

## HTTPS Token Binding & TLS Termination




**Brian Campbell** 

IETF 97 Seoul November 2016

## Situation



- Very common in HTTPS application deployments to have TLS 'terminated' by a reverse proxy sitting in front of the actual application
- For applications in such deployments to take advantage of token binding, some information needs to be communicated from the TLS layer to the application
- In the absence of a standard means of conveying the appropriate token binding information, different implementations will do it differently
  - Terrible for interoperability
  - A boon to unneeded complexity
  - Improved opportunity to get things wrong




## **Proposed Solution**

- Work to standardize something in this WG!
- Hopefully not controversial



## **Two General Approaches**

- The TLS terminator validates the Token Binding Message and passes it (or some variation) along to the application
  - More work for the TLS layer
  - Easier reconciliation of supported key parameters
- The application validates the Token Binding Message with sufficient info provided as headers by the TLS terminator
  - EKM, the negotiated key parameters
  - Hard to terminate the connection with the client
  - Not sure how renegotiation would work
- Miscellaneous thoughts
  - What about version?
  - TLS terminator must sanitize headers either way
  - Only one level of proxying supported
  - Applications likely need configuration





- Does the WG think this is work worth pursuing?
- Feedback on the approach
- Write a draft
  - Me
  - You?
- IETF magic happens!