appropriate network treatment can likely also result in lower end-to-end or at least enables the network device to impose any additional delay (e.g. to set up state) on these packets.

6.5. Security, Privacy, and Trust

No trust relationship is needed as the provided information do not results in a preferential treatment. Only transport semantics are exposed that to not contain any private information.

7. Application-Limited Flows

7.1. Problem Statement

Many flows are application-limited, where the application itself adapts the limit to changing traffic conditions or link characteristics, such as with unicast adaptive bitrate streaming video. This adaptation is difficult, since TCP cross-traffic will often probe for available bandwidth more aggressively than the application’s control loop. Further complicating the situation is the fact that rate adaptation may have negative effects on the user’s quality of experience, and should therefore be done infrequently.
7.2. Information Exposed

A SPUD endpoint sending application-limited traffic can provide an explicit per-tube indication of the maximum intended data rate needed by the current encoding or data source. If the bottleneck device is SPUD-aware, it can use this information to decide how to correctly treat the tube, e.g. setting a rate limit or scheduling weight if served from its own queue.

A SPUD endpoint could also send a "minimum rate limit accumulation" request, similar to the other accumulation requests outlined above, where SPUD-aware routers and middleboxes could note the maximum bandwidth available to a tube. Receiving this signal on a feedback channel could allow a sender to more quickly adapt its sending rate. This rate limit information might be derived from local per-flow or per-tube rate limit policy, as well as from current information about load at the router.

These signals can be sent throughout the lifetime of the flow, to help adapt to changing application demands and/or network conditions.

7.3. Mechanism

Maximum expected data rate exposed by the endpoints could be used to make routing decisions and queue selection decisions at SPUD-aware routers, if different paths or queues with different capacity, delay, and load characteristics are available.

A SPUD-aware router that indicates a rate limit can be used by the sender to choose an encoding. However, the sender should still implement a mechanism to probe for available bandwidth to verify the provided information. As a certain rate limit is expected, the sender should probe carefully around this rate.

These mechanisms can also be used for rate increases. If a sender receives an indication that more bandwidth is available it should probe carefully, instead of switching to the higher rate immediately, and decrease its sensitivity to loss (e.g. through the use of additional FEC) which will provide additional protection as soon as the new capacity limit is reached. Likewise, a SPUD-aware router that receives an indication that a flow intends to increase its might prioritize this flow for a certain (short) time to enable a smoother transition.
7.4. Deployment Incentives

Endpoints that indicate maximum sending rate for application-limited traffic on SPUD-aware networks allow the operators of those networks to better handle traffic. This can benefit the service quality and increase the user’s satisfaction with the provided network service.

Currently applications have no good indication when to change their coding rate. Rate increases are especially hard. Further, frequent rate changes should be avoided for quality of experience. Cooperative indication of intended and available sending rate for application-limited flows can simplify probing, and provide signals beyond loss to react effectively to congestion.

7.5. Security, Privacy, and Trust

Both endpoints and SPUD-aware middleboxes should react defensively to rate limit and rate intention information. Endpoints and middleboxes should use measurement and probing to verify that rate information is accurate, but the exposed rate information can be used as hints to routing, scheduling, and rate determination processes.

8. Priority Multiplexing

8.1. Problem Statement

Many services require multiple parallel transmissions to transfer different kinds of data which have clear priority relationships among them. For example, in WebRTC, audio frames should be prioritized over video frames. Sometimes these transmissions happen in different flows, and sometimes some packets within a flow have higher priority than others, for example I-frames in video transmissions. However, current networks will treat all packets the same in case of congestion and might e.g. drop audio packets while video and control traffic are still transmitted.

8.2. Information Exposed

A SPUD sender may indicate a that one tube should "yield" to another, i.e. that it should have lower relative priority than another tube in the same flow. Similarly, individual packets within a tube could be marked as having lower priority. This information can be used to preferentially drop less important packets e.g. carrying information that could be recovered by FEC.

With a stronger integration of codec and transport protocols, SPUD could even indicate more fine-grained priority levels to provide automatic graceful degradation of service within the network itself.
8.3. Mechanism

Designing a general-purpose mechanism that maps relative priorities from the yield information exposed via SPUD to correct per-tube and per-packet treatment at any point in the Internet, is an extremely hard problem and a possible subject for future research. It appears impossible at this writing to design a straightforward mapping function from these relative priorities per-flow to absolute priorities across flows in a fair way.

