Abstract

This document reserves the IPv6 prefix 64:ff9b:1::/48 for local use with IPv4/IPv6 translation mechanisms. It updates RFC6890 in order to reflect this reservation.

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1. Introduction

This document reserves 64:ff9b:1::/48 for local use with IPv4/IPv6 translation mechanisms. This facilitates the co-existence of multiple IPv4/IPv6 translation mechanisms in the same network without requiring the use of a Network-Specific Prefix assigned from the operator's allocated global unicast address space.

2. Terminology

This document makes use of the following terms:

Network-Specific Prefix (NSP)
A globally unique prefix assigned by a network operator for use with and IPv4/IPv6 translation mechanism, cf. [RFC6052]

Well-Known Prefix (WKP)
The prefix 64:ff9b::/96, which is reserved for use with the [RFC6052] IPv4/IPv6 address translation algorithm.

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

3. Problem Statement

Since the WKP 64:ff9b::/96 was reserved by [RFC6052], several new IPv4/IPv6 translation mechanisms have been defined by the IETF. These target various different use cases. An operator might therefore wish to make use of several of them simultaneously.
The smallest possible prefix supported by the [RFC6052] algorithm is a /96. Because the WKP is a /96, an operator preferring to use a WKP over an NSP can only do so for only one of his IPv4/IPv6 translation mechanisms. All others must necessarily use an NSP.

The WKP is reserved specifically for use with the algorithm specified in [RFC6052]. More recent IETF documents describe IPv4/IPv6 translation mechanisms that use different algorithms. An operator deploying such mechanisms can not make use of the WKP in a legitimate fashion.

Section 3.1 of [RFC6052] imposes certain restrictions on the use of the WKP. These restrictions might conflict with the operator’s desired use of an IPv4/IPv6 translation mechanism.

In summary, there is a need for a prefix that facilitates the co-existence of multiple IPv4/IPv6 translation mechanisms (that do not necessarily use the [RFC6052] algorithm).

4. Choosing 64:ff9b:1::/48

The primary reason for choosing 64:ff9b:1::/48 is that it is adjacent to the [RFC6052] WKP 64:ff9b::/96. As these two prefixes are intended for very similar uses, it is prudent to allow them to be referred to using a single aggregate (64:ff9b::/47).

The prefix length of 48 bits was chosen in order to attain the goal of facilitating multiple simultaneous deployments of IPv4/IPv6 translation in a single network. The shortest IPv4/IPv6 translation prefixes reported to the V6OPS working group as being used in production was 64 bits. 64:ff9b:1::/48 will accommodate up to 65536 such prefixes.

While the [RFC6052] algorithm specifies IPv4/IPv6 translation prefixes as short as /32, facilitating for multiple instances of these was considered as too wasteful by the V6OPS working group.

5. Deployment Considerations

64:ff9b:1::/48 is intended as a technology-agnostic and generic reservation. A network operator may freely use it in combination with any kind of IPv4/IPv6 translation mechanism deployed within his network.

By default, IPv6 nodes and applications must not treat IPv6 addresses within 64:ff9b:1::/48 different from other globally scoped IPv6 addresses. In particular, they must not make any assumptions regarding the syntax or properties of those addresses (e.g., the...
existence and location of embedded IPv4 addresses), or the type of
associated translation mechanism (e.g., whether it is stateful or
stateless).

64:ff9b:1::/48 or any other more-specific prefix may not be
advertised in inter-domain routing, except by explicit agreement
between all involved parties. Such prefixes MUST NOT be advertised
to the default-free zone.

When 64:ff9b:1::/48 or a more-specific prefix is used with the
[RFC6052] algorithm, it is considered to be a Network-Specific
Prefix.

6. Checksum Neutrality

Use of 64:ff9b:1::/48 does not in itself guarantee checksum
neutrality, as many of the IPv4/IPv6 translation algorithms it can be
used with are fundamentally incompatible with checksum-neutral
address translations.

The Stateless IP/ICMP Translation algorithm [RFC7915] is one well-
known algorithm that can operate in a checksum-neutral manner, when
using the [RFC6052] algorithm for all of its address translations.
However, in order to attain checksum neutrality is imperative that
the translation prefix is chosen carefully. Specifically, in order
for a 96-bit [RFC6052] prefix to be checksum neutral, all the six
16-bit words in the prefix must add up to a multiple of 0xffff.

The following non-exhaustive list contains examples of translation
prefixes that are checksum neutral when used with the [RFC7915] and
[RFC6052] algorithms:

- 64:ff9b:1:fffe::/96
- 64:ff9b:1:fffd:1::/96
- 64:ff9b:1:fffc:2::/96
- 64:ff9b:1:abcd:0:5431::/96

Section 4.1 of [RFC6052] contains further discussion about IPv4/IPv6
translation and checksum neutrality.

7. IANA Considerations

The IANA is requested to add the following entry to the IPv6 Special-
Purpose Address Registry:
The IANA is furthermore requested to add the following footnote to the 0000::/8 entry of the Internet Protocol Version 6 Address Space registry:

64:ff9b:1::/48 reserved for Local-use IPv4/IPv6 Translation [TBD]

8. Security Considerations

The reservation of 64:ff9b:1::/48 is not known to cause any new security considerations beyond those documented in Section 5 of [RFC6052].

9. References

9.1. Normative References


9.2. Informative References

Appendix A. Acknowledgements

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Abstract

Connecting an enterprise site to multiple ISPs using provider-assigned addresses is difficult without the use of some form of Network Address Translation (NAT). Much has been written on this topic over the last 10 to 15 years, but it still remains a problem without a clearly defined or widely implemented solution. Any multihoming solution without NAT requires hosts at the site to have addresses from each ISP and to select the egress ISP by selecting a source address for outgoing packets. It also requires routers at the site to take into account those source addresses when forwarding packets out towards the ISPs.

This document attempts to define a complete solution to this problem. It covers the behavior of routers to forward traffic taking into account source address, and it covers the behavior of host to select appropriate source addresses. It also covers any possible role that routers might play in providing information to hosts to help them select appropriate source addresses. In the process of exploring potential solutions, this documents also makes explicit requirements for how the solution would be expected to behave from the perspective of an enterprise site network administrator.

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1. Introduction

Site multihoming, the connection of a subscriber network to multiple upstream networks using redundant uplinks, is a common enterprise architecture for improving the reliability of its Internet connectivity. If the site uses provider-independent (PI) addresses, all traffic originating from the enterprise can use source addresses from the PI address space. Site multihoming with PI addresses is commonly used with both IPv4 and IPv6, and does not present any new technical challenges.

It may be desirable for an enterprise site to connect to multiple ISPs using provider-assigned (PA) addresses, instead of PI addresses. Multihoming with provider-assigned addresses is typically less expensive for the enterprise relative to using provider-independent
addresses. PA multihoming is also a practice that should be facilitated and encouraged because it does not add to the size of the Internet routing table, whereas PI multihoming does. Note that PA is also used to mean "provider-aggregatable". In this document we assume that provider-assigned addresses are always provider-aggregatable.

With PA multihoming, for each ISP connection, the site is assigned a prefix from within an address block allocated to that ISP by its National or Regional Internet Registry. In the simple case of two ISPs (ISP-A and ISP-B), the site will have two different prefixes assigned to it (prefix-A and prefix-B). This arrangement is problematic. First, packets with the "wrong" source address may be dropped by one of the ISPs. In order to limit denial of service attacks using spoofed source addresses, BCP38 [RFC2827] recommends that ISPs filter traffic from customer sites to only allow traffic with a source address that has been assigned by that ISP. So a packet sent from a multihomed site on the uplink to ISP-B with a source address in prefix-A may be dropped by ISP-B.

However, even if ISP-B does not implement BCP38 or ISP-B adds prefix-A to its list of allowed source addresses on the uplink from the multihomed site, two-way communication may still fail. If the packet with source address in prefix-A was sent to ISP-B because the uplink to ISP-A failed, then if ISP-B does not drop the packet and the packet reaches its destination somewhere on the Internet, the return packet will be sent back with a destination address in prefix-A. The return packet will be routed over the Internet to ISP-A, but it will not be delivered to the multihomed site because its link with ISP-A has failed. Two-way communication would require some arrangement for ISP-B to advertise prefix-A when the uplink to ISP-A fails.

Note that the same may be true with a provider that does not implement BCP 38, if his upstream provider does, or has no corresponding route. The issue is not that the immediate provider implements ingress filtering; it is that someone upstream does, or lacks a route.

With IPv4, this problem is commonly solved by using [RFC1918] private address space within the multi-homed site and Network Address Translation (NAT) or Network Address/Port Translation (NAPT) on the uplinks to the ISPs. However, one of the goals of IPv6 is to eliminate the need for and the use of NAT or NAPT. Therefore, requiring the use of NAT or NAPT for an enterprise site to multihome with provider-assigned addresses is not an attractive solution.
[RFC6296] describes a translation solution specifically tailored to meet the requirements of multi-homing with provider-assigned IPv6 addresses. With the IPv6-to-IPv6 Network Prefix Translation (NPTv6) solution, within the site an enterprise can use Unique Local Addresses [RFC4193] or the prefix assigned by one of the ISPs. As traffic leaves the site on an uplink to an ISP, the source address gets translated to an address within the prefix assigned by the ISP on that uplink in a predictable and reversible manner. [RFC6296] is currently classified as Experimental, and it has been implemented by several vendors. See Section 5.2, for more discussion of NPTv6.

This document defines routing requirements for enterprise multihoming using provider-assigned IPv6 addresses. We have made no attempt to write these requirements in a manner that is agnostic to potential solutions. Instead, this document focuses on the following general class of solutions.

Each host at the enterprise has multiple addresses, at least one from each ISP-assigned prefix. Each host, as discussed in Section 4.1 and [RFC6724], is responsible for choosing the source address applied to each packet it sends. A host SHOULD be able respond dynamically to the failure of an uplink to a given ISP by no longer sending packets with the source address corresponding to that ISP. Potential mechanisms for the communication of changes in the network to the host are Neighbor Discovery Router Advertisements, DHCPv6, and ICMPv6.

The routers in the enterprise network are responsible for ensuring that packets are delivered to the "correct" ISP uplink based on source address. This requires that at least some routers in the site network are able to take into account the source address of a packet when deciding how to route it. That is, some routers must be capable of some form of Source Address Dependent Routing (SADR), if only as described in [RFC3704]. At a minimum, the routers connected to the ISP uplinks (the site exit routers or SERs) must be capable of Source Address Dependent Routing. Expanding the connected domain of routers capable of SADR from the site exit routers deeper into the site network will generally result in more efficient routing of traffic with external destinations.

The document first looks in more detail at the enterprise networking environments in which this solution is expected to operate. It then discusses existing and proposed mechanisms for hosts to select the source address applied to packets. Finally, it looks at the requirements for routing that are needed to support these enterprise network scenarios and the mechanisms by which hosts are expected to select source addresses dynamically based on network state.
2. Enterprise Multihoming Requirements

2.1. Simple ISP Connectivity with Connected SERs

We start by looking at a scenario in which a site has connections to two ISPs, as shown in Figure 1. The site is assigned the prefix 2001:db8:0:a000::/52 by ISP-A and prefix 2001:db8:0:b000::/52 by ISP-B. We consider three hosts in the site. H31 and H32 are on a LAN that has been assigned subnets 2001:db8:0:a010::/64 and 2001:db8:0:b010::/64. H31 has been assigned the addresses 2001:db8:0:a010::31 and 2001:db8:0:b010::31. H32 has been assigned 2001:db8:0:a010::32 and 2001:db8:0:b010::32. H41 is on a different subnet that has been assigned 2001:db8:0:a020::/64 and 2001:db8:0:b020::/64.

![Diagram of Simple ISP Connectivity with Connected SERs](image)

We refer to a router that connects the site to an ISP as a site edge router (SER). Several other routers provide connectivity among the internal hosts (H31, H32, and H41), as well as connecting the internal hosts to the Internet through SERa and SERb. In this
example SERa and SERb share a direct connection to each other. In Section 2.2, we consider a scenario where this is not the case.

For the moment, we assume that the hosts are able to make good choices about which source addresses through some mechanism that doesn’t involve the routers in the site network. Here, we focus on primary task of the routed site network, which is to get packets efficiently to their destinations, while sending a packet to the ISP that assigned the prefix that matches the source address of the packet. In Section 4, we examine what role the routed network may play in helping hosts make good choices about source addresses for packets.

With this solution, routers will need form of Source Address Dependent Routing, which will be new functionality. It would be useful if an enterprise site does not need to upgrade all routers to support the new SADR functionality in order to support PA multihoming. We consider if this is possible and what are the tradeoffs of not having all routers in the site support SADR functionality.

In the topology in Figure 1, it is possible to support PA multihoming with only SERa and SERb being capable of SADR. The other routers can continue to forward based only on destination address, and exchange routes that only consider destination address. In this scenario, SERa and SERb communicate source-scoped routing information across their shared connection. When SERa receives a packet with a source address matching prefix 2001:db8:0:b000::/52 , it forwards the packet to SERb, which forwards it on the uplink to ISP-B. The analogous behaviour holds for traffic that SERb receives with a source address matching prefix 2001:db8:0:a000::/52.

In Figure 1, when only SERa and SERb are capable of source address dependent routing, PA multi-homing will work. However, the paths over which the packets are sent will generally not be the shortest paths. The forwarding paths will generally be more efficient as more routers are capable of SADR. For example, if R4, R2, and R6 are upgraded to support SADR, then can exchange source-scoped routes with SERa and SERb. They will then know to send traffic with a source address matching prefix 2001:db8:0:b000::/52 directly to SERb, without sending it to SERa first.

2.2. Simple ISP Connectivity Where SERs Are Not Directly Connected

In Figure 2, we modify the topology slightly by inserting R7, so that SERa and SERb are no longer directly connected. With this topology, it is not enough to just enable SADR routing on SERa and SERb to support PA multi-homing. There are two solutions to ways to enable PA multihoming in this topology.
One option is to effectively modify the topology by creating a logical tunnel between SERa and SERb, using GRE for example. Although SERa and SERb are not directly connected physically in this topology, they can be directly connected logically by a tunnel.

The other option is to enable SADR functionality on R7. In this way, R7 will exchange source-scoped routes with SERa and SERb, making the three routers act as a single SADR domain. This illustrates the basic principle that the minimum requirement for the routed site network to support PA multi-homing is having all of the site exit routers be part of a connected SADR domain. Extending the connected SADR domain beyond that point can produce more efficient forwarding paths.

