

Network Working Group
Internet-Draft
Obsoletes: 5077, 5246, 6961 (if
approved)
Updates: 4492, 5705, 6066 (if approved)
Intended status: Standards Track
Expires: September 21, 2018

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March 20, 2018

The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3
draft-ietf-tls-tls13-28

Abstract

This document specifies version 1.3 of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. TLS allows client/server applications to communicate over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery.

This document updates RFCs 4492, 5705, and 6066 and it obsoletes RFCs 5077, 5246, and 6961. This document also specifies new requirements for TLS 1.2 implementations.

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1. Introduction

RFC EDITOR: PLEASE REMOVE THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH The source for this draft is maintained in GitHub. Suggested changes should be submitted as pull requests at <https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec>. Instructions are on that page as well. Editorial changes can be managed in GitHub, but any substantive change should be discussed on the TLS mailing list.

The primary goal of TLS is to provide a secure channel between two communicating peers; the only requirement from the underlying transport is a reliable, in-order, data stream. Specifically, the secure channel should provide the following properties:

- **Authentication:** The server side of the channel is always authenticated; the client side is optionally authenticated. Authentication can happen via asymmetric cryptography (e.g., RSA [RSA], ECDSA [ECDSA], EdDSA [RFC8032]) or a pre-shared key (PSK).
- **Confidentiality:** Data sent over the channel after establishment is only visible to the endpoints. TLS does not hide the length of the data it transmits, though endpoints are able to pad TLS records in order to obscure lengths and improve protection against traffic analysis techniques.
- **Integrity:** Data sent over the channel after establishment cannot be modified by attackers.

These properties should be true even in the face of an attacker who has complete control of the network, as described in [RFC3552]. See Appendix E for a more complete statement of the relevant security properties.

TLS consists of two primary components:

- A handshake protocol (Section 4) that authenticates the communicating parties, negotiates cryptographic modes and parameters, and establishes shared keying material. The handshake protocol is designed to resist tampering; an active attacker should not be able to force the peers to negotiate different parameters than they would if the connection were not under attack.
- A record protocol (Section 5) that uses the parameters established by the handshake protocol to protect traffic between the communicating peers. The record protocol divides traffic up into a series of records, each of which is independently protected using the traffic keys.

TLS is application protocol independent; higher-level protocols can layer on top of TLS transparently. The TLS standard, however, does not specify how protocols add security with TLS; how to initiate TLS handshaking and how to interpret the authentication certificates exchanged are left to the judgment of the designers and implementors of protocols that run on top of TLS.

This document defines TLS version 1.3. While TLS 1.3 is not directly compatible with previous versions, all versions of TLS incorporate a versioning mechanism which allows clients and servers to interoperably negotiate a common version if one is supported by both peers.

This document supersedes and obsoletes previous versions of TLS including version 1.2 [RFC5246]. It also obsoletes the TLS ticket mechanism defined in [RFC5077] and replaces it with the mechanism defined in Section 2.2. Section 4.2.7 updates [RFC4492] by modifying the protocol attributes used to negotiate Elliptic Curves. Because TLS 1.3 changes the way keys are derived, it updates [RFC5705] as described in Section 7.5. It also changes how OCSP messages are carried and therefore updates [RFC6066] and obsoletes [RFC6961] as described in section Section 4.4.2.1.

1.1. Conventions and Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

The following terms are used:

client: The endpoint initiating the TLS connection.

connection: A transport-layer connection between two endpoints.

endpoint: Either the client or server of the connection.

handshake: An initial negotiation between client and server that establishes the parameters of their subsequent interactions within TLS.

peer: An endpoint. When discussing a particular endpoint, "peer" refers to the endpoint that is not the primary subject of discussion.

receiver: An endpoint that is receiving records.

sender: An endpoint that is transmitting records.

server: The endpoint which did not initiate the TLS connection.

1.2. Change Log

RFC EDITOR PLEASE DELETE THIS SECTION.

(*) indicates changes to the wire protocol which may require implementations to update.

draft-28

Add a section on exposure of PSK identities.

draft-27

- SHOULD->MUST for being able to process "supported_versions" without 0x0304.
- Much editorial cleanup.

draft-26

- Clarify that you can't negotiate pre-TLS 1.3 with supported_versions.

draft-25

- Add the header to additional data (*)
- Minor clarifications.
- IANA cleanup.

draft-24

- Require that CH2 have version 0303 (*)
- Some clarifications

draft-23

- Renumber key_share (*)
- Add a new extension and new code points to allow negotiating PSS separately for certificates and CertificateVerify (*)

- Slightly restrict when CCS must be accepted to make implementation easier.
- Document protocol invariants
- Add some text on the security of static RSA.

draft-22

- Implement changes for improved middlebox penetration (*)
- Move `server_certificate_type` to encrypted extensions (*)
- Allow resumption with a different SNI (*)
- Padding extension can change on HRR (*)
- Allow an empty `ticket_nonce` (*)
- Remove requirement to immediately respond to `close_notify` with `close_notify` (allowing half-close)

draft-21

- Add a per-ticket nonce so that each ticket is associated with a different PSK (*).
- Clarify that clients should send alerts with the handshake key if possible.
- Update state machine to show rekeying events
- Add discussion of 0-RTT and replay. Recommend that implementations implement some anti-replay mechanism.

draft-20

- Add "`post_handshake_auth`" extension to negotiate post-handshake authentication (*).
- Shorten labels for `HKDF-Expand-Label` so that we can fit within one compression block (*).
- Define how RFC 7250 works (*).
- Re-enable post-handshake client authentication even when you do PSK. The previous prohibition was editorial error.

- Remove `cert_type` and `user_mapping`, which don't work on TLS 1.3 anyway.
- Added the `no_application_protocol` alert from [RFC7301] to the list of extensions.
- Added discussion of traffic analysis and side channel attacks.

draft-19

- Hash `context_value` input to Exporters (*).
- Add an additional Derive-Secret stage to Exporters (*).
- Hash `ClientHello1` in the transcript when HRR is used. This reduces the state that needs to be carried in cookies. (*).
- Restructure `CertificateRequest` to have the selectors in extensions. This also allowed defining a `"certificate_authorities"` extension which can be used by the client instead of `trusted_ca_keys` (*).
- Tighten record framing requirements and require checking of them (*).
- Consolidate `"ticket_early_data_info"` and `"early_data"` into a single extension (*).
- Change `end_of_early_data` to be a handshake message (*).
- Add pre-extract Derive-Secret stages to key schedule (*).
- Remove spurious requirement to implement `"pre_shared_key"`.
- Clarify location of `"early_data"` from server (it goes in EE, as indicated by the table in S 10).
- Require peer public key validation
- Add state machine diagram.

draft-18

- Remove unnecessary `resumption_psk` which is the only thing expanded from the resumption master secret. (*).
- Fix `signature_algorithms` entry in extensions table.

- Restate rule from RFC 6066 that you can't resume unless SNI is the same.

draft-17

- Remove 0-RTT Finished and resumption_context, and replace with a psk_binder field in the PSK itself (*)
- Restructure PSK key exchange negotiation modes (*)
- Add max_early_data_size field to TicketEarlyDataInfo (*)
- Add a 0-RTT exporter and change the transcript for the regular exporter (*)
- Merge TicketExtensions and Extensions registry. Changes ticket_early_data_info code point (*)
- Replace Client.key_shares in response to HRR (*)
- Remove redundant labels for traffic key derivation (*)
- Harmonize requirements about cipher suite matching: for resumption you need to match KDF but for 0-RTT you need whole cipher suite. This allows PSKs to actually negotiate cipher suites. (*)
- Move SCT and OCSP into Certificate.extensions (*)
- Explicitly allow non-offered extensions in NewSessionTicket
- Explicitly allow predicting client Finished for NST
- Clarify conditions for allowing 0-RTT with PSK

draft-16

- Revise version negotiation (*)
- Change RSASSA-PSS and EdDSA SignatureScheme codepoints for better backwards compatibility (*)
- Move HelloRetryRequest.selected_group to an extension (*)
- Clarify the behavior of no exporter context and make it the same as an empty context. (*)

- New KeyUpdate format that allows for requesting/not-requesting an answer. This also means changes to the key schedule to support independent updates (*)
- New certificate_required alert (*)
- Forbid CertificateRequest with 0-RTT and PSK.
- Relax requirement to check SNI for 0-RTT.

draft-15

- New negotiation syntax as discussed in Berlin (*)
- Require CertificateRequest.context to be empty during handshake (*)
- Forbid empty tickets (*)
- Forbid application data messages in between post-handshake messages from the same flight (*)
- Clean up alert guidance (*)
- Clearer guidance on what is needed for TLS 1.2.
- Guidance on 0-RTT time windows.
- Rename a bunch of fields.
- Remove old PRNG text.
- Explicitly require checking that handshake records not span key changes.

draft-14

- Allow cookies to be longer (*)
- Remove the "context" from EarlyDataIndication as it was undefined and nobody used it (*)
- Remove 0-RTT EncryptedExtensions and replace the ticket_age extension with an obfuscated version. Also necessitates a change to NewSessionTicket (*)
- Move the downgrade sentinel to the end of ServerHello.Random to accommodate tlsdate (*)

- Define `ecdsa_shal (*)`.
- Allow resumption even after fatal alerts. This matches current practice.
- Remove non-closure warning alerts. Require treating unknown alerts as fatal.
- Make the rules for accepting 0-RTT less restrictive.
- Clarify 0-RTT backward-compatibility rules.
- Clarify how 0-RTT and PSK identities interact.
- Add a section describing the data limits for each cipher.
- Major editorial restructuring.
- Replace the Security Analysis section with a WIP draft.

draft-13

- Allow server to send `SupportedGroups`.
- Remove 0-RTT client authentication
- Remove (EC)DHE 0-RTT.
- Flesh out 0-RTT PSK mode and shrink `EarlyDataIndication`
- Turn PSK-resumption response into an index to save room
- Move `CertificateStatus` to an extension
- Extra fields in `NewSessionTicket`.
- Restructure key schedule and add a `resumption_context` value.
- Require DH public keys and secrets to be zero-padded to the size of the group.
- Remove the redundant length fields in `KeyShareEntry`.
- Define a cookie field for HRR.

draft-12

- Provide a list of the PSK cipher suites.

- Remove the ability for the ServerHello to have no extensions (this aligns the syntax with the text).
- Clarify that the server can send application data after its first flight (0.5 RTT data)
- Revise signature algorithm negotiation to group hash, signature algorithm, and curve together. This is backwards compatible.
- Make ticket lifetime mandatory and limit it to a week.
- Make the purpose strings lower-case. This matches how people are implementing for interop.
- Define exporters.
- Editorial cleanup

draft-11

- Port the CFRG curves & signatures work from RFC4492bis.
- Remove sequence number and version from additional_data, which is now empty.
- Reorder values in HkdfLabel.
- Add support for version anti-downgrade mechanism.
- Update IANA considerations section and relax some of the policies.
- Unify authentication modes. Add post-handshake client authentication.
- Remove early_handshake content type. Terminate 0-RTT data with an alert.
- Reset sequence number upon key change (as proposed by Fournet et al.)

draft-10

- Remove ClientCertificateTypes field from CertificateRequest and add extensions.
- Merge client and server key shares into a single extension.

draft-09

- Change to RSA-PSS signatures for handshake messages.
- Remove support for DSA.
- Update key schedule per suggestions by Hugo, Hoeteck, and Bjoern Tackmann.
- Add support for per-record padding.
- Switch to encrypted record ContentType.
- Change HKDF labeling to include protocol version and value lengths.
- Shift the final decision to abort a handshake due to incompatible certificates to the client rather than having servers abort early.
- Deprecate SHA-1 with signatures.
- Add MTI algorithms.

draft-08

- Remove support for weak and lesser used named curves.
- Remove support for MD5 and SHA-224 hashes with signatures.
- Update lists of available AEAD cipher suites and error alerts.
- Reduce maximum permitted record expansion for AEAD from 2048 to 256 octets.
- Require digital signatures even when a previous configuration is used.
- Merge EarlyDataIndication and KnownConfiguration.
- Change code point for server_configuration to avoid collision with server_hello_done.
- Relax certificate_list ordering requirement to match current practice.

draft-07

- Integration of semi-ephemeral DH proposal.
- Add initial 0-RTT support.

- Remove resumption and replace with PSK + tickets.
- Move ClientKeyShare into an extension.
- Move to HKDF.

draft-06

- Prohibit RC4 negotiation for backwards compatibility.
- Freeze & deprecate record layer version field.
- Update format of signatures with context.
- Remove explicit IV.

draft-05

- Prohibit SSL negotiation for backwards compatibility.
- Fix which MS is used for exporters.

draft-04

- Modify key computations to include session hash.
- Remove ChangeCipherSpec.
- Renumber the new handshake messages to be somewhat more consistent with existing convention and to remove a duplicate registration.
- Remove renegotiation.
- Remove point format negotiation.

draft-03

- Remove GMT time.
- Merge in support for ECC from RFC 4492 but without explicit curves.
- Remove the unnecessary length field from the AD input to AEAD ciphers.
- Rename {Client,Server}KeyExchange to {Client,Server}KeyShare.
- Add an explicit HelloRetryRequest to reject the client's.

draft-02

- Increment version number.
- Rework handshake to provide 1-RTT mode.
- Remove custom DHE groups.
- Remove support for compression.
- Remove support for static RSA and DH key exchange.
- Remove support for non-AEAD ciphers.

1.3. Major Differences from TLS 1.2

The following is a list of the major functional differences between TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3. It is not intended to be exhaustive and there are many minor differences.

- The list of supported symmetric algorithms has been pruned of all algorithms that are considered legacy. Those that remain all use Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) algorithms. The ciphersuite concept has been changed to separate the authentication and key exchange mechanisms from the record protection algorithm (including secret key length) and a hash to be used with the key derivation function and HMAC.
- A 0-RTT mode was added, saving a round-trip at connection setup for some application data, at the cost of certain security properties.
- Static RSA and Diffie-Hellman cipher suites have been removed; all public-key based key exchange mechanisms now provide forward secrecy.
- All handshake messages after the ServerHello are now encrypted. The newly introduced EncryptedExtension message allows various extensions previously sent in clear in the ServerHello to also enjoy confidentiality protection from active attackers.
- The key derivation functions have been re-designed. The new design allows easier analysis by cryptographers due to their improved key separation properties. The HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF) is used as an underlying primitive.

- The handshake state machine has been significantly restructured to be more consistent and to remove superfluous messages such as ChangeCipherSpec (except when needed for middlebox compatibility).
- Elliptic curve algorithms are now in the base spec and new signature algorithms, such as ed25519 and ed448, are included. TLS 1.3 removed point format negotiation in favor of a single point format for each curve.
- Other cryptographic improvements including the removal of compression and custom DHE groups, changing the RSA padding to use RSASSA-PSS, and the removal of DSA.
- The TLS 1.2 version negotiation mechanism has been deprecated in favor of a version list in an extension. This increases compatibility with existing servers that incorrectly implemented version negotiation.
- Session resumption with and without server-side state as well as the PSK-based ciphersuites of earlier TLS versions have been replaced by a single new PSK exchange.
- Updated references to point to the updated versions of RFCs, as appropriate (e.g., RFC 5280 rather than RFC 3280).

1.4. Updates Affecting TLS 1.2

This document defines several changes that optionally affect implementations of TLS 1.2, including those which do not also support TLS 1.3:

- A version downgrade protection mechanism is described in Section 4.1.3.
- RSASSA-PSS signature schemes are defined in Section 4.2.3.
- The "supported_versions" ClientHello extension can be used to negotiate the version of TLS to use, in preference to the legacy_version field of the ClientHello.
- The "signature_algorithms_cert" extension allows a client to indicate which signature algorithms it can validate in X.509 certificates

Additionally, this document clarifies some compliance requirements for earlier versions of TLS; see Section 9.3.

2. Protocol Overview


The cryptographic parameters used by the secure channel are produced by the TLS handshake protocol. This sub-protocol of TLS is used by the client and server when first communicating with each other. The handshake protocol allows peers to negotiate a protocol version, select cryptographic algorithms, optionally authenticate each other, and establish shared secret keying material. Once the handshake is complete, the peers use the established keys to protect the application layer traffic.

A failure of the handshake or other protocol error triggers the termination of the connection, optionally preceded by an alert message (Section 6).

TLS supports three basic key exchange modes:

- (EC)DHE (Diffie-Hellman over either finite fields or elliptic curves)
- PSK-only
- PSK with (EC)DHE

Figure 1 below shows the basic full TLS handshake:



- + Indicates noteworthy extensions sent in the previously noted message.
- * Indicates optional or situation-dependent messages/extensions that are not always sent.
- { } Indicates messages protected using keys derived from a [sender]_handshake_traffic_secret.
- [] Indicates messages protected using keys derived from [sender]_application_traffic_secret_N

Figure 1: Message flow for full TLS Handshake

The handshake can be thought of as having three phases (indicated in the diagram above):

- Key Exchange: Establish shared keying material and select the cryptographic parameters. Everything after this phase is encrypted.
- Server Parameters: Establish other handshake parameters (whether the client is authenticated, application layer protocol support, etc.).
- Authentication: Authenticate the server (and optionally the client) and provide key confirmation and handshake integrity.

In the Key Exchange phase, the client sends the ClientHello (Section 4.1.2) message, which contains a random nonce (ClientHello.random); its offered protocol versions; a list of symmetric cipher/HKDF hash pairs; either a set of Diffie-Hellman key shares (in the "key_share" extension Section 4.2.8), a set of pre-shared key labels (in the "pre_shared_key" extension Section 4.2.11) or both; and potentially additional extensions. Additional fields and/or messages may also be present for middlebox compatibility.

The server processes the ClientHello and determines the appropriate cryptographic parameters for the connection. It then responds with its own ServerHello (Section 4.1.3), which indicates the negotiated connection parameters. The combination of the ClientHello and the ServerHello determines the shared keys. If (EC)DHE key establishment is in use, then the ServerHello contains a "key_share" extension with the server's ephemeral Diffie-Hellman share; the server's share MUST be in the same group as one of the client's shares. If PSK key establishment is in use, then the ServerHello contains a "pre_shared_key" extension indicating which of the client's offered PSKs was selected. Note that implementations can use (EC)DHE and PSK together, in which case both extensions will be supplied.

The server then sends two messages to establish the Server Parameters:

EncryptedExtensions: responses to ClientHello extensions that are not required to determine the cryptographic parameters, other than those that are specific to individual certificates.
[Section 4.3.1]

CertificateRequest: if certificate-based client authentication is desired, the desired parameters for that certificate. This message is omitted if client authentication is not desired.
[Section 4.3.2]

Finally, the client and server exchange Authentication messages. TLS uses the same set of messages every time that certificate-based authentication is needed. (PSK-based authentication happens as a side effect of key exchange.) Specifically:

Certificate: the certificate of the endpoint and any per-certificate extensions. This message is omitted by the server if not authenticating with a certificate and by the client if the server did not send CertificateRequest (thus indicating that the client should not authenticate with a certificate). Note that if raw public keys [RFC7250] or the cached information extension [RFC7924] are in use, then this message will not contain a

certificate but rather some other value corresponding to the server's long-term key. [Section 4.4.2]

CertificateVerify: a signature over the entire handshake using the private key corresponding to the public key in the Certificate message. This message is omitted if the endpoint is not authenticating via a certificate. [Section 4.4.3]

Finished: a MAC (Message Authentication Code) over the entire handshake. This message provides key confirmation, binds the endpoint's identity to the exchanged keys, and in PSK mode also authenticates the handshake. [Section 4.4.4]

Upon receiving the server's messages, the client responds with its Authentication messages, namely Certificate and CertificateVerify (if requested), and Finished.

At this point, the handshake is complete, and the client and server derive the keying material required by the record layer to exchange application-layer data protected through authenticated encryption. Application data **MUST NOT** be sent prior to sending the Finished message, except as specified in [Section 2.3]. Note that while the server may send application data prior to receiving the client's Authentication messages, any data sent at that point is, of course, being sent to an unauthenticated peer.

2.1. Incorrect DHE Share

If the client has not provided a sufficient "key_share" extension (e.g., it includes only DHE or ECDHE groups unacceptable to or unsupported by the server), the server corrects the mismatch with a HelloRetryRequest and the client needs to restart the handshake with an appropriate "key_share" extension, as shown in Figure 2. If no common cryptographic parameters can be negotiated, the server **MUST** abort the handshake with an appropriate alert.



Figure 2: Message flow for a full handshake with mismatched parameters

Note: The handshake transcript incorporates the initial ClientHello/HelloRetryRequest exchange; it is not reset with the new ClientHello.

TLS also allows several optimized variants of the basic handshake, as described in the following sections.

2.2. Resumption and Pre-Shared Key (PSK)

Although TLS PSKs can be established out of band, PSKs can also be established in a previous connection and then used to establish a new connection ("session resumption" or "resuming" with a PSK). Once a handshake has completed, the server can send to the client a PSK identity that corresponds to a unique key derived from the initial handshake (see Section 4.6.1). The client can then use that PSK identity in future handshakes to negotiate the use of the associated PSK. If the server accepts the PSK, then the security context of the new connection is cryptographically tied to the original connection and the key derived from the initial handshake is used to bootstrap the cryptographic state instead of a full handshake. In TLS 1.2 and below, this functionality was provided by "session IDs" and "session tickets" [RFC5077]. Both mechanisms are obsoleted in TLS 1.3.

PSKs can be used with (EC)DHE key exchange in order to provide forward secrecy in combination with shared keys, or can be used

alone, at the cost of losing forward secrecy for the application data.

Figure 3 shows a pair of handshakes in which the first establishes a PSK and the second uses it:



Figure 3: Message flow for resumption and PSK

As the server is authenticating via a PSK, it does not send a Certificate or a CertificateVerify message. When a client offers resumption via PSK, it SHOULD also supply a "key_share" extension to the server to allow the server to decline resumption and fall back to a full handshake, if needed. The server responds with a "pre_shared_key" extension to negotiate use of PSK key establishment

and can (as shown here) respond with a "key_share" extension to do (EC)DHE key establishment, thus providing forward secrecy.

When PSKs are provisioned out of band, the PSK identity and the KDF hash algorithm to be used with the PSK MUST also be provisioned.

Note: When using an out-of-band provisioned pre-shared secret, a critical consideration is using sufficient entropy during the key generation, as discussed in [RFC4086]. Deriving a shared secret from a password or other low-entropy sources is not secure. A low-entropy secret, or password, is subject to dictionary attacks based on the PSK binder. The specified PSK authentication is not a strong password-based authenticated key exchange even when used with Diffie-Hellman key establishment. Specifically, it does not prevent an attacker that can observe the handshake from performing a brute-force attack on the password/pre-shared key.

2.3. 0-RTT Data

When clients and servers share a PSK (either obtained externally or via a previous handshake), TLS 1.3 allows clients to send data on the first flight ("early data"). The client uses the PSK to authenticate the server and to encrypt the early data.

As shown in Figure 4, the 0-RTT data is just added to the 1-RTT handshake in the first flight. The rest of the handshake uses the same messages as for a 1-RTT handshake with PSK resumption.




Figure 4: Message flow for a zero round trip handshake

IMPORTANT NOTE: The security properties for 0-RTT data are weaker than those for other kinds of TLS data. Specifically:

1. This data is not forward secret, as it is encrypted solely under keys derived using the offered PSK.
2. There are no guarantees of non-replay between connections. Protection against replay for ordinary TLS 1.3 1-RTT data is provided via the server's Random value, but 0-RTT data does not depend on the ServerHello and therefore has weaker guarantees. This is especially relevant if the data is authenticated either with TLS client authentication or inside the application

protocol. The same warnings apply to any use of the `early_exporter_master_secret`.

0-RTT data cannot be duplicated within a connection (i.e., the server will not process the same data twice for the same connection) and an attacker will not be able to make 0-RTT data appear to be 1-RTT data (because it is protected with different keys.) Appendix E.5 contains a description of potential attacks and Section 8 describes mechanisms which the server can use to limit the impact of replay.

3. Presentation Language

This document deals with the formatting of data in an external representation. The following very basic and somewhat casually defined presentation syntax will be used.

3.1. Basic Block Size

The representation of all data items is explicitly specified. The basic data block size is one byte (i.e., 8 bits). Multiple byte data items are concatenations of bytes, from left to right, from top to bottom. From the byte stream, a multi-byte item (a numeric in the example) is formed (using C notation) by:

```
value = (byte[0] << 8*(n-1)) | (byte[1] << 8*(n-2)) |  
        ... | byte[n-1];
```

This byte ordering for multi-byte values is the commonplace network byte order or big-endian format.

3.2. Miscellaneous

Comments begin with `/*` and end with `*/`.

Optional components are denoted by enclosing them in `"[]"` double brackets.

Single-byte entities containing uninterpreted data are of type `opaque`.

A type alias `T'` for an existing type `T` is defined by:

```
T T';
```

3.3. Numbers

The basic numeric data type is an unsigned byte (uint8). All larger numeric data types are formed from fixed-length series of bytes concatenated as described in Section 3.1 and are also unsigned. The following numeric types are predefined.

```
uint8 uint16[2];
uint8 uint24[3];
uint8 uint32[4];
uint8 uint64[8];
```

All values, here and elsewhere in the specification, are transmitted in network byte (big-endian) order; the uint32 represented by the hex bytes 01 02 03 04 is equivalent to the decimal value 16909060.

3.4. Vectors

A vector (single-dimensional array) is a stream of homogeneous data elements. The size of the vector may be specified at documentation time or left unspecified until runtime. In either case, the length declares the number of bytes, not the number of elements, in the vector. The syntax for specifying a new type, T', that is a fixed-length vector of type T is

```
T T'[n];
```

Here, T' occupies n bytes in the data stream, where n is a multiple of the size of T. The length of the vector is not included in the encoded stream.

In the following example, Datum is defined to be three consecutive bytes that the protocol does not interpret, while Data is three consecutive Datum, consuming a total of nine bytes.

```
opaque Datum[3];      /* three uninterpreted bytes */
Datum Data[9];        /* 3 consecutive 3-byte vectors */
```

Variable-length vectors are defined by specifying a subrange of legal lengths, inclusively, using the notation <floor..ceiling>. When these are encoded, the actual length precedes the vector's contents in the byte stream. The length will be in the form of a number consuming as many bytes as required to hold the vector's specified maximum (ceiling) length. A variable-length vector with an actual length field of zero is referred to as an empty vector.

```
T T'<floor..ceiling>;
```

In the following example, `mandatory` is a vector that must contain between 300 and 400 bytes of type `opaque`. It can never be empty. The actual length field consumes two bytes, a `uint16`, which is sufficient to represent the value 400 (see Section 3.3). Similarly, `longer` can represent up to 800 bytes of data, or 400 `uint16` elements, and it may be empty. Its encoding will include a two-byte actual length field prepended to the vector. The length of an encoded vector must be an exact multiple of the length of a single element (e.g., a 17-byte vector of `uint16` would be illegal).

```
opaque mandatory<300..400>;
    /* length field is 2 bytes, cannot be empty */
uint16 longer<0..800>;
    /* zero to 400 16-bit unsigned integers */
```

3.5. Enumerateds

An additional sparse data type is available called `enum` or `enumerated`. Each definition is a different type. Only `enumerateds` of the same type may be assigned or compared. Every element of an `enumerated` must be assigned a value, as demonstrated in the following example. Since the elements of the `enumerated` are not ordered, they can be assigned any unique value, in any order.

```
enum { e1(v1), e2(v2), ... , en(vn) [[, (n)]] } Te;
```

Future extensions or additions to the protocol may define new values. Implementations need to be able to parse and ignore unknown values unless the definition of the field states otherwise.

An `enumerated` occupies as much space in the byte stream as would its maximal defined ordinal value. The following definition would cause one byte to be used to carry fields of type `Color`.

```
enum { red(3), blue(5), white(7) } Color;
```

One may optionally specify a value without its associated tag to force the width definition without defining a superfluous element.

In the following example, `Taste` will consume two bytes in the data stream but can only assume the values 1, 2, or 4 in the current version of the protocol.

```
enum { sweet(1), sour(2), bitter(4), (32000) } Taste;
```

The names of the elements of an enumeration are scoped within the defined type. In the first example, a fully qualified reference to the second element of the enumeration would be `Color.blue`. Such

qualification is not required if the target of the assignment is well specified.

```
Color color = Color.blue;    /* overspecified, legal */
Color color = blue;         /* correct, type implicit */
```

The names assigned to enumerateds do not need to be unique. The numerical value can describe a range over which the same name applies. The value includes the minimum and maximum inclusive values in that range, separated by two period characters. This is principally useful for reserving regions of the space.

```
enum { sad(0), meh(1..254), happy(255) } Mood;
```

3.6. Constructed Types

Structure types may be constructed from primitive types for convenience. Each specification declares a new, unique type. The syntax for definition is much like that of C.

```
struct {
    T1 f1;
    T2 f2;
    ...
    Tn fn;
} T;
```

Fixed- and variable-length vector fields are allowed using the standard vector syntax. Structures V1 and V2 in the variants example below demonstrate this.

The fields within a structure may be qualified using the type's name, with a syntax much like that available for enumerateds. For example, T.f2 refers to the second field of the previous declaration.

3.7. Constants

Fields and variables may be assigned a fixed value using "=", as in:

```
struct {
    T1 f1 = 8; /* T.f1 must always be 8 */
    T2 f2;
} T;
```

3.8. Variants

Defined structures may have variants based on some knowledge that is available within the environment. The selector must be an enumerated type that defines the possible variants the structure defines. Each arm of the select specifies the type of that variant's field and an optional field label. The mechanism by which the variant is selected at runtime is not prescribed by the presentation language.

```
struct {
    T1 f1;
    T2 f2;
    ....
    Tn fn;
    select (E) {
        case e1: Te1 [[fe1]];
        case e2: Te2 [[fe2]];
        ....
        case en: Ten [[fen]];
    };
} Tv;
```

For example:

```
enum { apple(0), orange(1) } VariantTag;

struct {
    uint16 number;
    opaque string<0..10>; /* variable length */
} V1;

struct {
    uint32 number;
    opaque string[10]; /* fixed length */
} V2;

struct {
    VariantTag type;
    select (VariantRecord.type) {
        case apple: V1;
        case orange: V2;
    };
} VariantRecord;
```

4. Handshake Protocol

The handshake protocol is used to negotiate the security parameters of a connection. Handshake messages are supplied to the TLS record layer, where they are encapsulated within one or more `TLSPlaintext` or `TLSCiphertext` structures, which are processed and transmitted as specified by the current active connection state.

```
enum {
    client_hello(1),
    server_hello(2),
    new_session_ticket(4),
    end_of_early_data(5),
    encrypted_extensions(8),
    certificate(11),
    certificate_request(13),
    certificate_verify(15),
    finished(20),
    key_update(24),
    message_hash(254),
    (255)
} HandshakeType;

struct {
    HandshakeType msg_type;      /* handshake type */
    uint24 length;             /* bytes in message */
    select (Handshake.msg_type) {
        case client_hello:      ClientHello;
        case server_hello:      ServerHello;
        case end_of_early_data:  EndOfEarlyData;
        case encrypted_extensions: EncryptedExtensions;
        case certificate_request: CertificateRequest;
        case certificate:        Certificate;
        case certificate_verify: CertificateVerify;
        case finished:           Finished;
        case new_session_ticket: NewSessionTicket;
        case key_update:         KeyUpdate;
    };
} Handshake;
```

Protocol messages MUST be sent in the order defined in Section 4.4.1 and shown in the diagrams in Section 2. A peer which receives a handshake message in an unexpected order MUST abort the handshake with an "unexpected_message" alert.

New handshake message types are assigned by IANA as described in Section 11.

4.1. Key Exchange Messages

The key exchange messages are used to determine the security capabilities of the client and the server and to establish shared secrets including the traffic keys used to protect the rest of the handshake and the data.

4.1.1. Cryptographic Negotiation

In TLS, the cryptographic negotiation proceeds by the client offering the following four sets of options in its ClientHello:

- A list of cipher suites which indicates the AEAD algorithm/HKDF hash pairs which the client supports.
- A "supported_groups" (Section 4.2.7) extension which indicates the (EC)DHE groups which the client supports and a "key_share" (Section 4.2.8) extension which contains (EC)DHE shares for some or all of these groups.
- A "signature_algorithms" (Section 4.2.3) extension which indicates the signature algorithms which the client can accept.
- A "pre_shared_key" (Section 4.2.11) extension which contains a list of symmetric key identities known to the client and a "psk_key_exchange_modes" (Section 4.2.9) extension which indicates the key exchange modes that may be used with PSKs.

If the server does not select a PSK, then the first three of these options are entirely orthogonal: the server independently selects a cipher suite, an (EC)DHE group and key share for key establishment, and a signature algorithm/certificate pair to authenticate itself to the client. If there is no overlap between the received "supported_groups" and the groups supported by the server then the server MUST abort the handshake with a "handshake_failure" or an "insufficient_security" alert.

If the server selects a PSK, then it MUST also select a key establishment mode from the set indicated by client's "psk_key_exchange_modes" extension (at present, PSK alone or with (EC)DHE). Note that if the PSK can be used without (EC)DHE then non-overlap in the "supported_groups" parameters need not be fatal, as it is in the non-PSK case discussed in the previous paragraph.

If the server selects an (EC)DHE group and the client did not offer a compatible "key_share" extension in the initial ClientHello, the server MUST respond with a HelloRetryRequest (Section 4.1.4) message.

If the server successfully selects parameters and does not require a HelloRetryRequest, it indicates the selected parameters in the ServerHello as follows:

- If PSK is being used, then the server will send a "pre_shared_key" extension indicating the selected key.
- If PSK is not being used, then (EC)DHE and certificate-based authentication are always used.
- When (EC)DHE is in use, the server will also provide a "key_share" extension.
- When authenticating via a certificate, the server will send the Certificate (Section 4.4.2) and CertificateVerify (Section 4.4.3) messages. In TLS 1.3 as defined by this document, either a PSK or a certificate is always used, but not both. Future documents may define how to use them together.