However, in the not-uncommon case that exists in many access networks, where the bottleneck link has per-user queues and can enforce per-user fairness, the relative priorities can be mapped to absolute priorities, and simple priority queueing at the bottleneck can be used. Lower priority packets within a tube, however, should be assigned to the tube's priority class, and preferentially dropped instead, e.g. using a different drop threshold at the queue.

8.4. Deployment Incentives

Deployment incentives for priority multiplexing are similar to those for bandwidth declaration for app-limited flows as in Section 7.4: endpoints that correctly declare priority information will experience better quality of service on SPUD-enabled networks, and SPUD-enabled networks get information that allows them to better manage traffic.

8.5. Security, Privacy, and Trust

Since yield information can only be used to disadvantage an application's traffic relative to its own traffic, there is no incentive for applications to declare incorrect yielding.

The pattern and relative volume of traffic in different yield classes may be used to "fingerprint" certain applications, though it is not clear whether this provides additional information beyond that contained inter-packet delay and volume patterns.

9. In-Band Measurement

9.1. Problem Statement

The current Internet protocol stack has very limited facilities for network measurement and diagnostics. The only explicit measurement feature built into the stack is ICMP Echo ("ping"). In the meantime, the Internet measurement community has defined many inference- and assumption-based approaches for getting better information out of the network: traceroute and BGP looking glasses for topology information, TCP sequence number and TCP timestamp based approaches for latency
and loss estimation, and so on. Each of these uses values placed on the wire for the internal use of the protocol, not for measurement purposes, and do not necessarily apply to the deployment of new protocols or changes to the use of those values by protocol implementations. Approaches involving the encryption of transport protocol and application headers (indeed, including that the authors advance in [I-D.trammell-spud-req]) will break most of these, as well.

Replacing the information used for measurement with values defined explicitly to be used for measurement in a transport protocol independent way allows explicit endpoint control of measurability and measurement overhead.

We note that current work in IPPM [I-D.ietf-ippm-6man-pdm-option] proposes a roughly equivalent, IPv6-only, kernel-implementation-only facility.

9.2. Information Exposed

The "big five" metrics - latency, loss, jitter, data rate / goodput, and reordering - can be measured using a relatively simple set of primitives. Packet receipt acknowledgment using a cumulative nonce echo allows both endpoint and on-path measurement of loss and reordering as well as goodput (when combined with layer 3 packet length headers). A timestamp echo facility, analogous to TCP’s timestamp option but using an explicitly defined, constant-rate clock and exposure of local delta (time between receipt and subsequent transmission).

The cumulative nonce echo consists of two values: a number identifying a given packet (nonce), which also identifies all retransmissions of the packet, and a number which is the sum of all packet identifiers received from the remote endpoint (echo), modulo the maximum value of the echo field. Nonces need not be sequential, or even monotonic, but two packets with the same nonce should not be simultaneously in flight. These are exposed on a per-packet basis, but need not appear on every packet in the tube or flow, with the caveat that lower sampling rates lead to lower sensitivity.

The timestamp echo consists of three values: The time in terms of ticks of a constant rate clock that a packet is sent, the echo of the last such timestamp received from the remote endpoint, and the number of ticks of the sender’s clock between the receipt of the last timestamp from the remote endpoint and the transmission of the packet containing the echo. This last delta value is the missing link in TCP sequence number based and timestamp option based latency estimation.
The information exposed is roughly equivalent than that currently exposed by TCP as a side effect of its operation, but defined such that they are explicitly useful for measurement, useful regardless of transport protocol, and such that information exposure is in the explicit control of the endpoint (when the superstrate transport protocol’s headers are encrypted).

9.3. Mechanism

The nonce and timestamp echo information, emitted as per-packet signals in the SPUD header, can be used by any device which can see it to estimate performance metrics on a per-tube basis. This includes both remote endpoints, as well as passive performance measurement devices collocated with network gateways.

