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Segment Routing Policy for Traffic Engineering
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Abstract

Segment Routing (SR) allows a headend node to steer a packet flow along any path. Intermediate per-flow states are eliminated thanks to source routing. The headend node steers a flow into an SR Policy. The header of a packet steered in an SR Policy is augmented with the ordered list of segments associated with that SR Policy. This document details the concepts of SR Policy and steering into an SR Policy.

Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

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1. Introduction

Segment Routing (SR) allows a headend node to steer a packet flow along any path. Intermediate per-flow states are eliminated thanks to source routing [I-D.ietf-spring-segment-routing].

The headend node is said to steer a flow into an Segment Routing Policy (SR Policy).

The header of a packet steered in an SR Policy is augmented with the ordered list of segments associated with that SR Policy.

This document details the concepts of SR Policy and steering into an SR Policy. These apply equally to the MPLS and SRv6 instantiations of segment routing.

For reading simplicity, the illustrations are provided for the MPLS instantiations.

2. SR Traffic Engineering Architecture




Figure 1: SR Policy architecture

The Segment Routing Traffic Engineering (SRTE) process installs a Segment Routing Policy (SR Policy) in the forwarding plane (FIB).

An SR policy is represented in FIB as a BSID-keyed entry with the action of steering the packets matching this entry to the selected path of the SR Policy.

For a given SR policy, the SRTE process MAY learn multiple candidate paths from different sources: NETCONF with OpenConfig or YANG model (work in progress), PCEP [I-D.ietf-pce-pce-initiated-lsp], local configuration or BGP [I-D.previdi-idr-segment-routing-te-policy].

The SRTE process selects the best candidate path and installs it in FIB.




Figure 2: Topology/link-state database architecture

The SRTE process maintains an SRTE database (SRTE-DB).

The SRTE-DB is multi-domain capable.

The attached domain topology MAY be learned via IGP, BGP-LS or NETCONF.

A non-attached (remote) domain topology MAY be learned via BGP-LS or NETCONF.

In some use-cases, the SRTE-DB may only contain the attached domain topology while in others, the SRTE-DB may contain the topology of multiple domains.

3. SR Policy

An SR Policy is identified through the following tuple:

- o The head-end where the policy is instantiated/implemented.
- o The endpoint (i.e.: the destination of the policy).
- o The color (an arbitrary numerical value).

At a given head-end, an SR Policy is fully identified by the <color, endpoint> tuple.

An endpoint can be specified as an IPv4 or IPv6 address.

An SR Policy contains one or more candidate paths.

An SR Policy instantiates one single path in RIB/FIB: i.e. the selected path among the candidate paths.

A candidate path is either dynamic or explicit.

A dynamic path expresses an optimization objective and a set of constraints. The headend computes a solution to the optimization problem as a Segment Identifier (SID) list or a set of SID lists. When the headend does not have enough topological information (e.g. multi-domain problem), the headend may delegate the computation to a PCE. Whenever the network situation changes, the path is recomputed.

An explicit path is a SID list or a set of SID lists.

A candidate path has a preference. If not specified, the default preference is 100.

A candidate path is associated with a single Binding SID (BSID).

A candidate path is valid if it is usable. A common path validity criterion is the reachability of its constituent SIDs. The validation rules are defined in a later section.

A Path is selected (i.e. it is the best path of the policy) when it is valid and its preference is the best (highest value) among all the paths of the SR Policy.

Whenever a new path is learned or the validity of an existing path changes or an existing path is changed, the selection process must be re-executed.

A headend may be informed about a path for a policy <color, endpoint> by various means including: local configuration, NETCONF, PCEP or BGP. The protocol source of the path does not matter to the path selection logic.

In the vast majority of use-cases known to date, a path is associated with a single SID list and each path of a policy has a different preference.

The SID list of an SR Policy is the SID list of its selected path.

The BSID of an SR Policy refers to its selected path.

In all the use-cases known to date, all the paths associated with a given policy have the same BSID. One may thus assume that in practice a policy has a stable BSID that is independent of the selected path changes and this BSID is an identification of a policy. However, one should know that a BSID MAY change over the life of an SR Policy and the true identification of a policy is the tuple <headend, endpoint, color>.

An SR Policy <color, endpoint> is active at a headend as soon as this head-end knows about a valid path for this policy.

An active SR Policy installs a BSID-keyed entry in the forwarding plane with the action of steering the packets matching this entry to the SID list of the SR Policy.

If a set of SID lists is associated with the selected path of the policy, then the steering is flow and W-ECMP based according to the relative weight of each SID list.

In summary, the information model is the following:

```
SR policy FOO
  path 200 (selected)
    BSID1
    Weight W1, SID list1: SID11...SID1i
    Weight W2, SID list2: SID21...SID2j
  path 100 (selected)
    BSID2
    Weight W3, SID list3: SID31...SID3i
    Weight W4, SID list4: SID41...SID4j
```

In general $BSDIn = BSID1 = BSID2 \dots$

4. SID List

The segment list (SID list) includes segments of different types (1 to 8) and an optional weight value that is used for W-ECMP.

The following segment types are defined:

- Type 1: SID only, in the form of MPLS Label.
- Type 2: SID only, in the form of IPv6 address.
- Type 3: IPv4 Node Address with optional SID.
- Type 4: IPv6 Node Address with optional SID.
- Type 5: IPv4 Address + index with optional SID.
- Type 6: IPv4 Local and Remote addresses with optional SID.
- Type 7: IPv6 Address + index with optional SID.
- Type 8: IPv6 Local and Remote addresses with optional SID.

The optional SID can be an MPLS label (SR applied to the MPLS dataplane) or an IPv6 SID (SRv6, SR applied to the IPv6 dataplane).

When building the MPLS label stack or the IPv6 Segment list from the Segment List, the node instantiating the policy MUST interpret the set of Segments as follows:

- o The first Segment represents the topmost label or the first IPv6 segment. It identifies the first segment the traffic will be directed toward along the SR explicit path.
- o The last Segment represents the bottommost label or the last IPv6 segment the traffic will be directed toward along the SR explicit path.

A SID list is represented as $\langle S1, S2, \dots Sn \rangle$ where $S1$ is the first SID.

4.1. Explicit Null

A Type 1 SID may be any MPLS label, including reserved labels.

For example, assuming that the desired traffic-engineered path from a headend 1 to an endpoint 4 can be expressed by the SID list $\langle 16002, 16003, 16004 \rangle$ where 16002, 16003 and 16004 respectively refer to the IPv4 Prefix SIDs bound to node 2, 3 and 4, then IPv6 traffic can be traffic-engineered from nodes 1 to 4 via the previously described path using an SRTE Policy with SID list $\langle 16002, 16003, 16004, 2 \rangle$ where mpls label value of 2 represents the "IPv6 Explicit NULL Label.

The penultimate node before node 4 will pop 16004 and will forward the frame on its directly connected interface to node 4.

The endpoint receives the traffic with top label "2" which indicates that the payload is an IPv6 packet.

5. SR Policy Multi-Domain Database

A headend can learn an attached domain topology via its IGP or a BGP-LS session. A headend can learn a non-attached domain topology via a BGP-LS session.

A headend collects all these topologies in the SR-TE database (SRTE-DB).

The SRTE-DB is multi-domain capable.

In some deployments, the SRTE-DB may only contain the attached domain topology while in others, the SRTE-DB may contain the topology of multiple domains.

6. Operations

6.1. W-ECMP

Packets steered to an SR Policy (i.e. to its BSID either via presence in the packet header as active segment or via FIB recursion) are load-balanced on a weighted basis among the SID lists associated with the selected path of the SR Policy.

The fraction of the flows associated with a given SID list is w/S_w where w is the weight of the SID list and S_w is the sum of the weights of the SID lists of the selected path of the SR Policy.

The accuracy of the weighted load-balancing depends on the platform implementation.

6.2. Path Validation

A SID List is invalid as soon as:

- o It is empty.
- o The headend is unable to resolve the first SID into one or more outgoing interface(s) and next-hop(s).
- o The headend is unable to resolve any non-first SID of type 3-to-8 into an MPLS label or an SRv6 SID.

Unreachable means that the headend has no path to the SID in its SRTE-DB.

In multi-domain deployments, it is expected that the headend be unable to verify the reachability of the SIDs in remote domains. Types 1 and 2 MUST be used for the SIDs for which the reachability cannot be verified. Note that the first SID must always be reachable whatever is type.

A Path is invalid as soon as it has no valid SID list.

The headend of an SR Policy updates the validity of a SID list upon network topological change.

A path of an SR Policy is invalid when all its SID lists are invalid.

An SR Policy is invalid when all its paths are invalid.

6.3. Fast Convergence

Upon topological change, many policies could be recomputed. An implementation MAY provide a per-policy priority field. The operator MAY set this field to indicate in which order the policies should be re-computed. Such a priority may be represented by an integer in the range [0, 254] where the lowest value is the highest priority.

7. Binding SID

7.1. Benefits

The Binding SID (BSID) is fundamental to Segment Routing. It provides scaling, network opacity and service independence.




Figure 3: A Simple Datacenter Topology

A simplified illustration is provided on the basis of the previous diagram where we assume that S, A, B, Data Center Interconnect DCI1 and DCI2 share the same IGP-SR instance in the data-center 1 (DC1). DCI1, DCI2, C, D, E, F, G, DCI3 and DCI4 share the same IGP-SR domain

in the core. DCI3, DCI4, H, K and Z share the same IGP-SR domain in the data-center 2 (DC2).

In this example, we assume no redistribution between the IGP's and no presence of BGP. The inter-domain communication is only provided by SR through SR Policies.

The latency from S to DCI1 equals to DCI2. The latency from Z to DCI3 equals to DCI4. All the intra-DC links have the same IGP metric 10.

The path DCI1, C, D, E, DCI3 has a lower latency and lower capacity than the path DCI2, F, G, DCI4.

The IGP metrics of all the core links are set to 10 except the links D-E which is set to 100.

A low-latency multi-domain policy from S to Z may be expressed as <DCI1, BSID, Z> where:

- o DCI1 is the prefix SID of DCI1.
- o BSID is the Binding SID bound to an SRTE policy <D, D2E, DCI3> instantiated at DCI1.
- o Z is the prefix SID of Z.

Without the use of an intermediate core SR Policy (efficiently summarized by a single BSID), S would need to steer its low-latency flow into the policy <DCI1, D, D2E, DCI3, Z>.

The use of a BSID (and the intermediate bound SR Policy) decreases the number of segments imposed by the source.

A BSID acts as a stable anchor point which isolates one domain from the churn of another domain. Upon topology changes within the core of the network, the low-latency path from DCI1 to DCI3 may change. While the path of an intermediate policy changes, its BSID does not change. Hence the policy used by the source does not change, hence the source is shielded from the churn in another domain.

A BSID provides opacity and independence between domains. The administrative authority of the core domain may not want to share information about its topology. The use of a BSID allows keeping the service opaque. S is not aware of the details of how the low-latency service is provided by the core domain. S is not aware of the need of the core authority to temporarily change the intermediate path.

7.2. Allocation

There are three approaches to allocate a BSID to an SR Policy: all the paths have no explicit BSID (called dynamic allocation), all the paths have the same explicit BSID (explicit allocation) and finally a mix of paths with and without explicit BSID (generic allocation).

In practice, all the use-cases seen to-date either use the explicit allocation or the dynamic allocation. The explicit allocation is most-often associated with controller-instantiated SR Policies. The dynamic allocation is most-often associated with router-based on-demand SR Policies.

7.2.1. Dynamic BSID Allocation

No path of the SR Policy have a specified BSID.

In such a case, the SR-TE implementation allocates a SID to the SR Policy and keeps it along the whole existence of the policy.

In the case of SR-MPLS, the SR-TE implementation binds a local dynamic label in the same way LDP, RSVP-TE or BGP would do.

7.2.2. Explicit BSID Allocation

All the paths of the SR Policy have the same specified BSID, with the same behavioral preference in case this specified BSID is not available.

If the specified BSID is available, then it is bound to the SR Policy and used along the existence of the policy.

If the specified BSID is not available, then a SYSLOG/NETCONF message is generated and if the preferred behavior is to fall-back on the dynamic allocation, then the dynamic allocation is performed.

If the specified BSID is not available and the operator-requested behavior is to not fall-back on the dynamic allocation, then a SYSLOG/NETCONF message is generated and the SR Policy does not install any BSID entry in the forwarding plane.

A later section will explain how controllers can discover the local SIDs available at a node N so as to pick an explicit BSID for a SR Policy to be instantiated at headend N.

7.2.3. Generic BSID Allocation

This section details the BSID allocation when a policy is made of paths with different BSID allocation behaviors (e.g. mix of paths with and without an explicit BSID, potentially with different explicit BSIDs).

When the selected path has a specified BSID, the SR Policy uses that BSID if this value (label in MPLS, IPv6 address in SRv6) is available (i.e. not associated with any other usage: e.g. to another MPLS client, to another SID, to another SR Policy).

If the selected path's BSID is not available, then the SR Policy keeps the previous BSID. If the SR Policy did not have a previous BSID, then the SR Policy dynamically binds a BSID to itself.

Note that a path may request that only its specified BSID be used. In that case, if that BSID is not available and that path is active, then no BSID is bound to the policy and a SYSLOG/NETCONF is triggered. In this case, the SR Policy does not install any entry indexed by a BSID in the forwarding plane.

When an SR Policy has multiple multiple valid paths with the best preference but with different BSIDs, it is left to the implementation to decide which BSID to install. This case is unlikely in practice for two reasons. First, all known use-cases share the same BSID across all the paths of a given SR Policy. Second, all known use-cases have a different preference for each path. Hence in practice a single path will be active and with a stable BSID on a per-policy basis.

8. Centralized Discovery

This section explains how controllers can discover the local SIDs available at a node N so as to pick an explicit BSID for a SR Policy to be instantiated at headend N.

Any controller can discover the following properties of a node N (e.g. via BGP-LS, NETCONF etc.):

- o its local Segment Routing Label Block (SRLB).
- o its local topology.
- o its topology-related SIDs (Adj SID and EPE SID).
- o its SR Policies and their BSID ([I-D.ietf-idr-te-lsp-distribution]).

Any controller can thus infer the available SIDs in the SRLB of any node.

As an example, a controller discovers the following characteristics of N: SRLB [4000, 8000], 3 Adj SIDs (4001, 4002, 4003), 2 EPE SIDs (4004, 4005) and 3 SRTE policies (whose BSIDs are respectively 4006, 4007 and 4008). This controller can deduce that the SRLB sub-range [4009, 5000] is free for allocation.

Likely, the next question is: how do we ensure that different controllers do not pick the same available SID at the same time for different SR Policies.

Clearly, a controller is not restricted to use the next numerically available SID in the available SRLB sub-range. It can pick any label in the subset of available labels. This random pick make the chance for a collision unlikely.

An operator could also sub-allocate the SRLB between different controllers (e.g. [4000-4499] to controller 1 and [4500-5000] to controller 2).

Inter-controller state-synchronization may be used to avoid/detect collision in BSID.

All these techniques make the likelihood of a collision between different controllers very unlikely.

In the unlikely case of a collision, the controllers will detect it through SYSLOG/NETCONF, BGP-LS reporting ([I-D.ietf-idr-te-lsp-distribution]) or PCEP notification. They then have the choice to continue the operation of their SR Policy with the dynamically allocated BSID or re-try with another explicit pick.

Note: in deployments where PCE Protocol (PCEP) is used between head-end and controller (PCE), a head-end can report BSID as well as policy attributes (e.g., type of disjointness) and operational and administrative states to controller. Similarly, a controller can also assign/update the BSID of a policy via PCEP when instantiating or updating SR Policy.

9. Dynamic Path

A dynamic path is a path that expresses an optimization objective and constraints.

The headend of the policy is responsible to compute a SID list ("solution SID list") that fits this optimization problem. The headend is responsible for computing the solution SID list any time the inputs to the problem change (e.g. topology changes).

9.1. Optimization Objective

We define two optimization objectives:

- o Min-Metric - requests computation of a solution SID list optimized for a selected metric.
- o Min-Metric with margin and maximum number of SIDs - Min-Metric with two changes: a margin of by which two paths with similar metrics would be considered equal, a constraint on the max number of SIDs in the SID list.

The "Min-Metric" optimization objective requests to compute a solution SID list such that packets flowing through the solution SID list use ECMP-aware paths optimized for the selected metric. The "Min-Metric" objective can be instantiated for the IGP metric xor the TE metric xor the latency extended TE metric. This metric is called the O metric (the optimized metric) to distinguish it from the IGP metric. The solution SID list must be computed to minimize the number of SIDs and the number of SID lists.

If the selected O metric is the IGP metric and the headend and tailend are in the same IGP domain, then the solution SID list is made of the single prefix-SID of the tailend.

When the selected O metric is not the IGP metric, then the solution SID list is made of prefix SIDs of intermediate nodes, Adjacency SIDs along intermediate links and potentially BSIDs of intermediate policies.

In many deployments there are insignificant metric differences between mostly equal path (e.g. a difference of 100 usec of latency between two paths from NYC to SFO would not matter in most cases). The "Min-Metric with margin" objective supports such requirement.

The "Min-Metric with margin and maximum number of SIDs" optimization objective requests to compute a solution SID list such that packets flowing through the solution SID list do not use a path whose cumulated O metric is larger than the shortest-path O metric + margin.

If this is not possible because of the number of SIDs constraint, then the solution SID list minimizes the O metric while meeting the maximum number of SID constraints.

9.2. Constraints

The following constraints can be defined:

- o Inclusion and/or exclusion of TE affinity.
- o Inclusion and/or exclusion of IP address.
- o Inclusion and/or exclusion of SRLG.
- o Inclusion and/or exclusion of admin-tag.
- o Maximum accumulated metric (IGP, TE and latency).
- o Maximum number of SIDs in the solution SID list.
- o Maximum number of weighted SID lists in the solution set.
- o Diversity to another service instance (e.g., link, node, or SRLG disjoint paths originating from different head-ends).

9.3. SR Native Algorithm




Figure 4: Illustration used to describe SR native algorithm

Let us assume that all the links have the same IGP metric of 10 and let us consider the dynamic path defined as: Min-Metric(from 1, to 3, IGP metric, margin 0) with constraint "avoid link 2-to-3".

A classical circuit implementation would do: prune the graph, compute the shortest-path, pick a single non-ECMP branch of the ECMP-aware shortest-path and encode it as a SID list. The solution SID list would be <4, 5, 7, 3>.

An SR-native algorithm would find a SID list that minimizes the number of SIDs and maximize the use of all the ECMP branches along the ECMP shortest path. In this illustration, the solution SID list would be <7, 3>.

In the vast majority of SR use-cases, SR-native algorithms should be preferred: they preserve the native ECMP of IP and they minimize the dataplane header overhead.

In some specific use-case (e.g. TDM migration over IP where the circuit notion prevails), one may prefer a classic circuit computation followed by an encoding into SIDs.

SR-native algorithms are a local node behavior and are thus outside the scope of this document.

9.4. Path to SID

Let us assume the below diagram where all the links have an IGP metric of 10 and a TE metric of 10 except the link AB which has an IGP metric of 20 and the link AD which has a TE metric of 100. Let us consider the min-metric(from A, to D, TE metric, margin 0).



Figure 5: Illustration used to describe path to SID conversion

The solution path to this problem is ABCD.

This path can be expressed in SIDs as $\{B, D\}$; where B and D are the IGP prefix SIDs respectively associated with nodes B and D in the diagram.

Indeed, from A, the IGP path to B is AB (IGP metric 20 better than ADCB of IGP metric 30). From B, the IGP path to D is BCD (IGP metric 20 better than BAD of IGP metric 30).

While the details of the algorithm remain a local node behavior, a high-level description follows: start at the headend and find an IGP prefix SID that leads as far down the desired path as possible (without using any link not included in the desired path). If no prefix SID exists, use the Adj SID to the first neighbor along the path. Restart from the node that was reached.

9.5. PCE Computed Path

A local computation should be preferred whenever possible. When local computation is not possible (e.g., a policy's tail-end is outside the topology known to the head-end), the head-end may send path computation request to a PCE supporting PCEP extension specified in [I-D.ietf-pce-segment-routing].

10. Signaling Paths of an SR Policy to a Head-end

A headend H can be informed about a path for an SR policy (endpoint, color) via several means: BGP, PCEP, CLI, netconf.

We remind that the selection of the best path for a policy is independent of the protocol source of the path.

10.1. BGP

Please refer to [I-D.previdi-idr-segment-routing-te-policy]

10.2. PCEP

Please refer to [I-D.ietf-pce-pce-initiated-lsp]

10.3. NETCONF

Operator MUST be able to install policy via NETCONF with OpenConfig/YANG models (work in progress).

10.4. CLI

Operator MUST be able to install policy via CLI.

11. Steering into an SR Policy

A headend can steer a packet flow on an SR Policy in various ways:

- o Incoming packets have an active SID matching a local BSID at the head-end.
- o Incoming packets match a BGP/Service route which recurses on the BSID of a local policy.
- o Incoming packets match a BGP/Service route which recurses on an array of paths to the BGP nhop where some of the paths in the array are local SR Policies.
- o Incoming packets match a routing policy which directs them on a local SR policy.

For simplicity of illustration, we will use the SR-MPLS example.

11.1. Incoming Active SID is a BSID

Let us assume that headend H has a local SR Policy P of SID list <S1, S2, S3> and BSID B.

When H receives a packet with label stack <B, L2, L3>, H pops B and pushes <S1, S2, S3>. H sends the resulting packet with label stack <S1, S2, S3, L2, L3> along the path to S1.

H has steered the packet in the policy P.

H did not have to classify the packet. The classification was done by a node upstream of H (e.g. the source of the packet or an intermediate ingress edge node of the SR domain) and the result of this classification was efficiently encoded in the packet header as a BSID.

This is another key benefit of the segment routing in general and the binding SID in particular: the ability to encode a classification and the resulting steering in the packet header such as to better scale and simplify intermediate aggregation nodes.

11.2. Recursion on a BSID

Let us assume that headend H:

- o learns about a BGP route R/r via next-hop N, extended-color community C and label V.
- o has a local SR Policy P to (endpoint = N, color = C) of SID list <S1, S2, S3> and BSID B.
- o has a local BGP policy which matches on the extended-color community C and allows its usage as an SR-TE SLA steering information.

In such a case, H installs R/r in RIB/FIB with next-hop = B (instead of N).

Indeed, H's local BGP policy and the received BGP route indicate that the headend should associate R/r with an SR-TE path to N with the SLA associated with color C. The headend therefore installs the BGP route on that policy.

This can be implemented by using the BSID as a generalized nhop and installing the BGP route on that generalized next-hop.

When H receives a packet with a destination matching R/r, H pushes the label stack <S1, S2, S3, V> and sends the resulting packet along the path to S1.

Note that any label associated with the BGP route is pushed after the SID list of the SR Policy.

11.3. Recursion on a dynamic BSID

In the previous section, we assumed that H had a pre-established "explicit" SR Policy (endpoint N, color C).

In this section, we note that this policy may be generated dynamically by the head-end H upon reception of the BGP route R/r via N with color C.

A possible implementation has the BGP policy matches on the color C and triggers an on-demand local request to the SR-TE process to instantiate an SR Policy (endpoint N, color C). Color C is bound to some optimization objective and constraints specified in the local BGP policy defined for color C. Once the related SR Policy is instantiated, the SR-TE process returns the related BSID to BGP process which can then installs the BGP route R/r on B.

The rest of the explanation is the same as the previous section.

11.4. An array of BSIDs associated with an IGP entry

Let us assume that head-end H:

- o learns about a BGP route R/r via next-hop N and label V.
- o has a local SR Policy P1 to (endpoint = N, color = C1) of SID list <S1, S2, S3> and BSID B1.
- o has a local SR Policy P2 to (endpoint = N, color = C2) of SID list <S4, S5, S6> and BSID B2.
- o is configured to instantiate an array of paths to N where the entry 0 is the IGP path to N, color C1 is the first entry and Color C2 is the second entry. The index into the array is called a Forwarding Class (FC). The index can have values 0 to 7.
- o is configured to match flows in its ingress interfaces (upon any field such as Ethernet destination/source/vlan/tos or IP destination/source/DSCP or transport ports etc.) and color them with an internal per-packet forwarding-class variable (0, 1 or 2 in this example).

In such a case, H installs in RIB/FIB:

- o R/r in with next-hop N (as usual).
- o N via a recursion on an array A (instead of the immediate outgoing link associated with the IGP shortest-path to N).
- o Entry A(0) set to the immediate outgoing link of the IGP shortest-path to N.
- o Entry A(1) set to B1.
- o Entry A(2) set to B2.

H receives three packets P, P1 and P2 on its incoming interface. H colors them respectively with forwarding-class 0, 1 and 2. As a result:

- o H pushes <V> on packet P and forwards the resulting frame along the shortest-path to N (which in SR-MPLS results in the pushing of the prefix-SID of N).
- o H pushes <S1, S2, S3, V> on packet P1 and forwards the resulting frame along the shortest-path to S1.
- o H pushes <S4, S5, S6, V> on packet P2 and forwards the resulting frame along the shortest-path to S4.

If the local configuration does not specify any explicit forwarding information for an entry of the array, then this entry is filled with the same information as entry 0 (i.e. the IGP shortest-path).

This realizes per-flow steering: different flows bound to the same BGP destination R/r are steered on different SR-TE paths.

11.5. A Routing Policy on a BSID

Finally, headend H may be configured with a local routing policy which overrides any BGP/IGP path and steer a specified flow on an SR Policy.

12. Optional Steering Modes for BGP Destinations

12.1. Color-Only BGP Destination Steering

In the previous section "Recursion on a BSID", we have seen that the steering on an SR Policy is governed by the matching of the BGP route's next-hop N and the authorized color C with a local SR Policy defined by the tuple (N, C).

This is the most likely form of BGP destination steering and the one we recommend.

In this section, we define an alternative steering mechanism based only on the color.

This color-only steering variation is governed by two new flags "C" and "O" defined in the color extended community.

The Color-Only flags "CO" are set to 00 by default.

When 00, the BGP destination is preferably steered onto a valid SR Policy (N, C) where N is an IPv4/6 endpoint address and C is a color

value else it is steered on the IGP path to the next-hop N. This is the classic case we described before and that we recommend.

When 01, the BGP destination is preferably steered onto a valid SR Policy (N, C) else onto a valid SR Policy (null endpoint, C) else on the IGP path to the next-hop N.

When 10, the BGP destination is preferably steered onto a valid SR Policy (N, C) else onto a valid SR Policy (null endpoint, C) else on any valid SR Policy (any endpoint, C) else on the IGP path to the next-hop N.

The null endpoint is 0.0.0.0 for IPv4 and ::0 for IPv6 (all bits set to the 0 value).

When 11, it is treated like 00.

12.2. Drop on Invalid

The local BGP policy authorizing the use of an extended color community steering on an SR policy may specify that if the related SR Policy becomes invalid then the related BSID should remain in RIB/FIB and point to null0 (drop any packet recursing on that BSID).

Recall that, by default, for a BGP route R/r via next-hop N with extended-color community C, when the SR Policy (N, C) becomes invalid, then BGP re-installs R/r in RIB/FIB via N (the IGP path to N).

13. Multipoint SR Policy

13.1. Spray SR Policy

A Spray SR-TE policy is a variant of an SR-TE policy which involves packet replication.

Any traffic steered into a Spray SR Policy is replicated along the SID lists of its selected path.

In the context of a Spray SR Policy, the selected path SHOULD have more than one SID list. The weights of the SID lists is not applicable for a Spray SR Policy. They MUST be set to 1.

Like any SR policy, a Spray SR Policy has a BSID instantiated into the forwarding plane.

Traffic is typically steered into a Spray SR Policy in two ways:

- o local policy-based routing at the headend of the policy.
- o remote classification and steering via the BSID of the Spray SR Policy.

14. Reporting SR Policy

Stateful PCEP ([I-D.ietf-pce-stateful-pce] and [I-D.sivabalan-pce-binding-label-sid] provides an ability for head-end to report BSID, attributes, and operational/administrative states. Using this protocol, a PCE can also update an existing SR Policy whose path computation is delegated to it as well as instantiate new SR Policy on a head-end.

