

Implicit IV for Counter-based Ciphers in IPsec

DRAFT-MGLT-IPSECME-IMPLICIT-IV


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
Why?

- Counter-based algorithms and AEADs are becoming more popular: AES-GCM, AES-CCM, ChaCha20.
- Unlike CBC-based algorithms, these do not benefit from unpredictable IVs. In fact, the specifications for all of these recommend using a guaranteed unique IV, specifically a counter as the recommended method of setting this IV.

ESP Header




ESP Header




This is a packet sequence number

ESP Header



So is this



Implicit IV

- If we follow the recommendations, those two counters will be equal.
- So why do we need to repeat the same counter in two different fields?
- We don't.
- If both sides agree, we can just omit the IV.
- It's optional anyway.
- Saves 8 bytes per packet.

Negotiating Implicit IV

- New Transform ID
 - ENCR_AES-CCM_8_IIV
 - ENCR_AES-GCM_16_IIV
 - ENCR_CHACHA20-POLY1305_IIV
 - ENCR_AES-CTR_IIV ?