2.3. Enterprise Network Operator Expectations

Before considering a more complex scenario, let’s look in more detail at the reasonably simple multihoming scenario in Figure 2 to understand what can reasonably be expected from this solution. As a
general guiding principle, we assume an enterprise network operator will expect a multihomed network to behave as close as to a single-homed network as possible. So a solution that meets those expectations where possible is a good thing.

For traffic between internal hosts and traffic from outside the site to internal hosts, an enterprise network operator would expect there to be no visible change in the path taken by this traffic, since this traffic does not need to be routed in a way that depends on source address. It is also reasonable to expect that internal hosts should be able to communicate with each other using either of their source addresses without restriction. For example, H31 should be able to communicate with H41 using a packet with S=2001:db8:0:a010::31, D=2001:db8:0:b010::41, regardless of the state of uplink to ISP-B.

These goals can be accomplished by having all of the routers in the network continue to originate normal unscoped destination routes for their connected networks. If we can arrange so that these unscoped destination routes get used for forwarding this traffic, then we will have accomplished the goal of keeping forwarding of traffic destined for internal hosts, unaffected by the multihoming solution.

For traffic destined for external hosts, it is reasonable to expect that traffic with a source address from the prefix assigned by ISP-A to follow the path that the traffic would follow if there is no connection to ISP-B. This can be accomplished by having SERa originate a source-scoped route of the form (S=2001:db8:0:a000::/52, D=::/0). If all of the routers in the site support SADR, then the path of traffic exiting via ISP-A can match that expectation. If some routers don’t support SADR, then it is reasonable to expect that the path for traffic exiting via ISP-A may be different within the site. This is a tradeoff that the enterprise network operator may decide to make.

It is important to understand how this multihoming solution behaves when an uplink to one of the ISPs fails. To simplify this discussion, we assume that all routers in the site support SADR. We first start by looking at how the network operates when the uplinks to both ISP-A and ISP-B are functioning properly. SERa originates a source-scoped route of the form (S=2001:db8:0:a000::/52, D=::/0), and SERb originates a source-scoped route of the form (S=2001:db8:0:b000::/52, D=::/0). These routes are distributed through the routers in the site, and they establish within the routers two set of forwarding paths for traffic leaving the site. One set of forwarding paths is for packets with source address in 2001:db8:0:a000::/52. The other set of forwarding paths is for packets with source address in 2001:db8:0:b000::/52. The normal destination routes which are not scoped to these two source prefixes
play no role in the forwarding. Whether a packet exits the site via SERa or via SERb is completely determined by the source address applied to the packet by the host. So for example, when host H31 sends a packet to host H101 with \( (S=2001:db8:0:a010::31, D=2001:db8:0:1234::101) \), the packet will only be sent out the link from SERa to ISP-A.

Now consider what happens when the uplink from SERa to ISP-A fails. The only way for the packets from H31 to reach H101 is for H31 to start using the source address for ISP-B. H31 needs to send the following packet: \( (S=2001:db8:0:b010::31, D=2001:db8:0:1234::101) \).

This behavior is very different from the behavior that occurs with site multihoming using PI addresses or with PA addresses using NAT. In these other multi-homing solutions, hosts do not need to react to network failures several hops away in order to regain Internet access. Instead, a host can be largely unaware of the failure of an uplink to an ISP. When multihoming with PA addresses and NAT, existing sessions generally need to be re-established after a failure since the external host will receive packets from the internal host with a new source address. However, new sessions can be established without any action on the part of the hosts.

Another example where the behavior of this multihoming solution differs significantly from that of multihoming with PI addresses or with PA addresses using NAT is in the ability of the enterprise network operator to route traffic over different ISPs based on destination address. We still consider the fairly simple network of Figure 2 and assume that uplinks to both ISPs are functioning. Assume that the site is multihomed using PA addresses and NAT, and that SERa and SERb each originate a normal destination route for \( D=::/0 \), with the route origination dependent on the state of the uplink to the respective ISP.

Now suppose it is observed that an important application running between internal hosts and external host H101 experience much better performance when the traffic passes through ISP-A (perhaps because ISP-A provides lower latency to H101.) When multihoming this site with PI addresses or with PA addresses and NAT, the enterprise network operator can configure SERa to originate into the site network a normal destination route for \( D=2001:db8:0:1234::/64 \) (the destination prefix to reach H101) that depends on the state of the uplink to ISP-A. When the link to ISP-A is functioning, the destination route \( D=2001:db8:0:1234::/64 \) will be originated by SERa, so traffic from all hosts will use ISP-A to reach H101 based on the longest destination prefix match in the route lookup.
Implementing the same routing policy is more difficult with the PA multihoming solution described in this document since it doesn’t use NAT. By design, the only way to control where a packet exits this network is by setting the source address of the packet. Since the network cannot modify the source address without NAT, the host must set it. To implement this routing policy, each host needs to use the source address from the prefix assigned by ISP-A to send traffic destined for H101. Mechanisms have been proposed to allow hosts to choose the source address for packets in a fine grained manner. We will discuss these proposals in Section 4. However, interacting with host operating systems in some manner to ensure a particular source address is chosen for a particular destination prefix is not what an enterprise network administrator would expect to have to do to implement this routing policy.

2.4. More complex ISP connectivity

The previous sections considered two variations of a simple multihoming scenario where the site is connected to two ISPs offering only Internet connectivity. It is likely that many actual enterprise multihoming scenarios will be similar to this simple example. However, there are more complex multihoming scenarios that we would like this solution to address as well.

It is fairly common for an ISP to offer a service in addition to Internet access over the same uplink. Two variations of this are reflected in Figure 3. In addition to Internet access, ISP-A offers a service which requires the site to access host H51 at 2001:db8:0:5555::51. The site has a single physical and logical connection with ISP-A, and ISP-A only allows access to H51 over that connection. So when H32 needs to access the service at H51 it needs to send packets with (S=2001:db8:0:a010::32, D=2001:db8:0:5555::51) and those packets need to be forward out the link from SERa to ISP-A.
ISP-B illustrates a variation on this scenario. In addition to Internet access, ISP-B also offers a service which requires the site to access host H61. The site has two connections to two different parts of ISP-B (shown as SERb1 and SERb2 in Figure 3). ISP-B expects Internet traffic to use the uplink from SERb1, while it expects traffic destined for the service at H61 to use the uplink from SERb2. For either uplink, ISP-B expects the ingress traffic to have a source address matching the prefix it assigned to the site, 2001:db8:0:b000::/52.
As discussed before, we rely completely on the internal host to set the source address of the packet properly. In the case of a packet sent by H31 to access the service in ISP-B at H61, we expect the packet to have the following addresses: (S=2001:db8:0:b010::31, D=2001:db8:0:6666::61). The routed network has two potential ways of distributing routes so that this packet exits the site on the uplink at SERb2.

We could just rely on normal destination routes, without using source-prefix scoped routes. If we have SERb2 originate a normal unscoped destination route for D=2001:db8:0:6666::/64, the packets from H31 to H61 will exit the site at SERb2 as desired. We should not have to worry about SERa needing to originate the same route, because ISP-B should choose a globally unique prefix for the service at H61.

The alternative is to have SERb2 originate a source-prefix-scoped destination route of the form (S=2001:db8:0:b000::/52, D=2001:db8:0:6666::/64). From a forwarding point of view, the use of the source-prefix-scoped destination route would result in traffic with source addresses corresponding only to ISP-B being sent to SERb2. Instead, the use of the unscoped destination route would result in traffic with source addresses corresponding to ISP-A and ISP-B being sent to SERb2, as long as the destination address matches the destination prefix. It seems like either forwarding behavior would be acceptable.

However, from the point of view of the enterprise network administrator trying to configure, maintain, and trouble-shoot this multihoming solution, it seems much clearer to have SERb2 originate the source-prefix-scoped destination route correspond to the service offered by ISP-B. In this way, all of the traffic leaving the site is determined by the source-prefix-scoped routes, and all of the traffic within the site or arriving from external hosts is determined by the unscoped destination routes. Therefore, for this multihoming solution we choose to originate source-prefix-scoped routes for all traffic leaving the site.

2.5. ISPs and Provider-Assigned Prefixes

While we expect that most site multihoming involves connecting to only two ISPs, this solution allows for connections to an arbitrary number of ISPs to be supported. However, when evaluating scalable implementations of the solution, it would be reasonable to assume that the maximum number of ISPs that a site would connect to is five.
It is also useful to note that the prefixes assigned to the site by different ISPs will not overlap. This must be the case, since the provider-assigned addresses have to be globally unique.

2.6. Simplified Topologies

The topologies of many enterprise sites using this multihoming solution may in practice be simpler than the examples that we have used. The topology in Figure 1 could be further simplified by having all hosts directly connected to the LAN connecting the two site exit routers, SERa and SERb. The topology could also be simplified by having the uplinks to ISP-A and ISP-B both connected to the same site exit router. However, it is the aim of this draft to provide a solution that applies to a broad range of enterprise site network topologies, so this draft focuses on providing a solution to the more general case. The simplified cases will also be supported by this solution, and there may even be optimizations that can be made for simplified cases. This solution however needs to support more complex topologies.

We are starting with the basic assumption that enterprise site networks can be quite complex from a routing perspective. However, even a complex site network can be multihomed to different ISPs with PA addresses using IPv4 and NAT. It is not reasonable to expect an enterprise network operator to change the routing topology of the site in order to deploy IPv6.

3. Generating Source-Prefix-Scoped Forwarding Tables

So far we have described in general terms how the routers in this solution that are capable of Source Address Dependent Routing will forward traffic using both normal unscoped destination routes and source-prefix-scoped destination routes. Here we give a precise method for generating a source-prefix-scoped forwarding table on a router that supports SADR.

1. Compute the next-hops for the source-prefix-scoped destination prefixes using only routers in the connected SADR domain. These are the initial source-prefix-scoped forwarding table entries.

2. Compute the next-hops for the unscoped destination prefixes using all routers in the IGP. This is the unscoped forwarding table.

3. Augment each source-prefix-scoped forwarding table with unscoped forwarding table entries based on the following rule. If the destination prefix of the unscoped forwarding entry exactly matches the destination prefix of an existing source-prefix-scoped forwarding entry (including destination prefix length),
then do not add the unscoped forwarding entry. If the destination prefix does NOT match an existing entry, then add the entry to the source-prefix-scoped forwarding table.

The forward tables produced by this process are used in the following way to forward packets.

1. If the source address of the packet matches one of the source prefixes, then look up the destination address of the packet in the corresponding source-prefix-scoped forwarding table to determine the next-hop for the packet.

2. If the source address of the packet does NOT match one of the source prefixes, then look up the destination address of the packet in unscoped forwarding table to determine the next-hop for the packet.

The following example illustrates how this process is used to create a forwarding table for each provider-assigned source prefix. We consider the multihomed site network in Figure 3. Initially we assume that all of the routers in the site network support SADR. Figure 4 shows the routes that are originated by the routers in the site network.
Routes originated by SERa:
(S=2001:db8:0:a000::/52, D=2001:db8:0:5555/64)
(S=2001:db8:0:a000::/52, D::/0)
(D=2001:db8:0:5555::/64)
(D::/0)

Routes originated by SERb1:
(S=2001:db8:0:b000::/52, D::/0)
(D::/0)

Routes originated by SERb2:
(S=2001:db8:0:b000::/52, D=2001:db8:0:6666::/64)
(D=2001:db8:0:6666::/64)

Routes originated by R1:
(D=2001:db8:0:a010::/64)
(D=2001:db8:0:b010::/64)

Routes originated by R2:
(D=2001:db8:0:a010::/64)
(D=2001:db8:0:b010::/64)

Routes originated by R3:
(D=2001:db8:0:a020::/64)
(D=2001:db8:0:b020::/64)

Figure 4: Routes Originated by Routers in the Site Network

Each SER originates destination routes which are scoped to the source prefix assigned by the ISP that the SER connects to. Note that the SERs also originate the corresponding unscoped destination route. This is not needed when all of the routers in the site support SADR. However, it is required when some routers do not support SADR. This will be discussed in more detail later.

We focus on how R8 constructs its source-prefix-scoped forwarding tables from these route advertisements. R8 computes the next hops for destination routes which are scoped to the source prefix 2001:db8:0:a000::/52. The results are shown in the first table in Figure 5. (In this example, the next hops are computed assuming that all links have the same metric.) Then, R8 computes the next hops for destination routes which are scoped to the source prefix 2001:db8:0:b000::/52. The results are shown in the second table in Figure 5. Finally, R8 computes the next hops for the unscoped destination prefixes. The results are shown in the third table in Figure 5.
forwarding entries scoped to
source prefix = 2001:db8:0:a000::/52
============================================
D=2001:db8:0:5555/64      NH=R7
D=:::/0                    NH=R7

forwarding entries scoped to
source prefix = 2001:db8:0:b000::/52
============================================
D=2001:db8:0:6666/64      NH=SERb2
D=:::/0                    NH=SERb1

unscoped forwarding entries
============================================
D=2001:db8:0:a010::/64    NH=R2
D=2001:db8:0:b010::/64    NH=R2
D=2001:db8:0:a020::/64    NH=R5
D=2001:db8:0:b020::/64    NH=R5
D=2001:db8:0:5555::/64    NH=R7
D=2001:db8:0:6666::/64    NH=SERb2
D=:::/0                    NH=SERb1

Figure 5: Forwarding Entries Computed at R8

The final step is for R8 to augment the source-prefix-scoped forwarding entries with unscoped forwarding entries. If an unscoped forwarding entry has the exact same destination prefix as an source-prefix-scoped forwarding entry (including destination prefix length), then the source-prefix-scoped forwarding entry wins.

As as an example of how the source scoped forwarding entries are augmented with unscoped forwarding entries, we consider how the two entries in the first table in Figure 5 (the table for source prefix = 2001:db8:0:a000::/52) are augmented with entries from the third table in Figure 5 (the table of unscoped forwarding entries). The first four unscoped forwarding entries (D=2001:db8:0:a010::/64, D=2001:db8:0:b010::/64, D=2001:db8:0:a020::/64, and D=2001:db8:0:b020::/64) are not an exact match for any of the existing entries in the forwarding table for source prefix 2001:db8:0:a000::/52. Therefore, these four entries are added to the final forwarding table for source prefix 2001:db8:0:a000::/52. The result of adding these entries is reflected in first four entries the first table in Figure 6. The next unscoped forwarding table entry is for D=2001:db8:0:5555::/64. This entry is an exact match for the existing entry in the forwarding table for source prefix 2001:db8:0:a000::/52. Therefore, we do not replace the existing
entry with the entry from the unscoped forwarding table. This is reflected in the fifth entry in the first table in Figure 6. (Note that since both scoped and unscoped entries have R7 as the next hop, the result of applying this rule is not visible.)