BGP-LS reports an SR Policy via ([I-D.ietf-idr-te-lsp-distribution]

15. Work in Progress

- o Open configuration model.
- o Yang model.

16. Acknowledgement

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Segment Routing Policy Architecture
draft-filsfils-spring-segment-routing-policy-06.txt

Abstract

Segment Routing (SR) allows a headend node to steer a packet flow along any path. Intermediate per-flow states are eliminated thanks to source routing. The headend node steers a flow into an SR Policy. The header of a packet steered in an SR Policy is augmented with the ordered list of segments associated with that SR Policy. This document details the concepts of SR Policy and steering into an SR Policy.

Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

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1. Introduction

Segment Routing (SR) allows a headend node to steer a packet flow along any path. Intermediate per-flow states are eliminated thanks to source routing [I-D.ietf-spring-segment-routing].

The headend node is said to steer a flow into an Segment Routing Policy (SR Policy).

The header of a packet steered in an SR Policy is augmented with the ordered list of segments associated with that SR Policy.

This document details the concepts of SR Policy and steering into an SR Policy. These apply equally to the MPLS and SRv6 instantiations of segment routing.

For reading simplicity, the illustrations are provided for the MPLS instantiations.

2. SR Policy

An SR Policy is a framework that enables instantiation of an ordered list of segments on a node for implementing a source routing policy with a specific intent for traffic steering from that node.

The Segment Routing architecture [I-D.ietf-spring-segment-routing] specifies that any instruction can be bound to a segment. Thus, an SR Policy can be built using any types of Segment Identifiers (SIDs) including those associated with topological or service instructions.

This section defines the key aspects and constituents of an SR Policy.

2.1. Identification of an SR Policy

An SR Policy is identified through the tuple <headend, color, endpoint>. In the context of a specific headend, one may identify an SR policy by the <color, endpoint> tuple.

The headend is the node where the policy is instantiated/implemented. The headend is specified as an IPv4 or IPv6 address.

The endpoint indicates the destination of the policy. The endpoint is specified as an IPv4 or IPv6 address. In a specific case (refer to Section 8.8.1), the endpoint can be the null address (0.0.0.0 for IPv4, ::0 for IPv6).

The color is a 32-bit numerical value that associates the SR Policy with an intent (e.g. low-latency).

The endpoint and the color are used to automate the steering of service or transport routes on SR Policies (refer to Section 8).

An implementation MAY allow assignment of a symbolic name comprising of printable ASCII characters to an SR Policy to serve as a user-friendly attribute for debug and troubleshooting purposes. Such symbolic names MUST NOT be considered as identifiers for an SR Policy.

2.2. Candidate Path and Segment List

An SR Policy is associated with one or more candidate paths. A candidate path is the unit for signaling of an SR Policy to a headend via protocols like Path Computation Element (PCE) Communication Protocol (PCEP) [RFC8281] or BGP SR Policy [I-D.ietf-idr-segment-routing-te-policy].

A candidate path is itself associated with a Segment-List (SID-List) or a set of SID-Lists.

A SID-List represents a specific source-routed way to send traffic from the headend to the endpoint of the corresponding SR policy.

A candidate path is either dynamic or explicit.

An explicit candidate path is associated with a SID-List or a set of SID-Lists.

A dynamic candidate path expresses an optimization objective and a set of constraints. The headend (potentially with the help of a PCE) computes the solution SID-List (or set of SID-Lists) that solves the optimization problem.

When a candidate path is associated with a set of SID-Lists, each SID-List is associated with a weight for weighted load balancing (refer Section 2.11 for details). The default weight is 1.

A variation of SR Policy can be used for packet replication. A candidate path could comprise multiple SID-Lists; one for each replication path. In such a scenario, packets are actually replicated through each SID List of the SR Policy to realize a point-to-multipoint service delivery. The weight of each SID-List does not come into the picture in this case since there is no load-balancing. The details of this and other such mechanisms for use of SR Policy for point-to-multipoint delivery are outside the scope of this document.

2.3. Protocol-Origin of a Candidate Path

A headend may be informed about a candidate path for an SR Policy <color, endpoint> by various means including: via configuration, PCEP [RFC8281] or BGP [I-D.ietf-idr-segment-routing-te-policy].

Protocol-Origin of a candidate path is an 8-bit value which identifies the component or protocol that originates or signals the candidate path.

The table below specifies the RECOMMENDED default values:

Value	Protocol-Origin
10	PCEP
20	BGP SR Policy
30	Local (via CLI, Yang model through NETCONF, gRPC, etc.)

Table 1: Protocol-origin Identifier

Implementations MAY allow modifications of these default values assigned to protocols on the headend along similar lines as a routing administrative distance. Its application in the candidate path selection is described in Section 2.9.

2.4. Originator of a Candidate Path

Originator identifies the node which provisioned or signalled the candidate path on the headend. The originator is expressed in the form of a 160 bit numerical value formed by the concatenation of the fields of the tuple <ASN, node-address> as below:

- o ASN : represented as a 4 byte number.
- o Node Address : represented as a 128 bit value. IPv4 addresses are encoded in the lowest 32 bits.

Its application in the candidate path selection is described in Section 2.9.

When Protocol-Origin is Local, the ASN and node address MAY be set to either the headend or the provisioning controller/node ASN and address. Default value is 0 for both AS and node address.

When Protocol-Origin is PCEP, it is the IPv4 or IPv6 address of the PCE and the AS number SHOULD be set to 0 by default when not available or known.

Protocol-Origin is BGP SR Policy, it is provided by the BGP component on the headend and is:

- o the BGP Router ID and ASN of the node/controller signalling the candidate path when it has a BGP session to the headend, OR

- o the BGP Router ID of the eBGP peer signalling the candidate path along with ASN of origin when the signalling is done via one or more intermediate eBGP routers, OR
- o the BGP Originator ID [RFC4456] and the ASN of the node/controller when the signalling is done via one or more route-reflectors over iBGP session.

2.5. Discriminator of a Candidate Path

The Discriminator is a 32 bit value associated with a candidate path that uniquely identifies it within the context of an SR Policy from a specific Protocol-Origin as specified below:

When Protocol-Origin is Local, this is an implementation's configuration model specific unique identifier for a candidate path. Default value is 0.

When PCEP is the Protocol-Origin, the method to uniquely identify signalled path will be specified in a future PCEP document. Default value is 0.

When BGP SR Policy is the Protocol-Origin, it is the distinguisher specified in Section 2.1 of [I-D.ietf-idr-segment-routing-te-policy].

Its application in the candidate path selection is described in Section 2.9.

2.6. Identification of a Candidate Path

A candidate path is identified in the context of a single SR Policy.

A candidate path is not shared across SR Policies.

A candidate path is not identified by its SID-List(s).

If CP1 is a candidate path of SR Policy Pol1 and CP2 is a candidate path of SR Policy Pol2, then these two candidate paths are independent, even if they happen to have the same SID-List. The SID-List does not identify a candidate path. The SID-List is an attribute of a candidate path.

The identity of a candidate path MUST be uniquely established in the context of an SR Policy <headend, color, endpoint> in order to handle add, delete or modify operations on them in an unambiguous manner regardless of their source(s).

The tuple <Protocol-Origin, originator, discriminator> uniquely identify a candidate path.

Candidate paths MAY also be assigned or signaled with a symbolic name comprising printable ASCII characters to serve as a user-friendly attribute for debug and troubleshooting purposes. Such symbolic names MUST NOT be considered as identifiers for a candidate path.

2.7. Preference of a Candidate Path

The preference of the candidate path is used to select the best candidate path for an SR Policy. The default preference is 100.

It is RECOMMENDED that each candidate path of a given SR policy has a different preference.

2.8. Validity of a Candidate Path

A candidate path is valid if it is usable. A common path validity criterion is the reachability of its constituent SIDs. The validation rules are specified in Section 5.

2.9. Active Candidate Path

A candidate path is selected when it is valid and it is determined to be the best path of the SR Policy. The selected path is referred to as the "active path" of the SR policy in this document.

Whenever a new path is learned or an active path is deleted, the validity of an existing path changes or an existing path is changed, the selection process MUST be re-executed.

The candidate path selection process operates on the candidate path Preference. A candidate path is selected when it is valid and it has the highest preference value among all the candidate paths of the SR Policy.

In the case of multiple valid candidate paths of the same preference, the tie-breaking rules are evaluated on the identification tuple in the following order until only one valid best path is selected:

1. Higher value of Protocol-Origin is selected.
2. Lower value of originator is selected.
3. Finally, the higher value of discriminator is selected.

An implementation MAY choose to override any of the tie-breaking rules above and maintain the already selected candidate path as active path.

The rules are framed with multiple protocols and sources in mind and hence may not follow the logic of a single protocol (e.g. BGP best path selection). The motivation behind these rules are as follows:

- o The Protocol-Origin allows an operator to setup a default selection mechanism across protocol sources, e.g., to prefer locally provisioned over paths signalled via BGP SR Policy or PCEP.
- o The preference, being the first tiebreaker, allows an operator to influence selection across paths thus allowing provisioning of multiple path options, e.g., CP1 is preferred and if it becomes invalid then fall-back to CP2 and so on. Since preference works across protocol sources it also enables (where necessary) selective override of the default protocol-origin preference, e.g., to prefer a path signalled via BGP SR Policy over what is locally provisioned.
- o The originator allows an operator to have multiple redundant controllers and still maintain a deterministic behaviour over which of them are preferred even if they are providing the same candidate paths for the same SR policies to the headend.
- o The discriminator performs the final tiebreaking step to ensure a deterministic outcome of selection regardless of the order in which candidate paths are signalled across multiple transport channels or sessions.

[I-D.filsfils-spring-sr-policy-considerations] provides a set of examples to illustrate the active candidate path selection rules.

2.10. Validity of an SR Policy

An SR Policy is valid when it has at least one valid candidate path.

2.11. Instantiation of an SR Policy in the Forwarding Plane

A valid SR Policy is instantiated in the forwarding plane.

Only the active candidate path is used for forwarding traffic that is being steered onto that policy.

If a set of SID-Lists is associated with the active path of the policy, then the steering is per flow and W-ECMP based according to the relative weight of each SID-List.

The fraction of the flows associated with a given SID-List is w/S_w where w is the weight of the SID-List and S_w is the sum of the weights of the SID-Lists of the selected path of the SR Policy.

The accuracy of the weighted load-balancing depends on the platform implementation.

2.12. Priority of an SR Policy

Upon topological change, many policies could be recomputed. An implementation MAY provide a per-policy priority configuration. The operator MAY set this field to indicate order in which the policies should be re-computed. Such a priority is represented by an integer in the range (0, 255) where the lowest value is the highest priority. The default value of priority is 128.

An SR Policy may comprise multiple Candidate Paths received from the same or different sources. A candidate path MAY be signaled with a priority value. When an SR Policy has multiple candidate paths with distinct signaled non-default priority values, the SR Policy as a whole takes the lowest value (i.e. the highest priority) amongst these signaled priority values.

2.13. Summary

In summary, the information model is the following:

```

SR policy POL1 <headend, color, endpoint>
  Candidate-path CP1 <protocol-origin = 20, originator =
100:1.1.1.1, discriminator = 1>
    Preference 200
    Weight W1, SID-List1 <SID11...SID1i>
    Weight W2, SID-List2 <SID21...SID2j>
  Candidate-path CP2 <protocol-origin = 20, originator =
100:2.2.2.2, discriminator = 2>
    Preference 100
    Weight W3, SID-List3 <SID31...SID3i>
    Weight W4, SID-List4 <SID41...SID4j>

```

The SR Policy POL1 is identified by the tuple <headend, color, endpoint>. It has two candidate paths CP1 and CP2. Each is identified by a tuple <protocol-origin, originator, discriminator>. CP1 is the active candidate path (it is valid and it has the highest preference). The two SID-Lists of CP1 are installed as the

forwarding instantiation of SR policy Poll. Traffic steered on Poll is flow-based hashed on SID-List <SID11...SIDli> with a ratio $W1/(W1+W2)$.

3. Segment Routing Database

An SR headend maintains the Segment Routing Database (SR-DB).

An SR headend leverages the SR-DB to validate explicit candidate paths and compute dynamic candidate paths.

The information in the SR-DB MAY include:

- o IGP information (topology, IGP metrics based on ISIS [RFC1195] and OSPF [RFC2328] [RFC5340])
- o Segment Routing information (such as SRGB, SRLB, Prefix-SIDs, Adj-SIDs, BGP Peering SID, SRv6 SIDs)
[I-D.ietf-spring-segment-routing]
[I-D.ietf-idr-bgpls-segment-routing-epe]
[I-D.filsfils-spring-srv6-network-programming]
- o TE Link Attributes (such as TE metric, SRLG, attribute-flag, extended admin group) [RFC5305] [RFC3630].
- o Extended TE Link attributes (such as latency, loss) [RFC7810] [RFC7471]
- o Inter-AS Topology information
[I-D.ietf-idr-bgpls-segment-routing-epe].

The attached domain topology MAY be learned via IGP, BGP-LS or NETCONF.

A non-attached (remote) domain topology MAY be learned via BGP-LS or NETCONF.

In some use-cases, the SR-DB may only contain the attached domain topology while in others, the SR-DB may contain the topology of multiple domains and in this case it is multi-domain capable.

The SR-DB MAY also contain the SR Policies instantiated in the network. This can be collected via BGP-LS [I-D.ietf-idr-te-lsp-distribution] or PCEP [RFC8231] and [I-D.sivabalan-pce-binding-label-sid]. This information allows to build an end-to-end policy on the basis of intermediate SR policies (see Section 6 for further details).

The SR-DB MAY also contain the Maximum SID Depth (MSD) capability of nodes in the topology. This can be collected via ISIS [I-D.ietf-isis-segment-routing-msd], OSPF [I-D.ietf-ospf-segment-routing-msd], BGP-LS

[I-D.ietf-idr-bgp-ls-segment-routing-msd] or PCEP [I-D.ietf-pce-segment-routing].

The use of the SR-DB for computation and validation of SR Policies is outside the scope of this document. Some implementation aspects related to this are covered in [I-D.filsfils-spring-sr-policy-considerations].

4. Segment Types

A SID-List is an ordered set of segments represented as <S1, S2, ... Sn> where S1 is the first segment.

Based on the desired dataplane, either the MPLS label stack or the SRv6 SRH is built from the SID-List. However, the SID-List itself can be specified using different segment-descriptor types and the following are currently defined:

Type 1: SR-MPLS Label:

A MPLS label corresponding to any of the segment types defined for SR-MPLS (as defined in [I-D.ietf-spring-segment-routing] or other SR-MPLS specifications) can be used. Additionally, reserved labels like explicit-null or in general any MPLS label may also be used. e.g. this type can be used to specify a label representation which maps to an optical transport path on a packet transport node. This type does not require the headend to perform SID resolution.

Type 2: SRv6 SID:

An IPv6 address corresponding to any of the segment types defined for SRv6 (as defined in [I-D.filsfils-spring-srv6-network-programming] or other SRv6 specifications) can be used. This type does not require the headend to perform SID resolution.

Type 3: IPv4 Prefix with optional SR Algorithm:

The headend is required to resolve the specified IPv4 Prefix Address to the SR-MPLS label corresponding to a Prefix SID segment (as defined in [I-D.ietf-spring-segment-routing]). The SR algorithm (refer to Section 3.1.1 of [I-D.ietf-spring-segment-routing]) to be used MAY also be provided.

Type 4: IPv6 Global Prefix with optional SR Algorithm for SR-MPLS:

In this case the headend is required to resolve the specified IPv6 Global Prefix Address to the SR-MPLS label corresponding to its Prefix SID segment (as defined in [I-D.ietf-spring-segment-routing]). The SR Algorithm (refer to

Section 3.1.1 of [I-D.ietf-spring-segment-routing]) to be used MAY also be provided.

Type 5: IPv4 Prefix with Local Interface ID:

This type allows identification of Adjacency SID (as defined in [I-D.ietf-spring-segment-routing]) or BGP EPE Peering SID (as defined in [I-D.ietf-idr-bgpls-segment-routing-epe]) label for point-to-point links including IP unnumbered links. The headend is required to resolve the specified IPv4 Prefix Address to the Node originating it and then use the Local Interface ID to identify the point-to-point link whose adjacency is being referred to. The Local Interface ID link descriptor follows semantics as specified in [RFC7752]. This type can also be used to indicate indirection into a layer 2 interface (i.e. without IP address) like a representation of an optical transport path or a layer 2 Ethernet port or circuit at the specified node.

Type 6: IPv4 Addresses for link endpoints as Local, Remote pair:

This type allows identification of Adjacency SID (as defined in [I-D.ietf-spring-segment-routing]) or BGP EPE Peering SID (as defined in [I-D.ietf-idr-bgpls-segment-routing-epe]) label for links. The headend is required to resolve the specified IPv4 Local Address to the Node originating it and then use the IPv4 Remote Address to identify the link adjacency being referred to. The Local and Remote Address pair link descriptors follows semantics as specified in [RFC7752].

Type 7: IPv6 Prefix and Interface ID for link endpoints as Local, Remote pair for SR-MPLS:

This type allows identification of Adjacency SID (as defined in [I-D.ietf-spring-segment-routing]) or BGP EPE Peering SID (as defined in [I-D.ietf-idr-bgpls-segment-routing-epe]) label for links including those with only Link Local IPv6 addresses. The headend is required to resolve the specified IPv6 Prefix Address to the Node originating it and then use the Local Interface ID to identify the point-to-point link whose adjacency is being referred to. For other than point-to-point links, additionally the specific adjacency over the link needs to be resolved using the Remote Prefix and Interface ID. The Local and Remote pair of Prefix and Interface ID link descriptor follows semantics as specified in [RFC7752]. This type can also be used to indicate indirection into a layer 2 interface (i.e. without IP address) like a representation of an optical transport path or a layer 2 Ethernet port or circuit at the specified node.

Type 8: IPv6 Addresses for link endpoints as Local, Remote pair for SR-MPLS:

This type allows identification of Adjacency SID (as defined in [I-D.ietf-spring-segment-routing]) or BGP EPE Peering SID (as defined in [I-D.ietf-idr-bgpls-segment-routing-epe]) label for links with Global IPv6 addresses. The headend is required to resolve the specified Local IPv6 Address to the Node originating it and then use the Remote IPv6 Address to identify the link adjacency being referred to. The Local and Remote Address pair link descriptors follows semantics as specified in [RFC7752].

Type 9: IPv6 Global Prefix with optional SR Algorithm for SRv6:

The headend is required to resolve the specified IPv6 Global Prefix Address to the SRv6 END function SID (as defined in [I-D.filsfils-spring-srv6-network-programming]) corresponding to the node which is originating the prefix. The SR Algorithm (refer to Section 3.1.1 of [I-D.ietf-spring-segment-routing]) to be used MAY also be provided.

Type 10: IPv6 Prefix and Interface ID for link endpoints as Local, Remote pair for SRv6:

This type allows identification of SRv6 END.X SID (as defined in [I-D.filsfils-spring-srv6-network-programming]) for links with only Link Local IPv6 addresses. The headend is required to resolve the specified IPv6 Prefix Address to the Node originating it and then use the Local Interface ID to identify the point-to-point link whose adjacency is being referred to. For other than point-to-point links, additionally the specific adjacency needs to be resolved using the Remote Prefix and Interface ID. The Local and Remote pair of Prefix and Interface ID link descriptor follows semantics as specified in [RFC7752].

Type 11: IPv6 Addresses for link endpoints as Local, Remote pair for SRv6:

This type allows identification of SRv6 END.X SID (as defined in [I-D.filsfils-spring-srv6-network-programming]) for links with Global IPv6 addresses. The headend is required to resolve the specified Local IPv6 Address to the Node originating it and then use the Remote IPv6 Address to identify the link adjacency being referred to. The Local and Remote Address pair link descriptors follows semantics as specified in [RFC7752].

When the algorithm is not specified for the SID types above which optionally allow for it, the headend SHOULD use the Strict Shortest Path algorithm if available; otherwise it SHOULD use the default

Shortest Path algorithm. The specification of algorithm enables the use of IGP Flex Algorithm [I-D.ietf-lsr-flex-algo] specific SIDs in SR Policy.

For SID types 3-through-11, a SID value may also be optionally provided to the headend for verification purposes. Section 5.1. describes the resolution and verification of the SIDs and Segment Lists on the headend.

When building the MPLS label stack or the IPv6 Segment list from the Segment List, the node instantiating the policy MUST interpret the set of Segments as follows:

- o The first Segment represents the topmost label or the first IPv6 segment. It identifies the first segment the traffic will be directed toward along the SR explicit path.
- o The last Segment represents the bottommost label or the last IPv6 segment the traffic will be directed toward along the SR explicit path.

4.1. Explicit Null

A Type 1 SID may be any MPLS label, including reserved labels.

For example, assuming that the desired traffic-engineered path from a headend 1 to an endpoint 4 can be expressed by the SID-List <16002, 16003, 16004> where 16002, 16003 and 16004 respectively refer to the IPv4 Prefix SIDs bound to node 2, 3 and 4, then IPv6 traffic can be traffic-engineered from nodes 1 to 4 via the previously described path using an SR Policy with SID-List <16002, 16003, 16004, 2> where mpls label value of 2 represents the "IPv6 Explicit NULL Label".

The penultimate node before node 4 will pop 16004 and will forward the frame on its directly connected interface to node 4.

The endpoint receives the traffic with top label "2" which indicates that the payload is an IPv6 packet.

When steering unlabeled IPv6 BGP destination traffic using an SR policy composed of SID-List(s) based on IPv4 SIDs, the Explicit Null Label Policy is processed as specified in [I-D.ietf-idr-segment-routing-te-policy] Section 2.4.4. When an "IPv6 Explicit NULL label" is not present as the bottom label, the headend SHOULD automatically impose one. Refer to Section 8) later in this document for more details.

5. Validity of a Candidate Path

5.1. Explicit Candidate Path

An explicit candidate path is associated with a SID-List or a set of SID-Lists.

An explicit candidate path is provisioned by the operator directly or via a controller.

The computation/logic that leads to the choice of the SID list is external to the SR Policy headend. The SR Policy headend does not compute the SID list. The SR Policy headend only confirms its validity.

A SID-List of an explicit candidate path MUST be declared invalid when:

- o It is empty.
- o Its weight is 0.
- o The headend is unable to resolve the first SID into one or more outgoing interface(s) and next-hop(s).
- o The headend is unable to resolve any non-first SID of type 3-through-11 into an MPLS label or an SRv6 SID.
- o The headend verification fails for any SID for which verification has been explicitly requested.

"Unable to resolve" means that the headend has no path to the SID in its SR database.

SID verification is performed when the headend is explicitly requested to verify SID(s) by the controller via the signaling protocol used. Implementations MAY provide a local configuration option to enable verification on a global or per policy or per candidate path basis.

"Verification fails" for a SID means any of the following:

- o The headend is unable to find the SID in its SR DB
- o The headend detects mis-match between the SID value and its context provided for SIDs of type 3-through-11 in its SR DB.
- o The headend is unable to resolve any non-first SID of type 3-through-11 into an MPLS label or an SRv6 SID.

In multi-domain deployments, it is expected that the headend be unable to verify the reachability of the SIDs in remote domains. Types A or B MUST be used for the SIDs for which the reachability

cannot be verified. Note that the first SID MUST always be reachable regardless of its type.

In addition, a SID-List MAY be declared invalid when:

- o Its last segment is not a Prefix SID (including BGP Peer Node-SID) advertised by the node specified as the endpoint of the corresponding SR policy.
- o Its last segment is not an Adjacency SID (including BGP Peer Adjacency SID) of any of the links present on neighbor nodes and that terminate on the node specified as the endpoint of the corresponding SR policy.

An explicit candidate path is invalid as soon as it has no valid SID-List.

5.2. Dynamic Candidate Path

A dynamic candidate path is specified as an optimization objective and constraints.

The headend of the policy leverages its SR database to compute a SID-List ("solution SID-List") that solves this optimization problem.

The headend re-computes the solution SID-List any time the inputs to the problem change (e.g., topology changes).

When local computation is not possible (e.g., a policy's tailend is outside the topology known to the headend) or not desired, the headend MAY send path computation request to a PCE supporting PCEP extension specified in [I-D.ietf-pce-segment-routing].

If no solution is found to the optimization objective and constraints, then the dynamic candidate path MUST be declared invalid.

[I-D.filsfils-spring-sr-policy-considerations] discusses some of the optimization objectives and constraints that may be considered by a dynamic candidate path. It illustrates some of the desirable properties of the computation of the solution SID list.

6. Binding SID

The Binding SID (BSID) is fundamental to Segment Routing [I-D.ietf-spring-segment-routing]. It provides scaling, network opacity and service independence. [I-D.filsfils-spring-sr-policy-considerations] illustrates some of these benefits.

6.1. BSID of a candidate path

Each candidate path MAY be defined with a BSID.

Candidate Paths of the same SR policy SHOULD have the same BSID.

Candidate Paths of different SR policies MUST NOT have the same BSID.

6.2. BSID of an SR Policy

The BSID of an SR policy is the BSID of its active candidate path.

When the active candidate path has a specified BSID, the SR Policy uses that BSID if this value (label in MPLS, IPv6 address in SRv6) is available (i.e., not associated with any other usage: e.g. to another MPLS client, to another SID, to another SR Policy).

Optionally, instead of only checking that the BSID of the active path is available, a headend MAY check that it is available within a given SID range i.e., Segment Routing Local Block (SRLB) as specified in [I-D.ietf-spring-segment-routing].

When the specified BSID is not available (optionally is not in the SRLB), an alert message is generated.

In the cases (as described above) where SR Policy does not have a BSID available, then the SR Policy MAY dynamically bind a BSID to itself. Dynamically bound BSID SHOULD use an available SID outside the SRLB.

Assuming that at time t the BSID of the SR Policy is $B1$, if at time $t+dt$ a different candidate path becomes active and this new active path does not have a specified BSID or its BSID is specified but is not available, then the SR Policy keeps the previous BSID $B1$.

The association of an SR Policy with a BSID thus MAY change over the life of the SR policy (e.g., upon active path change). Hence, the BSID cannot be used as an identification of an SR Policy.

6.2.1. Frequent use-cases : unspecified BSID

All the candidate paths of the same SR Policy can have an unspecified BSID.

In such a case, a BSID MAY be dynamically bound to the SR Policy as soon as the first valid candidate path is received. That BSID is kept along all the life of the SR Policy and across changes of active candidate path.

6.2.2. Frequent use-case: all specified to the same BSID

All the paths of the SR Policy can have the same specified BSID.

6.2.3. Specified-BSID-only

An implementation MAY support the configuration of the Specified-BSID-only restrictive behavior on the headend for all SR Policies or individual SR Policies. Further, this restrictive behavior MAY also be signaled on a per SR Policy basis to the headend.

When this restrictive behavior is enabled, if the candidate path has an unspecified BSID or if the specified BSID is not available when the candidate path becomes active then no BSID is bound to it and it is considered invalid. An alert is triggered. Other candidate paths can then be evaluated for becoming the active candidate path.

6.3. Forwarding Plane

A valid SR Policy installs a BSID-keyed entry in the forwarding plane with the action of steering the packets matching this entry to the selected path of the SR Policy.

If the Specified-BSID-only restrictive behavior is enabled and the BSID of the active path is not available (optionally not in the SRLB), then the SR Policy does not install any entry indexed by a BSID in the forwarding plane.

6.4. Non-SR usage of Binding SID

An implementation MAY choose to associate a Binding SID with any type of interface (e.g. a layer 3 termination of an Optical Circuit) or a tunnel (e.g. IP tunnel, GRE tunnel, IP/UDP tunnel, MPLS RSVP-TE tunnel, etc). This enables the use of other non-SR enabled interfaces and tunnels as segments in an SR Policy SID-List without the need of forming routing protocol adjacencies over them.

