IPv6 DOTS Signal Option

draft-francois-dots-ipv6-signal-option-00

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Key idea

- ▶ Regular paths for delivering DOTS signals might be also affected by the DDoS → Adding an auxiliary mechanism for signaling (does not substitute)
 - Embed the information into traffic being able to be routed
 - without impact its original routing or content being processed but end-hosts
- Use IPv6 Hop-by-Hop Option Header [RFC2460]
 - signaling information is embedded into outgoing IPv6 packets
 - ▶ in an opportunistic manner (not all packets, not only those outgoing to the DOTS server... but some well chosen)
 - the DOTS client initiate this process, intermediate capable routers can store the information and embed it into other packets
 - once such a packet reaches the server of the gateway
- Intended for the intra-domain use case

Option encoding


▶ TLV-encoded in the Ipv6 header

DOTS attributes


- from draft-reddy-dots-transport
- + a specific TTL value to avoid embedding the information into new packets indefinitely
- + address and port of the DOTS server to reach (+ flags)
- a mix between TLV and fixed-length field

Attribute type	value
policy-id	10 1
target-ip	1
target-port	2
target-protocol	3
lifetime	4


Example



- C Client
- S Server
- **G** Gateway
- R Capable Router
- Non-capable Router
- ➤ Forwarded IPv6 packet




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- ▶ The client continues the *marking*




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


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- ▶ Non-capable routers ignore the option and forward the packets
- The client continues the marking
- When arriving at capable agents (gateways, routers), embedded information is stored
- The gateway tries to initialize the regular signaling
- ► The capable router having saved the information embeds it again in other IPv6 packets



Option processing

- Selection of packets is rule-based to only consider a subset
- ► A sequence of rules where each is defined by
 - ▶ 1st level: a filter on IPv6 header to be matched
 - 2nd level: a ratio of previously matched packets
 - ► + a timeout
- ▶ When a rule expires (timeout) the next one is applied
- Rules are manually configured
- Recommendation: firs rules should select more packets (taking benefit of the first instant before loosing connectivity)
- 1: all outgoing IPv6 packets with a 10 second timeout
- 2: all outgoing IPv6 packets with a ratio of 10% and a 1 minute timeout $\,$
- 3: all outgoing multicast IPv6 packets with a ratio of 10% and a 1 minute timeout
- 4: all outgoing anycast IPv6 packets with a ratio of 10% and a 5 minute timeout
- 5: all outgoing IPv6 packets heading to the DOTS server with a ratio of 100% and a one hour timeout

Deployment considerations

- ► IPv6 extension headers are often rate-limited or dropped entirely
 - One reason is the overhead of processing
 - Our proposed option is only used under a DDoS attack and performance might be so already degraded
 - Practical for an operator to allow such an option within its own network but more difficult in the inter-domain cases with non-cooperative networks in between
- Modification to IP layers implementations
 - capable routers: need to extract store and embed signaling information
 - clients: need to create the specific option header to be embedded then
 - servers and gateways: all DOTS signaling information contained in IPv6 headers has to transmitted to the application layer

Security considerations

- Forged option headers from non legitimate sources to entail additional processing on routers
 - Source-based filtering to discard those since we know which sources can emit such IPv6 packets
 - The option can be signed by the clients and verified by the servers and gateways (intermediate capable routers do not for efficiency reason → exclude TTL from the signature calculation)
- Replay attack from a compromised router to inject more packets
 - Thanks to the id and TTL, other agents will not consider the header

Next steps

- Receive comments
- ► Improve the document