The next unscoped forwarding table entry is for D=2001:db8:0:6666::/64. This entry is not an exact match for any existing entries in the forwarding table for source prefix 2001:db8:0:a000::/52. Therefore, we add this entry. This is reflected in the sixth entry in the first table in Figure 6.

The next unscoped forwarding table entry is for D=:/:0. This entry is an exact match for the existing entry in the forwarding table for source prefix 2001:db8:0:a000::/52. Therefore, we do not overwrite the existing source-prefix-scoped entry, as can be seen in the last entry in the first table in Figure 6.
if source address matches 2001:db8:0:a000::/52
then use this forwarding table
============================================
D=2001:db8:0:a010::/64    NH=R2
D=2001:db8:0:b010::/64    NH=R2
D=2001:db8:0:a020::/64    NH=R5
D=2001:db8:0:b020::/64    NH=R5
D=2001:db8:0:5555::/64    NH=R7
D=2001:db8:0:6666::/64    NH=SERb2
D=::/0                    NH=R7

else if source address matches 2001:db8:0:b000::/52
then use this forwarding table
============================================
D=2001:db8:0:a010::/64    NH=R2
D=2001:db8:0:b010::/64    NH=R2
D=2001:db8:0:a020::/64    NH=R5
D=2001:db8:0:b020::/64    NH=R5
D=2001:db8:0:5555::/64    NH=R7
D=2001:db8:0:6666::/64    NH=SERb2
D=::/0                    NH=SERb1

else use this forwarding table
============================================
D=2001:db8:0:a010::/64    NH=R2
D=2001:db8:0:b010::/64    NH=R2
D=2001:db8:0:a020::/64    NH=R5
D=2001:db8:0:b020::/64    NH=R5
D=2001:db8:0:5555::/64    NH=R7
D=2001:db8:0:6666::/64    NH=SERb2
D=::/0                    NH=SERb1

Figure 6: Complete Forwarding Tables Computed at R8

The forwarding tables produced by this process at R8 have the desired properties. A packet with a source address in 2001:db8:0:a000::/52 will be forwarded based on the first table in Figure 6. If the packet is destined for the Internet at large or the service at D=2001:db8:0:5555/64, it will be sent to R7 in the direction of SERa. If the packet is destined for an internal host, then the first four entries will send it to R2 or R5 as expected. Note that if this packet has a destination address corresponding to the service offered by ISP-B (D=2001:db8:0:5555::/64), then it will get forwarded to SERb2. It will be dropped by SERb2 or by ISP-B, since it the packet has a source address that was not assigned by ISP-B. However, this is expected behavior. In order to use the service offered by ISP-B, the host needs to originate the packet with a source address assigned by ISP-B.
In this example, a packet with a source address that doesn’t match 2001:db8:0:a000::/52 or 2001:db8:0:b000::/52 must have originated from an external host. Such a packet will use the unscoped forwarding table (the last table in Figure 6). These packets will flow exactly as they would in absence of multihoming.

We can also modify this example to illustrate how it supports deployments where not all routers in the site support SADR. Continuing with the topology shown in Figure 3, suppose that R3 and R5 do not support SADR. Instead they are only capable of understanding unscoped route advertisements. The SADR routers in the network will still originate the routes shown in Figure 4. However, R3 and R5 will only understand the unscoped routes as shown in Figure 7.

Routes originated by SERa:
(D=2001:db8:0:5555::/64)
(D=::/0)

Routes originated by SERb1:
(D=::/0)

Routes originated by SERb2:
(D=2001:db8:0:6666::/64)

Routes originated by R1:
(D=2001:db8:0:a010::/64)
(D=2001:db8:0:b010::/64)

Routes originated by R2:
(D=2001:db8:0:a010::/64)
(D=2001:db8:0:b010::/64)

Routes originated by R3:
(D=2001:db8:0:a020::/64)
(D=2001:db8:0:b020::/64)

Figure 7: Routes Advertisements Understood by Routers that do not Support SADR

With these unscoped route advertisements, R5 will produce the forwarding table shown in Figure 8.
Any traffic that needs to exit the site will eventually hit a SADR-capable router. Once that traffic enters the SADR-capable domain, then it will not leave that domain until it exits the site. This property is required in order to guarantee that there will not be routing loops involving SADR-capable and non-SADR-capable routers.

Note that the mechanism described here for converting source-prefix-scoped destination prefix routing advertisements into forwarding state is somewhat different from that proposed in [I-D.ietf-rtgwg-dst-src-routing]. The method described in this document is intended to be easy to understand for network enterprise operators while at the same time being functionally correct. Another difference is that the method in this document assumes that source prefix will not overlap. Other differences between the two approaches still need to be understood and reconciled.

An interesting side-effect of deploying SADR is if all routers in a given network support SADR and have a scoped forwarding table, then the unscoped forwarding table can be eliminated which ensures that packets with legitimate source addresses only can leave the network (as there are no scoped forwarding tables for spoofed/bogon source addresses). It would prevent accidental leaks of ULA/reserved/link-local sources to the Internet as well as ensures that no spoofing is possible from the SADR-enabled network.

4. Mechanisms For Hosts To Choose Good Source Addresses In A Multihomed Site

Until this point, we have made the assumption that hosts are able to choose the correct source address using some unspecified mechanism. This has allowed us to just focus on what the routers in a multihomed site network need to do in order to forward packets to the correct ISP based on source address. Now we look at possible mechanisms for hosts to choose the correct source address. We also look at what
role, if any, the routers may play in providing information that helps hosts to choose source addresses.

Any host that needs to be able to send traffic using the uplinks to a given ISP is expected to be configured with an address from the prefix assigned by that ISP. The host will control which ISP is used for its traffic by selecting one of the addresses configured on the host as the source address for outgoing traffic. It is the responsibility of the site network to ensure that a packet with the source address from an ISP is not sent on an uplink to that ISP.

If all of the ISP uplinks are working, the choice of source address by the host may be driven by the desire to load share across ISP uplinks, or it may be driven by the desire to take advantage of certain properties of a particular uplink or ISP. If any of the ISP uplinks is not working, then the choice of source address by the host can determine if packets get dropped.

How a host should make good decisions about source address selection in a multihomed site is not a solved problem. We do not attempt to solve this problem in this document. Instead we discuss the current state of affairs with respect to standardized solutions and implementation of those solutions. We also look at proposed solutions for this problem.

An external host initiating communication with a host internal to a PA multihomed site will need to know multiple addresses for that host in order to communicate with it using different ISPs to the multihomed site. These addresses are typically learned through DNS. (For simplicity, we assume that the external host is single-homed.) The external host chooses the ISP that will be used at the remote multihomed site by setting the destination address on the packets it transmits. For a sessions originated from an external host to an internal host, the choice of source address used by the internal host is simple. The internal host has no choice but to use the destination address in the received packet as the source address of the transmitted packet.

For a session originated by a host internal to the multi-homed site, the decision of what source address to select is more complicated. We consider three main methods for hosts to get information about the network. The two proactive methods are Neighbor Discovery Router Advertisements and DHCPv6. The one reactive method we consider is ICMPv6. Note that we are explicitly excluding the possibility of having hosts participate in or even listen directly to routing protocol advertisements.
First we look at how a host is currently expected to select the source and destination address with which it sends a packet.

4.1. Source Address Selection Algorithm on Hosts

[RFC6724] defines the algorithms that hosts are expected to use to select source and destination addresses for packets. It defines an algorithm for selecting a source address and a separate algorithm for selecting a destination address. Both of these algorithms depend on a policy table. [RFC6724] defines a default policy which produces certain behavior.

The rules in the two algorithms in [RFC6724] depend on many different properties of addresses. While these are needed for understanding how a host should choose addresses in an arbitrary environment, most of the rules are not relevant for understanding how a host should choose among multiple source addresses in multihomed environment when sending a packet to a remote host. Returning to the example in Figure 3, we look at what the default algorithms in [RFC6724] say about the source address that internal host H31 should use to send traffic to external host H101, somewhere on the Internet. Let’s look at what rules in [RFC6724] are actually used by H31 in this case.

There is no choice to be made with respect to destination address. H31 needs to send a packet with D=2001:db8:0:1234::101 in order to reach H101. So H31 have to choose between using S=2001:db8:0:a010::31 or S=2001:db8:0:b010::31 as the source address for this packet. We go through the rules for source address selection in Section 5 of [RFC6724]. Rule 1 (Prefer same address) is not useful to break the tie between source addresses, because neither the candidate source addresses equals the destination address. Rule 2 (Prefer appropriate scope) is also not used in this scenario, because both source addresses and the destination address have global scope.

Rule 3 (Avoid deprecated addresses) applies to an address that has been autoconfigured by a host using stateless address autoconfiguration as defined in [RFC4862]. An address autoconfigured by a host has a preferred lifetime and a valid lifetime. The address is preferred until the preferred lifetime expires, after which it becomes deprecated. A deprecated address can still be used, but it is better to use a preferred address. When the valid lifetime expires, the address cannot be used at all. The preferred and valid lifetimes for an autoconfigured address are set based on the corresponding lifetimes in the Prefix Information Option in Neighbor Discovery Router Advertisements. So a possible tool to control source address selection in this scenario would be to a host to make an address deprecated by having routers on that link, R1 and R2 in
Figure 3, send Prefix Information Option messages with the preferred lifetime for the source prefix to be discouraged (or prohibited) set to zero. This is a rather blunt tool, because it discourages or prohibits the use of that source prefix for all destinations. However, it may be useful in some scenarios.

Rule 4 (Avoid home addresses) does not apply here because we are not considering Mobile IP.

Rule 5 (Prefer outgoing interface) is not useful in this scenario, because both source addresses are assigned to the same interface.

Rule 5.5 (Prefer addresses in a prefix advertised by the next-hop) is not useful in the scenario when both R1 and R2 will advertise both source prefixes. However potentially this rule may allow a host to select the correct source prefix by selecting a next-hop. The most obvious way would be to make R1 to advertise itself as a default router and send PIO for 2001:db8:0:a010::/64, while R2 is advertising itself as a default router and sending PIO for 2001:db8:0:b010::/64. We’ll discuss later how Rule 5.5 can be used to influence a source address selection in single-router topologies (e.g. when H41 is sending traffic using R3 as a default gateway).

Rule 6 (Prefer matching label) refers to the Label value determined for each source and destination prefix as a result of applying the policy table to the prefix. With the default policy table defined in Section 2.1 of [RFC6724], Label(2001:db8:0:a010::31) = 5, Label(2001:db8:0:b010::31) = 5, and Label(2001:db8:0:1234::101) = 5. So with the default policy, Rule 6 does not break the tie. However, the algorithms in [RFC6724] are defined in such a way that non-default address selection policy tables can be used. [RFC7078] defines a way to distribute a non-default address selection policy table to hosts using DHCPv6. So even though the application of rule 6 to this scenario using the default policy table is not useful, rule 6 may still be a useful tool.

Rule 7 (Prefer temporary addresses) has to do with the technique described in [RFC4941] to periodically randomize the interface portion of an IPv6 address that has been generated using stateless address autoconfiguration. In general, if H31 were using this technique, it would use it for both source addresses, for example creating temporary addresses 2001:db8:0:a010:2839:9938:ab58:830f and 2001:db8:0:b010:4838:f483:8384:3208, in addition to 2001:db8:0:a010::31 and 2001:db8:0:b010::31. So this rule would prefer the two temporary addresses, but it would not break the tie between the two source prefixes from ISP-A and ISP-B.
Rule 8 (Use longest matching prefix) dictates that between two candidate source addresses the one which has longest common prefix length with the destination address. For example, if H31 were selecting the source address for sending packets to H101, this rule would not be a tie breaker as for both candidate source addresses 2001:db8:0:a101::31 and 2001:db8:0:b101::31 the common prefix length with the destination is 48. However if H31 were selecting the source address for sending packets H41 address 2001:db8:0:a020::41, then this rule would result in using 2001:db8:0:a101::31 as a source (2001:db8:0:a101::31 and 2001:db8:0:a020::41 share the common prefix 2001:db8:0:a000::/58, while for ‘2001:db8:0:b101::31 and 2001:db8:0:a020::41 the common prefix is 2001:db8:0:a000::/51). Therefore rule 8 might be useful for selecting the correct source address in some but not all scenarios (for example if ISP-B services belong to 2001:db8:0:b000::/59 then H31 would always use 2001:db8:0:b010::31 to access those destinations).

So we can see that of the 8 source selection address rules from [RFC6724], five actually apply to our basic site multihoming scenario. The rules that are relevant to this scenario are summarized below.

- Rule 3: Avoid deprecated addresses.
- Rule 5.5: Prefer addresses in a prefix advertised by the next-hop.
- Rule 6: Prefer matching label.
- Rule 8: Prefer longest matching prefix.

The two methods that we discuss for controlling the source address selection through the four relevant rules above are SLAAC Router Advertisement messages and DHCPv6.

We also consider a possible role for ICMPv6 for getting traffic-driven feedback from the network. With the source address selection algorithm discussed above, the goal is to choose the correct source address on the first try, before any traffic is sent. However, another strategy is to choose a source address, send the packet, get feedback from the network about whether or not the source address is correct, and try another source address if it is not.

We consider four scenarios where a host needs to select the correct source address. The first is when both uplinks are working. The second is when one uplink has failed. The third one is a situation when one failed uplink has recovered. The last one is failure of both (all) uplinks.
4.2. Selecting Source Address When Both Uplinks Are Working

Again we return to the topology in Figure 3. Suppose that the site administrator wants to implement a policy by which all hosts need to use ISP-A to reach H01 at D=2001:db8:0:1234::101. So for example, H31 needs to select S=2001:db8:0:a010::31.