The details of this kind of usage are beyond the scope of this document. A specific packet optical integration use case is described in [I-D.anand-spring-poi-sr]

7. SR Policy State

The SR Policy State is maintained on the headend to represent the state of the policy and its candidate paths. This is to provide an accurate representation of whether the SR Policy is being instantiated in the forwarding plane and which of its candidate paths and segment-list(s) are active. The SR Policy state MUST also

reflect the reason when a policy and/or its candidate path is not active due to validation errors or not being preferred.

The SR Policy state can be reported by the headend node via BGP-LS [I-D.ietf-idr-te-lsp-distribution] or PCEP [RFC8231] and [I-D.sivabalan-pce-binding-label-sid].

SR Policy state on the headend also includes traffic accounting information for the flows being steered via the policies. The details of the SR Policy accounting are beyond the scope of this document and [I-D.ali-spring-sr-traffic-accounting] covers these aspects in the broader context of traffic accounting in a SR network.

Implementations MAY support an administrative state to control locally provisioned policies via mechanisms like CLI or NETCONF.

8. Steering into an SR Policy

A headend can steer a packet flow into a valid SR Policy in various ways:

- o Incoming packets have an active SID matching a local BSID at the headend.
- o Per-destination Steering: incoming packets match a BGP/Service route which recurses on an SR policy.
- o Per-flow Steering: incoming packets match or recurse on a forwarding array of where some of the entries are SR Policies.
- o Policy-based Steering: incoming packets match a routing policy which directs them on an SR policy.

For simplicity of illustration, this document uses the SR-MPLS example.

8.1. Validity of an SR Policy

An SR Policy is invalid when all its candidate paths are invalid.

By default, upon transitioning to the invalid state,

- o an SR Policy and its BSID are removed from the forwarding plane.
- o any steering of a service (PW), destination (BGP-VPN), flow or packet on the related SR policy is disabled and the related service, destination, flow or packet is routed per the classic forwarding table (e.g. longest-match to the destination or the recursing next-hop).

8.2. Drop upon invalid SR Policy

An SR Policy MAY be enabled for the Drop-Upon-Invalid behavior:

- o an invalid SR Policy and its BSID is kept in the forwarding plane with an action to drop.
- o any steering of a service (PW), destination (BGP-VPN), flow or packet on the related SR policy is maintained with the action to drop all of this traffic.

The drop-upon-invalid behavior has been deployed in use-cases where the operator wants some PW to only be transported on a path with specific constraints. When these constraints are no longer met, the operator wants the PW traffic to be dropped. Specifically, the operator does not want the PW to be routed according to the IGP shortest-path to the PW endpoint.

8.3. Incoming Active SID is a BSID

Let us assume that headend H has a valid SR Policy P of SID-List <S1, S2, S3> and BSID B.

When H receives a packet K with label stack <B, L2, L3>, H pops B and pushes <S1, S2, S3> and forwards the resulting packet according to SID S1.

"Forwarding the resulting packet according to S1" means: If S1 is an Adj SID or a PHP-enabled prefix SID advertised by a neighbor, H sends the resulting packet with label stack <S2, S3, L2, L3> on the outgoing interface associated with S1; Else H sends the resulting packet with label stack <S1, S2, S3, L2, L3> along the path of S1.

H has steered the packet in the SR policy P.

H did not have to classify the packet. The classification was done by a node upstream of H (e.g., the source of the packet or an intermediate ingress edge node of the SR domain) and the result of this classification was efficiently encoded in the packet header as a BSID.

This is another key benefit of the segment routing in general and the binding SID in particular: the ability to encode a classification and the resulting steering in the packet header to better scale and simplify intermediate aggregation nodes.

If the SR Policy P is invalid, the BSID B is not in the forwarding plane and hence the packet K is dropped by H.

8.4. Per-Destination Steering

Let us assume that headend H:

- o learns a BGP route R/r via next-hop N, extended-color community C and VPN label V.
- o has a valid SR Policy P to (endpoint = N, color = C) of SID-List <S1, S2, S3> and BSID B.
- o has a BGP policy which matches on the extended-color community C and allows its usage as SLA steering information.

If all these conditions are met, H installs R/r in RIB/FIB with next-hop = SR Policy P of BSID B instead of via N.

Indeed, H's local BGP policy and the received BGP route indicate that the headend should associate R/r with an SR Policy path to N with the SLA associated with color C. The headend therefore installs the BGP route on that policy.

This can be implemented by using the BSID as a generalized next-hop and installing the BGP route on that generalized next-hop.

When H receives a packet K with a destination matching R/r, H pushes the label stack <S1, S2, S3, V> and sends the resulting packet along the path to S1.

Note that any SID associated with the BGP route is inserted after the SID-List of the SR Policy (i.e., <S1, S2, S3, V>).

The same behavior is applicable to any type of service route: any AFI/SAFI of BGP [RFC4760] any AFI/SAFI of LISP [RFC6830].

8.4.1. Multiple Colors

When a BGP route has multiple extended-color communities each with a valid SR Policy NLRI, the BGP process installs the route on the SR policy whose color is of highest numerical value.

Let us assume that headend H:

- o learns a BGP route R/r via next-hop N, extended-color communities C1 and C2 and VPN label V.
- o has a valid SR Policy P1 to (endpoint = N, color = C1) of SID list <S1, S2, S3> and BSID B1.
- o has a valid SR Policy P2 to (endpoint = N, color = C2) of SID list <S4, S5, S6> and BSID B2.
- o has a BGP policy which matches on the extended-color communities C1 and C2 and allows their usage as SLA steering information

If all these conditions are met, H installs R/r in RIB/FIB with next-hop = SR Policy P2 of BSID=B2 (instead of N) because $C2 > C1$.

8.5. Recursion on an on-demand dynamic BSID

In the previous section, it was assumed that H had a pre-established "explicit" SR Policy (endpoint N, color C).

In this section, independently to the a-priori existence of any explicit candidate path of the SR policy (N, C), it is to be noted that the BGP process at headend node H triggers the instantiation of a dynamic candidate path for the SR policy (N, C) as soon as:

- o the BGP process learns of a route R/r via N and with color C.
- o a local policy at node H authorizes the on-demand SR Policy path instantiation and maps the color to a dynamic SR Policy path optimization template.

8.5.1. Multiple Colors

When a BGP route R/r via N has multiple extended-color communities C_i (with $i=1 \dots n$), an individual on-demand SR Policy dynamic path request (endpoint N, color C_i) is triggered for each color C_i .

8.6. Per-Flow Steering

Let us assume that headend H:

- o has a valid SR Policy P1 to (endpoint = N, color = C1) of SID-List $\langle S1, S2, S3 \rangle$ and BSID B1.
- o has a valid SR Policy P2 to (endpoint = N, color = C2) of SID-List $\langle S4, S5, S6 \rangle$ and BSID B2.
- o is configured to instantiate an array of paths to N where the entry 0 is the IGP path to N, color C1 is the first entry and Color C2 is the second entry. The index into the array is called a Forwarding Class (FC). The index can have values 0 to 7.
- o is configured to match flows in its ingress interfaces (upon any field such as Ethernet destination/source/vlan/tos or IP destination/source/DSCP or transport ports etc.) and color them with an internal per-packet forwarding-class variable (0, 1 or 2 in this example).

If all these conditions are met, H installs in RIB/FIB:

- o N via a recursion on an array A (instead of the immediate outgoing link associated with the IGP shortest-path to N).
- o Entry A(0) set to the immediate outgoing link of the IGP shortest-path to N.

- o Entry A(1) set to SR Policy P1 of BSID=B1.
- o Entry A(2) set to SR Policy P2 of BSID=B2.

H receives three packets K, K1 and K2 on its incoming interface. These three packets either longest-match on N or more likely on a BGP/service route which recurses on N. H colors these 3 packets respectively with forwarding-class 0, 1 and 2. As a result:

- o H forwards K along the shortest-path to N (which in SR-MPLS results in the pushing of the prefix-SID of N).
- o H pushes <S1, S2, S3> on packet K1 and forwards the resulting frame along the shortest-path to S1.
- o H pushes <S4, S5, S6> on packet K2 and forwards the resulting frame along the shortest-path to S4.

If the local configuration does not specify any explicit forwarding information for an entry of the array, then this entry is filled with the same information as entry 0 (i.e. the IGP shortest-path).

If the SR Policy mapped to an entry of the array becomes invalid, then this entry is filled with the same information as entry 0. When all the array entries have the same information as entry0, the forwarding entry for N is updated to bypass the array and point directly to its outgoing interface and next-hop.

The array index values (e.g. 0, 1 and 2) and the notion of forwarding-class are implementation specific and only meant to describe the desired behavior. The same can be realized by other mechanisms.

This realizes per-flow steering: different flows bound to the same BGP endpoint are steered on different IGP or SR Policy paths.

8.7. Policy-based Routing

Finally, headend H may be configured with a local routing policy which overrides any BGP/IGP path and steer a specified packet on an SR Policy. This includes the use of mechanisms like IGP Shortcut for automatic routing of IGP prefixes over SR Policies intended for such purpose.

8.8. Optional Steering Modes for BGP Destinations

8.8.1. Color-Only BGP Destination Steering

In the previous section, it is seen that the steering on an SR Policy is governed by the matching of the BGP route's next-hop N and the authorized color C with an SR Policy defined by the tuple (N, C).

This is the most likely form of BGP destination steering and the one recommended for most use-cases.

This section defines an alternative steering mechanism based only on the color.

This color-only steering variation is governed by two new flags "C" and "O" defined in the color extended community [ref draft-ietf-idr-segment-routing-te-policy section 3].

The Color-Only flags "CO" are set to 00 by default.

When 00, the BGP destination is steered as follows:

```
IF there is a valid SR Policy (N, C) where N is the IPv4 or IPv6
    endpoint address and C is a color;
    Steer into SR Policy (N, C);
ELSE;
    Steer on the IGP path to the next-hop N.
```

This is the classic case described in this document previously and what is recommended in most scenarios.

When 01, the BGP destination is steered as follows:

```
IF there is a valid SR Policy (N, C) where N is the IPv4 or IPv6
    endpoint address and C is a color;
    Steer into SR Policy (N, C);
ELSE IF there is a valid SR Policy (null endpoint, C) of the
    same address-family of N;
    Steer into SR Policy (null endpoint, C);
ELSE IF there is any valid SR Policy
    (any address-family null endpoint, C);
    Steer into SR Policy (any null endpoint, C);
ELSE;
    Steer on the IGP path to the next-hop N.
```

When 10, the BGP destination is steered as follows:

```
IF there is a valid SR Policy (N, C) where N is an IPv4 or IPv6
    endpoint address and C is a color;
    Steer into SR Policy (N, C);
ELSE IF there is a valid SR Policy (null endpoint, C)
    of the same address-family of N;
    Steer into SR Policy (null endpoint, C);
ELSE IF there is any valid SR Policy
```

```
(any address-family null endpoint, C);
Steer into SR Policy (any null endpoint, C);
ELSE IF there is any valid SR Policy (any endpoint, C)
of the same address-family of N;
Steer into SR Policy (any endpoint, C);
ELSE IF there is any valid SR Policy
(any address-family endpoint, C);
Steer into SR Policy (any address-family endpoint, C);
ELSE;
Steer on the IGP path to the next-hop N.
```

The null endpoint is 0.0.0.0 for IPv4 and ::0 for IPv6 (all bits set to the 0 value).

The value 11 is reserved for future use and SHOULD NOT be used. Upon reception, an implementations MUST treat it like 00.

8.8.2. Multiple Colors and CO flags

The steering preference is first based on highest color value and then CO-dependent for the color. Assuming a Prefix via (NH, C1(CO=01), C2(CO=01)); C1>C2 The steering preference order is:

- o SR policy (NH, C1).
- o SR policy (null, C1).
- o SR policy (NH, C2).
- o SR policy (null, C2).
- o IGP to NH.

8.8.3. Drop upon Invalid

This document defined earlier that when all the following conditions are met, H installs R/r in RIB/FIB with next-hop = SR Policy P of BSID B instead of via N.

- o H learns a BGP route R/r via next-hop N, extended-color community C and VPN label V.
- o H has a valid SR Policy P to (endpoint = N, color = C) of SID-List <S1, S2, S3> and BSID B.
- o H has a BGP policy which matches on the extended-color community C and allows its usage as SLA steering information.

This behavior is extended by noting that the BGP policy may require the BGP steering to always stay on the SR policy whatever its validity.

This is the "drop upon invalid" option described in section 10.2 applied to BGP-based steering.

9. Protection

9.1. Leveraging TI-LFA local protection of the constituent IGP segments

In any topology, Topology-Independent Loop Free Alternate (TI-LFA) [I-D.bashandy-rtgwg-segment-routing-ti-lfa] provides a 50msec local protection technique for IGP SIDs. The backup path is computed on a per IGP SID basis along the post-convergence path.

In a network that has deployed TI-LFA, an SR Policy built on the basis of TI-LFA protected IGP segments leverages the local protection of the constituent segments.

In a network that has deployed TI-LFA, an SR Policy instantiated only with non-protected Adj SIDs does not benefit from any local protection.

9.2. Using an SR Policy to locally protect a link




Figure 1: Local protection using SR Policy

An SR Policy can be instantiated at node 2 to protect the link 2to6. A typical explicit SID list would be <3, 9, 6>.

A typical use-case occurs for links outside an IGP domain: e.g. 1, 2, 3 and 4 are part of IGP/SR sub-domain 1 while 6, 7, 8 and 9 are part of IGP/SR sub-domain 2. In such a case, links 2to6 and 3to9 cannot benefit from TI-LFA automated local protection.

9.3. Using a Candidate Path for Path Protection

An SR Policy allows for multiple candidate paths, of which at any point in time there is a single active candidate path that is provisioned in the forwarding plane and used for traffic steering. However, another (lower preference) candidate path MAY be designated as the backup for a specific or all (active) candidate path(s). Such a backup candidate path is generally disjoint from the active candidate path.

The headend MAY compute a-priori and validate such backup candidate paths as well as provision them into forwarding plane as backup for the active path. A fast re-route mechanism MAY then be used to

trigger sub 50msec switchover from the active to the backup candidate path in the forwarding plane. Mechanisms like BFD MAY be used for fast detection of such failures.

10. Security Considerations

This document does not define any new protocol extensions and does not impose any additional security challenges.

11. IANA Considerations

This document has no actions for IANA.

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SRv6 Network Programming
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Abstract

This document describes the SRv6 network programming concept and its most basic functions.

Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

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1. Introduction

This document defines the SRv6 network programming concept, its most frequent functions and the related terminology.

This document assumes familiarity with the Segment Routing Header [I-D.ietf-6man-segment-routing-header].

2. Terminology

SRH is the abbreviation for the Segment Routing Header. We assume that the SRH may be present multiple times inside each packet.

NH is the abbreviation of the IPv6 next-header field.

NH=SRH means that the next-header field is 43 with routing type 4.

When there are multiple SRHs, they must follow each other: the next-header field of all SRH except the last one must be SRH.

The effective next-header (ENH) is the next-header field of the IP header when no SRH is present, or is the next-header field of the last SRH.

In this version of the document, we assume that there is no other extension header than the SRH. These will be lifted in future versions of the document.

SID: A Segment Identifier which represents a specific segment in segment routing domain. The SID type used in this document is IPv6 address (also referenced as SRv6 Segment or SRv6 SID).

A SID list is represented as <S1, S2, S3> where S1 is the first SID to visit, S2 is the second SID to visit and S3 is the last SID to visit along the SR path.

(SA,DA) (S3, S2, S1; SL) represents an IPv6 packet with:

- IPv6 header with source and destination addresses respectively SA and DA and next-header is SRH
- SRH with SID list <S1, S2, S3> with SegmentsLeft = SL
- Note the difference between the <> and () symbols: <S1, S2, S3> represents a SID list where S1 is the first SID and S3 is the last SID. (S3, S2, S1; SL) represents the same SID list but encoded in the SRH format where the rightmost SID in the SRH is the first SID and the leftmost SID in the SRH is the last SID. When referring to an SR policy in a high-level use-case, it is simpler to use the <S1, S2, S3> notation. When referring to an illustration of the detailed behavior, the (S3, S2, S1; SL) is more convenient.
- The payload of the packet is omitted.

SRH[SL] represents the SID pointed by the SL field in the first SRH. In our example, SRH[2] represents S1, SRH[1] represents S2 and SRH[0] represents S3.

FIB is the abbreviation for the forwarding table. A FIB lookup is a lookup in the forwarding table. When a packet is intercepted on a wire, it is possible that SRH[SL] is different from the DA.

3. SRv6 Segment

An SRv6 Segment is a 128-bit value. "SID" (abbreviation for Segment Identifier) is often used as a shorter reference for "SRv6 Segment".

An SRv6-capable node N maintains a "My Local SID Table". This table contains all the local SRv6 segments explicitly instantiated at node N. N is the parent node for these SIDs.

A local SID of N can be an IPv6 address associated to a local interface of N but it is not mandatory. Nor is the My Local SID table populated by default with all IPv6 addresses defined on node N.

In most use-cases, a local SID will NOT be an address associated to a local interface of N.

A local SID of N could be routed to N but it does not have to be. Most often, it is routed to N via a shorter-mask prefix.

Let's provide a classic illustration.

Node N is configured with a loopback0 interface address of C1::1/40 originated in its IGP. Node N is configured with two SIDs: C1::100 and C2::101.

The entry C1::1 is not defined explicitly as an SRv6 SID and hence does not appear in the "My Local SID Table". The entries C1::100 and C2::101 are defined explicitly as SRv6 SIDs and hence appear in the "My Local SID Table".

The network learns about a path to C1::/40 via the IGP and hence a packet destined to C1::100 would be routed up to N. The network does not learn about a path to C2::/40 via the IGP and hence a packet destined to C2::101 would not be routed up to N.

A packet could be steered to a non-routed SID C2::101 by using a SID list <...,C1::100,C2::101,...> where the non-routed SID is preceded by a routed SID to the same node. This is similar to the local vs global segments in SR-MPLS.

Every SRv6 local SID instantiated has a specific instruction bound to it. This information is stored in the "My Local SID Table". The "My Local SID Table" has three main purposes:

- Define which local SIDs are explicitly instantiated
- Specify which instruction is bound to each of the instantiated SIDs
- Store the parameters associated with such instruction (i.e. OIF, NextHop,...)

We represent an SRv6 local SID as LOC:FUNCT where LOC is the L most significant bits and FUNCT is the 128-L least significant bits. L is called the locator length and is flexible. Each operator is free to

use the locator length it chooses. Most often the LOC part of the SID is routable and leads to the node which owns that SID.

Often, for simplicity of illustration, we will use a locator length of 64 bits. This is just an example. Implementations must not assume any a priori prefix length.

The FUNCT part of the SID is an opaque identification of a local function bound to the SID. Hence the name SRv6 Local SID.

A function may require additional arguments that would be placed in the rightmost-bits of the 128-bit space. In such case, the SRv6 Local SID will have the form LOC:FUNCT:ARGS.

These arguments may vary on a per-packet basis and may contain information related to the flow, service, or any other information required by the function associated to the SRv6 Local SID.

For to this reason, the "My Local SID Table" matches on a per longest-prefix-match basis.

A node may receive a packet with an SRv6 SID in the DA without an SRH. In such case the packet should still be processed by the Segment Routing engine.

4. Functions associated with a Local SID

Each entry of the "My Local SID Table" indicates the function associated with the local SID.

We define hereafter a set of well-known functions that can be associated with a SID.

End	Endpoint function The SRv6 instantiation of a prefix SID
End.X	Endpoint function with Layer-3 cross-connect The SRv6 instantiation of a Adj SID
End.T	Endpoint function with specific IPv6 table lookup
End.DX2	Endpoint with decapsulation and Layer-2 cross-connect L2VPN use-case
End.DX6	Endpoint with decapsulation and IPv6 cross-connect IPv6 L3VPN use (equivalent of a per-CE VPN label)
End.DX4	Endpoint with decapsulation and IPv4 cross-connect IPv4 L3VPN use (equivalent of a per-CE VPN label)
End.DT6	Endpoint with decapsulation and IPv6 table lookup IPv6 L3VPN use (equivalent of a per-VRF VPN label)
End.DT4	Endpoint with decapsulation and IPv4 table lookup IPv4 L3VPN use (equivalent of a per-VRF VPN label)
End.B6	Endpoint bound to an SRv6 policy SRv6 instantiation of a Binding SID
End.B6.Encaps	Endpoint bound to an SRv6 encapsulation Policy SRv6 instantiation of a Binding SID
End.BM	Endpoint bound to an SR-MPLS Policy SRv6/SR-MPLS instantiation of a Binding SID
End.S	Endpoint in search of a target in table T
End.AS	Endpoint to SR-unaware APP via static proxy
End.AM	Endpoint to SR-unaware APP via masquerading

The list is not exhaustive. In practice, any function can be attached to a local SID: e.g. a node N can bind a SID to a local VM or container which can apply any complex function on the packet.

We call N the node who has an explicitly defined local SID S and we detail the function that N binds to S.

At the end of this section we also present some flavours of these well-known functions.

4.1. End: Endpoint

The Endpoint function ("End" for short) is the most basic function.

When N receives a packet whose IPv6 DA is S and S is a local End SID, N does:

1. IF NH=SRH and SL > 0
2. decrement SL
3. update the IPv6 DA with SRH[SL]
4. FIB lookup on updated DA ; ; Ref1
5. forward accordingly to the matched entry ; ; Ref2
6. ELSE
7. drop the packet ; ; Ref3

Ref1: The End function performs the FIB lookup in the forwarding table associated to the ingress interface

Ref2: If the FIB lookup matches a multicast state, then the related RPF check must be considered successful

Ref3: a local SID could be bound to a function which authorizes the decapsulation of an outer header (e.g. IPinIP) or the punting of the packet to TCP, UDP or any other protocol. This however needs to be explicitly defined in the function bound to the local SID. By default, a local SID bound to the well-known function "End" only allows the punting to OAM protocols and neither allows the decapsulation of an outer header nor the cleanup of an SRH. As a consequence, an End SID cannot be the last SID of an SRH and cannot be the DA of a packet without SRH.

This is the SRv6 instantiation of a Prefix SID [I-D.ietf-spring-segment-routing].

4.2. End.X: Endpoint with Layer-3 cross-connect

The "Endpoint with cross-connect to an array of layer-3 adjacencies" function (End.X for short) is a variant of the End function.

When N receives a packet destined to S and S is a local End.X SID, N does:

1. IF NH = SRH and SL > 0
2. decrement SL
3. update the IPv6 DA with SRH[SL]
4. forward to layer-3 adjacency bound to the SID S ; ; Ref1
5. ELSE
6. drop the packet ; ; Ref2

Ref1: If an array of adjacencies is bound to the End.X SID, then one entry of the array is selected based on a hash of the packet's header.

Ref2: An End.X function only allows punting to OAM and does not allow decaps. An End.X SID cannot be the last SID of an SRH and cannot be the DA of a packet without SRH.

The End.X function is required to express any traffic-engineering policy.

This is the SRv6 instantiation of an Adjacency SID [I-D.ietf-spring-segment-routing].

If a node N has 30 outgoing interfaces to 30 neighbors, usually the operator would explicitly instantiate 30 End.X SIDs at N: one per layer-3 adjacency to a neighbor. Potentially, more End.X could be explicitly defined (groups of layer-3 adjacencies to the same neighbor or to different neighbors).

Note that with SR-MPLS, an AdjSID is typically preceded by a PrefixSID. This is unlikely in SRv6 as most likely an End.X SID is globally routed to N.

Note that if N has an outgoing interface bundle I to a neighbor Q made of 10 member links, N may allocate up to 11 End.X local SIDs for that bundle: one for the bundle itself and then up to one for each member link. This is the equivalent of the L2-Link Adj SID in SR-MPLS [I-D.ietf-isis-l2bundles].

4.3. End.T: Endpoint with specific IPv6 table lookup

The "Endpoint with specific IPv6 table lookup" function (End.T for short) is a variant of the End function.

When N receives a packet destined to S and S is a local End.T SID, N does:

1. IF NH=SRH and SL > 0 ;; Ref1
2. lookup the next segment in IPv6 table T associated with the SID
3. forward via the matched table entry
4. ELSE
5. drop the packet

Ref1: The End.T SID must not be the last SID

The End.T is used for multi-table operation in the core.

4.4. End.DX2: Endpoint with decapsulation and Layer-2 cross-connect

The "Endpoint with decapsulation and Layer-2 cross-connect to OIF" function (End.DX2 for short) is a variant of the endpoint function.

When N receives a packet destined to S and S is a local End.DX2 SID, N does:

1. IF NH=SRH and SL > 0
2. drop the packet ;; Ref1
3. ELSE IF ENH = 59 ;; Ref2
4. pop the (outer) IPv6 header and its extension headers
5. forward the resulting frame via OIF associated to the SID
6. ELSE
7. drop the packet

Ref1: An End.DX2 SID must always be the last SID, or it can be the Destination Address of an IPv6 packet with no SRH header.

Ref2: We conveniently reuse the next-header value 59 allocated to IPv6 No Next Header [RFC2460]. When the SID is of function End.DX2 and the Next-Header=59, we know that an Ethernet frame is in the payload without any further header.

An End.DX2 function could be customized to expect a specific VLAN format and rewrite the egress VLAN header before forwarding on the outgoing interface.

The End.DX2 is used for L2VPN use-cases.

4.5. End.DX6: Endpoint with decapsulation and IPv6 cross-connect

The "Endpoint with decapsulation and cross-connect to an array of IPv6 adjacencies" function (End.DX6 for short) is a variant of the End and End.X functions.

When N receives a packet destined to S and S is a local End.DX6 SID, N does:

1. IF NH=SRH and SL > 0
2. drop the packet ;; Ref1
3. ELSE IF ENH = 41 ;; Ref2
4. pop the (outer) IPv6 header and its extension headers
5. forward to layer-3 adjacency bound to the SID S ;; Ref3
6. ELSE
7. drop the packet

Ref1: The End.DX6 SID must always be the last SID, or it can be the Destination Address of an IPv6 packet with no SRH header.

Ref2: 41 refers to IPv6 encapsulation as defined by IANA allocation for Internet Protocol Numbers

Ref3: Selected based on a hash of the packet's header (at least SA, DA, Flow Label)

The End.DX6 is used for L3VPN use-cases where a FIB lookup in a specific tenant table at the egress PE is not required. This would be equivalent to the per-CE VPN label in MPLS[RFC4364].

4.6. End.DX4: Endpoint with decapsulation and IPv4 cross-connect

The "Endpoint with decapsulation and cross-connect to an array of IPv4 adjacencies" function (End.DX4 for short) is a variant of the End and End.X functions.

When N receives a packet destined to S and S is a local End.DX4 SID, N does:

1. IF NH=SRH and SL > 0
2. drop the packet ;; Ref1
3. ELSE IF ENH = 4 ;; Ref2
4. pop the (outer) IPv6 header and its extension headers
5. forward to layer-3 adjacency bound to the SID S ;; Ref3
6. ELSE
7. drop the packet

Ref1: The End.DX6 SID must always be the last SID, or it can be the Destination Address of an IPv6 packet with no SRH header.

Ref2: 4 refers to IPv4 encapsulation as defined by IANA allocation for Internet Protocol Numbers

Ref3: Selected based on a hash of the packet's header (at least SA, DA, Flow Label)

The End.DX4 is used for L3VPN use-cases where a FIB lookup in a specific tenant table at the egress PE is not required. This would be equivalent to the per-CE VPN label in MPLS[RFC4364].

4.7. End.DT6: Endpoint with decapsulation and specific IPv6 table lookup

The "Endpoint with decapsulation and specific IPv6 table lookup" function (End.DT6 for short) is a variant of the End function.

When N receives a packet destined to S and S is a local End.DT6 SID, N does:

1. IF NH=SRH and SL > 0
2. drop the packet ;; Ref1
3. ELSE IF ENH = 41 ;; Ref2
4. pop the (outer) IPv6 header and its extension headers
5. lookup the exposed inner IPv6 DA in IPv6 table T
6. forward via the matched table entry
7. ELSE
8. drop the packet

Ref1: the End.DT6 SID must always be the last SID, or it can be the Destination Address of an IPv6 packet with no SRH header.

