
draft-ietf-dnsop-nsec-aggressiveuse

and draft-wkumari-dnsop-cheese-shop



-- Plato, quoting Socrates*


50'000ft example / reminder

```
wkumari$ dig +dnssec belkin
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NXDOMAIN, id: 41230
;; flags: gr rd ra ad; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 0, AUTHORITY: 6, ADDITIONAL: 1
;; QUESTION SECTION:
; belkin. IN A
;; AUTHORITY SECTION:
       1795 IN SOA a.root-servers.net. nstld.verisign-grs.com.
2016070901 1800 900 604800 86400
beer.
       21512 IN NSEC bentley. NS DS RRSIG NSEC
beer. 21512 IN RRSIG NSEC 8 1 86400 20160719170000
20160709160000 46551 .
AoT2Oe3eVZ3pC1DousLXDYABGuTTvkyP4rbBXvquGp3T/Lq7Rer3Vx2q
oC9p5u6T+lj/3u879htWNRO62wSdODkvOdtVFA5iJxN9DJ5EtuJdbuL/
xJuPhoin+0Fc6Vtf0X017e5TBtxYAyPZqUq6dxm6qE/NW6Ft1nAv3GYX jlq=
;; Query time: 222 msec
```

The problem

Couldn't have made a better example if I'd planned it...

May 12, a Friday afternoon, Colin Petrie / Kaveh Ranjbar from RIPE poked me:
 "Google is suddenly sending K-root way more junk queries, e.g 'nq0nnjzba-fn.357.225.340.251'. It burns us, please make it stop…"



Well, that's not good....

- What's causing this?
 - Have we got some bug?
 - Did anyone change anything?!
 - Are we being used as a DoS reflector?
 - Why does the graph look more like organic growth than a DoS?
- Phew, it's not just Google Public DNS, just we show up towards the top...
 ...still, what's causing this? And why? And can we make it stop?

Ugh, unpatched CPE...

Thousands of Ubiquiti AirOS routers hit with worm attacks

A worm is exploiting an old v firmware.

By: Symantec Security Response | | | | | | | | | | | |

Created 19 May 2016 O Comments



Worm infects unpatched

Ubiquiti wireles

The vulnerability has been kn many users haven't applied th



The Ubiquiti Networks AirRouter Credit: Ub

A worm is reportedly spreading across thousands of Ubiquiti Networks routers runt advisory, a Ubiquiti spokesperson said that over the past week, the worm has been devices. The worm creates its own account on the compromised device and, from the routers both within the same subnet and on other networks.

21 June 2016

Alert Number MC-000075-MW

WE NEED YOUR HELP!

If you find any of these indicators on your networks, or have related information, please contact

FRI CVWATCH

Foul-mouthed worm takes control of wireless ISPs around the globe

Active attack targets Internet-connected radios from Ubiquiti Networks.

by Dan Goodin - May 19, 2016 4:14pm EDT



In furtherance of public-private partnerships, the FBI routinely advises private industry of various cyber threat indicators observed during the course of our investigations. This data is provided in order to help cyber security professionals and system administrators to guard against the persistent malicious actions of cyber criminals.


This FLASH has been released TLP: GREEN: The information in this product is useful for the awareness off all participating organizations within their sector or community, but not via publicly accessible channels.

Unpatched Ubiquiti Network Devices Subject to Virus Attack Resulting in Denial of Service

Summary

Self-propagating malware has infected thousands of devices from wireless equipment vendor Ubiquiti Networks running outdated airMAX,

... turning on Aggressive NSEC / Cheeseshop





Rewritten to be more readable

Integrated comments / no longer applicable

Better examples

Seeing as this is moving along, no need for Cheese-shop

Updates

- Document adopted by DNSOP WG
- Adoption comments
- Changed main purpose to performance
 - o Thanks to Jinmei.
- Use NSEC3/Wildcard keywords
 - Thanks to Matthijs
- Improved wordings (from good comments)
- Simplified pseudo code for NSEC3
- Added Warren as co-author
- Reworded much of the problem statement
- Reworked examples to better explain the problem / solution

Notes

- This technique may occlude newly added information
 - If you ask for foo.example.com, and it doesn't exist, it doesn't exist for the NSEC TTL
- NSEC3 is trickier than NSEC
 - So implementations may choose to only support this for NSEC
- Provide knobs for enabling / disabling on a per-domain basis

Done?

A few minor edits:

Jinmei provided some comments, mainly suggesting removing references to subdomain attacks.

Typos and grammar nits, fixing references

https://github.
com/wkumari/draft-ietf-dnsopnsec-aggressiveuse