9.4. Deployment Incentives

Initial deployment of this facility is most likely in closed networks such as enterprise data centers, where a single administrative entity owns the network and the endpoints, can control which flows and tubes are annotated with measurement information, and can benefit from the additional insight given during network troubleshooting by explicit measurement headers.

Further, since the provided measurement information is exposed by SPUD to the far-endpoint, it can be used for performance enhancement on these layers. Once the facility is deployed in SPUD-aware endpoints, it can also be used for inter-network and cross-Internet performance measurement and debugging (replacing today’s processing-intensive DPI mechanisms).

9.5. Security, Privacy, and Trust

The cumulative nonce and timestamp echo leaks no more information about the traffic than the TCP header does. Indeed, since the cumulative nonce does not include sequence number information or other protocol-internal information, it allows passive measurement of loss and latency without giving measurement devices access to information they could use to spoof valid packets within a transport layer connection.

In order to prevent middleboxes from modifying measurement-relevant information, these per-packet signals will need to be integrity protected by SPUD.

Performance measurement boxes at gateways which observe and aggregate these signals will necessarily need to trust their accuracy, but can
verify their plausibility by calculating nonce sums and synchronizing
timing clocks.

10. IANA Considerations

This document has no actions for IANA.

11. Security Considerations

Security and privacy considerations for each use case are given in
the corresponding Security, Privacy, and Trust subsection.

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Abstract

We have identified the potential need for a UDP-based encapsulation protocol to allow explicit cooperation with middleboxes while using new, encrypted transport protocols. This document proposes an initial set of requirements for such a protocol, and discusses tradeoffs to be made in further refining these requirements.

Status of This Memo

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1. Motivation

A number of efforts to create new transport protocols or experiment with new network behaviors in the Internet have been built on top of UDP, as it traverses firewalls and other middleboxes more readily than new protocols do. Each such effort must, however, either manage its flows within common middlebox assumptions for UDP or train the middleboxes on the new protocol (thus losing the benefit of using UDP). A common Substrate Protocol for User Datagrams (SPUD) would allow each effort to re-use a set of shared methods for notifying middleboxes of the flows’ semantics, thus avoiding both the limitations of current flow semantics and the need to re-invent the mechanism for notifying the middlebox of the new semantics.

As a concrete example, it is common for some middleboxes to tear down required state (such as NAT bindings) very rapidly for UDP flows. By notifying the path that a particular transport using UDP maintains session state and explicitly signals session start and stop using the substrate, the using protocol may reduce or avoid the need for heartbeat traffic.

The intention of this work is to make it possible to define and deploy new transport protocols that use encryption to protect their own operation as well as the confidentiality, authenticity, integrity, and linkability resistance of their payloads. The accelerating deployment of encryption will render obsolete network operations techniques that rely on packet inspection and modification based upon assumptions about the protocols in use. This work will allow the replacement the current regime of middlebox inspection and modification of transport and application-layer headers and payload with one that allows inspection only of information explicitly exposed by the endpoints, and modification of such information only under endpoint control.

Any selective exposure of traffic metadata outside a relatively restricted trust domain must be advisory, non-negotiated, and declarative rather than imperative. As with other signaling systems, exposure of specific elements must be carefully assessed for privacy risks and the total of exposed elements must be so assessed. Each exposed parameter should also be independently verifiable, so that each entity can assign its own trust to other entities. Basic transport over the substrate must continue working even if signaling is ignored or stripped, to support incremental deployment. These restrictions on vocabulary are discussed further in [I-D.trammell-stackevo-explicit-coop]. This discussion includes privacy and trust concerns as well as the need for strong incentives for middlebox cooperation based on the information that are exposed.
Within this document, requirements are presented for a facility implementable as an encapsulation protocol, atop which new transports ("superstrates") can be built. Alternately, these could be viewed as a set of requirements for future transport protocol development without a layer separation between the transport and the superstrate.

This document defines a specific set of requirements for a SPUD facility, based on analysis on a target set of applications. It is intended as the basis for determining the next steps to make progress in this space, including possibly chartering a working group for specific protocol engineering work.