Ref2: 41 refers to IPv6 encapsulation as defined by IANA allocation for Internet Protocol Numbers

The End.DT6 is used for L3VPN use-cases where a FIB lookup in a specific tenant table at the egress PE is required. This would be equivalent to the per-VRF VPN label in MPLS[RFC4364].

Note that an End.DT6 may be defined for the main IPv6 table in which case End.DT6 supports the equivalent of an IPv6inIPv6 decaps (without VPN/tenant implication).

4.8. End.DT4: Endpoint with decapsulation and specific IPv4 table lookup

The "Endpoint with decapsulation and specific IPv4 table lookup" function (End.DT4 for short) is a variant of the End function.

When N receives a packet destined to S and S is a local End.DT4 SID, N does:


```
1.  IF NH=SRH and SL > 0
2.      drop the packet                                ;; Ref1
3.  ELSE IF ENH = 4                                    ;; Ref2
4.      pop the (outer) IPv6 header and its extension headers
5.      lookup the exposed inner IPv4 DA in IPv4 table T
6.      forward via the matched table entry
7.  ELSE
8.      drop the packet
```

Ref1: the End.DT4 SID must always be the last SID, or it can be the Destination Address of an IPv6 packet with no SRH header.

Ref2: 4 refers to IPv4 encapsulation as defined by IANA allocation for Internet Protocol Numbers

The End.DT4 is used for L3VPN use-cases where a FIB lookup in a specific tenant table at the egress PE is required. This would be equivalent to the per-VRF VPN label in MPLS[RFC4364].

4.9. End.B6: Endpoint bound to an SRv6 policy

The "Endpoint bound to an SRv6 Policy" is a variant of the End function.

When N receives a packet destined to S and S is a local End.B6 SID, N does:

```
1.  IF NH=SRH and SL > 0                                ;; Ref1
2.      do not decrement SL nor update the IPv6 DA with SRH[SL]
3.      insert a new SRH                                ;; Ref2
4.      set the IPv6 DA to the first segment of the SRv6 Policy
5.      forward according to the first segment of the SRv6 Policy
6.  ELSE
7.      drop the packet
```

Ref1: An End.B6 SID, by definition, is never the last SID.

Ref2: In case that an SRH already exists, the new SRH is inserted in between the IPv6 header and the received SRH

Note: Instead of the term "insert", "push" may also be used.

The End.B6 function is required to express scalable traffic-engineering policies across multiple domains. This is the SRv6 instantiation of a Binding SID [I-D.ietf-spring-segment-routing].

4.10. End.B6.Encaps: Endpoint bound to an SRv6 encapsulation policy

This is a variation of the End.B6 behavior where the SRv6 Policy also includes an IPv6 Source Address A.

When N receives a packet destined to S and S is a local End.B6.Encaps SID, N does:

1. IF NH=SRH and SL > 0
2. decrement SL and update the IPv6 DA with SRH[SL]
3. push an outer IPv6 header with its own SRH
4. set the outer IPv6 SA to A
5. set the outer IPv6 DA to the first segment of the SRv6 Policy
6. forward according to the first segment of the SRv6 Policy
7. ELSE
8. drop the packet

Instead of simply inserting an SRH with the policy (End.B6), this behavior also adds an outer IPv6 header. The source address defined for the outer header does not have to be a local SID of the node.

4.11. End.BM: Endpoint bound to an SR-MPLS policy

The "Endpoint bound to an SR-MPLS Policy" is a variant of the End.B6 function.

When N receives a packet destined to S and S is a local End.BM SID, N does:

1. IF NH=SRH and SL > 0 ;; Ref1
2. decrement SL and update the IPv6 DA with SRH[SL]
3. push an MPLS label stack <L1, L2, L3> on the received packet
4. forward according to L1
5. ELSE
6. drop the packet

Ref1: an End.BM SID, by definition, is never the last SID.

The End.BM function is required to express scalable traffic-engineering policies across multiple domains where some domains support the MPLS instantiation of Segment Routing.

This is an SRv6/SR-MPLS instantiation of a Binding SID [I-D.ietf-spring-segment-routing].

4.12. End.S: Endpoint in search of a target in table T

The "Endpoint in search of a target in Table T" function (End.S for short) is a variant of the End function.

When N receives a packet destined to S and S is a local End.S SID, N does:

1. IF NH=SRH and SL = 0 ;; Ref1
2. drop the packet
3. ELSE IF match(last SID) in specified table T
4. forward accordingly
5. ELSE
6. apply the End behavior

Ref1: By definition, an End.S SID cannot be the last SID, as the last SID is the targeted object.

The End.S function is required in information-centric networking (ICN) use-cases where the last SID in the SRv6 SID list represents a targeted object. If the identification of the object would require more than 128 bits, then obvious customization of the End.S function may either use multiple SIDs or a TLV of the SR header to encode the searched object ID.

4.13. End.AS: Endpoint to SR-unaware APP via static proxy

The "Endpoint to SR-unaware App via Static PROXY" (End.AS for short) is a variant of the End function.

When N receives a packet destined to S and S is a local End.AS SID, it does:

1. IF ENH=4 or ENH=41 ;; Ref1
2. remove the (outer) IPv6 header and its extension headers
3. forward via the interface associated with the LocalSID ;; Ref2
4. ELSE
5. drop the packet

Ref1: 4 and 41 refer to IPv4 encapsulation and IPv6 encapsulation respectively as defined by IANA allocation for Internet Protocol Numbers

Ref2: An SR-unaware app resides in a VM, container or appliance behind this interface. We always assume that the packet that needs to be processed by the app is encapsulated in an outer IPv6 header with its SRH.

The End.AS supports service chaining through SR-unaware application.

When an End.AS SID is locally instantiated at N, it is assumed that the End.AS SID is associated with two interfaces, referred to as target and source interfaces, and an egress SRH. The target interface is the one described above. The source interface is used to recognize the packets coming back from the VM, container or appliance and is associated with an egress SRH. N encapsulates these packets in an outer IPv6 header with the configured egress SRH.

In this scenario, there are no restrictions on the operations that can be performed by the SR-unaware app on the stream of packets. The app can operate at all protocol layers (e.g. it can also terminate transport layer connections); the app can also generate new packets and initiate transport layer connections.

Note that it is possible that the target and source interfaces coincide, (i.e. a single interface can be used to send and receive packets to/from the VM, container or appliance). In this case, the VM, container or appliance can be inserted only in one "unidirectional" chain.

4.14. End.AM: Endpoint to SR-unaware APP via masquerading

The "Endpoint to SR-unaware App via Masquerading" (End.AM for short) is a variant of the End function.

When N receives a packet destined to S and S is a local End.AM SID, it does:

1. IF NR=SRH & SL > 0 ;; Ref1
2. decrement SL
3. write the last SID in the IPv6 DA
4. forward via the interface associated with the LocalSID ;; Ref2
5. ELSE
6. drop the packet

Ref1: An End.AM must not be the last SID.

Ref2: An SR-unaware VNF resides behind this interface

The End.AM supports service chaining through SR-unaware application.

We "masquerade" the packet for two reasons:

- 1.- We want the app to receive a packet with the source and destination addresses respectively set as the true source and the final destination.

- 2.- We do not want the app to support/read the SRH. We leverage [RFC2460] which specifies that a transit node does not need to process an IPv6 routing extension header.

When an End.AM SID is locally instantiated at N, it is assumed that two interfaces are associated with the SID, referred to as target and source. The target interface is the one described above. The source interface identifies the packets coming back from the app. N is set to always inspect the SRH of the packets coming from the source interface and set their DA = SRH[SL] (to "de-masquerade" the SRH header).

In this scenario, we assume that the app residing in the VM, container or appliance can only inspect the packets, drop the packets, perform limited changes to the packet (in particular, the app must not change the IP Destination Address of the packet). The app cannot terminate a transport connection nor generate arbitrary packets. For example Firewalls, Intrusion Detection Systems, Deep Packet Inspectors are among the app classes that can be supported in this scenario.

4.15. SR-aware application

Generally, any SR-aware application can be bound to an SRv6 SID. This application could represent anything from a small piece of code focused on topological/tenant function to a much larger process focusing on higher-level applications (e.g. video compression, transcoding etc.).

The ways in which an SR-aware application can binds itself on a local SID depends on the operating system. Let us consider an SR-aware application running on a Linux operating system. A possible approach is to associate an SRv6 SID to a target (virtual) interface, so that packets with IP DA corresponding to the SID will be sent to the target interface. In this approach, the SR-aware application can simply listen to all packets received on the interface.

A different approach for the SR-aware app is to listen to packets received with a specific SRv6 SID as IPv6 DA on a given transport port (i.e. corresponding to a TCP or UDP socket). In this case, the app can read the SRH information with a `getsockopt` Linux system call and can set the SRH information to be added to the outgoing packets with a `setsockopt` system call.

4.16. Flavours

We present the PSP and USP variants of the functions End, End.X and End.T. For each of these functions these variants can be enabled or disabled either individually or together.

4.16.1. PSP: penultimate segment POP of the SRH

After the instruction 'update the IPv6 DA with SRH[SL]' is executed, the following instructions must be added:

1. IF updated SL = 0 & PSP is TRUE
2. pop the top SRH ;; Ref1

Ref1: The received SRH had SL=1. When the last SID is written in the DA, the End, End.X and End.T functions with the PSP flavour pop the first (top-most) SRH. Subsequent stacked SRH's may be present but are not processed as part of the function.

4.16.2. USP: Ultimate Segment Pop of the SRH

We insert at the beginning of the pseudo-code the following instructions:

1. IF SL = 0 & NH=SRH & USP=TRUE ;; Ref1
2. pop the top SRH
3. restart the function processing on the modified packet ;; Ref2

Ref1: The next header is an SRH header

Ref2: Typically SL of the exposed SRH is > 0 and hence the restarting of the complete function would lead to decrement SL, update the IPv6 DA with SRH[SL], FIB lookup on updated DA and forward accordingly to the matched entry.

5. Transit behaviors

We define hereafter the set of basic transit behaviors.

T	Transit behavior
T.Insert	Transit behavior with insertion of an SRv6 Policy
T.Encaps	Transit behavior with encapsulation in an SRv6 policy
T.Encaps.L2	T.Encaps behavior of the received L2 frame

This list can be expanded in case any new functionality requires it.

5.1. T: Transit behavior

As per [RFC2460], if a node N receives a packet (A, S2)(S3, S2, S1; SL=2) and S2 is neither a local address nor a local SID of N then N forwards the packet without inspecting the SRH.

This means that N treats the following two packets with the same performance:

- (A, S2)
- (A, S2)(S3, S2, S1; SL=2)

A transit node does not need to count by default the amount of transit traffic with an SRH extension header. This accounting might be enabled as an optional behavior leveraging SEC4 behavior described later in this document. Section 7.4

A transit node MUST include the outer flow label in its ECMP hash[RFC6437].

5.2. T.Insert: Transit with insertion of an SRv6 Policy

Node N receives two packets P1=(A, B2) and P2=(A,B2)(B3, B2, B1; SL=1). B2 is neither a local address nor SID of N.

N steers the transit packets P1 and P2 into an SRv6 Policy with one SID list <S1, S2, S3>.

The "T.Insert" transit insertion behavior is defined as follows:

1. insert the SRH (B2, S3, S2, S1; SL=3) ;; Refl, Reflbis
2. set the IPv6 DA = S1
3. forward along the shortest path to S1

Refl: The received IPv6 DA is placed as last SID of the inserted SRH.

Reflbis: The SRH is inserted before any other IPv6 Routing Extension Header.

After the T.Insert behavior, P1 and P2 respectively look like:

- (A, S1) (B2, S3, S2, S1; SL=3)
- (A, S1) (B2, S3, S2, S1; SL=3) (B3, B2, B1; SL=1)

5.3. T.Encaps: Transit with encapsulation in an SRv6 Policy

Node N receives two packets P1=(A, B2) and P2=(A,B2)(B3, B2, B1; SL=1). B2 is neither a local address nor SID of N.

N steers the transit packets P1 and P2 into an SR Encapsulation Policy with a Source Address A and a Segment list <S1, S2, S3>.

The T.Encaps transit encapsulation behavior is defined as follows:

1. push an IPv6 header with its own SRH (S3, S2, S1; SL=2)
2. set outer IPv6 SA = N and outer IPv6 DA = S1
3. set outer payload length, traffic class and flow label ;; Ref 1
4. update the next_header value ;; Ref 1
5. decrement inner Hop Limit or TTL ;; Ref 1
6. forward along the shortest path to S1

After the T.Encaps behavior, P1 and P2 respectively look like:

- (T, S1) (S3, S2, S1; SL=2) (A, B2)
- (T, S1) (S3, S2, S1; SL=2) (A, B2) (B3, B2, B1; SL=1)

The T.Encaps behavior is valid for any kind of Layer-3 traffic. This behavior is commonly used for L3VPN with IPv4 and IPv6 deployments.

The SRH MAY be omitted when the SRv6 Policy only contains one segment and there is no need to use any flag, tag or TLV.

Ref 1: As described in [RFC2473] (Generic Packet Tunneling in IPv6 Specification)

5.4. T.Encaps.L2: Transit with encapsulation of L2 frames

While T.Encaps encapsulates the received IP packet, T.Encaps.L2 encapsulates the received L2 frame (i.e. the received ethernet header and its optional VLAN header is in the payload of the outer packet).

If the outer header is pushed without SRH then the DA must be a SID of type End.DX2 and the next-header must be 59 (IPv6 NoNextHeader). The received Ethernet frame follows the IPv6 header and its extension headers.

Else, if the outer header is pushed with an SRH, then the last SID of the SRH must be of type End.DX2 and the next-header of the SRH must be 59 (IPv6 NoNextHeader). The received Ethernet frame follows the IPv6 header and its extension headers.

6. Operation

6.1. Counters

Any SRv6 capable node MUST implement the following set of combined counters (packets and bytes):

- Per entry of the "My Local SID Table":
 - Traffic that matched that SID and was processed correctly
 - Traffic that matched that SID and was NOT processed correctly
- Per SRv6 Policy:
 - Traffic steered into it and processed correctly
 - Traffic steered into it and NOT processed correctly

Furthermore, an SRv6 capable node maintains an aggregate counter tracking the IPv6 traffic that was received with a destination address matching a local interface address that is not a local SID and the next-header is SRH. We remind that this traffic is dropped as an interface address is not a local SID by default. A SID must be explicitly instantiated.

6.2. Flow-based hash computation

When a flow-based selection within a set needs to be performed, the source address, the destination address and the flow-label MUST be included in the flow-based hash.

This occurs when the destination address is updated and a FIB lookup is performed and multiple ECMP paths exist to the updated destination address.

This occurs when End.X is bound to an array of adjacencies.

This occurs when the packet is steered in an SR policy whose selected path has multiple SID lists
[I-D.filsfils-spring-segment-routing-policy].

7. Basic security for intra-domain deployment

We use the following terminology:

An internal node is a node part of the domain of trust.

A border router is an internal node at the edge of the domain of trust.

An external interface is an interface of a border router towards another domain.

An internal interface is an interface entirely within the domain of trust.

The internal address space is the IP address block dedicated to internal interfaces.

An internal SID is a SID instantiated on an internal node.

The internal SID space is the IP address block dedicated to internal SIDs.

External traffic is traffic received from an external interface to the domain of trust.

Internal traffic is traffic that originates and ends within the domain of trust.

The purpose of this section is to document how a domain of trust can operate SRv6-based services for internal traffic while preventing any external traffic from accessing the internal SRv6-based services.

It is expected that future documents will detail enhanced security mechanisms for SRv6 (e.g. how to allow external traffic to leverage internal SRv6 services).

7.1. SEC 1

An SRv6 router MUST support an ACL on the external interface that drops any traffic with SA or DA in the internal SID space.

A provider would generally do this for its internal address space to prevent access to internal addresses and in order to prevent spoofing. The technique is extended to the local SID space.

The typical counters of an ACL are expected.

7.2. SEC 2

An SRv6 router MUST support an ACL with the following behavior:

1. IF (DA == LocalSID) && (SA != internal address or SID space)
2. drop

This prevents access to local SIDs from outside the operator's infrastructure. Note that this ACL may not be enabled in all cases. For example, specific SIDs can be used to provide resources to devices that are outside of the operator's infrastructure.

When an SID is in the form of LOC:FUNCT:ARGS the DA match should be implemented as a prefix match covering the argument space of the specific SID i.s.o. a host route.

The typical counters of an ACL are expected.

7.3. SEC 3

As per the End definition, an SRv6 router MUST only implement the End behavior on a local IPv6 address if that address has been explicitly enabled as a segment.

This address may or may not be associated with an interface. This address may or may not be routed. The only thing that matters is that the local SID must be explicitly instantiated and explicitly bound to a function (the default function is the End function).

7.4. SEC 4

An SRv6 router should support Unicast-RPF on source address on external interface.

This is a generic provider technique applied to the internal address space. It is extended to the internal SID space.

The typical counters to validate such filtering are expected.

8. Control Plane

In an SDN environment, one expects the controller to explicitly provision the SIDs and/or discover them as part of a service discovery function. Applications residing on top of the controller could then discover the required SIDs and combine them to form a distributed network program.

The concept of "SRv6 network programming" refers to the capability for an application to encode any complex program as a set of individual functions distributed through the network. Some functions relate to underlay SLA others to overlay/tenant, others to complex applications residing in VM and containers.

The specification of the SRv6 control-plane is outside the scope of this document.

We limit ourselves to a few important observations.

8.1. IGP

The End and End.X SIDs express topological functions and hence are expected to be signaled in the IGP together with the flavours PSP and USP.

The presence of SIDs in the IGP do not imply any routing semantics to the addresses represented by these SIDs. The routing reachability to an IPv6 address is solely governed by the classic, non-SID-related, IGP information. Routing is not governed neither influenced in any way by a SID advertisement in the IGP.

These two SIDs provide important topological functions for the IGP to build FRR/TI-LFA solution and for TE processes relying on IGP LSDB to build SR policies.

8.2. BGP-LS

BGP-LS is expected to be the key service discovery protocol. Every node is expected to advertise via BGP-LS its SRv6 capabilities (e.g. how many SIDs in can insert as part of an T.Insert behavior) and any locally instantiated SID[I-D.ietf-idr-bgp-ls-segment-routing-ext][I-D.ietf-idr-te-lsp-distribution].

8.3. BGP IP/VPN

The End.DX46, End.DT46 and End.DX2 SIDs are expected to be signaled in BGP.

8.4. Summary

The following table summarizes which SID would be signaled in which signaling protocol.

	IGP	BGP-LS	BGP IP/VPN
End (PSP, USP)	X	X	
End.X (PSP, USP)	X	X	
End.T (PSP, USP)	X	X	
End.DX2		X	X
End.DX6		X	X
End.DX4		X	X
End.DT6		X	X
End.DT4		X	X
End.B6		X	
End.B6.Encaps		X	
End.B6.BM		X	
End.S		X	
End.AS		X	
End.AM		X	

Table 1: SRv6 LocalSID signaling

The following table summarizes which transit capability would be signaled in which signaling protocol.

	IGP	BGP-LS	BGP IP/VPN
T		X	
T.Insert		X	
T.Encaps		X	
T.Encaps.L2		X	

Table 2: SRv6 transit behaviors signaling

The previous table describes generic capabilities. It does not describe specific instantiated SID.

For example, a BGP-LS advertisement of the T capability of node N would indicate that node N supports the basic transit behavior. The T.Insert behavior would describe the capability of node N to instantiate a T.Insert behavior, specifically it would describe how many SIDs could be inserted by N without significant performance degradation. Same for T.Encaps (the number potentially lower as the overhead of the additional outer IP header is accounted).

The reader should also remember that any specific instantiated SR policy (via T.Insert or T.Encaps) is always assigned a Binding SID. He should remember that BSIDs are advertised in BGP-LS as shown in Table 1. Hence, it is normal that Table 2 only focuses on the generic capabilities related to T.Insert and T.Encaps as Table 1 advertises the specific instantiated BSID properties.

9. Illustration

We introduce a simplified SID allocation technique to ease the reading of the text. We document the reference diagram. We then illustrate the network programming concept through different use-cases. These use-cases have been thought to allow straightforward combination between each other.

9.1. Simplified SID allocation

To simplify the illustration, we assume:

A::/4 is dedicated to the internal SRv6 SID space

B::/4 is dedicated to the internal address space

We assume a location expressed in 48 bits and a function expressed in 80 bits

Node k has a classic IPv6 loopback address Bk::/128 which is advertised in the IGP

Node k has Ak::/48 for its local SID space. Its SIDs will be explicitly allocated from that block

Node k advertises Ak::/48 in its IGP

Function 0:0:0:0:0 (function 0, for short) represents the End function

Function 0:0:0:0:C2 (function C2, for short) represents the End.X function towards neighbor 2

Function 0:0:0:0:E100 (function E100, for short) represents the End.T function in tenant table 100

Each node K has:

An explicit SID instantiation Ak::0/128 bound to an End function with additional support for PSP and USP

An explicit SID instantiation `Ak::Cj/128` bound to an `End.X` function to neighbor `J` with additional support for PSP and USP

9.2. Reference diagram

Let us assume the following topology where all the links have IGP metric 10 except the link 23 which is 100.

Nodes A, 1 to 8 and B are considered within the network domain while nodes CE-A and CE-B are outside the domain.




Figure 1: Reference topology

9.3. Basic security

Any edge node such as 1 would be configured with an ACL on any of its external interface (e.g. from CE-A) which drops any traffic with SA or DA in `A::/4`. See SEC 1 (Section 7.1).

Any core node such as 6 could be configured with an ACL with the SEC2 (Section 7.2) behavior "IF (DA == LocalSID) && (SA is not in A::/4 or B::/4) THEN drop".

SEC 3 (Section 7.3) protection is a default property of SRv6. A SID must be explicitly instantiated. In our illustration, the only available SIDs are those explicitly instantiated.

Any edge node such as 1 would be configured with Unicast-RPF on source address on external interface (e.g. from CE-A). See SEC 4 (Section 7.4).

9.4. SR-IPVPN

Let us illustrate the SR-IPVPN use-case applied to IPv4.

Nodes 1 and 8 are configured with a tenant 100, each respectively connected to CE-A and CE-B.

Node 8 is configured with a local SID A8::E100 of function End.DT4(100) bound to tenant IPv4 table 100.

Via BGP signaling or an SDN-based controller, Node 1's tenant-100 IPv4 table is programmed with an IPv4 SR-VPN route 20/8 via SRv6 policy <A8::E100>.

When 1 receives a packet P from CE-A destined to 20.20.20.20, P looks up its tenant-100 IPv4 table and finds an SR-VPN entry 20/8 via SRv6 policy <A8::E100>. As a consequence, 1 pushes an outer IPv6 header with SA=A1::0, DA=A8::E100 and NH=4. 1 then forwards the resulting packet on the shortest path to A8::/40.

When 8 receives the packet, 8 matches the DA in its My LocalSID table, finds the bound function End.DT4(100) and confirms NH=4. As a result, 8 decaps the outer header, looks up the inner IPv4 DA in tenant-100 IPv4 table, and forward the (inner) IPv4 packet towards CE-B.

The reader can easily infer all the other SR-IPVPN IP instantiations:

Route at ingress PE(1)	SR-VPN Egress SID of egress PE(8)
IPv4 tenant route with egress tenant table lookup	End.DT4 function bound to IPv4-tenant-100 table
IPv4 tenant route without egress tenant table lookup	End.DX4 function bound to CE-B (IPv4)
IPv6 tenant route with egress tenant table lookup	End.DT6 function bound to IPv6-tenant-100 table
IPv6 tenant route without egress tenant table lookup	End.DX6 function bound to CE-B (IPv6)

9.5. SR-Ethernet-VPWS

Let us illustrate the SR-Ethernet-VPWS use-case.

Node 1 is configured with an ethernet VPWS service:

- Local attachment circuit: Ethernet interface from CE-A
- Local End.DX2 bound to the local attachment circuit: A1::C2A
- Remote End.DX2 SID: A8::C2B

Node 8 is configured with an ethernet VPWS service:

- Local attachment circuit: Ethernet interface from CE-B
- Local End.DX2 bound to the local attachment circuit: A8::C2B
- Remote End.DX2 SID: A1::C2A

These configurations can either be programmed by an SDN controller or partially derived from a BGP-based signaling and discovery service .

When 1 receives a packet P from CE-A, 1 pushes an outer IPv6 header with SA=A1::0, DA=A8::C2B and NH=59. Note that no additional header is pushed. 1 then forwards the resulting packet on the shortest path to A8::/40.

When 8 receives the packet, 8 matches the DA in its My LocalSID table and finds the bound function End.DX2. After confirming that the next-header=59, 8 decaps the outer IPv6 header and forwards the inner Ethernet frame towards CE-B.

The reader can easily infer the Ethernet multipoint use-case:

Route at ingress PE(1)	SR-VPN Egress SID of egress PE(8)
Ethernet VPWS	End.DX2 function bound to CE-B (Ethernet)

9.6. SR TE for Underlay SLA

9.6.1. SR policy from the Ingress PE

Let's assume that node 1's tenant-100 IPv4 route "20/8 via A8::E100" is programmed with a color/community that requires low-latency underlay optimization [I-D.filsfils-spring-segment-routing-policy].

In such case, node 1 either computes the low-latency path to the egress node itself or delegates the computation to a PCE.

In either case, the location of the egress PE can easily be found by looking for who originates the SID block comprising the SID A8::E100. This can be found in the IGP's LSDB for a single domain case, and in the BGP-LS LSDB for a multi-domain case.

Let us assume that the TE metric encodes the per-link propagation latency. Let us assume that all the links have a TE metric of 10, except link 27 which has TE metric 100.

The low-latency path from 1 to 8 is thus 1245678.

This path is encoded in a SID list as: first a hop through A4::C5 and then a hop to 8.

As a consequence the SR-VPN entry 20/8 installed in the Node1's Tenant-100 IPv4 table is: T.Encaps with SRv6 Policy <A4::C5, A8::E100>.

When 1 receives a packet P from CE-A destined to 20.20.20.20, P looks up its tenant-100 IPv4 table and finds an SR-VPN entry 20/8. As a consequence, 1 pushes an outer header with SA=A1::0, A4::C5, NH=SRH followed by SRH (A8::E100, A4::C5; SL=1; NH=4) . 1 then forwards the resulting packet on the interface to 2.

2 forwards to 4 along the path to A4::/40.

When 4 receives the packet, 4 matches the DA in its My LocalSID table and finds the bound function End.X to neighbor 5. 4 notes the PSP capability of the SID A4::C5. 4 sets the DA to the next SID A8::E100. As 4 is the penultimate segment hop, it performs PSP and pops the SRH. 4 forwards the resulting packet to 5.

5, 6 and 7 forwards along the path to A8::/40.

When 8 receives the packet, 8 matches the DA in its My LocalSID Table and finds the bound function End.DT(100). As a result, 8 decaps the outer header, looks up the inner IPv4 DA in tenant-100 IPv4 table, and forward the (inner) IPv4 packet towards CE-B.

9.6.2. SR policy at a midpoint

Let us analyze a policy applied at a midpoint on a packet without SRH.

Packet P1 is (A1::, A8::E100).

Let us consider P1 when it is received by node 2 and let us assume that that node 2 is configured to steer A8::/40 in a transit behavior T.Insert associated with SR policy <A4::C5>.

In such a case, node 2 would send the following modified packet P1 on the link to 4:

(A1::, A4::C5)(A8::E100, A4::C5; SL=1).

The rest of the processing is similar to the previous section.

Let us analyze a policy applied at a midpoint on a packet with an SRH.

Packet P2 is (A1::, A7::)(A8::E100, A7::; SL=1).

Let us consider P2 when it is received by node 2 and let us assume that node 2 is configured to steer A7::/40 in a transit behavior T.Insert associated with SR policy <A4::C5, A9::>.