If the server is unable to negotiate a supported set of parameters (i.e., there is no overlap between the client and server parameters), it MUST abort the handshake with either a "handshake_failure" or "insufficient_security" fatal alert (see Section 6).

4.1.2. Client Hello

When a client first connects to a server, it is REQUIRED to send the ClientHello as its first TLS message. The client will also send a ClientHello when the server has responded to its ClientHello with a HelloRetryRequest. In that case, the client MUST send the same ClientHello without modification, except:

- If a "key_share" extension was supplied in the HelloRetryRequest, replacing the list of shares with a list containing a single KeyShareEntry from the indicated group.
- Removing the "early_data" extension (Section 4.2.10) if one was present. Early data is not permitted after HelloRetryRequest.
- Including a "cookie" extension if one was provided in the HelloRetryRequest.
- Updating the "pre_shared_key" extension if present by recomputing the "obfuscated_ticket_age" and binder values and (optionally) removing any PSKs which are incompatible with the server's indicated cipher suite.

- Optionally adding, removing, or changing the length of the "padding" extension [RFC7685].
- Other modifications that may be allowed by an extension defined in the future and present in the HelloRetryRequest.

Because TLS 1.3 forbids renegotiation, if a server has negotiated TLS 1.3 and receives a ClientHello at any other time, it MUST terminate the connection with an "unexpected_message" alert.

If a server established a TLS connection with a previous version of TLS and receives a TLS 1.3 ClientHello in a renegotiation, it MUST retain the previous protocol version. In particular, it MUST NOT negotiate TLS 1.3.

Structure of this message:

```
uint16 ProtocolVersion;
opaque Random[32];

uint8 CipherSuite[2];    /* Cryptographic suite selector */

struct {
    ProtocolVersion legacy_version = 0x0303;    /* TLS v1.2 */
    Random random;
    opaque legacy_session_id<0..32>;
    CipherSuite cipher_suites<2..2^16-2>;
    opaque legacy_compression_methods<1..2^8-1>;
    Extension extensions<8..2^16-1>;
} ClientHello;
```

legacy_version In previous versions of TLS, this field was used for version negotiation and represented the highest version number supported by the client. Experience has shown that many servers do not properly implement version negotiation, leading to "version intolerance" in which the server rejects an otherwise acceptable ClientHello with a version number higher than it supports. In TLS 1.3, the client indicates its version preferences in the "supported_versions" extension (Section 4.2.1) and the legacy_version field MUST be set to 0x0303, which is the version number for TLS 1.2. (See Appendix D for details about backward compatibility.)

random 32 bytes generated by a secure random number generator. See Appendix C for additional information.

legacy_session_id Versions of TLS before TLS 1.3 supported a "session resumption" feature which has been merged with Pre-Shared

Keys in this version (see Section 2.2). A client which has a cached session ID set by a pre-TLS 1.3 server SHOULD set this field to that value. In compatibility mode (see Appendix D.4) this field MUST be non-empty, so a client not offering a pre-TLS 1.3 session MUST generate a new 32-byte value. This value need not be random but SHOULD be unpredictable to avoid implementations fixating on a specific value (also known as ossification). Otherwise, it MUST be set as a zero length vector (i.e., a single zero byte length field).

cipher_suites This is a list of the symmetric cipher options supported by the client, specifically the record protection algorithm (including secret key length) and a hash to be used with HKDF, in descending order of client preference. If the list contains cipher suites that the server does not recognize, support or wish to use, the server MUST ignore those cipher suites and process the remaining ones as usual. Values are defined in Appendix B.4. If the client is attempting a PSK key establishment, it SHOULD advertise at least one cipher suite indicating a Hash associated with the PSK.

legacy_compression_methods Versions of TLS before 1.3 supported compression with the list of supported compression methods being sent in this field. For every TLS 1.3 ClientHello, this vector MUST contain exactly one byte, set to zero, which corresponds to the "null" compression method in prior versions of TLS. If a TLS 1.3 ClientHello is received with any other value in this field, the server MUST abort the handshake with an "illegal_parameter" alert. Note that TLS 1.3 servers might receive TLS 1.2 or prior ClientHellos which contain other compression methods and (if negotiating such a prior version) MUST follow the procedures for the appropriate prior version of TLS. TLS 1.3 ClientHellos are identified as having a legacy_version of 0x0303 and a supported_versions extension present with 0x0304 as the highest version indicated therein.

extensions Clients request extended functionality from servers by sending data in the extensions field. The actual "Extension" format is defined in Section 4.2. In TLS 1.3, use of certain extensions is mandatory, as functionality is moved into extensions to preserve ClientHello compatibility with previous versions of TLS. Servers MUST ignore unrecognized extensions.

All versions of TLS allow an extensions field to optionally follow the compression_methods field. TLS 1.3 ClientHello messages always contain extensions (minimally "supported_versions", otherwise they will be interpreted as TLS 1.2 ClientHello messages). However, TLS 1.3 servers might receive ClientHello messages without an extensions

field from prior versions of TLS. The presence of extensions can be detected by determining whether there are bytes following the `compression_methods` field at the end of the `ClientHello`. Note that this method of detecting optional data differs from the normal TLS method of having a variable-length field, but it is used for compatibility with TLS before extensions were defined. TLS 1.3 servers will need to perform this check first and only attempt to negotiate TLS 1.3 if the "supported_versions" extension is present. If negotiating a version of TLS prior to 1.3, a server MUST check that the message either contains no data after `legacy_compression_methods` or that it contains a valid extensions block with no data following. If not, then it MUST abort the handshake with a "decode_error" alert.

In the event that a client requests additional functionality using extensions, and this functionality is not supplied by the server, the client MAY abort the handshake.

After sending the `ClientHello` message, the client waits for a `ServerHello` or `HelloRetryRequest` message. If early data is in use, the client may transmit early application data (Section 2.3) while waiting for the next handshake message.

4.1.3. Server Hello

The server will send this message in response to a `ClientHello` message to proceed with the handshake if it is able to negotiate an acceptable set of handshake parameters based on the `ClientHello`.

Structure of this message:

```
struct {
    ProtocolVersion legacy_version = 0x0303;    /* TLS v1.2 */
    Random random;
    opaque legacy_session_id_echo<0..32>;
    CipherSuite cipher_suite;
    uint8 legacy_compression_method = 0;
    Extension extensions<6..2^16-1>;
} ServerHello;
```

`legacy_version` In previous versions of TLS, this field was used for version negotiation and represented the selected version number for the connection. Unfortunately, some middleboxes fail when presented with new values. In TLS 1.3, the TLS server indicates its version using the "supported_versions" extension (Section 4.2.1), and the `legacy_version` field MUST be set to 0x0303, which is the version number for TLS 1.2. (See Appendix D for details about backward compatibility.)

random 32 bytes generated by a secure random number generator. See Appendix C for additional information. The last eight bytes MUST be overwritten as described below if negotiating TLS 1.2 or TLS 1.1, but the remaining bytes MUST be random. This structure is generated by the server and MUST be generated independently of the ClientHello.random.

legacy_session_id_echo The contents of the client's legacy_session_id field. Note that this field is echoed even if the client's value corresponded to a cached pre-TLS 1.3 session which the server has chosen not to resume. A client which receives a legacy_session_id_echo field that does not match what it sent in the ClientHello MUST abort the handshake with an "illegal_parameter" alert.

cipher_suite The single cipher suite selected by the server from the list in ClientHello.cipher_suites. A client which receives a cipher suite that was not offered MUST abort the handshake with an "illegal_parameter" alert.

legacy_compression_method A single byte which MUST have the value 0.

extensions A list of extensions. The ServerHello MUST only include extensions which are required to establish the cryptographic context and negotiate the protocol version. All TLS 1.3 ServerHello messages MUST contain the "supported_versions" extension. Current ServerHello messages additionally contain either the "pre_shared_key" or "key_share" extensions, or both when using a PSK with (EC)DHE key establishment. Other extensions are sent separately in the EncryptedExtensions message.

For reasons of backward compatibility with middleboxes (see Appendix D.4) the HelloRetryRequest message uses the same structure as the ServerHello, but with Random set to the special value of the SHA-256 of "HelloRetryRequest":

```
CF 21 AD 74 E5 9A 61 11 BE 1D 8C 02 1E 65 B8 91
C2 A2 11 16 7A BB 8C 5E 07 9E 09 E2 C8 A8 33 9C
```

Upon receiving a message with type server_hello, implementations MUST first examine the Random value and if it matches this value, process it as described in Section 4.1.4).

TLS 1.3 has a downgrade protection mechanism embedded in the server's random value. TLS 1.3 servers which negotiate TLS 1.2 or below in response to a ClientHello MUST set the last eight bytes of their Random value specially.

If negotiating TLS 1.2, TLS 1.3 servers MUST set the last eight bytes of their Random value to the bytes:

```
44 4F 57 4E 47 52 44 01
```

If negotiating TLS 1.1 or below, TLS 1.3 servers MUST and TLS 1.2 servers SHOULD set the last eight bytes of their Random value to the bytes:

```
44 4F 57 4E 47 52 44 00
```

TLS 1.3 clients receiving a ServerHello indicating TLS 1.2 or below MUST check that the last eight bytes are not equal to either of these values. TLS 1.2 clients SHOULD also check that the last eight bytes are not equal to the second value if the ServerHello indicates TLS 1.1 or below. If a match is found, the client MUST abort the handshake with an "illegal_parameter" alert. This mechanism provides limited protection against downgrade attacks over and above what is provided by the Finished exchange: because the ServerKeyExchange, a message present in TLS 1.2 and below, includes a signature over both random values, it is not possible for an active attacker to modify the random values without detection as long as ephemeral ciphers are used. It does not provide downgrade protection when static RSA is used.

Note: This is a change from [RFC5246], so in practice many TLS 1.2 clients and servers will not behave as specified above.

A legacy TLS client performing renegotiation with TLS 1.2 or prior and which receives a TLS 1.3 ServerHello during renegotiation MUST abort the handshake with a "protocol_version" alert. Note that renegotiation is not possible when TLS 1.3 has been negotiated.

RFC EDITOR: PLEASE REMOVE THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH Implementations of draft versions (see Section 4.2.1.1) of this specification SHOULD NOT implement this mechanism on either client and server. A pre-RFC client connecting to RFC servers, or vice versa, will appear to downgrade to TLS 1.2. With the mechanism enabled, this will cause an interoperability failure.

4.1.4. Hello Retry Request

The server will send this message in response to a ClientHello message if it is able to find an acceptable set of parameters but the ClientHello does not contain sufficient information to proceed with the handshake. As discussed in Section 4.1.3, the HelloRetryRequest has the same format as a ServerHello message, and the legacy_version, legacy_session_id_echo, cipher_suite, and legacy_compression methods

fields have the same meaning. However, for convenience we discuss HelloRetryRequest throughout this document as if it were a distinct message.

The server's extensions MUST contain "supported_versions" and otherwise the server SHOULD send only the extensions necessary for the client to generate a correct ClientHello pair. As with ServerHello, a HelloRetryRequest MUST NOT contain any extensions that were not first offered by the client in its ClientHello, with the exception of optionally the "cookie" (see Section 4.2.2) extension.

Upon receipt of a HelloRetryRequest, the client MUST check the legacy_version, legacy_session_id_echo, cipher_suite, and legacy_compression_method as specified in Section 4.1.3 and then process the extensions, starting with determining the version using "supported_versions". Clients MUST abort the handshake with an "illegal_parameter" alert if the HelloRetryRequest would not result in any change in the ClientHello. If a client receives a second HelloRetryRequest in the same connection (i.e., where the ClientHello was itself in response to a HelloRetryRequest), it MUST abort the handshake with an "unexpected_message" alert.

Otherwise, the client MUST process all extensions in the HelloRetryRequest and send a second updated ClientHello. The HelloRetryRequest extensions defined in this specification are:

- supported_versions (see Section 4.2.1)
- cookie (see Section 4.2.2)
- key_share (see Section 4.2.8)

In addition, in its updated ClientHello, the client SHOULD NOT offer any pre-shared keys associated with a hash other than that of the selected cipher suite. This allows the client to avoid having to compute partial hash transcripts for multiple hashes in the second ClientHello. A client which receives a cipher suite that was not offered MUST abort the handshake. Servers MUST ensure that they negotiate the same cipher suite when receiving a conformant updated ClientHello (if the server selects the cipher suite as the first step in the negotiation, then this will happen automatically). Upon receiving the ServerHello, clients MUST check that the cipher suite supplied in the ServerHello is the same as that in the HelloRetryRequest and otherwise abort the handshake with an "illegal_parameter" alert.

The value of selected_version in the HelloRetryRequest "supported_versions" extension MUST be retained in the ServerHello,

and a client MUST abort the handshake with an "illegal_parameter" alert if the value changes.

4.2. Extensions

A number of TLS messages contain tag-length-value encoded extensions structures.

```

struct {
    ExtensionType extension_type;
    opaque extension_data<0..2^16-1>;
} Extension;

enum {
    server_name(0),                /* RFC 6066 */
    max_fragment_length(1),        /* RFC 6066 */
    status_request(5),             /* RFC 6066 */
    supported_groups(10),          /* RFC 4492, 7919 */
    signature_algorithms(13),     /* [[this document]] */
    use_srtp(14),                 /* RFC 5764 */
    heartbeat(15),               /* RFC 6520 */
    application_layer_protocol_negotiation(16), /* RFC 7301 */
    signed_certificate_timestamp(18), /* RFC 6962 */
    client_certificate_type(19),  /* RFC 7250 */
    server_certificate_type(20),  /* RFC 7250 */
    padding(21),                 /* RFC 7685 */
    pre_shared_key(41),           /* [[this document]] */
    early_data(42),              /* [[this document]] */
    supported_versions(43),      /* [[this document]] */
    cookie(44),                  /* [[this document]] */
    psk_key_exchange_modes(45),  /* [[this document]] */
    certificate_authorities(47), /* [[this document]] */
    oid_filters(48),             /* [[this document]] */
    post_handshake_auth(49),     /* [[this document]] */
    signature_algorithms_cert(50), /* [[this document]] */
    key_share(51),               /* [[this document]] */
    (65535)
} ExtensionType;

```

Here:

- "extension_type" identifies the particular extension type.
- "extension_data" contains information specific to the particular extension type.

The list of extension types is maintained by IANA as described in Section 11.

Extensions are generally structured in a request/response fashion, though some extensions are just indications with no corresponding response. The client sends its extension requests in the ClientHello message and the server sends its extension responses in the ServerHello, EncryptedExtensions, HelloRetryRequest and Certificate messages. The server sends extension requests in the CertificateRequest message which a client MAY respond to with a Certificate message. The server MAY also send unsolicited extensions in the NewSessionTicket, though the client does not respond directly to these.

Implementations MUST NOT send extension responses if the remote endpoint did not send the corresponding extension requests, with the exception of the "cookie" extension in HelloRetryRequest. Upon receiving such an extension, an endpoint MUST abort the handshake with an "unsupported_extension" alert.

The table below indicates the messages where a given extension may appear, using the following notation: CH (ClientHello), SH (ServerHello), EE (EncryptedExtensions), CT (Certificate), CR (CertificateRequest), NST (NewSessionTicket) and HRR (HelloRetryRequest). If an implementation receives an extension which it recognizes and which is not specified for the message in which it appears it MUST abort the handshake with an "illegal_parameter" alert.

Extension	TLS 1.3
server_name [RFC6066]	CH, EE
max_fragment_length [RFC6066]	CH, EE
status_request [RFC6066]	CH, CR, CT
supported_groups [RFC7919]	CH, EE
signature_algorithms [RFC5246]	CH, CR
use_srtp [RFC5764]	CH, EE
heartbeat [RFC6520]	CH, EE
application_layer_protocol_negotiation [RFC7301]	CH, EE
signed_certificate_timestamp [RFC6962]	CH, CR, CT
client_certificate_type [RFC7250]	CH, EE
server_certificate_type [RFC7250]	CH, EE
padding [RFC7685]	CH
key_share [[this document]]	CH, SH, HRR
pre_shared_key [[this document]]	CH, SH
psk_key_exchange_modes [[this document]]	CH
early_data [[this document]]	CH, EE, NST
cookie [[this document]]	CH, HRR
supported_versions [[this document]]	CH, SH, HRR
certificate_authorities [[this document]]	CH, CR
oid_filters [[this document]]	CR
post_handshake_auth [[this document]]	CH
signature_algorithms_cert [[this document]]	CH, CR

When multiple extensions of different types are present, the extensions MAY appear in any order, with the exception of "pre_shared_key" Section 4.2.11 which MUST be the last extension in the ClientHello. There MUST NOT be more than one extension of the same type in a given extension block.

In TLS 1.3, unlike TLS 1.2, extensions are negotiated for each handshake even when in resumption-PSK mode. However, 0-RTT parameters are those negotiated in the previous handshake; mismatches may require rejecting 0-RTT (see Section 4.2.10).

There are subtle (and not so subtle) interactions that may occur in this protocol between new features and existing features which may result in a significant reduction in overall security. The following considerations should be taken into account when designing new extensions:

- Some cases where a server does not agree to an extension are error conditions (e.g., the handshake cannot continue), and some are simply refusals to support particular features. In general, error alerts should be used for the former and a field in the server extension response for the latter.
- Extensions should, as far as possible, be designed to prevent any attack that forces use (or non-use) of a particular feature by manipulation of handshake messages. This principle should be followed regardless of whether the feature is believed to cause a security problem. Often the fact that the extension fields are included in the inputs to the Finished message hashes will be sufficient, but extreme care is needed when the extension changes the meaning of messages sent in the handshake phase. Designers and implementors should be aware of the fact that until the handshake has been authenticated, active attackers can modify messages and insert, remove, or replace extensions.

4.2.1. Supported Versions

```
struct {
    select (Handshake.msg_type) {
        case client_hello:
            ProtocolVersion versions<2..254>;

        case server_hello: /* and HelloRetryRequest */
            ProtocolVersion selected_version;
    };
} SupportedVersions;
```

The "supported_versions" extension is used by the client to indicate which versions of TLS it supports and by the server to indicate which version it is using. The extension contains a list of supported versions in preference order, with the most preferred version first. Implementations of this specification MUST send this extension in the ClientHello containing all versions of TLS which they are prepared to negotiate (for this specification, that means minimally 0x0304, but if previous versions of TLS are allowed to be negotiated, they MUST be present as well).

If this extension is not present, servers which are compliant with this specification, and which also support TLS 1.2, MUST negotiate TLS 1.2 or prior as specified in [RFC5246], even if ClientHello.legacy_version is 0x0304 or later. Servers MAY abort the handshake upon receiving a ClientHello with legacy_version 0x0304 or later.

If this extension is present in the ClientHello, servers MUST NOT use the ClientHello.legacy_version value for version negotiation and MUST use only the "supported_versions" extension to determine client preferences. Servers MUST only select a version of TLS present in that extension and MUST ignore any unknown versions that are present in that extension. Note that this mechanism makes it possible to negotiate a version prior to TLS 1.2 if one side supports a sparse range. Implementations of TLS 1.3 which choose to support prior versions of TLS SHOULD support TLS 1.2. Servers MUST be prepared to receive ClientHellos that include this extension but do not include 0x0304 in the list of versions.

A server which negotiates a version of TLS prior to TLS 1.3 MUST set ServerHello.version and MUST NOT send the "supported_versions" extension. A server which negotiates TLS 1.3 MUST respond by sending a "supported_versions" extension containing the selected version value (0x0304). It MUST set the ServerHello.legacy_version field to 0x0303 (TLS 1.2). Clients MUST check for this extension prior to processing the rest of the ServerHello (although they will have to parse the ServerHello in order to read the extension). If this extension is present, clients MUST ignore the ServerHello.legacy_version value and MUST use only the "supported_versions" extension to determine the selected version. If the "supported_versions" extension in the ServerHello contains a version not offered by the client or contains a version prior to TLS 1.3, the client MUST abort the handshake with an "illegal_parameter" alert.

4.2.1.1. Draft Version Indicator

RFC EDITOR: PLEASE REMOVE THIS SECTION

While the eventual version indicator for the RFC version of TLS 1.3 will be 0x0304, implementations of draft versions of this specification SHOULD instead advertise 0x7f00 | draft_version in the ServerHello and HelloRetryRequest "supported_versions" extension. For instance, draft-17 would be encoded as the 0x7f11. This allows pre-RFC implementations to safely negotiate with each other, even if they would otherwise be incompatible.

4.2.2. Cookie

```
struct {  
    opaque cookie<1..2^16-1>;  
} Cookie;
```

Cookies serve two primary purposes:

- Allowing the server to force the client to demonstrate reachability at their apparent network address (thus providing a measure of DoS protection). This is primarily useful for non-connection-oriented transports (see [RFC6347] for an example of this).
- Allowing the server to offload state to the client, thus allowing it to send a HelloRetryRequest without storing any state. The server can do this by storing the hash of the ClientHello in the HelloRetryRequest cookie (protected with some suitable integrity algorithm).

When sending a HelloRetryRequest, the server MAY provide a "cookie" extension to the client (this is an exception to the usual rule that the only extensions that may be sent are those that appear in the ClientHello). When sending the new ClientHello, the client MUST copy the contents of the extension received in the HelloRetryRequest into a "cookie" extension in the new ClientHello. Clients MUST NOT use cookies in their initial ClientHello in subsequent connections.

When a server is operating statelessly it may receive an unprotected record of type change_cipher_spec between the first and second ClientHello (see Section 5). Since the server is not storing any state this will appear as if it were the first message to be received. Servers operating statelessly MUST ignore these records.

4.2.3. Signature Algorithms

TLS 1.3 provides two extensions for indicating which signature algorithms may be used in digital signatures. The "signature_algorithms_cert" extension applies to signatures in certificates and the "signature_algorithms" extension, which originally appeared in TLS 1.2, applies to signatures in CertificateVerify messages. The keys found in certificates MUST also be of appropriate type for the signature algorithms they are used with. This is a particular issue for RSA keys and PSS signatures, as described below. If no "signature_algorithms_cert" extension is present, then the "signature_algorithms" extension also applies to signatures appearing in certificates. Clients which desire the server to authenticate itself via a certificate MUST send "signature_algorithms". If a server is authenticating via a certificate and the client has not sent a "signature_algorithms" extension, then the server MUST abort the handshake with a "missing_extension" alert (see Section 9.2).

The "signature_algorithms_cert" extension was added to allow implementations which supported different sets of algorithms for certificates and in TLS itself to clearly signal their capabilities. TLS 1.2 implementations SHOULD also process this extension. Implementations which have the same policy in both cases MAY omit the "signature_algorithms_cert" extension.

The "extension_data" field of these extensions contains a SignatureSchemeList value:

```
enum {
    /* RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 algorithms */
    rsa_pkcs1_sha256(0x0401),
    rsa_pkcs1_sha384(0x0501),
    rsa_pkcs1_sha512(0x0601),

    /* ECDSA algorithms */
    ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256(0x0403),
    ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384(0x0503),
    ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512(0x0603),

    /* RSASSA-PSS algorithms with public key OID rsaEncryption */
    rsa_pss_rsae_sha256(0x0804),
    rsa_pss_rsae_sha384(0x0805),
    rsa_pss_rsae_sha512(0x0806),

    /* EdDSA algorithms */
    ed25519(0x0807),
    ed448(0x0808),

    /* RSASSA-PSS algorithms with public key OID RSASSA-PSS */
    rsa_pss_pss_sha256(0x0809),
    rsa_pss_pss_sha384(0x080a),
    rsa_pss_pss_sha512(0x080b),

    /* Legacy algorithms */
    rsa_pkcs1_shal(0x0201),
    ecdsa_shal(0x0203),

    /* Reserved Code Points */
    private_use(0xFE00..0xFFFF),
    (0xFFFF)
} SignatureScheme;

struct {
    SignatureScheme supported_signature_algorithms<2..2^16-2>;
} SignatureSchemeList;
```

Note: This enum is named "SignatureScheme" because there is already a "SignatureAlgorithm" type in TLS 1.2, which this replaces. We use the term "signature algorithm" throughout the text.

Each SignatureScheme value lists a single signature algorithm that the client is willing to verify. The values are indicated in descending order of preference. Note that a signature algorithm takes as input an arbitrary-length message, rather than a digest. Algorithms which traditionally act on a digest should be defined in TLS to first hash the input with a specified hash algorithm and then

proceed as usual. The code point groups listed above have the following meanings:

RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 algorithms Indicates a signature algorithm using RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 [RFC8017] with the corresponding hash algorithm as defined in [SHS]. These values refer solely to signatures which appear in certificates (see Section 4.4.2.2) and are not defined for use in signed TLS handshake messages, although they MAY appear in "signature_algorithms" and "signature_algorithms_cert" for backward compatibility with TLS 1.2,

ECDSA algorithms Indicates a signature algorithm using ECDSA [ECDSA], the corresponding curve as defined in ANSI X9.62 [X962] and FIPS 186-4 [DSS], and the corresponding hash algorithm as defined in [SHS]. The signature is represented as a DER-encoded [X690] ECDSA-Sig-Value structure.

RSASSA-PSS RSAE algorithms Indicates a signature algorithm using RSASSA-PSS [RFC8017] with mask generation function 1. The digest used in the mask generation function and the digest being signed are both the corresponding hash algorithm as defined in [SHS]. The length of the salt MUST be equal to the length of the output of the digest algorithm. If the public key is carried in an X.509 certificate, it MUST use the rsaEncryption OID [RFC5280].

EdDSA algorithms Indicates a signature algorithm using EdDSA as defined in [RFC8032] or its successors. Note that these correspond to the "PureEdDSA" algorithms and not the "prehash" variants.

RSASSA-PSS PSS algorithms Indicates a signature algorithm using RSASSA-PSS [RFC8017] with mask generation function 1. The digest used in the mask generation function and the digest being signed are both the corresponding hash algorithm as defined in [SHS]. The length of the salt MUST be equal to the length of the digest algorithm. If the public key is carried in an X.509 certificate, it MUST use the RSASSA-PSS OID [RFC5756]. When used in certificate signatures, the algorithm parameters MUST be DER encoded. If the corresponding public key's parameters are present, then the parameters in the signature MUST be identical to those in the public key.

Legacy algorithms Indicates algorithms which are being deprecated because they use algorithms with known weaknesses, specifically SHA-1 which is used in this context with either with RSA using RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 or ECDSA. These values refer solely to signatures which appear in certificates (see Section 4.4.2.2) and

are not defined for use in signed TLS handshake messages, although they MAY appear in "signature_algorithms" and "signature_algorithms_cert" for backward compatibility with TLS 1.2, Endpoints SHOULD NOT negotiate these algorithms but are permitted to do so solely for backward compatibility. Clients offering these values MUST list them as the lowest priority (listed after all other algorithms in SignatureSchemeList). TLS 1.3 servers MUST NOT offer a SHA-1 signed certificate unless no valid certificate chain can be produced without it (see Section 4.4.2.2).

The signatures on certificates that are self-signed or certificates that are trust anchors are not validated since they begin a certification path (see [RFC5280], Section 3.2). A certificate that begins a certification path MAY use a signature algorithm that is not advertised as being supported in the "signature_algorithms" extension.

Note that TLS 1.2 defines this extension differently. TLS 1.3 implementations willing to negotiate TLS 1.2 MUST behave in accordance with the requirements of [RFC5246] when negotiating that version. In particular:

- TLS 1.2 ClientHellos MAY omit this extension.
- In TLS 1.2, the extension contained hash/signature pairs. The pairs are encoded in two octets, so SignatureScheme values have been allocated to align with TLS 1.2's encoding. Some legacy pairs are left unallocated. These algorithms are deprecated as of TLS 1.3. They MUST NOT be offered or negotiated by any implementation. In particular, MD5 [SLOTH], SHA-224, and DSA MUST NOT be used.
- ECDSA signature schemes align with TLS 1.2's ECDSA hash/signature pairs. However, the old semantics did not constrain the signing curve. If TLS 1.2 is negotiated, implementations MUST be prepared to accept a signature that uses any curve that they advertised in the "supported_groups" extension.
- Implementations that advertise support for RSASSA-PSS (which is mandatory in TLS 1.3), MUST be prepared to accept a signature using that scheme even when TLS 1.2 is negotiated. In TLS 1.2, RSASSA-PSS is used with RSA cipher suites.

4.2.4. Certificate Authorities

The "certificate_authorities" extension is used to indicate the certificate authorities which an endpoint supports and which SHOULD be used by the receiving endpoint to guide certificate selection.

The body of the "certificate_authorities" extension consists of a CertificateAuthoritiesExtension structure.

```
opaque DistinguishedName<1..2^16-1>;

struct {
    DistinguishedName authorities<3..2^16-1>;
} CertificateAuthoritiesExtension;
```

authorities A list of the distinguished names [X501] of acceptable certificate authorities, represented in DER-encoded [X690] format. These distinguished names specify a desired distinguished name for trust anchor or subordinate CA; thus, this message can be used to describe known trust anchors as well as a desired authorization space.

The client MAY send the "certificate_authorities" extension in the ClientHello message. The server MAY send it in the CertificateRequest message.

The "trusted_ca_keys" extension, which serves a similar purpose [RFC6066], but is more complicated, is not used in TLS 1.3 (although it may appear in ClientHello messages from clients which are offering prior versions of TLS).

4.2.5. OID Filters

The "oid_filters" extension allows servers to provide a set of OID/value pairs which it would like the client's certificate to match. This extension, if provided by the server, MUST only be sent in the CertificateRequest message.

```
struct {
    opaque certificate_extension_oid<1..2^8-1>;
    opaque certificate_extension_values<0..2^16-1>;
} OIDFilter;

struct {
    OIDFilter filters<0..2^16-1>;
} OIDFilterExtension;
```

`filters` A list of certificate extension OIDs [RFC5280] with their allowed value(s) and represented in DER-encoded [X690] format. Some certificate extension OIDs allow multiple values (e.g., Extended Key Usage). If the server has included a non-empty `filters` list, the client certificate included in the response MUST contain all of the specified extension OIDs that the client recognizes. For each extension OID recognized by the client, all of the specified values MUST be present in the client certificate (but the certificate MAY have other values as well). However, the client MUST ignore and skip any unrecognized certificate extension OIDs. If the client ignored some of the required certificate extension OIDs and supplied a certificate that does not satisfy the request, the server MAY at its discretion either continue the connection without client authentication, or abort the handshake with an "unsupported_certificate" alert. Any given OID MUST NOT appear more than once in the `filters` list.

PKIX RFCs define a variety of certificate extension OIDs and their corresponding value types. Depending on the type, matching certificate extension values are not necessarily bitwise-equal. It is expected that TLS implementations will rely on their PKI libraries to perform certificate selection using certificate extension OIDs.

This document defines matching rules for two standard certificate extensions defined in [RFC5280]:

- The Key Usage extension in a certificate matches the request when all key usage bits asserted in the request are also asserted in the Key Usage certificate extension.
- The Extended Key Usage extension in a certificate matches the request when all key purpose OIDs present in the request are also found in the Extended Key Usage certificate extension. The special `anyExtendedKeyUsage` OID MUST NOT be used in the request.

Separate specifications may define matching rules for other certificate extensions.

4.2.6. Post-Handshake Client Authentication

The "post_handshake_auth" extension is used to indicate that a client is willing to perform post-handshake authentication (Section 4.6.2). Servers MUST NOT send a post-handshake CertificateRequest to clients which do not offer this extension. Servers MUST NOT send this extension.

```
struct {} PostHandshakeAuth;
```

The "extension_data" field of the "post_handshake_auth" extension is zero length.

4.2.7. Negotiated Groups

When sent by the client, the "supported_groups" extension indicates the named groups which the client supports for key exchange, ordered from most preferred to least preferred.

Note: In versions of TLS prior to TLS 1.3, this extension was named "elliptic_curves" and only contained elliptic curve groups. See [RFC4492] and [RFC7919]. This extension was also used to negotiate ECDSA curves. Signature algorithms are now negotiated independently (see Section 4.2.3).

The "extension_data" field of this extension contains a "NamedGroupList" value:

```
enum {  
  
    /* Elliptic Curve Groups (ECDHE) */  
    secp256r1(0x0017), secp384r1(0x0018), secp521r1(0x0019),  
    x25519(0x001D), x448(0x001E),  
  
    /* Finite Field Groups (DHE) */  
    ffdhe2048(0x0100), ffdhe3072(0x0101), ffdhe4096(0x0102),  
    ffdhe6144(0x0103), ffdhe8192(0x0104),  
  
    /* Reserved Code Points */  
    ffdhe_private_use(0x01FC..0x01FF),  
    ecdhe_private_use(0xFE00..0xFEFF),  
    (0xFFFF)  
} NamedGroup;  
  
struct {  
    NamedGroup named_group_list<2..2^16-1>;  
} NamedGroupList;
```

Elliptic Curve Groups (ECDHE) Indicates support for the corresponding named curve, defined either in FIPS 186-4 [DSS] or in [RFC7748]. Values 0xFE00 through 0xFEFF are reserved for private use.

Finite Field Groups (DHE) Indicates support of the corresponding finite field group, defined in [RFC7919]. Values 0x01FC through 0x01FF are reserved for private use.

Items in `named_group_list` are ordered according to the client's preferences (most preferred choice first).

As of TLS 1.3, servers are permitted to send the "supported_groups" extension to the client. Clients MUST NOT act upon any information found in "supported_groups" prior to successful completion of the handshake but MAY use the information learned from a successfully completed handshake to change what groups they use in their "key_share" extension in subsequent connections. If the server has a group it prefers to the ones in the "key_share" extension but is still willing to accept the ClientHello, it SHOULD send "supported_groups" to update the client's view of its preferences; this extension SHOULD contain all groups the server supports, regardless of whether they are currently supported by the client.

4.2.8. Key Share

The "key_share" extension contains the endpoint's cryptographic parameters.

Clients MAY send an empty `client_shares` vector in order to request group selection from the server at the cost of an additional round trip. (see Section 4.1.4)

```
struct {
    NamedGroup group;
    opaque key_exchange<1..2^16-1>;
} KeyShareEntry;
```

`group` The named group for the key being exchanged.

