

LURK TLS/DTLS Use Cases

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LURK Architecture



1. TLS Connection Initialization

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2. Authentication Credentials
(Private Key based
cryptographic operations)

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3. Finalization of the TLS
Connection Handshake

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TLS Connection Established

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Containers and Virtual Machines Use Case

Problem: No control of the Private Key

- Private Keys are spread all over the data center through:
 - ▶ Running instances of VMs / containers
 - ▶ Persistent images of VMs / containers
- Isolation may not sufficiently prevent access to the private keys

LURK:

- Protects the Private Key against leakage by:
 - ▶ Outsourcing the Private Key from VMs / containers to the Key Server
 - ▶ Preventing direct access to the Private Key by the VMs / containers
 - ▶ Restricting Private Keys operations to those authorized by the Key Server
 - In case of privilege escalation, virtualization isolation breach, etc...
- Provides inter-operability for different OS / applications

Content Provider Use Case

Problem: Edge Servers are exposed to OS-to-applications vulnerabilities

- Risk exposure increases with implementation diversity
- One leakage affects the whole service

LURK:

- Protects the Private Key against leakage by:
 - ▶ Outsourcing the Private Key from Edge Servers to the Key Server
 - ▶ Preventing direct access to the Private Key by the Edge Servers
 - ▶ Restricting Private Keys operations to those authorized by the Key Server
 - In case a Edge Server become corrupted, etc...

Content Owner / Content Provider Use Case

Problem: Content Owner (URL) wants a CDN to operate without providing the Private Key

- Private key may present more value than the content itself:
 - ▶ Content accessed by devices configured with the public credentials need to be replaced/reconfigured in case of private key leakage
 - ▶ Content with ephemeral value presents acceptable content leakage risks
 - ▶ Content may be encrypted with DRM

LURK:

- Enables the Private Key to operate without being provided.
- Enables interoperability between independent administrative domains - Content Owner, Content Provider

CDN Interconnection Use Case

Problem: Providing the Private Key prevents CDNs to collaborate

- The company with which the Content Owner has contracted may further delegate delivery to another CDN with which the Content Owner has no official business relationship
- The delegating CDN may not even host the Key Server, in which case, it may proxy the communications to the upstream CDN or the Content Owner.

LURK:

- Enables the Private Key to operate without being provided.
- Enables interoperability between independent administrative domains - Content Owner, Content Provider

LURK Requirements

LURK Requirements

- R1: LURK MUST be standardized at the IETF.
- R2: LURK MUST NOT impact the TLS Client.

Key Server Requirements

- R3: The Key Server MUST be able to provide the necessary authentication credentials so the TLS Client and the Edge Server can set an authenticate TLS Connection with the Private Key.
- R4: The Key Server MUST NOT leak any information associated to the Private Key. In particular the Key Server MUST NOT provide a generic signing/encryption oracle.
- R5: The Key Server SHOULD NOT perform any operation outside the authentication of a TLS Connection.
- R6: The Key Server MUST provide confidential information to the Edge Server only over an authenticated and encrypted channel.

LURK Requirements

Edge Server

- The Edge Server SHOULD be provisioned with the public authentication credentials. Note: Public certificate provisioning is outside of LURK.

Thank you for your attention