In such a case, node 2 would send the following modified packet P2 on the link to 4:

(A1::, A4::C5)(A7::, A9::, A4::C5; SL=2)(A8::E100, A7::; SL=1)

Node 4 would send the following packet to 5: (A1::, A9::)(A7::, A9::, A4::C5; SL=1)(A8::E100, A7::; SL=1)

Node 5 would send the following packet to 9: (A1::, A9::)(A7::, A9::, A4::C5; SL=1)(A8::E100, A7::; SL=1)

Node 9 would send the following packet to 6: (A1::, A7::)(A8::E100, A7::; SL=1)

Node 6 would send the following packet to 7: (A1::, A7::)(A8::E100, A7::; SL=1)

Node 7 would send the following packet to 8: (A1::, A8::E100)

9.7. End-to-End policy with intermediate BSID

Let us now describe a case where the ingress VPN edge node steers the packet destined to 20.20.20.20 towards the egress edge node connected to the tenant100 site with 20/8, but via an intermediate SR Policy represented by a single routable Binding SID. Let us illustrate this case with an intermediate policy which both encodes underlay optimization for low-latency and the service chaining via two SR-aware container-based apps.

Let us assume that the End.B6 SID A2::B1 is configured at node 2 and is associated with midpoint T.Insert policy <A4::C5, A9::A1, A6::A2>.

A4::C5 realizes the low-latency path from the ingress PE to the egress PE. This is the underlay optimization part of the intermediate policy.

A9::A1 and A6::A2 represent two SR-aware NFV applications residing in containers respectively connected to node 9 and 6.

Let us assume the following ingress VPN policy for 20/8 in tenant 100 IPv4 table of node 1: T.Encaps with SRv6 Policy <A2::B1, A8::E100>.

This ingress policy will steer the 20/8 tenant-100 traffic towards the correct egress PE and via the required intermediate policy that realizes the SLA and NFV requirements of this tenant customer.

Node 1 sends the following packet to 2: (A1::, A2::B1) (A8::E100, A2::B1; SL=1)

Node 2 sends the following packet to 4: (A1::, A4::C5) (A6::A2, A9::A1, A4::C5; SL=2)(A8::E100, A2::B1; SL=1)

Node 4 sends the following packet to 5: (A1::, A9::A1) (A6::A2, A9::A1, A4::C5; SL=1)(A8::E100, A2::B1; SL=1)

Node 5 sends the following packet to 9: (A1::, A9::A1) (A6::A2, A9::A1, A4::C5; SL=1)(A8::E100, A2::B1; SL=1)

Node 9 sends the following packet to 6: (A1::, A6::A2) (A8::E100, A2::B1; SL=1)

Node 6 sends the following packet to 7: (A1::, A8::E100)

Node 7 sends the following packet to 8: (A1::, A8::E100) which decaps and forwards to CE-B.

The benefits of using an intermediate Binding SID are well-known and key to the Segment Routing architecture: the ingress edge node needs to push fewer SIDs, the ingress edge node does not need to change its SR policy upon change of the core topology or re-homing of the container-based apps on different servers. Conversely, the core and service organizations do not need to share details on how they realize underlay SLA's or where they home their NFV apps.

9.8. TI-LFA

Let us assume two packets P1 and P2 received by node 2 exactly when the failure of link 27 is detected.

P1: (A1::, A7::)

P2: (A1::, A7::)(A8::E100, A7::; SL=1)

Node 2's pre-computed TI-LFA backup path for the destination A7:: is <A4::C5>. It is installed as a T.Insert transit behavior.

Node 2 protects the two packets P1 and P2 according to the pre-computed TI-LFA backup path and send the following modified packets on the link to 4:

P1: (A1::, A4::C5)(A7::, A4::C5; SL=1)

P2: (A1::, A4::C5)(A7::, A4::C5; SL=1) (A8::E100, A7::; SL=1)

Node 4 then sends the following modified packets to 5:

P1: (A1::, A7::)

P2: (A1::, A7::)(A8::E100, A7::; SL=1)

Then these packets follow the rest of their post-convergence path towards node 7 and then go to node 8 for the VPN decaps.

9.9. SR TE for Service chaining

We have illustrated the service chaining through SR-aware apps in a previous section.

We illustrate the use of End.AS functions to service chain an IP flow bound to the internet through two SR-unaware applications hosted in containers.

Let us assume that servers 20 and 70 are respectively connected to nodes 2 and 7. They are respectively configured with SID spaces A020::/40 and A070::/40. Their connected routers advertise the related prefixes in the IGP. Two SR-unaware container-based applications App2 and App7 are respectively hosted on server 20 and 70. Server 20 (70) is configured explicitly with an End.AS SID A020::2 for App2 (A070::7 for App7).

Let us assume a broadband customer with a home gateway CE-A connected to edge router 1. Router 1 is configured with an SR policy which encapsulates all the traffic received from CE-A into a T.Encaps policy <A020::2, A070::7, A8::E0> where A8::E0 is an End.DT4 SID instantiated at node 8.

P1 is a packet sent by the broadband customer to 1: (X, Y) where X and Y are two IPv4 addresses.

1 sends the following packet to 2: (A1::0, A020::2)(A8::E0, A070::7, A020::2; SL=2; NH=4)(X, Y).

2 forwards the packet to server 20.

20 receives the packet (A1::0, A070::7)(A8::E0, A070::7, A020::2; SL=2; NH=1)(X, Y) and forwards the inner IPv4 packet (X,Y) to App2. App2 works on the packet and forwards it back to 20. 20 sends the (whole) IPv6 packet back to 2.

2 and 7 forward to server 70.

70 receives the packet (A1::0, A8::E0)(X, Y) and forwards the inner IPv4 packet (X,Y) to App7. App7 works on the packet and forwards it back to 70. 70 sends the (whole) IPv6 packet back to 7.

7 forwards to 8.

8 performs the End.DT4 function and sends the IP packet (X, Y) towards its internet destination

10. Benefits

10.1. Seamless deployment

The VPN use-case can be realized with SRv6 capability deployed solely at the ingress and egress PE's.

All the nodes in between these PE's act as transit routers as per [RFC2460]. No software/hardware upgrade is required on all these nodes. They just need to support IPv6 per [RFC2460].

The SRTE/underlay-SLA use-case can be realized with SRv6 capability deployed at few strategic nodes.

It is well-known from the experience deploying SR-MPLS that underlay SLA optimization requires few SIDs placed at strategic locations. This was illustrated in our example with the low-latency optimization which required the operator to enable one single core node with SRv6 (node 4) where one single End.X SID towards node 5 was instantiated. This single SID is sufficient to force the end-to-end traffic via the low-latency path.

The TI-LFA benefits are collected incrementally as SRv6 capabilities are deployed.

It is well-known that TI-LFA is an incremental node-by-node deployment. When a node N is enabled for TI-LFA, it computes TI-

LFA backup paths for each primary path to each IGP destination. In more than 50% of the case, the post-convergence path is loop-free and does not depend on the presence of any remote SRv6 SID. In the vast majority of cases, a single segment is enough to encode the post-convergence path in a loop-free manner. If the required segment is available (that node has been upgraded) then the related back-up path is installed in FIB, else the pre-existing situation (no backup) continues. Hence, as the SRv6 deployment progresses, the coverage incrementally increases. Eventually, when the core network is SRv6 capable, the TI-LFA coverage is complete.

The service chaining use-case can be realized with SRv6 capability deployed at few strategic nodes.

The service-chaining deployment is again incremental and does not require any pre-deployment of SRv6 in the network. When an NFV app A1 needs to be enabled for inclusion in an SRv6 service chain, all what is required is to install that app in a container or VM on an SRv6-capable server (Linux 4.10 or FD.io 17.04 release). The app can either be SR-aware or not, leveraging the proxy functions described in this document.

By leveraging the various END functions it can also be used to support any current PNF/VNF implementations and their forwarding methods (e.g. Layer 2).

The ability to leverage SR TE policies and BSIDs also permits building scalable, hierarchical service-chains.

10.2. Integration

The SRv6 network programming concept allows integrating all the application and service requirements: multi-domain underlay SLA optimization with scale, overlay VPN/Tenant, sub-50msec automated FRR, security and service chaining.

10.3. Security

The combination of well-known techniques (SEC1, SEC2, SEC4) and carefully chosen architectural rules (SEC3) ensure a secure deployment of SRv6 inside a multi-domain network managed by a single organization.

Inter-domain security will be described in a companion document.

11. IANA Considerations

This document has no actions for IANA.

12. Acknowledgements

TBD.

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SRv6 Network Programming
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Abstract

This document describes the SRv6 network programming concept and its most basic functions.

Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

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1. Introduction

Segment Routing leverages the source routing paradigm. An ingress node steers a packet through a ordered list of instructions, called segments. Each one of these instructions represents a function to be called at a specific location in the network. A function is locally defined on the node where it is executed and may range from simply moving forward in the segment list to any complex user-defined behavior. The network programming consists in combining segment routing functions, both simple and complex, to achieve a networking objective that goes beyond mere packet routing.

This document illustrates the SRv6 Network Programming concept and aims at standardizing the main segment routing functions to enable the creation of interoperable overlays with underlay optimization and service chaining.

Familiarity with the Segment Routing Header [I-D.ietf-6man-segment-routing-header] is assumed.

2. Terminology

SRH is the abbreviation for the Segment Routing Header. We assume that the SRH may be present multiple times inside each packet.

NH is the abbreviation of the IPv6 next-header field.

NH=SRH means that the next-header field is 43 with routing type 4.

When there are multiple SRHs, they must follow each other: the next-header field of all SRH, except the last one, must be SRH.

The effective next-header (ENH) is the next-header field of the IP header when no SRH is present, or is the next-header field of the last SRH.

In this version of the document, we assume that there is no other extension header than the SRH. These will be lifted in future versions of the document.

SID: A Segment Identifier which represents a specific segment in segment routing domain. The SID type used in this document is IPv6 address (also referenced as SRv6 Segment or SRv6 SID).

A SID list is represented as $\langle S1, S2, S3 \rangle$ where S1 is the first SID to visit, S2 is the second SID to visit and S3 is the last SID to visit along the SR path.

(SA,DA) (S3, S2, S1; SL) represents an IPv6 packet with:

- IPv6 header with source and destination addresses respectively SA and DA and next-header is SRH
- SRH with SID list $\langle S1, S2, S3 \rangle$ with SegmentsLeft = SL
- Note the difference between the $\langle \rangle$ and $()$ symbols: $\langle S1, S2, S3 \rangle$ represents a SID list where S1 is the first SID and S3 is the last SID. $(S3, S2, S1; SL)$ represents the same SID list but encoded in the SRH format where the rightmost SID in the SRH is the first SID and the leftmost SID in the SRH is the last SID. When referring to an SR policy in a high-level use-case, it is simpler to use the $\langle S1, S2, S3 \rangle$ notation. When referring to an illustration of the detailed behavior, the $(S3, S2, S1; SL)$ notation is more convenient.
- The payload of the packet is omitted.

SRH[SL] represents the SID pointed by the SL field in the first SRH. In our example, SRH[2] represents S1, SRH[1] represents S2 and SRH[0] represents S3.

FIB is the abbreviation for the forwarding table. A FIB lookup is a lookup in the forwarding table. When a packet is intercepted on a wire, it is possible that SRH[SL] is different from the DA.

3. SRv6 Segment

An SRv6 Segment is a 128-bit value. "SID" (abbreviation for Segment Identifier) is often used as a shorter reference for "SRv6 Segment".

An SRv6-capable node N maintains a "My Local SID Table". This table contains all the SRv6 segments explicitly instantiated at node N. N is the parent node for these SIDs.

A local SID of N can be an IPv6 address associated to a local interface of N but it is not mandatory. Nor is the My Local SID table populated by default with all IPv6 addresses defined on node N.

In most use-cases, a local SID will NOT be an address associated to a local interface of N.

A local SID of N could be routed to N but it does not have to be. Most often, it is routed to N via a shorter-mask prefix.

Let's provide a classic illustration.

Node N is configured with a loopback0 interface address of C1::1/40 originated in its IGP. Node N is configured with two SIDs: C1::100 and C2::101.

The entry C1::1 is not defined explicitly as an SRv6 SID and hence does not appear in the "My Local SID Table". The entries C1::100 and C2::101 are defined explicitly as SRv6 SIDs and hence appear in the "My Local SID Table".

The network learns about a path to C1::/40 via the IGP and hence a packet destined to C1::100 would be routed up to N. The network does not learn about a path to C2::/40 via the IGP and hence a packet destined to C2::101 would not be routed up to N.

A packet could be steered to a non-routed SID C2::101 by using a SID list <...,C1::100,C2::101,...> where the non-routed SID is preceded by a routed SID to the same node. This is similar to the local vs global segments in SR-MPLS.

Every SRv6 SID instantiated has a specific instruction bound to it. This information is stored in the "My Local SID Table". The "My Local SID Table" has three main purposes:

- Define which local SIDs are explicitly instantiated
- Specify which instruction is bound to each of the instantiated SIDs
- Store the parameters associated with such instruction (i.e. OIF, NextHop,...)

We represent an SRv6 SID as LOC:FUNCT where LOC is the L most significant bits and FUNCT is the 128-L least significant bits. L is called the locator length and is flexible. Each operator is free to use the locator length it chooses. Most often the LOC part of the SID is routable and leads to the node which instantiates that SID.

Often, for simplicity of illustration, we will use a locator length of 64 bits. This is just an example. Implementations must not assume any a priori prefix length.

The FUNCT part of the SID is an opaque identification of a local function bound to the SID. Hence the name SRv6 Local SID.

A function may require additional arguments that would be placed in the rightmost-bits of the 128-bit space. In such case, the SRv6 SID will have the form LOC:FUNCT:ARGS.

These arguments may vary on a per-packet basis and may contain information related to the flow, service, or any other information required by the function associated to the SRv6 SID.

For this reason, the "My Local SID Table" matches on a per longest-prefix-match basis.

A node may receive a packet with an SRv6 SID in the DA without an SRH. In such case the packet should still be processed by the Segment Routing engine.

4. Functions associated with a SID

Each entry of the "My Local SID Table" indicates the function associated with the local SID and its parameters.

We define hereafter a set of well-known functions that can be associated with a SID.

End	Endpoint function The SRv6 instantiation of a prefix SID
End.X	Endpoint function with Layer-3 cross-connect The SRv6 instantiation of a Adj SID
End.T	Endpoint function with specific IPv6 table lookup
End.DX2	Endpoint with decapsulation and Layer-2 cross-connect L2VPN use-case
End.DX2V	Endpoint with decapsulation and VLAN L2 table lookup EVPN Flexible cross-connect use-cases
End.DT2U	Endpoint with decaps and unicast MAC L2 table lookup EVPN Bridging unicast use-cases
End.DT2M	Endpoint with decapsulation and L2 table flooding EVPN Bridging BUM use-cases with ESI filtering
End.DX6	Endpoint with decapsulation and IPv6 cross-connect IPv6 L3VPN use (equivalent of a per-CE VPN label)
End.DX4	Endpoint with decapsulation and IPv4 cross-connect IPv4 L3VPN use (equivalent of a per-CE VPN label)
End.DT6	Endpoint with decapsulation and IPv6 table lookup IPv6 L3VPN use (equivalent of a per-VRF VPN label)
End.DT4	Endpoint with decapsulation and IPv4 table lookup IPv4 L3VPN use (equivalent of a per-VRF VPN label)
End.DT46	Endpoint with decapsulation and IP table lookup IP L3VPN use (equivalent of a per-VRF VPN label)
End.B6	Endpoint bound to an SRv6 policy SRv6 instantiation of a Binding SID
End.B6.Encaps	Endpoint bound to an SRv6 encapsulation Policy SRv6 instantiation of a Binding SID
End.BM	Endpoint bound to an SR-MPLS Policy SRv6/SR-MPLS instantiation of a Binding SID
End.S	Endpoint in search of a target in table T

The list is not exhaustive. In practice, any function can be attached to a local SID: e.g. a node N can bind a SID to a local VM or container which can apply any complex function on the packet.

We call N the node who has an explicitly instantiated SID S and we detail the function that N binds to S.

At the end of this section we also present some flavours of these well-known functions.

4.1. End: Endpoint

The Endpoint function ("End" for short) is the most basic function.

When N receives a packet whose IPv6 DA is S and S is a local End SID, N does:

1. IF NH=SRH and SL > 0
2. decrement SL
3. update the IPv6 DA with SRH[SL]
4. FIB lookup on the updated DA ;; Ref1
5. forward accordingly to the matched entry ;; Ref2
6. ELSE
7. drop the packet ;; Ref3

Ref1: The End function performs the FIB lookup in the forwarding table associated to the ingress interface

Ref2: If the FIB lookup matches a multicast state, then the related RPF check must be considered successful

Ref3: a local SID could be bound to a function which authorizes the decapsulation of an outer header (e.g. IPinIP) or the punting of the packet to TCP, UDP or any other protocol. This however needs to be explicitly defined in the function bound to the local SID. By default, a local SID bound to the well-known function "End" only allows the punting to OAM protocols and neither allows the decapsulation of an outer header nor the cleanup of an SRH. As a consequence, an End SID cannot be the last SID of an SRH and cannot be the DA of a packet without SRH.

This is the SRv6 instantiation of a Prefix SID [I-D.ietf-spring-segment-routing].

4.2. End.X: Endpoint with Layer-3 cross-connect

The "Endpoint with cross-connect to an array of layer-3 adjacencies" function (End.X for short) is a variant of the End function.

When N receives a packet destined to S and S is a local End.X SID, N does:

1. IF NH=SRH and SL > 0
2. decrement SL
3. update the IPv6 DA with SRH[SL]
4. forward to layer-3 adjacency bound to the SID S ;; Ref1
5. ELSE
6. drop the packet ;; Ref2

Ref1: If an array of adjacencies is bound to the End.X SID, then one entry of the array is selected based on a hash of the packet's header.

Ref2: An End.X function only allows punting to OAM and does not allow decaps. An End.X SID cannot be the last SID of an SRH and cannot be the DA of a packet without SRH.

The End.X function is required to express any traffic-engineering policy.

This is the SRv6 instantiation of an Adjacency SID [I-D.ietf-spring-segment-routing].

If a node N has 30 outgoing interfaces to 30 neighbors, usually the operator would explicitly instantiate 30 End.X SIDs at N: one per layer-3 adjacency to a neighbor. Potentially, more End.X could be explicitly defined (groups of layer-3 adjacencies to the same neighbor or to different neighbors).

Note that with SR-MPLS, an AdjSID is typically preceded by a PrefixSID. This is unlikely in SRv6 as most likely an End.X SID is globally routed to N.

Note that if N has an outgoing interface bundle I to a neighbor Q made of 10 member links, N may allocate up to 11 End.X local SIDs for that bundle: one for the bundle itself and then up to one for each member link. This is the equivalent of the L2-Link Adj SID in SR-MPLS [I-D.ietf-isis-l2bundles].

4.3. End.T: Endpoint with specific IPv6 table lookup

The "Endpoint with specific IPv6 table lookup" function (End.T for short) is a variant of the End function.

When N receives a packet destined to S and S is a local End.T SID, N does:

1. IF NH=SRH and SL > 0 ;; Ref1
2. decrement SL
3. update the IPv6 DA with SRH[SL]
4. lookup the next segment in IPv6 table T associated with the SID
5. forward via the matched table entry
6. ELSE
7. drop the packet

Ref1: The End.T SID must not be the last SID

The End.T is used for multi-table operation in the core.

4.4. End.DX2: Endpoint with decapsulation and Layer-2 cross-connect

The "Endpoint with decapsulation and Layer-2 cross-connect to OIF" function (End.DX2 for short) is a variant of the endpoint function.

When N receives a packet destined to S and S is a local End.DX2 SID, N does:

1. IF NH=SRH and SL > 0
2. drop the packet ;; Ref1
3. ELSE IF ENH = 59 ;; Ref2
4. pop the (outer) IPv6 header and its extension headers
5. forward the resulting frame via OIF associated to the SID
6. ELSE
7. drop the packet

Ref1: An End.DX2 SID must always be the last SID, or it can be the Destination Address of an IPv6 packet with no SRH header.

Ref2: We conveniently reuse the next-header value 59 allocated to IPv6 No Next Header [RFC8200]. When the SID corresponds to function End.DX2 and the Next-Header value is 59, we know that an Ethernet frame is in the payload without any further header.

An End.DX2 function could be customized to expect a specific VLAN format and rewrite the egress VLAN header before forwarding on the outgoing interface.

One of the applications of the End.DX2 function is the L2VPN use-case.

4.5. End.DX2V: Endpoint with decapsulation and VLAN L2 table lookup

The "Endpoint with decapsulation and specific VLAN L2 table lookup" function (End.DX2V for short) is a variant of the endpoint function.

When N receives a packet destined to S and S is a local End.DX2V SID, N does:

1. IF NH=SRH and SL > 0
2. drop the packet ;; Ref1
3. ELSE IF ENH = 59 ;; Ref2
4. pop the (outer) IPv6 header and its extension headers
5. lookup the exposed inner VLANs in L2 table T
6. forward via the matched table entry
7. ELSE
8. drop the packet

Ref1: An End.DX2V SID must always be the last SID, or it can be the Destination Address of an IPv6 packet with no SRH header.

Ref2: We conveniently reuse the next-header value 59 allocated to IPv6 No Next Header [RFC8200]. When the SID corresponds to function End.DX2V and the Next-Header value is 59, we know that an Ethernet frame is in the payload without any further header.

An End.DX2V function could be customized to expect a specific VLAN format and rewrite the egress VLAN header before forwarding on the outgoing interface.

The End.DX2V is used for EVPN Flexible cross-connect use-cases.

4.6. End.DT2U: Endpoint with decapsulation and unicast MAC L2 table lookup

The "Endpoint with decapsulation and specific unicast MAC L2 table lookup" function (End.DT2U for short) is a variant of the endpoint function.

When N receives a packet destined to S and S is a local End.DT2U SID, N does:

1. IF NH=SRH and SL > 0
2. drop the packet ;; Ref1
3. ELSE IF ENH = 59 ;; Ref2
4. pop the (outer) IPv6 header and its extension headers
5. learn the exposed inner MAC SA in L2 table T ;; Ref3
6. lookup the exposed inner MAC DA in L2 table T
7. forward via the matched T entry else to all L2OIF in T
8. ELSE
9. drop the packet

Ref1: An End.DT2U SID must always be the last SID, or it can be the Destination Address of an IPv6 packet with no SRH header.

Ref2: We conveniently reuse the next-header value 59 allocated to IPv6 No Next Header [RFC8200]. When the SID corresponds to function

End.DT2U and the Next-Header value is 59, we know that an Ethernet frame is in the payload without any further header.

Ref3: In EVPN, the learning of the exposed inner MAC SA is done via control plane.

The End.DT2U is used for EVPN Bridging unicast use cases.

4.7. End.DT2M: Endpoint with decapsulation and L2 table flooding

The "Endpoint with decapsulation and specific L2 table flooding" function (End.DT2M for short) is a variant of the endpoint function.

This function may take an argument: "Arg.FE2". It is an argument specific to EVPN ESI filtering. It is used to exclude a specific OIF from L2 table T flooding.

When N receives a packet destined to S and S is a local End.DT2M SID, N does:

1. IF NH=SRH and SL > 0
2. drop the packet ;; Ref1
3. ELSE IF ENH = 59 ;; Ref2
4. pop the (outer) IPv6 header and its extension headers
5. learn the exposed inner MAC SA in L2 table T ;; Ref3
6. forward on all L2OIF excluding the one specified in Arg.FE2
7. ELSE
8. drop the packet

Ref1: An End.DT2M SID must always be the last SID, or it can be the Destination Address of an IPv6 packet with no SRH header.

Ref2: We conveniently reuse the next-header value 59 allocated to IPv6 No Next Header [RFC8200]. When the SID corresponds to function End.DT2M and the Next-Header value is 59, we know that an Ethernet frame is in the payload without any further header.

Ref3: In EVPN, the learning of the exposed inner MAC SA is done via control plane

The End.DT2M is used for EVPN Bridging BUM use case with ESI filtering capability.

4.8. End.DX6: Endpoint with decapsulation and IPv6 cross-connect

The "Endpoint with decapsulation and cross-connect to an array of IPv6 adjacencies" function (End.DX6 for short) is a variant of the End and End.X functions.

When N receives a packet destined to S and S is a local End.DX6 SID, N does:

1. IF NH=SRH and SL > 0
2. drop the packet ;; Ref1
3. ELSE IF ENH = 41 ;; Ref2
4. pop the (outer) IPv6 header and its extension headers
5. forward to layer-3 adjacency bound to the SID S ;; Ref3
6. ELSE
7. drop the packet

Ref1: The End.DX6 SID must always be the last SID, or it can be the Destination Address of an IPv6 packet with no SRH header.

Ref2: 41 refers to IPv6 encapsulation as defined by IANA allocation for Internet Protocol Numbers

Ref3: Selected based on a hash of the packet's header (at least SA, DA, Flow Label)

One of the applications of the End.DX6 function is the L3VPN use-case where a FIB lookup in a specific tenant table at the egress PE is not required. This would be equivalent to the per-CE VPN label in MPLS[RFC4364].

4.9. End.DX4: Endpoint with decapsulation and IPv4 cross-connect

The "Endpoint with decapsulation and cross-connect to an array of IPv4 adjacencies" function (End.DX4 for short) is a variant of the End and End.X functions.

When N receives a packet destined to S and S is a local End.DX4 SID, N does:

1. IF NH=SRH and SL > 0
2. drop the packet ;; Ref1
3. ELSE IF ENH = 4 ;; Ref2
4. pop the (outer) IPv6 header and its extension headers
5. forward to layer-3 adjacency bound to the SID S ;; Ref3
6. ELSE
7. drop the packet

Ref1: The End.DX4 SID must always be the last SID, or it can be the Destination Address of an IPv6 packet with no SRH header.

Ref2: 4 refers to IPv4 encapsulation as defined by IANA allocation for Internet Protocol Numbers

Ref3: Selected based on a hash of the packet's header (at least SA, DA, Flow Label)

One of the applications of the End.DX4 function is the L3VPN use-case where a FIB lookup in a specific tenant table at the egress PE is not required. This would be equivalent to the per-CE VPN label in MPLS[RFC4364].

4.10. End.DT6: Endpoint with decapsulation and specific IPv6 table lookup

The "Endpoint with decapsulation and specific IPv6 table lookup" function (End.DT6 for short) is a variant of the End function.

When N receives a packet destined to S and S is a local End.DT6 SID, N does:

1. IF NH=SRH and SL > 0
2. drop the packet ;; Ref1
3. ELSE IF ENH = 41 ;; Ref2
4. pop the (outer) IPv6 header and its extension headers
5. lookup the exposed inner IPv6 DA in IPv6 table T
6. forward via the matched table entry
7. ELSE
8. drop the packet

Ref1: the End.DT6 SID must always be the last SID, or it can be the Destination Address of an IPv6 packet with no SRH header.

Ref2: 41 refers to IPv6 encapsulation as defined by IANA allocation for Internet Protocol Numbers

One of the applications of the End.DT6 function is the L3VPN use-case where a FIB lookup in a specific tenant table at the egress PE is required. This would be equivalent to the per-VRF VPN label in MPLS[RFC4364].

Note that an End.DT6 may be defined for the main IPv6 table in which case End.DT6 supports the equivalent of an IPv6inIPv6 decaps (without VPN/tenant implication).

4.11. End.DT4: Endpoint with decapsulation and specific IPv4 table lookup

The "Endpoint with decapsulation and specific IPv4 table lookup" function (End.DT4 for short) is a variant of the End function.

When N receives a packet destined to S and S is a local End.DT4 SID, N does:

1. IF NH=SRH and SL > 0
2. drop the packet ;; Ref1
3. ELSE IF ENH = 4 ;; Ref2
4. pop the (outer) IPv6 header and its extension headers
5. lookup the exposed inner IPv4 DA in IPv4 table T
6. forward via the matched table entry
7. ELSE
8. drop the packet

Ref1: the End.DT4 SID must always be the last SID, or it can be the Destination Address of an IPv6 packet with no SRH header.

Ref2: 4 refers to IPv4 encapsulation as defined by IANA allocation for Internet Protocol Numbers

One of the applications of the End.DT4 is the L3VPN use-case where a FIB lookup in a specific tenant table at the egress PE is required. This would be equivalent to the per-VRF VPN label in MPLS[RFC4364].