`key_exchange` Key exchange information. The contents of this field are determined by the specified group and its corresponding definition. Finite Field Diffie-Hellman [DH] parameters are described in Section 4.2.8.1; Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman parameters are described in Section 4.2.8.2.

In the ClientHello message, the "extension_data" field of this extension contains a "KeyShareClientHello" value:

```
struct {
    KeyShareEntry client_shares<0..2^16-1>;
} KeyShareClientHello;
```

`client_shares` A list of offered KeyShareEntry values in descending order of client preference.

This vector MAY be empty if the client is requesting a HelloRetryRequest. Each KeyShareEntry value MUST correspond to a group offered in the "supported_groups" extension and MUST appear in the same order. However, the values MAY be a non-contiguous subset of the "supported_groups" extension and MAY omit the most preferred groups. Such a situation could arise if the most preferred groups are new and unlikely to be supported in enough places to make pregenerating key shares for them efficient.

Clients can offer as many KeyShareEntry values as the number of supported groups it is offering, each representing a single set of key exchange parameters. For instance, a client might offer shares for several elliptic curves or multiple FFDHE groups. The key_exchange values for each KeyShareEntry MUST be generated independently. Clients MUST NOT offer multiple KeyShareEntry values for the same group. Clients MUST NOT offer any KeyShareEntry values for groups not listed in the client's "supported_groups" extension. Servers MAY check for violations of these rules and abort the handshake with an "illegal_parameter" alert if one is violated.

In a HelloRetryRequest message, the "extension_data" field of this extension contains a KeyShareHelloRetryRequest value:

```
struct {
    NamedGroup selected_group;
} KeyShareHelloRetryRequest;
```

selected_group The mutually supported group the server intends to negotiate and is requesting a retried ClientHello/KeyShare for.

Upon receipt of this extension in a HelloRetryRequest, the client MUST verify that (1) the selected_group field corresponds to a group which was provided in the "supported_groups" extension in the original ClientHello; and (2) the selected_group field does not correspond to a group which was provided in the "key_share" extension in the original ClientHello. If either of these checks fails, then the client MUST abort the handshake with an "illegal_parameter" alert. Otherwise, when sending the new ClientHello, the client MUST replace the original "key_share" extension with one containing only a new KeyShareEntry for the group indicated in the selected_group field of the triggering HelloRetryRequest.

In a ServerHello message, the "extension_data" field of this extension contains a KeyShareServerHello value:

```
struct {
    KeyShareEntry server_share;
} KeyShareServerHello;
```

`server_share` A single `KeyShareEntry` value that is in the same group as one of the client's shares.

If using (EC)DHE key establishment, servers offer exactly one `KeyShareEntry` in the `ServerHello`. This value MUST be in the same group as the `KeyShareEntry` value offered by the client that the server has selected for the negotiated key exchange. Servers MUST NOT send a `KeyShareEntry` for any group not indicated in the `"supported_groups"` extension and MUST NOT send a `KeyShareEntry` when using the `"psk_ke"` `PskKeyExchangeMode`. If using (EC)DHE key establishment, and a `HelloRetryRequest` containing a `"key_share"` extension was received by the client, the client MUST verify that the selected `NamedGroup` in the `ServerHello` is the same as that in the `HelloRetryRequest`. If this check fails, the client MUST abort the handshake with an `"illegal_parameter"` alert.

4.2.8.1. Diffie-Hellman Parameters

Diffie-Hellman [DH] parameters for both clients and servers are encoded in the opaque `key_exchange` field of a `KeyShareEntry` in a `KeyShare` structure. The opaque value contains the Diffie-Hellman public value ($Y = g^X \text{ mod } p$) for the specified group (see [RFC7919] for group definitions) encoded as a big-endian integer and padded to the left with zeros to the size of p in bytes.

Note: For a given Diffie-Hellman group, the padding results in all public keys having the same length.

Peers MUST validate each other's public key Y by ensuring that $1 < Y < p-1$. This check ensures that the remote peer is properly behaved and isn't forcing the local system into a small subgroup.

4.2.8.2. ECDHE Parameters

ECDHE parameters for both clients and servers are encoded in the opaque `key_exchange` field of a `KeyShareEntry` in a `KeyShare` structure.

For `secp256r1`, `secp384r1` and `secp521r1`, the contents are the serialized value of the following struct:

```
struct {
    uint8 legacy_form = 4;
    opaque X[coordinate_length];
    opaque Y[coordinate_length];
} UncompressedPointRepresentation;
```

X and Y respectively are the binary representations of the x and y values in network byte order. There are no internal length markers,

so each number representation occupies as many octets as implied by the curve parameters. For P-256 this means that each of X and Y use 32 octets, padded on the left by zeros if necessary. For P-384 they take 48 octets each, and for P-521 they take 66 octets each.

For the curves `secp256r1`, `secp384r1` and `secp521r1`, peers MUST validate each other's public value `Q` by ensuring that the point is a valid point on the elliptic curve. The appropriate validation procedures are defined in Section 4.3.7 of [X962] and alternatively in Section 5.6.2.3 of [KEYAGREEMENT]. This process consists of three steps: (1) verify that `Q` is not the point at infinity (`O`), (2) verify that for `Q = (x, y)` both integers `x` and `y` are in the correct interval, (3) ensure that `(x, y)` is a correct solution to the elliptic curve equation. For these curves, implementers do not need to verify membership in the correct subgroup.

For X25519 and X448, the contents of the public value are the byte string inputs and outputs of the corresponding functions defined in [RFC7748], 32 bytes for X25519 and 56 bytes for X448.

Note: Versions of TLS prior to 1.3 permitted point format negotiation; TLS 1.3 removes this feature in favor of a single point format for each curve.

4.2.9. Pre-Shared Key Exchange Modes

In order to use PSKs, clients MUST also send a "psk_key_exchange_modes" extension. The semantics of this extension are that the client only supports the use of PSKs with these modes, which restricts both the use of PSKs offered in this ClientHello and those which the server might supply via NewSessionTicket.

A client MUST provide a "psk_key_exchange_modes" extension if it offers a "pre_shared_key" extension. If clients offer "pre_shared_key" without a "psk_key_exchange_modes" extension, servers MUST abort the handshake. Servers MUST NOT select a key exchange mode that is not listed by the client. This extension also restricts the modes for use with PSK resumption; servers SHOULD NOT send NewSessionTicket with tickets that are not compatible with the advertised modes; however, if a server does so, the impact will just be that the client's attempts at resumption fail.

The server MUST NOT send a "psk_key_exchange_modes" extension.


```
enum { psk_ke(0), psk_dhe_ke(1), (255) } PskKeyExchangeMode;

struct {
    PskKeyExchangeMode ke_modes<1..255>;
} PskKeyExchangeModes;
```

`psk_ke` PSK-only key establishment. In this mode, the server MUST NOT supply a "key_share" value.

`psk_dhe_ke` PSK with (EC)DHE key establishment. In this mode, the client and server MUST supply "key_share" values as described in Section 4.2.8.

Any future values that are allocated must ensure that the transmitted protocol messages unambiguously identify which mode was selected by the server; at present, this is indicated by the presence of the "key_share" in the ServerHello.

4.2.10. Early Data Indication

When a PSK is used and early data is allowed for that PSK, the client can send application data in its first flight of messages. If the client opts to do so, it MUST supply both the "early_data" extension as well as the "pre_shared_key" extension.

The "extension_data" field of this extension contains an "EarlyDataIndication" value.

```
struct {} Empty;

struct {
    select (Handshake.msg_type) {
        case new_session_ticket:    uint32 max_early_data_size;
        case client_hello:          Empty;
        case encrypted_extensions: Empty;
    };
} EarlyDataIndication;
```

See Section 4.6.1 for the use of the `max_early_data_size` field.

The parameters for the 0-RTT data (version, symmetric cipher suite, ALPN protocol, etc.) are those associated with the PSK in use. For externally provisioned PSKs, the associated values are those provisioned along with the key. For PSKs established via a `NewSessionTicket` message, the associated values are those which were negotiated in the connection which established the PSK. The PSK used to encrypt the early data MUST be the first PSK listed in the client's "pre_shared_key" extension.

For PSKs provisioned via `NewSessionTicket`, a server MUST validate that the ticket age for the selected PSK identity (computed by subtracting `ticket_age_add` from `PskIdentity.obfuscated_ticket_age` modulo 2^{32}) is within a small tolerance of the time since the ticket was issued (see Section 8). If it is not, the server SHOULD proceed with the handshake but reject 0-RTT, and SHOULD NOT take any other action that assumes that this `ClientHello` is fresh.

0-RTT messages sent in the first flight have the same (encrypted) content types as messages of the same type sent in other flights (handshake and `application_data`) but are protected under different keys. After receiving the server's Finished message, if the server has accepted early data, an `EndOfEarlyData` message will be sent to indicate the key change. This message will be encrypted with the 0-RTT traffic keys.

A server which receives an "early_data" extension MUST behave in one of three ways:

- Ignore the extension and return a regular 1-RTT response. The server then skips past early data by attempting to deprotect received records using the handshake traffic key, discarding records which fail deprotection (up to the configured `max_early_data_size`). Once a record is deprotected successfully, it is treated as the start of the client's second flight and the server proceeds as with an ordinary 1-RTT handshake.
- Request that the client send another `ClientHello` by responding with a `HelloRetryRequest`. A client MUST NOT include the "early_data" extension in its followup `ClientHello`. The server then ignores early data by skipping all records with external content type of "application_data" (indicating that they are encrypted), up to the configured `max_early_data_size`.
- Return its own "early_data" extension in `EncryptedExtensions`, indicating that it intends to process the early data. It is not possible for the server to accept only a subset of the early data messages. Even though the server sends a message accepting early data, the actual early data itself may already be in flight by the time the server generates this message.

In order to accept early data, the server MUST have accepted a PSK cipher suite and selected the first key offered in the client's "pre_shared_key" extension. In addition, it MUST verify that the following values are the same as those associated with the selected PSK:

- The TLS version number

- The selected cipher suite
- The selected ALPN [RFC7301] protocol, if any

These requirements are a superset of those needed to perform a 1-RTT handshake using the PSK in question. For externally established PSKs, the associated values are those provisioned along with the key. For PSKs established via a NewSessionTicket message, the associated values are those negotiated in the connection during which the ticket was established.

Future extensions MUST define their interaction with 0-RTT.

If any of these checks fail, the server MUST NOT respond with the extension and must discard all the first flight data using one of the first two mechanisms listed above (thus falling back to 1-RTT or 2-RTT). If the client attempts a 0-RTT handshake but the server rejects it, the server will generally not have the 0-RTT record protection keys and must instead use trial decryption (either with the 1-RTT handshake keys or by looking for a cleartext ClientHello in the case of HelloRetryRequest) to find the first non-0-RTT message.

If the server chooses to accept the "early_data" extension, then it MUST comply with the same error handling requirements specified for all records when processing early data records. Specifically, if the server fails to decrypt a 0-RTT record following an accepted "early_data" extension it MUST terminate the connection with a "bad_record_mac" alert as per Section 5.2.

If the server rejects the "early_data" extension, the client application MAY opt to retransmit the application data previously sent in early data once the handshake has been completed. Note that automatic re-transmission of early data could result in assumptions about the status of the connection being incorrect. For instance, when the negotiated connection selects a different ALPN protocol from what was used for the early data, an application might need to construct different messages. Similarly, if early data assumes anything about the connection state, it might be sent in error after the handshake completes.

A TLS implementation SHOULD NOT automatically re-send early data; applications are in a better position to decide when re-transmission is appropriate. A TLS implementation MUST NOT automatically re-send early data unless the negotiated connection selects the same ALPN protocol.

4.2.11. Pre-Shared Key Extension

The "pre_shared_key" extension is used to negotiate the identity of the pre-shared key to be used with a given handshake in association with PSK key establishment.

The "extension_data" field of this extension contains a "PreSharedKeyExtension" value:

```
struct {
    opaque identity<1..2^16-1>;
    uint32 obfuscated_ticket_age;
} PskIdentity;

opaque PskBinderEntry<32..255>;

struct {
    PskIdentity identities<7..2^16-1>;
    PskBinderEntry binders<33..2^16-1>;
} OfferedPsk;

struct {
    select (Handshake.msg_type) {
        case client_hello: OfferedPsk;
        case server_hello: uint16 selected_identity;
    };
} PreSharedKeyExtension;
```

identity A label for a key. For instance, a ticket defined in Appendix B.3.4 or a label for a pre-shared key established externally.

obfuscated_ticket_age An obfuscated version of the age of the key. Section 4.2.11.1 describes how to form this value for identities established via the NewSessionTicket message. For identities established externally an obfuscated_ticket_age of 0 SHOULD be used, and servers MUST ignore the value.

identities A list of the identities that the client is willing to negotiate with the server. If sent alongside the "early_data" extension (see Section 4.2.10), the first identity is the one used for 0-RTT data.

binders A series of HMAC values, one for each PSK offered in the "pre_shared_keys" extension and in the same order, computed as described below.

`selected_identity` The server's chosen identity expressed as a (0-based) index into the identities in the client's list.

Each PSK is associated with a single Hash algorithm. For PSKs established via the ticket mechanism (Section 4.6.1), this is the KDF Hash algorithm on the connection where the ticket was established. For externally established PSKs, the Hash algorithm **MUST** be set when the PSK is established, or default to SHA-256 if no such algorithm is defined. The server **MUST** ensure that it selects a compatible PSK (if any) and cipher suite.

In TLS versions prior to TLS 1.3, the Server Name Identification (SNI) value was intended to be associated with the session (Section 3 of [RFC6066]), with the server being required to enforce that the SNI value associated with the session matches the one specified in the resumption handshake. However, in reality the implementations were not consistent on which of two supplied SNI values they would use, leading to the consistency requirement being de-facto enforced by the clients. In TLS 1.3, the SNI value is always explicitly specified in the resumption handshake, and there is no need for the server to associate an SNI value with the ticket. Clients, however, **SHOULD** store the SNI with the PSK to fulfill the requirements of Section 4.6.1.

Implementor's note: when session resumption is the primary use case of PSKs the most straightforward way to implement the PSK/cipher suite matching requirements is to negotiate the cipher suite first and then exclude any incompatible PSKs. Any unknown PSKs (e.g., they are not in the PSK database or are encrypted with an unknown key) **SHOULD** simply be ignored. If no acceptable PSKs are found, the server **SHOULD** perform a non-PSK handshake if possible. If backwards compatibility is important, client provided, externally established PSKs **SHOULD** influence cipher suite selection.

Prior to accepting PSK key establishment, the server **MUST** validate the corresponding binder value (see Section 4.2.11.2 below). If this value is not present or does not validate, the server **MUST** abort the handshake. Servers **SHOULD NOT** attempt to validate multiple binders; rather they **SHOULD** select a single PSK and validate solely the binder that corresponds to that PSK. See [Section 8.2] and [Appendix E.6] for the security rationale for this requirement. In order to accept PSK key establishment, the server sends a "pre_shared_key" extension indicating the selected identity.

Clients **MUST** verify that the server's `selected_identity` is within the range supplied by the client, that the server selected a cipher suite indicating a Hash associated with the PSK and that a server "key_share" extension is present if required by the ClientHello

"psk_key_exchange_modes". If these values are not consistent the client MUST abort the handshake with an "illegal_parameter" alert.

If the server supplies an "early_data" extension, the client MUST verify that the server's selected_identity is 0. If any other value is returned, the client MUST abort the handshake with an "illegal_parameter" alert.

The "pre_shared_key" extension MUST be the last extension in the ClientHello (this facilitates implementation as described below). Servers MUST check that it is the last extension and otherwise fail the handshake with an "illegal_parameter" alert.

4.2.11.1. Ticket Age

The client's view of the age of a ticket is the time since the receipt of the NewSessionTicket message. Clients MUST NOT attempt to use tickets which have ages greater than the "ticket_lifetime" value which was provided with the ticket. The "obfuscated_ticket_age" field of each PskIdentity contains an obfuscated version of the ticket age formed by taking the age in milliseconds and adding the "ticket_age_add" value that was included with the ticket (see Section 4.6.1), modulo 2^{32} . This addition prevents passive observers from correlating connections unless tickets are reused. Note that the "ticket_lifetime" field in the NewSessionTicket message is in seconds but the "obfuscated_ticket_age" is in milliseconds. Because ticket lifetimes are restricted to a week, 32 bits is enough to represent any plausible age, even in milliseconds.

4.2.11.2. PSK Binder

The PSK binder value forms a binding between a PSK and the current handshake, as well as a binding between the handshake in which the PSK was generated (if via a NewSessionTicket message) and the current handshake. Each entry in the binders list is computed as an HMAC over a transcript hash (see Section 4.4.1) containing a partial ClientHello up to and including the PreSharedKeyExtension.identities field. That is, it includes all of the ClientHello but not the binders list itself. The length fields for the message (including the overall length, the length of the extensions block, and the length of the "pre_shared_key" extension) are all set as if binders of the correct lengths were present.

The PskBinderEntry is computed in the same way as the Finished message (Section 4.4.4) but with the BaseKey being the binder_key derived via the key schedule from the corresponding PSK which is being offered (see Section 7.1).

If the handshake includes a HelloRetryRequest, the initial ClientHello and HelloRetryRequest are included in the transcript along with the new ClientHello. For instance, if the client sends ClientHello1, its binder will be computed over:

```
Transcript-Hash(Truncate(ClientHello1))
```

Where Truncate() removes the binders list from the ClientHello.

If the server responds with HelloRetryRequest, and the client then sends ClientHello2, its binder will be computed over:

```
Transcript-Hash(ClientHello1,  
                HelloRetryRequest,  
                Truncate(ClientHello2))
```

The full ClientHello1/ClientHello2 is included in all other handshake hash computations. Note that in the first flight, Truncate(ClientHello1) is hashed directly, but in the second flight, ClientHello1 is hashed and then reinjected as a "message_hash" message, as described in Section 4.4.1.

4.2.11.3. Processing Order

Clients are permitted to "stream" 0-RTT data until they receive the server's Finished, only then sending the EndOfEarlyData message, followed by the rest of the handshake. In order to avoid deadlocks, when accepting "early_data", servers MUST process the client's ClientHello and then immediately send their flight of messages, rather than waiting for the client's EndOfEarlyData message before sending its ServerHello.

4.3. Server Parameters

The next two messages from the server, EncryptedExtensions and CertificateRequest, contain information from the server that determines the rest of the handshake. These messages are encrypted with keys derived from the server_handshake_traffic_secret.

4.3.1. Encrypted Extensions

In all handshakes, the server MUST send the EncryptedExtensions message immediately after the ServerHello message. This is the first message that is encrypted under keys derived from the server_handshake_traffic_secret.

The EncryptedExtensions message contains extensions that can be protected, i.e., any which are not needed to establish the

cryptographic context, but which are not associated with individual certificates. The client MUST check EncryptedExtensions for the presence of any forbidden extensions and if any are found MUST abort the handshake with an "illegal_parameter" alert.

Structure of this message:

```
struct {
    Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>;
} EncryptedExtensions;
```

extensions A list of extensions. For more information, see the table in Section 4.2.

4.3.2. Certificate Request

A server which is authenticating with a certificate MAY optionally request a certificate from the client. This message, if sent, MUST follow EncryptedExtensions.

Structure of this message:

```
struct {
    opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>;
    Extension extensions<2..2^16-1>;
} CertificateRequest;
```

certificate_request_context An opaque string which identifies the certificate request and which will be echoed in the client's Certificate message. The certificate_request_context MUST be unique within the scope of this connection (thus preventing replay of client CertificateVerify messages). This field SHALL be zero length unless used for the post-handshake authentication exchanges described in Section 4.6.2. When requesting post-handshake authentication, the server SHOULD make the context unpredictable to the client (e.g., by randomly generating it) in order to prevent an attacker who has temporary access to the client's private key from pre-computing valid CertificateVerify messages.

extensions A set of extensions describing the parameters of the certificate being requested. The "signature_algorithms" extension MUST be specified, and other extensions may optionally be included if defined for this message. Clients MUST ignore unrecognized extensions.

In prior versions of TLS, the CertificateRequest message carried a list of signature algorithms and certificate authorities which the server would accept. In TLS 1.3 the former is expressed by sending

the "signature_algorithms" and optionally "signature_algorithms_cert" extensions. The latter is expressed by sending the "certificate_authorities" extension (see Section 4.2.4).

Servers which are authenticating with a PSK MUST NOT send the CertificateRequest message in the main handshake, though they MAY send it in post-handshake authentication (see Section 4.6.2) provided that the client has sent the "post_handshake_auth" extension (see Section 4.2.6).

4.4. Authentication Messages

As discussed in Section 2, TLS generally uses a common set of messages for authentication, key confirmation, and handshake integrity: Certificate, CertificateVerify, and Finished. (The PreSharedKey binders also perform key confirmation, in a similar fashion.) These three messages are always sent as the last messages in their handshake flight. The Certificate and CertificateVerify messages are only sent under certain circumstances, as defined below. The Finished message is always sent as part of the Authentication block. These messages are encrypted under keys derived from [sender]_handshake_traffic_secret.

The computations for the Authentication messages all uniformly take the following inputs:

- The certificate and signing key to be used.
- A Handshake Context consisting of the set of messages to be included in the transcript hash.
- A base key to be used to compute a MAC key.

Based on these inputs, the messages then contain:

Certificate The certificate to be used for authentication, and any supporting certificates in the chain. Note that certificate-based client authentication is not available in PSK (including 0-RTT) flows.

CertificateVerify A signature over the value Transcript-Hash(Handshake Context, Certificate)

Finished A MAC over the value Transcript-Hash(Handshake Context, Certificate, CertificateVerify) using a MAC key derived from the base key.

The following table defines the Handshake Context and MAC Base Key for each scenario:

Mode	Handshake Context	Base Key
Server	ClientHello ... later of EncryptedExtensions/CertificateRequest	server_handshake_traffic_secret
Client	ClientHello ... later of server Finished/EndOfEarlyData	client_handshake_traffic_secret
Post-Handshake	ClientHello ... client Finished + CertificateRequest	client_application_traffic_secret_N

4.4.1. The Transcript Hash

Many of the cryptographic computations in TLS make use of a transcript hash. This value is computed by hashing the concatenation of each included handshake message, including the handshake message header carrying the handshake message type and length fields, but not including record layer headers. I.e.,

$$\text{Transcript-Hash}(M_1, M_2, \dots, M_n) = \text{Hash}(M_1 \parallel M_2 \parallel \dots \parallel M_n)$$

As an exception to this general rule, when the server responds to a ClientHello with a HelloRetryRequest, the value of ClientHello1 is replaced with a special synthetic handshake message of handshake type "message_hash" containing Hash(ClientHello1). I.e.,

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Transcript-Hash}(\text{ClientHello1}, \text{HelloRetryRequest}, \dots, M_n) = \\ \text{Hash}(\text{message_hash} \parallel \text{ /* Handshake type */} \\ 00 \ 00 \ \text{Hash.length} \parallel \text{ /* Handshake message length (bytes) */} \\ \text{Hash}(\text{ClientHello1}) \parallel \text{ /* Hash of ClientHello1 */} \\ \text{HelloRetryRequest} \parallel \dots \parallel M_n) \end{aligned}$$

The reason for this construction is to allow the server to do a stateless HelloRetryRequest by storing just the hash of ClientHello1 in the cookie, rather than requiring it to export the entire intermediate hash state (see Section 4.2.2).

For concreteness, the transcript hash is always taken from the following sequence of handshake messages, starting at the first ClientHello and including only those messages that were sent:

ClientHello, HelloRetryRequest, ClientHello, ServerHello, EncryptedExtensions, server CertificateRequest, server Certificate, server CertificateVerify, server Finished, EndOfEarlyData, client Certificate, client CertificateVerify, client Finished.

In general, implementations can implement the transcript by keeping a running transcript hash value based on the negotiated hash. Note, however, that subsequent post-handshake authentications do not include each other, just the messages through the end of the main handshake.

4.4.2. Certificate

This message conveys the endpoint's certificate chain to the peer.

The server MUST send a Certificate message whenever the agreed-upon key exchange method uses certificates for authentication (this includes all key exchange methods defined in this document except PSK).

The client MUST send a Certificate message if and only if the server has requested client authentication via a CertificateRequest message (Section 4.3.2). If the server requests client authentication but no suitable certificate is available, the client MUST send a Certificate message containing no certificates (i.e., with the "certificate_list" field having length 0). A Finished message MUST be sent regardless of whether the Certificate message is empty.

Structure of this message:

```

/* Managed by IANA */
enum {
    X509(0),
    RawPublicKey(2),
    (255)
} CertificateType;

struct {
    select (certificate_type) {
        case RawPublicKey:
            /* From RFC 7250 ASN.1_subjectPublicKeyInfo */
            opaque ASN1_subjectPublicKeyInfo<1..2^24-1>;

        case X509:
            opaque cert_data<1..2^24-1>;
    };
    Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>;
} CertificateEntry;

struct {
    opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>;
    CertificateEntry certificate_list<0..2^24-1>;
} Certificate;

```

`certificate_request_context` If this message is in response to a `CertificateRequest`, the value of `certificate_request_context` in that message. Otherwise (in the case of server authentication), this field SHALL be zero length.

`certificate_list` This is a sequence (chain) of `CertificateEntry` structures, each containing a single certificate and set of extensions.

`extensions`: A set of extension values for the `CertificateEntry`. The "Extension" format is defined in Section 4.2. Valid extensions for server certificates at present include OCSP Status extension ([RFC6066]) and SignedCertificateTimestamps ([RFC6962]); future extensions may be defined for this message as well. Extensions in the `Certificate` message from the server MUST correspond to ones from the `ClientHello` message. Extensions in the `Certificate` from the client MUST correspond with extensions in the `CertificateRequest` message from the server. If an extension applies to the entire chain, it SHOULD be included in the first `CertificateEntry`.

If the corresponding certificate type extension ("`server_certificate_type`" or "`client_certificate_type`") was not negotiated in Encrypted Extensions, or the X.509 certificate type was

negotiated, then each CertificateEntry contains a DER-encoded X.509 certificate. The sender's certificate MUST come in the first CertificateEntry in the list. Each following certificate SHOULD directly certify the one immediately preceding it. Because certificate validation requires that trust anchors be distributed independently, a certificate that specifies a trust anchor MAY be omitted from the chain, provided that supported peers are known to possess any omitted certificates.

Note: Prior to TLS 1.3, "certificate_list" ordering required each certificate to certify the one immediately preceding it; however, some implementations allowed some flexibility. Servers sometimes send both a current and deprecated intermediate for transitional purposes, and others are simply configured incorrectly, but these cases can nonetheless be validated properly. For maximum compatibility, all implementations SHOULD be prepared to handle potentially extraneous certificates and arbitrary orderings from any TLS version, with the exception of the end-entity certificate which MUST be first.

If the RawPublicKey certificate type was negotiated, then the certificate_list MUST contain no more than one CertificateEntry, which contains an ASN1_subjectPublicKeyInfo value as defined in [RFC7250], Section 3.

The OpenPGP certificate type [RFC6091] MUST NOT be used with TLS 1.3.

The server's certificate_list MUST always be non-empty. A client will send an empty certificate_list if it does not have an appropriate certificate to send in response to the server's authentication request.

4.4.2.1. OCSP Status and SCT Extensions

[RFC6066] and [RFC6961] provide extensions to negotiate the server sending OCSP responses to the client. In TLS 1.2 and below, the server replies with an empty extension to indicate negotiation of this extension and the OCSP information is carried in a CertificateStatus message. In TLS 1.3, the server's OCSP information is carried in an extension in the CertificateEntry containing the associated certificate. Specifically: The body of the "status_request" extension from the server MUST be a CertificateStatus structure as defined in [RFC6066], which is interpreted as defined in [RFC6960].

Note: status_request_v2 extension ([RFC6961]) is deprecated. TLS 1.3 servers MUST NOT act upon its presence or information in it when processing Client Hello, in particular they MUST NOT send the

status_request_v2 extension in the Encrypted Extensions, Certificate Request or the Certificate messages. TLS 1.3 servers MUST be able to process Client Hello messages that include it, as it MAY be sent by clients that wish to use it in earlier protocol versions.

A server MAY request that a client present an OCSP response with its certificate by sending an empty "status_request" extension in its CertificateRequest message. If the client opts to send an OCSP response, the body of its "status_request" extension MUST be a CertificateStatus structure as defined in [RFC6066].

Similarly, [RFC6962] provides a mechanism for a server to send a Signed Certificate Timestamp (SCT) as an extension in the ServerHello in TLS 1.2 and below. In TLS 1.3, the server's SCT information is carried in an extension in CertificateEntry.

4.4.2.2. Server Certificate Selection

The following rules apply to the certificates sent by the server:

- The certificate type MUST be X.509v3 [RFC5280], unless explicitly negotiated otherwise (e.g., [RFC7250]).
- The server's end-entity certificate's public key (and associated restrictions) MUST be compatible with the selected authentication algorithm from the client's "signature_algorithms" extension (currently RSA, ECDSA, or EdDSA).
- The certificate MUST allow the key to be used for signing (i.e., the digitalSignature bit MUST be set if the Key Usage extension is present) with a signature scheme indicated in the client's "signature_algorithms"/"signature_algorithms_cert" extensions (see Section 4.2.3).
- The "server_name" [RFC6066] and "certificate_authorities" extensions are used to guide certificate selection. As servers MAY require the presence of the "server_name" extension, clients SHOULD send this extension, when applicable.

All certificates provided by the server MUST be signed by a signature algorithm advertised by the client, if it is able to provide such a chain (see Section 4.2.3). Certificates that are self-signed or certificates that are expected to be trust anchors are not validated as part of the chain and therefore MAY be signed with any algorithm.

If the server cannot produce a certificate chain that is signed only via the indicated supported algorithms, then it SHOULD continue the handshake by sending the client a certificate chain of its choice

that may include algorithms that are not known to be supported by the client. This fallback chain SHOULD NOT use the deprecated SHA-1 hash algorithm in general, but MAY do so if the client's advertisement permits it, and MUST NOT do so otherwise.

If the client cannot construct an acceptable chain using the provided certificates and decides to abort the handshake, then it MUST abort the handshake with an appropriate certificate-related alert (by default, "unsupported_certificate"; see Section 6.2 for more).

If the server has multiple certificates, it chooses one of them based on the above-mentioned criteria (in addition to other criteria, such as transport layer endpoint, local configuration and preferences).

4.4.2.3. Client Certificate Selection

The following rules apply to certificates sent by the client:

- The certificate type MUST be X.509v3 [RFC5280], unless explicitly negotiated otherwise (e.g., [RFC7250]).
- If the "certificate_authorities" extension in the CertificateRequest message was present, at least one of the certificates in the certificate chain SHOULD be issued by one of the listed CAs.
- The certificates MUST be signed using an acceptable signature algorithm, as described in Section 4.3.2. Note that this relaxes the constraints on certificate-signing algorithms found in prior versions of TLS.
- If the CertificateRequest message contained a non-empty "oid_filters" extension, the end-entity certificate MUST match the extension OIDs that are recognized by the client, as described in Section 4.2.5.

Note that, as with the server certificate, there are certificates that use algorithm combinations that cannot be currently used with TLS.

4.4.2.4. Receiving a Certificate Message

In general, detailed certificate validation procedures are out of scope for TLS (see [RFC5280]). This section provides TLS-specific requirements.

If the server supplies an empty Certificate message, the client MUST abort the handshake with a "decode_error" alert.

If the client does not send any certificates (i.e., it sends an empty Certificate message), the server MAY at its discretion either continue the handshake without client authentication, or abort the handshake with a "certificate_required" alert. Also, if some aspect of the certificate chain was unacceptable (e.g., it was not signed by a known, trusted CA), the server MAY at its discretion either continue the handshake (considering the client unauthenticated) or abort the handshake.

Any endpoint receiving any certificate which it would need to validate using any signature algorithm using an MD5 hash MUST abort the handshake with a "bad_certificate" alert. SHA-1 is deprecated and it is RECOMMENDED that any endpoint receiving any certificate which it would need to validate using any signature algorithm using a SHA-1 hash abort the handshake with a "bad_certificate" alert. For clarity, this means that endpoints MAY accept these algorithms for certificates that are self-signed or are trust anchors.

All endpoints are RECOMMENDED to transition to SHA-256 or better as soon as possible to maintain interoperability with implementations currently in the process of phasing out SHA-1 support.

Note that a certificate containing a key for one signature algorithm MAY be signed using a different signature algorithm (for instance, an RSA key signed with an ECDSA key).

4.4.3. Certificate Verify

This message is used to provide explicit proof that an endpoint possesses the private key corresponding to its certificate. The CertificateVerify message also provides integrity for the handshake up to this point. Servers MUST send this message when authenticating via a certificate. Clients MUST send this message whenever authenticating via a certificate (i.e., when the Certificate message is non-empty). When sent, this message MUST appear immediately after the Certificate message and immediately prior to the Finished message.

Structure of this message:

```
struct {
    SignatureScheme algorithm;
    opaque signature<0..2^16-1>;
} CertificateVerify;
```

The algorithm field specifies the signature algorithm used (see Section 4.2.3 for the definition of this field). The signature is a digital signature using that algorithm. The content that is covered

extension unless no valid certificate chain can be produced without unsupported algorithms (see Section 4.2.3).

If sent by a client, the signature algorithm used in the signature MUST be one of those present in the `supported_signature_algorithms` field of the "signature_algorithms" extension in the `CertificateRequest` message.

In addition, the signature algorithm MUST be compatible with the key in the sender's end-entity certificate. RSA signatures MUST use an RSASSA-PSS algorithm, regardless of whether RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 algorithms appear in "signature_algorithms". The SHA-1 algorithm MUST NOT be used in any signatures of `CertificateVerify` messages. All SHA-1 signature algorithms in this specification are defined solely for use in legacy certificates and are not valid for `CertificateVerify` signatures.