4.2.1. Distributing Address Selection Policy Table with DHCPv6

This policy can be implemented by using DHCPv6 to distribute an address selection policy table that assigns the same label to destination address that match 2001:db8:0:1234::/64 as it does to source addresses that match 2001:db8:0:a000::/52. The following two entries accomplish this.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prefix</th>
<th>Precedence</th>
<th>Label</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001:db8:0:1234::/64</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001:db8:0:a000::/52</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 9: Policy table entries to implement a routing policy

This requires that the hosts implement [RFC6724], the basic source and destination address framework, along with [RFC7078], the DHCPv6 extension for distributing a non-default policy table. Note that it does NOT require that the hosts use DHCPv6 for address assignment. The hosts could still use stateless address autoconfiguration for address configuration, while using DHCPv6 only for policy table distribution (see [RFC3736]). However this method has a number of disadvantages:

- DHCPv6 support is not a mandatory requirement for IPv6 hosts, so this method might not work for all devices.
- Network administrators are required to explicitly configure the desired network access policies on DHCPv6 servers.

4.2.2. Controlling Source Address Selection With Router Advertisements

 Neighbor Discovery currently has two mechanisms to communicate prefix information to hosts. The base specification for Neighbor Discovery (see [RFC4861]) defines the Prefix Information Option (PIO) in the Router Advertisement (RA) message. When a host receives a PIO with the A-flag set, it can use the prefix in the PIO as source prefix from which it assigns itself an IP address using stateless address autoconfiguration (SLAAC) procedures described in [RFC4862]. In the example of Figure 3, if the site network is using SLAAC, we would expect both R1 and R2 to send RA messages with PIOs for both source prefixes 2001:db8:0:a010::/64 and 2001:db8:0:b010::/64 with the
A-flag set. H31 would then use the SLAAC procedure to configure itself with the 2001:db8:0:a010::31 and 2001:db8:0:b010::31.

Whereas a host learns about source prefixes from PIO messages, hosts can learn about a destination prefix from a Router Advertisement containing Route Information Option (RIO), as specified in [RFC4191]. The destination prefixes in RIOs are intended to allow a host to choose the router that it uses as its first hop to reach a particular destination prefix.

As currently standardized, neither PIO nor RIO options contained in Neighbor Discovery RouterAdvertisements can communicate the information needed to implement the desired routing policy. PIO’s communicate source prefixes, and RIO communicate destination prefixes. However, there is currently no standardized way to directly associate a particular destination prefix with a particular source prefix.

[I-D.pfister-6man-sadr-ra] proposes a Source Address Dependent Route Information option for Neighbor Discovery Router Advertisements which would associate a source prefix and with a destination prefix. The details of [I-D.pfister-6man-sadr-ra] might need tweaking to address this use case. However, in order to be able to use Neighbor Discovery Router Advertisements to implement this routing policy, an extension that allows a R1 and R2 to explicitly communicate to H31 an association between S=2001:db8:0:a000::52 D=2001:db8:0:1234::/64 would be needed.

However the Rule 5.5 of the source address selection (discussed above) together with default router preference (specified in [RFC4191]) and RIO can be used to influence a source address selection on a host as described below. Let’s look at source address selection on the host H41. It receives RAs from R3 with PIOs for 2001:db8:0:a020::/64 and 2001:db8:0:b020::/64. At that point all traffic would use the same next-hop (R3 link-local address) so Rule 5.5 does not apply. Now let’s assume that R3 supports SADR and has two scoped forwarding tables, one scoped to S=2001:db8:0:a000::/52 and another scoped to S=2001:db8:0:b000::/52. If R3 generates two different link-local addresses for its interface facing H41 (one for each scoped forwarding table, LLA_A and LLA_B) and starts sending two different RAs: one is sent from LLA_A and includes PIO for 2001:db8:0:a020::/64, another us sent from LLA_B and includes PIO for 2001:db8:0:b020::/64. Now it is possible to influence H41 source address selection for destinations which follow the default route by setting default router preference in RAs. If it is desired that H41 reaches H101 (or any destinations in the Internet) via ISP-A, then RAs sent from LLA_A should have default router preference set to 01 (high priority), while RAs sent from LLA_B should have preference set...
to 11 (low). Then LLA_A would be chosen as a next-hop for H101 and therefore (as per rule 5.5) 2001:db8:0:a020::41 would be selected as the source address. If, at the same time, it is desired that H61 is accessible via ISP-B then R3 should include a RIO for 2001:db8:0:6666::/64 to its RA sent from LLA_B. H41 would chose LLA_B as a next-hop for all traffic to H61 and then as per Rule 5.5, 2001:db8:0:b020::41 would be selected as a source address.

If in the above mentioned scenario it is desirable that all Internet traffic leaves the network via ISP-A and the link to ISP-B is used for accessing ISP-B services only (not as ISP-A link backup), then RAs sent by R3 from LLA_B should have Router Lifetime set to 0 and should include RIOs for ISP-B address space. It would instruct H41 to use LLA_A for all Internet traffic but use LLA_B as a next-hop while sending traffic to ISP-B addresses.

The proposed solution relies on SADR support by first-hop routers as well as SERs.

4.2.3. Controlling Source Address Selection With ICMPv6

We now discuss how one might use ICMPv6 to implement the routing policy to send traffic destined for H101 out the uplink to ISP-A, even when uplinks to both ISPs are working. If H31 started sending traffic to H101 with S=2001:db8:0:b010::31 and D=2001:db8:0:1234::101, it would be routed through SER-b1 and out the uplink to ISP-B. SERb1 could recognize that this is traffic is not following the desired routing policy and react by sending an ICMPv6 message back to H31.

In this example, we could arrange things so that SERb1 drops the packet with S=2001:db8:0:b010::31 and D=2001:db8:0:1234::101, and then sends to H31 an ICMPv6 Destination Unreachable message with Code 5 (Source address failed ingress/egress policy). When H31 receives this packet, it would then be expected to try another source address to reach the destination. In this example, H31 would then send a packet with S=2001:db8:0:a010::31 and D=2001:db8:0:1234::101, which will reach SERa and be forwarded out the uplink to ISP-A.

However, we would also want it to be the case that SERb1 does not enforce this routing policy when the uplink from SERa to ISP-A has failed. This could be accomplished by having SERa originate a source-prefix-scoped route for (S=2001:db8:0:a000::/52, D=2001:db8:0:1234::/64) and have SERb1 monitor the presence of that route. If that route is not present (because SERa has stopped originating it), then SERb1 will not enforce the routing policy, and it will forward packets with S=2001:db8:0:b010::31 and D=2001:db8:0:1234::101 out its uplink to ISP-B.
We can also use this source-prefix-scoped route originated by SERa to communicate the desired routing policy to SERb1. We can define an EXCLUSIVE flag to be advertised together with the IGP route for (S=2001:db8:0:a000::/52, D=2001:db8:0:1234::/64). This would allow SERa to communicate to SERb that SERb should reject traffic for D=2001:db8:0:1234::/64 and respond with an ICMPv6 Destination Unreachable Code 5 message, as long as the route for (S=2001:db8:0:a000::/52, D=2001:db8:0:1234::/64) is present.

Finally, if we are willing to extend ICMPv6 to support this solution, then we could create a mechanism for SERb1 to tell the host what source address it should be using to successfully forward packets that meet the policy. In its current form, when SERb1 sends an ICMPv6 Destination Unreachable Code 5 message, it is basically saying, "This source address is wrong. Try another source address." It would be better is if the ICMPv6 message could say, "This source address is wrong. Instead use a source address in S=2001:db8:0:a000::/52."

However using ICMPv6 for signalling source address information back to hosts introduces new challenges. Most routers currently have software or hardware limits on generating ICMP messages. An site administrator deploying a solution that relies on the SERs generating ICMP messages could try to improve the performance of SERs for generating ICMP messages. However, in a large network, it is still likely that ICMP message generation limits will be reached. As a result hosts would not receive ICMPv6 back which in turns leads to traffic blackholing and poor user experience. To improve the scalability of ICMPv6-based signalling hosts SHOULD cache the preferred source address (or prefix) for the given destination. In addition, the same source prefix SHOULD be used for other destinations in the same /64 as the original destination address. The source prefix SHOULD have a specific lifetime. Expiration of the lifetime SHOULD trigger the source address selection algorithm again.

Using ICMPv6 Code 5 message for influencing source address selection allows an attacker to exhaust the list of candidate source addresses on the host by sending spoofed ICMPv6 Code 5 for all prefixes known on the network (therefore preventing a victim from establishing a communication with the destination host). To protect from such attack hosts SHOULD verify that the original packet header included into ICMPv6 error message was actually sent by the host.
4.2.4. Summary of Methods For Controlling Source Address Selection To Implement Routing Policy

So to summarize this section, we have looked at three methods for implementing a simple routing policy where all traffic for a given destination on the Internet needs to use a particular ISP, even when the uplinks to both ISPs are working.

The default source address selection policy cannot distinguish between the source addresses needed to enforce this policy, so a non-default policy table using associating source and destination prefixes using Label values would need to be installed on each host. A mechanism exists for DHCPv6 to distribute a non-default policy table but such solution would heavily rely on DHCPv6 support by host operating system. Moreover there is no mechanism to translate desired routing/traffic engineering policies into policy tables on DHCPv6 servers. Therefore using DHCPv6 for controlling address selection policy table is not recommended and SHOULD NOT be used.

At the same time Router Advertisements provide a reliable mechanism to influence source address selection process via PIO, RIO and default router preferences. As all those options have been standardized by IETF and are supported by various operating systems, no changes are required on hosts. First-hop routers in the enterprise network need to be able of sending different RAs for different SLAAC prefixes (either based on scoped forwarding tables or based on pre-configured policies).

SERs can enforce the routing policy by sending ICMPv6 Destination Unreachable messages with Code 5 (Source address failed ingress/egress policy) for traffic that is being sent with the wrong source address. The policy distribution can be automated by defining an EXCLUSIVE flag for the source-prefix-scoped route which can be set on the SER that originates the route. As ICMPv6 message generation can be rate-limited on routers, it SHOULD NOT be used as the only mechanism to influence source address selection on hosts. While hosts SHOULD select the correct source address for a given destination the network SHOULD signal any source address issues back to hosts using ICMPv6 error messages.

4.3. Selecting Source Address When One Uplink Has Failed

Now we discuss if DHCPv6, Neighbor Discovery Router Advertisements, and ICMPv6 can help a host choose the right source address when an uplink to one of the ISPs has failed. Again we look at the scenario in Figure 3. This time we look at traffic from H31 destined for external host H501 at D=2001:db8:0:5678::501. We initially assume
that the uplink from SERa to ISP-A is working and that the uplink from SERb1 to ISP-B is working.

We assume there is no particular routing policy desired, so H31 is free to send packets with $S=2001:db8:0:a010::31$ or $S=2001:db8:0:b010::31$ and have them delivered to H501. For this example, we assume that H31 has chosen $S=2001:db8:0:b010::31$ so that the packets exit via SERb to ISP-B. Now we see what happens when the link from SERb1 to ISP-B fails. How should H31 learn that it needs to start sending the packet to H501 with $S=2001:db8:0:a010::31$ in order to start using the uplink to ISP-A? We need to do this in a way that doesn’t prevent H31 from still sending packets with $S=2001:db8:0:b010::31$ in order to reach H61 at $D=2001:db8:0:6666::61$.

4.3.1. Controlling Source Address Selection With DHCPv6

For this example we assume that the site network in Figure 3 has a centralized DHCP server and all routers act as DHCP relay agents. We assume that both of the addresses assigned to H31 were assigned via DHCP.

We could try to have the DHCP server monitor the state of the uplink from SERb1 to ISP-B in some manner and then tell H31 that it can no longer use $S=2001:db8:0:b010::31$ by setting its valid lifetime to zero. The DHCP server could initiate this process by sending a Reconfigure Message to H31 as described in Section 19 of [RFC3315]. Or the DHCP server can assign addresses with short lifetimes in order to force clients to renew them often.

This approach would prevent H31 from using $S=2001:db8:0:b010::31$ to reach the a host on the Internet. However, it would also prevent H31 from using $S=2001:db8:0:b010::31$ to reach H61 at $D=2001:db8:0:6666::61$, which is not desirable.

Another potential approach is to have the DHCP server monitor the uplink from SERb1 to ISP-B and control the choice of source address on H31 by updating its address selection policy table via the mechanism in [RFC7078]. The DHCP server could initiate this process by sending a Reconfigure Message to H31. Note that [RFC3315] requires that Reconfigure Message use DHCP authentication. DHCP authentication could be avoided by using short address lifetimes to force clients to send Renew messages to the server often. If the host is not obtaining its IP addresses from the DHCP server, then it would need to use the Information Refresh Time option defined in [RFC4242].

If the following policy table can be installed on H31 after the failure of the uplink from SERb1, then the desired routing behavior...
should be achieved based on source and destination prefix being matched with label values.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prefix</th>
<th>Precedence</th>
<th>Label</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>::/0</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001:db8:0:a000::/52</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001:db8:0:6666::/64</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001:db8:0:b000::/52</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 10: Policy Table Needed On Failure Of Uplink From SERb1

The described solution has a number of significant drawbacks, some of them already discussed in Section 4.2.1.

- DHCPv6 support is not required for an IPv6 host and there are operating systems which do not support DHCPv6. Besides that, it does not appear that [RFC7078] has been widely implemented on host operating systems.

- [RFC7078] does not clearly specify this kind of a dynamic use case where address selection policy needs to be updated quickly in response to the failure of a link. In a large network it would present scalability issues as many hosts need to be reconfigured in very short period of time.

- No mechanism exists for making DHCPv6 servers aware of network topology/routing changes in the network. In general DHCPv6 servers monitoring network-related events sounds like a bad idea as completely new functionality beyond the scope of DHCPv6 role is required.

4.3.2. Controlling Source Address Selection With Router Advertisements

The same mechanism as discussed in Section 4.2.2 can be used to control the source address selection in the case of an uplink failure. If a particular prefix should not be used as a source for any destinations, then the router needs to send RA with Preferred Lifetime field for that prefix set to 0.

Let’s consider a scenario when all uplinks are operational and H41 receives two different RAs from R3: one from LLA_A with PIO for 2001:db8:0:a020::/64, default router preference set to 11 (low) and another one from LLA_B with PIO for 2001:db8:0:a020::/64, default router preference set to 01 (high) and RIO for 2001:db8:0:6666::/64. As a result H41 is using 2001:db8:0:b020::41 as a source address for all Internet traffic and those packets are sent by SERs to ISP-B. If SERb1 uplink to ISP-B failed, the desired behavior is that H41 stops
using 2001:db8:0:b020::41 as a source address for all destinations but H61. To achieve that R3 should react to SERb1 uplink failure (which could be detected as the scoped route (S=2001:db8:0:b000::/52, D=:/:0) disappearance) by withdrawing itself as a default router. R3 sends a new RA from LLA_B with Router Lifetime value set to 0 (which means that it should not be used as default router). That RA still contains PIO for 2001:db8:0:b020::/64 (for SLAAC purposes) and RIO for 2001:db8:0:6666::/64 so H41 can reach H61 using LLA_B as a next-hop and 2001:db8:0:b020::41 as a source address. For all traffic following the default route, LLA_A will be used as a next-hop and 2001:db8:0:a020::41 as a source address.