Note that an End.DT4 may be defined for the main IPv4 table in which case and End.DT4 supports the equivalent of an IPv4inIPv6 decaps (without VPN/tenant implication).

4.12. End.DT46: Endpoint with decapsulation and specific IP table lookup

The "Endpoint with decapsulation and specific IP table lookup" function (End.DT46 for short) is a variant of the End function.

When N receives a packet destined to S and S is a local End.DT46 SID, N does:

1. IF NH=SRH and SL > 0
2. drop the packet ;; Ref1
3. ELSE IF ENH = 4 ;; Ref2
4. pop the (outer) IPv6 header and its extension headers
5. lookup the exposed inner IPv4 DA in IPv4 table T
6. forward via the matched table entry
7. ELSE IF ENH = 41 ;; Ref2
8. pop the (outer) IPv6 header and its extension headers
9. lookup the exposed inner IPv6 DA in IPv6 table T
10. forward via the matched table entry
11. ELSE
12. drop the packet

Ref1: the End.DT46 SID must always be the last SID, or it can be the Destination Address of an IPv6 packet with no SRH header.

Ref2: 4 and 41 refer to IPv4 and IPv6 encapsulation respectively as defined by IANA allocation for Internet Protocol Numbers

One of the applications of the End.DT46 is the L3VPN use-case where a FIB lookup in a specific tenant table at the egress PE is required. This would be equivalent to the per-VRF VPN label in MPLS[RFC4364].

Note that an End.DT46 may be defined for the main IP table in which case and End.DT46 supports the equivalent of an IPinIPv6 decaps (without VPN/tenant implication).

4.13. End.B6: Endpoint bound to an SRv6 policy

The "Endpoint bound to an SRv6 Policy" is a variant of the End function.

When N receives a packet destined to S and S is a local End.B6 SID, N does:

1. IF NH=SRH and SL > 0 ;; Ref1
2. do not decrement SL nor update the IPv6 DA with SRH[SL]
3. insert a new SRH ;; Ref2
4. set the IPv6 DA to the first segment of the SRv6 Policy
5. forward according to the first segment of the SRv6 Policy
6. ELSE
7. drop the packet

Ref1: An End.B6 SID, by definition, is never the last SID.

Ref2: In case that an SRH already exists, the new SRH is inserted in between the IPv6 header and the received SRH

Note: Instead of the term "insert", "push" may also be used.

The End.B6 function is required to express scalable traffic-engineering policies across multiple domains. This is the SRv6 instantiation of a Binding SID [I-D.ietf-spring-segment-routing].

4.14. End.B6.Encaps: Endpoint bound to an SRv6 encapsulation policy

This is a variation of the End.B6 behavior where the SRv6 Policy also includes an IPv6 Source Address A.

When N receives a packet destined to S and S is a local End.B6.Encaps SID, N does:

1. IF NH=SRH and SL > 0
2. decrement SL and update the IPv6 DA with SRH[SL]
3. push an outer IPv6 header with its own SRH
4. set the outer IPv6 SA to A
5. set the outer IPv6 DA to the first segment of the SRv6 Policy
6. forward according to the first segment of the SRv6 Policy
7. ELSE
8. drop the packet

Instead of simply inserting an SRH with the policy (End.B6), this behavior also adds an outer IPv6 header. The source address defined for the outer header does not have to be a local SID of the node.

- 4.15. End.B6.Encaps.Red: Endpoint bound to an SRv6 reduced encapsulation policy

This is an optimization of the End.B6.Encaps function.

End.B6.Encaps.Red will reduce the size of the SRH by one segment by avoiding the insertion of the first SID in the pushed SRH. In this way, the first segment is only introduced in the DA and the packet is forwarded according to it.

Note that SL value is initially pointing to a non-existing segment in the SRH.

- 4.16. End.BM: Endpoint bound to an SR-MPLS policy

The "Endpoint bound to an SR-MPLS Policy" is a variant of the End.B6 function.

When N receives a packet destined to S and S is a local End.BM SID, N does:

1. IF NH=SRH and SL > 0 ;; Ref1
2. decrement SL and update the IPv6 DA with SRH[SL]
3. push an MPLS label stack <L1, L2, L3> on the received packet
4. forward according to L1
5. ELSE
6. drop the packet

Ref1: an End.BM SID, by definition, is never the last SID.

The End.BM function is required to express scalable traffic-engineering policies across multiple domains where some domains support the MPLS instantiation of Segment Routing.

This is an SRv6 instantiation of a SR-MPLS Binding SID [I-D.ietf-spring-segment-routing].

4.17. End.S: Endpoint in search of a target in table T

The "Endpoint in search of a target in Table T" function (End.S for short) is a variant of the End function.

When N receives a packet destined to S and S is a local End.S SID, N does:

1. IF NH=SRH and SL = 0 ;; Ref1
2. drop the packet
3. ELSE IF match(last SID) in specified table T
4. forward accordingly
5. ELSE
6. apply the End behavior

Ref1: By definition, an End.S SID cannot be the last SID, as the last SID is the targeted object.

The End.S function is required in information-centric networking (ICN) use-cases where the last SID in the SRv6 SID list represents a targeted object. If the identification of the object would require more than 128 bits, then obvious customization of the End.S function may either use multiple SIDs or a TLV of the SR header to encode the searched object ID.

4.18. SR-aware application

Generally, any SR-aware application can be bound to an SRv6 SID. This application could represent anything from a small piece of code focused on topological/tenant function to a much larger process focusing on higher-level applications (e.g. video compression, transcoding etc.).

The ways in which an SR-aware application can binds itself on a local SID depends on the operating system. Let us consider an SR-aware application running on a Linux operating system. A possible approach is to associate an SRv6 SID to a target (virtual) interface, so that packets with IP DA corresponding to the SID will be sent to the target interface. In this approach, the SR-aware application can simply listen to all packets received on the interface.

A different approach for the SR-aware app is to listen to packets received with a specific SRv6 SID as IPv6 DA on a given transport port (i.e. corresponding to a TCP or UDP socket). In this case, the app can read the SRH information with a `getsockopt` Linux system call

and can set the SRH information to be added to the outgoing packets with a `setsockopt` system call.

4.19. Non SR-aware application

[I-D.xu-clad-spring-sr-service-chaining] defines a set of additional functions in order to enable non SR-aware applications to be associated with a SRv6 Local SID.

4.20. Flavours

We present the PSP and USP variants of the functions `End`, `End.X` and `End.T`. For each of these functions these variants can be enabled or disabled either individually or together.

4.20.1. PSP: Penultimate Segment Pop of the SRH

After the instruction 'update the IPv6 DA with SRH[SL]' is executed, the following instructions must be added:

1. IF updated SL = 0 & PSP is TRUE & O-bit = 0 & A-bit = 0 ; ; Ref1
2. pop the top SRH ; ; Ref2

Ref1: If the SRH.Flags.O-bit or SRH.Flags.A-bit is set, PSP of the SRH is disabled. Section 6.1 specifies the pseudocode needed to process the SRH.Flags.O-bit.

Ref2: The received SRH had SL=1. When the last SID is written in the DA, the `End`, `End.X` and `End.T` functions with the PSP flavour pop the first (top-most) SRH. Subsequent stacked SRH's may be present but are not processed as part of the function.

4.20.2. USP: Ultimate Segment Pop of the SRH

We insert at the beginning of the pseudo-code the following instructions:

1. IF NH=SRH & SL = 0 & USP=TRUE ; ; Ref1
2. pop the top SRH
3. restart the function processing on the modified packet ; ; Ref2

Ref1: The next header is an SRH header

Ref2: Typically SL of the exposed SRH is > 0 and hence the restarting of the complete function would lead to decrement SL, update the IPv6 DA with SRH[SL], FIB lookup on updated DA and forward accordingly to the matched entry.

5. Transit behaviors

We define hereafter the set of basic transit behaviors.

T	Transit behavior
T.Insert	Transit behavior with insertion of an SRv6 policy
T.Insert.Red	Transit behavior with reduced insert of an SRv6 policy
T.Encaps	Transit behavior with encapsulation in an SRv6 policy
T.Encaps.Red	Transit behavior with reduced encaps in an SRv6 policy
T.Encaps.L2	T.Encaps behavior of the received L2 frame
T.Encaps.L2.Red	Transit with reduce encaps of received L2 frame

This list can be expanded in case any new functionality requires it.

5.1. T: Transit behavior

As per [RFC8200], if a node N receives a packet (A, S2)(S3, S2, S1; SL=2) and S2 is neither a local address nor a local SID of N then N forwards the packet without inspecting the SRH.

This means that N treats the following two packets with the same performance:

- (A, S2)
- (A, S2)(S3, S2, S1; SL=2)

A transit node does not need to count by default the amount of transit traffic with an SRH extension header. This accounting might be enabled as an optional behavior leveraging SEC4 behavior described later in this document. Section 7.4

A transit node MUST include the outer flow label in its ECMP hash[RFC6437].

5.2. T.Insert: Transit with insertion of an SRv6 Policy

Node N receives two packets P1=(A, B2) and P2=(A,B2)(B3, B2, B1; SL=1). B2 is neither a local address nor SID of N.

N steers the transit packets P1 and P2 into an SRv6 Policy with one SID list <S1, S2, S3>.

The "T.Insert" transit insertion behavior is defined as follows:

1. insert the SRH (B2, S3, S2, S1; SL=3) ;; Ref1, Ref1bis
2. set the IPv6 DA = S1
3. forward along the shortest path to S1

Ref1: The received IPv6 DA is placed as last SID of the inserted SRH.

Ref1bis: The SRH is inserted before any other IPv6 Routing Extension Header.

After the T.Insert behavior, P1 and P2 respectively look like:

- (A, S1) (B2, S3, S2, S1; SL=3)
- (A, S1) (B2, S3, S2, S1; SL=3) (B3, B2, B1; SL=1)

5.3. T.Insert.Red: Transit with reduced insertion of an SRv6 Policy

The T.Insert.Red behavior is an optimization of the T.Insert behavior. It is defined as follows:

1. insert the SRH (B2, S3, S2; SL=3)
2. set the IPv6 DA = S1
3. forward along the shortest path to S1

T.Insert.Red will reduce the size of the SRH by one segment by avoiding the insertion of the first SID in the pushed SRH. In this way, the first segment is only introduced in the DA and the packet is forwarded according to it.

Note that SL value is initially pointing to a non-existing segment in the SRH.

After the T.Insert.Red behavior, P1 and P2 respectively look like:

- (A, S1) (B2, S3, S2; SL=3)
- (A, S1) (B2, S3, S2; SL=3) (B3, B2, B1; SL=1)

5.4. T.Encaps: Transit with encapsulation in an SRv6 Policy

Node N receives two packets P1=(A, B2) and P2=(A,B2)(B3, B2, B1; SL=1). B2 is neither a local address nor SID of N.

N steers the transit packets P1 and P2 into an SR Encapsulation Policy with a Source Address T and a Segment list <S1, S2, S3>.

The T.Encaps transit encapsulation behavior is defined as follows:

1. push an IPv6 header with its own SRH (S3, S2, S1; SL=2)
2. set outer IPv6 SA = T and outer IPv6 DA = S1
3. set outer payload length, traffic class and flow label ;; Ref1
4. update the Next-Header value ;; Ref1
5. decrement inner Hop Limit or TTL ;; Ref1
6. forward along the shortest path to S1

After the T.Encaps behavior, P1 and P2 respectively look like:

- (T, S1) (S3, S2, S1; SL=2) (A, B2)
- (T, S1) (S3, S2, S1; SL=2) (A, B2) (B3, B2, B1; SL=1)

The T.Encaps behavior is valid for any kind of Layer-3 traffic. This behavior is commonly used for L3VPN with IPv4 and IPv6 deployments.

The SRH MAY be omitted when the SRv6 Policy only contains one segment and there is no need to use any flag, tag or TLV.

Ref 1: As described in [RFC2473] (Generic Packet Tunneling in IPv6 Specification)

5.5. T.Encaps.Red: Transit with reduce encaps in an SRv6 Policy

The T.Encaps.Red behavior is an optimization of the T.Encaps behavior. It is defined as follows:

1. push an IPv6 header with its own SRH (S3, S2; SL=2)
2. set outer IPv6 SA = T and outer IPv6 DA = S1
3. set outer payload length, traffic class and flow label ;; Ref1
4. update the Next-Header value ;; Ref1
5. decrement inner Hop Limit or TTL ;; Ref1
6. forward along the shortest path to S1

Ref 1: As described in [RFC2473] (Generic Packet Tunneling in IPv6 Specification)

T.Encaps.Red will reduce the size of the SRH by one segment by avoiding the insertion of the first SID in the SRH of the pushed IPv6 packet. In this way, the first segment is only introduced in the DA and the packet is forwarded according to it.

Note that SL value is initially pointing to a non-existing segment in the SRH.

After the T.Encaps.Red behavior, P1 and P2 respectively look like:

- (T, S1) (S3, S2; SL=2) (A, B2)

- (T, S1) (S3, S2; SL=2) (A, B2) (B3, B2, B1; SL=1)

The SRH MAY be omitted when the SRv6 Policy only contains one segment and there is no need to use any flag, tag or TLV.

5.6. T.Encaps.L2: Transit with encapsulation of L2 frames

While T.Encaps encapsulates the received IP packet, T.Encaps.L2 encapsulates the received L2 frame (i.e. the received ethernet header and its optional VLAN header is in the payload of the outer packet).

If the outer header is pushed without SRH then the DA must be a SID of type End.DX2, End.DX2V, End.DT2U or End.DT2M and the next-header must be 59 (IPv6 NoNextHeader). The received Ethernet frame follows the IPv6 header and its extension headers.

Else, if the outer header is pushed with an SRH, then the last SID of the SRH must be of type End.DX2, End.DX2V, End.DT2U or End.DT2M and the next-header of the SRH must be 59 (IPv6 NoNextHeader). The received Ethernet frame follows the IPv6 header and its extension headers.

5.7. T.Encaps.L2.Red: Transit with reduce encaps of L2 frames in an SRv6 Policy

The T.Encaps.L2.Red behavior is an optimization of the T.Encaps.L2 behavior.

T.Encaps.L2.Red will reduce the size of the SRH by one segment by avoiding the insertion of the first SID in the SRH of the pushed IPv6 packet. In this way, the first segment is only introduced in the DA and the packet is forwarded according to it.

Note that SL value is initially pointing to a non-existing segment in the SRH.

The SRH MAY be omitted when the SRv6 Policy only contains one segment and there is no need to use any flag, tag or TLV.

6. Operation

6.1. Counters

Any SRv6 capable node SHOULD implement the following set of combined counters (packets and bytes):

- CNT1: Per entry of the "My Local SID Table", traffic that matched that SID and was processed correctly.

- CNT2: Per SRv6 Policy, traffic steered into it and processed correctly.

Furthermore, an SRv6 capable node maintains an aggregate counter CNT3 tracking the IPv6 traffic that was received with a destination address matching a local interface address that is not a local SID and the next-header is SRH with SL>0. We remind that this traffic is dropped as an interface address is not a local SID by default. A SID must be explicitly instantiated.

6.2. Flow-based hash computation

When a flow-based selection within a set needs to be performed, the source address, the destination address and the flow-label MUST be included in the flow-based hash.

This occurs when the destination address is updated, a FIB lookup is performed and multiple ECMP paths exist to the updated destination address.

This occurs when End.X is bound to an array of adjacencies.

This occurs when the packet is steered in an SR policy whose selected path has multiple SID lists
[I-D.filsfils-spring-segment-routing-policy].

6.3. O-bit processing

[I-D.ietf-6man-segment-routing-header] defines the Segment Routing Header (SRH) Flag O-bit. This document defines the usage of the O-bit in the SRH.

Implementation of the O-bit is optional. If a node does not support the O-bit, then upon reception it simply ignores it. If a node supports the O-bit, it can optionally advertise its potential via node capability advertisement in IGP.

The SRH.Flags.O-bit implements the "punt a timestamped copy and forward" behavior. We insert at the beginning of the pseudo-code the following instructions:

1. Timestamp a local copy of the packet. ;; Ref1
2. Punt the copied packet to CPU for SW processing (slow-path);; Ref2

Ref1: Timestamping is done ASAP at the ingress pipeline (in hardware). As timestamping is done on a copy of the packet which is locally punted, timestamp value can be carried in the local packet header.

Ref2: Hardware (microcode) just punts the packet. There is no requirement for the hardware to manipulate any TLV in SRH (or elsewhere). Software (slow path) implements the required OAM mechanism. Timestamp is not carried in the packet forwarded to the next hop.

6.4. End.OTP: OAM Endpoint with Timestamp and Punt

Many scenarios require punting of SRv6 OAM packets at the desired nodes in the network. The "OAM Endpoint with Timestamp and Punt" function (End.OTP for short) represents a special OAM function to implement the timestamp and punt behavior for an OAM packet.

When N receives a packet destined to S and S is a local End.OTP SID, N does:

1. Timestamp the packet ; ; Ref1
2. Punt the packet to CPU for SW processing (slow-path) ; ; Ref2

Ref1: Timestamping is done ASAP at the ingress pipeline (in hardware). A timestamped packet is locally punted, timestamp value can be carried in local packet header.

Ref2: Hardware (microcode) only punts the packet. There is no requirement for the hardware to manipulate any TLV in the SRH (or elsewhere). Software (slow path) implements the required OAM mechanisms.

7. Basic security for intra-domain deployment

We use the following terminology:

An internal node is a node part of the domain of trust.

A border router is an internal node at the edge of the domain of trust.

An external interface is an interface of a border router towards another domain.

An internal interface is an interface entirely within the domain of trust.

The internal address space is the IP address block dedicated to internal interfaces.

An internal SID is a SID instantiated on an internal node.

The internal SID space is the IP address block dedicated to internal SIDs.

External traffic is traffic received from an external interface to the domain of trust.

Internal traffic is traffic that originates and ends within the domain of trust.

The purpose of this section is to document how a domain of trust can operate SRv6-based services for internal traffic while preventing any external traffic from accessing the internal SRv6-based services.

It is expected that future documents will detail enhanced security mechanisms for SRv6 (e.g. how to allow external traffic to leverage internal SRv6 services).

7.1. SEC 1

An SRv6 router MUST support an ACL on the external interface that drops any traffic with SA or DA in the internal SID space.

A provider would generally do this for its internal address space to prevent access to internal addresses and in order to prevent spoofing. The technique is extended to the local SID space.

The typical counters of an ACL are expected.

7.2. SEC 2

An SRv6 router MUST support an ACL with the following behavior:

1. IF (DA == LocalSID) && (SA != internal address or SID space)
2. drop

This prevents access to local SIDs from outside the operator's infrastructure. Note that this ACL may not be enabled in all cases. For example, specific SIDs can be used to provide resources to devices that are outside of the operator's infrastructure.

When an SID is in the form of LOC:FUNCT:ARGS the DA match should be implemented as a prefix match covering the argument space of the specific SID i.s.o. a host route.

The typical counters of an ACL are expected.

7.3. SEC 3

As per the End definition, an SRv6 router MUST only implement the End behavior on a local IPv6 address if that address has been explicitly enabled as a segment.

This address may or may not be associated with an interface. This address may or may not be routed. The only thing that matters is that the local SID must be explicitly instantiated and explicitly bound to a function (the default function is the End function).

7.4. SEC 4

An SRv6 router should support Unicast-RPF on source address on external interface.

This is a generic provider technique applied to the internal address space. It is extended to the internal SID space.

The typical counters to validate such filtering are expected.

8. Control Plane

In an SDN environment, one expects the controller to explicitly provision the SIDs and/or discover them as part of a service discovery function. Applications residing on top of the controller could then discover the required SIDs and combine them to form a distributed network program.

The concept of "SRv6 network programming" refers to the capability for an application to encode any complex program as a set of individual functions distributed through the network. Some functions relate to underlay SLA others to overlay/tenant, others to complex applications residing in VM and containers.

The specification of the SRv6 control-plane is outside the scope of this document.

We limit ourselves to a few important observations.

8.1. IGP

The End and End.X SIDs express topological functions and hence are expected to be signaled in the IGP together with the flavours PSP and USP [I-D.bashandy-isis-srv6-extensions].

The presence of SIDs in the IGP do not imply any routing semantics to the addresses represented by these SIDs. The routing reachability to

an IPv6 address is solely governed by the classic, non-SID-related, IGP information. Routing is not governed neither influenced in any way by a SID advertisement in the IGP.

These two SIDs provide important topological functions for the IGP to build FRR/TI-LFA solution and for TE processes relying on IGP LSDB to build SR policies.

8.2. BGP-LS

BGP-LS is expected to be the key service discovery protocol. Every node is expected to advertise via BGP-LS its SRv6 capabilities (e.g. how many SIDs in can insert as part of an T.Insert behavior) and any locally instantiated SID[I-D.ietf-idr-bgp-ls-segment-routing-ext][I-D.ietf-idr-te-lsp-distribution].

8.3. BGP IP/VPN

The End.DX4, End.DX6, End.DT4, End.DT6, End.DT46 and End.DX2 SIDs are expected to be signaled in BGP[I-D.dawra-idr-srv6-vpn].

8.4. Summary

The following table summarizes which SID would be signaled in which signaling protocol.

	IGP	BGP-LS	BGP IP/VPN
End (PSP, USP)	X	X	
End.X (PSP, USP)	X	X	
End.T (PSP, USP)	X	X	
End.DX2		X	X
End.DX2V		X	X
End.DT2U		X	X
End.DT2M		X	X
End.DX6	X	X	X
End.DX4		X	X
End.DT6	X	X	X
End.DT4		X	X
End.DT46		X	X
End.B6		X	
End.B6.Encaps		X	
End.B6.BM		X	
End.S		X	
End.OTP	X	X	X

Table 1: SRv6 LocalSID signaling

The following table summarizes which transit capability would be signaled in which signaling protocol.

	IGP	BGP-LS	BGP IP/VPN
T		X	
T.Insert		X	
T.Encaps		X	
T.Encaps.L2		X	

Table 2: SRv6 transit behaviors signaling

The previous table describes generic capabilities. It does not describe specific instantiated SID.

For example, a BGP-LS advertisement of the T capability of node N would indicate that node N supports the basic transit behavior. The T.Insert behavior would describe the capability of node N to instantiate a T.Insert behavior, specifically it would describe how many SIDs could be inserted by N without significant performance degradation. Same for T.Encaps (the number potentially lower as the overhead of the additional outer IP header is accounted).

The reader should also remember that any specific instantiated SR policy (via T.Insert or T.Encaps) is always assigned a Binding SID. They should remember that BSIDs are advertised in BGP-LS as shown in Table 1. Hence, it is normal that Table 2 only focuses on the generic capabilities related to T.Insert and T.Encaps as Table 1 advertises the specific instantiated BSID properties.

9. Illustration

We introduce a simplified SID allocation technique to ease the reading of the text. We document the reference diagram. We then illustrate the network programming concept through different use-cases. These use-cases have been thought to allow straightforward combination between each other.

9.1. Simplified SID allocation

To simplify the illustration, we assume:

A::/4 is dedicated to the internal SRv6 SID space

B::/4 is dedicated to the internal address space

We assume a location expressed in 48 bits and a function expressed in 80 bits

Node k has a classic IPv6 loopback address Bk::/128 which is advertised in the IGP

Node k has Ak::/48 for its local SID space. Its SIDs will be explicitly allocated from that block

Node k advertises Ak::/48 in its IGP

Function 0:0:0:0:1 (function 1, for short) represents the End function with PSP support

Function 0:0:0:0:C2 (function C2, for short) represents the End.X function towards neighbor 2

Each node K has:

An explicit SID instantiation Ak::1/128 bound to an End function with additional support for PSP

An explicit SID instantiation Ak::Cj/128 bound to an End.X function to neighbor J with additional support for PSP

9.2. Reference diagram

Let us assume the following topology where all the links have IGP metric 10 except the link 23 which is 100.

Nodes A, 1 to 8 and B are considered within the network domain while nodes CE-A and CE-B are outside the domain.




Figure 1: Reference topology

9.3. Basic security

Any edge node such as 1 would be configured with an ACL on any of its external interface (e.g. from CE-A) which drops any traffic with SA or DA in A::/4. See SEC 1 (Section 7.1).

Any core node such as 6 could be configured with an ACL with the SEC2 (Section 7.2) behavior "IF (DA == LocalSID) && (SA is not in A::/4 or B::/4) THEN drop".

SEC 3 (Section 7.3) protection is a default property of SRv6. A SID must be explicitly instantiated. In our illustration, the only available SIDs are those explicitly instantiated.

Any edge node such as 1 would be configured with Unicast-RPF on source address on external interface (e.g. from CE-A). See SEC 4 (Section 7.4).

9.4. SR-IPVPN

Let us illustrate the SR-IPVPN use-case applied to IPv4.

Nodes 1 and 8 are configured with a tenant 100, each respectively connected to CE-A and CE-B.

Node 8 is configured with a local SID A8::D100 of function End.DT4 bound to tenant IPv4 table 100.

Via BGP signaling or an SDN-based controller, Node 1's tenant-100 IPv4 table is programmed with an IPv4 SR-VPN route 20/8 via SRv6 policy <A8::D100>.

When 1 receives a packet P from CE-A destined to 20.20.20.20, 1 looks up P in its tenant-100 IPv4 table and finds an SR-VPN entry 20/8 via SRv6 policy <A8::D100>. As a consequence, 1 pushes an outer IPv6 header with SA=A1::0, DA=A8::D100 and NH=4. 1 then forwards the resulting packet on the shortest path to A8::/40.

When 8 receives the packet, 8 matches the DA in its My LocalSID table, finds the bound function End.DT4(100) and confirms NH=4. As a result, 8 decaps the outer header, looks up the inner IPv4 DA in tenant-100 IPv4 table, and forward the (inner) IPv4 packet towards CE-B.

The reader can easily infer all the other SR-IPVPN IP instantiations:

Route at ingress PE(1)	SR-VPN Egress SID of egress PE(8)
IPv4 tenant route with egress tenant table lookup	End.DT4 function bound to IPv4-tenant-100 table
IPv4 tenant route without egress tenant table lookup	End.DX4 function bound to CE-B (IPv4)
IPv6 tenant route with egress tenant table lookup	End.DT6 function bound to IPv6-tenant-100 table
IPv6 tenant route without egress tenant table lookup	End.DX6 function bound to CE-B (IPv6)

9.5. SR-Ethernet-VPWS

Let us illustrate the SR-Ethernet-VPWS use-case.

Node 1 is configured with an ethernet VPWS service:

- Local attachment circuit: Ethernet interface from CE-A
- Local End.DX2 bound to the local attachment circuit: A1::DC2A
- Remote End.DX2 SID: A8::DC2B

Node 8 is configured with an ethernet VPWS service:

- Local attachment circuit: Ethernet interface from CE-B
- Local End.DX2 bound to the local attachment circuit: A8::DC2B
- Remote End.DX2 SID: A1::DC2A

These configurations can either be programmed by an SDN controller or partially derived from a BGP-based signaling and discovery service.

When 1 receives a frame F from CE-A, 1 pushes an outer IPv6 header with SA=A1::0, DA=A8::DC2B and NH=59. Note that no additional header is pushed. 1 then forwards the resulting packet on the shortest path to A8::/40.

When 8 receives the packet, 8 matches the DA in its My LocalSID table and finds the bound function End.DX2. After confirming that the next-header=59, 8 decaps the outer IPv6 header and forwards the inner Ethernet frame towards CE-B.

The reader can easily infer the Ethernet VPWS use-case:

Route at ingress PE(1)	SR-VPN Egress SID of egress PE(8)
Ethernet VPWS	End.DX2 function bound to CE-B (Ethernet)

9.6. SR-EVPN-FXC

Let us illustrate the SR-EVPN-FXC use-case (Flexible cross-connect service).