The receiver of a `CertificateVerify` message MUST verify the signature field. The verification process takes as input:

- The content covered by the digital signature
- The public key contained in the end-entity certificate found in the associated `Certificate` message.
- The digital signature received in the signature field of the `CertificateVerify` message

If the verification fails, the receiver MUST terminate the handshake with a "decrypt_error" alert.

4.4.4. Finished

The `Finished` message is the final message in the authentication block. It is essential for providing authentication of the handshake and of the computed keys.

Recipients of `Finished` messages MUST verify that the contents are correct and if incorrect MUST terminate the connection with a "decrypt_error" alert.

Once a side has sent its `Finished` message and received and validated the `Finished` message from its peer, it may begin to send and receive application data over the connection. There are two settings in which it is permitted to send data prior to receiving the peer's `Finished`:

1. Clients sending 0-RTT data as described in Section 4.2.10.

2. Servers MAY send data after sending their first flight, but because the handshake is not yet complete, they have no assurance of either the peer's identity or of its liveness (i.e., the ClientHello might have been replayed).

The key used to compute the Finished message is computed from the Base key defined in Section 4.4 using HKDF (see Section 7.1). Specifically:

```
finished_key =  
    HKDF-Expand-Label(BaseKey, "finished", "", Hash.length)
```

Structure of this message:

```
struct {  
    opaque verify_data[Hash.length];  
} Finished;
```

The verify_data value is computed as follows:

```
verify_data =  
    HMAC(finished_key,  
        Transcript-Hash(Handshake Context,  
                        Certificate*, CertificateVerify*))
```

* Only included if present.

HMAC [RFC2104] uses the Hash algorithm for the handshake. As noted above, the HMAC input can generally be implemented by a running hash, i.e., just the handshake hash at this point.

In previous versions of TLS, the verify_data was always 12 octets long. In TLS 1.3, it is the size of the HMAC output for the Hash used for the handshake.

Note: Alerts and any other record types are not handshake messages and are not included in the hash computations.

Any records following a Finished message MUST be encrypted under the appropriate application traffic key as described in Section 7.2. In particular, this includes any alerts sent by the server in response to client Certificate and CertificateVerify messages.

4.5. End of Early Data

```
struct {} EndOfEarlyData;
```

If the server sent an "early_data" extension, the client MUST send an EndOfEarlyData message after receiving the server Finished. If the server does not send an "early_data" extension, then the client MUST NOT send an EndOfEarlyData message. This message indicates that all 0-RTT application_data messages, if any, have been transmitted and that the following records are protected under handshake traffic keys. Servers MUST NOT send this message and clients receiving it MUST terminate the connection with an "unexpected_message" alert. This message is encrypted under keys derived from the client_early_traffic_secret.

4.6. Post-Handshake Messages

TLS also allows other messages to be sent after the main handshake. These messages use a handshake content type and are encrypted under the appropriate application traffic key.

4.6.1. New Session Ticket Message

At any time after the server has received the client Finished message, it MAY send a NewSessionTicket message. This message creates a unique association between the ticket value and a secret PSK derived from the resumption master secret (see Section 7).

The client MAY use this PSK for future handshakes by including the ticket value in the "pre_shared_key" extension in its ClientHello (Section 4.2.11). Servers MAY send multiple tickets on a single connection, either immediately after each other or after specific events (see Appendix C.4). For instance, the server might send a new ticket after post-handshake authentication in order to encapsulate the additional client authentication state. Multiple tickets are useful for clients for a variety of purposes, including:

- Opening multiple parallel HTTP connections.
- Performing connection racing across interfaces and address families via, e.g., Happy Eyeballs [RFC8305] or related techniques.

Any ticket MUST only be resumed with a cipher suite that has the same KDF hash algorithm as that used to establish the original connection.

Clients MUST only resume if the new SNI value is valid for the server certificate presented in the original session, and SHOULD only resume if the SNI value matches the one used in the original session. The latter is a performance optimization: normally, there is no reason to expect that different servers covered by a single certificate would be able to accept each other's tickets, hence attempting resumption

in that case would waste a single-use ticket. If such an indication is provided (externally or by any other means), clients MAY resume with a different SNI value.

On resumption, if reporting an SNI value to the calling application, implementations MUST use the value sent in the resumption ClientHello rather than the value sent in the previous session. Note that if a server implementation declines all PSK identities with different SNI values, these two values are always the same.

Note: Although the resumption master secret depends on the client's second flight, servers which do not request client authentication MAY compute the remainder of the transcript independently and then send a NewSessionTicket immediately upon sending its Finished rather than waiting for the client Finished. This might be appropriate in cases where the client is expected to open multiple TLS connections in parallel and would benefit from the reduced overhead of a resumption handshake, for example.

```
struct {
    uint32 ticket_lifetime;
    uint32 ticket_age_add;
    opaque ticket_nonce<0..255>;
    opaque ticket<1..2^16-1>;
    Extension extensions<0..2^16-2>;
} NewSessionTicket;
```

`ticket_lifetime` Indicates the lifetime in seconds as a 32-bit unsigned integer in network byte order from the time of ticket issuance. Servers MUST NOT use any value greater than 604800 seconds (7 days). The value of zero indicates that the ticket should be discarded immediately. Clients MUST NOT cache tickets for longer than 7 days, regardless of the `ticket_lifetime`, and MAY delete tickets earlier based on local policy. A server MAY treat a ticket as valid for a shorter period of time than what is stated in the `ticket_lifetime`.

`ticket_age_add` A securely generated, random 32-bit value that is used to obscure the age of the ticket that the client includes in the "pre_shared_key" extension. The client-side ticket age is added to this value modulo 2^{32} to obtain the value that is transmitted by the client. The server MUST generate a fresh value for each ticket it sends.

`ticket_nonce` A per-ticket value that is unique across all tickets issued on this connection.

ticket The value of the ticket to be used as the PSK identity. The ticket itself is an opaque label. It MAY either be a database lookup key or a self-encrypted and self-authenticated value. Section 4 of [RFC5077] describes a recommended ticket construction mechanism.

extensions A set of extension values for the ticket. The "Extension" format is defined in Section 4.2. Clients MUST ignore unrecognized extensions.

The sole extension currently defined for NewSessionTicket is "early_data", indicating that the ticket may be used to send 0-RTT data (Section 4.2.10). It contains the following value:

max_early_data_size The maximum amount of 0-RTT data that the client is allowed to send when using this ticket, in bytes. Only Application Data payload (i.e., plaintext but not padding or the inner content type byte) is counted. A server receiving more than max_early_data_size bytes of 0-RTT data SHOULD terminate the connection with an "unexpected_message" alert. Note that servers that reject early data due to lack of cryptographic material will be unable to differentiate padding from content, so clients SHOULD NOT depend on being able to send large quantities of padding in early data records.

The PSK associated with the ticket is computed as:

```
HKDF-Expand-Label(resumption_master_secret,  
                  "resumption", ticket_nonce, Hash.length)
```

Because the ticket_nonce value is distinct for each NewSessionTicket message, a different PSK will be derived for each ticket.

Note that in principle it is possible to continue issuing new tickets which indefinitely extend the lifetime of the keying material originally derived from an initial non-PSK handshake (which was most likely tied to the peer's certificate). It is RECOMMENDED that implementations place limits on the total lifetime of such keying material; these limits should take into account the lifetime of the peer's certificate, the likelihood of intervening revocation, and the time since the peer's online CertificateVerify signature.

4.6.2. Post-Handshake Authentication

When the client has sent the "post_handshake_auth" extension (see Section 4.2.6), a server MAY request client authentication at any time after the handshake has completed by sending a CertificateRequest message. The client MUST respond with the

appropriate Authentication messages (see Section 4.4). If the client chooses to authenticate, it MUST send Certificate, CertificateVerify, and Finished. If it declines, it MUST send a Certificate message containing no certificates followed by Finished. All of the client's messages for a given response MUST appear consecutively on the wire with no intervening messages of other types.

A client that receives a CertificateRequest message without having sent the "post_handshake_auth" extension MUST send an "unexpected_message" fatal alert.

Note: Because client authentication could involve prompting the user, servers MUST be prepared for some delay, including receiving an arbitrary number of other messages between sending the CertificateRequest and receiving a response. In addition, clients which receive multiple CertificateRequests in close succession MAY respond to them in a different order than they were received (the certificate_request_context value allows the server to disambiguate the responses).

4.6.3. Key and IV Update

```
enum {  
    update_not_requested(0), update_requested(1), (255)  
} KeyUpdateRequest;
```

```
struct {  
    KeyUpdateRequest request_update;  
} KeyUpdate;
```

request_update Indicates whether the recipient of the KeyUpdate should respond with its own KeyUpdate. If an implementation receives any other value, it MUST terminate the connection with an "illegal_parameter" alert.

The KeyUpdate handshake message is used to indicate that the sender is updating its sending cryptographic keys. This message can be sent by either peer after it has sent a Finished message. Implementations that receive a KeyUpdate message prior to receiving a Finished message MUST terminate the connection with an "unexpected_message" alert. After sending a KeyUpdate message, the sender SHALL send all its traffic using the next generation of keys, computed as described in Section 7.2. Upon receiving a KeyUpdate, the receiver MUST update its receiving keys.

If the request_update field is set to "update_requested" then the receiver MUST send a KeyUpdate of its own with request_update set to "update_not_requested" prior to sending its next application data

record. This mechanism allows either side to force an update to the entire connection, but causes an implementation which receives multiple KeyUpdates while it is silent to respond with a single update. Note that implementations may receive an arbitrary number of messages between sending a KeyUpdate with `request_update` set to `update_requested` and receiving the peer's KeyUpdate, because those messages may already be in flight. However, because send and receive keys are derived from independent traffic secrets, retaining the receive traffic secret does not threaten the forward secrecy of data sent before the sender changed keys.

If implementations independently send their own KeyUpdates with `request_update` set to `update_requested`, and they cross in flight, then each side will also send a response, with the result that each side increments by two generations.

Both sender and receiver MUST encrypt their KeyUpdate messages with the old keys. Additionally, both sides MUST enforce that a KeyUpdate with the old key is received before accepting any messages encrypted with the new key. Failure to do so may allow message truncation attacks.

5. Record Protocol

The TLS record protocol takes messages to be transmitted, fragments the data into manageable blocks, protects the records, and transmits the result. Received data is verified, decrypted, reassembled, and then delivered to higher-level clients.

TLS records are typed, which allows multiple higher-level protocols to be multiplexed over the same record layer. This document specifies four content types: handshake, application data, alert, and `change_cipher_spec`. The `change_cipher_spec` record is used only for compatibility purposes (see Appendix D.4).

An implementation may receive an unencrypted record of type `change_cipher_spec` consisting of the single byte value `0x01` at any time after the first ClientHello message has been sent or received and before the peer's Finished message has been received and MUST simply drop it without further processing. Note that this record may appear at a point at the handshake where the implementation is expecting protected records and so it is necessary to detect this condition prior to attempting to deprotect the record. An implementation which receives any other `change_cipher_spec` value or which receives a protected `change_cipher_spec` record MUST abort the handshake with an "unexpected_message" alert. A `change_cipher_spec` record received before the first ClientHello message or after the peer's Finished message MUST be treated as an unexpected record type

(though stateless servers may not be able to distinguish these cases from allowed cases).

Implementations MUST NOT send record types not defined in this document unless negotiated by some extension. If a TLS implementation receives an unexpected record type, it MUST terminate the connection with an "unexpected_message" alert. New record content type values are assigned by IANA in the TLS Content Type Registry as described in Section 11.

5.1. Record Layer

The record layer fragments information blocks into TLSPlaintext records carrying data in chunks of 2^{14} bytes or less. Message boundaries are handled differently depending on the underlying ContentType. Any future content types MUST specify appropriate rules. Note that these rules are stricter than what was enforced in TLS 1.2.

Handshake messages MAY be coalesced into a single TLSPlaintext record or fragmented across several records, provided that:

- Handshake messages MUST NOT be interleaved with other record types. That is, if a handshake message is split over two or more records, there MUST NOT be any other records between them.
- Handshake messages MUST NOT span key changes. Implementations MUST verify that all messages immediately preceding a key change align with a record boundary; if not, then they MUST terminate the connection with an "unexpected_message" alert. Because the ClientHello, EndOfEarlyData, ServerHello, Finished, and KeyUpdate messages can immediately precede a key change, implementations MUST send these messages in alignment with a record boundary.

Implementations MUST NOT send zero-length fragments of Handshake types, even if those fragments contain padding.

Alert messages (Section 6) MUST NOT be fragmented across records and multiple Alert messages MUST NOT be coalesced into a single TLSPlaintext record. In other words, a record with an Alert type MUST contain exactly one message.

Application Data messages contain data that is opaque to TLS. Application Data messages are always protected. Zero-length fragments of Application Data MAY be sent as they are potentially useful as a traffic analysis countermeasure. Application Data fragments MAY be split across multiple records or coalesced into a single record.

```
enum {
    invalid(0),
    change_cipher_spec(20),
    alert(21),
    handshake(22),
    application_data(23),
    (255)
} ContentType;

struct {
    ContentType type;
    ProtocolVersion legacy_record_version;
    uint16 length;
    opaque fragment[TLSPplaintext.length];
} TLSPplaintext;
```

`type` The higher-level protocol used to process the enclosed fragment.

`legacy_record_version` This value MUST be set to 0x0303 for all records generated by a TLS 1.3 implementation other than an initial ClientHello (i.e., one not generated after a HelloRetryRequest), where it MAY also be 0x0301 for compatibility purposes. This field is deprecated and MUST be ignored for all purposes. Previous versions of TLS would use other values in this field under some circumstances.

`length` The length (in bytes) of the following TLSPplaintext.fragment. The length MUST NOT exceed 2^{14} bytes. An endpoint that receives a record that exceeds this length MUST terminate the connection with a "record_overflow" alert.

`fragment` The data being transmitted. This value is transparent and is treated as an independent block to be dealt with by the higher-level protocol specified by the `type` field.

This document describes TLS 1.3, which uses the version 0x0304. This version value is historical, deriving from the use of 0x0301 for TLS 1.0 and 0x0300 for SSL 3.0. In order to maximize backwards compatibility, records containing an initial ClientHello SHOULD have version 0x0301 and a record containing a second ClientHello or a ServerHello MUST have version 0x0303, reflecting TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.2 respectively. When negotiating prior versions of TLS, endpoints follow the procedure and requirements in Appendix D.

When record protection has not yet been engaged, TLSPplaintext structures are written directly onto the wire. Once record protection has started, TLSPplaintext records are protected and sent

as described in the following section. Note that application data records MUST NOT be written to the wire unprotected (see Section 2 for details).

5.2. Record Payload Protection

The record protection functions translate a `TLSP plaintext` structure into a `TLSCiphertext`. The deprotection functions reverse the process. In TLS 1.3, as opposed to previous versions of TLS, all ciphers are modeled as "Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data" (AEAD) [RFC5116]. AEAD functions provide a unified encryption and authentication operation which turns plaintext into authenticated ciphertext and back again. Each encrypted record consists of a plaintext header followed by an encrypted body, which itself contains a type and optional padding.

```
struct {
    opaque content[TLSP plaintext.length];
    ContentType type;
    uint8 zeros[length_of_padding];
} TLSInnerPlaintext;

struct {
    ContentType opaque_type = application_data; /* 23 */
    ProtocolVersion legacy_record_version = 0x0303; /* TLS v1.2 */
    uint16 length;
    opaque encrypted_record[TLSCiphertext.length];
} TLSCiphertext;
```

`content` The `TLSP plaintext.fragment` value, containing the byte encoding of a handshake or an alert message, or the raw bytes of the application's data to send.

`type` The `TLSP plaintext.type` value containing the content type of the record.

`zeros` An arbitrary-length run of zero-valued bytes may appear in the cleartext after the type field. This provides an opportunity for senders to pad any TLS record by a chosen amount as long as the total stays within record size limits. See Section 5.4 for more details.

`opaque_type` The outer `opaque_type` field of a `TLSCiphertext` record is always set to the value 23 (`application_data`) for outward compatibility with middleboxes accustomed to parsing previous versions of TLS. The actual content type of the record is found in `TLSInnerPlaintext.type` after decryption.

`legacy_record_version` The `legacy_record_version` field is always 0x0303. TLS 1.3 TLSCiphertexts are not generated until after TLS 1.3 has been negotiated, so there are no historical compatibility concerns where other values might be received. Note that the handshake protocol including the ClientHello and ServerHello messages authenticates the protocol version, so this value is redundant.

`length` The length (in bytes) of the following TLSCiphertext.encrypted_record, which is the sum of the lengths of the content and the padding, plus one for the inner content type, plus any expansion added by the AEAD algorithm. The length MUST NOT exceed $2^{14} + 256$ bytes. An endpoint that receives a record that exceeds this length MUST terminate the connection with a "record_overflow" alert.

`encrypted_record` The AEAD-encrypted form of the serialized TLSInnerPlaintext structure.

AEAD algorithms take as input a single key, a nonce, a plaintext, and "additional data" to be included in the authentication check, as described in Section 2.1 of [RFC5116]. The key is either the `client_write_key` or the `server_write_key`, the nonce is derived from the sequence number and the `client_write_iv` or `server_write_iv` (see Section 5.3), and the additional data input is the record header. I.e.,

```
additional_data = TLSCiphertext.opaque_type ||
                  TLSCiphertext.legacy_record_version ||
                  TLSCiphertext.length
```

The plaintext input to the AEAD algorithm is the encoded TLSInnerPlaintext structure. Derivation of traffic keys is defined in Section 7.3.

The AEAD output consists of the ciphertext output from the AEAD encryption operation. The length of the plaintext is greater than the corresponding TLSPlaintext.length due to the inclusion of TLSInnerPlaintext.type and any padding supplied by the sender. The length of the AEAD output will generally be larger than the plaintext, but by an amount that varies with the AEAD algorithm. Since the ciphers might incorporate padding, the amount of overhead could vary with different lengths of plaintext. Symbolically,

```
AEADEncrypted =
    AEAD-Encrypt(write_key, nonce, additional_data, plaintext)
```

Then the `encrypted_record` field of `TLSCiphertext` is set to `AEADEncrypted`.

In order to decrypt and verify, the cipher takes as input the key, nonce, additional data, and the `AEADEncrypted` value. The output is either the plaintext or an error indicating that the decryption failed. There is no separate integrity check. That is:

```
plaintext of encrypted_record =  
    AEAD-Decrypt(peer_write_key, nonce, additional_data, AEADEncrypted)
```

If the decryption fails, the receiver MUST terminate the connection with a `"bad_record_mac"` alert.

An AEAD algorithm used in TLS 1.3 MUST NOT produce an expansion greater than 255 octets. An endpoint that receives a record from its peer with `TLSCiphertext.length` larger than $2^{14} + 256$ octets MUST terminate the connection with a `"record_overflow"` alert. This limit is derived from the maximum `TLSInnerPlaintext` length of 2^{14} octets + 1 octet for `ContentType` + the maximum AEAD expansion of 255 octets.

5.3. Per-Record Nonce

A 64-bit sequence number is maintained separately for reading and writing records. The appropriate sequence number is incremented by one after reading or writing each record. Each sequence number is set to zero at the beginning of a connection and whenever the key is changed; the first record transmitted under a particular traffic key MUST use sequence number 0.

Because the size of sequence numbers is 64-bit, they should not wrap. If a TLS implementation would need to wrap a sequence number, it MUST either re-key (Section 4.6.3) or terminate the connection.

Each AEAD algorithm will specify a range of possible lengths for the per-record nonce, from `N_MIN` bytes to `N_MAX` bytes of input ([RFC5116]). The length of the TLS per-record nonce (`iv_length`) is set to the larger of 8 bytes and `N_MIN` for the AEAD algorithm (see [RFC5116] Section 4). An AEAD algorithm where `N_MAX` is less than 8 bytes MUST NOT be used with TLS. The per-record nonce for the AEAD construction is formed as follows:

1. The 64-bit record sequence number is encoded in network byte order and padded to the left with zeros to `iv_length`.
2. The padded sequence number is XORed with the static `client_write_iv` or `server_write_iv`, depending on the role.

The resulting quantity (of length `iv_length`) is used as the per-record nonce.

Note: This is a different construction from that in TLS 1.2, which specified a partially explicit nonce.

5.4. Record Padding

All encrypted TLS records can be padded to inflate the size of the `TLSCiphertext`. This allows the sender to hide the size of the traffic from an observer.

When generating a `TLSCiphertext` record, implementations MAY choose to pad. An unpadded record is just a record with a padding length of zero. Padding is a string of zero-valued bytes appended to the `ContentType` field before encryption. Implementations MUST set the padding octets to all zeros before encrypting.

Application Data records may contain a zero-length `TLSInnerPlaintext.content` if the sender desires. This permits generation of plausibly-sized cover traffic in contexts where the presence or absence of activity may be sensitive. Implementations MUST NOT send Handshake or Alert records that have a zero-length `TLSInnerPlaintext.content`; if such a message is received, the receiving implementation MUST terminate the connection with an "unexpected_message" alert.

The padding sent is automatically verified by the record protection mechanism; upon successful decryption of a `TLSCiphertext.encrypted_record`, the receiving implementation scans the field from the end toward the beginning until it finds a non-zero octet. This non-zero octet is the content type of the message. This padding scheme was selected because it allows padding of any encrypted TLS record by an arbitrary size (from zero up to TLS record size limits) without introducing new content types. The design also enforces all-zero padding octets, which allows for quick detection of padding errors.

Implementations MUST limit their scanning to the cleartext returned from the AEAD decryption. If a receiving implementation does not find a non-zero octet in the cleartext, it MUST terminate the connection with an "unexpected_message" alert.

The presence of padding does not change the overall record size limitations - the full encoded `TLSInnerPlaintext` MUST NOT exceed $2^{14} + 1$ octets. If the maximum fragment length is reduced, as for example by the `max_fragment_length` extension from [RFC6066], then the

reduced limit applies to the full plaintext, including the content type and padding.

Selecting a padding policy that suggests when and how much to pad is a complex topic and is beyond the scope of this specification. If the application layer protocol on top of TLS has its own padding, it may be preferable to pad application_data TLS records within the application layer. Padding for encrypted handshake and alert TLS records must still be handled at the TLS layer, though. Later documents may define padding selection algorithms or define a padding policy request mechanism through TLS extensions or some other means.

5.5. Limits on Key Usage

There are cryptographic limits on the amount of plaintext which can be safely encrypted under a given set of keys. [AEAD-LIMITS] provides an analysis of these limits under the assumption that the underlying primitive (AES or ChaCha20) has no weaknesses. Implementations SHOULD do a key update as described in Section 4.6.3 prior to reaching these limits.

For AES-GCM, up to $2^{24.5}$ full-size records (about 24 million) may be encrypted on a given connection while keeping a safety margin of approximately 2^{-57} for Authenticated Encryption (AE) security. For ChaCha20/Poly1305, the record sequence number would wrap before the safety limit is reached.

6. Alert Protocol

One of the content types supported by the TLS record layer is the alert type. Like other messages, alert messages are encrypted as specified by the current connection state.

Alert messages convey a description of the alert and a legacy field that conveyed the severity of the message in previous versions of TLS. Alerts are divided into two classes: closure alerts and error alerts. In TLS 1.3, the severity is implicit in the type of alert being sent, and the 'level' field can safely be ignored. The "close_notify" alert is used to indicate orderly closure of one direction of the connection. Upon receiving such an alert, the TLS implementation SHOULD indicate end-of-data to the application.

Error alerts indicate abortive closure of the connection (see Section 6.2). Upon receiving an error alert, the TLS implementation SHOULD indicate an error to the application and MUST NOT allow any further data to be sent or received on the connection. Servers and clients MUST forget the secret values and keys established in failed

connections, with the exception of the PSKs associated with session tickets, which SHOULD be discarded if possible.

All the alerts listed in Section 6.2 MUST be sent with `AlertLevel=fatal` and MUST be treated as error alerts regardless of the `AlertLevel` in the message. Unknown alert types MUST be treated as error alerts.

Note: TLS defines two generic alerts (see Section 6) to use upon failure to parse a message. Peers which receive a message which cannot be parsed according to the syntax (e.g., have a length extending beyond the message boundary or contain an out-of-range length) MUST terminate the connection with a `"decode_error"` alert. Peers which receive a message which is syntactically correct but semantically invalid (e.g., a DHE share of $p - 1$, or an invalid enum) MUST terminate the connection with an `"illegal_parameter"` alert.


```
enum { warning(1), fatal(2), (255) } AlertLevel;

enum {
    close_notify(0),
    unexpected_message(10),
    bad_record_mac(20),
    record_overflow(22),
    handshake_failure(40),
    bad_certificate(42),
    unsupported_certificate(43),
    certificate_revoked(44),
    certificate_expired(45),
    certificate_unknown(46),
    illegal_parameter(47),
    unknown_ca(48),
    access_denied(49),
    decode_error(50),
    decrypt_error(51),
    protocol_version(70),
    insufficient_security(71),
    internal_error(80),
    inappropriate_fallback(86),
    user_canceled(90),
    missing_extension(109),
    unsupported_extension(110),
    unrecognized_name(112),
    bad_certificate_status_response(113),
    unknown_psk_identity(115),
    certificate_required(116),
    no_application_protocol(120),
    (255)
} AlertDescription;

struct {
    AlertLevel level;
    AlertDescription description;
} Alert;
```

6.1. Closure Alerts

The client and the server must share knowledge that the connection is ending in order to avoid a truncation attack.

`close_notify` This alert notifies the recipient that the sender will not send any more messages on this connection. Any data received after a closure alert has been received MUST be ignored.

`user_canceled` This alert notifies the recipient that the sender is canceling the handshake for some reason unrelated to a protocol failure. If a user cancels an operation after the handshake is complete, just closing the connection by sending a `"close_notify"` is more appropriate. This alert SHOULD be followed by a `"close_notify"`. This alert generally has `AlertLevel=warning`.

Either party MAY initiate a close of its write side of the connection by sending a `"close_notify"` alert. Any data received after a closure alert has been received MUST be ignored. If a transport-level close is received prior to a `"close_notify"`, the receiver cannot know that all the data that was sent has been received.

Each party MUST send a `"close_notify"` alert before closing its write side of the connection, unless it has already sent some error alert. This does not have any effect on its read side of the connection. Note that this is a change from versions of TLS prior to TLS 1.3 in which implementations were required to react to a `"close_notify"` by discarding pending writes and sending an immediate `"close_notify"` alert of their own. That previous requirement could cause truncation in the read side. Both parties need not wait to receive a `"close_notify"` alert before closing their read side of the connection, though doing so would introduce the possibility of truncation.

If the application protocol using TLS provides that any data may be carried over the underlying transport after the TLS connection is closed, the TLS implementation MUST receive a `"close_notify"` alert before indicating end-of-data to the application-layer. No part of this standard should be taken to dictate the manner in which a usage profile for TLS manages its data transport, including when connections are opened or closed.

Note: It is assumed that closing the write side of a connection reliably delivers pending data before destroying the transport.

6.2. Error Alerts

Error handling in the TLS Handshake Protocol is very simple. When an error is detected, the detecting party sends a message to its peer. Upon transmission or receipt of a fatal alert message, both parties MUST immediately close the connection.

Whenever an implementation encounters a fatal error condition, it SHOULD send an appropriate fatal alert and MUST close the connection without sending or receiving any additional data. In the rest of this specification, when the phrases "terminate the connection" and "abort the handshake" are used without a specific alert it means that

the implementation SHOULD send the alert indicated by the descriptions below. The phrases "terminate the connection with a X alert" and "abort the handshake with a X alert" mean that the implementation MUST send alert X if it sends any alert. All alerts defined in this section below, as well as all unknown alerts, are universally considered fatal as of TLS 1.3 (see Section 6). The implementation SHOULD provide a way to facilitate logging the sending and receiving of alerts.

The following error alerts are defined:

`unexpected_message` An inappropriate message (e.g., the wrong handshake message, premature application data, etc.) was received. This alert should never be observed in communication between proper implementations.

`bad_record_mac` This alert is returned if a record is received which cannot be deprotected. Because AEAD algorithms combine decryption and verification, and also to avoid side channel attacks, this alert is used for all deprotection failures. This alert should never be observed in communication between proper implementations, except when messages were corrupted in the network.

`record_overflow` A TLSCiphertext record was received that had a length more than $2^{14} + 256$ bytes, or a record decrypted to a TLSPlaintext record with more than 2^{14} bytes (or some other negotiated limit). This alert should never be observed in communication between proper implementations, except when messages were corrupted in the network.

`handshake_failure` Receipt of a "handshake_failure" alert message indicates that the sender was unable to negotiate an acceptable set of security parameters given the options available.

`bad_certificate` A certificate was corrupt, contained signatures that did not verify correctly, etc.

`unsupported_certificate` A certificate was of an unsupported type.

`certificate_revoked` A certificate was revoked by its signer.

`certificate_expired` A certificate has expired or is not currently valid.

`certificate_unknown` Some other (unspecified) issue arose in processing the certificate, rendering it unacceptable.

- `illegal_parameter` A field in the handshake was incorrect or inconsistent with other fields. This alert is used for errors which conform to the formal protocol syntax but are otherwise incorrect.
- `unknown_ca` A valid certificate chain or partial chain was received, but the certificate was not accepted because the CA certificate could not be located or could not be matched with a known trust anchor.
- `access_denied` A valid certificate or PSK was received, but when access control was applied, the sender decided not to proceed with negotiation.
- `decode_error` A message could not be decoded because some field was out of the specified range or the length of the message was incorrect. This alert is used for errors where the message does not conform to the formal protocol syntax. This alert should never be observed in communication between proper implementations, except when messages were corrupted in the network.
- `decrypt_error` A handshake (not record-layer) cryptographic operation failed, including being unable to correctly verify a signature or validate a Finished message or a PSK binder.
- `protocol_version` The protocol version the peer has attempted to negotiate is recognized but not supported. (see Appendix D)
- `insufficient_security` Returned instead of "handshake_failure" when a negotiation has failed specifically because the server requires parameters more secure than those supported by the client.
- `internal_error` An internal error unrelated to the peer or the correctness of the protocol (such as a memory allocation failure) makes it impossible to continue.
- `inappropriate_fallback` Sent by a server in response to an invalid connection retry attempt from a client (see [RFC7507]).
- `missing_extension` Sent by endpoints that receive a handshake message not containing an extension that is mandatory to send for the offered TLS version or other negotiated parameters.
- `unsupported_extension` Sent by endpoints receiving any handshake message containing an extension known to be prohibited for inclusion in the given handshake message, or including any extensions in a ServerHello or Certificate not first offered in the corresponding ClientHello.

`unrecognized_name` Sent by servers when no server exists identified by the name provided by the client via the `"server_name"` extension (see [RFC6066]).

`bad_certificate_status_response` Sent by clients when an invalid or unacceptable OCSP response is provided by the server via the `"status_request"` extension (see [RFC6066]).

`unknown_psk_identity` Sent by servers when PSK key establishment is desired but no acceptable PSK identity is provided by the client. Sending this alert is OPTIONAL; servers MAY instead choose to send a `"decrypt_error"` alert to merely indicate an invalid PSK identity.

`certificate_required` Sent by servers when a client certificate is desired but none was provided by the client.

`no_application_protocol` Sent by servers when a client `"application_layer_protocol_negotiation"` extension advertises only protocols that the server does not support (see [RFC7301]).

New Alert values are assigned by IANA as described in Section 11.

7. Cryptographic Computations

The TLS handshake establishes one or more input secrets which are combined to create the actual working keying material, as detailed below. The key derivation process incorporates both the input secrets and the handshake transcript. Note that because the handshake transcript includes the random values from the Hello messages, any given handshake will have different traffic secrets, even if the same input secrets are used, as is the case when the same PSK is used for multiple connections.

7.1. Key Schedule

The key derivation process makes use of the HKDF-Extract and HKDF-Expand functions as defined for HKDF [RFC5869], as well as the functions defined below:

```
HKDF-Expand-Label(Secret, Label, Context, Length) =
    HKDF-Expand(Secret, HkdfLabel, Length)
```

Where HkdfLabel is specified as:

```
struct {
    uint16 length = Length;
    opaque label<7..255> = "tls13 " + Label;
    opaque context<0..255> = Context;
} HkdfLabel;
```

```
Derive-Secret(Secret, Label, Messages) =
    HKDF-Expand-Label(Secret, Label,
        Transcript-Hash(Messages), Hash.length)
```

The Hash function used by Transcript-Hash and HKDF is the cipher suite hash algorithm. Hash.length is its output length in bytes. Messages is the concatenation of the indicated handshake messages, including the handshake message type and length fields, but not including record layer headers. Note that in some cases a zero-length Context (indicated by "") is passed to HKDF-Expand-Label. The Labels specified in this document are all ASCII strings, and do not include a trailing NUL byte.

Note: with common hash functions, any label longer than 12 characters requires an additional iteration of the hash function to compute. The labels in this specification have all been chosen to fit within this limit.


Keys are derived from two input secrets using the HKDF-Extract and Derive-Secret functions. The general pattern for adding a new secret is to use HKDF-Extract with the salt being the current secret state and the IKM being the new secret to be added. In this version of TLS 1.3, the two input secrets are:

- PSK (a pre-shared key established externally or derived from the resumption_master_secret value from a previous connection)
- (EC)DHE shared secret (Section 7.4)

This produces a full key derivation schedule shown in the diagram below. In this diagram, the following formatting conventions apply:

- HKDF-Extract is drawn as taking the Salt argument from the top and the IKM argument from the left, with its output to the bottom and the name of the output on the right.

- Derive-Secret's Secret argument is indicated by the incoming arrow. For instance, the Early Secret is the Secret for generating the `client_early_traffic_secret`.
- "0" indicates a string of Hash-lengths bytes set to 0.



```

|
| ClientHello...server Finished)
| = server_application_traffic_secret_0
+-----> Derive-Secret(., "exp master",
| ClientHello...server Finished)
| = exporter_master_secret
+-----> Derive-Secret(., "res master",
| ClientHello...client Finished)
| = resumption_master_secret

```

The general pattern here is that the secrets shown down the left side of the diagram are just raw entropy without context, whereas the secrets down the right side include handshake context and therefore can be used to derive working keys without additional context. Note that the different calls to `Derive-Secret` may take different Messages arguments, even with the same secret. In a 0-RTT exchange, `Derive-Secret` is called with four distinct transcripts; in a 1-RTT-only exchange with three distinct transcripts.

