Abstract

It is becoming more commonplace to install front end proxy devices in front of DNS servers to provide (for example) load balancing or to perform transport layer conversions.

This document defines a meta resource record that allows a DNS server to receive information about the client’s original transport protocol parameters when supplied by trusted proxies.

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1. Introduction

It is becoming more commonplace to install front end proxy devices in front of DNS servers [RFC1035] to provide load balancing or to perform transport layer conversions (e.g. to add DNS over TLS [RFC7858] to a DNS server that lacks native support).

This has the unfortunate side effect of hiding the clients’ source IP addresses from the server, making it harder to employ server-side technologies that rely on knowing those addresses (e.g. ACLs, DNS Response Rate Limiting, etc).

This document defines the XPF meta resource record (RR) that allows a DNS server to receive information about the client’s original transport protocol parameters when supplied by trusted proxies.

Whilst in some circumstances it would be possible to re-use the Client Subnet EDNS Option [RFC7871] to carry a subset of this
information, a new RR is defined to allow both this feature and the Client Subnet Option to co-exist in the same packet.

2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

The XPF RR is analogous to the HTTP "X-Forwarded-For" header, but in DNS the term "forwarder" is usually understood to describe a network component that sits on the outbound query path of a resolver.

Instead we use the term "proxy", which in this document means a network component that sits on the inbound query path in front of a recursive or authoritative DNS server, receiving DNS queries from clients and dispatching them to local servers.

3. Description

The XPF RR contains the entire 6-tuple (IP version, Layer 4 protocol, source address, destination address, source port and destination port) of the packet received from the client by the proxy.

The presence of the source address supports use of ACLs based on the client’s IP address.

The source port allows for ACLs to support Carrier Grade NAT whereby different end-users might share a single IP address.

The destination address supports scenarios where the server behaviour depends upon the packet destination (e.g. BIND view’s "match-destinations" option)

The protocol and destination port fields allow server behaviour to vary depending on whether DNS over TLS [RFC7858] or DNS over DTLS [RFC8094] are in use.

3.1. Client Handling

Stub resolvers, client-side proxy devices, and recursive resolvers MUST NOT add the XPF RR to DNS requests.
3.2. Request Handling

The rules in this section apply to processing of the XPF RR whether by a proxy device or a DNS server.

If this RR is received from a non-white-listed client the server MUST return a REFUSED response.

If a server finds this RR anywhere other than in the Additional Section of a request it MUST return a REFUSED response.

If the value of the RR’s IP version field is not understood by the server it MUST return a REFUSED response.

If the length of the IP addresses contained in the RR are not consistent with that expected for the given IP version then the server MUST return a FORMERR response.

Servers MUST NOT send this RR in DNS responses.

3.3. Proxy Handling

For each request received, proxies MUST generate an XPF RR containing the 6-tuple representing the client’s Layer 3 and Layer 4 headers and append it to the Additional Section of the request (updating the ARCOUNT field accordingly) before sending it to the intended DNS server.

If a valid XPF RR is received from a white-listed client the original XPF RR MUST be preserved instead.

3.4. Server Handling

When this RR is received from a white-listed client the DNS server SHOULD use the transport information contained therein in preference to the packet’s own transport information for any data processing logic (e.g. ACLs) that would otherwise depend on the latter.

3.5. Wire Format

The XPF RR is formatted like any standard RR, but none of the fields except RDLENGTH and RDATA have any meaning in this specification. All multi-octet fields are transmitted in network order (i.e. big-endian).

The required values of the RR header fields are as follows:

NAME: MUST contain a single 0 octet (i.e. the root domain).
TYPE: MUST contain TBD1 (XPF).
CLASS: MUST contain 1 (IN).
TTL: MUST contain 0 (zero).
RDLENGTH: specifies the length in octets of the RDATA field.

The RDATA of the XPF RR is as follows:

```
+0 (MSB) +1 (LSB)
+----------------------------------------------+-
0: Unused | IP Version | Protocol +----------------------------------------------+-
+----------------------------------------------+-
2: Source Address Octet 0 | ... +----------------------------------------------+-
| ... // +----------------------------------------------+-
| Destination Address Octet 0 | ... +----------------------------------------------+-
| ... // +----------------------------------------------+-
| Source Port +----------------------------------------------+-
| Destination Port +----------------------------------------------+-
```

Unused: Currently reserved. These bits MUST be zero unless redefined in a subsequent specification.

IP Version: The IP protocol version number used by the client, as defined in the IANA IP Version Number Registry [IANA-IP]. Implementations MUST support IPv4 (4) and IPv6 (6).

Protocol: The Layer 4 protocol number (e.g. UDP or TCP) as defined in the IANA Protocol Number Registry [IANA-PROTO].

Source Address: The source IP address of the client.

Destination Address: The destination IP address of the request, i.e. the IP address of the proxy on which the request was received.

Source Port: The source port used by the client.

Destination Port: The destination port of the request.

The length of the Source Address and Destination Address fields will be variable depending on the IP Version used by the client.
3.6. Presentation Format

XPF is a meta RR that cannot appear in master format zone files, but a standardised presentation format is defined here for use by debugging utilities that might need to display the contents of an XPF RR.

The Unused bits and the IP Version field are treated as a single octet and presented as an unsigned decimal integer with range 0 .. 255.

The Protocol field is presented as an unsigned decimal integer with range 0 .. 255.

The Source and Destination Address fields are presented either as IPv4 or IPv6 addresses according to the IP Version field. In the case of IPv6 the recommendations from [RFC5952] SHOULD be followed.

The Source and Destination Port fields are presented as unsigned decimal integers with range 0 .. 65535.

3.7. Signed DNS Requests

Any XPF RRs found in a packet MUST be ignored for the purposes of calculating or verifying any signatures used for Secret Key Transaction Authentication for DNS [RFC2845] or DNS Request and Transaction Signatures (SIG(0)) [RFC2931].

Typically it is expected that proxies will append the XPF RR to the packet after any existing TSIG or SIG(0) RRs, and that servers will remove the XPF RR from the packet prior to verification of the original signature, with the ARCOUNT field updated as appropriate.

If either TSIG or SIG(0) are configured between the proxy and server then any XPF RRs MUST be ignored when the proxy calculates the packet signature.

4. Security Considerations

If the white-list of trusted proxies is implemented as a list of IP addresses, the server administrator MUST have the ability to selectively disable this feature for any transport where there is a possibility of the proxy’s source address being spoofed.

This does not mean to imply that use over UDP is impossible - if for example the network architecture keeps all proxy-to-server traffic on a dedicated network and clients have no direct access to the servers then the proxies’ source addresses can be considered unspoofable.
5. Implementation status

[RFC Editor Note: Please remove this entire section prior to publication as an RFC.]

This section records the status of known implementations of the protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in [RFC7942]. The description of implementations in this section is intended to assist the IETF in its decision processes in progressing drafts to RFCs. Please note that the listing of any individual implementation here does not imply endorsement by the IETF. Furthermore, no effort has been spent to verify the information presented here that was supplied by IETF contributors. This is not intended as, and must not be construed to be, a catalog of available implementations or their features. Readers are advised to note that other implementations may exist.

According to [RFC7942], "this will allow reviewers and working groups to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit of running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable experimentation and feedback that have made the implemented protocols more mature. It is up to the individual working groups to use this information as they see fit".

5.1. dnsdist

Support for adding an XPF RR to proxied packets is provided in the git version of dnsdist. The code point is configurable.

5.2. PowerDNS Recursor

Support for extracting the XPF RR from received packets (when coming from a trusted source) is available in the git version of the PowerDNS Recursor. The code point is configurable.

5.3. Wireshark

Support for dissecting XPF RRs is present in Wireshark 2.5.0, using a temporary code point of 65422.

6. Privacy Considerations

Used incorrectly, this RR could expose internal network information, however it is not intended for use on proxy / forwarder devices that sit on the client-side of a DNS request.
This specification is only intended for use on server-side proxy devices that are under the same administrative control as the DNS servers themselves. As such there is no change in the scope within which any private information might be shared.

Use other than as described above would be contrary to the principles of [RFC6973].

7. IANA Considerations

<< a copy of the RFC 6895 IANA RR TYPE application template will appear here >>

8. Acknowledgements

Mark Andrews, Robert Edmonds, Duane Wessels

9. References

9.1. Normative References


9.2. Informative References


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Abstract

This document defines an Extension Mechanisms for DNS (EDNS0) option that allows DNS clients and servers to signal support for DNS protocol capabilities. Clients and servers that support this option can take advantage of new DNS protocol features when completing a transaction, and by caching the set of capabilities advertised by a DNS server, a DNS client can utilize any mutually supported DNS protocol capability in subsequent queries.

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1. Introduction

The lack of explicit capability signaling in the DNS protocol [RFC1035] makes it hard to deploy new functionality. For instance, Client Subnet in DNS Queries [RFC7871] defines an EDNS option to be used with a subset of specialized zones on the Internet capable of producing "tailored responses". It describes two strategies for deciding when to originate the Client Subnet option: the use of periodic probes by the resolver, and the use of a safelist of nameservers permitted by the resolver operator to use the option. In practice, few EDNS options have been defined, and EDNS options have not been originated routinely by general purpose resolvers on the Internet. If many EDNS options were to be widely used, it would be unreasonable to expect resolver implementations to perform option-specific probing or resolver operators to perform option-specific safelisting for each newly introduced EDNS option.

EDNS options are not the only aspect of the DNS protocol that can benefit from explicit capability signaling. Extension Mechanisms for DNS (EDNS(0)) [RFC6891] includes a VERSION field in the OPT Pseudo-RR, but encourages clients to set this field to the "lowest implemented level capable of expressing a transaction, to minimize the responder and network load of discovering the greatest common
implementation level between requestor and responder". If new EDNS VERSIONs were to be introduced, capability signaling would permit a DNS transaction initiated with a lower implementation level to be completed with the highest mutually supported implementation level.

Similarly, Q and Meta-TYPEs [RFC6895] (Section 3.1) have been allocated sparingly. Introducing a new general purpose QTYPE is problematic, because by definition the existing installed base of nameservers will not support the new QTYPE.

This document defines an EDNS0 option that allows DNS clients and servers to exchange lists of supported "DNS Capabilities". This new option includes explicit client-side caching semantics that allow future queries to be initiated that take advantage of mutually supported functionality. It also defines two DNS Capabilities. The first, "DNS Features", encodes an array of feature flags that future DNS protocol features may take advantage of. The second, "EDNS0 Option Codes", encodes the set of EDNS0 options supported by the client or server.

2. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

3. Overview

A DNS client that implements this protocol will include the "DNS Capabilities" EDNS0 option described in Section 4 in queries that it initiates (Section 5.1). If a DNS server that implements this protocol receives a query that includes this option, it will generate a corresponding response (Section 5.2) indicating which DNS Capabilities it supports and the length of time that the client may cache the server’s capabilities for (Section 5.3).

4. Option Format

This protocol uses an EDNS0 [RFC6891] option to encode the capabilities supported by the client or server. For each capability, the option contains a TLV element <Capability Type, Capability Length, Capability Value>. Multiple Capability TLVs may be concatenated together, and the ordering of Capability TLVs within the option is not significant. The option is structured as follows:
The format of the CAPABILITY VALUE field depends on the value of the CAPABILITY TYPE field. This document defines the following CAPABILITY TYPE values:

o (Defined in [RFC6891]) OPTION-CODE, 2 octets, for the DNS Capabilities option is TBD-DNS-CAPABILITIES-OPT.

o (Defined in [RFC6891]) OPTION-LENGTH, 2 octets, contains the length of the payload (everything after OPTION-LENGTH) in octets.

o OPTION-TTL-MINUTES, 2 octets, unsigned, indicates the number of minutes clients may cache this DNS Capabilities option.

o CAPABILITY TYPE, 1 octet, identifies the Capability encoded in the Capability TLV, using codes as assigned in TBD-DNS-CAPABILITIES-TYPE-REGISTRY.

o CAPABILITY LENGTH, 1 octet, unsigned, encodes the number of octets in the CAPABILITY VALUE field.

o CAPABILITY VALUE, variable number of octets, contains capability-specific data.
The "DNS Features" and "EDNS0 Option Codes" capabilities are further described below.

4.1. The "DNS Features" Capability

The "DNS Features" capability is a variable length array of feature flags encoded as a bitmap with trailing zero octets omitted.

New DNS protocol functionality that requires upgraded semantics may register a flag in this capability. DNS clients and servers that support a new protocol feature with a feature flag in this capability MUST set the corresponding bit in this capability in queries and responses when those messages include a DNS Capabilities option.