If all uplinks to ISP-B have failed and therefore source addresses from ISP-B address space should not be used at all, the forwarding table scoped S=2001:db8:0:b000::/52 contains no entries. Hosts can be instructed to stop using source addresses from that block by sending RAs containing PIO with Preferred Lifetime set to 0.

4.3.3. Controlling Source Address Selection With ICMPv6

Now we look at how ICMPv6 messages can provide information back to H31. We assume again that at the time of the failure H31 is sending packets to H501 using (S=2001:db8:0:b010::31, D=2001:db8:0:5678::501). When the uplink from SERb1 to ISP-B fails, SERb1 would stop originating its source-prefix-scoped route for the default destination (S=2001:db8:0:b000::/52, D=:/:0) as well as its unscoped default destination route. With these routes no longer in the IGP, traffic with (S=2001:db8:0:b010::31, D=2001:db8:0:5678::501) would end up at SERa based on the unscoped default destination route being originated by SERa. Since that traffic has the wrong source address to be forwarded to ISP-A, SERa would drop it and send a Destination Unreachable message with Code 5 (Source address failing ingress/egress policy) back to H31. H31 would then know to use another source address for that destination and would try with (S=2001:db8:0:a010::31, D=2001:db8:0:5678::501). This would be forwarded to SERa based on the source-prefix-scoped default destination route still being originated by SERa, and SERa would forward it to ISP-A. As discussed above, if we are willing to extend ICMPv6, SERa can even tell H31 what source address it should use to reach that destination. The expected host behaviour has been discussed in Section 4.2.3. Potential issue with using ICMPv6 for signalling source address issues back to hosts is that uplink to an ISP-B failure immediately invalidates source addresses from 2001:db8:0:b000::/52 for all hosts which triggers a large number of ICMPv6 being sent back to hosts - the same scalability/rate limiting issues discussed in Section 4.2.3 would apply.
4.3.4. Summary Of Methods For Controlling Source Address Selection On The Failure Of An Uplink

It appears that DHCPv6 is not particularly well suited to quickly changing the source address used by a host in the event of the failure of an uplink, which eliminates DHCPv6 from the list of potential solutions. On the other hand Router Advertisements provides a reliable mechanism to dynamically provide hosts with a list of valid prefixes to use as source addresses as well as prevent particular prefixes to be used. While no additional new features are required to be implemented on hosts, routers need to be able to send RAs based on the state of scoped forwarding tables entries and to react to network topology changes by sending RAs with particular parameters set.

The use of ICMPv6 Destination Unreachable messages generated by the SER (or any SADR-capable) routers seem like they have the potential to provide a support mechanism together with RAs to signal source address selection errors back to hosts, however scalability issues may arise in large networks in case of sudden topology change. Therefore it is highly desirable that hosts are able to select the correct source address in case of uplinks failure with ICMPv6 being an additional mechanism to signal unexpected failures back to hosts.

The current behavior of different host operating system when receiving ICMPv6 Destination Unreachable message with code 5 (Source address failed ingress/egress policy) is not clear to the authors. Information from implementers, users, and testing would be quite helpful in evaluating this approach.

4.4. Selecting Source Address Upon Failed Uplink Recovery

The next logical step is to look at the scenario when a failed uplink on SERb1 to ISP-B is coming back up, so hosts can start using source addresses belonging to 2001:db8:0:b000::/52 again.

4.4.1. Controlling Source Address Selection With DHCPv6

The mechanism to use DHCPv6 to instruct the hosts (H31 in our example) to start using prefixes from ISP-B space (e.g. S=2001:db8:0:b010::31 for H31) to reach hosts on the Internet is quite similar to one discussed in Section 4.3.1 and shares the same drawbacks.
4.4.2. Controlling Source Address Selection With Router Advertisements

Let’s look at the scenario discussed in Section 4.3.2. If the uplink(s) failure caused the complete withdrawal of prefixes from 2001:db8:0:b000::/52 address space by setting Preferred Lifetime value to 0, then the recovery of the link should just trigger new RA being sent with non-zero Preferred Lifetime. In another scenario discussed in Section 4.3.2, the SERb1 uplink to ISP-B failure leads to disappearance of the (S=2001:db8:0:b000::/52, D::/0) entry from the forwarding table scoped to S=2001:db8:0:b000::/52 and, in turn, caused R3 to send RAs from LLA_B with Router Lifetime set to 0. The recovery of the SERb1 uplink to ISP-B leads to (S=2001:db8:0:b000::/52, D::/0) scoped forwarding entry re-appearance and instructs R3 that it should advertise itself as a default router for ISP-B address space domain (send RAs from LLA_B with non-zero Router Lifetime).

4.4.3. Controlling Source Address Selection With ICMP

It looks like ICMPv6 provides a rather limited functionality to signal back to hosts that particular source addresses have become valid again. Unless the changes in the uplink state a particular (S,D) pair, hosts can keep using the same source address even after an ISP uplink has come back up. For example, after the uplink from SERb1 to ISP-B had failed, H31 received ICMPv6 Code 5 message (as described in Section 4.3.3) and allegedly started using (S=2001:db8:0:a010::31, D=2001:db8:0:5678::501) to reach H501. Now when the SERb1 uplink comes back up, the packets with that (S,D) pair are still routed to SERa1 and sent to the Internet. Therefore H31 is not informed that it should stop using 2001:db8:0:a010::31 and start using 2001:db8:0:b010::31 again. Unless SERa has a policy configured to drop packets (S=2001:db8:0:a010::31, D=2001:db8:0:5678::501) and send ICMPv6 back if SERb1 uplink to ISP-B is up, H31 will be unaware of the network topology change and keep using S=2001:db8:0:a010::31 for Internet destinations, including H51.

One of the possible option may be using a scoped route with EXCLUSIVE flag as described in Section 4.2.3. SERa1 uplink recovery would cause (S=2001:db8:0:a000::/52, D=2001:db8:0:1234::/64) route to reappear in the routing table. In the absence of that route packets to H101 which were sent to ISP-B (as ISP-A uplink was down) with source addresses from 2001:db8:0:b000::/52. When the route re-appears SERb1 would reject those packets and sends ICMPv6 back as discussed in Section 4.2.3. Practically it might lead to scalability issues which have been already discussed in Section 4.2.3 and Section 4.4.3.
4.4.4. Summary Of Methods For Controlling Source Address Selection Upon Failed Uplink Recovery

Once again DHCPv6 does not look like reasonable choice to manipulate source address selection process on a host in the case of network topology changes. Using Router Advertisement provides the flexible mechanism to dynamically react to network topology changes (if routers are able to use routing changes as a trigger for sending out RAs with specific parameters). ICMPv6 could be considered as a supporting mechanism to signal incorrect source address back to hosts but should not be considered as the only mechanism to control the address selection in multihomed environments.

4.5. Selecting Source Address When All Uplinks Failed

One particular tricky case is a scenario when all uplinks have failed. In that case there is no valid source address to be used for any external destinations while it might be desirable to have intra-site connectivity.

4.5.1. Controlling Source Address Selection With DHCPv6

From DHCPv6 perspective uplinks failure should be treated as two independent failures and processed as described in Section 4.3.1. At this stage it is quite obvious that it would result in quite complicated policy table which needs to be explicitly configured by administrators and therefore seems to be impractical.

4.5.2. Controlling Source Address Selection With Router Advertisements

As discussed in Section 4.3.2 an uplink failure causes the scoped default entry to disappear from the scoped forwarding table and triggers RAs with zero Router Lifetime. Complete disappearance of all scoped entries for a given source prefix would cause the prefix being withdrawn from hosts by setting Preferred Lifetime value to zero in PIO. If all uplinks (SERa, SERb1 and SERb2) failed, hosts either lost their default routers and/or have no global IPv6 addresses to use as a source. (Note that ‘uplink failure’ might mean ‘IPv6 connectivity failure with IPv4 still being reachable’, in which case hosts might fall back to IPv4 if there is IPv4 connectivity to destinations). As a results intra-site connectivity is broken. One of the possible way to solve it is to use ULAs.

All hosts have ULA addresses assigned in addition to GUAs and used for intra-site communication even if there is no GUA assigned to a host. To avoid accidental leaking of packets with ULA sources SADR-capable routers SHOULD have a scoped forwarding table for ULA source for internal routes but MUST NOT have an entry for D=::/0 in that
In the absence of \( (S=ULA\_Prefix; D=::/0) \) first-hop routers will send dedicated RAs from a unique link-local source LLA\_ULA with PIO from ULA address space, RIO for the ULA prefix and Router Lifetime set to zero. The behaviour is consistent with the situation when SERb1 lost the uplink to ISP-B (so there is no Internet connectivity from 2001:db8:0:b000::/52 sources) but those sources can be used to reach some specific destinations. In the case of ULA there is no Internet connectivity from ULA sources but they can be used to reach another ULA destinations. Note that ULA usage could be particularly useful if all ISPs assign prefixes via DHCP-PD. In the absence of ULAs uplinks failure hosts would lost all their GUAs upon prefix lifetime expiration which again makes intra-site communication impossible.

4.5.3. Controlling Source Address Selection With ICMPv6

In case of all uplinks failure all SERs will drop outgoing IPv6 traffic and respond with ICMPv6 error message. In the large network when many hosts are trying to reach Internet destinations it means that SERs need to generate an ICMPv6 error to every packet they receive from hosts which presents the same scalability issues discussed in Section 4.3.3

4.5.4. Summary Of Methods For Controlling Source Address Selection When All Uplinks Failed

Again, combining SADR with Router Advertisements seems to be the most flexible and scalable way to control the source address selection on hosts.

4.6. Summary Of Methods For Controlling Source Address Selection

To summarize the scenarios and options discussed above:

While DHCPv6 allows administrators to manipulate source address selection policy tables, this method has a number of significant disadvantages which eliminates DHCPv6 from a list of potential solutions:

1. It required hosts to support DHCPv6 and its extension (RFC7078);
2. DHCPv6 server need to monitor network state and detect routing changes.
3. Network topology/routing policy changes could trigger simultaneous re-configuration of large number of hosts which present serious scalability issues.
The use of Router Advertisements to influence the source address selection on hosts seem to be the most reliable, flexible and scalable solution. It has the following benefits:

1. no new (non-standard) functionality needs to be implemented on hosts (except for [RFC4191] support);
2. no changes in RA format;
3. Routers can react to routing table changes by sending RAs which would minimize the failover time in the case of network topology changes;
4. information required for source address selection is broadcast to all affected hosts in case of topology change event which improves the scalability of the solution (comparing to DHCPv6 reconfiguration or ICMPv6 error messages).

To fully benefit from the RA-based solution, first-hop routers need to implement SADR and be able to send dedicated RAs per scoped forwarding table as discussed above, reacting to network changes with sending new RAs. It should be noted that the proposed solution would work even if first-hop routers are not SADR-capable but still able to send individual RAs for each ISP prefix and react to topology changes as discussed above.

The RA-based solution relies heavily on hosts correctly implementing default address selection algirth as defined in [RFC6724] and in particular, Rule 5.5. There are some evidences that not all host OSes have that rule implemented currently (it should be noted that [I-D.ietf-6man-multi-homed-host] states that Rule 5.5 SHOULD be implemented.

ICMPv6 Code 5 error message SHOULD be used to complement RA-based solution to signal incorrect source address selection back to hosts, but it SHOULD NOT be considered as the stand-alone solution. To prevent scenarios when hosts in multihomed environments incorrectly identify onlink/offlink destinations, hosts should treat ICMPv6 Redirects as discussed in [I-D.ietf-6man-multi-homed-host].

4.7. Other Configuration Parameters

4.7.1. DNS Configuration

In multihomed environment each ISP might provide their own list of DNS servers. E.g. in the topology show on Figure 3, ISP-A might provide recursive DNS server H51 2001:db8:0:5555::51, while ISP-B might provide H61 2001:db8:0:6666::61 as a recursive DNS server. If
the multihomed enterprise network is not running their own recursive resolver then hosts need to be configured with DNS server IPv6 addresses. [RFC6106] defines IPv6 Router Advertisement options to allow IPv6 routers to advertise a list of DNS recursive server addresses and a DNS Search List to IPv6 hosts. Using RDNSS together with 'scoped' RAs as described above would allow a first-hop router (R3 in the Figure 3) to send DNS server addresses and search lists provided by each ISPs.

As discussed in Section 4.5.2, failure of all ISP uplinks would cause deprecation of all addresses assigned to a host from ISPs address space. Most likely intra-site IPv6 connectivity would be still desirable so Section 4.5.2 proposes a usage of ULAs to enable intra-site communication. In such scenario the enterprise network should run its own recursive DNS server(s) and provide its ULA addresses to hosts via RDNSS mechanism in RAs send for ULA-scoped forwarding table as described in Section 4.5.2.

It should be noted that [RFC6106] explicitly prohibits using DNS information if the RA router Lifetime expired: "An RDNSS address or a DNSSL domain name MUST be used only as long as both the RA router Lifetime (advertised by a Router Advertisement message) and the corresponding option Lifetime have not expired.". Therefore hosts might ignore RDNSS information provided in ULA-scoped RAs as those RAs would have router lifetime set to 0. However the updated version of RFC6106 ([I-D.ietf-6man-rdnss-rfc6106bis]) has that requirement removed.

5. Other Solutions

5.1. Shim6

The Shim6 working group specified the Shim6 protocol [RFC5533] which allows a host at a multihomed site to communicate with an external host and exchange information about possible source and destination address pairs that they can use to communicate. It also specified the REAP protocol [RFC5534] to detect failures in the path between working address pairs and find new working address pairs. A fundamental requirement for Shim6 is that both internal and external hosts need to support Shim6. That is, both the host internal to the multihomed site and the host external to the multihomed site need to support Shim6 in order for there to be any benefit for the internal host to run Shim6. The Shim6 protocol specification was published in 2009, but it has not been implemented on widely used operating systems.

We do not consider Shim6 to be a viable solution. It suffers from the fact that it requires widespread deployment of Shim6 on hosts all
over the Internet before the host at a PA multihomed site sees significant benefit. However, there appears to be no motivation for the vast majority of hosts on the Internet (which are not at PA multihomed sites) to deploy Shim6. This may help explain why Shim6 has not been widely implemented.