If a given secret is not available, then the 0-value consisting of a string of `Hash.length` bytes set to zeros is used. Note that this does not mean skipping rounds, so if PSK is not in use Early Secret will still be `HKDF-Extract(0, 0)`. For the computation of the `binder_secret`, the label is "ext binder" for external PSKs (those provisioned outside of TLS) and "res binder" for resumption PSKs (those provisioned as the resumption master secret of a previous handshake). The different labels prevent the substitution of one type of PSK for the other.

There are multiple potential Early Secret values depending on which PSK the server ultimately selects. The client will need to compute one for each potential PSK; if no PSK is selected, it will then need to compute the early secret corresponding to the zero PSK.

Once all the values which are to be derived from a given secret have been computed, that secret SHOULD be erased.

7.2. Updating Traffic Secrets

Once the handshake is complete, it is possible for either side to update its sending traffic keys using the `KeyUpdate` handshake message defined in Section 4.6.3. The next generation of traffic keys is computed by generating `client_/server_application_traffic_secret_{N+1}` from `client_/server_application_traffic_secret_{N}` as described in this section then re-deriving the traffic keys as described in Section 7.3.

The next-generation `application_traffic_secret` is computed as:

```
application_traffic_secret_N+1 =
    HKDF-Expand-Label(application_traffic_secret_N,
                      "traffic upd", "", Hash.length)
```

Once client/server `application_traffic_secret_N+1` and its associated traffic keys have been computed, implementations SHOULD delete client_/server `application_traffic_secret_N` and its associated traffic keys.

7.3. Traffic Key Calculation

The traffic keying material is generated from the following input values:

- A secret value
- A purpose value indicating the specific value being generated
- The length of the key being generated

The traffic keying material is generated from an input traffic secret value using:

```
[sender]_write_key = HKDF-Expand-Label(Secret, "key", "", key_length)
[sender]_write_iv  = HKDF-Expand-Label(Secret, "iv" , "", iv_length)
```

[sender] denotes the sending side. The Secret value for each record type is shown in the table below.

Record Type	Secret
0-RTT Application	<code>client_early_traffic_secret</code>
Handshake	<code>[sender]_handshake_traffic_secret</code>
Application Data	<code>[sender]_application_traffic_secret_N</code>

All the traffic keying material is recomputed whenever the underlying Secret changes (e.g., when changing from the handshake to application data keys or upon a key update).

7.4. (EC)DHE Shared Secret Calculation

7.4.1. Finite Field Diffie-Hellman

For finite field groups, a conventional Diffie-Hellman [DH76] computation is performed. The negotiated key (Z) is converted to a byte string by encoding in big-endian and left padded with zeros up to the size of the prime. This byte string is used as the shared secret in the key schedule as specified above.

Note that this construction differs from previous versions of TLS which remove leading zeros.

7.4.2. Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman

For secp256r1, secp384r1 and secp521r1, ECDH calculations (including parameter and key generation as well as the shared secret calculation) are performed according to [IEEE1363] using the ECKAS-DH1 scheme with the identity map as key derivation function (KDF), so that the shared secret is the x-coordinate of the ECDH shared secret elliptic curve point represented as an octet string. Note that this octet string (Z in IEEE 1363 terminology) as output by FE2OSP, the Field Element to Octet String Conversion Primitive, has constant length for any given field; leading zeros found in this octet string MUST NOT be truncated.

(Note that this use of the identity KDF is a technicality. The complete picture is that ECDH is employed with a non-trivial KDF because TLS does not directly use this secret for anything other than for computing other secrets.)

ECDH functions are used as follows:

- The public key to put into the KeyShareEntry.key_exchange structure is the result of applying the ECDH scalar multiplication function to the secret key of appropriate length (into scalar input) and the standard public basepoint (into u-coordinate point input).
- The ECDH shared secret is the result of applying the ECDH scalar multiplication function to the secret key (into scalar input) and the peer's public key (into u-coordinate point input). The output is used raw, with no processing.

For X25519 and X448, implementations SHOULD use the approach specified in [RFC7748] to calculate the Diffie-Hellman shared secret. Implementations MUST check whether the computed Diffie-Hellman shared secret is the all-zero value and abort if so, as described in

Section 6 of [RFC7748]. If implementors use an alternative implementation of these elliptic curves, they SHOULD perform the additional checks specified in Section 7 of [RFC7748].

7.5. Exporters

[RFC5705] defines keying material exporters for TLS in terms of the TLS pseudorandom function (PRF). This document replaces the PRF with HKDF, thus requiring a new construction. The exporter interface remains the same.

The exporter value is computed as:

```
TLS-Exporter(label, context_value, key_length) =  
    HKDF-Expand-Label(Derive-Secret(Secret, label, ""),  
                      "exporter", Hash(context_value), key_length)
```

Where Secret is either the early_exporter_master_secret or the exporter_master_secret. Implementations MUST use the exporter_master_secret unless explicitly specified by the application. The early_exporter_master_secret is defined for use in settings where an exporter is needed for 0-RTT data. A separate interface for the early exporter is RECOMMENDED; this avoids the exporter user accidentally using an early exporter when a regular one is desired or vice versa.

If no context is provided, the context_value is zero-length. Consequently, providing no context computes the same value as providing an empty context. This is a change from previous versions of TLS where an empty context produced a different output to an absent context. As of this document's publication, no allocated exporter label is used both with and without a context. Future specifications MUST NOT define a use of exporters that permit both an empty context and no context with the same label. New uses of exporters SHOULD provide a context in all exporter computations, though the value could be empty.

Requirements for the format of exporter labels are defined in section 4 of [RFC5705].

8. 0-RTT and Anti-Replay

As noted in Section 2.3 and Appendix E.5, TLS does not provide inherent replay protections for 0-RTT data. There are two potential threats to be concerned with:

- Network attackers who mount a replay attack by simply duplicating a flight of 0-RTT data.

- Network attackers who take advantage of client retry behavior to arrange for the server to receive multiple copies of an application message. This threat already exists to some extent because clients that value robustness respond to network errors by attempting to retry requests. However, 0-RTT adds an additional dimension for any server system which does not maintain globally consistent server state. Specifically, if a server system has multiple zones where tickets from zone A will not be accepted in zone B, then an attacker can duplicate a ClientHello and early data intended for A to both A and B. At A, the data will be accepted in 0-RTT, but at B the server will reject 0-RTT data and instead force a full handshake. If the attacker blocks the ServerHello from A, then the client will complete the handshake with B and probably retry the request, leading to duplication on the server system as a whole.

The first class of attack can be prevented by sharing state to guarantee that the 0-RTT data is accepted at most once. Servers SHOULD provide that level of replay safety, by implementing one of the methods described in this section or by equivalent means. It is understood, however, that due to operational concerns not all deployments will maintain state at that level. Therefore, in normal operation, clients will not know which, if any, of these mechanisms servers actually implement and hence MUST only send early data which they deem safe to be replayed.

In addition to the direct effects of replays, there is a class of attacks where even operations normally considered idempotent could be exploited by a large number of replays (timing attacks, resource limit exhaustion and others described in Appendix E.5). Those can be mitigated by ensuring that every 0-RTT payload can be replayed only a limited number of times. The server MUST ensure that any instance of it (be it a machine, a thread or any other entity within the relevant serving infrastructure) would accept 0-RTT for the same 0-RTT handshake at most once; this limits the number of replays to the number of server instances in the deployment. Such a guarantee can be accomplished by locally recording data from recently-received ClientHellos and rejecting repeats, or by any other method that provides the same or a stronger guarantee. The "at most once per server instance" guarantee is a minimum requirement; servers SHOULD limit 0-RTT replays further when feasible.

The second class of attack cannot be prevented at the TLS layer and MUST be dealt with by any application. Note that any application whose clients implement any kind of retry behavior already needs to implement some sort of anti-replay defense.

8.1. Single-Use Tickets

The simplest form of anti-replay defense is for the server to only allow each session ticket to be used once. For instance, the server can maintain a database of all outstanding valid tickets; deleting each ticket from the database as it is used. If an unknown ticket is provided, the server would then fall back to a full handshake.

If the tickets are not self-contained but rather are database keys, and the corresponding PSKs are deleted upon use, then connections established using PSKs enjoy forward secrecy. This improves security for all 0-RTT data and PSK usage when PSK is used without (EC)DHE.

Because this mechanism requires sharing the session database between server nodes in environments with multiple distributed servers, it may be hard to achieve high rates of successful PSK 0-RTT connections when compared to self-encrypted tickets. Unlike session databases, session tickets can successfully do PSK-based session establishment even without consistent storage, though when 0-RTT is allowed they still require consistent storage for anti-replay of 0-RTT data, as detailed in the following section.

8.2. Client Hello Recording

An alternative form of anti-replay is to record a unique value derived from the ClientHello (generally either the random value or the PSK binder) and reject duplicates. Recording all ClientHellos causes state to grow without bound, but a server can instead record ClientHellos within a given time window and use the "obfuscated_ticket_age" to ensure that tickets aren't reused outside that window.

In order to implement this, when a ClientHello is received, the server first verifies the PSK binder as described Section 4.2.11. It then computes the expected_arrival_time as described in the next section and rejects 0-RTT if it is outside the recording window, falling back to the 1-RTT handshake.

If the expected arrival time is in the window, then the server checks to see if it has recorded a matching ClientHello. If one is found, it either aborts the handshake with an "illegal_parameter" alert or accepts the PSK but reject 0-RTT. If no matching ClientHello is found, then it accepts 0-RTT and then stores the ClientHello for as long as the expected_arrival_time is inside the window. Servers MAY also implement data stores with false positives, such as Bloom filters, in which case they MUST respond to apparent replay by rejecting 0-RTT but MUST NOT abort the handshake.

The server MUST derive the storage key only from validated sections of the ClientHello. If the ClientHello contains multiple PSK identities, then an attacker can create multiple ClientHellos with different binder values for the less-preferred identity on the assumption that the server will not verify it, as recommended by Section 4.2.11. I.e., if the client sends PSKs A and B but the server prefers A, then the attacker can change the binder for B without affecting the binder for A. If the binder for B is part of the storage key, then this ClientHello will not appear as a duplicate, which will cause the ClientHello to be accepted, and may cause side effects such as replay cache pollution, although any 0-RTT data will not be decryptable because it will use different keys. If the validated binder or the ClientHello.random are used as the storage key, then this attack is not possible.

Because this mechanism does not require storing all outstanding tickets, it may be easier to implement in distributed systems with high rates of resumption and 0-RTT, at the cost of potentially weaker anti-replay defense because of the difficulty of reliably storing and retrieving the received ClientHello messages. In many such systems, it is impractical to have globally consistent storage of all the received ClientHellos. In this case, the best anti-replay protection is provided by having a single storage zone be authoritative for a given ticket and refusing 0-RTT for that ticket in any other zone. This approach prevents simple replay by the attacker because only one zone will accept 0-RTT data. A weaker design is to implement separate storage for each zone but allow 0-RTT in any zone. This approach limits the number of replays to once per zone. Application message duplication of course remains possible with either design.

When implementations are freshly started, they SHOULD reject 0-RTT as long as any portion of their recording window overlaps the startup time. Otherwise, they run the risk of accepting replays which were originally sent during that period.

Note: If the client's clock is running much faster than the server's then a ClientHello may be received that is outside the window in the future, in which case it might be accepted for 1-RTT, causing a client retry, and then acceptable later for 0-RTT. This is another variant of the second form of attack described above.

8.3. Freshness Checks

Because the ClientHello indicates the time at which the client sent it, it is possible to efficiently determine whether a ClientHello was likely sent reasonably recently and only accept 0-RTT for such a ClientHello, otherwise falling back to a 1-RTT handshake. This is necessary for the ClientHello storage mechanism described in

Section 8.2 because otherwise the server needs to store an unlimited number of ClientHellos and is a useful optimization for self-contained single-use tickets because it allows efficient rejection of ClientHellos which cannot be used for 0-RTT.

In order to implement this mechanism, a server needs to store the time that the server generated the session ticket, offset by an estimate of the round trip time between client and server. I.e.,

$$\text{adjusted_creation_time} = \text{creation_time} + \text{estimated_RTT}$$

This value can be encoded in the ticket, thus avoiding the need to keep state for each outstanding ticket. The server can determine the client's view of the age of the ticket by subtracting the ticket's "ticket_age_add value" from the "obfuscated_ticket_age" parameter in the client's "pre_shared_key" extension. The server can determine the "expected arrival time" of the ClientHello as:

$$\text{expected_arrival_time} = \text{adjusted_creation_time} + \text{clients_ticket_age}$$

When a new ClientHello is received, the expected_arrival_time is then compared against the current server wall clock time and if they differ by more than a certain amount, 0-RTT is rejected, though the 1-RTT handshake can be allowed to complete.

There are several potential sources of error that might cause mismatches between the expected arrival time and the measured time. Variations in client and server clock rates are likely to be minimal, though potentially the absolute times may be off by large values. Network propagation delays are the most likely causes of a mismatch in legitimate values for elapsed time. Both the NewSessionTicket and ClientHello messages might be retransmitted and therefore delayed, which might be hidden by TCP. For clients on the Internet, this implies windows on the order of ten seconds to account for errors in clocks and variations in measurements; other deployment scenarios may have different needs. Clock skew distributions are not symmetric, so the optimal tradeoff may involve an asymmetric range of permissible mismatch values.

Note that freshness checking alone is not sufficient to prevent replays because it does not detect them during the error window, which, depending on bandwidth and system capacity could include billions of replays in real-world settings. In addition, this freshness checking is only done at the time the ClientHello is received, and not when later early application data records are received. After early data is accepted, records may continue to be streamed to the server over a longer time period.

9. Compliance Requirements

9.1. Mandatory-to-Implement Cipher Suites

In the absence of an application profile standard specifying otherwise, a TLS-compliant application MUST implement the TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 [GCM] cipher suite and SHOULD implement the TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 [GCM] and TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 [RFC7539] cipher suites. (see Appendix B.4)

A TLS-compliant application MUST support digital signatures with rsa_pkcs1_sha256 (for certificates), rsa_pss_rsae_sha256 (for CertificateVerify and certificates), and ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256. A TLS-compliant application MUST support key exchange with secp256r1 (NIST P-256) and SHOULD support key exchange with X25519 [RFC7748].

9.2. Mandatory-to-Implement Extensions

In the absence of an application profile standard specifying otherwise, a TLS-compliant application MUST implement the following TLS extensions:

- Supported Versions ("supported_versions"; Section 4.2.1)
- Cookie ("cookie"; Section 4.2.2)
- Signature Algorithms ("signature_algorithms"; Section 4.2.3)
- Signature Algorithms Certificate ("signature_algorithms_cert"; Section 4.2.3)
- Negotiated Groups ("supported_groups"; Section 4.2.7)
- Key Share ("key_share"; Section 4.2.8)
- Server Name Indication ("server_name"; Section 3 of [RFC6066])

All implementations MUST send and use these extensions when offering applicable features:

- "supported_versions" is REQUIRED for all ClientHello, ServerHello and HelloRetryRequest messages.
- "signature_algorithms" is REQUIRED for certificate authentication.
- "supported_groups" is REQUIRED for ClientHello messages using DHE or ECDHE key exchange.

- "key_share" is REQUIRED for DHE or ECDHE key exchange.
- "pre_shared_key" is REQUIRED for PSK key agreement.
- "psk_key_exchange_modes" is REQUIRED for PSK key agreement.

A client is considered to be attempting to negotiate using this specification if the ClientHello contains a "supported_versions" extension with 0x0304 contained in its body. Such a ClientHello message MUST meet the following requirements:

- If not containing a "pre_shared_key" extension, it MUST contain both a "signature_algorithms" extension and a "supported_groups" extension.
- If containing a "supported_groups" extension, it MUST also contain a "key_share" extension, and vice versa. An empty KeyShare.client_shares vector is permitted.

Servers receiving a ClientHello which does not conform to these requirements MUST abort the handshake with a "missing_extension" alert.

Additionally, all implementations MUST support use of the "server_name" extension with applications capable of using it. Servers MAY require clients to send a valid "server_name" extension. Servers requiring this extension SHOULD respond to a ClientHello lacking a "server_name" extension by terminating the connection with a "missing_extension" alert.

9.3. Protocol Invariants

This section describes invariants that TLS endpoints and middleboxes MUST follow. It also applies to earlier versions of TLS.

TLS is designed to be securely and compatibly extensible. Newer clients or servers, when communicating with newer peers, should negotiate the most preferred common parameters. The TLS handshake provides downgrade protection: Middleboxes passing traffic between a newer client and newer server without terminating TLS should be unable to influence the handshake (see Appendix E.1). At the same time, deployments update at different rates, so a newer client or server MAY continue to support older parameters, which would allow it to interoperate with older endpoints.

For this to work, implementations MUST correctly handle extensible fields:

- A client sending a ClientHello MUST support all parameters advertised in it. Otherwise, the server may fail to interoperate by selecting one of those parameters.
- A server receiving a ClientHello MUST correctly ignore all unrecognized cipher suites, extensions, and other parameters. Otherwise, it may fail to interoperate with newer clients. In TLS 1.3, a client receiving a CertificateRequest or NewSessionTicket MUST also ignore all unrecognized extensions.
- A middlebox which terminates a TLS connection MUST behave as a compliant TLS server (to the original client), including having a certificate which the client is willing to accept, and as a compliant TLS client (to the original server), including verifying the original server's certificate. In particular, it MUST generate its own ClientHello containing only parameters it understands, and it MUST generate a fresh ServerHello random value, rather than forwarding the endpoint's value.

Note that TLS's protocol requirements and security analysis only apply to the two connections separately. Safely deploying a TLS terminator requires additional security considerations which are beyond the scope of this document.

- An middlebox which forwards ClientHello parameters it does not understand MUST NOT process any messages beyond that ClientHello. It MUST forward all subsequent traffic unmodified. Otherwise, it may fail to interoperate with newer clients and servers.

Forwarded ClientHellos may contain advertisements for features not supported by the middlebox, so the response may include future TLS additions the middlebox does not recognize. These additions MAY change any message beyond the ClientHello arbitrarily. In particular, the values sent in the ServerHello might change, the ServerHello format might change, and the TLSCiphertext format might change.

The design of TLS 1.3 was constrained by widely-deployed non-compliant TLS middleboxes (see Appendix D.4), however it does not relax the invariants. Those middleboxes continue to be non-compliant.

10. Security Considerations

Security issues are discussed throughout this memo, especially in Appendix C, Appendix D, and Appendix E.

11. IANA Considerations

This document uses several registries that were originally created in [RFC4346]. IANA [SHALL update/has updated] these to reference this document. The registries and their allocation policies are below:

- TLS Cipher Suite Registry: values with the first byte in the range 0-254 (decimal) are assigned via Specification Required [RFC8126]. Values with the first byte 255 (decimal) are reserved for Private Use [RFC8126].

IANA [SHALL add/has added] the cipher suites listed in Appendix B.4 to the registry. The "Value" and "Description" columns are taken from the table. The "DTLS-OK" and "Recommended" columns are both marked as "Yes" for each new cipher suite. [[This assumes [I-D.ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates] has been applied.]]

- TLS ContentType Registry: Future values are allocated via Standards Action [RFC8126].
- TLS Alert Registry: Future values are allocated via Standards Action [RFC8126]. IANA [SHALL update/has updated] this registry to include values for "missing_extension" and "certificate_required". The "DTLS-OK" column is marked as "Yes" for each new alert.
- TLS HandshakeType Registry: Future values are allocated via Standards Action [RFC8126]. IANA [SHALL update/has updated] this registry to rename item 4 from "NewSessionTicket" to "new_session_ticket" and to add the "hello_retry_request_RESERVED", "encrypted_extensions", "end_of_early_data", "key_update", and "message_hash" values. The "DTLS-OK" are marked as "Yes" for each of these additions.

This document also uses the TLS ExtensionType Registry originally created in [RFC4366]. IANA has updated it to reference this document. Changes to the registry follow:

- IANA [SHALL update/has updated] the registration policy as follows:

Values with the first byte in the range 0-254 (decimal) are assigned via Specification Required [RFC8126]. Values with the first byte 255 (decimal) are reserved for Private Use [RFC8126].

- IANA [SHALL update/has updated] this registry to include the "key_share", "pre_shared_key", "psk_key_exchange_modes",

"early_data", "cookie", "supported_versions",
"certificate_authorities", "oid_filters", "post_handshake_auth",
and "signature_algorithms_cert", extensions with the values
defined in this document and the Recommended value of "Yes".

- IANA [SHALL update/has updated] this registry to include a "TLS 1.3" column which lists the messages in which the extension may appear. This column [SHALL be/has been] initially populated from the table in Section 4.2 with any extension not listed there marked as "-" to indicate that it is not used by TLS 1.3.

In addition, this document defines two new registries to be maintained by IANA:

- TLS SignatureScheme Registry: Values with the first byte in the range 0-253 (decimal) are assigned via Specification Required [RFC8126]. Values with the first byte 254 or 255 (decimal) are reserved for Private Use [RFC8126]. Values with the first byte in the range 0-6 or with the second byte in the range 0-3 that are not currently allocated are reserved for backwards compatibility. This registry SHALL have a "Recommended" column. The registry [shall be/ has been] initially populated with the values described in Section 4.2.3. The following values SHALL be marked as "Recommended": ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256, ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384, rsa_pss_rsae_sha256, rsa_pss_rsae_sha384, rsa_pss_rsae_sha512, rsa_pss_pss_sha256, rsa_pss_pss_sha384, rsa_pss_pss_sha512, and ed25519.
- TLS PskKeyExchangeMode Registry: Values in the range 0-253 (decimal) are assigned via Specification Required [RFC8126]. Values with the first byte 254 or 255 (decimal) are reserved for Private Use [RFC8126]. This registry SHALL have a "Recommended" column. The registry [shall be/ has been] initially populated psk_ke (0) and psk_dhe_ke (1). Both SHALL be marked as "Recommended".

12. References

12.1. Normative References

- [DH] Diffie, W. and M. Hellman, "New Directions in Cryptography", IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, V.IT-22 n.6 , June 1977.
- [DH76] Diffie, W. and M. Hellman, "New directions in cryptography", IEEE Transactions on Information Theory Vol. 22, pp. 644-654, DOI 10.1109/tit.1976.1055638, November 1976.

- [GCM] Dworkin, M., "Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC", NIST Special Publication 800-38D, November 2007.
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
12.3. URIs

- [1] <mailto:tls@ietf.org>

Appendix A. State Machine


This section provides a summary of the legal state transitions for the client and server handshakes. State names (in all capitals, e.g., START) have no formal meaning but are provided for ease of comprehension. Actions which are taken only in certain circumstances are indicated in []. The notation "K_{send,rcv} = foo" means "set the send/rcv key to the given key".

A.1. Client



Note that with the transitions as shown above, clients may send alerts that derive from post-ServerHello messages in the clear or with the early data keys. If clients need to send such alerts, they SHOULD first rekey to the handshake keys if possible.

A.2. Server



Appendix B. Protocol Data Structures and Constant Values

This section provides the normative protocol types and constants definitions. Values listed as `_RESERVED` were used in previous versions of TLS and are listed here for completeness. TLS 1.3

implementations MUST NOT send them but might receive them from older TLS implementations.

B.1. Record Layer

```
enum {
    invalid(0),
    change_cipher_spec(20),
    alert(21),
    handshake(22),
    application_data(23),
    (255)
} ContentType;

struct {
    ContentType type;
    ProtocolVersion legacy_record_version;
    uint16 length;
    opaque fragment[TLSPplaintext.length];
} TLSPplaintext;

struct {
    opaque content[TLSPplaintext.length];
    ContentType type;
    uint8 zeros[length_of_padding];
} TLSInnerPlaintext;

struct {
    ContentType opaque_type = application_data; /* 23 */
    ProtocolVersion legacy_record_version = 0x0303; /* TLS v1.2 */
    uint16 length;
    opaque encrypted_record[TLSCiphertext.length];
} TLSCiphertext;
```

B.2. Alert Messages

```
enum { warning(1), fatal(2), (255) } AlertLevel;

enum {
    close_notify(0),
    unexpected_message(10),
    bad_record_mac(20),
    decryption_failed_RESERVED(21),
    record_overflow(22),
    decompression_failure_RESERVED(30),
    handshake_failure(40),
    no_certificate_RESERVED(41),
    bad_certificate(42),
    unsupported_certificate(43),
    certificate_revoked(44),
    certificate_expired(45),
    certificate_unknown(46),
    illegal_parameter(47),
    unknown_ca(48),
    access_denied(49),
    decode_error(50),
    decrypt_error(51),
    export_restriction_RESERVED(60),
    protocol_version(70),
    insufficient_security(71),
    internal_error(80),
    inappropriate_fallback(86),
    user_canceled(90),
    no_renegotiation_RESERVED(100),
    missing_extension(109),
    unsupported_extension(110),
    certificate_unobtainable_RESERVED(111),
    unrecognized_name(112),
    bad_certificate_status_response(113),
    bad_certificate_hash_value_RESERVED(114),
    unknown_psk_identity(115),
    certificate_required(116),
    no_application_protocol(120),
    (255)
} AlertDescription;

struct {
    AlertLevel level;
    AlertDescription description;
} Alert;
```

B.3. Handshake Protocol

```

enum {
    hello_request_RESERVED(0),
    client_hello(1),
    server_hello(2),
    hello_verify_request_RESERVED(3),
    new_session_ticket(4),
    end_of_early_data(5),
    hello_retry_request_RESERVED(6),
    encrypted_extensions(8),
    certificate(11),
    server_key_exchange_RESERVED(12),
    certificate_request(13),
    server_hello_done_RESERVED(14),
    certificate_verify(15),
    client_key_exchange_RESERVED(16),
    finished(20),
    key_update(24),
    message_hash(254),
    (255)
} HandshakeType;

struct {
    HandshakeType msg_type;    /* handshake type */
    uint24 length;           /* bytes in message */
    select (Handshake.msg_type) {
        case client_hello:      ClientHello;
        case server_hello:      ServerHello;
        case end_of_early_data: EndOfEarlyData;
        case encrypted_extensions: EncryptedExtensions;
        case certificate_request: CertificateRequest;
        case certificate:        Certificate;
        case certificate_verify: CertificateVerify;
        case finished:           Finished;
        case new_session_ticket: NewSessionTicket;
        case key_update:         KeyUpdate;
    };
} Handshake;

```

B.3.1. Key Exchange Messages

```

uint16 ProtocolVersion;
opaque Random[32];

uint8 CipherSuite[2];    /* Cryptographic suite selector */

struct {

```

```

    ProtocolVersion legacy_version = 0x0303;    /* TLS v1.2 */
    Random random;
    opaque legacy_session_id<0..32>;
    CipherSuite cipher_suites<2..2^16-2>;
    opaque legacy_compression_methods<1..2^8-1>;
    Extension extensions<8..2^16-1>;
} ClientHello;

struct {
    ProtocolVersion legacy_version = 0x0303;    /* TLS v1.2 */
    Random random;
    opaque legacy_session_id_echo<0..32>;
    CipherSuite cipher_suite;
    uint8 legacy_compression_method = 0;
    Extension extensions<6..2^16-1>;
} ServerHello;

struct {
    ExtensionType extension_type;
    opaque extension_data<0..2^16-1>;
} Extension;

enum {
    server_name(0),                          /* RFC 6066 */
    max_fragment_length(1),                  /* RFC 6066 */
    status_request(5),                       /* RFC 6066 */
    supported_groups(10),                    /* RFC 4492, 7919 */
    signature_algorithms(13),               /* [[this document]] */
    use_srtp(14),                           /* RFC 5764 */
    heartbeat(15),                          /* RFC 6520 */
    application_layer_protocol_negotiation(16), /* RFC 7301 */
    signed_certificate_timestamp(18),       /* RFC 6962 */
    client_certificate_type(19),            /* RFC 7250 */
    server_certificate_type(20),            /* RFC 7250 */
    padding(21),                            /* RFC 7685 */
    RESERVED(40),                           /* Used but never assigned */
    pre_shared_key(41),                     /* [[this document]] */
    early_data(42),                         /* [[this document]] */
    supported_versions(43),                 /* [[this document]] */
    cookie(44),                             /* [[this document]] */
    psk_key_exchange_modes(45),             /* [[this document]] */
    RESERVED(46),                           /* Used but never assigned */
    certificate_authorities(47),            /* [[this document]] */
    oid_filters(48),                        /* [[this document]] */
    post_handshake_auth(49),                /* [[this document]] */
    signature_algorithms_cert(50),         /* [[this document]] */
    key_share(51),                          /* [[this document]] */
    (65535)
}

```

```
    } ExtensionType;

    struct {
        NamedGroup group;
        opaque key_exchange<1..2^16-1>;
    } KeyShareEntry;

    struct {
        KeyShareEntry client_shares<0..2^16-1>;
    } KeyShareClientHello;

    struct {
        NamedGroup selected_group;
    } KeyShareHelloRetryRequest;

    struct {
        KeyShareEntry server_share;
    } KeyShareServerHello;

    struct {
        uint8 legacy_form = 4;
        opaque X[coordinate_length];
        opaque Y[coordinate_length];
    } UncompressedPointRepresentation;

    enum { psk_ke(0), psk_dhe_ke(1), (255) } PskKeyExchangeMode;

    struct {
        PskKeyExchangeMode ke_modes<1..255>;
    } PskKeyExchangeModes;

    struct {} Empty;

    struct {
        select (Handshake.msg_type) {
            case new_session_ticket:    uint32 max_early_data_size;
            case client_hello:          Empty;
            case encrypted_extensions:  Empty;
        };
    } EarlyDataIndication;

    struct {
        opaque identity<1..2^16-1>;
        uint32 obfuscated_ticket_age;
    } PskIdentity;

    opaque PskBinderEntry<32..255>;
```

```
struct {
    PskIdentity identities<7..2^16-1>;
    PskBinderEntry binders<33..2^16-1>;
} OfferedPsk;

struct {
    select (Handshake.msg_type) {
        case client_hello: OfferedPsk;
        case server_hello: uint16 selected_identity;
    };
} PreSharedKeyExtension;
```

B.3.1.1. Version Extension

```
struct {
    select (Handshake.msg_type) {
        case client_hello:
            ProtocolVersion versions<2..254>;

        case server_hello: /* and HelloRetryRequest */
            ProtocolVersion selected_version;
    };
} SupportedVersions;
```

B.3.1.2. Cookie Extension

```
struct {
    opaque cookie<1..2^16-1>;
} Cookie;
```

B.3.1.3. Signature Algorithm Extension

```
enum {
    /* RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 algorithms */
    rsa_pkcs1_sha256(0x0401),
    rsa_pkcs1_sha384(0x0501),
    rsa_pkcs1_sha512(0x0601),

    /* ECDSA algorithms */
    ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256(0x0403),
    ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384(0x0503),
    ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512(0x0603),

    /* RSASSA-PSS algorithms with public key OID rsaEncryption */
    rsa_pss_rsae_sha256(0x0804),
    rsa_pss_rsae_sha384(0x0805),
    rsa_pss_rsae_sha512(0x0806),

    /* EdDSA algorithms */
    ed25519(0x0807),
    ed448(0x0808),

    /* RSASSA-PSS algorithms with public key OID RSASSA-PSS */
    rsa_pss_pss_sha256(0x0809),
    rsa_pss_pss_sha384(0x080a),
    rsa_pss_pss_sha512(0x080b),

    /* Legacy algorithms */
    rsa_pkcs1_shal(0x0201),
    ecdsa_shal(0x0203),

    /* Reserved Code Points */
    obsolete_RESERVED(0x0000..0x0200),
    dsa_shal_RESERVED(0x0202),
    obsolete_RESERVED(0x0204..0x0400),
    dsa_sha256_RESERVED(0x0402),
    obsolete_RESERVED(0x0404..0x0500),
    dsa_sha384_RESERVED(0x0502),
    obsolete_RESERVED(0x0504..0x0600),
    dsa_sha512_RESERVED(0x0602),
    obsolete_RESERVED(0x0604..0x06FF),
    private_use(0xFE00..0xFFFF),
    (0xFFFF)
} SignatureScheme;

struct {
    SignatureScheme supported_signature_algorithms<2..2^16-2>;
} SignatureSchemeList;
```

B.3.1.4. Supported Groups Extension

```
enum {
    unallocated_RESERVED(0x0000),

    /* Elliptic Curve Groups (ECDHE) */
    obsolete_RESERVED(0x0001..0x0016),
    secp256r1(0x0017), secp384r1(0x0018), secp521r1(0x0019),
    obsolete_RESERVED(0x001A..0x001C),
    x25519(0x001D), x448(0x001E),

    /* Finite Field Groups (DHE) */
    ffdhe2048(0x0100), ffdhe3072(0x0101), ffdhe4096(0x0102),
    ffdhe6144(0x0103), ffdhe8192(0x0104),

    /* Reserved Code Points */
    ffdhe_private_use(0x01FC..0x01FF),
    ecdhe_private_use(0xFE00..0xFEFF),
    obsolete_RESERVED(0xFF01..0xFF02),
    (0xFFFF)
} NamedGroup;

struct {
    NamedGroup named_group_list<2..2^16-1>;
} NamedGroupList;
```

Values within "obsolete_RESERVED" ranges are used in previous versions of TLS and MUST NOT be offered or negotiated by TLS 1.3 implementations. The obsolete curves have various known/theoretical weaknesses or have had very little usage, in some cases only due to unintentional server configuration issues. They are no longer considered appropriate for general use and should be assumed to be potentially unsafe. The set of curves specified here is sufficient for interoperability with all currently deployed and properly configured TLS implementations.