Each feature flag is assigned an individual bit in the "DNS Features" bitmap. For example, the first feature flag corresponds to the Most Significant Bit (MSB) of the first octet of the array, the ninth feature flag corresponds to the MSB of the second octet of the array, and the 256th feature flag corresponds to the Least Significant Bit (LSB) of the 32nd octet of the array.

If no "DNS Features" flags are supported by the DNS client or server, this capability MUST be omitted from the DNS Capabilities option. Trailing zero octets in the "DNS Features" bitmap MUST be omitted. The minimum CAPABILITY LENGTH value for this capability is 1, and the maximum CAPABILITY LENGTH value for this capability is 32.
"DNS Features" flags.

The "DNS Features" capability is a singleton capability. It MUST NOT appear more than once in a DNS Capabilities option.

4.2. The "EDNS0 Option Codes" Capability

[RFC4034] (Section 4.1.2) defines the Type Bit Maps field of the NSEC RR using a sparse encoding of the 16-bit code points in the DNS Resource Record (RR) TYPES registry. This document reuses that "window block" bitmap encoding for the "DNS EDNS0 Option Codes (OPT)" registry, which is also a 16-bit code space.

The "EDNS0 Option Codes" capability is a window block encoded bitmap indicating which EDNS0 Option Codes are supported by the DNS client or server. If the "EDNS0 Option Codes" capability is included in the DNS Capability option in a DNS message, the EDNS0 Option Codes supported by the DNS client or server SHOULD be indicated using this capability.

The EDNS0 Option Codes space is split into 256 window blocks, each representing the low-order 8 bits of the 16-bit code space. Each block that has at least one indicated EDNS0 Option Code is encoded using a single octet window number (from 0 to 255), a single octet bitmap length (from 1 to 32) indicating the number of octets used for the window block’s bitmap, and up to 32 octets (256 bits) of bitmap.

Window blocks are present in the "EDNS0 Option Codes" capability in increasing numerical order.

Each bitmap encodes the low-order 8 bits of EDNS0 Option Codes within the window block. The first bit is bit 0. For window block 0, bit 3 corresponds to NSID [RFC5001], bit 8 corresponds to EDNS Client Subnet [RFC7871], and so forth. If a bit is set, it indicates that the corresponding EDNS0 Option Code is supported by the DNS protocol implementation that sent the message containing the "EDNS0 Option Codes" capability.
Window blocks with no EDNS0 Option Codes present MUST NOT be included. Trailing zero octets in the bitmap MUST be omitted. The length of each block’s bitmap is determined by the option code with the largest numerical value, within that block, among the set of option codes indicated as supported. Trailing zero octets not specified MUST be interpreted as zero octets.

The "EDNS0 Option Codes" capability is a singleton capability. It MUST NOT appear more than once in a DNS Capabilities option.

5. Protocol Description

5.1. Originating the Option

A DNS client that implements this protocol SHOULD include the DNS Capabilities option in each EDNS(0) enabled query it sends. If the DNS client supports any DNS Features (Section 4.1), it MUST include a DNS Features capability in the DNS Capabilities option advertising the supported features. If the DNS client supports any EDNS0 Option Codes, it MAY include an EDNS0 Option Codes capability in the DNS Capabilities option advertising the supported option codes.

DNS clients MUST set the OPTION-TTL-MINUTES field to zero.

5.2. Generating a Response

When a query containing the DNS Capabilities option is received, a DNS server supporting DNS Capabilities MAY use the information contained in the client’s option to generate a response that utilizes the functionality that the client has advertised as supported.

A DNS server that implements this protocol and receives a DNS Capabilities option MUST include a DNS Capabilities option in its response. If the DNS server implements any DNS Features (Section 4.1), it MUST include a DNS Features capability in the DNS Capabilities option advertising the supported features. If the DNS server supports any EDNS0 Option Codes, it MUST include an EDNS0 Option Codes capability in the DNS Capabilities option advertising the supported option codes.

If the DNS Capabilities option was not included in a query, a DNS server MUST NOT include one when generating a response.

5.3. Caching the Option

When a DNS client originates a query containing the DNS Capabilities option and receives a response containing the DNS Capabilities option, the data contained in the option SHOULD be cached so that
future queries sent to the same DNS server can utilize functionality that the server has advertised as supported. A query sent to "the same DNS server" means a query sent to a server identified by the same network address as a previous query.

The amount of time that the DNS Capabilities option may be cached for is indicated in the OPTION-TTL-MINUTES field. This allows a maximum cache entry lifetime of 45.5 days. If a DNS Capabilities option for a given DNS server is already cached when a subsequent response containing a DNS Capabilities option is received, the cached option MAY be overwritten with the newer data, and the cache entry's lifetime MAY be extended or reduced.

If a DNS client receives a response containing the DNS Capabilities option where the OPTION-TTL-MINUTES field is zero, the data contained in the option MUST be discarded, and the response MUST be treated as if it did not contain a DNS Capabilities option.

6. IANA Considerations
   To be written.

7. Implementation Status
   To be written.

8. Security Considerations
   To be written.

9. Acknowledgements
   To be written.

10. TODO

1. There is a limited amount of space available in a UDP DNS query message (512 octets), and a query message with a maximum size query name (255 octets) and a plausible set of other EDNS0 options could be as much as ~300 octets, leaving ~200 octets for the DNS Capabilities option. What should happen if all of the desired DNS Capabilities data can’t be serialized into a <= 512 octet query message?
11. References

11.1. Normative References


11.2. Informative References


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This document specifies a DNS extension that allows a DNS client to specify a list of DNSSEC algorithms, in preference order, that the client desires to use. A DNS server upon receipt of this extension can choose to selectively respond with DNSSEC signatures using the most preferred algorithm they support. This mechanism may make it easier for DNS zone operators to support signing zone data simultaneously with multiple DNSSEC algorithms, without significantly increasing the size of DNS responses. It will also allow an easier way to transition to new algorithms while still retaining support for older DNS validators that do not yet support the new algorithms.

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1. Introduction

The DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) specifications [RFC4033] [RFC4034] [RFC4035] support multiple signature algorithms. A DNS zone can be signed simultaneously with multiple algorithms, but there is no provision in the current specifications to negotiate the selective delivery of signatures of a specific algorithm in DNS responses.

In contrast, many other security protocols, like TLS, IKE, SSH and others, support an algorithm or cipher suite negotiation mechanism to enable the client and server to select the "best" algorithm they jointly support.

This means that DNS servers have to send responses with signatures of all algorithms that the requested data are signed with, which can result in significantly large responses. Not only is this inefficient in terms of the additional communication and processing overhead, but it often causes a variety of operational problems. Most DNS queries and responses utilize UDP transport today. While
the EDNS0 specification can support very large DNS over UDP payload sizes, once they exceed the common Internet Path MTU (typically about 1,500 octets), they need to be fragmented at the IP layer. Many studies [add citations] have shown that IP fragmentation does not work reliably on today’s Internet, because fragments are often blocked by network security devices. Furthermore, fragments can cause a variety of security and operational issues, as documented in [frag-bad], and previous attempts to deprecate fragments in the IETF. Constraining DNS message sizes to sit comfortably within the network’s Path MTU can avoid these problems, and in fact modern UDP Usage Guidelines [RFC8085] strongly recommend this.

DNS can run over other transports that can obviate the IP fragmentation problem, such as TCP (with Path MTU discovery or a suitably configured Maximum Segment Size) and TLS. In fact, some operators are known to truncate a DNS payload in preference to emitting a a response that is likely to be fragmented, instructing the client to re-query over TCP. However, these alternative transports have not been widely deployed in the field, and there is some reluctance by operators to make wide use of TCP or TLS because of their added processing and performing costs. This situation may change over time, but at least today, the dominant transport for DNS query and response remains UDP.

The response size issue is also a significant barrier to the introduction of new algorithms in DNSSEC. As can be readily seen from the RSA to ECDSA transition, very few zones have transitioned from RSA to ECDSA, and furthermore, very few have been willing to sign their zones with multiple algorithms. Newer DNSSEC algorithms have already appeared or are being proposed: EdDSA [RFC8080], NSEC5 [nsec5], and it is expected that some time in the future, there will be post quantum signature algorithms for DNSSEC.

It is often not feasible to deploy only a new algorithm before the field of deployed validating resolvers have been updated to understand it. This would cause the zone to appear unsigned to those validators, negating the security that DNSSEC provides, and posing critical security problems for applications like DANE [RFC6698] [RFC7671] that rely on DNSSEC authentication. Thus new algorithms will require zone operators to simultaneously deploy multiple algorithms, and support older algorithms for an extended period of time until the population of validators have upgraded themselves to support the newer algorithms.

This document proposes a new mechanism by which a DNS client when sending a query can indicate an ordered list of DNSSEC signature algorithms it desires to use. The DNS server can use this
information to selectively construct a response with only the signatures using the most preferred algorithm that it supports.

2. DNSSEC Preferred Algorithms Option

The EDNS0 specification outlined in [RFC6891] defines a way to include new options using a standardized mechanism. These options are contained in the RDATA of the OPT meta resource record. This document defines a new EDNS0 option called "DNSSEC Preferred Algorithms" used by a client to indicate an ordered list of DNSSEC signature algorithms that it supports and prefers. This option can appear only once in an OPT RR.

```
0                       8                      16
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
|                  OPTION-CODE                  |
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
|                  LIST-LENGTH                  |
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
|       ALG-CODE        |        ...            |
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
```

OPTION-CODE is the code (TBD) assigned by IANA for this EDNS0 option.

LIST-LENGTH is the length of the list of digital signatures or hash algorithm codes in octets. Each algorithm code occupies a single octet.

ALG-CODE is the list of assigned values of DNSSEC zone signature algorithms that the client prefers to be used. The algorithms are listed in the order preferred by the client.

3. Why not use RFC 6975 for Algorithm Signaling?

The new EDNS0 option described in this document is very similar to the DNSSEC Algorithm Understood (DAU) option defined in [RFC6975] (Signaling Cryptographic Algorithm Understanding). That specification has not seen much adoption or even implementation, and it has been suggested that it could be repurposed to implement the algorithm negotiation mechanism described in this document.

This document proposes a new option instead, because the RFC6975 option could not be reused without significantly revising its semantics. For example, it currently says that the list of algorithm codes is unordered, and that the server must not infer any ordering...
or preferences from the list. Furthermore, it states that the option must not trigger any special processing on the server side.

In addition to algorithm negotiation, this new option could also subsume the additional function of signaling algorithm understanding originally intended by RFC 6975.

4. Changes to Clients

A client is defined to be any DNS speaker that issues a query, e.g. a stub resolver, a resolver issuing outbound queries to authoritative servers, or to other resolvers etc.

A client implementing this specification and configured to use it, adds an EDNS0 DNSSEC Preferred Algorithms option to the OPT Pseudo Resource Record in the Additional Section of the query, listing its desired DNSSEC algorithm numbers in preferred order. It only makes sense to add this option if the client is requesting DNSSEC signatures, so the DNSSEC-OK bit in the EDNS Flags field MUST also be set.

As a general rule, to maximize security, the client should prefer stronger DNSSEC algorithms to weaker ones.

5. Changes to Servers

A server is defined to be any DNS speaker that sends DNS responses, e.g. an authoritative server, or a resolver when answering queries from downstream clients.

Upon receipt of a query with the DNSSEC-OK bit set, and the DNSSEC Preferred Algorithms EDNS0 option, an Authoritative Server SHOULD include in its response, DNSSEC signatures using only the most preferred algorithm that it supports. It also includes the Preferred Algorithms EDNS0 option in the response, to indicate that it recognizes the option and has acted on it.

If an Authoritative Server has no algorithms in common with the Preferred Algorithms list in the incoming query, it MUST send back a SERVFAIL response (Response Code 2). This response MUST contain the list of algorithms supported by the server in the EDNS0 Preferred Algorithms option. [Note: this specific behavior may be controversial since it is a departure from plain DNSSEC’s fail open behavior. Alternative behavior could be specified, such as returning a NOERROR response with no signatures.]

If a resolver receives a query from a downstream validating client with a Preferred Algorithms list different from its own, then it
should send outbound queries with the client’s preferred list, and return answers appropriately.

6. Cache Considerations

A Validating Resolver answering queries with the DNSSEC-OK bit set from data in its cache needs to take a few additional steps. If the query does not include the Preferred Algorithms option, and the resolver has selectively cached signatures of a subset of algorithms supported by the zone containing the query domain name, then it MUST re-send outbound queries to the authoritative server without the Preferred Algorithms option in order to retrieve the entire set of signatures for the query. If the query includes the Preferred Algorithms option, but prefers algorithms known to be supported for the name, but different from what has been cached, the resolver MUST again send outbound queries to retrieve answers with signatures the client prefers, by copying the client’s Preferred Algorithms option into the outbound query.