2. History

An outcome of the IAB workshop on Stack Evolution in a Middlebox Internet (SEMI) [RFC7663], held in Zurich in January 2015, was a discussion on the creation of a substrate protocol to support the deployment of new transport protocols in the Internet. Assuming that a way forward for transport evolution in user space would involve encapsulation in UDP datagrams, the workshop noted that it may be useful to have a facility built atop UDP to provide minimal signaling of the semantics of a flow that would otherwise be available in TCP. At the very least, indications of first and last packets in a flow may assist firewalls and NATs in policy decision and state maintenance. This facility could also provide minimal application-to-path and path-to-application signaling, though there was less agreement about what should or could be signaled here. Further transport semantics would be used by the protocol running atop this facility, but would only be visible to the endpoints, as the transport protocol headers themselves would be encrypted, along with the payload, to prevent inspection or modification. This encryption might be accomplished by using DTLS [RFC6347] as a subtransport [I-D.huitema-tls-dtls-as-subtransport] or by other suitable methods.

The Substrate Protocol for User Datagrams (SPUD) BoF was held at IETF 92 in Dallas in March 2015 to develop this concept further. Restrictions on vocabulary assumed in these requirements are derived from discussions during this BoF, based on experience with previous endpoint-to-middle and middle-to-endpoint signaling approaches as well as concerns about the privacy implications of endpoint-to-middle signaling.

3. Terminology

This document uses the following terms:

- Superstrate: The transport protocol or protocol stack "above" SPUD, that uses SPUD for explicit path cooperation and path
traversal. The superstrate usually consists of a security layer (e.g. TLS, DTLS) and a transport protocol, or a transport protocol with integrated security features, to protect headers and payload above SPUD.

- **Endpoint**: One end of a communication session, located on a single node that is a source or destination of packets in that session. In this document, this term may refer to either the SPUD implementation at the endpoint, the superstrate implementation running over SPUD, or the applications running over that superstrate.

- **Path**: The sequence of Internet Protocol nodes and links that a given packet traverses from endpoint to endpoint.

- **Middlebox**: As defined in [RFC3234], a middlebox is any intermediary device performing functions other than the normal, standard functions of an IP router on the datagram path between a source host and destination host; e.g. making decisions about forwarding behavior based on other than addressing information, and/or modifying a packet before forwarding.

4. Use Cases

Use cases are outlined in more detail in [I-D.kuehlewind-spud-use-cases]. We summarize some of the primary use cases below.

The primary use case for endpoint to path signaling in the Internet making use of packet grouping, as described in the use case document, is the binding of limited related semantics (start, ack, and stop) to a flow or a group of packets within a flow that are semantically related in terms of the application or superstrate. By explicitly signaling start and stop semantics, a flow allows middleboxes to use those signals for setting up and tearing down their relevant state (NAT bindings, firewall pinholes), rather than requiring the middlebox to infer this state from continued traffic. At best, this would allow the application to reduce heartbeat traffic, which might result in reduced radio utilization and thus greater battery life on mobile platforms.

SPUD could also be used to provide information relevant for network treatment for middleboxes as a replacement for deep packet inspection for traffic classification purposes, rendered ineffective by superstrate encryption. In this application, properties would be expressed in terms of network-relevant parameters (intended bandwidth, latency and loss sensitivity, etc.) as opposed to application-relevant semantics. See
SPUD may also provide some facility for SPUD-aware nodes on the path to signal some property of the path to the endpoints and other SPUD-aware nodes on the path. The primary use case for path to application signaling is parallel to the use of ICMP [RFC0792] and ICMPv6 [RFC4443], in that it describes a set of conditions (including errors) that applies to the datagrams as they traverse the path. Since the signals here would traverse NATs in the same way as the traffic related to them, this use case would sidestep problems with ICMP availability in the deployed Internet.

Link-layer characteristics of use to the transport layer (e.g., whether a high-transient-delay, highly-buffered link such as LTE is present on the path) could also be signaled using this path-to-endpoint facility.

5. Functional Requirements

The following requirements detail the services that SPUD must provide to superstrates, endpoints, and middleboxes using SPUD.