B.3.2. Server Parameters Messages


```
opaque DistinguishedName<1..2^16-1>;

struct {
    DistinguishedName authorities<3..2^16-1>;
} CertificateAuthoritiesExtension;

struct {
    opaque certificate_extension_oid<1..2^8-1>;
    opaque certificate_extension_values<0..2^16-1>;
} OIDFilter;

struct {
    OIDFilter filters<0..2^16-1>;
} OIDFilterExtension;

struct {} PostHandshakeAuth;

struct {
    Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>;
} EncryptedExtensions;

struct {
    opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>;
    Extension extensions<2..2^16-1>;
} CertificateRequest;
```

B.3.3. Authentication Messages

```
/* Managed by IANA */
enum {
    X509(0),
    OpenPGP_RESERVED(1),
    RawPublicKey(2),
    (255)
} CertificateType;

struct {
    select (certificate_type) {
        case RawPublicKey:
            /* From RFC 7250 ASN.1_subjectPublicKeyInfo */
            opaque ASN1_subjectPublicKeyInfo<1..2^24-1>;

        case X509:
            opaque cert_data<1..2^24-1>;
    };
    Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>;
} CertificateEntry;

struct {
    opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>;
    CertificateEntry certificate_list<0..2^24-1>;
} Certificate;

struct {
    SignatureScheme algorithm;
    opaque signature<0..2^16-1>;
} CertificateVerify;

struct {
    opaque verify_data[Hash.length];
} Finished;
```

B.3.4. Ticket Establishment

```
struct {
    uint32 ticket_lifetime;
    uint32 ticket_age_add;
    opaque ticket_nonce<0..255>;
    opaque ticket<1..2^16-1>;
    Extension extensions<0..2^16-2>;
} NewSessionTicket;
```

B.3.5. Updating Keys

```

struct {} EndOfEarlyData;

enum {
    update_not_requested(0), update_requested(1), (255)
} KeyUpdateRequest;

struct {
    KeyUpdateRequest request_update;
} KeyUpdate;

```

B.4. Cipher Suites

A symmetric cipher suite defines the pair of the AEAD algorithm and hash algorithm to be used with HKDF. Cipher suite names follow the naming convention:

```
CipherSuite TLS_AEAD_HASH = VALUE;
```

Component	Contents
TLS	The string "TLS"
AEAD	The AEAD algorithm used for record protection
HASH	The hash algorithm used with HKDF
VALUE	The two byte ID assigned for this cipher suite

This specification defines the following cipher suites for use with TLS 1.3.

Description	Value
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256	{0x13,0x01}
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384	{0x13,0x02}
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256	{0x13,0x03}
TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256	{0x13,0x04}
TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256	{0x13,0x05}

The corresponding AEAD algorithms AEAD_AES_128_GCM, AEAD_AES_256_GCM, and AEAD_AES_128_CCM are defined in [RFC5116]. AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305 is defined in [RFC7539]. AEAD_AES_128_CCM_8 is defined in [RFC6655]. The corresponding hash algorithms are defined in [SHS].

Although TLS 1.3 uses the same cipher suite space as previous versions of TLS, TLS 1.3 cipher suites are defined differently, only specifying the symmetric ciphers, and cannot be used for TLS 1.2. Similarly, TLS 1.2 and lower cipher suites cannot be used with TLS 1.3.

New cipher suite values are assigned by IANA as described in Section 11.

Appendix C. Implementation Notes

The TLS protocol cannot prevent many common security mistakes. This section provides several recommendations to assist implementors. [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13-vectors] provides test vectors for TLS 1.3 handshakes.

C.1. Random Number Generation and Seeding

TLS requires a cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator (CSPRNG). In most cases, the operating system provides an appropriate facility such as /dev/urandom, which should be used absent other (performance) concerns. It is RECOMMENDED to use an existing CSPRNG implementation in preference to crafting a new one. Many adequate cryptographic libraries are already available under favorable license terms. Should those prove unsatisfactory, [RFC4086] provides guidance on the generation of random values.

TLS uses random values both in public protocol fields such as the public Random values in the ClientHello and ServerHello and to generate keying material. With a properly functioning CSPRNG, this does not present a security problem as it is not feasible to determine the CSPRNG state from its output. However, with a broken CSPRNG, it may be possible for an attacker to use the public output to determine the CSPRNG internal state and thereby predict the keying material, as documented in [CHECKOWAY]. Implementations can provide extra security against this form of attack by using separate CSPRNGs to generate public and private values.

C.2. Certificates and Authentication

Implementations are responsible for verifying the integrity of certificates and should generally support certificate revocation messages. Absent a specific indication from an application profile, Certificates should always be verified to ensure proper signing by a trusted Certificate Authority (CA). The selection and addition of trust anchors should be done very carefully. Users should be able to view information about the certificate and trust anchor. Applications SHOULD also enforce minimum and maximum key sizes. For example, certification paths containing keys or signatures weaker than 2048-bit RSA or 224-bit ECDSA are not appropriate for secure applications.

C.3. Implementation Pitfalls

Implementation experience has shown that certain parts of earlier TLS specifications are not easy to understand and have been a source of interoperability and security problems. Many of these areas have been clarified in this document but this appendix contains a short list of the most important things that require special attention from implementors.

TLS protocol issues:

- Do you correctly handle handshake messages that are fragmented to multiple TLS records (see Section 5.1)? Including corner cases like a ClientHello that is split to several small fragments? Do you fragment handshake messages that exceed the maximum fragment size? In particular, the Certificate and CertificateRequest handshake messages can be large enough to require fragmentation.
- Do you ignore the TLS record layer version number in all unencrypted TLS records? (see Appendix D)
- Have you ensured that all support for SSL, RC4, EXPORT ciphers, and MD5 (via the "signature_algorithms" extension) is completely removed from all possible configurations that support TLS 1.3 or later, and that attempts to use these obsolete capabilities fail correctly? (see Appendix D)
- Do you handle TLS extensions in ClientHello correctly, including unknown extensions?
- When the server has requested a client certificate, but no suitable certificate is available, do you correctly send an empty Certificate message, instead of omitting the whole message (see Section 4.4.2.3)?

- When processing the plaintext fragment produced by AEAD-Decrypt and scanning from the end for the ContentType, do you avoid scanning past the start of the cleartext in the event that the peer has sent a malformed plaintext of all-zeros?
- Do you properly ignore unrecognized cipher suites (Section 4.1.2), hello extensions (Section 4.2), named groups (Section 4.2.7), key shares (Section 4.2.8), supported versions (Section 4.2.1), and signature algorithms (Section 4.2.3) in the ClientHello?
- As a server, do you send a HelloRetryRequest to clients which support a compatible (EC)DHE group but do not predict it in the "key_share" extension? As a client, do you correctly handle a HelloRetryRequest from the server?

Cryptographic details:

- What countermeasures do you use to prevent timing attacks [TIMING]?
- When using Diffie-Hellman key exchange, do you correctly preserve leading zero bytes in the negotiated key (see Section 7.4.1)?
- Does your TLS client check that the Diffie-Hellman parameters sent by the server are acceptable, (see Section 4.2.8.1)?
- Do you use a strong and, most importantly, properly seeded random number generator (see Appendix C.1) when generating Diffie-Hellman private values, the ECDSA "k" parameter, and other security-critical values? It is RECOMMENDED that implementations implement "deterministic ECDSA" as specified in [RFC6979].
- Do you zero-pad Diffie-Hellman public key values to the group size (see Section 4.2.8.1)?
- Do you verify signatures after making them to protect against RSA-CRT key leaks? [FW15]

C.4. Client Tracking Prevention

Clients SHOULD NOT reuse a ticket for multiple connections. Reuse of a ticket allows passive observers to correlate different connections. Servers that issue tickets SHOULD offer at least as many tickets as the number of connections that a client might use; for example, a web browser using HTTP/1.1 [RFC7230] might open six connections to a server. Servers SHOULD issue new tickets with every connection. This ensures that clients are always able to use a new ticket when creating a new connection.

C.5. Unauthenticated Operation

Previous versions of TLS offered explicitly unauthenticated cipher suites based on anonymous Diffie-Hellman. These modes have been deprecated in TLS 1.3. However, it is still possible to negotiate parameters that do not provide verifiable server authentication by several methods, including:

- Raw public keys [RFC7250].
- Using a public key contained in a certificate but without validation of the certificate chain or any of its contents.

Either technique used alone is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks and therefore unsafe for general use. However, it is also possible to bind such connections to an external authentication mechanism via out-of-band validation of the server's public key, trust on first use, or a mechanism such as channel bindings (though the channel bindings described in [RFC5929] are not defined for TLS 1.3). If no such mechanism is used, then the connection has no protection against active man-in-the-middle attack; applications **MUST NOT** use TLS in such a way absent explicit configuration or a specific application profile.

Appendix D. Backward Compatibility

The TLS protocol provides a built-in mechanism for version negotiation between endpoints potentially supporting different versions of TLS.

TLS 1.x and SSL 3.0 use compatible ClientHello messages. Servers can also handle clients trying to use future versions of TLS as long as the ClientHello format remains compatible and there is at least one protocol version supported by both the client and the server.

Prior versions of TLS used the record layer version number (TLSPlaintext.legacy_record_version and TLSCiphertext.legacy_record_version) for various purposes. As of TLS 1.3, this field is deprecated. The value of TLSPlaintext.legacy_record_version **MUST** be ignored by all implementations. The value of TLSCiphertext.legacy_record_version is included in the additional data for deprotection but **MAY** otherwise be ignored or **MAY** be validated to match the fixed constant value. Version negotiation is performed using only the handshake versions (ClientHello.legacy_version, ServerHello.legacy_version, as well as the ClientHello, HelloRetryRequest and ServerHello "supported_versions" extensions). In order to maximize interoperability with older endpoints, implementations that negotiate

the use of TLS 1.0-1.2 SHOULD set the record layer version number to the negotiated version for the ServerHello and all records thereafter.

For maximum compatibility with previously non-standard behavior and misconfigured deployments, all implementations SHOULD support validation of certification paths based on the expectations in this document, even when handling prior TLS versions' handshakes. (see Section 4.4.2.2)

TLS 1.2 and prior supported an "Extended Master Secret" [RFC7627] extension which digested large parts of the handshake transcript into the master secret. Because TLS 1.3 always hashes in the transcript up to the server CertificateVerify, implementations which support both TLS 1.3 and earlier versions SHOULD indicate the use of the Extended Master Secret extension in their APIs whenever TLS 1.3 is used.

D.1. Negotiating with an older server

A TLS 1.3 client who wishes to negotiate with servers that do not support TLS 1.3 will send a normal TLS 1.3 ClientHello containing 0x0303 (TLS 1.2) in ClientHello.legacy_version but with the correct version(s) in the "supported_versions" extension. If the server does not support TLS 1.3 it will respond with a ServerHello containing an older version number. If the client agrees to use this version, the negotiation will proceed as appropriate for the negotiated protocol. A client using a ticket for resumption SHOULD initiate the connection using the version that was previously negotiated.

Note that 0-RTT data is not compatible with older servers and SHOULD NOT be sent absent knowledge that the server supports TLS 1.3. See Appendix D.3.

If the version chosen by the server is not supported by the client (or not acceptable), the client MUST abort the handshake with a "protocol_version" alert.

Some legacy server implementations are known to not implement the TLS specification properly and might abort connections upon encountering TLS extensions or versions which they are not aware of. Interoperability with buggy servers is a complex topic beyond the scope of this document. Multiple connection attempts may be required in order to negotiate a backwards compatible connection; however, this practice is vulnerable to downgrade attacks and is NOT RECOMMENDED.

D.2. Negotiating with an older client

A TLS server can also receive a ClientHello indicating a version number smaller than its highest supported version. If the "supported_versions" extension is present, the server MUST negotiate using that extension as described in Section 4.2.1. If the "supported_versions" extension is not present, the server MUST negotiate the minimum of ClientHello.legacy_version and TLS 1.2. For example, if the server supports TLS 1.0, 1.1, and 1.2, and legacy_version is TLS 1.0, the server will proceed with a TLS 1.0 ServerHello. If the "supported_versions" extension is absent and the server only supports versions greater than ClientHello.legacy_version, the server MUST abort the handshake with a "protocol_version" alert.

Note that earlier versions of TLS did not clearly specify the record layer version number value in all cases (TLSPlaintext.legacy_record_version). Servers will receive various TLS 1.x versions in this field, but its value MUST always be ignored.

D.3. 0-RTT backwards compatibility

0-RTT data is not compatible with older servers. An older server will respond to the ClientHello with an older ServerHello, but it will not correctly skip the 0-RTT data and will fail to complete the handshake. This can cause issues when a client attempts to use 0-RTT, particularly against multi-server deployments. For example, a deployment could deploy TLS 1.3 gradually with some servers implementing TLS 1.3 and some implementing TLS 1.2, or a TLS 1.3 deployment could be downgraded to TLS 1.2.

A client that attempts to send 0-RTT data MUST fail a connection if it receives a ServerHello with TLS 1.2 or older. A client that attempts to repair this error SHOULD NOT send a TLS 1.2 ClientHello, but instead send a TLS 1.3 ClientHello without 0-RTT data.

To avoid this error condition, multi-server deployments SHOULD ensure a uniform and stable deployment of TLS 1.3 without 0-RTT prior to enabling 0-RTT.

D.4. Middlebox Compatibility Mode

Field measurements [Ben17a], [Ben17b], [Res17a], [Res17b] have found that a significant number of middleboxes misbehave when a TLS client/server pair negotiates TLS 1.3. Implementations can increase the chance of making connections through those middleboxes by making the TLS 1.3 handshake look more like a TLS 1.2 handshake:

- The client always provides a non-empty session ID in the ClientHello, as described in the legacy_session_id section of Section 4.1.2.
- If not offering early data, the client sends a dummy change_cipher_spec record (see the third paragraph of Section 5.1) immediately before its second flight. This may either be before its second ClientHello or before its encrypted handshake flight. If offering early data, the record is placed immediately after the first ClientHello.
- The server sends a dummy change_cipher_spec record immediately after its first handshake message. This may either be after a ServerHello or a HelloRetryRequest.

When put together, these changes make the TLS 1.3 handshake resemble TLS 1.2 session resumption, which improves the chance of successfully connecting through middleboxes. This "compatibility mode" is partially negotiated: The client can opt to provide a session ID or not and the server has to echo it. Either side can send change_cipher_spec at any time during the handshake, as they must be ignored by the peer, but if the client sends a non-empty session ID, the server MUST send the change_cipher_spec as described in this section.

D.5. Backwards Compatibility Security Restrictions

Implementations negotiating use of older versions of TLS SHOULD prefer forward secret and AEAD cipher suites, when available.

The security of RC4 cipher suites is considered insufficient for the reasons cited in [RFC7465]. Implementations MUST NOT offer or negotiate RC4 cipher suites for any version of TLS for any reason.

Old versions of TLS permitted the use of very low strength ciphers. Ciphers with a strength less than 112 bits MUST NOT be offered or negotiated for any version of TLS for any reason.

The security of SSL 3.0 [SSL3] is considered insufficient for the reasons enumerated in [RFC7568], and it MUST NOT be negotiated for any reason.

The security of SSL 2.0 [SSL2] is considered insufficient for the reasons enumerated in [RFC6176], and it MUST NOT be negotiated for any reason.

Implementations MUST NOT send an SSL version 2.0 compatible CLIENT-HELLO. Implementations MUST NOT negotiate TLS 1.3 or later using an

SSL version 2.0 compatible CLIENT-HELLO. Implementations are NOT RECOMMENDED to accept an SSL version 2.0 compatible CLIENT-HELLO in order to negotiate older versions of TLS.

Implementations MUST NOT send a ClientHello.legacy_version or ServerHello.legacy_version set to 0x0300 or less. Any endpoint receiving a Hello message with ClientHello.legacy_version or ServerHello.legacy_version set to 0x0300 MUST abort the handshake with a "protocol_version" alert.

Implementations MUST NOT send any records with a version less than 0x0300. Implementations SHOULD NOT accept any records with a version less than 0x0300 (but may inadvertently do so if the record version number is ignored completely).

Implementations MUST NOT use the Truncated HMAC extension, defined in Section 7 of [RFC6066], as it is not applicable to AEAD algorithms and has been shown to be insecure in some scenarios.

Appendix E. Overview of Security Properties

A complete security analysis of TLS is outside the scope of this document. In this section, we provide an informal description the desired properties as well as references to more detailed work in the research literature which provides more formal definitions.

We cover properties of the handshake separately from those of the record layer.

E.1. Handshake

The TLS handshake is an Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) protocol which is intended to provide both one-way authenticated (server-only) and mutually authenticated (client and server) functionality. At the completion of the handshake, each side outputs its view of the following values:

- A set of "session keys" (the various secrets derived from the master secret) from which can be derived a set of working keys.
- A set of cryptographic parameters (algorithms, etc.)
- The identities of the communicating parties.

We assume the attacker to be an active network attacker, which means it has complete control over the network used to communicate between the parties [RFC3552]. Even under these conditions, the handshake should provide the properties listed below. Note that these

properties are not necessarily independent, but reflect the protocol consumers' needs.

Establishing the same session keys. The handshake needs to output the same set of session keys on both sides of the handshake, provided that it completes successfully on each endpoint (See [CK01]; defn 1, part 1).

Secrecy of the session keys. The shared session keys should be known only to the communicating parties and not to the attacker (See [CK01]; defn 1, part 2). Note that in a unilaterally authenticated connection, the attacker can establish its own session keys with the server, but those session keys are distinct from those established by the client.

Peer Authentication. The client's view of the peer identity should reflect the server's identity. If the client is authenticated, the server's view of the peer identity should match the client's identity.

Uniqueness of the session keys: Any two distinct handshakes should produce distinct, unrelated session keys. Individual session keys produced by a handshake should also be distinct and independent.

Downgrade protection. The cryptographic parameters should be the same on both sides and should be the same as if the peers had been communicating in the absence of an attack (See [BBFKZG16]; defns 8 and 9}).

Forward secret with respect to long-term keys. If the long-term keying material (in this case the signature keys in certificate-based authentication modes or the external/resumption PSK in PSK with (EC)DHE modes) is compromised after the handshake is complete, this does not compromise the security of the session key (See [DOW92]), as long as the session key itself has been erased. The forward secrecy property is not satisfied when PSK is used in the "psk_ke" PskKeyExchangeMode.

Key Compromise Impersonation (KCI) resistance. In a mutually-authenticated connection with certificates, compromising the long-term secret of one actor should not break that actor's authentication of their peer in the given connection (see [HGFS15]). For example, if a client's signature key is compromised, it should not be possible to impersonate arbitrary servers to that client in subsequent handshakes.

Protection of endpoint identities. The server's identity (certificate) should be protected against passive attackers. The

client's identity should be protected against both passive and active attackers.

Informally, the signature-based modes of TLS 1.3 provide for the establishment of a unique, secret, shared key established by an (EC)DHE key exchange and authenticated by the server's signature over the handshake transcript, as well as tied to the server's identity by a MAC. If the client is authenticated by a certificate, it also signs over the handshake transcript and provides a MAC tied to both identities. [SIGMA] describes the design and analysis of this type of key exchange protocol. If fresh (EC)DHE keys are used for each connection, then the output keys are forward secret.

The external PSK and resumption PSK bootstrap from a long-term shared secret into a unique per-connection set of short-term session keys. This secret may have been established in a previous handshake. If PSK with (EC)DHE key establishment is used, these session keys will also be forward secret. The resumption PSK has been designed so that the resumption master secret computed by connection N and needed to form connection N+1 is separate from the traffic keys used by connection N, thus providing forward secrecy between the connections. In addition, if multiple tickets are established on the same connection, they are associated with different keys, so compromise of the PSK associated with one ticket does not lead to the compromise of connections established with PSKs associated with other tickets. This property is most interesting if tickets are stored in a database (and so can be deleted) rather than if they are self-encrypted.

The PSK binder value forms a binding between a PSK and the current handshake, as well as between the session where the PSK was established and the current session. This binding transitively includes the original handshake transcript, because that transcript is digested into the values which produce the Resumption Master Secret. This requires that both the KDF used to produce the resumption master secret and the MAC used to compute the binder be collision resistant. See Appendix E.1.1 for more on this. Note: The binder does not cover the binder values from other PSKs, though they are included in the Finished MAC.

Note: TLS does not currently permit the server to send a `certificate_request` message in non-certificate-based handshakes (e.g., PSK). If this restriction were to be relaxed in future, the client's signature would not cover the server's certificate directly. However, if the PSK was established through a `NewSessionTicket`, the client's signature would transitively cover the server's certificate through the PSK binder. [PSK-FINISHED] describes a concrete attack on constructions that do not bind to the server's certificate (see also [Kraw16]). It is unsafe to use certificate-based client

authentication when the client might potentially share the same PSK/key-id pair with two different endpoints. Implementations MUST NOT combine external PSKs with certificate-based authentication of either the client or the server unless negotiated by some extension.

If an exporter is used, then it produces values which are unique and secret (because they are generated from a unique session key). Exporters computed with different labels and contexts are computationally independent, so it is not feasible to compute one from another or the session secret from the exported value. Note: exporters can produce arbitrary-length values. If exporters are to be used as channel bindings, the exported value MUST be large enough to provide collision resistance. The exporters provided in TLS 1.3 are derived from the same handshake contexts as the early traffic keys and the application traffic keys respectively, and thus have similar security properties. Note that they do not include the client's certificate; future applications which wish to bind to the client's certificate may need to define a new exporter that includes the full handshake transcript.

For all handshake modes, the Finished MAC (and where present, the signature), prevents downgrade attacks. In addition, the use of certain bytes in the random nonces as described in Section 4.1.3 allows the detection of downgrade to previous TLS versions. See [BBFKZG16] for more detail on TLS 1.3 and downgrade.

As soon as the client and the server have exchanged enough information to establish shared keys, the remainder of the handshake is encrypted, thus providing protection against passive attackers, even if the computed shared key is not authenticated. Because the server authenticates before the client, the client can ensure that if it authenticates to the server, it only reveals its identity to an authenticated server. Note that implementations must use the provided record padding mechanism during the handshake to avoid leaking information about the identities due to length. The client's proposed PSK identities are not encrypted, nor is the one that the server selects.

E.1.1. Key Derivation and HKDF

Key derivation in TLS 1.3 uses the HKDF function defined in [RFC5869] and its two components, HKDF-Extract and HKDF-Expand. The full rationale for the HKDF construction can be found in [Kraw10] and the rationale for the way it is used in TLS 1.3 in [KW16]. Throughout this document, each application of HKDF-Extract is followed by one or more invocations of HKDF-Expand. This ordering should always be followed (including in future revisions of this document), in particular, one SHOULD NOT use an output of HKDF-Extract as an input

to another application of HKDF-Extract without an HKDF-Expand in between. Consecutive applications of HKDF-Expand are allowed as long as these are differentiated via the key and/or the labels.

Note that HKDF-Expand implements a pseudorandom function (PRF) with both inputs and outputs of variable length. In some of the uses of HKDF in this document (e.g., for generating exporters and the `resumption_master_secret`), it is necessary that the application of HKDF-Expand be collision-resistant, namely, it should be infeasible to find two different inputs to HKDF-Expand that output the same value. This requires the underlying hash function to be collision resistant and the output length from HKDF-Expand to be of size at least 256 bits (or as much as needed for the hash function to prevent finding collisions).

E.1.2. Client Authentication

A client that has sent authentication data to a server, either during the handshake or in post-handshake authentication, cannot be sure if the server afterwards considers the client to be authenticated or not. If the client needs to determine if the server considers the connection to be unilaterally or mutually authenticated, this has to be provisioned by the application layer. See [CHHSV17] for details. In addition, the analysis of post-handshake authentication from [Kraw16] shows that the client identified by the certificate sent in the post-handshake phase possesses the traffic key. This party is therefore the client that participated in the original handshake or one to whom the original client delegated the traffic key (assuming that the traffic key has not been compromised).

E.1.3. 0-RTT

The 0-RTT mode of operation generally provides similar security properties as 1-RTT data, with the two exceptions that the 0-RTT encryption keys do not provide full forward secrecy and that the server is not able to guarantee uniqueness of the handshake (non-replayability) without keeping potentially undue amounts of state. See Section 8 for mechanisms to limit the exposure to replay.

E.1.4. Exporter Independence

The `exporter_master_secret` and `early_exporter_master_secret` are derived to be independent of the traffic keys and therefore do not represent a threat to the security of traffic encrypted with those keys. However, because these secrets can be used to compute any exporter value, they SHOULD be erased as soon as possible. If the total set of exporter labels is known, then implementations SHOULD pre-compute the inner Derive-Secret stage of the exporter computation

for all those labels, then erase the [early_]exporter_master_secret, followed by each inner values as soon as it is known that it will not be needed again.

E.1.5. Post-Compromise Security

TLS does not provide security for handshakes which take place after the peer's long-term secret (signature key or external PSK) is compromised. It therefore does not provide post-compromise security [CCG16], sometimes also referred to as backwards or future secrecy. This is in contrast to KCI resistance, which describes the security guarantees that a party has after its own long-term secret has been compromised.

E.1.6. External References

The reader should refer to the following references for analysis of the TLS handshake: [DFGS15] [CHSV16] [DFGS16] [KW16] [Kraw16] [FGSW16] [LXZFH16] [FG17] [BBK17].

E.2. Record Layer

The record layer depends on the handshake producing strong traffic secrets which can be used to derive bidirectional encryption keys and nonces. Assuming that is true, and the keys are used for no more data than indicated in Section 5.5 then the record layer should provide the following guarantees:

Confidentiality. An attacker should not be able to determine the plaintext contents of a given record.

Integrity. An attacker should not be able to craft a new record which is different from an existing record which will be accepted by the receiver.

Order protection/non-replayability An attacker should not be able to cause the receiver to accept a record which it has already accepted or cause the receiver to accept record N+1 without having first processed record N.

Length concealment. Given a record with a given external length, the attacker should not be able to determine the amount of the record that is content versus padding.

Forward secrecy after key change. If the traffic key update mechanism described in Section 4.6.3 has been used and the previous generation key is deleted, an attacker who compromises

the endpoint should not be able to decrypt traffic encrypted with the old key.

Informally, TLS 1.3 provides these properties by AEAD-protecting the plaintext with a strong key. AEAD encryption [RFC5116] provides confidentiality and integrity for the data. Non-replayability is provided by using a separate nonce for each record, with the nonce being derived from the record sequence number (Section 5.3), with the sequence number being maintained independently at both sides thus records which are delivered out of order result in AEAD deprotection failures. In order to prevent mass cryptanalysis when the same plaintext is repeatedly encrypted by different users under the same key (as is commonly the case for HTTP), the nonce is formed by mixing the sequence number with a secret per-connection initialization vector derived along with the traffic keys. See [BT16] for analysis of this construction.

The re-keying technique in TLS 1.3 (see Section 7.2) follows the construction of the serial generator in [REKEY], which shows that re-keying can allow keys to be used for a larger number of encryptions than without re-keying. This relies on the security of the HKDF-Expand-Label function as a pseudorandom function (PRF). In addition, as long as this function is truly one way, it is not possible to compute traffic keys from prior to a key change (forward secrecy).

TLS does not provide security for data which is communicated on a connection after a traffic secret of that connection is compromised. That is, TLS does not provide post-compromise security/future secrecy/backward secrecy with respect to the traffic secret. Indeed, an attacker who learns a traffic secret can compute all future traffic secrets on that connection. Systems which want such guarantees need to do a fresh handshake and establish a new connection with an (EC)DHE exchange.

E.2.1. External References

The reader should refer to the following references for analysis of the TLS record layer: [BMMT15] [BT16] [BDFKPPRSZZ16] [BK17] [Anon18].

E.3. Traffic Analysis

TLS is susceptible to a variety of traffic analysis attacks based on observing the length and timing of encrypted packets [CLINIC] [HCJ16]. This is particularly easy when there is a small set of possible messages to be distinguished, such as for a video server hosting a fixed corpus of content, but still provides usable information even in more complicated scenarios.

TLS does not provide any specific defenses against this form of attack but does include a padding mechanism for use by applications: The plaintext protected by the AEAD function consists of content plus variable-length padding, which allows the application to produce arbitrary length encrypted records as well as padding-only cover traffic to conceal the difference between periods of transmission and periods of silence. Because the padding is encrypted alongside the actual content, an attacker cannot directly determine the length of the padding, but may be able to measure it indirectly by the use of timing channels exposed during record processing (i.e., seeing how long it takes to process a record or trickling in records to see which ones elicit a response from the server). In general, it is not known how to remove all of these channels because even a constant time padding removal function will likely feed the content into data-dependent functions. At minimum, a fully constant time server or client would require close cooperation with the application layer protocol implementation, including making that higher level protocol constant time.

Note: Robust traffic analysis defences will likely lead to inferior performance due to delay in transmitting packets and increased traffic volume.

E.4. Side Channel Attacks

In general, TLS does not have specific defenses against side-channel attacks (i.e., those which attack the communications via secondary channels such as timing) leaving those to the implementation of the relevant cryptographic primitives. However, certain features of TLS are designed to make it easier to write side-channel resistant code:

- Unlike previous versions of TLS which used a composite MAC-then-encrypt structure, TLS 1.3 only uses AEAD algorithms, allowing implementations to use self-contained constant-time implementations of those primitives.
- TLS uses a uniform "bad_record_mac" alert for all decryption errors, which is intended to prevent an attacker from gaining piecewise insight into portions of the message. Additional resistance is provided by terminating the connection on such errors; a new connection will have different cryptographic material, preventing attacks against the cryptographic primitives that require multiple trials.

Information leakage through side channels can occur at layers above TLS, in application protocols and the applications that use them. Resistance to side-channel attacks depends on applications and

application protocols separately ensuring that confidential information is not inadvertently leaked.

E.5. Replay Attacks on 0-RTT

Replayable 0-RTT data presents a number of security threats to TLS-using applications, unless those applications are specifically engineered to be safe under replay (minimally, this means idempotent, but in many cases may also require other stronger conditions, such as constant-time response). Potential attacks include:

- Duplication of actions which cause side effects (e.g., purchasing an item or transferring money) to be duplicated, thus harming the site or the user.
- Attackers can store and replay 0-RTT messages in order to re-order them with respect to other messages (e.g., moving a delete to after a create).
- Exploiting cache timing behavior to discover the content of 0-RTT messages by replaying a 0-RTT message to a different cache node and then using a separate connection to measure request latency, to see if the two requests address the same resource.

If data can be replayed a large number of times, additional attacks become possible, such as making repeated measurements of the speed of cryptographic operations. In addition, they may be able to overload rate-limiting systems. For further description of these attacks, see [Mac17].

Ultimately, servers have the responsibility to protect themselves against attacks employing 0-RTT data replication. The mechanisms described in Section 8 are intended to prevent replay at the TLS layer but do not provide complete protection against receiving multiple copies of client data. TLS 1.3 falls back to the 1-RTT handshake when the server does not have any information about the client, e.g., because it is in a different cluster which does not share state or because the ticket has been deleted as described in Section 8.1. If the application layer protocol retransmits data in this setting, then it is possible for an attacker to induce message duplication by sending the ClientHello to both the original cluster (which processes the data immediately) and another cluster which will fall back to 1-RTT and process the data upon application layer replay. The scale of this attack is limited by the client's willingness to retry transactions and therefore only allows a limited amount of duplication, with each copy appearing as a new connection at the server.

If implemented correctly, the mechanisms described in Section 8.1 and Section 8.2 prevent a replayed ClientHello and its associated 0-RTT data from being accepted multiple times by any cluster with consistent state; for servers which limit the use of 0-RTT to one cluster for a single ticket, then a given ClientHello and its associated 0-RTT data will only be accepted once. However, if state is not completely consistent, then an attacker might be able to have multiple copies of the data be accepted during the replication window. Because clients do not know the exact details of server behavior, they MUST NOT send messages in early data which are not safe to have replayed and which they would not be willing to retry across multiple 1-RTT connections.

Application protocols MUST NOT use 0-RTT data without a profile that defines its use. That profile needs to identify which messages or interactions are safe to use with 0-RTT and how to handle the situation when the server rejects 0-RTT and falls back to 1-RTT.

In addition, to avoid accidental misuse, TLS implementations MUST NOT enable 0-RTT (either sending or accepting) unless specifically requested by the application and MUST NOT automatically resend 0-RTT data if it is rejected by the server unless instructed by the application. Server-side applications may wish to implement special processing for 0-RTT data for some kinds of application traffic (e.g., abort the connection, request that data be resent at the application layer, or delay processing until the handshake completes). In order to allow applications to implement this kind of processing, TLS implementations MUST provide a way for the application to determine if the handshake has completed.

E.5.1. Replay and Exporters

Replays of the ClientHello produce the same early exporter, thus requiring additional care by applications which use these exporters. In particular, if these exporters are used as an authentication channel binding (e.g., by signing the output of the exporter) an attacker who compromises the PSK can transplant authenticators between connections without compromising the authentication key.

In addition, the early exporter SHOULD NOT be used to generate server-to-client encryption keys because that would entail the reuse of those keys. This parallels the use of the early application traffic keys only in the client-to-server direction.

E.6. PSK Identity Exposure

Because implementations respond to an invalid PSK binder by aborting the handshake, it may be possible for an attacker to verify whether a given PSK identity is valid. Specifically, if a server accepts both external PSK and certificate-based handshakes, a valid PSK identity will result in a failed handshake, whereas an invalid identity will just be skipped and result in a successful certificate handshake. Servers which solely support PSK handshakes may be able to resist this form of attack by treating the cases where there is no valid PSK identity and where there is an identity but it has an invalid binder identically.

E.7. Attacks on Static RSA

Although TLS 1.3 does not use RSA key transport and so is not directly susceptible to Bleichenbacher-type attacks, if TLS 1.3 servers also support static RSA in the context of previous versions of TLS, then it may be possible to impersonate the server for TLS 1.3 connections [JSS15]. TLS 1.3 implementations can prevent this attack by disabling support for static RSA across all versions of TLS. In principle, implementations might also be able to separate certificates with different keyUsage bits for static RSA decryption and RSA signature, but this technique relies on clients refusing to accept signatures using keys in certificates that do not have the digitalSignature bit set, and many clients do not enforce this restriction.