7. Preventing Downgrade Attacks

There is no cryptographic integrity protection of EDNS0 options. In theory, Transaction Signatures [RFC2845] could be deployed to integrity protect the entire query message with per-client keys in closed populations of DNS speakers, but this is not a viable mechanism in the general case of arbitrary DNS clients and servers on the Internet.

Hence an active man-in-the-middle attacker could strip out stronger algorithms from the client’s preferred algorithms list and force the server to send back signatures with a weaker algorithm than it might have otherwise sent.

In order to detect such attacks, the client MUST compare the zone signing algorithms listed in the zone’s authenticated DNSKEY RRset, and the preferred list in the query that it sent, to the algorithms seen in the response signatures. If signatures by the most preferred algorithm they have in common have not been sent, this may indicate an algorithm downgrade attack.

8. Dealing with Proxies and Middleboxes

EDNS is a hop-by-hop mechanism. Hence all DNS speakers in the path from the querier invoking this option to the responding server need to support this mechanism for it to work correctly. DNS proxies along the path that transparently relay requests and responses, and largely comply with the implementation guidelines described in [RFC5625] should not be a problem. But more complicated proxies,
middleboxes, forwarding resolvers, etc that actively interpret DNS messages, but do not understand this new option, will likely strip off the unrecognized option in their outbound queries. The result will be that the responding server will send back signatures made with the full set of algorithms.

There is always a danger that a misbehaving middlebox might block or drop a DNS packet with an unrecognized EDNS option, but this is a threat that applies to almost all DNS extension proposals. Deployment of new DNS options provides an opportunity to identify and remove or fix such misbehaving devices.

An alternative end-to-end mechanism is described in [dnssec-nego] to workaround DNS speaking middleboxes that haven’t been upgraded to recognize this option. It involves the client encoding the ordered list of algorithms in a sequence of labels prepended to the query name, and the addition of a new DNSKEY RR (with a new algorithm number) at the authoritative server to signal to clients that the server recognizes these specially constructed query names. No further details of this alternative mechanism are provided in this document, but could be incorporated in future revisions if there is interest in developing that solution.

9. Acknowledgements

This specification builds on earlier work on DNSSEC algorithm negotiation by Amir Herzberg and Haya Shulman in [dnssec-nego].

10. Security Considerations

[ TODO ]

11. IANA Considerations

This specification requires the registration of a new value in the DNS EDNS0 Option Code Registry, maintained by IANA.

12. References

12.1. Normative References

12.2. Informative References


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Address-specific DNS Name Redirection (ANAME)
draft-ietf-dnsop-aname-01

Abstract

This document defines the "ANAME" DNS RR type, to provide similar functionality to CNAME, but only redirects type A and AAAA queries. Unlike CNAME, an ANAME can coexist with other record types. The ANAME RR allows zone owners to redirect queries for apex domain names in a standards compliant manner.

Status of This Memo

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1. **Introduction**

Websites hosted by content distribution networks are often served by multiple IP addresses handling different geographic areas. In many cases, an initial query for a domain name returns a CNAME record whose `<target>` is a name served by the CDN, and which ultimately resolves to a different final answer depending on the client’s IP address or subnet, geographic location, or other considerations.

It is common practice for websites to publish content at their registered domain name (sometimes referred to as a "bare domain" or "zone apex": for example, "example.com" rather than "www.example.com"). However, [RFC1033] forbids the use of CNAME records at the same node as any other record type. Zone apex nodes always contain SOA and NS RRsets, and frequently contain other types such as DNSKEY, MX, TXT/SPF, etc. Consequently, a CNAME record is not permitted at zone apex nodes.

It should be noted that [RFC4034] relaxed this restriction by allowing coexistence of CNAME with RRSIG and NSEC records, but such exceptions are not applicable to other resource records. RRSIG and NSEC exist to prove the integrity of the CNAME record; they are not intended to associate arbitrary data with the domain name.
DNAME [RFC6672] is also not a solution, as its function is to redirect all names in the namespace below the DNAME <owner>, not the DNAME <owner> itself.

Redirecting website lookups to an alternate domain name via SRV or URI resource records would be an effective solution, but to date this approach has not been accepted by browser implementations. In addition, it is not possible to use SRV records with wildcard names.

As a result of the above, the only widely supported and standards-compliant way to publish content at a zone apex is to place A and/or AAAA records at that node. The flexibility afforded by CNAME is not available.

This document specifies a new RR type "ANAME", which provides similar functionality to CNAME, but only for address queries (i.e., for type A or AAAA). The ANAME record can be present at any DNS node, and can coexist with most other RR types, enabling it to be present at a zone apex, or any other place where the presence of other records prevents the use of CNAME.

Authoritative servers configured with ANAME records will answer address queries for the ANAME owner with addresses found at the ANAME’s target, and also with the ANAME itself. Recursive resolvers which understand ANAME can re-query for the ANAME target, just as if they had received a CNAME response. Recursive resolvers which do not understand ANAME will ignore the ANAME and consume the provided A/AAAA records directly.

Similar authoritative functionality has been implemented and deployed by a number of DNS software vendors and service providers, using names such as ALIAS, ANAME, apex CNAME, CNAME flattening, and top level redirection. These approaches have all been standards-noncompliant in one way or another, and none have provided a mechanism for a recursive resolver to follow the redirection chain itself.

1.1. Terminology

"Address type" refers to a DNS RR type that encodes a network address. Currently the set of address types consists of A and AAAA. (This is not an exclusive list; in the event that any new address types are standardized in the future, they will be included.)

"Address query" refers to a DNS query for any address type.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

2. The ANAME Resource Record

This document defines the "ANAME" DNS resource record type, with RR TYPE value [TBD].

The ANAME presentation format is identical to that of CNAME [RFC1033]:

```
owner ttl class ANAME target
```

The wire format is also identical to CNAME, except that name compression is not permitted in ANAME RDATA, per [RFC3597].

Only one ANAME <target> can be defined per <owner>. An ANAME RRset MUST NOT contain more than one resource record.

3. Authoritative Server Behavior

When an ANAME record is present at a DNS node and a query is received by an authoritative server for type A or AAAA, the authoritative server returns the ANAME RR in the answer section.

Because not all querying resolvers understand ANAME, the authoritative server MUST also return address records, as described below. This is conceptually similar to the synthesized CNAME record included with DNAME responses [RFC6672].

Authoritative servers implementing ANAME MUST be equipped to resolve the ANAME <target> on the querying resolver’s behalf, either by sending queries to an external recursive resolver or by implementing recursive resolution logic internally, so that address records can be expanded when the ANAME <target> is in a separate zone from <owner>.

If a query for the ANAME <target> returns a chaining response (i.e., CNAME, DNAME, or another ANAME), then the authoritative server (or the resolver tasked with resolving the ANAME <target> on its behalf) MUST attempt to follow the chain until it is able to resolve a final address response, or until resolution fails. Intermediate ANAMES, CNAMEs, and DNAMEs MUST be omitted from the response.
3.1. Address records returned with ANAME

If the original query is for type A, and an RRset of type A exists at the final ANAME <target>, then that A RRset (with <owner> changed to match that of the ANAME RR), MUST be appended to the answer section after the ANAME RRset. If an AAAA RRset is also known to exist at the ANAME <target>, then the AAAA RRset MAY be appended to the additional section (again, with <owner> changed to match that of the ANAME RR).

Similarly, if the original query was for type AAAA, and an AAAA RRset exists at the final ANAME <target>, then it is appended to the answer section (with <owner> changed), and if an A RRset also exists at the final ANAME <target> then it MAY be appended to the additional section.

If the original query is for type ANAME, A and AAAA records MAY be returned in the additional section.

If the original query is for type ANY and access to ANY query processing is not restricted, then the answer section MUST contain both the ANAME and the A and AAAA RRsets, if present and successfully resolved at the ANAME <target>.

How and when an authoritative server resolves the A and AAAA responses from the ANAME <target> (when it is not itself authoritative for <target>) is unspecified. If the authoritative server is capable of performing recursive resolution, then it MAY resolve the query itself, or it MAY send address queries to an external resolver. It MAY send address queries to the ANAME <target> when loading the zone and cache the responses locally, or it MAY delay resolution of the address records until a query is received for the ANAME <owner>. In either case, for performance reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that address records be cached locally by the authoritative server.

Address records cached locally MUST have a limited TTL. The initial TTL for locally-cached address records MUST be set to the minimum of the ANAME TTL and the TTLs of the intermediate and address records retrieved during ANAME <> resolution. The TTL of the cached address records MUST count down, just as it would in a conventional resolver cache. Address records with expired TTLs MUST NOT be used to answer address queries until refreshed by sending a new query to the ANAME <target>.

If configured to do so, then the authoritative server MAY, when sending queries to the ANAME <target>, include an EDNS CLIENT-SUBNET (ECS) option [RFC7871], either forwarding an ECS option that was sent...
to it by the querying resolver, or generating a new ECS option from
the querying resolver’s address. If a response from the ANAME
<target> includes an ECS option with a SCOPE PREFIX-LENGTH greater
than zero, the response SHOULD be cached in such a way that it would
subsequently only be used in response to queries from the same client
subnet.

If resolution of the ANAME <target> yields no address records due to
NODATA or NXDOMAIN, then the authoritative server MUST return only
the ANAME record. If the query was for a specific address type, then
the response MUST also include the SOA as in a normal NODATA
response, along with NSEC or NSEC3 if applicable.

If resolution of the ANAME <target> yields no address records due to
some other failure, and the query was for a specific address type,
the response MUST include the ANAME record and set the RCODE to
SERVFAIL.

3.2. Coexistence with other types

If the zone is configured with an A or AAAA RRset at the same DNS
node as ANAME, then the ANAME is considered to have already been
expanded. If during query processing any address records are found
at the same node as an ANAME RR, then the ANAME RR MUST NOT be
further expanded by the authoritative server.

ANAME MUST NOT coexist with CNAME or any other RR type that restricts
the types with which it can itself coexist.

Like other types, ANAME MUST NOT exist below a DNAME, but it can
coexist at the same node; in fact, the two can be used cooperatively
to redirect both the owner name (via ANAME) and everything under it
(via DNAME).

ANAME can freely coexist at the same owner name with any other RR
type.

3.3. DNSSEC signing

If the zone in which the ANAME resides is DNSSEC-signed, and if the
server has access to its private zone-signing key, then the A and
AAAA RRsets MUST be signed, either in advance when populating the A/
AAAA answers for the ANAME records, or "on the fly" when responding
to a query.

If the server does not have access to the private zone-signing key
then it MAY return unsigned address records, but this is NOT
RECOMMENDED unless every resolver with access to the zone is known to
support ANAME (as might be the case in a split-horizon deployment where ANAME records are only served to an internal network with its own resolvers).

Validating resolvers which do not yet implement ANAME will not be able to validate the A and AAAA responses included with an ANAME response unless those responses are validly signed by a DNSKEY at the apex of the zone in which the ANAME resides. Passing along the RRSIGs associated with the original A and AAAA RRsets from the ANAME <target> will not be sufficient for DNSSEC validation.

Implementers MAY allow address records associated with the ANAME to be populated and signed by the primary server, then sent along with their RRSIGs to secondaries via zone transfer. In this case, the master server MUST respect the TTLs of the address records, MUST refresh the address records by re-resolving the ANAME <target> when their TTLs expire, SHOULD respond to address queries with TTLs that count down as they would when answering from a normal DNS cache, and MUST inform secondary servers via DNS NOTIFY they need to refresh the zone when address records have been updated. A secondary server SHOULD store address records and associated RRSIGs supplied via zone transfer in such a way that their TTLs will count down, as they would in a normal DNS cache, and ultimately trigger a zone refresh query upon reaching zero. When a secondary server is responding to an address query, it SHOULD answer with the reduced TTL, but when responding to a zone transfer request, it MUST answer with the original TTL received from the primary.

If this address record expansion and signing during zone transfer is not supported, then every authoritative server providing ANAME responses in a signed zone SHOULD have access to the private zone-signing key for that zone. Deployment of ANAME in signed zones where address records cannot be signed due to lack of access to the private zone-signing key is NOT RECOMMENDED.

When ANAME is present in a signed DNS node and address records exist at the ANAME <target>, the type bit map in the NSEC [RFC4034] or NSEC3 [RFC5155] record for that node MUST include bits for A and/or AAAA as well as ANAME. This is for the benefit of validating resolvers not implementing ANAME which may use a signed proof of nonexistence for type A and AAAA to prevent address queries from being resolved. The type bit map SHOULD only include address types which are known to exist at the <target>.
4. Recursive Server Behavior

When a recursive resolver sends a query of type A or AAAA and receives a response with an ANAME RRset in the answer section, it MUST re-query for the ANAME <target>. This is necessary because, in some cases, the address received will be dependent on network topology and other considerations, and the resolver may find a different answer than the authoritative server did. (This requirement MAY be relaxed if both the ANAME <owner> and <target> are validly signed and provably in the same zone.)