5.2. IPv6-to-IPv6 Network Prefix Translation

IPv6-to-IPv6 Network Prefix Translation (NPTv6) [RFC6296] is not the focus of this document. This document describes a solution where a host in a multihomed site determines which ISP a packet will be sent to based on the source address it applies to the packet. This solution has many moving parts. It requires some routers in the enterprise site to support some form of Source Address Dependent Routing (SADR). It requires a host to be able to learn when the uplink to an ISP fails so that it can stop using the source address corresponding to that ISP. Ongoing work to create mechanisms to accomplish this are discussed in this document, but they are still a work in progress.

This document attempts to create a PA multihoming solution that is as easy as possible for an enterprise to deploy. However, the success of this solution will depend greatly on whether or not the mechanisms for hosts to select source addresses based on the state of ISP uplinks gets implemented across a wide range of operating systems as the default mode of operation. Until that occurs, NPTv6 should still be considered a viable option to enable PA multihoming for enterprises.

6. IANA Considerations

This memo asks the IANA for no new parameters.

7. Security Considerations

7.1. Privacy Considerations

8. Acknowledgements

The original outline was suggested by Ole Troan.

9. References

9.1. Normative References
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Appendix A. Change Log

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Routing-Related Design Choices for IPv6 Networks

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Abstract

This document presents advice on certain routing-related design choices that arise when designing IPv6 networks (both dual-stack and IPv6-only). The intended audience is someone designing an IPv6 network who is knowledgeable about best current practices around IPv4 network design, and wishes to learn the corresponding practices for IPv6.

Status of This Memo

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1. Introduction

This document discusses routing-related design choices that arise when designing an IPv6-only or dual-stack network. The focus is on choices that do not come up when designing an IPv4-only network. The document presents each choice and the alternatives, and then discusses the pros and cons of the alternatives in detail. Where consensus currently exists around the best practice, this is documented; otherwise the document simply summarizes the current state of the discussion. Thus this document serves to both document the reasoning behind best current practices for IPv6, and to allow a designer to make an informed choice where no such consensus exists.

The design choices presented apply to both Service Provider and Enterprise network environments. Where choices have selection criteria which differ between the Service Provider and the Enterprise
environment, this is noted. The designer is encouraged to ensure that they familiarize themselves with any of the discussed technologies to ensure the best selection is made for their environment.

This document does not present advice on strategies for adding IPv6 to a network, nor does it discuss transition in these areas, see [RFC6180] for general advice, [RFC6782] for wireline service providers, [RFC6342] for mobile network providers, [RFC5963] for exchange point operators, [RFC6883] for content providers, and both [RFC4852] and [RFC7381] for enterprises. Nor does this document discuss the particulars of creating an IPv6 addressing plan; for advice in this area, see [RFC5375] or [v6-addressing-plan]. The document focuses on unicast routing design only and does not cover multicast or the issues involved in running MPLS over IPv6 transport.

Section 2 presents and discusses a number of design choices. Section 3 discusses some general themes that run through these choices.

2. Design Choices

Each subsection below presents a design choice and discusses the pros and cons of the various options. If there is consensus in the industry for a particular option, then the consensus position is noted.

2.1. Addresses

This section discusses the choice of addresses for router loopbacks and links between routers. It does not cover the choice of addresses for end hosts.

In IPv6, an interface is always assigned a Link-Local Address (LLA) [RFC4291]. The link-local address can only be used for communicating with devices that are on-link, so often one or more additional addresses are assigned which are able to communicate off-link. This additional address or addresses can be one of three types:

- **Provider-Independent Global Unicast Address (PI GUA):** IPv6 address allocated by a regional address registry [RFC4291]
- **Provider-Aggregable Global Unicast Address (PA GUA):** IPv6 Address allocated by your upstream service provider
- **Unique Local Address (ULA):** IPv6 address locally assigned [RFC4193]
This document uses the term "multi-hop address" to collectively refer to these three types of addresses.

PI GUAs are, for many situations, the most flexible of these choices. Their main disadvantages are that a regional address registry will only allocate them to organizations that meet certain qualifications, and one must pay an annual fee. These disadvantages mean that many smaller organization may not qualify or be willing to pay for these addresses.

PA GUAs have the advantage that they are usually provided at no extra charge when you contract with an upstream provider. However, they have the disadvantage that, when switching upstream providers, one must give back the old addresses and get new addresses from the new provider ("renumbering"). Though IPv6 has mechanisms to make renumbering easier than IPv4, these techniques are not generally applicable to routers and renumbering is still fairly hard [RFC5887] [RFC7010]. PA GUAs also have the disadvantage that it is not easy to have multiple upstream providers ("multi-homing") if they are used (see "Ingress Filtering Problem" in [RFC5220]).

ULAs have the advantage that they are extremely easy to obtain and cost nothing. However, they have the disadvantage that they cannot be routed on the Internet, so must be used only within a limited scope. In many situations, this is not a problem, but in certain situations this can be problematic. Though there is currently no document that describes these situations, many of them are similar to those described in [RFC6752]. See also [I-D.ietf-v6ops-ula-usage-recommendations].

Not discussed in this document is the possibility of using the technology described in [RFC6296] to work around some of the limitations of PA GUAs and ULAs.

2.1.1. Where to Use Addresses

As mentioned above, all interfaces in IPv6 always have a link-local address. This section addresses the question of when and where to assign multi-hop addresses in addition to the LLA. We consider four options:

a. Use only link-local addresses on all router interfaces.

b. Assign multi-hop addresses to all link interfaces on each router, and use only a link-local address on the loopback interfaces.

c. Assign multi-hop addresses to the loopback interface on each router, and use only a link-local address on all link interfaces.
d. Assign multi-hop addresses to both link and loopback interfaces on each router.

Option (a) means that the router cannot be reached (ping, management, etc.) from farther than one-hop away. The authors are not aware of anyone using this option.

Option (b) means that the loopback interfaces are effectively useless, since link-local addresses cannot be used for the purposes that loopback interfaces are usually used for. So option (b) degenerates into option (d).

Thus the real choice comes down to option (c) vs. option (d).

Option (c) has two advantages over option (d). The first advantage is ease of configuration. In a network with a large number of links, the operator can just assign one multi-hop address to each router and then enable the IGP, without going through the tedious process of assigning and tracking the addresses on each link. The second advantage is security. Since packets with link-local addresses cannot be should not be routed, it is very difficult to attack the associated nodes from an off-link device. This implies less effort around maintaining security ACLs.

Countering these advantages are various disadvantages to option (c) compared with option (d):

- It is not possible to ping a link-local-only interface from a device that is not directly attached to the link. Thus, to troubleshoot, one must typically log into a device that is directly attached to the device in question, and execute the ping from there.

- A traceroute passing over the link-local-only interface will return the loopback address of the router, rather than the address of the interface itself.

- In cases of parallel point to point links it is difficult to determine which of the parallel links was taken when attempting to troubleshoot unless one sends packets directly between the two attached link-locals on the specific interfaces. Since many network problems behave differently for traffic to/from a router than for traffic through the router(s) in question, this can pose a significant hurdle to some troubleshooting scenarios.

- On some routers, by default the link-layer address of the interface is derived from the MAC address assigned to interface. When this is done, swapping out the interface hardware (e.g.
interface card) will cause the link-layer address to change. In some cases (peering config, ACLs, etc) this may require additional changes. However, many devices allow the link-layer address of an interface to be explicitly configured, which avoids this issue. This problem should fade away over time as more and more routers select interface identifiers according to the rules in [RFC7217].

- The practice of naming router interfaces using DNS names is difficult and not recommended when using link-locals only. More generally, it is not recommended to put link-local addresses into DNS; see [RFC4472].

- It is often not possible to identify the interface or link (in a database, email, etc) by giving just its address without also specifying the link in some manner.

It should be noted that it is quite possible for the same link-local address to be assigned to multiple interfaces. This can happen because the MAC address is duplicated (due to manufacturing process defaults or the use of virtualization), because a device deliberately re-uses automatically-assigned link-local addresses on different links, or because an operator manually assigns the same easy-to-type link-local address to multiple interfaces. All these are allowed in IPv6 as long as the addresses are used on different links.

For more discussion on the pros and cons, see [RFC7404]. See also [RFC5375] for IPv6 unicast address assignment considerations.

Today, most operators use option (d).

2.1.2. Which Addresses to Use

Having considered above whether or not to use a "multi-hop address", we now consider which of the addresses to use.

When selecting between these three "multi-hop address" types, one needs to consider exactly how they will be used. An important consideration is how Internet traffic is carried across the core of the network. There are two main options: (1) the classic approach where Internet traffic is carried as unlabeled traffic hop-by-hop across the network, and (2) the more recent approach where Internet traffic is carried inside an MPLS LSP (typically as part of a L3 VPN).

Under the classic approach:

- PI GUAs are a very reasonable choice, if they are available.
o PA GUAs suffer from the "must renumber" and "difficult to multi-home" problems mentioned above.

o ULAs suffer from the "may be problematic" issues described above.

Under the MPLS approach:

o PA GUAs are a reasonable choice, if they are available.

o PA GUAs suffer from the "must renumber" problem, but the "difficult to multi-home" problem does not apply.

o ULAs are a reasonable choice, since (unlike in the classic approach) these addresses are not visible to the Internet, so the problematic cases do not occur.

2.2. Interfaces

2.2.1. Mix IPv4 and IPv6 on the Same Layer-3 Interface?

If a network is going to carry both IPv4 and IPv6 traffic, as many networks do today, then a question arises: Should an operator mix IPv4 and IPv6 traffic or keep them separated? More specifically, should the design:

a. Mix IPv4 and IPv6 traffic on the same layer-3 interface, OR

b. Separate IPv4 and IPv6 by using separate interfaces (e.g., two physical links or two VLANs on the same link)?

Option (a) implies a single layer-3 interface at each end of the connection with both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses; while option (b) implies two layer-3 interfaces at each end, one for IPv4 addresses and one with IPv6 addresses.

The advantages of option (a) include:

o Requires only half as many layer 3 interfaces as option (b), thus providing better scaling;

o May require fewer physical ports, thus saving money and simplifying operations;

o Can make the QoS implementation much easier (for example, rate-limiting the combined IPv4 and IPv6 traffic to or from a customer);
o Works well in practice, as any increase in IPv6 traffic is usually counter-balanced by a corresponding decrease in IPv4 traffic to or from the same host (ignoring the common pattern of an overall increase in Internet usage);

o And is generally conceptually simpler.

For these reasons, there is a relatively strong consensus in the operator community that option (a) is the preferred way to go. Most networks today use option (a) wherever possible.

However, there can be times when option (b) is the pragmatic choice. Most commonly, option (b) is used to work around limitations in network equipment. One big example is the generally poor level of support today for individual statistics on IPv4 traffic vs IPv6 traffic when option (a) is used. Other, device-specific, limitations exist as well. It is expected that these limitations will go away as support for IPv6 matures, making option (b) less and less attractive until the day that IPv4 is finally turned off.

2.3. Static Routes

2.3.1. Link-Local Next-Hop in a Static Route?

For the most part, the use of static routes in IPv6 parallels their use in IPv4. There is, however, one exception, which revolves around the choice of next-hop address in the static route. Specifically, should an operator:

a. Use the far-end’s link-local address as the next-hop address, OR

b. Use the far-end’s GUA/ULA address as the next-hop address?

Recall that the IPv6 specs for OSPF [RFC5340] and ISIS [RFC5308] dictate that they always use link-locals for next-hop addresses. For static routes, [RFC4861] section 8 says:

A router MUST be able to determine the link-local address for each of its neighboring routers in order to ensure that the target address in a Redirect message identifies the neighbor router by its link-local address. For static routing, this requirement implies that the next-hop router’s address should be specified using the link-local address of the router.

This implies that using a GUA or ULA as the next hop will prevent a router from sending Redirect messages for packets that "hit" this static route. All this argues for using a link-local as the next-hop address in a static route.
However, there are two cases where using a link-local address as the
next-hop clearly does not work. One is when the static route is an
indirect (or multi-hop) static route. The second is when the static
route is redistributed into another routing protocol. In these
cases, the above text from RFC 4861 notwithstanding, either a GUA or
ULA must be used.

Furthermore, many network operators are concerned about the
dependency of the default link-local address on an underlying MAC
address, as described in the previous section.

Today most operators use GUAs as next-hop addresses.

2.4. IGP Choice

One of the main decisions for a network operator looking to deploy
IPv6 is the choice of IGP (Interior Gateway Protocol) within the
network. The main options are OSPF, IS-IS and EIGRP. RIPng is
another option, but very few networks run RIP in the core these days,
so it is covered in a separate section below.

OSPF [RFC2328] [RFC5340] and IS-IS [RFC5120] [RFC5120] are both
standardized link-state protocols. Both protocols are widely
supported by vendors, and both are widely deployed. By contrast,
EIGRP [RFC7868] is a Cisco proprietary distance-vector protocol.
EIGRP is rarely deployed in service-provider networks, but is quite
common in enterprise networks, which is why it is discussed here.

It is out of scope for this document to describe all the differences
between the three protocols; the interested reader can find books and
websites that go into the differences in quite a bit of detail.
Rather, this document simply highlights a few differences that can be
important to consider when designing IPv6 or dual-stack networks.

Versions: There are two versions of OSPF: OSPFv2 and OSPFv3. The two
versions share many concepts, are configured in a similar manner and
seem very similar to most casual users, but have very different
packet formats and other "under the hood" differences. The most
important difference is that OSPFv2 will only route IPv4, while
OSPFv3 will route both IPv4 and IPv6 (see [RFC5838]). OSPFv2 was by
far the most widely deployed version of OSPF when this document was
published. By contrast, both IS-IS and EIGRP have just a single
version, which can route both IPv4 and IPv6.

Transport. IS-IS runs over layer 2 (e.g. Ethernet). This means
that the functioning of IS-IS has no dependencies on the IP layer: if
there is a problem at the IP layer (e.g. bad addresses), two routers can still exchange IS-IS packets. By contrast, OSPF and EIGRP both run over the IP layer. This means that the IP layer must be configured and working OSPF or EIGRP packets to be exchanged between routers. For EIGRP, the dependency on the IP layer is simple: EIGRP for IPv4 runs over IPv4, while EIGRP for IPv6 runs over IPv6. For OSPF, the story is more complex: OSPFv2 runs over IPv4, but OSPFv3 can run over either IPv4 or IPv6. Thus it is possible to route both IPv4 and IPv6 with OSPFv3 running over IPv6 or with OSPFv3 running over IPv4. This means that there are number of choices for how to run OSPF in a dual-stack network:

- Use OSPFv2 for routing IPv4, and OSPFv3 running over IPv6 for routing IPv6, OR
- Use OSPFv3 running over IPv6 for routing both IPv4 and IPv6, OR
- Use OSPFv3 running over IPv4 for routing both IPv4 and IPv6.