5.1. Grouping of Packets (into "tubes")

Transport semantics and many properties of communication that endpoints may want to expose to middleboxes are bound to flows or groups of flows (5-tuples). SPUD must therefore provide a basic facility for associating packets together (into what we call a "tube", for lack of a better term) and associate information to these groups of packets. Each packet in a SPUD "flow" (determined by 5-tuple) belongs to exactly one tube. Notionally, a tube consists of a set of packets with a set of common properties, that should therefore receive equivalent treatment from the network; these tubes may or may not be related to separate semantic entities in the superstrate (e.g. SCTP streams), at the superstrate’s discretion.

The simplest mechanisms for association involve the addition of an identifier to each packet in a tube. Other mechanisms that don’t directly encode the identifier in a packet header, but instead provide it in a way that it is simple to derive from other information available in the packet at the endpoints and along the path, are also possible. In any cases, for the purposes of this requirement we treat this identifier as a simple vector of N bits. The properties of the tube identifier are subject to tradeoffs on the requirements for privacy, security, ease of implementation, and header overhead efficiency.
In determining the optimal size and scope for this tube identifier, we first assume that the 5-tuple of source and destination IP address, UDP port, and IP protocol identifier (17 for UDP) is used in the Internet as an existing flow identifier, due to the widespread deployment of network address and port translation. We conclude that SPUD tube IDs should be scoped to this 5-tuple.

While a globally-unique identifier would allow easier state comparison and migration for mobility use cases, it would have two serious disadvantages. First, $N$ would need to be sufficiently large to minimize the probability of collision among multiple tubes having the same identifier along the same path during some period of time. A 128-bit UUID [RFC4122] or an identifier of equivalent size generated using an equivalent algorithm would probably be sufficient, at the cost of 128 bits of header space in every packet. Second, globally unique tube identifiers would also introduce new possibilities for user and node tracking, with a serious negative impact on privacy. We note that global identifiers for mobility, when necessary to expose to the path, can be supported separately from the tube identification mechanism, by using a generic tube-grouping application-to-path signaling bound to the tube.

Even when tube IDs are scoped to 5-tuples, $N$ must still be sufficiently large, and the bits in the identifier sufficiently random, that possession of a valid tube ID implies that a node can observe packets belonging to the tube. This reduces the chances of success of blind packet injection attacks of packets with guessed valid tube IDs.

5.2. Bidirectionality of Tubes

When scoped to 5-tuples, the forward and backward directions of a bidirectional connection will have different tube IDs, since these will necessarily take different paths and may interact with a different set of middleboxes due to asymmetric routing. SPUD will therefore require some facility to note that one tube is the "reverse" direction of another, a general case of the tube grouping signal above.

5.3. Signaling of Per-Tube Properties

SPUD must be able to provide information scoped to a tube from the end-point(s) to all SPUD-aware nodes on the path about the packets in that tube.

We note that in-band signaling would meet this requirement.
5.4. Path to Receiver Signaling under Sender Control

SPUD must be able to provide information about from a SPUD-aware middlebox to the endpoint. This information is associated with a tube, in terms of "the properties of the path(s) the packets in this tube will traverse". This signaling must happen only with explicit sender permission and be sent to the receiver of packets in the tube.

We note that in-band signaling would meet this requirement, if the sender created a "placeholder" in-band that could be filled in by the middlebox(es) on path. In-band signaling has the advantage that it does not require foreknowledge of the identity and addresses of devices along the path by endpoints and vice versa, but does add complexity to the signaling protocol. Piggybacked signaling uses some number of bits in each packet generated by the overlying transport. It requires either reducing the MTU available to the encapsulated transport and/or opportunistically using "headroom" as it is available: bits between the network-layer MTU and the bits actually used by the transport. For use cases that accumulate information from devices on path in the SPUD header, piggybacked signaling also requires a mechanism for endpoints to create "scratch space" for potential use of the on-path devices.

In contrast, interleaved signaling uses signaling packets on the same 5-tuple and tube ID, which don’t carry any superstrate data. These interleaved packets could also contain scratch space for on-path device use. This reduces complexity and sidesteps MTU problems, at the cost of sending more packets per flow.

5.5. Receiver to Sender Feedback

SPUD must be able send information collected from SPUD-aware middleboxes along the path to a receiver back to the sender that gave permission; see Section 6.4 for restrictions on this facility.