If resolution fails -- for example, due to the local resolver being nonfunctional or the ANAME <target> zone being unreachable -- then the resolver MAY use the address records that were included in the authoritative response as a fallback. Otherwise, these records MUST NOT be cached or returned.

If configured to do so, the resolver MAY include an EDNS CLIENT-SUBNET option [RFC7871] both when sending the initial query to the ANAME <owner> and when re-querying for the ANAME <target>. If the response includes a SCOPE PREFIX-LENGTH greater than zero, the response SHOULD be cached in such a way that it would subsequently only be used in response to queries from the same client subnet.

5. Examples

Given the following zone:

$ORIGIN example.com.
@ IN SOA example.com hostmaster.example.com 1 7200 600 1209600 60
@ IN NS ns1
@ IN ANAME example.com.my-cdn.example.net.
www IN CNAME example.com.my-cdn.example.net.

A query for example.com/A would return the following:

;; QUESTION SECTION:
example.com. IN A

;; ANSWER SECTION:
example.com. 5 IN ANAME example.com.my-cdn.example.net.
example.com. 5 IN A 192.0.2.1

;; ADDITIONAL SECTION:
example.com. 5 IN AAAA 2001:db8::1

Similarly, for example.com/AAAA:
Internet-Draft                    aname                     January 2018

;; QUESTION SECTION:
;example.com.                   IN      AAAA

;; ANSWER SECTION:
example.com.            5       IN      ANAME   example.com.my-cdn.example.net.
example.com.            5       IN      AAAA    2001:db8::1

;; ADDITIONAL SECTION:
example.com.            5       IN      A       192.0.2.1

A query for example.com/ANAME would receive only the ANAME in the
answer section, with the addresses for example.com.my-cdn.example.net
expanded in the additional section:

;; QUESTION SECTION:
;example.com.                   IN      ANAME

;; ANSWER SECTION:
example.com.            5       IN      ANAME   example.com.my-cdn.example.net.

;; ADDITIONAL SECTION:
example.com.my-cdn.example.net. 5 IN    A       192.0.2.1
example.com.my-cdn.example.net. 5 IN    AAAA    2001:db8::1

Meanwhile, a query for a non-address type would be returned normally:

;; QUESTION SECTION:
;example.com.                   IN      NS

;; ANSWER SECTION:
example.com.            5       IN      NS      ns1.example.com.

6. Operational Considerations

When a zone containing ANAME records is transferred to a secondary
server, the ANAME records are transferred, but the A or AAAA records
retrieved from the ANAME <target> may not be. If the primary server
implements ANAME but the secondary server does not, then the two will
return different answers for address queries. It is therefore
RECOMMENDED that ANAME not be deployed in a zone unless all of the
authoritative servers for that zone implement ANAME, or the primary
is able to expand the ANAME with the related address RRsets during
the zone transfer.
7. Implementation Status

PowerDNS <https://powerdns.com> currently implements a similar authoritative-only feature using "ALIAS" records, which are expanded by the primary server and transferred as address records to secondaries.

[TODO: Add discussion of DNSimple, DNS Made Easy, EasyDNS, Cloudflare, Amazon, and Akamai.]

8. Security Considerations

An authoritative server which implements ANAME resolves address queries on behalf of its clients, either internally or by querying an external resolver. This resolution must be allowed to take place regardless of whether the client would ordinarily have been permitted by local policy to send recursive queries.

When a resolver that does not understand ANAME receives a response containing A or AAAA records with <owner> rewritten to match that of the ANAME RR, this may bypass security mechanisms based on local policy limiting access to the original ANAME <target>. One possible mitigation for this is to make sure the resolver being used during ANAME resolution lives outside of such critical network sections.

If ANAME is used in a signed zone, validating resolvers that do not understand ANAME will not be able to validate the A and AAAA records included in the response, unless the responding server has added signatures for those records. Merely passing along signatures from the <target> is not sufficient. An authoritative server hosting a secure domain that includes ANAME SHOULD therefore have access to the private zone-signing key for that domain; otherwise, the operator must accept that validation failures will be common until ANAME is widely deployed.

Both authoritative servers and resolvers that implement ANAME SHOULD carefully check for loops and treat them as an error condition. One possible approach is to implement a hop counter and stop resolution when a maximum hop count is reached.

An authoritative resolver returning address records which were obtained by resolving the ANAME <target> is supplying its own best information to clients as to the correct answer. The response may be signed by the authoritative server, but that is not a guarantee of the actual correctness of the answer. This can have the effect of promoting an insecure response from the ANAME <target> to a signed response from the <owner>, which may then appear to clients to be more trustworthy than it should. To mitigate harm from this, DNSSEC
validation SHOULD be used when resolving the ANAME <target>. Authoritative servers MAY refuse to expand ANAME records unless the <target> node is both signed and validated.

9. IANA Considerations

IANA is requested to assign a DNS RR data type value for the ANAME RR type under the "Resource Record (RR) TYPEs" subregistry under the "Domain Name System (DNS) Parameters" registry.

IANA may wish to consider the creation of a registry of address types; addition of new types to such a registry would then implicitly update this specification.

10. Acknowledgments


11. References

11.1. Normative References


11.2. Informative References


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Abstract

This document describes a data representation for collections of DNS messages. The format is designed for efficient storage and transmission of large packet captures of DNS traffic; it attempts to minimize the size of such packet capture files but retain the full DNS message contents along with the most useful transport metadata. It is intended to assist with the development of DNS traffic monitoring applications.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction ............................................ 3
2. Terminology ............................................ 4
3. Data collection use cases ............................... 5
4. Design considerations ................................... 7
5. Choice of CBOR ......................................... 8
6. C-DNS format conceptual overview ....................... 9
   6.1. Block Parameters .................................. 13
   6.2. Storage Parameters ................................ 13
       6.2.1. Optional data items .......................... 13
       6.2.2. Optional RRs and OPCODEs ................... 14
       6.2.3. Storage flags ................................ 15
       6.2.4. IP Address storage ........................... 15
7. C-DNS format detailed description ....................... 15
   7.1. Map quantities and indexes ........................ 15
   7.2. Tabular representation ............................. 16
   7.3. "File" ............................................ 17
   7.4. "FilePreamble" .................................... 17
       7.4.1. "BlockParameters" ............................ 18
       7.4.2. "CollectionParameters" ....................... 21
   7.5. "Block" ............................................ 22
       7.5.1. "BlockPreamble" ............................... 23
       7.5.2. "BlockStatistics" ............................. 24
       7.5.3. "BlockTables" ................................ 25
   7.6. "QueryResponse" ................................... 31
       7.6.1. "ResponseProcessingData" ..................... 33
       7.6.2. "QueryResponseExtended" ..................... 33
   7.7. "AddressEventCount" ................................ 34
   7.8. "MalformedMessage" ................................ 35
8. Versioning ................................................ 36
9. C-DNS to PCAP ........................................... 36
  9.1. Name compression .................................... 37
10. Data collection .......................................... 38
   10.1. Matching algorithm ................................ 39
   10.2. Message identifiers ............................... 41
       10.2.1. Primary ID (required) ...................... 41
       10.2.2. Secondary ID (optional) ................... 42
   10.3. Algorithm parameters ............................. 42
   10.4. Algorithm requirements ........................... 42
   10.5. Algorithm limitations ............................ 42
1. Introduction

There has long been a need to collect DNS queries and responses on authoritative and recursive name servers for monitoring and analysis. This data is used in a number of ways including traffic monitoring, analyzing network attacks and "day in the life" (DITL) [ditl] analysis.

A wide variety of tools already exist that facilitate the collection of DNS traffic data, such as DSC [dsc], packetq [packetq], dnscap [dnscap] and dnstap [dnstap]. However, there is no standard exchange format for large DNS packet captures. The PCAP [pcap] or PCAP-NG [pcapng] formats are typically used in practice for packet captures, but these file formats can contain a great deal of additional information that is not directly pertinent to DNS traffic analysis and thus unnecessarily increases the capture file size.

Dickinson, et al. Expires February 11, 2019
There has also been work on using text based formats to describe DNS packets such as [I-D.daley-dnsxml], [I-D.hoffman-dns-in-json], but these are largely aimed at producing convenient representations of single messages.

Many DNS operators may receive hundreds of thousands of queries per second on a single name server instance so a mechanism to minimize the storage size (and therefore upload overhead) of the data collected is highly desirable.

The format described in this document, C-DNS (Compacted-DNS), focusses on the problem of capturing and storing large packet capture files of DNS traffic with the following goals in mind:

- Minimize the file size for storage and transmission.
- Minimize the overhead of producing the packet capture file and the cost of any further (general purpose) compression of the file.

This document contains:

- A discussion of some common use cases in which DNS data is collected, see Section 3.
- A discussion of the major design considerations in developing an efficient data representation for collections of DNS messages, see Section 4.
- A description of why CBOR [RFC7049] was chosen for this format, see Section 5.
- A conceptual overview of the C-DNS format, see Section 6.
- The definition of the C-DNS format for the collection of DNS messages, see Section 7.
- Notes on converting C-DNS data to PCAP format, see Section 9.
- Some high level implementation considerations for applications designed to produce C-DNS, see Section 10.

2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
"Packet" refers to an individual IPv4 or IPv6 packet. Typically packets are UDP datagrams, but may also be part of a TCP data stream. "Message", unless otherwise qualified, refers to a DNS payload extracted from a UDP datagram or a TCP data stream.

The parts of DNS messages are named as they are in [RFC1035]. Specifically, the DNS message has five sections: Header, Question, Answer, Authority, and Additional.

Pairs of DNS messages are called a Query and a Response.

3. Data collection use cases

In an ideal world, it would be optimal to collect full packet captures of all packets going in or out of a name server. However, there are several design choices or other limitations that are common to many DNS installations and operators.

- DNS servers are hosted in a variety of situations:
  - Self-hosted servers
  - Third party hosting (including multiple third parties)
  - Third party hardware (including multiple third parties)

- Data is collected under different conditions:
  - On well-provisioned servers running in a steady state
  - On heavily loaded servers
  - On virtualized servers
  - On servers that are under DoS attack
  - On servers that are unwitting intermediaries in DoS attacks

- Traffic can be collected via a variety of mechanisms:
  - Within the name server implementation itself
  - On the same hardware as the name server itself
  - Using a network tap on an adjacent host to listen to DNS traffic
  - Using port mirroring to listen from another host
The capabilities of data collection (and upload) networks vary:

- Out-of-band networks with the same capacity as the in-band network
- Out-of-band networks with less capacity than the in-band network
- Everything being on the in-band network

Thus, there is a wide range of use cases from very limited data collection environments (third party hardware, servers that are under attack, packet capture on the name server itself and no out-of-band network) to "limitless" environments (self hosted, well provisioned servers, using a network tap or port mirroring with an out-of-band networks with the same capacity as the in-band network). In the former, it is infeasible to reliably collect full packet captures, especially if the server is under attack. In the latter case, collection of full packet captures may be reasonable.

As a result of these restrictions, the C-DNS data format is designed with the most limited use case in mind such that:

- Data collection will occur on the same hardware as the name server itself
- Collected data will be stored on the same hardware as the name server itself, at least temporarily
- Collected data being returned to some central analysis system will use the same network interface as the DNS queries and responses
- There can be multiple third party servers involved

Because of these considerations, a major factor in the design of the format is minimal storage size of the capture files.

Another significant consideration for any application that records DNS traffic is that the running of the name server software and the transmission of DNS queries and responses are the most important jobs of a name server; capturing data is not. Any data collection system co-located with the name server needs to be intelligent enough to carefully manage its CPU, disk, memory and network utilization. This leads to designing a format that requires a relatively low overhead to produce and minimizes the requirement for further potentially costly compression.
However, it is also essential that interoperability with less restricted infrastructure is maintained. In particular, it is highly desirable that the collection format should facilitate the re-creation of common formats (such as PCAP) that are as close to the original as is realistic given the restrictions above.

4. Design considerations

This section presents some of the major design considerations used in the development of the C-DNS format.

1. The basic unit of data is a combined DNS Query and the associated Response (a "Q/R data item"). The same structure will be used for unmatched Queries and Responses. Queries without Responses will be captured omitting the response data. Responses without queries will be captured omitting the Query data (but using the Question section from the response, if present, as an identifying QNAME).