Summarization and MPLS: For most casual users, the three protocols are fairly similar in what they can do, with two glaring exceptions: summarization and MPLS. For summarization, both OSPF and IS-IS have the concept of summarization between areas, but the two area concepts are quite different, and an area design that works for one protocol will usually not work for the other. EIGRP has no area concept, but has the ability to summarize at any router. Thus a large network will typically have a very different OSPF, IS-IS and EIGRP designs, which is important to keep in mind if you are planning on using one protocol to route IPv4 and a different protocol for IPv6. The other difference is that OSPF and IS-IS both support RSVP-TE, a widely-used MPLS signaling protocol, while EIGRP does not: this is due to OSPF and IS-IS both being link-state protocols while EIGRP is a distance-vector protocol.

The table below sets out possible combinations of protocols to route both IPv4 and IPv6, and makes some observations on each combination. Here "EIGRP-v4" means "EIGRP for IPv4" and similarly for "EIGRP-v6". For OSPFv3, it is possible to run it over either IPv4 or IPv6; this is not indicated in the table.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IGP for IPv4</th>
<th>IGP for IPv6</th>
<th>Protocol separation</th>
<th>Similar configuration possible</th>
<th>Multiple Known Deployments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OSPFv2</td>
<td>OSPFv3</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSPFv2</td>
<td>IS-IS</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>YES (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSPFv2</td>
<td>EIGRP-v6</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSPFv3</td>
<td>OSPFv3</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSPFv3</td>
<td>IS-IS</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSPFv3</td>
<td>EIGRP-v6</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IS-IS</td>
<td>OSPFv3</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>YES (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IS-IS</td>
<td>IS-IS</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES (12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IS-IS</td>
<td>EIGRP-v6</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIGRP-v4</td>
<td>OSPFv3</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>? (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIGRP-v4</td>
<td>IS-IS</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIGRP-v4</td>
<td>EIGRP-v6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>? (2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the column "Multiple Known Deployments", a YES indicates that a significant number of production networks run this combination, with the number of such networks indicated in parentheses following, while a "?" indicates that the authors are only aware of one or two small networks that run this combination. Data for this column was gathered from an informal poll of operators on a number of mailing lists. This poll was not intended to be a thorough scientific study of IGP choices, but to provide a snapshot of known operator choices at the time of writing (Mid-2015) for successful production dual stack network deployments. There were twenty six (26) network implementations represented by 17 respondents. Some respondents provided information on more then one network or network deployment. Due to privacy considerations, the networks’ represented and respondents are not listed in this document.
A number of combinations are marked as offering "Protocol separation". These options use a different IGP protocol for IPv4 vs IPv6. With these options, a problem with routing IPv6 is unlikely to affect IPv4 or visa-versa. Some operator may consider this as a benefit when first introducing dual stack capabilities or for ongoing technical reasons.

Three combinations are marked "Similar configuration possible". This means it is possible (but not required) to use very similar IGP configuration for IPv4 and IPv6: for example, the same area boundaries, area numbering, link costing, etc. If you are happy with your IPv4 IGP design, then this will likely be a consideration. By contrast, the options that use, for example, IS-IS for one IP version and OSPF for the other version will require considerably different configuration, and will also require the operations staff to become familiar with the difference between the two protocols.

It should be noted that a number of ISPs have run OSPF as their IPv4 IGP for quite a few years, but have selected IS-IS as their IPv6 IGP. However, there are very few (none?) that have made the reverse choice. This is, in part, because routers generally support more nodes in an IS-IS area than in the corresponding OSPF area, and because IS-IS is seen as more secure because it runs at layer 2.

2.4.2. IS-IS Topology Mode

When IS-IS is used to route both IPv4 and IPv6, then there is an additional choice of whether to run IS-IS in single-topology or multi-topology mode.

With single-topology mode (also known as Native mode) [RFC5308]:

- IS-IS keeps a single link-state database for both IPv4 and IPv6.
- There is a single set of link costs which apply to both IPv4 and IPv6.
- All links in the network must support both IPv4 and IPv6, as the calculation of routes does not take this into account. If some links do not support IPv6 (or IPv4), then packets may get routed across links where support is lacking and get dropped. This can cause problems if some network devices do not support IPv6 (or IPv4).
- It is also important to keep the previous point in mind when adding or removing support for either IPv4 or IPv6.

With multi-topology mode [RFC5120]:

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IS-IS keeps two link-state databases, one for IPv4 and one for IPv6.

IPv4 and IPv6 can have separate link metrics. Note that most implementations today require separate link metrics: a number of operators have rudely discovered that they have forgotten to configure the IPv6 metric until sometime after deploying IPv6 in multi-topology mode!

Some links can be IPv4-only, some IPv6-only, and some dual-stack. Routes to IPv4 and IPv6 addresses are computed separately and may take different paths even if the addresses are located on the same remote device.

The previous point may help when adding or removing support for either IPv4 or IPv6.

In the informal poll of operators, out of 12 production networks that ran IS-IS for both IPv4 and IPv6, 6 used single topology mode, 4 used multi-topology mode, and 2 did not specify. One motivation often cited by then operators for using Single Topology mode was because some device did not support multi-topology mode.

When asked, many people feel multi-topology mode is superior to single-topology mode because it provides greater flexibility at minimal extra cost. Never-the-less, as shown by the poll results, a number of operators have used single-topology mode successfully.

Note that this issue does not come up with OSPF, since there is nothing that corresponds to IS-IS single-topology mode with OSPF.

2.4.3. RIP / RIPng

A protocol option not described in the table above is RIP for IPv4 and RIPng for IPv6 [RFC2080]. These are distance vector protocols that are almost universally considered to be inferior to OSPF, IS-IS, or EIGRP for general use.

However, there is one specialized use where RIP/RIPng is still considered to be appropriate: in star topology networks where a single core device has lots and lots of links to edge devices and each edge device has only a single path back to the core. In such networks, the single path means that the limitations of RIP/RIPng are mostly not relevant and the very light-weight nature of RIP/RIPng gives it an advantage over the other protocols mentioned above. One concrete example of this scenario is the use of RIP/RIPng between cable modems and the CMTS.
2.5. BGP

2.5.1. Which Transport for Which Routes?

BGP these days is multi-protocol. It can carry routes of many different types, or more precisely, many different AFI/SAFI combinations. It can also carry routes when the BGP session, or more accurately the underlying TCP connection, runs over either IPv4 or IPv6 (here referred to as either "IPv4 transport" or "IPv6 transport"). Given this flexibility, one of the biggest questions when deploying BGP in a dual-stack network is the question of which route types should be carried over sessions using IPv4 transport and which should be carried over sessions using IPv6 transport.

This section discusses this question for the three most-commonly-used SAFI values: unlabeled (SAFI 1), labeled (SAFI 4) and VPN (SAFI 128). Though we do not explicitly discuss other SAFI values, many of the comments here can be applied to the other values.

Consider the following table:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Route Family</th>
<th>Transport</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unlabeled IPv4</td>
<td>IPv4</td>
<td>Works well</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unlabeled IPv4</td>
<td>IPv6</td>
<td>Next-hop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unlabeled IPv6</td>
<td>IPv4</td>
<td>Next-hop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unlabeled IPv6</td>
<td>IPv6</td>
<td>Works well</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labeled IPv4</td>
<td>IPv4</td>
<td>Works well</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labeled IPv4</td>
<td>IPv6</td>
<td>Next-hop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labeled IPv6</td>
<td>IPv4</td>
<td>(6PE) Works well</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labeled IPv6</td>
<td>IPv6</td>
<td>Next-hop or MPLS over IPv6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VPN IPv4</td>
<td>IPv4</td>
<td>Works well</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VPN IPv4</td>
<td>IPv6</td>
<td>Next-hop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VPN IPv6</td>
<td>IPv4</td>
<td>(6VPE) Works well</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VPN IPv6</td>
<td>IPv6</td>
<td>Next-hop or MPLS over IPv6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first column in this table lists various route families, where "unlabeled" means SAFI 1, "labeled" means the routes carry an MPLS label (SAFI 4, see [RFC3107]), and "VPN" means the routes are normally associated with a layer-3 VPN (SAFI 128, see [RFC4364]). The second column lists the protocol used to transport the BGP session, frequently specified by giving either an IPv4 or IPv6 address in the "neighbor" statement.

The third column comments on the combination in the first two columns:

- For combinations marked "Works well", these combinations are standardized, widely supported and widely deployed.
For combinations marked "Next-hop", these combinations are not standardized and are less-widely supported. These combinations all have the "next-hop mismatch" problem: the transported route needs a next-hop address from the other address family than the transport address (for example, an IPv4 route needs an IPv4 next-hop, even when transported over IPv6). Some vendors have implemented ways to solve this problem for specific combinations, but for combinations marked "next-hop", these solutions have not been standardized (cf. 6PE and 6VPE, where the solution has been standardized).

For combinations marked as "Next-hop or MPLS over IPv6", these combinations either require a non-standard solution to the next-hop problem, or require MPLS over IPv6. At the time of writing, MPLS over IPv6 is not widely supported or deployed.

Also, it is important to note that changing the set of address families being carried over a BGP session requires the BGP session to be reset (unless something like [I-D.ietf-idr-dynamic-cap] or [I-D.ietf-idr-bgp-multisession] is in use). This is generally more of an issue with eBGP sessions than iBGP sessions: for iBGP sessions it is common practice for a router to have two iBGP sessions, one to each member of a route reflector pair, so one can change the set of address families on first one of the sessions and then the other.

The following subsections discuss specific combinations in more detail.

2.5.1.1. BGP Sessions for Unlabeled Routes

Unlabeled routes are commonly carried on eBGP sessions, as well as on iBGP sessions in networks where Internet traffic is carried unlabeled across the network.

In these scenarios, there are three reasonable choices:

a. Carry unlabeled IPv4 and IPv6 routes over IPv4, OR
b. Carry unlabeled IPv4 and IPv6 routes over IPv6, OR
c. Carry unlabeled IPv4 routes over IPv4, and unlabeled IPv6 routes over IPv6

Options (a) and (b) have the advantage that one one BGP session is required between pairs of routers. However, option (c) is widely considered to be the best choice. There are several reasons for this:
- It gives a clean separation between IPv4 and IPv6. This can be especially useful when first deploying IPv6 and troubleshooting resulting problems.

- This avoids the next-hop problem described above.

- The status of the routes follows the status of the underlying transport. If, for example, the IPv6 data path between the two BGP speakers fails, then the IPv6 session between the two speakers will fail and the IPv6 routes will be withdrawn, which will allow the traffic to be re-routed elsewhere. By contrast, if the IPv6 routes were transported over IPv4, then the failure of the IPv6 data path might leave a working IPv4 data path, so the BGP session would remain up and the IPv6 routes would not be withdrawn, and thus the IPv6 traffic would be sent into a black hole.

- It avoids resetting the BGP session when adding IPv6 to an existing session, or when removing IPv4 from an existing session.

  Rarely, there are situations where option (c) is not practical. In those cases today, most operators use option (a), carrying both route types over a single BGP session.

2.5.1.2. BGP sessions for Labeled or VPN Routes

When carrying labeled or VPN routes, the only widely-supported solution at time of writing is to carry both route types over IPv4. This may change as MPLS over IPv6 becomes more widely implemented.

There are two options when carrying both over IPv4:

a. Carry all routes over a single BGP session, OR

b. Carry the routes over multiple BGP sessions (e.g. one for VPN IPv4 routes and one for VPN IPv6 routes)

Using a single session is usually simplest for an iBGP session going to a route reflector handling both route families. Using a single session here usually means that the BGP session will reset when changing the set of address families, but as noted above, this is usually not a problem when redundant route reflectors are involved.

In eBGP situations, two sessions are usually more appropriate.
2.5.2. eBGP Endpoints: Global or Link-Local Addresses?

When running eBGP over IPv6, there are two options for the addresses to use at each end of the eBGP session (or more properly, the underlying TCP session):

a. Use link-local addresses for the eBGP session, OR
b. Use global addresses for the eBGP session.

Note that the choice here is the addresses to use for the eBGP sessions, and not whether the link itself has global (or unique-local) addresses. In particular, it is quite possible for the eBGP session to use link-local addresses even when the link has global addresses.

The big attraction for option (a) is security: an eBGP session using link-local addresses is extremely difficult to attack from a device that is off-link. This provides very strong protection against TCP RST and similar attacks. Though there are other ways to get an equivalent level of security (e.g. GTSM [RFC5082], MD5 [RFC5925], or ACLs), these other ways require additional configuration which can be forgotten or potentially mis-configured.

However, there are a number of small disadvantages to using link-local addresses:

- Using link-local addresses only works for single-hop eBGP sessions; it does not work for multi-hop sessions.

- One must use "next-hop self" at both endpoints, otherwise re-advertising routes learned via eBGP into iBGP will not work. (Some products enable "next-hop self" in this situation automatically).

- Operators and their tools are used to referring to eBGP sessions by address only, something that is not possible with link-local addresses.

- If one is configuring parallel eBGP sessions for IPv4 and IPv6 routes, then using link-local addresses for the IPv6 session introduces extra operational differences between the two sessions which could otherwise be avoided.

- On some products, an eBGP session using a link-local address is more complex to configure than a session that uses a global address.
o If hardware or other issues cause one to move the cable to a different local interface, then reconfiguration is required at both ends: at the local end because the interface has changed (and with link-local addresses, the interface must always be specified along with the address), and at the remote end because the link-local address has likely changed. (Contrast this with using global addresses, where less re-configuration is required at the local end, and no reconfiguration is required at the remote end).

o Finally, a strict application of [RFC2545] forbids running eBGP between link-local addresses, as [RFC2545] requires the BGP next-hop field to contain at least a global address.

For these reasons, most operators today choose to have their eBGP sessions use global addresses.

3. General Observations

There are two themes that run though many of the design choices in this document. This section presents some general discussion on these two themes.

3.1. Use of Link-Local Addresses

The proper use of link-local addresses is a common theme in the IPv6 network design choices. Link-layer addresses are, of course, always present in an IPv6 network, but current network design practice mostly ignores them, despite efforts such as [RFC7404].