Appendix F. Working Group Information

The discussion list for the IETF TLS working group is located at the e-mail address tls@ietf.org [1]. Information on the group and information on how to subscribe to the list is at <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls>

Archives of the list can be found at: <https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/index.html>

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Transport Layer Security
Internet-Draft
Intended status: Standards Track
Expires: December 8, 2016

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Blocked Site Alerts for TLS
draft-lemon-tls-blocking-alert-00

Abstract

Hosts connecting to the Internet should generally be able to connect to all available services. However, as a matter of policy, need or preference, some services may be blocked by the network. TLS correctly treats attempts to communicate the reason for such blockage to the client as an attack. This memo describes a safe way for hosts to be notified using the TLS alert mechanism that a connection has been blocked by the network.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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1. Introduction

There are a number of situations in which a connection from a particular host to a particular service on the Internet may be prohibited by policy, or may be blocked in order to redirect the user to a captive portal login. In current practice, such connections, particularly HTTP connections, are usually terminated on some sort of HTTP proxy that presents a web page notifying the user as to what happened, and possibly offering some way to address whatever problem has come up. For instance, with a captive portal, the user may be directed to log in.

Such HTTP proxies are performing what can accurately be described as a man-in-the-middle attack. Whether the purpose is benign or malicious, TLS[1] detects such attacks and, rightly, prevents them.

Unfortunately, TLS's correct behavior in this situation creates a usability problem. There is no way to notify the user as to what went wrong. This is a problem not only with HTTP connections, but also with other TLS-based connections, such as secure IMAP connections: users of captive portals are generally familiar with the phenomenon of having to reset the mail client after logging in to the captive portal, because it has concluded that the network is not usable as a result of detecting an invalid certificate.

One way to address this is to simply tell the user to click through the security warning. This is of course a disastrously bad idea, because it trains the end user to automatically permit genuinely malicious attacks.

There is no reasonable basis for trusting a proxy engaging in a MiTM attack of this sort. It would be very unsafe, for example, to provide a TLS extension that could be used by the proxy to convey any sort of server-generated status message or URL, because these would present a valuable attack surface.

However, the TLS protocol begins as a plaintext communication. A plaintext response to the initial TLS Client Hello message can include an Alert response indicating that the connection is not permitted. Alert response codes contain no information generated by the server: they simply contain a status code and an indication as to whether the alert is fatal or just a warning.

Because they provide no mechanism for a malicious attacker to trick the end user into clicking on a malicious URL, or any way to tell a careful lie to the end user, TLS alerts would seem to be a viable means of providing the client with sufficient information to present a useful error message without compromising the security of the end user.

This document defines a set of TLS alert descriptions to indicate each of the common reasons why a network service provider might block a particular connection.

2. Applicability

Alert descriptions defined in this document are intended to be used in alert messages marked fatal. If a server sends an alert using any of the codes defined in this document which is marked as a warning, the client will detect a MiTM attack once the connection progresses to the point where the server certificate can be checked.

TLS clients receiving any of the alert descriptions documented here may present a message in a user interface describing the result code that was received. TLS clients without user interfaces may log a message indicating that such an alert was received. In either case, clients should limit the rate at which such messages that are presented, to avoid denial of service or resource exhaustion.

Connections not directly initiated by a user should not result in a message being displayed in the user interface (for example, a Javascript XMLHttpRequest that generates such an alert).

Because a TLS proxy interposed between the host and the server will not know the name of the server to which the host is connecting, it may need to depend on the Server Name Indication extension [2] to provide different status codes for different servers.

3. Meanings of Alert Descriptions

3.1. Captive Portal

The 'captive_portal' alert description represents a claim by the server that the host is connected to a network behind a captive portal. This is a curable condition: the end user may be able to register with the captive portal, and subsequently a connection to the same server would not be intercepted, and could succeed. TLS clients receiving this code may choose to retry the connection periodically, frequently enough that authenticating would provide a timely resumption of service.

3.2. Malicious Site

The 'malicious_site' alert description represents a claim by the server that the host has attempted a connection to a service that is known by the network administration to serve malicious content (e.g., malware, phishing, etc.). This condition is assumed to be a permanent failure; although it may be that at some future time the same IP address is no longer marked malicious, the particular transaction that was attempted is not likely to succeed if retried.

3.3. Policy Violation

The 'policy_violation' alert description represents a claim by the server that the host has attempted to connect to a site the use of which is in violation of local policy. For example, connecting to a porn site from an enterprise network might be a policy violation.

3.4. Account Attention Requested

The 'account_attention_requested' alert description represents a claim by the server that the network service provider is requesting that the end user log in to their account. This is a temporary condition, such that an immediate attempt to reconnect can be expected to succeed reaching the correct server.

3.5. Account Attention Required

The 'account_attention_required' alert description represents a claim by the server that the network service provider is insisting that the end user log in to their account. This is not a temporary condition:

until whatever situation has motivated the service provider to place this block has been resolved, any further attempt to connect will result in the same alert description being returned.

4. Acknowledgements

Placeholder

5. IANA Considerations

The IANA is requested to allocate values for the five new TLS Alert descriptions documented here from the TLS Alert Registry. These are:

TBD captive_portal

TBD malicious_site

TBD policy_violation

TBD account_attention_requested

TBD account_attention_required

6. Security Considerations

This document attempts to avoid creating a channel of attack for a malicious attacker. However, any bit of information, no matter how small, can be used as a lever to trick the user into taking some action which will create an opportunity for attack.

The situation prior to introduction of these new alert messages is that attackers wanting to trick an end user into taking such an action can do one of two things: they can simply block the connection, which will result in the user trying to figure out what went wrong, or they can send an invalid cert and hope that the user clicks through the warnings.

A captive_portal alert might be used by the operating system as a means of directing the end user to log in to a captive portal web page. An attacker knowing the expected behavior of the operating system could trigger such an attempt. However, means of triggering such attempts already exist, so this introduces no new opportunity.

A malicious_site alert has no meaningful user mitigation response other than to stop trying to visit that site. An attacker might provide such a response as a way to prevent an end user from accessing that site in the future. To avoid this, TLS clients that receive such alerts should not cache them. An end user might still

remember that such a warning was received, and might take it more seriously than an invalid cert message. There is no means to mitigate this risk; however, the added value of being able to block malicious sites likely outweighs the possibility that a malicious attacker could succeed in tricking the user in this way.

A `policy_violation` alert might encourage the end user to try to find some way around the policy. The alternative is to block the connection entirely, however; this would likely trigger similar behavior in the end user, so this does not seem to be a substantial additional risk.

The `account_attention_requested` and `account_attention_required` alerts could be used to trick the end user into going to a faked version of their provider's site that is not secured using TLS and PKI. The user could then be tricked into providing authentication credentials or other personal information. Existing browser mitigation for such attacks are likely adequate, but it cannot be denied that there is some additional risk in presenting these messages to the end user. The messages could be presented along with some advice to the end user about checking to make sure that the site is secure, or even provide the user with a user interface element to click that brings them to a browser window that prevents non-TLS/non-PKI connections from succeeding.

7. Privacy Considerations

To the extent that HTTP proxies using these alert messages rely on the Server Name Indication TLS extension [2], there could be a concern that the end user's privacy might be violated if the proxy logs the SNI information sent in each request. However, there is no way at present to prevent a passive listener from capturing such information, so this does not create a new privacy risk.

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Network Working Group
Internet-Draft
Intended status: Standards Track
Expires: July 1, 2017

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TLS Client Puzzles Extension
draft-nygren-tls-client-puzzles-02

Abstract

Client puzzles allow a TLS server to defend itself against asymmetric DDoS attacks. In particular, it allows a server to request clients perform a selected amount of computation prior to the server performing expensive cryptographic operations. This allows servers to employ a layered defense that represents an improvement over pure rate-limiting strategies.

Client puzzles are implemented as an extension to TLS 1.3 [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13] wherein a server can issue a HelloRetryRequest containing the puzzle as an extension. The client must then resend its ClientHello with the puzzle results in the extension.

Status of This Memo

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1. Overview and rationale

Adversaries can exploit the design of the TLS protocol to craft powerful asymmetric DDOS attacks. Once an attacker has opened a TCP connection, the attacker can transmit effectively static content that causes the server to perform expensive cryptographic operations. Rate limiting offers one possible defense against this type of attack; however, pure rate limiting systems represent an incomplete solution:

1. Rate limiting systems work best when a small number of bots are attacking a single server. Rate limiting is much more difficult when a large number of bots are directing small amounts of traffic to each member of a large distributed pool of servers.
2. Rate limiting systems encounter problems where a mixture of "good" and "bad" clients are hidden behind a single NAT or Proxy IP address and thus are all stuck being treated on equal footing.
3. Rate limiting schemes often penalize well-behaved good clients (which try to complete handshakes and may limit their number of retries) much more heavily than they penalize attacking bad clients (which may try to disguise themselves as good clients, but which otherwise are not constrained to behave in any particular way).

Client puzzles are complementary to rate-limiting and give servers another option than just rejecting some fraction of requests. A server can provide a puzzle (of varying and server-selected complexity) to a client as part of a HelloRetryRequest extension. The client must choose to either abandon the connection or solve the puzzle and resend its ClientHello with a solution to the puzzle. Puzzles are designed to have asymmetric complexity such that it is much cheaper for the server to generate and validate puzzles than it is for clients to solve them.

Client puzzle systems may be inherently "unfair" to clients that run with limited resources (such as mobile devices with batteries and slow CPUs). However, client puzzle schemes will typically only be evoked when a server is under attack and would otherwise be rejecting some fraction of requests. The overwhelming majority of transactions will never involve a client puzzle. Indeed, if client puzzles are successful in forcing adversaries to use a new attack vector, the presence of client puzzles will be completely transparent to end users.

It is likely that not all clients will choose to support this extension. During attack scenarios, servers will still have the option to apply traditional rate limiting schemes (perhaps with different parameters) to clients not supporting this extension or using a version of TLS prior to 1.3.

2. Notational Conventions

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

Messages are formatted with the notation as described within [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13].

3. Handshake Changes

Client puzzles are implemented as a new ClientPuzzleExtension to TLS 1.3 [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13]. A client supporting the ClientPuzzleExtension MUST indicate support by sending a ClientPuzzleExtension along with their ClientHello containing a list of puzzle types supported, but with no puzzle response. When a server wishes to force the client to solve a puzzle, it MAY send a HelloRetryRequest with a ClientPuzzleExtension containing a puzzle of a supported puzzle type and with associated parameters. To continue with the handshake, a client MUST resend their ClientHello with a ClientPuzzleExtension containing a response to the puzzle. The ClientHello must otherwise be identical to the initial ClientHello, other than for attributes that are defined by specification to not be identical.

Puzzles issued by the server contain a token that the client must include in their response. This allows a server to issue puzzles without retaining state, which is particularly useful when used in conjunction with DTLS.

If a puzzle would consume too many resources, a client MAY choose to abort the handshake with the new fatal alert "puzzle_too_hard" and terminate the connection.

A typical handshake when a puzzle is issued will look like:




Figure 1. Message flow for a handshake with a client puzzle

* Indicates optional or situation-dependent messages that are not always sent.

{ } Indicates messages protected using keys derived from the ephemeral secret.

[] Indicates messages protected using keys derived from the master secret.

Note in particular that the major cryptographic operations (starting to use the ephemeral secret and generating the CertificateVerify) are performed after the server has received and validated the ClientPuzzleExtension response from the client.

3.1. The ClientPuzzleExtension Message

The ClientPuzzleExtension message contains an indication of supported puzzle types during the initial ClientHello, a selected puzzle type and puzzle challenge during HelloRetryRequest, and the puzzle type and puzzle response in the retried ClientHello:


```
struct {
    ClientPuzzleType type<1..255>;
    opaque client_puzzle_challenge_response<0..2^16-1>;
} ClientPuzzleExtension;

enum {
    cookie (0),
    sha256_cpu (1),
    sha512_cpu (2),
    birthday_puzzle (3),
    (0xFFFF)
} ClientPuzzleType;
```

type During initial ClientHello, a vector of supported client puzzle types. During the HelloRetryRequest, a vector of exactly one element containing the proposed puzzle. During the retried ClientHello, a vector containing exactly one element with the type of the puzzle being responded to.

client_puzzle_challenge_response Data specific to the puzzle type, as defined in Section (#puzzles). In the initial ClientHello, this MUST be empty (zero-length). During HelloRetryRequest, this contains the challenge. During the retried ClientHello, this contains a response to the challenge. Puzzles containing a token may have it within this field.

4. Usage by Servers

Servers MAY send puzzles to clients when under duress, and the percentage of clients receiving puzzles and the complexity of the puzzles both MAY be selected as a function of the degree of duress.

Servers MAY also occasionally send puzzles to clients under normal operating circumstances to ensure that the extension works properly.

Servers MAY use additional factors, such as client IP reputation information, to determine when to send a puzzle as well as the complexity.

5. Proposed Client Puzzles

Having multiple client puzzle types allows good clients a choice to implement puzzles that match with their hardware capabilities (although this also applies to bad clients). It also allows "broken" puzzles to be phased out and retired, such as when cryptographic weaknesses are identified.

5.1. Cookie Client Puzzle Type

The "cookie" ClientPuzzleType is intended to be trivial. The `client_puzzle_challenge_response` data field is defined to be a token that the client must echo back.

During an initial ClientHello, this MUST be empty (zero-length). During HelloRetryRequest, the server MAY send a cookie challenge of zero or more bytes as `client_puzzle_challenge_response`. During the retried ClientHello, the client MUST respond by resending the identical cookie sent in the HelloRetryRequest.

5.2. SHA-256 CPU Puzzle Type

This puzzle forces the client to calculate a SHA-256 [RFC5754] multiple times. In particular, the server selects a difficulty and a random salt. The client solves the puzzle by finding any nonce where a SHA-256 hash across the nonce, the salt and a label contains difficulty leading zero bits.

```
struct {
    opaque token<0..2^16-1>;
    uint16 difficulty;
    uint8 salt<0..2^16-1>;
} SHA256CPUPuzzleChallenge;

struct {
    opaque token<0..2^16-1>;
    uint64 challenge_solution;
} SHA256CPUPuzzleResponse;
```

`token` The token allows the server to encapsulate and drop state, and also acts as a cookie for DTLS. During an initial ClientHello, this MUST be empty (zero-length). During HelloRetryRequest, the server MAY send a token challenge of zero or more bytes. During the retried ClientHello, the client MUST respond by resending the identical token sent in the HelloRetryRequest. Servers MAY include an authenticated version of difficulty and salt in this token if they wish to be stateless.

`difficulty` filter affecting the time to find solution.

`salt` A server selected variable-length bytestring.

`challenge_solution` The solution response to the puzzle, as solved by the client.

To find the response, the client must find a numeric value of `challenge_solution` where:

SHA-256(`challenge_solution || salt || label`) contains difficulty leading zeros.

where `"||"` denotes concatenation and where `label` is the NUL-terminated value `"TLS SHA256CPUPuzzle"` (including the NUL terminator).

Clients offering to support this puzzle type SHOULD support a difficulty value of at least 18. [\[\[TODO: is this a good value? https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Non-specialized_hardware_comparison has a comparison of SHA256 on various hardware.\]\]](https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Non-specialized_hardware_comparison)

5.3. SHA-512 CPU Puzzle Type

The SHA-512 CPU Puzzle Type is identical to the "SHA256 CPU Puzzle Type" except that the SHA-512 [RFC5754] hash function is used instead of SHA-256. The label used is the value `"TLS SHA512CPUPuzzle"`.

Clients offering to support this puzzle type SHOULD support difficulty values of at least 17. [\[\[TODO: is this a good value?\]\]](#)

5.4. Equihash: Memory-hard Generalized Birthday Problem Puzzle Type

Using Equihash, the asymmetric memory-hard generalized birthday problem PoW [NDSS2016], this puzzle will force a client to use a significant amount of memory to solve. The solution to this puzzle can be trivially verified.

```
struct {
    opaque token<0..2^16-1>;
    uint16 n;
    uint16 k;
    uint16 difficulty;
    uint8 salt<0..2^16-1>;
} BirthdayPuzzleChallenge;

struct {
    opaque token<0..2^16-1>;
    uint8 V<20>;
    uint8 solution<0..2^16-1>;
} BirthdayPuzzleResponse;
```

`token` The token allows the server to encapsulate and drop state, and also acts as a cookie for DTLS. During an initial ClientHello, this MUST be empty (zero-length). During HelloRetryRequest, the

server MAY send a token challenge of zero or more bytes. During the retried ClientHello, the client MUST respond by resending the identical token sent in the HelloRetryRequest. Servers MAY included an authenticated version of n , k , difficulty and salt in this token if they wish to be stateless.

salt A server selected variable-length bytestring.

n , k parameters affecting the complexity of Wagner's algorithm.

difficulty secondary filter affecting the time to find solution.

V 20 byte nonce used in solution.

solution list of $2^k (n/(k+1)+1)$ -bit nonces used in solution, referred to as x_i below.

In the further text, the output of blake2b is treated as a 512-bit register with most significant bits coming from the last bytes of blake2b output (i.e. little-endian conversion).

To compute the response, the client must find a V and 2^k solutions such that:

$$\text{blake2b}(\text{salt} \parallel V \parallel x_1) \text{ XOR } \text{blake2b}(\text{salt} \parallel V \parallel x_2) \text{ XOR } \dots \text{ XOR } \text{blake2b}(I \parallel V \parallel x(2^k)) = 0$$

$\text{blake2b}(\text{label} \parallel \text{salt} \parallel V \parallel x_1 \parallel x_2 \parallel \dots \parallel x(2^k))$ has difficulty leading zero bits.

where " \parallel " denotes concatenation and where label is the NUL-terminated value "TLS BirthdayPuzzle" (including the NUL terminator). Incomplete bytes in nonces x_i are padded with zero bits, which occupy the most significant bits.

The client MUST provide the solution list in an order that allows a server to verify the solution was created using Wagner's algorithm:

$$\text{blake2b}(\text{salt} \parallel V \parallel x(w_{2^l+1})) \text{ XOR } \text{blake2b}(\text{salt} \parallel V \parallel x(w_{2^l+2})) \text{ XOR } \dots \text{ XOR } \text{blake2b}(I \parallel V \parallel x(w * 2^l + 2^l))$$

has $nl/(k+1)$ leading zero bits for all w, l .

and two $2^{(l-1)} (n/(k+1)+1)$ -bit numbers Z_1 and Z_2 must satisfy $Z_1 < Z_2$ where

$$Z_1 = x(w_{2^l+1}) \parallel x(w_{2^l+2}) \parallel \dots \parallel x(w_{2^l+2^{(l-1)}}) \quad Z_2 = x(w_{2^l+2^{(l-1)}+1}) \parallel x(w_{2^l+2^l}) \parallel \dots \parallel x(w_{2^l+2^l})$$

as in ([NDSS2016] section 4A, 5C). The server MUST verify these intermediate equations.

A solution can be found using Wagner's algorithm as described in [NDSS2016]. The amount of memory required to find a solution is $2^{(n/(k+1)+k)}$ bytes. A solution requires $(k+1)2^{(n/(k+1)+d)}$ calls to the blake2b hash function.

Clients offering to support this puzzle type SHOULD support n , k values such that $2^{(n/(k+1)+k)}$ is at least 20MB.

Servers SHOULD look to minimize the value of k as 2^k blake2b hash operations will be required to verify a solution.

6. IANA Considerations

The IANA will need to assign an extension codepoint value for ClientPuzzleExtension.

The IANA will need to assign an AlertDescription codepoint value for puzzle_too_hard.

The IANA will also need to maintain a registry of client puzzle types.

7. Security Considerations

A hostile server could cause a client to consume unbounded resources. Clients MUST bound the amount of resources (cpu/time and memory) they will spend on a puzzle.

A puzzle type with economic utility could be abused by servers, resulting in unnecessary resource usage by clients. In the worst case, this could open up a new class of attacks where clients might be directed to malicious servers to get delegated work. As such, any new puzzle types SHOULD NOT be ones with utility for other purposes (such as mining cryptocurrency or cracking password hashes). Including fixed labels in new puzzle definitions may help mitigate this risk.

Depeding on the structure of the puzzles, it is possible that an attacker could send innocent clients to a hostile server and then use those clients to solve puzzles presented by another target server that the attacker wishes to attack. There may be ways to defend against this by including IP information in the puzzles (not currently proposed in this draft), although that introduces additional issues.

All extensions add complexity, which could expose additional attack surfaces on the client or the server. Using cryptographic primitives

and patterns already in-use in TLS can help reduce (but certainly not eliminate) this complexity.

An attacker that can force a server into client puzzle mode could result in a denial of service to clients not supporting puzzles or not having the resources to complete the puzzles. This is not necessarily worse than if the server was overloaded and forced to deny service to all clients or to a random selection of clients. By using client puzzles, clients willing to rate-limit themselves to the rate at which they can solve puzzles should still be able to obtain service while the server is able to stay available for these clients.

It is inevitable that attackers will build hardware optimized to solve particular puzzles. Using common cryptographic primitives (such as SHA-256) also means that commonly deployed clients may have hardware assistance, although this also benefits legitimate clients.

8. Privacy Considerations

Measuring the response time of clients to puzzles gives an indication of the relative capabilities of clients. This could be used as an input for client fingerprinting.

Client's support for this extension, as well as which puzzles they support, could also be used as an input for client fingerprinting.

9. Acknowledgments

The story of client puzzles dates back to Dwork and Naor [DN92] and Juels and Brainard [JB99]. Some of this draft was inspired by work done by Kyle Rose in 2001, as well as a 2001 paper by Drew Dean (Xerox PARC) and Adam Stubblefield (Rice) [SEC2001.DEAN]. Discussions with Eric Rescorla, Yoav Nir, Richard Willey, Rich Salz, Kyle Rose, Brian Sniffen, and others on the TLS working group have heavily influenced this proposal and contributed to its content. An alternate approach was proposed in [I-D.nir-tls-puzzles]. Some similar mechanisms for protecting IKE are discussed in [I-D.ietf-ipsecme-ddos-protection].

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Network Working Group
Internet-Draft
Intended status: Experimental
Expires: December 28, 2019

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TLS Server Identity Pinning with Tickets
draft-sheffer-tls-pinning-ticket-12

Abstract

Misissued public-key certificates can prevent TLS clients from appropriately authenticating the TLS server. Several alternatives have been proposed to detect this situation and prevent a client from establishing a TLS session with a TLS end point authenticated with an illegitimate public-key certificate. These mechanisms are either not widely deployed or limited to public web browsing.

This document proposes experimental extensions to TLS with opaque pinning tickets as a way to pin the server's identity. During an initial TLS session, the server provides an original encrypted pinning ticket. In subsequent TLS session establishment, upon receipt of the pinning ticket, the server proves its ability to decrypt the pinning ticket and thus the ownership of the pinning protection key. The client can now safely conclude that the TLS session is established with the same TLS server as the original TLS session. One of the important properties of this proposal is that no manual management actions are required.

Status of This Memo

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1. Introduction

Misissued public-key certificates can prevent TLS [RFC8446] clients from appropriately authenticating the TLS server. This is a significant risk in the context of the global public key infrastructure (PKI), and similarly for large scale deployments of certificates within enterprises.

This document proposes experimental extensions to TLS with opaque pinning tickets as a way to pin the server's identity. The approach is intended to be easy to implement and deploy, and reuses some of the ideas behind TLS session resumption [RFC5077].

Ticket pinning is a second factor server authentication method and is not proposed as a substitute for the authentication method provided in the TLS key exchange. More specifically, the client only uses the

pinning identity method after the TLS key exchange is successfully completed. In other words, the pinning identity method is only performed over an authenticated TLS session. Note that Ticket Pinning does not pin certificate information and therefore is truly an independent second factor authentication.

Ticket pinning is a Trust On First Use (TOFU) mechanism, in that the first server authentication is only based on PKI certificate validation, but for any follow-on sessions, the client is further ensuring the server's identity based on the server's ability to decrypt the ticket, in addition to normal PKI certificate authentication.

During initial TLS session establishment, the client requests a pinning ticket from the server. Upon receiving the request the server generates a pinning secret which is expected to be unpredictable for peers other than the client or the server. In our case, the pinning secret is generated from parameters exchanged during the TLS key exchange, so client and server can generate it locally and independently. The server constructs the pinning ticket with the necessary information to retrieve the pinning secret. The server then encrypts the ticket and returns the pinning ticket to the client with an associated pinning lifetime.

The pinning lifetime value indicates for how long the server promises to retain the server-side ticket-encryption key, which allows it to complete the protocol exchange correctly and prove its identity. The server commitment (and ticket lifetime) is typically on the order of weeks.

Once the key exchange is completed and the server is deemed authenticated, the client generates locally the pinning secret and caches the server's identifiers to index the pinning secret as well as the pinning ticket and its associated lifetime.

When the client re-establishes a new TLS session with the server, it sends the pinning ticket to the server. Upon receiving it, the server returns a proof of knowledge of the pinning secret. Once the key exchange is completed and the server has been authenticated, the client checks the pinning proof returned by the server using the client's stored pinning secret. If the proof matches, the client can conclude that the server it is currently connecting to is in fact the correct server.

This document only applies to TLS 1.3. We believe that the idea can also be back-fitted into earlier versions of the protocol, but this would require significant changes. One example is that TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] and earlier versions do not provide a generic facility of

encrypted handshake extensions, such as is used here to transport the ticket.

The main advantages of this protocol over earlier pinning solutions are:

- The protocol is at the TLS level, and as a result is not restricted to HTTP at the application level.
- The protocol is robust to server IP, Certificate Authority (CA), and public key changes. The server is characterized by the ownership of the pinning protection key, which is never provided to the client. Server configuration parameters such as the CA and the public key may change without affecting the pinning ticket protocol.
- Once a single parameter is configured (the ticket's lifetime), operation is fully automated. The server administrator need not bother with the management of backup certificates or explicit pins.
- For server clusters, we reuse the existing [RFC5077] infrastructure where it exists.
- Pinning errors, presumably resulting from man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks, can be detected both by the client and the server. This allows for server-side detection of MITM attacks using large-scale analytics, and with no need to rely on clients to explicitly report the error.

A note on terminology: unlike other solutions in this space, we do not do "certificate pinning" (or "public key pinning"), since the protocol is oblivious to the server's certificate. We prefer the term "server identity pinning" for this new solution. In our solution, the server proves its identity by generating a proof that it can read and decrypt an encrypted ticket. As a result, the identity proof relies on proof of ownership of the pinning protection key. However, this key is never exchanged with the client or known by it, and so cannot itself be pinned.

1.1. Conventions used in this document

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

1.2. Scope of Experimentation

This document describes an experimental extension to the TLS protocol. This section defines constraints on this experiment and how it can yield useful information, potentially resulting in a standard.

The protocol is designed so that if the server does not support it, the client and server fall back to a normal TLS exchange, with the exception of a single PinningTicket extension being initially sent by the client. In addition, the protocol is designed to only strengthen the validation of the server's identity ("second factor"). As a result, implementation or even protocol errors should not result in weakened security compared to the normal TLS exchange. Given these two points, experimentation can be run on the open Internet between consenting client and server implementations.

The goal of the experiment is to prove that:

- Non-supporting clients and servers are unaffected.
- Connectivity between supporting clients and servers is retained under normal circumstances, whether the client connects to the server frequently (relative to the ticket's lifetime) or very rarely.
- Enterprise middleboxes do not interrupt such connectivity.
- Misissued certificates and rogue TLS-aware middleboxes do result in broken connectivity, and these cases are detected on the client and/or server side. Clients and servers can be recovered even after such events and the normal connectivity restored.

Following two years of successful deployment, the authors will publish a document that summarizes the experiment's findings and will resubmit the protocol for consideration as a Proposed Standard.

2. Protocol Overview

The protocol consists of two phases: the first time a particular client connects to a server, and subsequent connections.

This protocol supports full TLS handshakes, as well as 0-RTT handshakes. Below we present it in the context of a full handshake, but behavior in 0-RTT handshakes should be identical.

The document presents some similarities with the ticket resumption mechanism described in [RFC5077]. However the scope of this document

differs from session resumption mechanisms implemented with [RFC5077] or with other mechanisms. Specifically, the pinning ticket does not carry any state associated with a TLS session and thus cannot be used for session resumption, or to authenticate the client. Instead, the pinning ticket only contains the encrypted pinning secret. The pinning ticket is used by the server to prove its ability to decrypt it, which implies ownership of the pinning protection key.

[RFC5077] has been obsoleted by [RFC8446] and ticket resumption is now defined by Sec. 2.2 of [RFC8446]. This document references [RFC5077] as an informational document since it contains a more thorough discussion of stateless ticket resumption and because ticket resumption benefits from significant operational experience with TLS 1.2 that is still widely deployed at the time of writing this document. This experience as well as deployment can easily be re-used for identity pinning.

With TLS 1.3, session resumption is based on a preshared key (PSK). This is orthogonal to this protocol. With TLS 1.3, a TLS session can be established using PKI and a pinning ticket, and later resumed with PSK.

However, the protocol described in this document addresses the problem of misissued certificates. Thus, it is not expected to be used outside a certificate-based TLS key exchange, such as in PSK. As a result, PSK handshakes MUST NOT include the extension defined here.

2.1. Initial Connection

When a client first connects to a server, it requests a pinning ticket by sending an empty PinningTicket extension, and receives it as part of the server's first response, in the returned PinningTicket extension.

```

Client                                     Server

ClientHello
+ key_share
+ signature_algorithms
+ PinningTicket ----->

                                     ServerHello
                                     + key_share
                                     {EncryptedExtensions
                                     + PinningTicket}
                                     {CertificateRequest*}
                                     {Certificate*}
                                     {CertificateVerify*}
                                     {Finished}
                                     <-----
{Certificate*}
{CertificateVerify*}
{Finished} ----->
[Application Data] <-----> [Application Data]

```

* Indicates optional or situation-dependent messages that are not always sent.

{ } Indicates messages protected using keys derived from the ephemeral secret.

[] Indicates messages protected using keys derived from the master secret.

If a client supports the PinningTicket extension and does not have any pinning ticket associated with the server, the exchange is considered as an initial connection. Other reasons the client may not have a pinning ticket include the client having flushed its pinning ticket store, or the committed lifetime of the pinning ticket having expired.

Upon receipt of the PinningTicket extension, the server computes a pinning secret (Section 4.1), and sends the pinning ticket (Section 4.2) encrypted with the pinning protection key (Section 4.3). The pinning ticket is associated with a lifetime value by which the server assumes the responsibility of retaining the pinning protection key and being able to decrypt incoming pinning tickets during the period indicated by the committed lifetime.

Once the pinning ticket has been generated, the server returns the pinning ticket and the committed lifetime in a PinningTicket extension embedded in the EncryptedExtensions message. We note that a PinningTicket extension MUST NOT be sent as part of a HelloRetryRequest.

Upon receiving the pinning ticket, the client MUST NOT accept it until the key exchange is completed and the server authenticated. If the key exchange is not completed successfully, the client MUST ignore the received pinning ticket. Otherwise, the client computes the pinning secret and SHOULD cache the pinning secret and the pinning ticket for the duration indicated by the pinning ticket lifetime. The client SHOULD clean up the cached values at the end of the indicated lifetime.

2.2. Subsequent Connections

When the client initiates a connection to a server it has previously seen (see Section 2.3 on identifying servers), it SHOULD send the pinning ticket for that server. The pinning ticket, pinning secret and pinning ticket lifetime computed during the establishment of the previous TLS session are designated in this document as the "original" ones, to distinguish them from a new ticket that may be generated during the current session.

The server MUST extract the original `pinning_secret` value from the ticket and MUST respond with a `PinningTicket` extension, which includes:

- A proof that the server can understand the ticket that was sent by the client; this proof also binds the pinning ticket to the server's (current) public key, as well as the ongoing TLS session. The proof is mandatory and MUST be included if a pinning ticket was sent by the client.
- A fresh pinning ticket. The main reason for refreshing the ticket on each connection is privacy: to avoid the ticket serving as a fixed client identifier. While a fresh pinning ticket might be of zero length, it is RECOMMENDED to include a fresh ticket with a non zero length with each response.

If the server cannot validate the received ticket, that might indicate an earlier MITM attack on this client. The server MUST then abort the connection with a `handshake_failure` alert, and SHOULD log this failure.

The client MUST verify the proof, and if it fails to do so, MUST issue a `handshake_failure` alert and abort the connection (see also Section 7.5). It is important that the client does not attempt to "fall back" by omitting the `PinningTicket` extension.

When the connection is successfully set up, i.e. after the `Finished` message is verified, the client SHOULD store the new ticket along with the corresponding `pinning_secret`, replacing the original ticket.

Although this is an extension, if the client already has a ticket for a server, the client MUST interpret a missing PinningTicket extension in the server's response as an attack, because of the server's prior commitment to respect the ticket. The client MUST abort the connection in this case. See also Section 5.5 on ramping down support for this extension.

2.3. Indexing the Pins

Each pin is associated with a set of identifiers which include among others host name, protocol (TLS or DTLS) and port number. In other words, the pin for port TCP/443 may be different from that for DTLS or from the pin for port TCP/8443. These identifiers are expected to be relevant to characterize the identity of the server as well as the establishing TLS session. When a host name is used, it MUST be the value sent inside the Server Name Indication (SNI) extension. This definition is similar to a Web Origin [RFC6454], but does not assume the existence of a URL.

The purpose of ticket pinning is to pin the server identity. As a result, any information orthogonal to the server's identity MUST NOT be considered in indexing. More particularly, IP addresses are ephemeral and forbidden in SNI and therefore pins MUST NOT be associated with IP addresses. Similarly, CA names or public keys associated with server MUST NOT be used for indexing as they may change over time.