* Rationale: A Query and Response represents the basic level of a client’s interaction with the server. Also, combining the Query and Response into one item often reduces storage requirements due to commonality in the data of the two messages.

In the context of generating a C-DNS file it is assumed that only those DNS payloads which can be parsed to produce a well-formed DNS message are stored in the C-DNS format and that all other messages will be (optionally) recorded as malformed messages. Parsing a well-formed message means as a minimum:

* The packet has a well-formed 12 byte DNS Header with a recognised OPCODE.

* The section counts are consistent with the section contents.

* All of the resource records can be fully parsed.

2. All top level fields in each Q/R data item will be optional.

* Rationale: Different users will have different requirements for data to be available for analysis. Users with minimal requirements should not have to pay the cost of recording full data, though this will limit the ability to perform certain kinds of data analysis and also to reconstruct packet captures. For example, omitting the resource records from a Response will reduce the C-DNS file size; in principle responses can be synthesized if there is enough context.
3. Multiple Q/R data items will be collected into blocks in the format. Common data in a block will be abstracted and referenced from individual Q/R data items by indexing. The maximum number of Q/R data items in a block will be configurable.

* Rationale: This blocking and indexing provides a significant reduction in the volume of file data generated. Although this introduces complexity, it provides compression of the data that makes use of knowledge of the DNS message structure.

* It is anticipated that the files produced can be subject to further compression using general purpose compression tools. Measurements show that blocking significantly reduces the CPU required to perform such strong compression. See Appendix C.2.

* Examples of commonality between DNS messages are that in most cases the QUESTION RR is the same in the query and response, and that there is a finite set of query signatures (based on a subset of attributes). For many authoritative servers there is very likely to be a finite set of responses that are generated, of which a large number are NXDOMAIN.

4. Traffic metadata can optionally be included in each block. Specifically, counts of some types of non-DNS packets (e.g. ICMP, TCP resets) sent to the server may be of interest.

5. The wire format content of malformed DNS messages may optionally be recorded.

* Rationale: Any structured capture format that does not capture the DNS payload byte for byte will be limited to some extent in that it cannot represent malformed DNS messages. Only those messages that can be fully parsed and transformed into the structured format can be fully represented. Note, however, this can result in rather misleading statistics. For example, a malformed query which cannot be represented in the C-DNS format will lead to the (well formed) DNS responses with error code FORMERR appearing as ‘unmatched’. Therefore it can greatly aid downstream analysis to have the wire format of the malformed DNS messages available directly in the C-DNS file.

5. Choice of CBOR

This document presents a detailed format description using CBOR, the Concise Binary Object Representation defined in [RFC7049].

The choice of CBOR was made taking a number of factors into account.
o CBOR is a binary representation, and thus is economical in storage space.

o Other binary representations were investigated, and whilst all had attractive features, none had a significant advantage over CBOR. See Appendix C for some discussion of this.

o CBOR is an IETF standard and familiar to IETF participants. It is based on the now-common ideas of lists and objects, and thus requires very little familiarization for those in the wider industry.

o CBOR is a simple format, and can easily be implemented from scratch if necessary. More complex formats require library support which may present problems on unusual platforms.

o CBOR can also be easily converted to text formats such as JSON ([RFC8259]) for debugging and other human inspection requirements.

o CBOR data schemas can be described using CDDL [I-D.ietf-cbor-cddl].

6. C-DNS format conceptual overview

The following figures show purely schematic representations of the C-DNS format to convey the high-level structure of the C-DNS format. Section 7 provides a detailed discussion of the CBOR representation and individual elements.

Figure 1 shows the C-DNS format at the top level including the file header and data blocks. The Query/Response data items, Address/Event Count data items and Malformed Message data items link to various Block tables.
Figure 1: The C-DNS format.

Figure 2 shows some more detailed relationships within each block, specifically those between the Query/Response data item and the relevant Block tables.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Query/Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Time offset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Client address</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Client port</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transaction ID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Query signature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Client hoplimit (q)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response delay (r)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Query name (q)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Query size (q)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response size (r)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response processing (r)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bailiwick index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flags</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extra query info (q)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Answer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extra response info (r)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Answer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dickinson, et al. Expires February 11, 2019
Figure 2: The Query/Response data item and subsidiary tables.

In Figure 2 data items annotated (q) are only present when a query/response has a query, and those annotated (r) are only present when a query/response response is present.

A C-DNS file begins with a file header containing a File Type Identifier and a File Preamble. The File Preamble contains information on the file Format Version and an array of Block Parameters items (the contents of which include Collection and Storage Parameters used for one or more blocks).

The file header is followed by a series of data Blocks.

A Block consists of a Block Preamble item, some Block Statistics for the traffic stored within the Block and then various arrays of common data collectively called the Block Tables. This is then followed by an array of the Query/Response data items detailing the queries and responses stored within the Block. The array of Query/Response data items is in turn followed by the Address/Event Counts data items (an array of per-client counts of particular IP events) and then Malformed Message data items (an array of malformed messages that stored in the Block).

The exact nature of the DNS data will affect what block size is the best fit, however sample data for a root server indicated that block
sizes up to 10,000 Q/R data items give good results. See Appendix C.6 for more details.

6.1. Block Parameters

The details of the Block Parameters items are not shown in the diagrams but are discussed here for context.

An array of Block Parameters items is stored in the File Preamble (with a minimum of one item at index 0); a Block Parameters item consists of a collection of Storage and Collection Parameters that applies to any given Block. An array is used in order to support use cases such as wanting to merge C-DNS files from different sources. The Block Preamble item then contains an optional index for the Block Parameters item that applies for that Block; if not present the index defaults to 0. Hence, in effect, a global Block Parameters item is defined which can then be overridden per Block.

6.2. Storage Parameters

The Block Parameters item includes a Storage Parameters item - this contains information about the specific data fields stored in the C-DNS file.

These parameters include:

- The sub-second timing resolution used by the data.
- Information (hints) on which optional data are omitted. See Section 6.2.1.
- Recorded OPCODES and RR types. See Section 6.2.2.
- Flags indicating, for example, whether the data is sampled or anonymised. See Section 6.2.3.
- Client and server IPv4 and IPv6 address prefixes. See Section 6.2.4

6.2.1. Optional data items

To enable implementations to store data to their precise requirements in as space-efficient manner as possible, all fields in the following arrays are optional:

- Query/Response
- Query Signature
Malformed messages

In other words, an implementation can choose to omit any data item that is not required for its use case. In addition, implementations may be configured to not record all RRs, or only record messages with certain OPCODES.

This does, however, mean that a consumer of a C-DNS file faces two problems:

1. How can it quickly determine if a file definitely does not contain the data items it requires to complete a particular task (e.g. reconstructing query traffic or performing a specific piece of data analysis)?

2. How can it determine if a data item is not present because it was:
   * explicitly not recorded or
   * the data item was not available/present.

For example, capturing C-DNS data from within a nameserver implementation makes it unlikely that the Client Hoplimit can be recorded. Or, if there is no query ARCount recorded and no query OPT RDATA recorded, is that because no query contained an OPT RR, or because that data was not stored?

The Storage Parameters therefore also contains a Storage Hints item which specifies which items the encoder of the file omits from the stored data. An implementation decoding that file can then use these to quickly determine whether the input data is rich enough for its needs.

### 6.2.2. Optional RRs and OPCODEs

Also included in the Storage Parameters are explicit arrays listing the RR types and the OPCODEs to be recorded. These remove any ambiguity over whether messages containing particular OPCODEs or RR types are not present because they did not occur, or because the implementation is not configured to record them.

In the case of OPCODEs, for a message to be fully parsable, the OPCODE must be known to the collecting implementation. Any message with an OPCODE unknown to the collecting implementation cannot be validated as correctly formed, and so must be treated as malformed. Messages with OPCODES known to the recording application but not
listed in the Storage Parameters are discarded (regardless of whether they are malformed or not).

In the case of RR records, each record in a message must be fully parsable, including parsing the record RDATA, as otherwise the message cannot be validated as correctly formed. Any RR record with an RR type not known to the collecting implementation cannot be validated as correctly formed, and so must be treated as malformed.

Once a message is correctly parsed, an implementation is free to record only a subset of the RR records present.

6.2.3. Storage flags

The Storage Parameters contains flags that can be used to indicate if:

- the data is anonymised,
- the data is produced from sample data, or
- names in the data have been normalised (converted to uniform case).

The Storage Parameters also contains optional fields holding details of the sampling method used and the anonymisation method used. It is RECOMMENDED these fields contain URIs pointing to resources describing the methods used.

6.2.4. IP Address storage

The format contains fields to indicate if only IP prefixes were stored. If IP address prefixes are given, only the prefix bits of addresses are stored. For example, if a client IPv4 prefix of 16 is specified, a client address of 192.0.2.1 will be stored as 0xC000 (192.0), reducing address storage space requirements.

7. C-DNS format detailed description

The CDDL definition for the C-DNS format is given in Appendix A.

7.1. Map quantities and indexes

All map keys are integers with values specified in the CDDL. String keys would significantly bloat the file size.

All key values specified are positive integers under 24, so their CBOR representation is a single byte. Positive integer values not
currently used as keys in a map are reserved for use in future standard extensions.

Implementations may choose to add additional implementation-specific entries to any map. Negative integer map keys are reserved for these values. Key values from -1 to -24 also have a single byte CBOR representation, so such implementation-specific extensions are not at any space efficiency disadvantage.

An item described as an index is the index of the data item in the referenced array. Indexes are 0-based.

7.2. Tabular representation

The following sections present the C-DNS specification in tabular format with a detailed description of each item.

In all quantities that contain bit flags, bit 0 indicates the least significant bit, i.e. flag "n" in quantity "q" is on if "(q & (1 << n)) != 0".

For the sake of readability, all type and field names defined in the CDDL definition are shown in double quotes. Type names are by convention camel case (e.g. "BlockTable"), field names are lower-case with hyphens (e.g. "block-tables").

For the sake of brevity, the following conventions are used in the tables:

- The column O marks whether items in a map are optional.
  * O - Optional. The item may be omitted.
  * M - Mandatory. The item must be present.

- The column T gives the CBOR data type of the item.
  * U - Unsigned integer
  * I - Signed integer
  * B - Byte string
  * T - Text string
  * M - Map
  * A - Array
In the case of maps and arrays, more information on the type of each value, include the CDDL definition name if applicable, is given in the description.

7.3. "File"

A C-DNS file has an outer structure "File", a map that contains the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field</th>
<th>O</th>
<th>T</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>file-type-id</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>String &quot;C-DNS&quot; identifying the file type.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>file-preamble</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Version and parameter information for the whole file. Map of type &quot;FilePreamble&quot;, see Section 7.4.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>file-blocks</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Array of items of type &quot;Block&quot;, see Section 7.5. The array may be empty if the file contains no data.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7.4. "FilePreamble"

Information about data in the file. A map containing the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field</th>
<th>O</th>
<th>T</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>major-format-version</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>Unsigned integer ‘1’. The major version of format used in file.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>minor-format-version</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>Unsigned integer ‘0’. The minor version of format used in file.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>private-version</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>Version indicator available for private use by implementations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>block-parameters</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Array of items of type &quot;BlockParameters&quot;, see Section 7.4.1. The array must contain at least one entry. (The &quot;block-parameters-index&quot; item in each &quot;BlockParameters&quot; indicates which array entry applies to that &quot;Block&quot;).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7.4.1. "BlockParameters"

Parameters relating to data storage and collection which apply to one or more items of type "Block". A map containing the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field</th>
<th>O</th>
<th>T</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>storage-parameters</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Parameters relating to data storage in a &quot;Block&quot; item. Map of type &quot;StorageParameters&quot;, see Section 7.4.1.1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>collection-parameters</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Parameters relating to collection of the data in a &quot;Block&quot; item. Map of type &quot;CollectionParameters&quot;, see Section 7.4.2.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7.4.1.1. "StorageParameters"

Parameters relating to how data is stored in the items of type "Block". A map containing the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field</th>
<th>O</th>
<th>T</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ticks-per-second</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>Sub-second timing is recorded in ticks. This specifies the number of ticks in a second.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>max-block-items</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>The maximum number of items stored in any of the arrays in a &quot;Block&quot; item (Q/R items, address event counts or malformed messages). An indication to a decoder of the resources needed to process the file.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>storage-hints</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Collection of hints as to which fields are omitted in the arrays that have optional fields. Map of type &quot;StorageHints&quot;, see Section 7.4.1.1.1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>opcodes</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Array of OPCODES (unsigned integers) recorded by the collection implementation. See Section 6.2.2.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### C-DNS: A DNS Packet Capture Format

