

URI Signing

draft-ietf-cdni-uri-signing-09

CDNI

IETF 96

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Update since BA

- Currently in WGLC
- Two new versions posted since BA (-08, -09)
- New in -08
 - Addressed comments from Leif, Phil and Gancho based on implementation experience
 - Percent-encoding of URI Pattern Container
 - Recommendations on parsing of UPC to increase performance
 - Brought algorithm notation in line with NIST (e.g. “ECDSA” versus “EC-DSA”)
 - Added support for signalling of URI Signing Package as a URL Path Parameter
- New in -09
 - Added CDNI Metadata Auth Type registration to IANA section
 - (Will probably be removed again)

Open Issues - 1

- Matt Miller reviewed draft from a security perspective. Issues he found:
- Implicit algorithms: when using the default algorithms, the HF/DSA field is optional. This should be changed
- Implicit key sizes
- Currently using AES-ECB for Client IP Encryption. Potential for oracle and substitution attacks
- Mixing of hashing algorithm: better to use a single one throughout
- No recommendations regarding use of ECDSA (specific curves etc.)
- In summary: we need some work here

Open Issues - 2

- Proposal from Ben to make ECDSA optional instead of mandatory
- Proposal to merge KID and KID_NUM information elements
 - Both are used for communicating Key Index
 - KID as string (e.g. for public key URLs), KID_NUM as 32-bit int
 - Original intention for introducing KID_NUM was that it might be slightly better in terms of performance
 - Questionable whether that's still the case given that we now have mandatory Signing Package
- Proposal to merge HF and DSA
 - HF and DSA are used to signal the used hash function or digital signature algorithm respectively
 - In practice, no real benefit of having two elements, since actual algorithm value has to be parsed anyway
- Proposal to merge MD and DS
 - MD and DS for signalling the message signature itself (MD when HF is used, DS when DSA is used)

Open Issues - 3

- One way to deal with security issues would be to simply adopt JSON Web Token/Signature (JWT/JWS) as format for URI Signing
 - draf-ietf-cdni-uri-signing would become profile of JWT/JWS that defines additional 'claims' and explains how JWT/JWS with the new claims may be used to perform URI Signing
 - + Would benefit from thorough security review JWT/JWS went through
 - + Would benefit from existing JWT implementations
 - Would require very significant rewrite of draft at this late stage (and probably delay it)
 - Current implementation would need to be overhauled
- Thoughts? Do the benefits outweigh the costs?

Next steps

- Make decision on whether to adopt JWT/JWS
 - If yes: rewrite draft
 - If no: address comments received during WGLC, including security issues
- Submit to IESG