


# Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Profile for Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE)

draft-gerdes-ace-dtls-authorize-01

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# ACE Framework




- ▶ RS has registered at AS for profile `coap_dtls`
- ▶ Optional unauthorized request (RS declines with AS info)
- ▶ C requests access token from AS for communication with RS
  - ▶ general assumption: access tokens are PoP tokens
- ▶ AS includes RS information in AS-to-Client response

## Authorized Communication

C	RS	AS
[--- Access Token ----->]		
<== DTLS channel setup ==>		
== Authorized Request ==>		
<=== Protected Resource ==		

- ▶ C uploads access token to RS (/authz-info)
- ▶ C uses RS information to establish DTLS channel
  - ▶ RPK mode or PSK mode
- ▶ DTLS session identifies C
  - ▶ All access tokens for C apply

# Dynamic Update of Authorization Information



- ▶ C retrieves new access token from AS and uploads to RS (/authz-info)
- ▶ C MAY re-negotiate DTLS session based on new token

## RPK Mode: Client-to-AS Request

- ▶ Client-to-AS request MUST contain cnf object either with
  - ▶ C's raw public key, or
  - ▶ a known unique identifier of C's public key.

```
POST coaps://as.example.com/token
Content-Format: application/cbor
{
  grant_type:    client_credentials,
  aud:          "tempSensor4711",
  cnf: {
    COSE_Key: {
      kty: EC2,
      crv: P-256,
      x:   h'...',
      y:   h'...'
    }
  }
}
```

# RPK Mode: AS-to-Client Response

2.01 Created

Location-Path: /authz-info/37

Content-Format: application/cbor

```
{
  access_token: b64'SlAV32hkKG ...
    (remainder of CWT omitted for brevity;
    CWT contains COSE_Key in the 'cnf' claim)',
  profile: coap_dtls,
  expires_in: 3600,
  cnf: {
    COSE_Key: { ... }
  }
}
```

- ▶ profile is coap\_dtls
- ▶ Contains cnf object with RS's public key
- ▶ C uploads access token to RS before DTLS handshake
- ▶ C MUST use RPK denoted in Client-to-AS request in DTLS handshake

## PSK Mode: Client-to-AS Request

- ▶ Client-to-AS request MAY contain `cnf` object with `kid` for existing session key generated by AS
  - simplify dynamic updates

```
POST coaps://as.example.com/token
Content-Format: application/cbor
{
  grant_type:    client_credentials,
  aud:          "tempSensor4711",
}
```

# PSK Mode: AS-to-Client Response

2.01 Created

Content-Format: application/cbor

Location-Path: /token/asdjaskd

Max-Age: 86400

```
{
  access_token: b64'SlAV32hkKG ...
  token_type:   pop,
  alg:          HS256,
  expires_in:   86400,
  profile:      coap_dtls,
  cnf: {
    COSE_Key: {
      kty: symmetric,
      k: h'7365737369666e6b6579'
    }
  }
}
```

- ▶ profile is coap\_dtls
- ▶ Contains cnf object with symmetric session key
- ▶ C uploads access token to RS before DTLS handshake or includes it in *psk\_identity*

## PSK Mode: DTLS Channel Setup

- ▶ C uses key from AS-to-Client response as shared secret
- ▶ RS extracts shared secret from access token
  - ▶ encrypted with some key known by RS and AS, or
  - ▶ derived from access token and some key known by RS and AS (HKDF SHA-256 as mandatory KDF), or
  - ▶ **new in -01**: referenced by `kid`
  
- ▶ Updating authorization information
  - ▶ upload new access token, or
  - ▶ optionally re-negotiate DTLS session with access token **or kid** as `psk_identity`, or
  - ▶ perform a new DTLS handshake.

# Status

<https://github.com/obgm/ace-dtls-profile>

- ▶ Mostly editorial changes and clarifications in -01
- ▶ Minor fixes in Editor's copy as of 2017-03-27:
  - ▶ Fixed CDDL spec for contents of `psk_identity` (access token vs. kid)
  - ▶ Fixed reference to error response creation in ACE framework
- ▶ Independent implementations being developed (Ludwig, Olaf)

Ready for WG adoption?