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field</th>
<th>O</th>
<th>T</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>rr-types</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Array of RR types (unsigned integers) recorded by the collection implementation. See Section 6.2.2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>storage-flags</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>Bit flags indicating attributes of stored data.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bit 0. 1 if the data has been anonymised.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bit 1. 1 if the data is sampled data.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bit 2. 1 if the names have been normalised (converted to uniform case).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>client-address</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>IPv4 client address prefix length. If specified, only the address prefix bits are stored.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-prefix-ipv4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>client-address</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>IPv6 client address prefix length. If specified, only the address prefix bits are stored.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-prefix-ipv6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>server-address</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>IPv4 server address prefix length. If specified, only the address prefix bits are stored.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-prefix-ipv4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>server-address</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>IPv6 server address prefix length. If specified, only the address prefix bits are stored.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-prefix-ipv6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sampling-method</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>Information on the sampling method used. See Section 6.2.3.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anonymisation-method</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>Information on the anonymisation method used. See Section 6.2.3.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 7.4.1.1.1. "StorageHints"

An indicator of which fields the collecting implementation omits in the arrays with optional fields. A map containing the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field</th>
<th>O</th>
<th>T</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>query-response</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>Hints indicating which &quot;QueryResponse&quot; fields are omitted, see section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-hints</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Section 7.6. If the field is omitted the bit is unset.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Bit 0. time-offset
Bit 1. client-address-index
Bit 2. client-port
Bit 3. transaction-id
Bit 4. qr-signature-index
Bit 5. client-hoplimit
Bit 6. response-delay
Bit 7. query-name-index
Bit 8. query-size
Bit 9. response-size
Bit 10. response-processing-data
Bit 11. query-question-sections
Bit 12. query-answer-sections
Bit 13. query-authority-sections
Bit 14. query-additional-sections
Bit 15. response-answer-sections
Bit 16. response-authority-sections
Bit 17. response-additional-sections

query-response-signature-hints M U Hints indicating which
"QueryResponseSignature" fields are omitted, see section Section 7.5.3.2.
If the field is omitted the bit is unset.
Bit 0. server-address
Bit 1. server-port
Bit 2. qr-transport-flags
Bit 3. qr-type
Bit 4. qr-sig-flags
Bit 5. query-opcode
Bit 6. dns-flags
Bit 7. query-rcode
Bit 8. query-class-type
Bit 9. query-ancount
Bit 10. query-ancount
Bit 11. query-nscount
Bit 12. query-arcount
Bit 13. query-edns-version
Bit 14. query-udp-size
Bit 15. query-opt-rdata
Bit 16. response-rcode

rr-hints M U Hints indicating which optional "RR" fields are omitted, see Section 7.5.3.4. If the field is omitted the bit is unset.
Bit 0. ttl
Bit 1. rdata-index
other-data-hints | M | U | Hints indicating which other data types are are omitted. If the data type is are omitted the bit is unset. Bit 0. malformed-messages Bit 1. address-event-counts

7.4.2. "CollectionParameters"

Parameters relating to how data in the file was collected.

These parameters have no default. If they do not appear, nothing can be inferred about their value.

A map containing the following items:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field</th>
<th>O</th>
<th>T</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>query-timeout</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>To be matched with a query, a response must arrive within this number of seconds.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>skew-timeout</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>The network stack may report a response before the corresponding query. A response is not considered to be missing a query until after this many micro-seconds.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>snaplen</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>Collect up to this many bytes per packet.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>promisc</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>1 if promiscuous mode was enabled on the interface, 0 otherwise.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>interfaces</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Array of identifiers (of type text string) of the interfaces used for collection.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>server-addresses</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Array of server collection IP addresses (of type byte string). Hint for downstream analysers; does not affect collection.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vlan-ids</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Array of identifiers (of type unsigned integer) of VLANs selected for collection.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>filter</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>&quot;tcpdump&quot; [pcap] style filter for input.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>generator-id</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>String identifying the collection method.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>host-id</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>String identifying the collecting host. Empty if converting an existing packet capture file.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7.5. "Block"

Container for data with common collection and storage parameters. A map containing the following:
| Field              | O | T | Description                                                                                                                                 |
|--------------------+---+---+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| block-preamble     | M | M | Overall information for the "Block" item. Map of type "BlockPreamble", see Section 7.5.1.                                                   |
| block-statistics   | O | M | Statistics about the "Block" item. Map of type "BlockStatistics", see Section 7.5.2.                                                      |
| block-tables       | O | M | The arrays containing data referenced by individual "QueryResponse" or "MalformedMessage" items. Map of type "BlockTables", see Section 7.5.3. |
| query-responses    | O | A | Details of individual DNS Q/R data items. Array of items of type "QueryResponse", see Section 7.6. If present, the array must not be empty. |
| address-event-counts | O | A | Per client counts of ICMP messages and TCP resets. Array of items of type "AddressEventCount", see Section 7.7. If present, the array must not be empty. |
| malformed-messages | O | A | Details of malformed DNS messages. Array of items of type "MalformedMessage", see Section 7.8. If present, the array must not be empty.          |

7.5.1. "BlockPreamble"

Overall information for a "Block" item. A map containing the following:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field</th>
<th>O</th>
<th>T</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>earliest-time</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A timestamp (2 unsigned integers, &quot;Timestamp&quot;) for the earliest record in the &quot;Block&quot; item. The first integer is the number of seconds since the Posix epoch (&quot;time_t&quot;). The second integer is the number of ticks since the start of the second. This timestamp can only be omitted if all block items containing a time offset from the start of the block also omit that time offset.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>block-parameters-index</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>The index of the item in the &quot;block-parameters&quot; array (in the &quot;file-preamble&quot; item) applicable to this block. If not present, index 0 is used. See Section 7.4.1.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 7.5.2. "BlockStatistics"

Basic statistical information about a "Block" item. A map containing the following:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field</th>
<th>O</th>
<th>T</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>processed-messages</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>Total number of DNS messages processed from the input traffic stream during collection of data in this &quot;Block&quot; item.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>qr-data-items</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>Total number of Q/R data items in this &quot;Block&quot; item.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unmatched-queries</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>Number of unmatched queries in this &quot;Block&quot; item.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unmatched-responses</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>Number of unmatched responses in this &quot;Block&quot; item.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>discarded-opcode</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>Number of DNS messages processed from the input traffic stream during collection of data in this &quot;Block&quot; item but not recorded because their OPCODE is not in the list to be collected.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>malformed-items</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>Number of malformed messages found in input for this &quot;Block&quot; item.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7.5.3. "BlockTables"

Arrays containing data referenced by individual "QueryResponse" or "MalformedMessage" items in this "Block". Each element is an array which, if present, must not be empty.

An item in the "qlist" array contains indexes to values in the "qrr" array. Therefore, if "qlist" is present, "qrr" must also be present. Similarly, if "rrlist" is present, "rr" must also be present.

The map contains the following items:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field</th>
<th>O</th>
<th>T</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ip-address</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Array of IP addresses, in network byte order (of type byte string). If client or server address prefixes are set, only the address prefix bits are stored. Each string is therefore up</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Internet-Draft     C-DNS: A DNS Packet Capture Format        August 2018

classtype         O A  Array of RR class and type information. Type is "ClassType", see Section 7.5.3.1.
name-rdata        O A  Array where each entry is the contents of a single NAME or RDATA (of type byte string). Note that NAMES, and labels within RDATA contents, are full domain names or labels; no DNS style name compression is used on the individual names/labels within the format.
qr-sig            O A  Array Q/R data item signatures. Type is "QueryResponseSignature", see Section 7.5.3.2.
qlist             O A  Array of type "QuestionList". A "QuestionList" is an array of unsigned integers, indexes to "Question" items in the "qrr" array.
qrr               O A  Array of type "Question". Each entry is the contents of a single question, where a question is the second or subsequent question in a query. See Section 7.5.3.3.
rrlist            O A  Array of type "RRList". An "RRList" is an array of unsigned integers, indexes to "RR" items in the "rr" array.
rr                O A  Array of type "RR". Each entry is the contents of a single RR. See Section 7.5.3.4.
malformed-message-data O A  Array of the contents of malformed messages. Array of type "MalformedMessageData", see Section 7.5.3.5.
7.5.3.1. "ClassType"

RR class and type information. A map containing the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field</th>
<th>O</th>
<th>T</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>type</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>TYPE value.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>class</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>CLASS value.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7.5.3.2. "QueryResponseSignature"

Elements of a Q/R data item that are often common between multiple individual Q/R data items. A map containing the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field</th>
<th>O</th>
<th>T</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>server-address-index</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>The index in the item in the &quot;ip-address&quot; array of the server IP address. See Section 7.5.3.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>server-port</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>The server port.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>qr-transport-flags</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>Bit flags describing the transport used to service the query.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bit 0. IP version. 0 if IPv4, 1 if IPv6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bit 1-4. Transport. 4 bit unsigned value where 0 = UDP, 1 = TCP, 2 = TLS, 3 = DTLS. Values 4-15 are reserved for future use.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bit 5. 1 if trailing bytes in query packet. See Section 11.2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>qr-type</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>Type of Query/Response transaction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0 = Stub. A query from a stub resolver.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 = Client. An incoming query to a recursive resolver.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 = Resolver. A query sent from a recursive resolver to an authoritative resolver.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3 = Authorative. A query to an authoritative resolver.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4 = Forwarder. A query sent from a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>qr-sig-flags</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>Bit flags explicitly indicating attributes of the message pair represented by this Q/R data item (not all attributes may be recorded or deducible). Bit 0. 1 if a Query was present. Bit 1. 1 if a Response was present. Bit 2. 1 if a Query was present and it had an OPT Resource Record. Bit 3. 1 if a Response was present and it had an OPT Resource Record. Bit 4. 1 if a Query was present but had no Question. Bit 5. 1 if a Response was present but had no Question (only one query-name-index is stored per Q/R item).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>query-opcode</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>Query OPCODE.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field</td>
<td>Mode</td>
<td>Usage</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>query-classtype-index</td>
<td>O U</td>
<td></td>
<td>Query RCODE. If the Query contains OPT, this value incorporates any EXTENDED_RCODE_VALUE.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>query-qd-count</td>
<td>O U</td>
<td></td>
<td>The index to the item in the the &quot;classtype&quot; array of the CLASS and TYPE of the first Question. See Section 7.5.3.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>query-an-count</td>
<td>O U</td>
<td></td>
<td>The QDCOUNT in the Query, or Response if no Query present.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>query-ns-count</td>
<td>O U</td>
<td></td>
<td>Query NSCOUNT.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>query-ar-count</td>
<td>O U</td>
<td></td>
<td>Query ARCOUNT.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>edns-version</td>
<td>O U</td>
<td></td>
<td>The query EDNS version.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>udp-buf-size</td>
<td>O U</td>
<td></td>
<td>The query EDNS sender’s UDP payload size.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>opt-rdata-index</td>
<td>O U</td>
<td></td>
<td>The index in the &quot;name-rdata&quot; array of the OPT RDATA. See Section 7.5.3.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>response-rcode</td>
<td>O U</td>
<td></td>
<td>Response RCODE. If the Response contains OPT, this value incorporates any EXTENDED_RCODE_VALUE.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 7.5.3.3. "Question"

Details on individual Questions in a Question section. A map containing the following:
### 7.5.3.4. "RR"

Details on individual Resource Records in RR sections. A map containing the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field</th>
<th>O</th>
<th>T</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>name-index</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>The index in the &quot;name-rdata&quot; array of the NAME. See Section 7.5.3.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>classtype-index</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>The index in the &quot;classtype&quot; array of the CLASS and TYPE of the RR. See Section 7.5.3.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ttl</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>The RR Time to Live.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rdata-index</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>The index in the &quot;name-rdata&quot; array of the RR RDATA. See Section 7.5.3.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 7.5.3.5. "MalformedMessageData"

Details on malformed message items in this "Block" item. A map containing the following:
### Field

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field</th>
<th>O</th>
<th>T</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>server-address-index</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>The index in the &quot;ip-address&quot; array of the server IP address. See Section 7.5.3.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>server-port</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>The server port.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mm-transport-flags</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>Bit flags describing the transport used to service the query. Bit 0 is the least significant bit. Bit 0. IP version. 0 if IPv4, 1 if IPv6. Bit 1-4. Transport. 4 bit unsigned value where 0 = UDP, 1 = TCP, 2 = TLS, 3 = DTLS. Values 4-15 are reserved for future use.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mm-payload</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>The payload (raw bytes) of the DNS message.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 7.6. "QueryResponse"

Details on individual Q/R data items.

Note that there is no requirement that the elements of the "query-responses" array are presented in strict chronological order.