5.6. Direct Path to Sender Signaling

SPUD must provide a facility for a middlebox to send a packet directly in response to a sending endpoint, primarily to signal error conditions (e.g. "packet administratively prohibited" or "no route to destination", as in present ICMP).

In this case, the direct return packet generated by the middlebox uses the reversed end-to-end 5-tuple in order to receive equivalent NAT treatment, though the reverse path might not be the same as the forward path. Endpoints have control over this feature: A SPUD-aware middlebox must not emit a direct return packet unless it is in direct response to a packet from a sending endpoint, and must not forward a
5.7. Tube Start and End Signaling

SPUD must provide a facility for endpoints to signal that a tube has started, that the start of the tube has been acknowledged and accepted by the remote endpoint(s), and that a tube has ended and its state can be forgotten by the path. Given unreliable signaling (see Section 7.10), both endpoints and devices on the path must be resilient to the loss of any of these signals. Specifically, timeouts are still necessary to clean up stale state.

5.8. Transport Semantic Signaling

Similar to tube start and end signaling, SPUD must provide a facility for endpoints to signal that a superstrate transport session has been requested, set up, and/or torn down. This facility provides an explicit replacement for the common practice in TCP-aware middleboxes of modeling TCP state of flows by inspecting the TCP flags byte.

Given the fact that a superstrate transport session may consist of multiple tubes, this signaling must be separate from that for tube start and end.

5.9. Declarative signaling

All information signaled via SPUD is defined to be declarative (as opposed to imperative). A SPUD endpoint must function correctly even if no middlebox along the path understands the signals it sends, or if sent signals from middleboxes it does not understand. It must also function correctly if the path (and thereby the set of middleboxes traversed) changes during the lifetime of a tube; endpoints cannot rely on the creation or maintenance of state even on cooperative middleboxes. Likewise, a SPUD-aware middlebox must function correctly if sent signals from endpoints it does not understand, or in the absence of expected signals from endpoints.

The declarative nature of this signaling removes any requirement that SPUD provide reliability for its signals.

5.10. Extensibility

SPUD must enable multiple new transport semantics and application/path declarations without requiring updates to SPUD implementations in middleboxes.
The use of SPUD for experimental signaling must be possible either without the registration of codepoints or namespaces with IANA, or with trivially easy (First Come, First Served [RFC5226] registration of such codepoints.

5.11. Common Vocabulary

For the interoperability of SPUD endpoints and middleboxes with each other, the use of SPUD for standard signaling must use a common vocabulary with registered codepoints allocated under relatively restrictive policy. This restrictive policy serves primarily security and privacy goals (i.e., reducing the risk of misuse of the extensibility provided by the protocol).

We note that an IANA registry requiring Standards Action (RFC5226) to modify would meet this requirement.

5.12. Additional Per-Packet Signaling

SPUD may provide a facility for signaling semantically simple information (similar to tube start and end) on a per-packet as opposed to a per-tube basis. Properties signaled per packet reduce state requirements at middleboxes, but also increase per-packet overhead. Small signal size (in bits of entropy) and encoding efficiency (in bits on the wire) is therefore more important for per-packet signaling that per-tube signaling. If per-packet signals need to be used by multiple hops along a path, these will need to be encoded in an efficiently-implementable way (i.e., using fixed-length, constant-offset data structures).

Given these constraints, per-packet signaling is necessary for certain use cases, it is likely that SPUD will provide a very limited set of per-packet signals using flags in a SPUD header, and require all more complex properties to be bound per-tube.

6. Security Requirements

6.1. Privacy

SPUD must allow endpoints to control the amount of information exposed to middleboxes, with the default being the minimum necessary for correct functioning. This includes the cryptographic protection of transport layer headers from inspection by devices on path, in order to prevent ossification of these headers.
6.2. Authentication

The basic SPUD protocol must not require any authentication or a priori trust relationship between endpoints and middleboxes to function. However, SPUD should interoperate with the presentation/exchange of authentication information in environments where a trust relationship already exists, or can be easily established, either in-band or out-of-band, and use this information where possible and appropriate.

Given the advisory nature of the signaling it supports, SPUD may also support eventual authentication: authentication of a signal after the reception of a packet after that containing the signal.