3. Message Definitions

This section defines the format of the PinningTicket extension. We follow the message notation of [RFC8446].

```
opaque pinning_ticket<0..2^16-1>;
opaque pinning_proof<0..2^8-1>;

struct {
    select (Role) {
        case client:
            pinning_ticket ticket<0..2^16-1>; //omitted on 1st connection

        case server:
            pinning_proof proof<0..2^8-1>; //no proof on 1st connection
            pinning_ticket ticket<0..2^16-1>; //omitted on ramp down
            uint32 lifetime;
    }
} PinningTicketExtension;
```

`ticket` a pinning ticket sent by the client or returned by the server. The ticket is opaque to the client. The extension MUST contain exactly 0 or 1 tickets.

`proof` a demonstration by the server that it understands the received ticket and therefore that it is in possession of the secret that was used to generate it originally. The extension MUST contain exactly 0 or 1 proofs.

`lifetime` the duration (in seconds) that the server commits to accept offered tickets in the future.

4. Cryptographic Operations

This section provides details on the cryptographic operations performed by the protocol peers.

4.1. Pinning Secret

The pinning secret is generated locally by the client and the server which means they must use the same inputs to generate it. This value must be generated before the `ServerHello` message is sent, as the server includes the corresponding pinning ticket in the same flight as the `ServerHello` message. In addition, the pinning secret must be unpredictable to any party other than the client and the server.

The pinning secret is derived using the `Derive-Secret` function provided by TLS 1.3, described in Section "Key Schedule" of [RFC8446].

```
pinning secret = Derive-Secret(Handshake Secret, "pinning secret",
                             ClientHello...ServerHello)
```

4.2. Pinning Ticket

The pinning ticket contains the pinning secret. The pinning ticket is provided by the client to the server which decrypts it in order to extract the pinning secret and responds with a pinning proof. As a result, the characteristics of the pinning ticket are:

- Pinning tickets MUST be encrypted and integrity-protected using strong cryptographic algorithms.
- Pinning tickets MUST be protected with a long-term pinning protection key.
- Pinning tickets MUST include a pinning protection key ID or serial number as to enable the pinning protection key to be refreshed.

- The pinning ticket MAY include other information, in addition to the pinning secret. When additional information is included, a careful review needs to be performed to evaluate its impact on privacy.

The pinning ticket's format is not specified by this document, but we RECOMMEND a format similar to the one proposed by [RFC5077].

4.3. Pinning Protection Key

The pinning protection key is only used by the server and so remains server implementation specific. [RFC5077] recommends the use of two keys, but when using AEAD algorithms only a single key is required.

When a single server terminates TLS for multiple virtual servers using the Server Name Indication (SNI) mechanism, we strongly RECOMMEND to use a separate protection key for each one of them, in order to allow migrating virtual servers between different servers while keeping pinning active.

As noted in Section 5.1, if the server is actually a cluster of machines, the protection key MUST be synchronized between all the nodes that accept TLS connections to the same server name. When [RFC5077] is deployed, an easy way to do it is to derive the protection key from the session-ticket protection key, which is already synchronized. For example:

```
pinning_protection_key = HKDF-Expand(resumption_protection_key,  
                                     "pinning protection", L)
```

Where `resumption_protection_key` is the ticket protection key defined in [RFC5077]. Both `resumption_protection_key` and `pinning_protection_key` are only used by the server.

The above solution attempts to minimize code changes related to management of the `resumption_protection_key`. The drawback is that this key would be used both to directly encrypt session tickets and to derive the `pinning_protection_key`, and such mixed usage of a single key is not in line with cryptographic best practices. Where possible, we RECOMMEND to have the `resumption_protection_key` and `pinning_protection_key` as two, unrelated keys that are separately shared among the relevant servers.

4.4. Pinning Proof

The pinning proof is sent by the server to demonstrate that it has been able to decrypt the pinning ticket and retrieve the pinning secret. The proof must be unpredictable and must not be replayed.

Similarly to the pinning ticket, the pinning proof is sent by the server in the ServerHello message. In addition, it must not be possible for a MITM server with a fake certificate to obtain a pinning proof from the original server.

In order to address these requirements, the pinning proof is bound to the TLS session as well as the public key of the server:

```
pinning_proof_secret=Derive-Secret(Handshake Secret, "pinning proof 1",
    ClientHello...ServerHello)
```

```
proof = HMAC(original_pinning_secret, "pinning proof 2" +
    pinning_proof_secret + Hash(server_public_key))
```

where HMAC [RFC2104] uses the Hash algorithm that was negotiated in the handshake, and the same hash is also used over the server's public key. The `original_pinning_secret` value refers to the secret value extracted from the ticket sent by the client, to distinguish it from a new pinning secret value that is possibly computed in the current exchange. The `server_public_key` value is the DER representation of the public key, specifically the `SubjectPublicKeyInfo` structure as-is.

5. Operational Considerations

The main motivation behind the current protocol is to enable identity pinning without the need for manual operations. Manual operations are susceptible to human error and in the case of public key pinning, can easily result in "server bricking": the server becoming inaccessible to some or all of its users. To achieve this goal operations described in identity pinning are only performed within the current TLS session, and there is no dependence on any TLS configuration parameters such as CA identity or public keys. As a result, configuration changes are unlikely to lead to desynchronized state between the client and the server.

5.1. Protection Key Synchronization

The only operational requirement when deploying this protocol is that if the server is part of a cluster, protection keys (the keys used to encrypt tickets) MUST be synchronized between all cluster members. The protocol is designed so that if resumption ticket protection keys [RFC5077] are already synchronized between cluster members, nothing more needs to be done.

Moreover, synchronization does not need to be instantaneous, e.g. protection keys can be distributed a few minutes or hours in advance of their rollover. In such scenarios, each cluster member MUST be

able to accept tickets protected with a new version of the protection key, even while it is still using an old version to generate keys. This ensures that a client that receives a "new" ticket does not next hit a cluster member that still rejects this ticket.

Misconfiguration can lead to the server's clock being off by a large amount of time. Consider a case where a server's clock is misconfigured, for example, to be 1 year in the future, and the system is allowed to delete expired keys automatically. The server will then delete many outstanding keys because they are now long expired and will end up rejecting valid tickets that are stored by clients. Such a scenario could make the server inaccessible to a large number of clients.

The decision to delete a key should at least consider the largest value of the ticket lifetime as well as the expected time desynchronisation between the servers of the cluster and the time difference for distributing the new key among the different servers in the cluster.

5.2. Ticket Lifetime

The lifetime of the ticket is a commitment by the server to retain the ticket's corresponding protection key for this duration, so that the server can prove to the client that it knows the secret embedded in the ticket. For production systems, the lifetime SHOULD be between 7 and 31 days.

5.3. Certificate Renewal

The protocol ensures that the client will continue speaking to the correct server even when the server's certificate is renewed. In this sense, pinning is not associated with certificates which is the reason we designate the protocol described in this document as "server identity pinning".

Note that this property is not impacted by the use of the server's public key in the pinning proof, because the scope of the public key used is only the current TLS session.

5.4. Certificate Revocation

The protocol is orthogonal to certificate validation in the sense that, if the server's certificate has been revoked or is invalid for some other reason, the client MUST refuse to connect to it regardless of any ticket-related behavior.

5.5. Disabling Pinning

A server implementing this protocol MUST have a "ramp down" mode of operation where:

- The server continues to accept valid pinning tickets and responds correctly with a proof.
- The server does not send back a new pinning ticket.

After a while no clients will hold valid tickets any more and the feature may be disabled. Note that clients that do not receive a new pinning ticket do not necessarily need to remove the original ticket. Instead, the client may keep on using the ticket until its lifetime expires. However, as detailed in section Section 7.7, re-use of a ticket by the client may result in privacy concerns as the ticket value may be used to correlate TLS sessions.

Issuing a new pinning ticket with a shorter lifetime would only delay the ramp down process, as the shorter lifetime can only affect clients that actually initiated a new connection. Other clients would still see the original lifetime for their pinning tickets.

5.6. Server Compromise

If a server compromise is detected, the pinning protection key MUST be rotated immediately, but the server MUST still accept valid tickets that use the old, compromised key. Clients that still hold old pinning tickets will remain vulnerable to MITM attacks, but those that connect to the correct server will immediately receive new tickets protected with the newly generated pinning protection key.

The same procedure applies if the pinning protection key is compromised directly, e.g. if a backup copy is inadvertently made public.

5.7. Disaster Recovery

All web servers in production need to be backed up, so that they can be recovered if a disaster (including a malicious activity) ever wipes them out. Backup often includes the certificate and its private key, which must be backed up securely. The pinning secret, including earlier versions that are still being accepted, must be backed up regularly. However since it is only used as an authentication second factor, it does not require the same level of confidentiality as the server's private key.

Readers should note that [RFC5077] session resumption keys are more security sensitive, and should normally not be backed up but rather treated as ephemeral keys. Even when servers derive pinning secrets from resumption keys (Section 4.1), they MUST NOT back up resumption keys.

6. Implementation Status

Note to RFC Editor: please remove this section before publication, including the reference to [RFC7942].

This section records the status of known implementations of the protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in [RFC7942]. The description of implementations in this section is intended to assist the IETF in its decision processes in progressing drafts to RFCs. Please note that the listing of any individual implementation here does not imply endorsement by the IETF. Furthermore, no effort has been spent to verify the information presented here that was supplied by IETF contributors. This is not intended as, and must not be construed to be, a catalog of available implementations or their features. Readers are advised to note that other implementations may exist.

According to RFC 7942, "this will allow reviewers and working groups to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit of running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable experimentation and feedback that have made the implemented protocols more mature. It is up to the individual working groups to use this information as they see fit".

6.1. Mint Fork

6.1.1. Overview

A fork of the Mint TLS 1.3 implementation, developed by Yaron Sheffer and available at <https://github.com/yaronf/mint>.

6.1.2. Description

This is a fork of the TLS 1.3 implementation, and includes client and server code. In addition to the actual protocol, several utilities are provided allowing to manage pinning protection keys on the server side, and pinning tickets on the client side.

6.1.3. Level of Maturity

This is a prototype.

6.1.4. Coverage

The entire protocol is implemented.

6.1.5. Version Compatibility

The implementation is compatible with draft-sheffer-tls-pinning-ticket-02.

6.1.6. Licensing

Mint itself and this fork are available under an MIT license.

6.1.7. Contact Information

See author details below.

7. Security Considerations

This section reviews several security aspects related to the proposed extension.

7.1. Trust on First Use (TOFU) and MITM Attacks

This protocol is a "trust on first use" protocol. If a client initially connects to the "right" server, it will be protected against MITM attackers for the lifetime of each received ticket. If it connects regularly (depending of course on the server-selected lifetime), it will stay constantly protected against fake certificates.

However if it initially connects to an attacker, subsequent connections to the "right" server will fail. Server operators might want to advise clients on how to remove corrupted pins, once such large scale attacks are detected and remediated.

The protocol is designed so that it is not vulnerable to an active MITM attacker who has real-time access to the original server. The pinning proof includes a hash of the server's public key, to ensure the client that the proof was in fact generated by the server with which it is initiating the connection.

7.2. Pervasive Monitoring

Some organizations, and even some countries perform pervasive monitoring on their constituents [RFC7258]. This often takes the form of always-active SSL proxies. Because of the TOFU property, this protocol does not provide any security in such cases.

Pervasive monitoring may also result in privacy concerns detailed in section Section 7.7.

7.3. Server-Side Error Detection

Uniquely, this protocol allows the server to detect clients that present incorrect tickets and therefore can be assumed to be victims of a MITM attack. Server operators can use such cases as indications of ongoing attacks, similarly to fake certificate attacks that took place in a few countries in the past.

7.4. Client Policy and SSL Proxies

Like it or not, some clients are normally deployed behind an SSL proxy. Similarly to [RFC7469], it is acceptable to allow pinning to be disabled for some hosts according to local policy. For example, a User Agent (UA) MAY disable pinning for hosts whose validated certificate chain terminates at a user-defined trust anchor, rather than a trust anchor built-in to the UA (or underlying platform). Moreover, a client MAY accept an empty PinningTicket extension from such hosts as a valid response.

7.5. Client-Side Error Behavior

When a client receives a malformed or empty PinningTicket extension from a pinned server, it MUST abort the handshake and MUST NOT retry with no PinningTicket in the request. Doing otherwise would expose the client to trivial fallback attacks, similar to those described in [RFC7507].

This rule can however have negative affects on clients that move from behind SSL proxies into the open Internet and vice versa, if the advice in Section 7.4 is not followed. Therefore, we RECOMMEND that browser and library vendors provide a documented way to remove stored pins.

7.6. Stolen and Forged Tickets

Stealing pinning tickets even in conjunction with other pinning parameters, such as the associated pinning secret, provides no benefit to the attacker since pinning tickets are used to secure the

client rather than the server. Similarly, it is useless to forge a ticket for a particular server.

7.7. Client Privacy

This protocol is designed so that an external attacker cannot correlate between different requests of a single client, provided the client requests and receives a fresh ticket upon each connection. This may be of concern particularly during ramp-down, if the server does not provide any new ticket and the client re-uses the same ticket. To reduce or avoid such privacy concerns, it is RECOMMENDED for the server to issue a fresh ticket with a reduced life time. This would at least reduce the time period under which TLS session of the client are correlated. The server MAY also issue tickets with a zero second lifetime until it is confident all tickets are expired.

On the other hand, the server to which the client is connecting can easily track the client. This may be an issue when the client expects to connect to the server (e.g., a mail server) with multiple identities. Implementations SHOULD allow the user to opt out of pinning, either in general or for particular servers.

This document does not define the exact content of tickets. Including client-specific information in tickets would raise privacy concerns and is NOT RECOMMENDED.

7.8. Ticket Protection Key Management

While the ticket format is not mandated by this document, we RECOMMEND using authenticated encryption to protect it. Some of the algorithms commonly used for authenticated encryption, e.g. GCM, are highly vulnerable to nonce reuse, and this problem is magnified in a cluster setting. Therefore implementations that choose AES-GCM or any AEAD equivalent MUST adopt one of these three alternatives:

- Partition the nonce namespace between cluster members and use monotonic counters on each member, e.g. by setting the nonce to the concatenation of the cluster member ID and an incremental counter.
- Generate random nonces but avoid the so-called birthday bound, i.e. never generate more than the maximum allowed number of encrypted tickets (2^{64} for AES-128-GCM) for the same ticket pinning protection Key.
- An alternative design which has been attributed to Karthik Bhargavan is as follows. Start with a 128-bit master key "K_master" and then for each encryption, generate a 256-bit random

nonce and compute: $K = \text{HKDF}(K_{\text{master}}, \text{Nonce} \parallel \text{"key"})$, then $N = \text{HKDF}(K_{\text{master}}, \text{Nonce} \parallel \text{"nonce"})$. Use these values to encrypt the ticket, $\text{AES-GCM}(K, N, \text{data})$. This nonce should then be stored and transmitted with the ticket.

8. IANA Considerations

IANA is requested to allocate a TicketPinning extension value in the TLS ExtensionType Registry.

[RFC8447] defines the procedure and requirements and the necessary information for the IANA to update the "TLS ExtensionType Values" registry [TLS-EXT].

According to [RFC8447] the update of the "TLS ExtensionType Values" registry is "Specification Required" [RFC8126] which is fulfilled by the current document, when it is published as an RFC.

The TicketPinning Extension is not limited to Private use and as such the TicketPinning Extension Value is expected to have its first byte in the range 0-254.

The TicketPinning Extension Name is expected to be ticket_pinning.

The TicketPinning Extension Recommended value should be set to "No" with the publication of the current document as "Experimental".

The TicketPinning Extension TLS.13 column should be set to CH, EE to indicate that the TicketPinning Extension is present in ClientHello and EncryptedExtensions messages.

9. Acknowledgements

The original idea behind this proposal was published in [Oreo] by Moti Yung, Benny Pinkas and Omer Berkman. The current protocol is but a distant relative of the original Oreo protocol, and any errors are the responsibility of the authors of this document alone.

We would like to thank Adrian Farrel, Dave Garrett, Daniel Kahn Gillmor, Alexey Melnikov, Yoav Nir, Eric Rescorla, Benjamin Kaduk and Rich Salz for their comments on this document. Special thanks to Craig Francis for contributing the HPKP deployment script, and to Ralph Holz for several fruitful discussions.

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Appendix A. Previous Work

The global PKI system relies on the trust of a CA issuing certificates. As a result, a corrupted trusted CA may issue a certificate for any organization without the organization's approval (a misissued or "fake" certificate), and use the certificate to impersonate the organization. There are many attempts to resolve these weaknesses, including Certificate Transparency (CT) [RFC6962], HTTP Public Key Pinning (HPKP) [RFC7469], and TACK [I-D.perrin-tls-tack].

CT requires cooperation of a large portion of the hundreds of extant certificate authorities (CAs) before it can be used "for real", in enforcing mode. It is noted that the relevant industry forum (CA/Browser Forum) is indeed pushing for such extensive adoption. However the public nature of CT often makes it inappropriate for enterprise use, because many organizations are not willing to expose their internal infrastructure publicly.

TACK has some similarities to the current proposal, but work on it seems to have stalled. Appendix A.2 compares our proposal to TACK.

HPKP is an IETF standard, but so far has proven hard to deploy. HPKP pins (fixes) a public key, one of the public keys listed in the certificate chain. As a result, HPKP needs to be coordinated with the certificate management process. Certificate management impacts HPKP and thus increases the probability of HPKP failures. This risk is made even higher given the fact that, even though work has been done at the ACME WG to automate certificate management, in many or even most cases, certificates are still managed manually. As a result, HPKP cannot be completely automated resulting in error-prone manual configuration. Such errors could prevent the web server from being accessed by some clients. In addition, HPKP uses a HTTP header which makes this solution HTTPS specific and not generic to TLS. On the other hand, the current document provides a solution that is independent of the server's certificate management and that can be entirely and easily automated. Appendix A.1 compares HPKP to the current document in more detail.

The ticket pinning proposal augments these mechanisms with a much easier to implement and deploy solution for server identity pinning, by reusing some of the ideas behind TLS session resumption.

This section compares ticket pinning to two earlier proposals, HPKP and TACK.

A.1. Comparison: HPKP

The current IETF standard for pinning the identity of web servers is the Public Key Pinning Extension for HTTP, or HPKP [RFC7469].

The main differences between HPKP and the current document are the following:

- HPKP limits its scope to HTTPS, while the current document considers all application above TLS.
- HPKP pins the public key of the server (or another public key along the certificate chain) and as such is highly dependent on the management of certificates. Such dependency increases the potential error surface, especially as certificate management is not yet largely automated. The current proposal, on the other hand, is independent of certificate management.
- HPKP pins public keys which are public and used for the standard TLS authentication. Identity pinning relies on the ownership of the pinning key which is not disclosed to the public and not involved in the standard TLS authentication. As a result, identity pinning is a completely independent second factor authentication mechanism.
- HPKP relies on a backup key to recover the misissuance of a key. We believe such backup mechanisms add excessive complexity and cost. Reliability of the current mechanism is primarily based on its being highly automated.
- HPKP relies on the client to report errors to the report-uri. The current document does not need any out-of band mechanism, and the server is informed automatically. This provides an easier and more reliable health monitoring.

On the other hand, HPKP shares the following aspects with identity pinning:

- Both mechanisms provide hard failure. With HPKP only the client is aware of the failure, while with the current proposal both client and server are informed of the failure. This provides room for further mechanisms to automatically recover such failures.
- Both mechanisms are subject to a server compromise in which users are provided with an invalid ticket (e.g. a random one) or HTTP Header, with a very long lifetime. For identity pinning, this lifetime SHOULD NOT be longer than 31 days. In both cases, clients will not be able to reconnect the server during this

lifetime. With the current proposal, an attacker needs to compromise the TLS layer, while with HPKP, the attacker needs to compromise the HTTP server. Arguably, the TLS-level compromise is typically more difficult for the attacker.

Unfortunately HPKP has not seen wide deployment yet. As of March 2016, the number of servers using HPKP was less than 3000 [Netcraft]. This may simply be due to inertia, but we believe the main reason is the interactions between HPKP and manual certificate management which is needed to implement HPKP for enterprise servers. The penalty for making mistakes (e.g. being too early or too late to deploy new pins) is having the server become unusable for some of the clients.

To demonstrate this point, we present a list of the steps involved in deploying HPKP on a security-sensitive Web server.

1. Generate two public/private key-pairs on a computer that is not the Live server. The second one is the "backup1" key-pair.

```
"openssl genrsa -out "example.com.key" 2048;"  
  
"openssl genrsa -out "example.com.backup1.key" 2048;"
```
2. Generate hashes for both of the public keys. These will be used in the HPKP header:

```
"openssl rsa -in "example.com.key" -outform der -pubout |  
openssl dgst -sha256 -binary | openssl enc -base64"  
  
"openssl rsa -in "example.com.backup1.key" -outform der  
-pubout | openssl dgst -sha256 -binary | openssl enc -base64"
```
3. Generate a single CSR (Certificate Signing Request) for the first key-pair, where you include the domain name in the CN (Common Name) field:

```
"openssl req -new -subj "/C=GB/ST=Area/L=Town/O=Company/  
CN=example.com" -key "example.com.key" -out "example.com.csr";"
```
4. Send this CSR to the CA (Certificate Authority), and go through the dance to prove you own the domain. The CA will give you back a single certificate that will typically expire within a year or two.
5. On the Live server, upload and setup the first key-pair (and its certificate). At this point you can add the "Public-Key-Pins" header, using the two hashes you created in step 2.

Note that only the first key-pair has been uploaded to the server so far.

6. Store the second (backup1) key-pair somewhere safe, probably somewhere encrypted like a password manager. It won't expire, as it's just a key-pair, it just needs to be ready for when you need to get your next certificate.
7. Time passes... probably just under a year (if waiting for a certificate to expire), or maybe sooner if you find that your server has been compromised and you need to replace the key-pair and certificate.
8. Create a new CSR (Certificate Signing Request) using the "backup1" key-pair, and get a new certificate from your CA.
9. Generate a new backup key-pair (backup2), get its hash, and store it in a safe place (again, not on the Live server).
10. Replace your old certificate and old key-pair, and update the "Public-Key-Pins" header to remove the old hash, and add the new "backup2" key-pair.

Note that in the above steps, both the certificate issuance as well as the storage of the backup key pair involve manual steps. Even with an automated CA that runs the ACME protocol, key backup would be a challenge to automate.

A.2. Comparison: TACK

Compared with HPKP, TACK [I-D.perrin-tls-tack] is a lot more similar to the current document. It can even be argued that this document is a symmetric-cryptography variant of TACK. That said, there are still a few significant differences:

- Probably the most important difference is that with TACK, validation of the server certificate is no longer required, and in fact TACK specifies it as a "MAY" requirement (Sec. 5.3). With ticket pinning, certificate validation by the client remains a MUST requirement, and the ticket acts only as a second factor. If the pinning secret is compromised, the server's security is not immediately at risk.
- Both TACK and the current document are mostly orthogonal to the server certificate as far as their life cycle, and so both can be deployed with no manual steps.

- TACK uses ECDSA to sign the server's public key. This allows cooperating clients to share server assertions between themselves. This is an optional TACK feature, and one that cannot be done with pinning tickets.
- TACK allows multiple servers to share its public keys. Such sharing is disallowed by the current document.
- TACK does not allow the server to track a particular client, and so has better privacy properties than the current document.
- TACK has an interesting way to determine the pin's lifetime, setting it to the time period since the pin was first observed, with a hard upper bound of 30 days. The current document makes the lifetime explicit, which may be more flexible to deploy. For example, Web sites which are only visited rarely by users may opt for a longer period than other sites that expect users to visit on a daily basis.

Appendix B. Document History

B.1. draft-sheffer-tls-pinning-ticket-12

- IETF-Conflict Review comments.
- IANA: removed request for a specific extension value.

B.2. draft-sheffer-tls-pinning-ticket-11

- Comments by Ben Kaduk. Specifically, changed the derivation of the pinning proof to make it more in line with the TLS 1.3 key schedule.

B.3. draft-sheffer-tls-pinning-ticket-10

- ISE comments by Adrian Farrel, the ISE.

B.4. draft-sheffer-tls-pinning-ticket-09

- ISE comments by Yoav Nir.

B.5. draft-sheffer-tls-pinning-ticket-08

- ISE comments by Rich Salz.

- B.6. draft-sheffer-tls-pinning-ticket-07
 - Refer to published RFCs.
- B.7. draft-sheffer-tls-pinning-ticket-06
 - IANA Considerations in preparation for Experimental publication.
- B.8. draft-sheffer-tls-pinning-ticket-05
 - Multiple comments from Eric Rescorla.
- B.9. draft-sheffer-tls-pinning-ticket-04
 - Editorial changes.
 - Two-phase rotation of protection key.
- B.10. draft-sheffer-tls-pinning-ticket-03
 - Deleted redundant length fields in the extension's formal definition.
 - Modified cryptographic operations to align with the current state of TLS 1.3.
 - Numerous textual improvements.
- B.11. draft-sheffer-tls-pinning-ticket-02
 - Added an Implementation Status section.
 - Added lengths into the extension structure.
 - Changed the computation of the pinning proof to be more robust.
 - Clarified requirements on the length of the pinning_secret.
 - Revamped the HPKP section to be more in line with current practices, and added recent statistics on HPKP deployment.
- B.12. draft-sheffer-tls-pinning-ticket-01
 - Corrected the notation for variable-sized vectors.
 - Added a section on disaster recovery and backup.
 - Added a section on privacy.

- Clarified the assumptions behind the HPKP procedure in the comparison section.
- Added a definition of pin indexing (origin).
- Adjusted to the latest TLS 1.3 notation.

B.13. draft-sheffer-tls-pinning-ticket-00

Initial version.

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TLS Working Group
Internet-Draft
Intended status: Standards Track
Expires: October 6, 2016

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AES-OCB (Offset Codebook Mode) Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security
(TLS)
draft-zauner-tls-aes-ocb-04

Abstract

This memo describes the use of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in the Offset Codebook Mode (OCB) of operation within Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram TLS (DTLS) to provide confidentiality and data origin authentication. The AES-OCB algorithm is highly parallelizable, provable secure and can be efficiently implemented in software and hardware providing high performance. Furthermore, use of AES-OCB in TLS is exempt from former IPR claims by various parties.

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1. Introduction

This document describes the use of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in the Offset Codebook Mode (OCB) of operation within Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram TLS (DTLS) to provide confidentiality and data origin authentication. The AES-OCB algorithm is highly parallelizable, provable secure and can be efficiently implemented in software and hardware providing high performance.

Furthermore OCB Mode [OCB] for AES [AES] provides a high performance, single-pass, constant-time AEAD alternative to existing and deployed block-cipher modes without the need for special platform specific instructions.

Authenticated encryption, in addition to providing confidentiality for the plaintext that is encrypted, provides a way to check its integrity and authenticity. Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data, or AEAD [RFC5116], adds the ability to check the integrity and authenticity of some associated data that is not encrypted. This document utilizes the AEAD facility within TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] and the AES-OCB-based AEAD algorithms defined in [RFC5116] and [RFC7253].

The ciphersuites defined in this document use ECDHE, DHE or Pre-Shared-Key (PSK) as their key establishment mechanism; these ciphersuites can be used with DTLS [RFC6347]. Since the ability to use AEAD ciphers was introduced in DTLS version 1.2, the ciphersuites defined in this document cannot be used with earlier versions of that protocol.

2. Conventions Used in This Document

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

3. Forward-secret AES-OCB Ciphersuites

The ciphersuites defined in this document are based on the AES-OCB authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD) algorithms AEAD_AES_128_OCB_TAGLEN96 and AEAD_AES_256_OCB_TAGLEN96 described in [RFC7253]. The following forward-secret ciphersuites are defined:

```
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_OCB = {TBD1, TBD1}
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_OCB = {TBD2, TBD2}
CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_OCB = {TBD3, TBD3}
CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_OCB = {TBD4, TBD4}
CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_OCB = {TBD5, TBD5}
CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_OCB = {TBD6, TBD6}
```

These ciphersuites make use of the AEAD capability in TLS 1.2 [RFC5246].

Because this document makes use of an AEAD construct, use of HMAC truncation in TLS (as specified in [RFC6066]) has no effect on the ciphersuites defined herein.

The "nonce" construction is identical to that of draft-ietf-tls-chacha20-poly1305-04:

AES-OCB requires a 96-bit nonce, which is formed as follows:

1. The 64-bit record sequence number is serialized as an 8-byte, big-endian value and padded on the left with four 0x00 bytes.
2. The padded sequence number is XORed with the client_write_IV (when the client is sending) or server_write_IV (when the server is sending).

In DTLS, the 64-bit seq_num is the 16-bit epoch concatenated with the 48-bit seq_num.

This nonce construction is different from the one used with AES-GCM in TLS 1.2 but matches the scheme expected to be used in TLS 1.3. The nonce is constructed from the record sequence number and shared secret, both of which are known to the recipient. The advantage is that no per-record, explicit nonce need be transmitted, which saves eight bytes per record and prevents implementations from mistakenly using a random nonce. Thus, in the terms of [RFC5246], `SecurityParameters.fixed_iv_length` is twelve bytes and `SecurityParameters.record_iv_length` is zero bytes.

These ciphersuites make use of the default TLS 1.2 Pseudorandom Function (PRF), which uses HMAC with the SHA-256 hash function. The ECDSA-ECDHE, RSA-ECDHE and RSA-DHE key exchanges are performed as defined in [RFC5246].

4. Pre-Shared-Key (PSK) AES-OCB Ciphersuites

As in Section 3, these ciphersuites follow [RFC7253]. The PSK, ECDHE_PSK and DHE_PSK key exchanges are performed as specified in [RFC4279]. The following Pre-Shared-Key (PSK) ciphersuites are defined:

```
CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_OCB = {TBD7, TBD7}
CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_OCB = {TBD8, TBD8}
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_OCB = {TBD9, TBD9}
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_OCB = {TBD10, TBD10}
CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_OCB = {TBD11, TBD11}
CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_OCB = {TBD12, TBD12}
```

The "nonce" input to the AEAD algorithm is identical to the one defined in Section 3. These ciphersuites make use of the default TLS 1.2 Pseudorandom Function (PRF), which uses HMAC with the SHA-256 hash function.

5. Applicable TLS Versions

These ciphersuites make use of the authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD) defined in TLS 1.2 [RFC5288]. Earlier versions of TLS do not have support for AEAD; for instance, the `TLSCiphertext` structure does not have the "aead" option in TLS 1.1. Consequently, these ciphersuites MUST NOT be negotiated in older versions of TLS. Clients MUST NOT offer these cipher suites if they do not offer TLS 1.2 or later. Servers which select an earlier version of TLS MUST NOT select one of these ciphersuites. A client MUST treat the selection of these cipher suites in combination with a version of TLS that does not support AEAD (i.e., TLS 1.1 or earlier) as an error and generate a fatal 'illegal_parameter' TLS alert.

6. Intellectual Property Rights

Historically Offset Codebook Mode has seen difficulty with implementation, deployment and standardization because of pending patents and intellectual rights claims on OCB itself. In preparation of this document all involved parties have declared they will issue IPR statements exempting use of OCB Mode in TLS from these claims. Specifically - OCB Mode as described in this document for use in TLS - is based, and strongly influenced, by earlier work from Charanjit Jutla on [IAPM].

6.1. Resolved IPR Claims

The following parties have made IPR claims in the past:

- o US Patent No. 7,093,126 (Issued Aug 15, 2006) - Filed Apr 14, 2000. Inventor Name: Charanjit S. Jutla, Assignee: IBM
- o US Patent No. 6,963,976 (Issued Nov 8, 2005) - Filed Nov 3, 2000. Inventor Name: Charanjit S. Jutla, Assignee: IBM
- o US Patent No. 7,046,802 (Issued May 16, 2006) - Filed 30 Jul 2001. Inventor Name: Phillip W. Rogaway, Assignee: Rogaway Phillip W
- o US Patent No. 7,200,227 (Issued Apr 3, 2007) - Filed 18 Jul 2005. Inventor Name: Phillip Rogaway, Assignee: Phillip Rogaway
- o US Patent No. 7,949,129 (Issued May 24, 2011) - Filed 23 Mar 2007. Inventor Name: Phillip W. Rogaway, Assignee: Rogaway Phillip W

Use of technology described by these patents, when used with TLS, has been explicitly exempted from any previous claims by the original authors and patent holders.

7. IANA Considerations

IANA is requested to assign the values for the ciphersuites defined in Section 3 and Section 4 from the TLS and DTLS Ciphersuite registries. IANA, please note that the DTLS-OK column should be marked as "Y" for each of these algorithms.

8. Security Considerations

The security considerations in [RFC5246] apply to this document as well. The remainder of this section describes security considerations specific to the ciphersuites described in this document.

8.1. (Perfect) Forward Secrecy

With the exception of two Pre-Shared-Key (PSK) ciphersuites intended for use in constrained environments and embedded devices (IoT), defined in Section 4, this document deals exclusively with ciphersuites that are inherently forward-secret.

8.2. Static RSA Key-transport

No ciphersuite is defined in this document that makes use of RSA as Key-Transport.

8.3. Nonce reuse

AES-OCB security requires that the "nonce" (number used once) is never reused. The IV construction in Section 3 is designed to prevent nonce reuse. Specifically, if there is any error in the nonce construction implementation, it will simply be non-interoperable with conforming implementations.

8.4. Data volume limit under a single key

There is a limitation on the total number of bytes that can be transmitted under one set of keys. For the AES-OCB ciphersuites, implementations MUST NOT transmit more than 2^{36} bytes encrypted under a single key: they MUST rekey or close the connection before 2^{36} bytes are reached. These limitations are based on limitations introduced in the TLS 1.3 draft for AES-GCM, this document adheres to the same constraints. A detailed analysis can be found in [AELIMIT].

9. Acknowledgements

This document borrows heavily from [RFC5288], [RFC6655] and draft-ietf-tls-chacha20-poly1305-04.

The author would like to thank Martin Thomson for his suggested change on the client negotiation paragraph, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos and Peter Gutmann for the discussion on PSK ciphersuites, Jack Lloyd for content on the clarification of the TLS Record IV length, Samuel Neves for suggesting the data-limitation paragraph from the TLS 1.3 draft and the TLS Working Group in general for feedback and discussion on this document.

10. References

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