A map containing the following items:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field</th>
<th>O</th>
<th>T</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>time-offset</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>Q/R timestamp as an offset in ticks from &quot;earliest-time&quot;. The timestamp is the timestamp of the Query, or the Response if there is no Query.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>client-address-index</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>The index in the &quot;ip-address&quot; array of the client IP address. See Section 7.5.3.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>client-port</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>The client port.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>transaction-id</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>DNS transaction identifier.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field</td>
<td>Mode</td>
<td>Meaning</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>qr-signature-index</td>
<td>O U</td>
<td>The index in the &quot;qr-sig&quot; array of the &quot;QueryResponseSignature&quot; item. See Section 7.5.3.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>client-hoplimit</td>
<td>O U</td>
<td>The IPv4 TTL or IPv6 Hoplimit from the Query packet.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>response-delay</td>
<td>O I</td>
<td>The time difference between Query and Response, in ticks. Only present if there is a query and a response. The delay can be negative if the network stack/capture library returns packets out of order.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>query-name-index</td>
<td>O U</td>
<td>The index in the &quot;name-rdata&quot; array of the item containing the QNAME for the first Question. See Section 7.5.3.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>query-size</td>
<td>O U</td>
<td>DNS query message size (see below).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>response-size</td>
<td>O U</td>
<td>DNS query message size (see below).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>query-extended</td>
<td>O M</td>
<td>Extended Query data. Map of type &quot;QueryResponseExtended&quot;, see Section 7.6.2.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>response-extended</td>
<td>O M</td>
<td>Extended Response data. Map of type &quot;QueryResponseExtended&quot;, see Section 7.6.2.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The "query-size" and "response-size" fields hold the DNS message size. For UDP this is the size of the UDP payload that contained the DNS message. For TCP it is the size of the DNS message as specified in the two-byte message length header. Trailing bytes in UDP queries are routinely observed in traffic to authoritative servers and this value allows a calculation of how many trailing bytes were present.
7.6.1. "ResponseProcessingData"

Information on the server processing that produced the response. A map containing the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field</th>
<th>O</th>
<th>T</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>bailiwick-index</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>The index in the &quot;name-rdata&quot; array of the owner name for the response bailiwick. See Section 7.5.3.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>processing-flags</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>Flags relating to response processing. Bit 0. 1 if the response came from cache.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7.6.2. "QueryResponseExtended"

Extended data on the Q/R data item.

Each item in the map is present only if collection of the relevant details is configured.

A map containing the following items:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field</th>
<th>O</th>
<th>T</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>question-index</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>The index in the &quot;qlist&quot; array of the entry listing any second and subsequent Questions in the Question section for the Query or Response. See Section 7.5.3.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>answer-index</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>The index in the &quot;rrlist&quot; array of the entry listing the Answer Resource Record sections for the Query or Response. See Section 7.5.3.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>authority-index</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>The index in the &quot;rrlist&quot; array of the entry listing the Authority Resource Record sections for the Query or Response. See Section 7.5.3.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>additional-index</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>The index in the &quot;rrlist&quot; array of the entry listing the Additional Resource Record sections for the Query or Response. See Section 7.5.3. Note that Query OPT RR data can be optionally stored in the QuerySignature.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7.7. "AddressEventCount"

Counts of various IP related events relating to traffic with individual client addresses. A map containing the following:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field</th>
<th>O</th>
<th>T</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ae-type</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>The type of event. The following events types are currently defined: 0. TCP reset. 1. ICMP time exceeded. 2. ICMP destination unreachable. 3. ICMPv6 time exceeded. 4. ICMPv6 destination unreachable. 5. ICMPv6 packet too big.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ae-code</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>A code relating to the event.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ae-address-index</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>The index in the &quot;ip-address&quot; array of the client address. See Section 7.5.3.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ae-count</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>The number of occurrences of this event during the block collection period.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7.8. "MalformedMessage"

Details of malformed messages. A map containing the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field</th>
<th>O</th>
<th>T</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>time-offset</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>Message timestamp as an offset in ticks from &quot;earliest-time&quot;.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>client-address-index</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>The index in the &quot;ip-address&quot; array of the client IP address. See Section 7.5.3.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>client-port</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>The client port.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>message-data-index</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>The index in the &quot;malformed-message-data&quot; array of the message data for this message. See Section 7.5.3.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8. Versioning

The C-DNS file preamble includes a file format version; a major and minor version number are required fields. The document defines version 1.0 of the C-DNS specification. This section describes the intended use of these version numbers in future specifications.

It is noted that version 1.0 includes many optional fields and therefore consumers of version 1.0 should be inherently robust to parsing files with variable data content.

Within a major version, a new minor version MUST be a strict superset of the previous minor version, with no semantic changes to existing fields. New keys MAY be added to existing maps, and new maps MAY be added. A consumer capable of reading a particular major.minor version MUST also be capable of reading all previous minor versions of the same major version. It SHOULD also be capable of parsing all subsequent minor versions ignoring any keys or maps that it does not recognise.

A new major version indicates changes to the format that are not backwards compatible with previous major versions. A consumer capable of only reading a particular major version (greater than 1) is not required to and has no expectation to be capable of reading a previous major version.

9. C-DNS to PCAP

It is possible to re-construct PCAP files from the C-DNS format in a lossy fashion. Some of the issues with reconstructing both the DNS payload and the full packet stream are outlined here.

The reconstruction depends on whether or not all the optional sections of both the query and response were captured in the C-DNS file. Clearly, if they were not all captured, the reconstruction will be imperfect.

Even if all sections of the response were captured, one cannot reconstruct the DNS response payload exactly due to the fact that some DNS names in the message on the wire may have been compressed. Section 9.1 discusses this in more detail.

Some transport information is not captured in the C-DNS format. For example, the following aspects of the original packet stream cannot be re-constructed from the C-DNS format:

- IP fragmentation
TCP stream information:

* Multiple DNS messages may have been sent in a single TCP segment
* A DNS payload may have been split across multiple TCP segments
* Multiple DNS messages may have been sent on a single TCP session

Malformed DNS messages if the wire format is not recorded

Any Non-DNS messages that were in the original packet stream e.g. ICMP

Simple assumptions can be made on the reconstruction: fragmented and DNS-over-TCP messages can be reconstructed into single packets and a single TCP session can be constructed for each TCP packet.

Additionally, if malformed messages and Non-DNS packets are captured separately, they can be merged with packet captures reconstructed from C-DNS to produce a more complete packet stream.

9.1. Name compression

All the names stored in the C-DNS format are full domain names; no DNS style name compression is used on the individual names within the format. Therefore when reconstructing a packet, name compression must be used in order to reproduce the on the wire representation of the packet.

[RFC1035] name compression works by substituting trailing sections of a name with a reference back to the occurrence of those sections earlier in the message. Not all name server software uses the same algorithm when compressing domain names within the responses. Some attempt maximum recompression at the expense of runtime resources, others use heuristics to balance compression and speed and others use different rules for what is a valid compression target.

This means that responses to the same question from different name server software which match in terms of DNS payload content (header, counts, RRs with name compression removed) do not necessarily match byte-for-byte on the wire.

Therefore, it is not possible to ensure that the DNS response payload is reconstructed byte-for-byte from C-DNS data. However, it can at least, in principle, be reconstructed to have the correct payload length (since the original response length is captured) if there is enough knowledge of the commonly implemented name compression
algorithms. For example, a simplistic approach would be to try each algorithm in turn to see if it reproduces the original length, stopping at the first match. This would not guarantee the correct algorithm has been used as it is possible to match the length whilst still not matching the on the wire bytes but, without further information added to the C-DNS data, this is the best that can be achieved.

Appendix B presents an example of two different compression algorithms used by well-known name server software.

10. Data collection

This section describes a non-normative proposed algorithm for the processing of a captured stream of DNS queries and responses and production of a stream of query/response items, matching queries/responses where possible.

For the purposes of this discussion, it is assumed that the input has been pre-processed such that:

1. All IP fragmentation reassembly, TCP stream reassembly, and so on, has already been performed.

2. Each message is associated with transport metadata required to generate the Primary ID (see Section 10.2.1).

3. Each message has a well-formed DNS header of 12 bytes and (if present) the first Question in the Question section can be parsed to generate the Secondary ID (see below). As noted earlier, this requirement can result in a malformed query being removed in the pre-processing stage, but the correctly formed response with RCODE of FORMERR being present.

DNS messages are processed in the order they are delivered to the implementation.

It should be noted that packet capture libraries do not necessarily provide packets in strict chronological order. This can, for example, arise on multi-core platforms where packets arriving at a network device are processed by different cores. On systems where this behaviour has been observed, the timestamps associated with each packet are consistent; queries always have a timestamp prior to the response timestamp. However, the order in which these packets appear in the packet capture stream is not necessarily strictly chronological; a response can appear in the capture stream before the query that provoked the response. For this discussion, this non-chronological delivery is termed "skew".
In the presence of skew, a response packets can arrive for matching before the corresponding query. To avoid generating false instances of responses without a matching query, and queries without a matching response, the matching algorithm must take account of the possibility of skew.

10.1. Matching algorithm

A schematic representation of the algorithm for matching Q/R data items is shown in Figure 3. It takes individual DNS query or response messages as input, and outputs matched Q/R items. The numbers in the figure identify matching operations listed in Table 1. Specific details of the algorithm, for example queues, timers and identifiers, are given in the following sections.
Figure 3: Query/Response matching algorithm
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ref</th>
<th>Operation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| [1] | Find earliest QR item in FIFO where:  
* QR.done = false  
* QR.Q.PrimaryID == R.PrimaryID  
and, if both QR.Q and R have SecondaryID:  
* QR.Q.SecondaryID == R.SecondaryID |
| [2] | Set:  
QR.Q := Q  
QR.R := nil  
QR.done := false |
| [3] | Set:  
QR.R := R  
QR.done := true |
| [4] | Set:  
QR.done := true |
| [5] | Set:  
QR.Q := nil  
QR.R := R  
QR.done := true |

Table 1: Operations used in the matching algorithm

10.2. Message identifiers

10.2.1. Primary ID (required)

A Primary ID is constructed for each message. It is composed of the following data:

1. Source IP Address
2. Destination IP Address
3. Source Port
4. Destination Port
5. Transport
6. DNS Message ID
10.2.2. Secondary ID (optional)

If present, the first Question in the Question section is used as a secondary ID for each message. Note that there may be well formed DNS queries that have a QDCOUNT of 0, and some responses may have a QDCOUNT of 0 (for example, responses with RCODE=FORMERR or NOTIMP). In this case the secondary ID is not used in matching.

10.3. Algorithm parameters

1. Query timeout, QT. A query arrives with timestamp t1. If no response matching that query has arrived before other input arrives timestamped later than (t1 + QT), a query/response item containing only a query item is recorded. The query timeout value is typically of the order of 5 seconds.

2. Skew timeout, ST. A response arrives with timestamp t2. If a response has not been matched by a query before input arrives timestamped later than (t2 + ST), a query/response item containing only a response is recorded. The skew timeout value is typically a few microseconds.

10.4. Algorithm requirements

The algorithm is designed to handle the following input data:

1. Multiple queries with the same Primary ID (but different Secondary ID) arriving before any responses for these queries are seen.

2. Multiple queries with the same Primary and Secondary ID arriving before any responses for these queries are seen.

3. Queries for which no later response can be found within the specified timeout.

4. Responses for which no previous query can be found within the specified timeout.

10.5. Algorithm limitations

For cases 1 and 2 listed in the above requirements, it is not possible to unambiguously match queries with responses. This algorithm chooses to match to the earliest query with the correct Primary and Secondary ID.
10.6. Workspace

The algorithm employs two FIFO queues:

- OFIFO, an output FIFO containing Q/R items in chronological order,
- RFIFO, a FIFO holding responses without a matching query in order of arrival.

10.7. Output

The output is a list of Q/R data items. Both the Query and Response elements are optional in these items, therefore Q/R data items have one of three types of content:

1. A matched pair of query and response messages
2. A query message with no response
3. A response message with no query

The timestamp of a list item is that of the query for cases 1 and 2 and that of the response for case 3.

10.8. Post processing

When ending capture, all items in the responses FIFO are timed out immediately, generating response-only entries to the Q/R data item FIFO. These and all other remaining entries in the Q/R data item FIFO should be treated as timed out queries.

11. Implementation guidance

Whilst this document makes no specific recommendations with respect to Canonical CBOR (see Section 3.9 of [RFC7049]) the following guidance may be of use to implementors.

Adherence to the first two rules given in Section 3.9 of [RFC7049] will minimise file sizes.

Adherence to the last two rules given in Section 3.9 of [RFC7049] for all maps and arrays would unacceptably constrain implementations, for example, in the use case of real-time data collection in constrained environments.
11.1. Optional data

When decoding C-DNS data some of the items required for a particular function that the consumer wishes to perform may be missing. Consumers should consider providing configurable default values to be used in place of the missing values in their output.