6.3. Integrity

SPUD must be able to provide integrity protection of information exposed by endpoints in SPUD-encapsulated packets, though the details of this integrity protection are still open.

Endpoints should be able to detect changes to headers SPUD uses for its own signaling (whether due to error, accidental modification, or malicious modification), as well as the injection of packets into a SPUD flow (defined by 5-tuple) or tube by nodes other than the remote endpoints. Errors and accidental modifications can be detected using a simple checksum over the SPUD header, while detecting malicious modifications requires cryptographic integrity protection. Similar to Section 6.2, cryptographic integrity protection may also be eventual.

Integrity protection of the superstrate is left up to the superstrate.

6.4. Encrypted Feedback

As feedback from a receiver to a sender (see Section 5.5) does not need to be exposed to the path, this feedback channel should be encrypted for confidentiality and authenticity, when available (see Section 6.2). This facility will rely on cooperation with the superstrate or some other out-of-band mechanism to provide these guarantees.

6.5. Preservation of Security Properties

The use of SPUD must not weaken the essential security properties of the superstrate: confidentiality, integrity, authenticity, and defense against linkability. If the superstrate includes payload encryption for confidentiality, for example, the use of SPUD must not
allow deep packet inspection systems to have access to the plaintext. Likewise, the use of SPUD must not create additional opportunities for linkability not already existing in the superstrate.

6.6. Protection against trivial abuse

Malicious background traffic is a serious problem for UDP-based protocols due to the ease of forging source addresses in UDP together with only limited deployment of network egress filtering [RFC2827]. Trivial abuse includes flooding and state exhaustion attacks, as well as reflection and amplification attacks. SPUD must provide minimal protection against this trivial abuse. This implies that SPUD should provide:

- a proof of return routability, that the endpoint identified by a packet’s source address receives packets sent to that address;
- a feedback channel between endpoints;
- a method to probabilistically discriminate legitimate SPUD traffic from reflected malicious traffic;
- a method to probabilistically discriminate SPUD traffic from on-path devices from devices off-path; and
- the ability to deploy mechanisms to protect against state exhaustion and other denial-of-service attacks against SPUD itself.

We note that using a "magic number" or other pattern of bits in an encapsulation-layer header not used in any widely deployed protocol has the nice property that no existing node in the Internet can be induced to reflect traffic containing it. This allows the magic number to provide probabilistic assurance that a given packet is not reflected, assisting in meeting this requirement.

If SPUD is implemented over UDP, see [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-rfc5405bis] for guidelines on the safe usage of UDP in the Internet, which addresses some of these issues.

6.7. Continuum of trust among endpoints and middleboxes

There are different security considerations for different security contexts. The end-to-end context is one; anything that only needs to be seen by the path shouldn’t be exposed in SPUD, but rather by the superstrate. There are multiple different types of end-to-middle context based on levels of trust between end and middle - is the middlebox on the same network as the endpoint, under control of the
same owner? Is there some contract between the application user and the middlebox operator? SPUD should support different levels of trust than the default ("untrusted, but presumed honest due to limitations on the signaling vocabulary") and fully-authenticated; how these points along the continuum are to be implemented and how they relate to each other needs to be explored further.

In the Internet, it is not in the general case possible for the endpoint to authenticate every middlebox that might see packets it sends and receives. In this case information produced by middleboxes may enjoy less integrity protection than that produced by endpoints. In addition, endpoint authentication of middleboxes and vice-versa may be better conducted out-of-band (treating the middlebox as an endpoint for the authentication protocol) than in-band (treating the middlebox as a participant in a 3+ party communication).

7. Technical Requirements

The following requirements detail the constraints on how the SPUD facility must meet its functional requirements.

7.1. Middlebox Traversal

SPUD, including all path-to-endpoint and endpoint-to-path signaling as well as superstrate and superstrate payload, should be able to traverse existing middleboxes and firewalls, including those that are not SPUD-aware. Therefore SPUD must be encapsulated in a transport protocol that is known to be accepted on a large fraction of paths in the Internet, or implement some form of probing to determine in advance which transport protocols will be accepted on a certain path. This encapsulation will require port numbers to support endpoints connected via network address and port translation (NAPT). We note that UDP encapsulation would meet these requirements.