Node 1 is configured with an EVPN-FXC service:

- Local attachment circuit: Ethernet interface from CE1-A over VLAN 100
- Local attachment circuit: Ethernet interface from CE2-A over VLAN 200
- Local End.DX2 bound to the local attachment circuit: A1::DC2A
- Remote End.DX2 SID: A8::DC2B

Node 8 is configured with an EVPN-FXC service:

- Local attachment circuit: Ethernet interface from CE1-B over VLAN 100
- Local attachment circuit: Ethernet interface from CE2-B over VLAN 200
- Local End.DX2 bound to the local attachment circuit: A8::DC2B
- Remote End.DX2 SID: A1::DC2A

These configurations can either be programmed by an SDN controller or derived from a BGP-based EVPN-FXC service. EVPN route Type-1 is used for that purpose.

When node 1 receives a frame F from CE-A, it pushes an outer IPv6 header with SA=A1::0, DA=A8::DC2B and NH=59. Note that no additional header is pushed. Node 1 then forwards the resulting packet on the shortest path to A8::/40.

When node 8 receives the packet, it matches the IP DA in its My LocalSID table and finds the bound function End.DX2V. After confirming that the next-header=59, node 8 decaps the outer IPv6 header, performs a VLAN lookup in table T1 and forwards the inner Ethernet frame to matching interface e.g. for VLAN 100, packet is forwarded to CE1-B and for VLAN 200, frame is forwarded to CE2-B.

The reader can easily infer the Ethernet FXC use-case:

Route at ingress PE (1)	SR-VPN Egress SID of egress PE (8)
EVPN-FXC	End.DX2V function bound to CE1-B / CE2-B (Ethernet)

9.7. SR-EVPN

There are few use cases to illustrate under SR-EVPN: bridging (unicast and multicast), multi-homing ESI filtering, EVPN L3, EVPN-IRB.

9.7.1. EVPN Bridging

Node 1 is configured with an EVPN bridging service (E-LAN service):

- Local attachment circuit: Ethernet interface from CE-A

- Local End.DT2U bound to a local layer2 table T1 where EVPN is enable: A1::D2AA. That SID is used to attract unicast traffic
- Local End.DT2M bound to the same local layer2 table T1 where EVPN is enable: A1::D2AF:0. That SID is used to attract BUM traffic

Node 4 is configured with an EVPN bridging service:

- Local attachment circuit: Ethernet interface from CE-B
- Local End.DT2U bound to a local layer2 table T1 where EVPN is enable: A4::D2BA. That SID is used to attract unicast traffic
- Local End.DT2M bound to the same local layer2 Table T1 where EVPN is enable: A4::D2BF:0. That SID is used to attract BUM traffic

Node 8 is configured with an EVPN bridging service:

- Local attachment circuit: Ethernet interface from CE-C
- Local End.DT2U bound to a local layer2 table T1 where EVPN is enable: A8::D2CA. That SID is used to attract unicast traffic
- Local End.DT2M bound to the same local layer2 Table T1 where EVPN is enable: A8::D2CF:0/112. That SID is used to attract BUM traffic

The End.DT2M SID are exchanged between nodes via BGP-based EVPN Type-3 route.

Upon reception of EVPN Type-3 routes, each node build its own replication list per layer2 table T1.

On node 1, the replication list looks like: A4::D2BF:0, A8::D2CF:0.
On node 4, the replication list looks like: A1::D2AF:0, A8::D2CF:0.
On node 8, the replication list looks like: A1:D2AF:0, A4:D2BF:0. In the case of ingress replication, Ingress PE transmitting the BUM traffic stream replicates the traffic using that list.

When node 1 receives a BUM frame F from CE-A, it replicates that frame to remote nodes. For node 4, it pushes an outer IPv6 header with SA=A1::0, DA=A4::D2BF:0 and NH=59. For node 8, it performs the same operation but DA=A8::D2CF:0. Note that no additional header is pushed. Node 1 then forwards the resulting packet on the shortest path for each replication e.g. A4::D2BF:0/112 and A8::D2CF:0/112.

When node 4 receives the packet, it matches the DA in its My LocalSID table and finds the bound function End.DT2M and its related layer2 table T1. After confirming that the next-header=59, node 4 decaps

the outer IPv6 header and forwards the inner Ethernet frame to all layer-2 output interface found to table T1. Similar processing is also performed by node 8 upon packet reception. This example is the same for any BUM stream coming from CE-B and CE-C.

Node 1,4 and 8 are also performing software MAC learning to exchange MAC reachability information (unicast traffic) via BGP among themselves.

Each MAC being learned in software are exchanged using BGP-based EVPN route type-2.

When node 1 receives an unicast frame F from CE-A, it learns its MAC-SA=CEA in software. Node 1 transmits that MAC and its associated SID A1::D2AA using BGP-based EVPN route-type 2 to all remote nodes.

When node 4 receives an unicast frame F from CE-B destined to MAC-DA=CEA, it performs a L2 table T1 MAC-DA lookup to find the associated SID. It pushes an outer IPv6 header with SA=A4::0, DA=A1::D2AA and NH=59. Note that no additional header is pushed. Node 4 then forwards the resulting packet on the shortest path to A1::/40. Similar processing is also performed by node 8.

9.7.2. EVPN Multi-homing with ESI filtering

In L2 network, traffic loop avoidance is a MUST. In EVPN all-active multi-homing scenario, ESI filtering feature enforce that requirement.

Node 1 and node 2 are peering partners of a redundancy group where the access CE-A is connected in an all-active multi-homing way with these two nodes.

Node 1 is configured with an EVPN bridging service (E-LAN service):

- Local attachment circuit: Ethernet interface from CE-A
- Local Arg.FE2 bound to the attachment circuit: 0xC1
- Local End.DT2M bound to the same local layer2 table T1 where EVPN is enable: A1::D2AF:0/112. That SID is used to attract BUM traffic

Node 2 is configured with an EVPN bridging service:

- Local attachment circuit: Ethernet interface from CE-A
- Local Arg.FE2 bound to the attachment circuit: 0xC2

- Local End.DT2M bound to the same local layer2 Table T1 where EVPN is enable: A2::D2BF:0/112. That SID is used to attract BUM traffic

The End.DT2M SID are exchanged between nodes via BGP-based EVPN route type-3.

Upon reception of EVPN Type-3 routes, each node build its own replication list per layer2 table T1.

The End.DT2M SID arguments Arg.FE2 are exchange between nodes via BGP ESI-filtering extended community attached to BGP-based EVPN route type-1.

Upon reception of EVPN route type-1 and type-3, node 1 merges the End.DT2M SID and the Arg.FE2 argument from node 2; its peering partner. Its replication list looks like A2::D2BF:C1. Similar procedure is performed by node 2.

When node 1 receives a BUM frame F from CE-A, it replicates that frame to remote nodes. For node 2, it pushes an outer IPv6 header with SA=A1::0, DA=A2::D2BF:C1 and NH=59. Note that no additional header is pushed. Node 1 then forwards the resulting packet on the shortest path for each replication e.g. A2::D2BF:00/112. Again, similar processing is also performed by node 8 upon packet reception

9.7.3. EVPN Layer-3

EVPN layer-3 works exactly in the same way of IPVPN. Please refer to SR-IPVPN section

9.7.4. EVPN Integrated Routing Bridging (IRB)

EVPN IRB brings Layer-2 and Layer-3 together. It uses BGP-based EVPN route type-2 to achieve Layer-2 intra-subnet and Layer-3 inter-subnet forwarding. The EVPN route type-2 maintain the associated of a MAC/IP association.

Node 1 is configured with an EVPN IRB service:

- Local attachment circuit: Ethernet interface from CE-A
- Local End.DT2U bound to a local layer2 table T1 where EVPN is enable: SID = A1::D2AA. That SID is used to attract unicast L2 traffic
- Local End.DT2 bound to tenant IPv4 table 100: SID = A1::D3AA. That SID is used to attract L3 traffic

Node 8 is configured with an EVPN IRB service:

- Local attachment circuit: Ethernet interface from CE-C
- Local End.DT2U bound to a local layer2 table T1 where EVPN is enable: SID = A8::D2CB. That SID is used to attract unicast L2 traffic
- Local End.DT2 bound to tenant IPv4 table 100: SID = A8::D3CB. That SID is used to attract L3 traffic

Each ARP/ND request learned by each node are exchanged using BGP-based EVPN route type-2.

When node 1 receives an ARP/ND packet P from a host (10.10.10.10) on CE-A destined to 20.20.20.20, it learns its MAC-SA=CEA in software. It also learns the ARP/ND entry (IP SA=10.10.10.10) in its cache. Node 1 transmits that MAC/IP and its associated L2 SID A1::D2AA and L3 SID A1::D3AA using BGP-based EVPN route-type 2 to all remote nodes.

When node 8 receives a packet P from CE-C destined to 10.10.10.10 from a host (20.20.20.20), P looks up its tenant-100 IPv4 table and finds an SR-VPN entry for that prefix. As a consequence, node 8 pushes an outer IPv6 header with SA=A8::0, DA=A1::D3AA and NH=4. Node 8 then forwards the resulting packet on the shortest path to A1::/40. EVPN inter-subnet forwarding is then achieved.

When node 8 receives a packet P from CE-C destined to 10.10.10.10 from a host (10.10.10.11), P looks up its L2 table T1 MAC-DA lookup to find the associated SID. It pushes an outer IPv6 header with SA=A8::0, DA=A1::D2AA and NH=59. Note that no additional header is pushed. Node 8 then forwards the resulting packet on the shortest path to A1::/40. EVPN intra-subnet forwarding is then achieved.

9.8. SR TE for Underlay SLA

9.8.1. SR policy from the Ingress PE

Let's assume that node 1's tenant-100 IPv4 route "20/8 via A8::D100" is programmed with a color/community that requires low-latency underlay optimization [I-D.filsfils-spring-segment-routing-policy].

In such case, node 1 either computes the low-latency path to the egress node itself or delegates the computation to a PCE.

In either case, the location of the egress PE can easily be found by looking for who originates the SID block comprising the SID A8::D100.

This can be found in the IGP's LSDB for a single domain case, and in the BGP-LS LSDB for a multi-domain case.

Let us assume that the TE metric encodes the per-link propagation latency. Let us assume that all the links have a TE metric of 10, except link 27 which has TE metric 100.

The low-latency path from 1 to 8 is thus 1245678.

This path is encoded in a SID list as: first a hop through A4::C5 and then a hop to 8.

As a consequence the SR-VPN entry 20/8 installed in the Node1's Tenant-100 IPv4 table is: T.Encaps with SRv6 Policy <A4::C5, A8::D100>.

When 1 receives a packet P from CE-A destined to 20.20.20.20, P looks up its tenant-100 IPv4 table and finds an SR-VPN entry 20/8. As a consequence, 1 pushes an outer header with SA=A1::0, DA=A4::C5, NH=SRH followed by SRH (A8::D100, A4::C5; SL=1; NH=4). 1 then forwards the resulting packet on the interface to 2.

2 forwards to 4 along the path to A4::/40.

When 4 receives the packet, 4 matches the DA in its My LocalSID table and finds the bound function End.X to neighbor 5. 4 notes the PSP capability of the SID A4::C5. 4 sets the DA to the next SID A8::D100. As 4 is the penultimate segment hop, it performs PSP and pops the SRH. 4 forwards the resulting packet to 5.

5, 6 and 7 forwards along the path to A8::/40.

When 8 receives the packet, 8 matches the DA in its My LocalSID Table and finds the bound function End.DT(100). As a result, 8 decaps the outer header, looks up the inner IPv4 DA in tenant-100 IPv4 table, and forward the (inner) IPv4 packet towards CE-B.

9.8.2. SR policy at a midpoint

Let us analyze a policy applied at a midpoint on a packet without SRH.

Packet P1 is (A1::, A8::D100).

Let us consider P1 when it is received by node 2 and let us assume that that node 2 is configured to steer A8::/40 in a transit behavior T.Insert associated with SR policy <A4::C5>.

In such a case, node 2 would send the following modified packet P1 on the link to 4:

```
(A1::, A4::C5)(A8::D100, A4::C5; SL=1).
```

The rest of the processing is similar to the previous section.

Let us analyze a policy applied at a midpoint on a packet with an SRH.

Packet P2 is (A1::, A7::1)(A8::D100, A7::1; SL=1).

Let us consider P2 when it is received by node 2 and let us assume that node 2 is configured to steer A7::/40 in a transit behavior T.Insert associated with SR policy <A4::C5, A9::1>.

In such a case, node 2 would send the following modified packet P2 on the link to 4:

```
(A1::, A4::C5)(A7::1, A9::1, A4::C5; SL=2)(A8::D100, A7::1; SL=1)
```

Node 4 would send the following packet to 5: (A1::, A9::1)(A7::1, A9::1, A4::C5; SL=1)(A8::D100, A7::; SL=1)

Node 5 would send the following packet to 9: (A1::, A9::1)(A7::1, A9::1, A4::C5; SL=1)(A8::D100, A7::1; SL=1)

Node 9 would send the following packet to 6: (A1::, A7::1)(A8::D100, A7::1; SL=1)

Node 6 would send the following packet to 7: (A1::, A7::1)(A8::D100, A7::1; SL=1)

Node 7 would send the following packet to 8: (A1::, A8::D100)

9.9. End-to-End policy with intermediate BSID

Let us now describe a case where the ingress VPN edge node steers the packet destined to 20.20.20.20 towards the egress edge node connected to the tenant100 site with 20/8, but via an intermediate SR Policy represented by a single routable Binding SID. Let us illustrate this case with an intermediate policy which both encodes underlay optimization for low-latency and the service chaining via two SR-aware container-based apps.

Let us assume that the End.B6 SID A2::B1 is configured at node 2 and is associated with midpoint T.Insert policy <A4::C5, A9::A1, A6::A2>.

A4::C5 realizes the low-latency path from the ingress PE to the egress PE. This is the underlay optimization part of the intermediate policy.

A9::A1 and A6::A2 represent two SR-aware NFV applications residing in containers respectively connected to node 9 and 6.

Let us assume the following ingress VPN policy for 20/8 in tenant 100 IPv4 table of node 1: T.Encaps with SRv6 Policy <A2::B1, A8::D100>.

This ingress policy will steer the 20/8 tenant-100 traffic towards the correct egress PE and via the required intermediate policy that realizes the SLA and NFV requirements of this tenant customer.

Node 1 sends the following packet to 2: (A1::, A2::B1) (A8::D100, A2::B1; SL=1)

Node 2 sends the following packet to 4: (A1::, A4::C5) (A6::A2, A9::A1, A4::C5; SL=2)(A8::D100, A2::B1; SL=1)

Node 4 sends the following packet to 5: (A1::, A9::A1) (A6::A2, A9::A1, A4::C5; SL=1)(A8::D100, A2::B1; SL=1)

Node 5 sends the following packet to 9: (A1::, A9::A1) (A6::A2, A9::A1, A4::C5; SL=1)(A8::D100, A2::B1; SL=1)

Node 9 sends the following packet to 6: (A1::, A6::A2) (A8::D100, A2::B1; SL=1)

Node 6 sends the following packet to 7: (A1::, A8::D100)

Node 7 sends the following packet to 8: (A1::, A8::D100) which decaps and forwards to CE-B.

The benefits of using an intermediate Binding SID are well-known and key to the Segment Routing architecture: the ingress edge node needs to push fewer SIDs, the ingress edge node does not need to change its SR policy upon change of the core topology or re-homing of the container-based apps on different servers. Conversely, the core and service organizations do not need to share details on how they realize underlay SLA's or where they home their NFV apps.

9.10. TI-LFA

Let us assume two packets P1 and P2 received by node 2 exactly when the failure of link 27 is detected.

P1: (A1::, A7::1)

P2: (A1::, A7::1)(A8::D100, A7::1; SL=1)

Node 2's pre-computed TI-LFA backup path for the destination A7:: is <A4::C5>. It is installed as a T.Insert transit behavior.

Node 2 protects the two packets P1 and P2 according to the pre-computed TI-LFA backup path and send the following modified packets on the link to 4:

P1: (A1::, A4::C5)(A7::1, A4::C5; SL=1)

P2: (A1::, A4::C5)(A7::1, A4::C5; SL=1) (A8::D100, A7::1; SL=1)

Node 4 then sends the following modified packets to 5:

P1: (A1::, A7::1)

P2: (A1::, A7::1)(A8::D100, A7::1; SL=1)

Then these packets follow the rest of their post-convergence path towards node 7 and then go to node 8 for the VPN decaps.

9.11. SR TE for Service chaining

We have illustrated the service chaining through SR-aware apps in a previous section.

We illustrate the use of End.AS function [I-D.xu-clad-spring-sr-service-chaining] to service chain an IP flow bound to the internet through two SR-unaware applications hosted in containers.

Let us assume that servers 20 and 70 are respectively connected to nodes 2 and 7. They are respectively configured with SID spaces A020::/40 and A070::/40. Their connected routers advertise the related prefixes in the IGP. Two SR-unaware container-based applications App2 and App7 are respectively hosted on server 20 and 70. Server 20 (70) is configured explicitly with an End.AS SID A020::2 for App2 (A070::7 for App7).

Let us assume a broadband customer with a home gateway CE-A connected to edge router 1. Router 1 is configured with an SR policy which encapsulates all the traffic received from CE-A into a T.Encaps policy <A020::2, A070::7, A8::D0> where A8::D0 is an End.DT4 SID instantiated at node 8.

P1 is a packet sent by the broadband customer to 1: (X, Y) where X and Y are two IPv4 addresses.

1 sends the following packet to 2: (A1::0, A020::2)(A8::D0, A070::7, A020::2; SL=2; NH=4)(X, Y).

2 forwards the packet to server 20.

20 receives the packet (A1::0, A020::2)(A8::D0, A070::7, A020::2; SL=2; NH=4)(X, Y) and forwards the inner IPv4 packet (X,Y) to App2. App2 works on the packet and forwards it back to 20. 20 pushes the outer IPv6 header with SRH (A1::0, A070::7)(A8::D0, A070::7, A020::2; SL=1; NH=4) and sends the (whole) IPv6 packet with the encapsulated IPv4 packet back to 2.

2 and 7 forward to server 70.

70 receives the packet (A1::0, A070::7)(A8::D0, A070::7, A020::2; SL=1; NH=4)(X, Y) and forwards the inner IPv4 packet (X,Y) to App7. App7 works on the packet and forwards it back to 70. 70 pushes the outer IPv6 header with SRH (A1::0, A8::D0)(A8::D0, A070::7, A020::2; SL=0; NH=4) and sends the (whole) IPv6 packet with the encapsulated IPv4 packet back to 7.

7 forwards to 8.

8 receives (A1::0, A8::D0)(A8::D0, A070::7, A020::2; SL=0; NH=4)(X, Y) and performs the End.DT4 function and sends the IP packet (X, Y) towards its internet destination.

9.12. OAM

This section illustrates the use of O-bit and End.OTP SID by describing the ping use-case.

9.12.1. Ping to a SID function

Consider the case where the user wants to ping a remote SID function A8::DC4B, via A4::C5, from node 1. Node 1 constructs the ping packet (B1::0, A4::C5)(A8::DC4B, A4::C5, SL=1; NH=ICMPv6)(ICMPv6 Echo Request). When node 8 receives the ICMPv6 echo request with DA set to A8::DC4B and next header set to ICMPv6, it silently drops it (see security section for details). To solve this problem, the initiator needs to mark the ICMPv6 echo request as an OAM packet. The OAM packets are identified either by setting the O-bit in the SRH or by inserting an End.OTP SID at the appropriate place in the SRH.

9.12.2. End-to-end ping using End.OTP

Consider the same example where the user wants to ping a remote SID function A8::DC4B , via A4::C5, from node 1. To force a punt of the ICMPv6 echo request at the node 8, node 1 inserts the End.OTP SID just before the target SID A8::DC4B in the SRH, i.e., packet as it leaves node 1 looks like (B1::0, A4::C5)(A8::DC4B, A8::OTP, A4::C5; SL=2; NH=ICMPv6)(ICMPv6 Echo Request).

When the node 8 receives the packet (B1::0, A8::OTP)(A8::DC4B, A8::OTP, A4::C5 ; SL=1; NH=ICMPv6)(ICMPv6 Echo Request), it processes the End.OTP SID. The packet gets punted to ICMPv6 process for processing. The ICMPv6 process checks if the next SID in SRH (target SID A8::DC4B) is locally programmed or not and responds to the ICMPv6 Echo Request, accordingly.

9.12.3. Segment-by-segment ping using the O-bit

Consider the same example where the user wants to ping a remote SID function A8::DC4B, via A4::C5, from node 1. However, in this ping, the node 1 wants to get a response from each segment node in the SRH. In other words, in the segment-by-segment ping case, the node 1 expects a response from node 4 and node 8 for their respective local SID function.

To force a punt of the ICMPv6 echo request at node 4 and node 8, node 1 sets the O-bit in the SRH. The packet, as it leaves node 1, looks like (B1::0, A4::C5)(A8::DC4B, A4::C5; SL=1, Flags.O=1; NH=ICMPv6)(ICMPv6 Echo Request).

When the node 4 receives the packet (B1::0, A4::C5)(A8::DC4B, A4::C5; SL=1, Flags.O=1; NH=ICMPv6)(ICMPv6 Echo Request) packet a time-stamped copy of the packet gets punted to the ICMPv6 process for processing. Node 4 continues to apply the A4::C5 SID function on the original packet and forwards it, accordingly. As SRH.Flags.O=1, Node4 also disables the PSP flavour, i.e., does not remove the SRH. The ICMPv6 process at node4 checks if its local SID (A4::C5) is locally programmed or not and responds to the ICMPv6 Echo Request, accordingly. Please note that if node 4 does not support the O-bit, it simply ignores it and process the local SID, A4::C5.

When the node 8 receives the packet (B1::0, A8::DC4B)(A8::DC4B, A4::C5; SL=0, Flags.O=1; NH=ICMPv6)(ICMPv6 Echo Request), it processes the O-bit in SRH. A time-stamped copy of the packet gets punted to the ICMPv6 process for processing. The ICMPv6 process at node 8 checks if its local SID (A8::DC4B) is locally programmed or not and responds to the ICMPv6 Echo Request, accordingly.

Support for the O-bit is part of the node capability advertisement. That enables node 1 to know which segment nodes are capable of responding to the ICMPv6 echo request.

10. Benefits

10.1. Seamless deployment

The VPN use-case can be realized with SRv6 capability deployed solely at the ingress and egress PE's.

All the nodes in between these PE's act as transit routers as per [RFC8200]. No software/hardware upgrade is required on all these nodes. They just need to support IPv6 per [RFC8200].

The SRTE/underlay-SLA use-case can be realized with SRv6 capability deployed at few strategic nodes.

It is well-known from the experience deploying SR-MPLS that underlay SLA optimization requires few SIDs placed at strategic locations. This was illustrated in our example with the low-latency optimization which required the operator to enable one single core node with SRv6 (node 4) where one single and End.X SID towards node 5 was instantiated. This single SID is sufficient to force the end-to-end traffic via the low-latency path.

The TI-LFA benefits are collected incrementally as SRv6 capabilities are deployed.

It is well-know that TI-LFA is an incremental node-by-node deployment. When a node N is enabled for TI-LFA, it computes TI-LFA backup paths for each primary path to each IGP destination. In more than 50% of the case, the post-convergence path is loop-free and does not depend on the presence of any remote SRv6 SID. In the vast majority of cases, a single segment is enough to encode the post-convergence path in a loop-free manner. If the required segment is available (that node has been upgraded) then the related back-up path is installed in FIB, else the pre-existing situation (no backup) continues. Hence, as the SRv6 deployment progresses, the coverage incrementally increases. Eventually, when the core network is SRv6 capable, the TI-LFA coverage is complete.

The service chaining use-case can be realized with SRv6 capability deployed at few strategic nodes.

The service-chaining deployment is again incremental and does not require any pre-deployment of SRv6 in the network. When an NFV

app A1 needs to be enabled for inclusion in an SRv6 service chain, all what is required is to install that app in a container or VM on an SRv6-capable server (Linux 4.10 or FD.io 17.04 release). The app can either be SR-aware or not, leveraging the proxy functions described in this document.

By leveraging the various END functions it can also be used to support any current PNF/VNF implementations and their forwarding methods (e.g. Layer 2).

The ability to leverage SR TE policies and BSIDs also permits building scalable, hierarchical service-chains.

10.2. Integration

The SRv6 network programming concept allows integrating all the application and service requirements: multi-domain underlay SLA optimization with scale, overlay VPN/Tenant, sub-50msec automated FRR, security and service chaining.

10.3. Security

The combination of well-known techniques (SEC1, SEC2, SEC4) and carefully chosen architectural rules (SEC3) ensure a secure deployment of SRv6 inside a multi-domain network managed by a single organization.

Inter-domain security will be described in a companion document.

11. IANA Considerations

This document requests the following new IANA registries:

- A new top-level registry "Segment-routing with IPv6 dataplane (SRv6) Parameters" to be created under IANA Protocol registries. This registry is being defined to serve as a top-level registry for keeping all other SRv6 sub-registries.
- A sub-registry "SRv6 Endpoint Types" to be defined under top-level "Segment-routing with IPv6 dataplane (SRv6) Parameters" registry. This sub-registry maintains 16-bit code-points for the defined SRv6 Endpoint types. The range of the registry is 0-65535 (0x0000 - 0xFFFF) and has the following registration rules and allocation policies:

Range	Hex	Registration procedure	Notes
0	0x0000	Reserved	Invalid Draft Specifications
1-32767	0x0001-0x7FFF	IETF review	
32768-49151	0x8000-0xBFFF	Reserved for experimental use	Wildcard
49152-65534	0xC000-0xFFFE	Reserved for private use	
65535	0xFFFF	Reserved	

Table 3: SRv6 Endpoint Types

The initial registrations for the "Draft Specifications" portion of the sub-registry are as follows:

Value	Hex	Endpoint function	Reference
1	0x0001	End (no PSP, no USP)	[This.ID]
2	0x0002	End with PSP	[This.ID]
3	0x0003	End with USP	[This.ID]
4	0x0004	End with PSP&USP	[This.ID]
5	0x0005	End.X (no PSP, no USP)	[This.ID]
6	0x0006	End.X with PSP	[This.ID]
7	0x0007	End.X with USP	[This.ID]
8	0x0008	End.X with PSP&USP	[This.ID]
9	0x0009	End.T (no PSP, no USP)	[This.ID]
10	0x000A	End.T with PSP	[This.ID]
11	0x000B	End.T with USP	[This.ID]
12	0x000C	End.T with PSP&USP	[This.ID]
13	0x000D	End.B6	[This.ID]
14	0x000E	End.B6.Encaps	[This.ID]
15	0x000F	End.BM	[This.ID]
16	0x0010	End.DX6	[This.ID]
17	0x0011	End.DX4	[This.ID]
18	0x0012	End.DT6	[This.ID]
19	0x0013	End.DT4	[This.ID]
20	0x0014	End.DT46	[This.ID]
21	0x0015	End.DX2	[This.ID]
22	0x0016	End.DX2V	[This.ID]
23	0x0017	End.DT2U	[This.ID]
24	0x0018	End.DT2M	[This.ID]
25	0x0019	End.OTP	[This.ID]
26	0x001A	End.S	[This.ID]

Table 4: SRv6 Endpoint Types

12. Work in progress

We are working on a extension of this document to provide Yang modelling for all the functionality described in this document. This work is ongoing in [I-D.raza-spring-srv6-yang].

13. Acknowledgements

TBD.

14. Contributors

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Separating Routing Planes using Segment Routing
draft-gulkohegde-routing-planes-using-sr-00

Abstract

Many network deployments arrange the network topologies in two or more planes. The traffic generally uses one of the planes and fails over to the other plane when there are link or node failure. Certain applications require the traffic to be strictly restricted to a particular plane and should not failover to the other plane. This document proposes a solution for the strict planar routing using Segment Routing.

Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

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1. Introduction




Figure 1: Network Planes

The above Figure 1 represents a network topology in two planes. Nodes A1, A2, A3, A4 are in plane A and B1, B2, B3, B4 are in plane B. A1->B1, A2->B2, A3->B3, A4->B4 represent the "shunt links" which connect the two planes. Certain applications require that the

traffic follows plane A and remains in plane A in case of failures and does not cross over to plane B. Strict routing plane requirements can be met using multiple techniques. This draft focuses on solutions using Segment Routing technology.

2. Motivation

The motivation of this document is to provide solutions to strict routing plane requirements using Segment Routing. The following objectives help to accomplish this in a range of deployment scenarios.