There are three main reasons for this current practice:

o Network operators are concerned about the volatility of link-local addresses based on MAC addresses, despite the fact that this concern can be overcome by manually-configuring link-local addresses;

o It is very difficult to impossible to ping a link-local address from a device that is not on the same subnet. This is a troubleshooting disadvantage, though it can also be viewed as a security advantage.

o Most operators are currently running networks that carry both IPv4 and IPv6 traffic, and wish to harmonize their IPv4 and IPv6 design and operational practices where possible.
3.2. Separation of IPv4 and IPv6

Currently, most operators are running or planning to run networks that carry both IPv4 and IPv6 traffic. Hence the question: To what degree should IPv4 and IPv6 be kept separate? As can be seen above, this breaks into two sub-questions: To what degree should IPv4 and IPv6 traffic be kept separate, and to what degree should IPv4 and IPv6 routing information be kept separate?

The general consensus around the first question is that IPv4 and IPv6 traffic should generally be mixed together. This recommendation is driven by the operational simplicity of mixing the traffic, plus the general observation that the service being offered to the end user is Internet connectivity and most users do not know or care about the differences between IPv4 and IPv6. Thus it is very desirable to mix IPv4 and IPv6 on the same link to the end user. On other links, separation is possible but more operationally complex, though it does occasionally allow the operator to work around limitations on network devices. The situation here is roughly comparable to IP and MPLS traffic: many networks mix the two traffic types on the same links without issues.

By contrast, there is more of an argument for carrying IPv6 routing information over IPv6 transport, while leaving IPv4 routing information on IPv4 transport. By doing this, one gets fate-sharing between the control and data plane for each IP protocol version: if the data plane fails for some reason, then often the control plane will too.

4. IANA Considerations

This document makes no requests of IANA.

5. Security Considerations

This document introduces no new security considerations that are not already documented elsewhere.

The following is a brief list of pointers to documents related to the topics covered above that the reader may wish to review for security considerations.

For general IPv6 security, [RFC4942] provides guidance on security considerations around IPv6 transition and coexistence.

For OSPFv3, the base protocol specification [RFC5340] has a short security considerations section which notes that the fundamental
mechanism for protecting OSPFv3 from attacks is the mechanism described in [RFC4552].

For IS-IS, [RFC5308] notes that ISIS for IPv6 raises no new security considerations over ISIS for IPv4 over those documented in [ISO10589] and [RFC5304].

For BGP, [RFC2545] notes that BGP for IPv6 raises no new security considerations over those present in BGP for IPv4. However, there has been much discussion of BGP security recently, and the interested reader is referred to the documents of the IETF’s SIDR working group.

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Unique IPv6 Prefix Per Host

draft-ietf-v6ops-unique-ipv6-prefix-per-host-13

Abstract

This document outlines an approach utilising existing IPv6 protocols to allow hosts to be assigned a unique IPv6 prefix (instead of a unique IPv6 address from a shared IPv6 prefix). Benefits of unique IPv6 prefix over a unique service provider IPv6 address include improved host isolation and enhanced subscriber management on shared network segments.

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1. Introduction

The concepts in this document are originally developed as part of a large scale, production deployment of IPv6 support for a provider managed shared access network service.

A shared network service, is a service offering where a particular L2 access network (e.g. wifi) is shared and used by multiple visiting devices (i.e. subscribers). Many service providers offering shared access network services, have legal requirements, or find it good practice, to provide isolation between the connected visitor devices to control potential abuse of the shared access network.

A network implementing a unique IPv6 prefix per host, can simply ensure that devices cannot send packets to each other except through the first-hop router. This will automatically provide robust protection against attacks between devices that rely on link-local ICMPv6 packets, such as DAD reply spoofing, ND cache exhaustion, malicious redirects, and rogue RAs. This form of protection is much more scalable and robust than alternative mechanisms such as DAD proxying, forced forwarding, or ND snooping.

In this document IPv6 support does not preclude support for IPv4; however, the primary objectives for this work was to make it so that user equipment (UE) were capable of an IPv6 only experience from a network operators perspective. In the context of this document, UE can be 'regular' end-user-equipment, as well as a server in a datacenter, assuming a shared network (wired or wireless).
Details of IPv4 support are out of scope for this document. This document will also, in general, outline the requirements that must be satisfied by UE to allow for an IPv6 only experience.

In most current deployments, User Equipment (UE) IPv6 address assignment is commonly done using either IPv6 SLAAC RFC4862 [RFC4862] and/or DHCP IA_NA (Identity Association - Non-temporary Address) RFC3315 [RFC3315]. During the time when this approach was developed and subsequently deployed, it has been observed that some operating systems do not support the use of DHCPv6 for the acquisition of IA_NA per RFC7934 [RFC7934]. To not exclude any known IPv6 implementations, IPv6 SLAAC based subscriber and address management is the recommended technology to reach highest percentage of connected IPv6 devices on a provider managed shared network service. In addition an IA_NA-only network is not recommended per RFC 7934 RFC7934 [RFC7934] section 8. This document will detail the mechanics involved for IPv6 SLAAC based address and subscriber management coupled with stateless DHCPv6, where beneficial.

This document focuses upon the process for UEs to obtain a unique IPv6 prefix.

1.1. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

2. Motivation and Scope of Applicability

The motivation for this work falls into the following categories:

- Deployment advice for IPv6 that will allow stable and secure IPv6 only experience, even if IPv4 support is present
- Ensure support for IPv6 is efficient and does not impact the performance of the underlying network and in turn the customer experience
- Allow for the greatest flexibility across host implementation to allow for the widest range of addressing and configuration mechanisms to be employed. The goal here is to ensure that the widest population of UE implementations can leverage the availability of IPv6
- Lay the technological foundation for future work related to the use of IPv6 over shared media requiring optimized subscriber management
o Two devices (subscriber/hosts), both attached to the same provider managed shared network should only be able to communicate through the provider managed First Hop Router. Often service providers have legal requirements, or find it good practice, to provide isolation between the connected visitor devices to control potential abuse of the shared access network.

o Provide guidelines regarding best common practices around IPv6 neighbor discovery RFC4861 [RFC4861] and IPv6 address management settings between the First Hop router and directly connected hosts/subscribers.

3. Design Principles

The First Hop router discussed in this document is the L3-Edge router responsible for the communication with the devices (hosts and subscribers) directly connected to a provider managed shared network, and to transport traffic between the directly connected devices and between directly connected devices and remote devices.

The work detailed in this document is focused on providing details regarding best common practices of the IPv6 neighbor discovery and related IPv6 address management settings between the First Hop router and directly connected hosts/subscribers. The documented Best Current Practice helps a service provider to better manage the shared provider managed network on behalf of the connected devices.

This document recommends providing a unique IPv6 prefix to devices connected to the managed shared network. Each unique IPv6 prefix can function as control-plane anchor point to make sure that each device receives expected subscriber policy and service levels (throughput, QoS, security, parental-control, subscriber mobility management, etc.).

4. IPv6 Unique Prefix Assignment

When a UE connects to the shared provider managed network and is attached, it will initiate IP configuration phase. During this phase the UE will, from an IPv6 perspective, attempt to learn the default IPv6 gateway, the IPv6 prefix information, the DNS information RFC8106 [RFC8106], and the remaining information required to establish globally routable IPv6 connectivity. For that purpose, the subscriber sends a RS (Router Solicitation) message.

The First Hop Router receives this subscriber RS message and starts the process to compose the response to the subscriber originated RS message. The First Hop Router will answer using a solicited RA (Router Advertisement) to the subscriber.
When the First Hop Router sends a solicited RA response, or periodically sends unsolicited RAs, the RA MUST be sent only to the subscriber that has been assigned the Unique IPv6 prefix contained in the RA. This is achieved by sending a solicited RA response or unsolicited RAs to the all-nodes group, as detailed in RFC4861 [RFC4861] section 6.2.4 and 6.2.6, but instead of using the link-layer multicast address associated with the all-nodes group, the link-layer unicast address of the subscriber that has been assigned the Unique IPv6 prefix contained in the RA MUST be used as the link-layer destination RFC6085 [RFC6085]. Or, optionally in some cases, a solicited RA response could be sent unicast to the link-local address of the subscriber as detailed in RFC4861 [RFC4861] section 6.2.6, nevertheless unsolicited RAs are always sent to the all-nodes group.

This solicited RA contains two important parameters for the subscriber to consume: a Unique IPv6 prefix (currently a /64 prefix) and some flags. The Unique IPv6 prefix can be derived from a locally managed pool or aggregate IPv6 block assigned to the First Hop Router or from a centrally allocated pool. The flags indicate to the subscriber to use SLAAC and/or DHCPv6 for address assignment; it may indicate if the autoconfigured address is on/off-link and if ‘Other’ information (e.g. DNS server address) needs to be requested.

The IPv6 RA flags used for best common practice in IPv6 SLAAC based Provider managed shared networks are:

- M-flag = 0 (subscriber address is not managed through DHCPv6), this flag may be set to 1 in the future if/when DHCPv6 prefix delegation support is desired)
- O-flag = 1 (DHCPv6 is used to request configuration information i.e. DNS, NTP information, not for IPv6 addressing)
- A-flag = 1 (The subscriber can configure itself using SLAAC)
- L-flag = 0 (the prefix is not an on-link prefix, which means that the subscriber will never assume destination addresses that match the prefix are on-link and will always send packets to those addresses to the appropriate gateway according to route selection rules.)

The use of a unique IPv6 prefix per subscriber adds an additional level of protection and efficiency. The protection is driven because all external communication of a connected device is directed to the first hop router as required by RFC4861 [RFC4861]. Best efficiency is achieved because the recommended RA flags allow broadest support on connected devices to receive a valid IPv6 address (i.e. privacy addresses RFC4941 [RFC4941] or SLAAC RFC4862 [RFC4862]).
The architected result of designing the RA as documented above is that each subscriber gets its own unique IPv6 prefix. Each host can consequently use SLAAC or any other method of choice to select its /128 unique address. Either stateless DHCPv6 RFC3736 [RFC3736] or IPv6 Router Advertisement Options for DNS Configuration RFC8106 [RFC8106] can be used to get the IPv6 address of the DNS server. If the subscriber desires to send anything external including towards other subscriber devices (assuming device to device communications is enabled and supported), then, due to the L-bit being unset, then RFC4861 [RFC4861] requires that this traffic is sent to the First Hop Router.

After the subscriber received the RA, and the associated flags, it will assign itself a 128 bit IPv6 address using SLAAC. Since the address is composed by the subscriber device itself, it will need to verify that the address is unique on the shared network. The subscriber will for that purpose, perform Duplicate Address Detection algorithm. This will occur for each address the UE attempts to utilize on the shared provider managed network.

5. IPv6 Neighbor Discovery Best Practices

An operational consideration when using IPv6 address assignment using IPv6 SLAAC is that after the onboarding procedure, the subscriber will have a prefix with certain preferred and valid lifetimes. The First Hop Router extends these lifetimes by sending an unsolicited RA, the applicable MaxRtrAdvInterval on the first hop router MUST therefore be lower than the preferred lifetime. One consequence of this process is that the First Hop Router never knows when a subscriber stops using addresses from a prefix and additional procedures are required to help the First Hop Router to gain this information. When using stateful DHCPv6 IA_NA for IPv6 subscriber address assignment, this uncertainty on the First Hop Router is not of impact due to the stateful nature of DHCPv6 IA_NA address assignment.

Following is a reference table of the key IPv6 router discovery and neighbor discovery timers for provider managed shared networks:

- Maximum IPv6 Router Advertisement Interval (MaxRtrAdvInterval) = 300s (or when battery consumption is a concern 686s, see Note below)
- IIPv6 Router LifeTime = 3600s (see Note below)
- Reachable time = 30s
- IPv6 Valid Lifetime = 3600s
IPv6 Preferred Lifetime = 1800s

Retransmit timer = 0s

Note: When servicing large numbers of battery powered devices, RFC7772 [RFC7772] suggests a maximum of 7 RAs per hour and a 45-90 minute IPv6 Router Lifetime. To achieve a maximum of 7 RAs per hour, the Minimum IPv6 Router Advertisement Interval (MinRtrAdvInterval) is the important parameter, and MUST be greater than or equal to 514 seconds (1/7 of an hour). Further as discussed in RFC4861 [RFC4861] section 6.2.1, MinRtrAdvInterval <= 0.75 * MaxRtrAdvInterval, therefore MaxRtrAdvInterval MUST additionally be greater than or equal to 686 seconds. As for the recommended IPv6 Router Lifetime, since this technique requires that RAs are sent using the link-layer unicast address of the subscriber, the concerns over multicast delivery discussed in RFC7772 [RFC7772] are already mitigated, therefore the above suggestion of 3600 seconds (an hour) seems sufficient for this use case.

IPv6 SLAAC requires the router to maintain neighbor state, which implies costs in terms of memory, power, message exchanges, and message processing. Stale entries can prove an unnecessary burden, especially on WiFi interfaces. It is RECOMMENDED that stale neighbor state be removed quickly.

When employing stateless IPv6 address assignment, a number of widely deployed operating systems will attempt to utilise RFC4941 [RFC4941] temporary ‘private’ addresses.

Similarly, when using this technology in a datacenter, the UE server may need to use several addresses from the same Unique IPv6 Prefix, for example because is using multiple virtual hosts, containers, etc. in the bridged virtual switch. This can lead to the consequence that a UE has multiple /128 addresses from the same IPv6 prefix. The First Hop Router MUST be able to handle the presence and use of multiple globally routable IPv6 addresses.

6. IANA Considerations

No IANA considerations are defined at this time.

7. Security Considerations

The mechanics of IPv6 privacy extensions RFC4941 [RFC4941] is compatible with assignment of a unique IPv6 Prefix per Host. However, when combining both IPv6 privacy extensions and a unique IPv6 Prefix per Host a reduced privacy experience for the subscriber is introduced, because a prefix may be associated with a subscriber,
even when the subscriber implemented IPv6 privacy extensions RFC4941 [RFC4941]. If the operator assigns the same unique prefix to the same link-layer address every time a host connects, any remote party who is aware of this fact can easily track a host simply by tracking its assigned prefix. This nullifies the benefit provided by privacy addresses RFC4941 [RFC4941]. If a host wishes to maintain privacy on such networks, it SHOULD ensure that its link-layer address is periodically changed or randomized.

No other additional security considerations are made in this document.

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9. Normative References


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