7.2. Low Overhead in Network Processing

SPUD must be designed to have low overhead, specifically requiring very little effort to recognize that a packet is a SPUD packet and to determine the tube it is associated with. We note that a magic number as in Section 6.6 would also have a low probability of colliding with any non-SPUD traffic, therefore meeting the recognition requirement. Tube identifiers appearing directly in the encapsulation-layer header would meet the tube association requirement.
7.3. Implementability in User-Space

To enable fast deployment SPUD and superstrates must be implementable without requiring kernel replacements or modules on the endpoints, and without having special privilege (such as is required for raw packet transmission, i.e. root or "jailbreak") on the endpoints.

We note here that UDP would meet this requirement, as nearly all operating systems and application development platforms allow a userspace application to open UDP sockets.

We additionally note that while TCP APIs are also widely available to userspace applications, they are bound to TCP transport semantics, and generally do not provide enough control over segmentation and transmission to successfully implement superstrate transports.

7.4. Incremental Deployability

SPUD must be designed to operate in the present Internet, and must be designed to encourage incremental deployment.

As endpoint implementations can change more quickly than middleboxes can be designed and deployed, a SPUD facility that was be useful between endpoints even before the deployment of middleboxes that understand it would stimulate deployment. The information exposed over SPUD must provide incentives for adoption by both endpoints and middleboxes.

SPUD must not be designed in such a way that precludes its deployability in multipath, multicast, and/or endpoint multi-homing environments.

7.5. No unnecessary restrictions on the superstrate

Beyond those restrictions deemed necessary as common features of any secure, responsible transport protocol (see Section 6.6), SPUD must impose only minimal restrictions on the transport protocols it encapsulates. However, to serve as a substrate, it is necessary to factor out the information that middleboxes commonly rely on and endpoints are commonly willing to expose. This information should be included in SPUD, and might itself impose additional restrictions to the superstrate.

7.6. Minimal additional start-up latency

SPUD should not introduce additional start-up latency for superstrates. Specifically, superstrates which can send data on an initial packet must be able to do so when encapsulated within SPUD.
7.7. Minimal header overhead

To avoid reducing network performance, the information and coding used in SPUD should be designed to use the minimum necessary amount of additional space in encapsulation headers.

7.8. Minimal non-productive traffic

SPUD should minimize additional non-productive traffic (e.g. keepalives), and should provide mechanisms to allow its superstrates to minimize their reliance on non-productive traffic.

7.9. Endpoint Control

Both endpoint-to-path and path-to-endpoint signaling happen completely under endpoint control.

7.10. On Reliability, Fragmentation, MTU, and Duplication

As any information provided by SPUD is anyway opportunistic, SPUD need not provide reliable signaling for the information associated with a tube. Signals must be idempotent; all middleboxes and endpoints must gracefully handle receiving duplicate signal information. SPUD must continue working in the presence of IPv4 fragmentation on path, but in order to reduce the impact of requiring fragments reassembly at middleboxes for signals to be intelligible, endpoints using SPUD should attempt to fit all signals into single MTU-sized packets.

Given the importance of good path MTU information to SPUD’s own signaling, SPUD should implement packetization layer path MTU discovery [RFC4821].

Any facilities requiring more than an MTU’s worth of data in a single signal should use an out-of-band method which does provide reliability - this method may be an existing transport or superstrate/SPUD combination, or a "minimal transport" defined by SPUD for its own use.

7.11. SPUD Support Discovery

If SPUD is not usable on a path to an endpoint, a SPUD sender needs to be able to fall back to some other approach to achieve the goals of the superstrate; a SPUD endpoint must be able to easily determine whether a remote endpoint with which it wants to communicate using SPUD as a substrate can support SPUD, and whether path to the remote endpoint as well as the return path from the remote endpoint will pass SPUD packets.
It is not clear whether this is a requirement of SPUD, or a requirement of the superstrate / application over SPUD.

8. Security Considerations

The security-relevant requirements for SPUD are outlined in Section 6. These will be further addressed in protocol definition work following from these requirements.

9. IANA Considerations

This document has no actions for IANA.

10. Contributors

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12. Informative References


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