1. Maintain strict routing within routing planes.
2. Allow traffic to failover within routing plane and do not allow traffic to failover to other planes
3. Achieve ease of configuration and operational management

3. Solutions

There are multiple ways to address the strict routing plane requirements. Section 3.1 describes a mechanism by using different SIDs for each plane. Another option is to use Multi-topology SIDs as defined in Section 3.2.

3.1. Routing-plane SID

A new SID called Routing-Plane SID is defined and associated with new algorithm values. This document proposes 4 new algorithm values which represent SPF in routing-planes. When the network topology is organized into two different planes, each node in plane A associates a new Routing-Plane SID to one of its loopback addresses and advertises the SID in the segment routing extension defined in [SR-OSPF] section 2.1 and [SR-IS-IS] section 5. The prefix-SID sub-TLV carries the new algorithm values corresponding to the routing-plane. The traffic which needs to be restricted to a certain routing-plane, should use the Routing-Plane SID corresponding to that plane to forward the traffic. The paths through the Routing planes MAY use single Routing Plane SID or a stack of multiple Routing Plane SIDs. Adjacency-SIDs can also be used build paths across routing planes. Adjacency-SIDs are not scoped per-algorithm and it is possible that the protection path for the adjacency SIDs uses a path going over a different routing-plane. It is recommended to use non-protected adjacency-SIDs to avoid backup traffic flowing through different plane.

3.1.1. Elements of procedure

All the nodes that belong to a certain routing-plane MUST advertise the algorithm corresponding to that routing-plane in the algorithm sub-TLV as defined in [SR-OSPF] and [SR-IS-IS]. The nodes SHOULD also advertise Routing-Plane SID corresponding to that algorithm in the prefix-SID Sub-TLV.

A node that receives the algorithm sub-TLV with new algorithm value specified in Section 6 MUST compute SPF with all the nodes that advertised the new algorithm. The next-hops and RIB entries for the Routing-Plane SIDs MUST be computed from the routing-plane SPF. Certain nodes MAY belong to multiple routing-planes. Such nodes MUST compute SPF corresponding to each plane and compute the next-hops for the SIDs corresponding to each plane.

Each router MAY assign different IP address corresponding to each plane or MAY use the same IP address to assign the node-SIDs and Routing-Plane SIDs. The ingress routers MAY advertise binding-SIDs as defined in [SR-ARCH] section 3.5.2, for the label stacks that are constructed using routing-Plane SIDs. The ingress routers MAY map the incoming IP traffic onto the Routing-Plane SIDs, the mechanisms to do so is implementation dependant and outside the scope of this document.

When the network topology is organized into multiple IGP levels or areas, the Routing Plane SIDs MAY be re-originated from one IGP domain into the other domain by the border routers. The border IGP routers MUST re-advertise the Routing-Plane SIDs if they belong to the corresponding Routing plane and has advertised the algorithm corresponding to the routing-plane.

3.2. Multi-topology SID

Multi topology Routing defines mechanisms to support multiple topologies in a single physical network. ISIS and OSPF extensions to support multi-topology routing is defined in [RFC5120] and [RFC4915] respectively. Multi-topology routing defined in [RFC5120] and [RFC4915] describes mechanisms to separate topologies in ISIS and OSPF by advertising separate MT-TLVs in ISIS and multi-topology scoped Router LSA in OSPF. The different routing planes in customer network can be assigned with different MT-ID for each routing-plane and the multi-topology SIDs can be advertised for each MT-ID as described in [SR-OSPF] and [SR-IS-IS]. Multi-topology SIDs are associated with algorithm 0 and no new algorithm definition is required. All the nodes in the network MUST also support multi-topology routing as defined in [RFC5120] and [RFC4915]. All the nodes in the network compute separate SPF per MT-ID and program the

forwarding planes with MT-SIDs accordingly. Multi-topology SIDs are used to build the explicit paths through the network. Multi-topology based solution has an advantage of possibility of assigning different IGP costs to links for different MTs. For deployments that do not need separate IGP costs and topologies for each routing plane, it comes with an additional operational overhead of maintaining multi-topology configurations.

4. Backward compatibility

The mechanism described in the document is fully backward compatible. If a node does not support the extensions defined in this document, it will not advertise the additional algorithm values in the algorithm sub-TLV. All the computing nodes will not consider the node in the SPF computation if it has not advertised the specific algorithm. For the multi-topology based solution backward compatibility mechanism described in [RFC5120] and [RFC4915] are applicable.

5. Security Considerations

This document does not introduce any further security issues other than those discussed in [SR-OSPF] and [SR-IS-IS].

6. IANA Considerations

This specification updates OSPF and ISIS registry:

OSPF Router Information (RI) TLVs Registry

8 (IANA Preallocated) - SR-Algorithm TLV

Algorithm 2 -5 : SPF in routing plane

ISIS Sub TLVs for Type 242

Type: TBD (suggested value 19)

Description: Segment Routing Algorithm

Algorithm 2-5 : SPF in Routing Plane

7. Acknowledgements

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Implementing non protected paths using SPRING
draft-litkowski-spring-non-protected-paths-01

Abstract

Segment Routing (SR) leverages the source routing paradigm. A node can steer a packet on a specific path by prepending the packet with an SR header. In the framework of traffic-engineering use cases, a customer may request its service provider to implement some non protected paths. This means that in case of a failure within the network, fast-reroute (or similar) techniques should not be activated for those paths. This document analyzes the different options to implement a non protected path with Segment Routing and in a future release will provide a recommendation on the best option.

Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

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1. Problem statement

In some cases, a customer may prefer to react on network failures using its own mechanism. In such cases, the customer usually has two disjoint paths, so a path can take over the traffic in case of failure of the other. The disjoint paths can be provided by a single provider or by multihoming to different providers as displayed in the figure below.




Figure 1 - Disjoint paths provided by a single provider

R3-R4 fails, the traffic between CE3 and CE4 will be disrupted until the convergence occurs.




Figure 3 - Provider selling traffic protection as an option

A service provider may also propose a traffic protection service based on path protection rather than local repair on each transit node. In the figure 4, on PE1, two LSPs were created to ensure the customer traffic protection between PE1 and PE2. The primary LSP is used to carry the traffic in the nominal situation. The protection LSP is built as disjoint from the primary LSP and may be preestablished (from controlplane and/or dataplane point of view). When the primary LSP fails, PE1 is responsible to switch the traffic to the protection LSP. As the protection is provided by PE1, both primary and protection LSPs should be setup as non protected so transit nodes will not activate any local-repair mechanism for those LSPs.




Figure 4 - Provider selling traffic protection as an option

A segment-routing path is expressed as a list of segment identifiers (SID) from different types (Node-SID, Adj-SID, Binding-SID ...). In order to ensure that the segment routing path is not protected, we need to ensure that it does not contain any segment representing a protected path. As an example, in the Figure 1, we consider a path from PE1 to PE2 expressed with the following segment list: {Adj_R1R3,Node_R2,Adj_R2PE2}. If we want to ensure that this path is not protected, we need to ensure that the segment represented by Adj_R1R3 represents a non protected segment, as well as the segments Node_R2 and Adj_R2PE2.

The segment routing path may be computed by a Path Computation Element (PCE). In order to fulfil the non protected path constraint, the PCE needs to be aware of the available SIDs in the network and their protection status.

Several techniques may be used to represent a non protected path with a segment identifier. We propose to analyze the different options.

2. Requirements for a non protected LSP

- o A non protected LSP SHOULD follow a primary path defined based on the constraints of the LSP. This path can be the shortest path (as per the IGP metric) or a more constrained path (explicit path) to fulfil for example a bandwidth, latency or disjointness requirement.

- o Upon a failure, a non protected LSP SHOULD be reestablished over a new suitable non-protected path that still fulfils the constraints of the LSP.
- o Upon a failure (link, node, srlg...), the traffic of a non protected LSP MUST NOT use any local-repair or any local-rerouting mechanism on transit nodes.
- o The computation of a new primary path for the LSP will be handled by the computation node responsible of this LSP (it could be the head-end or a PCE).
- o Upon any other traffic-engineering topology change (metric change, overload status change, bandwidth change, latency change...), the non protected LSP MAY be reoptimized to a better path.

2.1. ECMP considerations

When equal cost paths are available within the end-to-end path, implementations may reuse a fast-reroute like mechanism in the dataplane, so when one of the outgoing interface fails, the dataplane switches traffic immediately to the remaining outgoing interfaces in the ECMP set. This behavior is usually hardcoded and cannot be disabled. Based on this assumption, a non protected LSP SHOULD avoid ECMPs.

3. Options to create a non protected path with Segment Routing

3.1. Using only non protected adjacency segments

A node can advertise multiple adjacency segments for a particular link with different properties. The non-protected property is already defined as part of the protocol encodings ([I-D.ietf-isis-segment-routing-extensions], [I-D.ietf-ospf-segment-routing-extensions] and [I-D.gredler-idr-bgp-ls-segment-routing-extension]) through the B flag. However, from an implementation perspective, advertising a protected adjacency segment, a non protected adjacency segment or both for each link is optional.

It is important to note that even if an adjacency segment has the B flag set (protected), it remains up to a local policy of the advertising router to implement the protection or not.

If both protected and non protected Adj-SID are advertised, every node in the network (including PCEs) can be aware of the adjacency segments protection property. When a non protected path is

requested, the path computation module can choose to encode the path with a list a non protected adjacency segments only.

One of the advantage of using only adjacency segments is the insurance that the traffic will never go transiently outside the path defined by the computation module responsible of the path. This solution is fully compliant with the requirements sets in Section 2.

One of the drawbacks of using only adjacency segments is the resulting label stack depth as each hop should require a segment in the stack: crossing 15 nodes, means stacking 15 labels to encode the SR tunnel. Having such a deep stack may be a problem for current hardwares and softwares for either pushing the stack (because the head end is limited in the number of labels it can push) or loadbalancing flows on transit nodes (as deep packet inspection or entropy label look up may be difficult with a deep label stack). Another drawback of advertising both protected and non protected adjacency segments is the additional controlplane and dataplane resource consumption used in the network. As the adjacency SIDs have a local significance, this resource consumption can be considered as negligible from a data plane point of view. From a control plane point of view, this can also be considered as negligible with the current CPU and memory usually available on routers.

3.2. Using a combination of node segments and adjacency segments

Using a combination of node segments and adjacency segments is the usual way of creating a segment routing path. However the well known Node-SID (algorithm type Shortest Path) may be protected by a local-repair mechanism by any transit node or may use ECMPs which may be a problem when used for a non protected path. Protecting a particular Node-SID is a matter of a local policy configuration on every node. The following discusses a number of possible approaches.

3.2.1. Adding a protection flag in the Node SID

As for adjacency segments, a new flag may be added in the Prefix-SID to encode the willingness of protection. Each node will then advertise two Node-SIDs (using SPF algorithm), one with the protection flag set, the other without the protection flag set. The same discussion regarding ECMP is also applicable here.

The remaining flag space in the Prefix-SID is small, so adding a new flag requires analysis but this should not be considered as a showstopper.

3.2.2. Using Strict SPF Node SID

[I-D.ietf-spring-segment-routing] defines a Strict Shortest Path algorithm which mandates that the packet is forwarded according to ECMP-aware SPF algorithm and instructs any router in the path to ignore any possible local policy overriding SPF decision. The use of a local-repair for a strict SPF Node-SID is allowed as long as the FRR mechanism enforces the post convergence path to the destination.

This solution does not bring any benefit compared to the regular Node-SID (as it has similar properties).

3.2.3. Using two Node-SIDs with different local policies

Having two instances of the Node-SID (protected and not protected) is a requirement when using Node-SID in protected and non protected paths. The protection of a Node-SID is a matter of a local policy configuration on every node in the network. A service provider may configure two Node-SIDs per node and may adjust the local-repair on every node to protect one Node-SID but not the other. As the protection of the Node-SID is inherited from the protection of the associated prefix, the service provider will need to deploy a new set of prefixes to all nodes to deploy the new set of Node-SIDs. Then it will need to maintain the local-repair policy on every node to ensure that the prefixes associated to the non protected Node-SID are not using the local-repair.

The path computation engine (head-end or PCE) must be aware of the policy defined by the service provider so it can select the right SIDs/prefixes when computing a path.

3.2.4. Advantages and drawbacks

One advantage of combining adjacency and node segments is the reduction of the label stack size.

The drawbacks are the increase of the controlplane and dataplane resource consumption. Whereas having two adjacency SIDs introduces a negligible impact, having two nodes SIDs increases controlplane and dataplane processing as each node in the network will have to install an MPLS->MPLS and IP->MPLS entry for each additional Node-SID. The regular IP convergence time of the network may be doubled in the worst case while the newly deployed node-SIDs are only used for traffic-engineering applications. One of the other drawback is that a Node-SID may be transiently rerouted on a path that does not fit the constraints anymore if a transit node converges faster than the head-end: this concern is not new and applies to all traffic-engineering use cases. Note that there is a high chance for a

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[I-D.ietf-spring-segment-routing] defines the binding segment with multiple use cases. One of the use case of the binding segment is to advertise a tunnel as a segment. When a computation engine computes a non protected path and if the resulting label stack using only non protected adjacency segments is too deep for the network, an external component may create shortcuts in the network by creating a binding segment representing a list of non protected adjacency segments.




Figure 3 - Use of Binding SID

In the example above, the path from PE1 to PE2 must be expressed with the stack: {Adj_P1P4,Adj_P4P5,Adj_P5P6,Adj_P6P7,Adj_P7P8,Adj_P8P9,Adj_P9P10,Adj_P10PE2}. This stack is too deep due to the limitations of the network. An external component may create a binding Binding1 on P5 that represents the non protected path (P5->P6->P7->P8->P9->P10). When the binding is created and advertised in the topology, the computation engine can use this binding SID in a path, resulting for a PE1 to PE2 path to the stack: {Adj_P1P4,Adj_P4P5,Binding1,Adj_P10PE2}. The usage of the binding SID in the stack allowed to reduce its size to an acceptable value.

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reduced to a small amount of labels at some price (creating some states on transit nodes).

The drawbacks are the increase of the controlplane and dataplane resource consumption. This controlplane and dataplane resource consumption are variable and will be linked to the intelligence of the external controller and computation engines and especially how the placement of the bindings is done to maximize the sharing between LSPs. Moreover any optimization try in the binding segment may introduce churn in the network controlplane (Make Before Break can be used to ensure that dataplane is not affected). Programming a binding-SID on a transit node is feasible only if the programming node has the necessary protocol sessions to do so. When a head-end router is performing a path computation, it is usually not the case. When a controller (PCE) is used, it may not have a session to all LSRs in the network, as only edge nodes may require a path computation. The controller may be limited for the placement of the binding SID to the nodes it has a protocol session with (it cannot setup a PCEP session by itself). A full deployment of protocol sessions with the controller may not be feasible for technical reasons (scaling, ...) or economical reasons. A potential mitigation could be to allow protocol sessions to be setup dynamically (when requirement comes) to an authorized subset of nodes in the network: some protocol modifications may be necessary to allow this behavior.

4. Comparison

The following table tries to summarize the various solution pros/cons within a comparison table:

- o Solution 1: using adjacency-SIDs only
- o Solution 2: using adjacency-SIDs + Node-SIDs with strict SPF algorithm
- o Solution 3: using adjacency-SIDs + Node-SIDs with new protection flag
- o Solution 4: using adjacency-SIDs + two regular Node-SIDs with a different policy
- o Solution 5: using adjacency-SIDs + Binding-SIDs

We consider a network with N nodes and L links, with an average of 1 links per node.

Criteria	Soluti	Solution	Solution 3	Solution 4	Solutio
----------	--------	----------	------------	------------	---------

	on 1	2			n 5
Label stack size	One label per hop	Reduced	Reduced	Reduced	Reduced
Control plane	Negligible	Potential additional computation + 2*N entries in RIB	+ 2*N entries in RIB	+ 2*N entries in RIB	Adds states in the LSRs
Dataplane	+1 entries	+2*N entries	+2*N entries	+2*N entries	Variable
IP convergence time	None	Double	Double	Double	None
Computation engine	Needs to select Adj-SIDs with B=0	Needs to select Adj-SIDs with B=0 and Node-SIDs with strict SPF	Needs to select Adj-SIDs with B=0 and Node-SIDs with B=0	Needs to select Adj-SIDs with B=0 and needs to understand policy from the SP to select the right Node-SIDs	Needs to select Adj-SIDs with B=0 and place the binding SID in a smart way
Protocol	None	None	Need a new flag	None	None
ECMP avoidance	Supported	Supported at the price of increasing the label stack	Supported at the price of increasing the label stack	Supported at the price of increasing the label stack	Supported
Requirement	Yes	Partially	Partially	Partially	Yes

ents fulfilment		(allows E CMP+transient rerouting)	(allows EC MP+transient rerouting)	(allows EC MP+transient rerouting)	
Others	None	None	None	None	Requires a controller with sessions to all nodes (even transit)

Comparison of solutions

5. Recommended option(s)

Based on the analysis in Section 4, we only have two solutions that fulfill the requirements expressed in Section 2: usage of adjacency-SIDs only, usage of a combination of adjacency SIDs and binding SIDs.

As using only Adjacency-SIDs may reduce today the possibility of creating a path (due to the hardware/software limitations), authors would like to encourage the usage of a combination of adjacency-SIDs and binding-SIDs (Section 3.3) as a short-term solution.

However this approach has also several drawbacks, but authors think that these drawbacks can be reduced by enhancing existing protocols.

As a long term solution, authors would like to encourage vendors to support the ability for a node to push a significant number of labels, up to the full network diameter.

6. Security Considerations

TBD.

7. Acknowledgements

Authors would like to thank Bruno Decraene for his valuable comments.

8. IANA Considerations

N/A

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August 9, 2017

Implementing non protected paths using SPRING
draft-litkowski-spring-non-protected-paths-02

Abstract

Segment Routing (SR) leverages the source routing paradigm. A node can steer a packet on a specific path by prepending the packet with an SR header. In the framework of traffic-engineering use cases, a customer may request its service provider to implement some non protected paths. This means that in case of a failure within the network, fast-reroute (or similar) techniques should not be activated for those paths. This document analyzes the different options to implement a non protected path with Segment Routing and in a future release will provide a recommendation on the best option.

Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

Status of This Memo

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1. Problem statement

In some cases, a customer may prefer to react on network failures using its own mechanism. In such cases, the customer usually has two disjoint paths, so a path can take over the traffic in case of failure of the other. The disjoint paths can be provided by a single provider or by multihoming to different providers as displayed in the figure below.




Figure 1 - Disjoint paths provided by a single provider




Figure 2 - Disjoint paths provided by using two providers

As the traffic protection is ensured by an end-to-end mechanism at the customer level, the customer requests the service provider to not protect the paths. This is particularly required to avoid both protection mechanisms (customer level and provider level) to be activated at the same time which may lead to unpredictable side effects. However the service provider is allowed to restore the end-to-end path automatically when the primary path is failing by computing and installing a new primary path at the head-end. How the end-to-end protection is handled is out of scope of this document and will be under the customer responsibility.

Another use case could be a service provider selling the traffic protection as a service option. So by default, the provided IP/MPLS path is not protected by any fast-reroute mechanism but the customer can subscribe to an option to activate fast-reroute for its traffic. In the figure 3, the Customer1 service between PE1 and PE2 is protected, in case of failure between R1 and R2, the LSP can use a bypass through R3-R4 nodes until the convergence occurs. The Customer2 did not subscribe to the traffic protection option. If

R3-R4 fails, the traffic between CE3 and CE4 will be disrupted until the convergence occurs.




Figure 3 - Provider selling traffic protection as an option

A service provider may also propose a traffic protection service based on path protection rather than local repair on each transit node. In the figure 4, on PE1, two LSPs were created to ensure the customer traffic protection between PE1 and PE2. The primary LSP is used to carry the traffic in the nominal situation. The protection LSP is built as disjoint from the primary LSP and may be preestablished (from controlplane and/or dataplane point of view). When the primary LSP fails, PE1 is responsible to switch the traffic to the protection LSP. As the protection is provided by PE1, both primary and protection LSPs should be setup as non protected so transit nodes will not activate any local-repair mechanism for those LSPs.




Figure 4 - Provider selling traffic protection as an option

A segment-routing path is expressed as a list of segment identifiers (SID) from different types (Node-SID, Adj-SID, Binding-SID ...). In order to ensure that the segment routing path is not protected, we need to ensure that it does not contain any segment representing a protected path. As an example, in the Figure 1, we consider a path from PE1 to PE2 expressed with the following segment list: {Adj_R1R3,Node_R2,Adj_R2PE2}. If we want to ensure that this path is not protected, we need to ensure that the segment represented by Adj_R1R3 represents a non protected segment, as well as the segments Node_R2 and Adj_R2PE2.

The segment routing path may be computed by a Path Computation Element (PCE). In order to fulfil the non protected path constraint, the PCE needs to be aware of the available SIDs in the network and their protection status.

Several techniques may be used to represent a non protected path with a segment identifier. We propose to analyze the different options.

2. Requirements for a non protected LSP

- o A non protected LSP SHOULD follow a primary path defined based on the constraints of the LSP. This path can be the shortest path (as per the IGP metric) or a more constrained path (explicit path) to fulfil for example a bandwidth, latency or disjointness requirement.

- o Upon a failure, a non protected LSP SHOULD be reestablished over a new suitable non-protected path that still fulfils the constraints of the LSP.
- o Upon a failure (link, node, srlg...), the traffic of a non protected LSP MUST NOT use any local-repair or any local-rerouting mechanism on transit nodes.
- o The computation of a new primary path for the LSP will be handled by the computation node responsible of this LSP (it could be the head-end or a PCE).
- o Upon any other traffic-engineering topology change (metric change, overload status change, bandwidth change, latency change...), the non protected LSP MAY be reoptimized to a better path.

2.1. ECMP considerations

When equal cost paths are available within the end-to-end path, implementations may reuse a fast-reroute like mechanism in the dataplane, so when one of the outgoing interface fails, the dataplane switches traffic immediately to the remaining outgoing interfaces in the ECMP set. This behavior is usually hardcoded and cannot be disabled. Based on this assumption, a non protected LSP SHOULD avoid ECMPs.

3. Options to create a non protected path with Segment Routing

3.1. Using only non protected adjacency segments

A node can advertise multiple adjacency segments for a particular link with different properties. The non-protected property is already defined as part of the protocol encodings ([I-D.ietf-isis-segment-routing-extensions], [I-D.ietf-ospf-segment-routing-extensions] and [I-D.gredler-idr-bgp-ls-segment-routing-extension]) through the B flag. However, from an implementation perspective, advertising a protected adjacency segment, a non protected adjacency segment or both for each link is optional.

It is important to note that even if an adjacency segment has the B flag set (protected), it remains up to a local policy of the advertising router to implement the protection or not.

If both protected and non protected Adj-SID are advertised, every node in the network (including PCEs) can be aware of the adjacency segments protection property. When a non protected path is

requested, the path computation module can choose to encode the path with a list a non protected adjacency segments only.

One of the advantage of using only adjacency segments is the insurance that the traffic will never go transiently outside the path defined by the computation module responsible of the path. This solution is fully compliant with the requirements sets in Section 2.

One of the drawbacks of using only adjacency segments is the resulting label stack depth as each hop should require a segment in the stack: crossing 15 nodes, means stacking 15 labels to encode the SR tunnel. Having such a deep stack may be a problem for current hardwares and softwares for either pushing the stack (because the head end is limited in the number of labels it can push) or loadbalancing flows on transit nodes (as deep packet inspection or entropy label look up may be difficult with a deep label stack). Another drawback of advertising both protected and non protected adjacency segments is the additional controlplane and dataplane resource consumption used in the network. As the adjacency SIDs have a local significance, this resource consumption can be considered as negligible from a data plane point of view. From a control plane point of view, this can also be considered as negligible with the current CPU and memory usually available on routers.

3.2. Using a combination of node segments and adjacency segments

Using a combination of node segments and adjacency segments is the usual way of creating a segment routing path. However the well known Node-SID (algorithm type Shortest Path) may be protected by a local-repair mechanism by any transit node or may use ECMPs which may be a problem when used for a non protected path. Protecting a particular Node-SID is a matter of a local policy configuration on every node. The following discusses a number of possible approaches.

3.2.1. Adding a protection flag in the Node SID

As for adjacency segments, a new flag may be added in the Prefix-SID to encode the willingness of protection. Each node will then advertise two Node-SIDs (using SPF algorithm), one with the protection flag set, the other without the protection flag set. The same discussion regarding ECMP is also applicable here.

The remaining flag space in the Prefix-SID is small, so adding a new flag requires analysis but this should not be considered as a showstopper.

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This solution does not bring any benefit compared to the regular Node-SID (as it has similar properties).

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Having two instances of the Node-SID (protected and not protected) is a requirement when using Node-SID in protected and non protected paths. The protection of a Node-SID is a matter of a local policy configuration on every node in the network. A service provider may configure two Node-SIDs per node and may adjust the local-repair on every node to protect one Node-SID but not the other. As the protection of the Node-SID is inherited from the protection of the associated prefix, the service provider will need to deploy a new set of prefixes to all nodes to deploy the new set of Node-SIDs. Then it will need to maintain the local-repair policy on every node to ensure that the prefixes associated to the non protected Node-SID are not using the local-repair.

The path computation engine (head-end or PCE) must be aware of the policy defined by the service provider so it can select the right SIDs/prefixes when computing a path.

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One advantage of combining adjacency and node segments is the reduction of the label stack size.

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


Figure 3 - Use of Binding SID

In the example above, the path from PE1 to PE2 must be expressed with the stack: {Adj_P1P4,Adj_P4P5,Adj_P5P6,Adj_P6P7,Adj_P7P8,Adj_P8P9,Adj_P9P10,Adj_P10PE2}. This stack is too deep due to the limitations of the network. An external component may create a binding Binding1 on P5 that represents the non protected path (P5->P6->P7->P8->P9->P10). When the binding is created and advertised in the topology, the computation engine can use this binding SID in a path, resulting for a PE1 to PE2 path to the stack: {Adj_P1P4,Adj_P4P5,Binding1,Adj_P10PE2}. The usage of the binding SID in the stack allowed to reduce its size to an acceptable value.

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reduced to a small amount of labels at some price (creating some states on transit nodes).

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Dataplane	+1 entries	+2*N entries	+2*N entries	+2*N entries	VARIABLE
IP convergence time	None	Double	Double	Double	None
Computation engine	Needs to select Adj-SIDs with B=0	Needs to select Adj-SIDs with B=0 and Node-SIDs with strict SPF	Needs to select Adj-SIDs with B=0 and Node-SIDs with B=0	Needs to select Adj-SIDs with B=0 and needs to understand policy from the SP to select the right Node-SIDs	Needs to select Adj-SIDs with B=0 and place the binding SID in a smart way
Protocol	None	None	Need a new flag	None	None
ECMP avoidance	Supported	Supported at the price of increasing the label stack	Supported at the price of increasing the label stack	Supported at the price of increasing the label stack	Supported
Requirements	Yes	Partially	Partially	Partially	Yes

ents ful filment		(allows E CMP+trans ient rero uting) None	(allows EC MP+transie nt rerouting) None	(allows EC MP+transie nt rerouting) None	
Others	None				Require s a con troller with se ssions to all nodes (even t ransit)

Comparison of solutions

5. Recommended option(s)

Based on the analysis in Section 4, we only have two solutions that fulfill the requirements expressed in Section 2: usage of adjacency-SIDs only, usage of a combination of adjacency SIDs and binding SIDs.

As using only Adjacency-SIDs may reduce today the possibility of creating a path (due to the hardware/software limitations), authors would like to encourage the usage of a combination of adjacency-SIDs and binding-SIDs (Section 3.3) as a short-term solution.

However this approach has also several drawbacks, but authors think that these drawbacks can be reduced by enhancing existing protocols.

As a long term solution, authors would like to encourage vendors to support the ability for a node to push a significant number of labels, up to the full network diameter.

6. Security Considerations

TBD.

7. Acknowledgements

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8. IANA Considerations

N/A

9. Normative References

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