11.2. Trailing bytes

A DNS query message in a UDP or TCP payload can be followed by some additional (spurious) bytes, which are not stored in C-DNS.

When DNS traffic is sent over TCP, each message is prefixed with a two byte length field which gives the message length, excluding the two byte length field. In this context, trailing bytes can occur in two circumstances with different results:

1. The number of bytes consumed by fully parsing the message is less than the number of bytes given in the length field (i.e. the length field is incorrect and too large). In this case, the surplus bytes are considered trailing bytes in an analogous manner to UDP and recorded as such. If only this case occurs it is possible to process a packet containing multiple DNS messages where one or more has trailing bytes.

2. There are surplus bytes between the end of a well-formed message and the start of the length field for the next message. In this case the first of the surplus bytes will be processed as the first byte of the next length field, and parsing will proceed from there, almost certainly leading to the next and any subsequent messages in the packet being considered malformed. This will not generate a trailing bytes record for the processed well-formed message.

11.3. Limiting collection of RDATA

Implementations should consider providing a configurable maximum RDATA size for capture, for example, to avoid memory issues when confronted with large XFR records.

12. Implementation status

[Note to RFC Editor: please remove this section and reference to [RFC7942] prior to publication.]

This section records the status of known implementations of the protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in [RFC7942].
The description of implementations in this section is intended to assist the IETF in its decision processes in progressing drafts to RFCs. Please note that the listing of any individual implementation here does not imply endorsement by the IETF. Furthermore, no effort has been spent to verify the information presented here that was supplied by IETF contributors. This is not intended as, and must not be construed to be, a catalog of available implementations or their features. Readers are advised to note that other implementations may exist.

According to [RFC7942], "this will allow reviewers and working groups to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit of running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable experimentation and feedback that have made the implemented protocols more mature. It is up to the individual working groups to use this information as they see fit".

12.1. DNS-STATS Compactor

ICANN/Sinodun IT have developed an open source implementation called DNS-STATS Compactor. The Compactor is a suite of tools which can capture DNS traffic (from either a network interface or a PCAP file) and store it in the Compacted-DNS (C-DNS) file format. PCAP files for the captured traffic can also be reconstructed. See Compactor [1].

This implementation:

- covers the whole of the specification described in the -03 draft with the exception of support for malformed messages and pico second time resolution. (Note: this implementation does allow malformed messages to be recorded separately in a PCAP file).
- is released under the Mozilla Public License Version 2.0.
- has a users mailing list available, see dns-stats-users [2].

There is also some discussion of issues encountered during development available at Compressing Pcap Files [3] and Packet Capture [4].

This information was last updated on 3rd of May 2018.

13. IANA considerations

None
14. Security considerations

Any control interface MUST perform authentication and encryption.

Any data upload MUST be authenticated and encrypted.

15. Acknowledgements

The authors wish to thank CZ.NIC, in particular Tomas Gavenciak, for many useful discussions on binary formats, compression and packet matching. Also Jan Vcelak and Wouter Wijngaards for discussions on name compression and Paul Hoffman for a detailed review of the document and the C-DNS CDDL.

Thanks also to Robert Edmonds, Jerry Lundstroem, Richard Gibson, Stephane Bortzmeier and many other members of DNSOP for review.

Also, Miek Gieben for mmark [5]

16. Changelog

draft-ietf-dnsop-dns-capture-format-08
  o Convert diagrams to ASCII
  o Describe versioning
  o Fix unused group warning in CDDL
draft-ietf-dnsop-dns-capture-format-07
  o Resolve outstanding questions and TODOs
  o Make RR RDATA optional
  o Update matching diagram and explain skew
  o Add count of discarded messages to block statistics
  o Editorial clarifications and improvements
draft-ietf-dnsop-dns-capture-format-06
  o Correct BlockParameters type to map
  o Make RR ttl optional
  o Add storage flag indicating name normalisation
- Add storage parameter fields for sampling and anonymisation methods
- Editorial clarifications and improvements

**draft-ietf-dnsop-dns-capture-format-05**

- Make all data items in Q/R, QuerySignature and Malformed Message arrays optional
- Re-structure the FilePreamble and ConfigurationParameters into BlockParameters
- BlockParameters has separate Storage and Collection Parameters
- Storage Parameters includes information on what optional fields are present, and flags specifying anonymisation or sampling
- Addresses can now be stored as prefixes.
- Switch to using a variable sub-second timing granularity
- Add response bailiwick and query response type
- Add specifics of how to record malformed messages
- Add implementation guidance
- Improve terminology and naming consistency

**draft-ietf-dnsop-dns-capture-format-04**

- Correct query-d0 to query-do in CDDL
- Clarify that map keys are unsigned integers
- Add Type to Class/Type table
- Clarify storage format in section 7.12

**draft-ietf-dnsop-dns-capture-format-03**

- Added an Implementation Status section

**draft-ietf-dnsop-dns-capture-format-02**

- Update qr_data_format.png to match CDDL
Editorial clarifications and improvements

- Many editorial improvements by Paul Hoffman
- Included discussion of malformed message handling
- Improved Appendix C on Comparison of Binary Formats
- Now using C-DNS field names in the tables in section 8
- A handful of new fields included (CDDL updated)
- Timestamps now include optional picoseconds
- Added details of block statistics

Changed dnstap.io to dnstap.info

- qr_data_format.png was cut off at the bottom
- Update authors address
- Improve wording in Abstract
- Changed DNS-STAT to C-DNS in CDDL
- Set the format version in the CDDL
- Added a TODO: Add block statistics
  - Added a TODO: Add extend to support pico/nano. Also do this for Time offset and Response delay
  - Added a TODO: Need to develop optional representation of malformed messages within C-DNS and what this means for packet matching. This may influence which fields are optional in the rest of the representation.
- Added section on design goals to Introduction
  - Added a TODO: Can Class be optimised? Should a class of IN be inferred if not present?
17. References

17.1. Normative References


17.2. Informative References


17.3. URIs


Appendix A. CDDL

This appendix gives a CDDL [I-D.ietf-cbor-cddl] specification for C-DNS.

CDDL does not permit a range of allowed values to be specified for a bitfield. Where necessary, those values are given as a CDDL group, but the group definition is commented out to prevent CDDL tooling from warning that the group is unused.

; CDDL specification of the file format for C-DNS, which describes a collection of DNS messages and traffic meta-data.

; The overall structure of a file.
; File = [ file-type-id : tstr .regexp "C-DNS", file-preamble : FilePreamble, file-blocks : [* Block], ]

; The file preamble.
; FilePreamble = { major-format-version => uint .eq 1, minor-format-version => uint .eq 0, ? private-version => uint, block-parameters => [+ BlockParameters], }

major-format-version = 0 minor-format-version = 1 private-version = 2 block-parameters = 3
BlockParameters = {
    storage-parameters => StorageParameters,
    ? collection-parameters => CollectionParameters,
}
storage-parameters = 0
collection-parameters = 1

StorageParameters = {
    ticks-per-second => uint,
    max-block-items => uint,
    storage-hints => StorageHints,
    opcodes => [+ uint],
    rr-types => [+ uint],
    ? storage-flags => StorageFlags,
    ? client-address-prefix-ipv4 => uint,
    ? client-address-prefix-ipv6 => uint,
    ? server-address-prefix-ipv4 => uint,
    ? server-address-prefix-ipv6 => uint,
    ? sampling-method => tstr,
    ? anonymisation-method => tstr,
}
ticks-per-second = 0
max-block-items = 1
storage-hints = 2
opcodes = 3
rr-types = 4
storage-flags = 5
client-address-prefix-ipv4 = 6
client-address-prefix-ipv6 = 7
server-address-prefix-ipv4 = 8
server-address-prefix-ipv6 = 9
sampling-method = 10
anonymisation-method = 11

; A hint indicates if the collection method will output the
; item or will ignore the item if present.
StorageHints = {
    query-response-hints => QueryResponseHints,
    query-response-signature-hints => QueryResponseSignatureHints,
    rr-hints => RRHints,
    other-data-hints => OtherDataHints,
}
query-response-hints = 0
query-response-signature-hints = 1
rr-hints = 2
other-data-hints = 3

QueryResponseHintValues = &(

time-offset : 0,
client-address-index : 1,
client-port : 2,
transaction-id : 3,
qr-signature-index : 4,
client-hoplimit : 5,
response-delay : 6,
query-name-index : 7,
query-size : 8,
response-size : 9,
response-processing-data : 10,
query-question-sections : 11, ; Second & subsequent questions
query-answer-sections : 12,
query-authority-sections : 13,
query-additional-sections : 14,
response-answer-sections : 15,
response-authority-sections : 16,
response-additional-sections : 17,
)
QueryResponseHints = uint .bits QueryResponseHintValues

QueryResponseSignatureHintValues = &(
  server-address : 0,
  server-port : 1,
  qr-transport-flags : 2,
  qr-type : 3,
  qr-sig-flags : 4,
  query-opcode : 5,
  dns-flags : 6,
  query-rcode : 7,
  query-class-type : 8,
  query-qdcount : 9,
  query-ancount : 10,
  query-arcount : 11,
  query-nscount : 12,
  query-edns-version : 13,
  query-udp-size : 14,
  query-opt-rdata : 15,
  response-rcode : 16,
)
QueryResponseSignatureHints = uint .bits QueryResponseSignatureHintValues

RRHintValues = &(
  ttl : 0,
  rdata-index : 1,
)
RRHints = uint .bits RRHintValues
OtherDataHintValues = &(
    malformed-messages : 0,
    address-event-counts : 1,
)
OtherDataHints = uint .bits OtherDataHintValues

StorageFlagValues = &(
    anonymised-data : 0,
    sampled-data : 1,
    normalised-names : 2,
)
StorageFlags = uint .bits StorageFlagValues

CollectionParameters = {
? query-timeout => uint,
? skew-timeout => uint,
? snaplen => uint,
? promisc => uint,
? interfaces => [+ tstr],
? server-addresses => [+ IPAddress], ; Hint for later analysis
? vlan-ids => [+ uint],
? filter => tstr,
? generator-id => tstr,
? host-id => tstr,
}
query-timeout = 0
skew-timeout = 1
snaplen = 2
promisc = 3
interfaces = 4
server-addresses = 5
vlan-ids = 6
filter = 7
generator-id = 8
host-id = 9

; Data in the file is stored in Blocks.
;
Block = {
    block-preamble => BlockPreamble,
? block-statistics => BlockStatistics, ; Much of this could be derived
? block-tables => BlockTables,
? query-responses => [+ QueryResponse],
? address-event-counts => [+ AddressEventCount],
? malformed-messages => [+ MalformedMessage],
}
block-preamble = 0
block-statistics = 1
block-tables = 2
query-responses = 3
address-event-counts = 4
malformed-messages = 5

;
; The (mandatory) preamble to a block.
;
BlockPreamble = {
    ? earliest-time => Timestamp,
    ? block-parameters-index => uint .default 0,
}

earliest-time = 0
block-parameters-index = 1

; Ticks are subsecond intervals. The number of ticks in a second is file/block
; metadata. Signed and unsigned tick types are defined.
ticks = int
ticks = uint

Timestamp = [
    timestamp-secs : uint,
    timestamp-uticks : uticks,
]

;
; Statistics about the block contents.
;
BlockStatistics = {
    ? processed-messages => uint,
    ? qr-data-items => uint,
    ? unmatched-queries => uint,
    ? unmatched-responses => uint,
    ? discarded-opcode => uint,
    ? malformed-items => uint,
}

processed-messages = 0
qr-data-items = 1
unmatched-queries = 2
unmatched-responses = 3
discarded-opcode = 4
malformed-items = 5

;
; Tables of common data referenced from records in a block.
;
BlockTables = {

Internet-Draft     C-DNS: A DNS Packet Capture Format        August 2018

? ip-address             => [+ IPAddress],
? classtype              => [+ ClassType],
? name-rdata             => [+ bstr], ; Holds both Name RDATA and RDATA
? qr-sig                 => [+ QueryResponseSignature],
? QuestionTables,
? RRTables,
? malformed-message-data => [+ MalformedMessageData],
}

ip-address             = 0
classtype              = 1
name-rdata             = 2
qr-sig                 = 3
qlist                  = 4
qrr                    = 5
rrlist                 = 6
rr                     = 7
malformed-message-data = 8

IPv4Address = bstr .size 4
IPv6Address = bstr .size 16
IPAddress = IPv4Address / IPv6Address

ClassType = {
    type => uint,
    class => uint,
}
type = 0
class = 1

QueryResponseSignature = {
    ? server-address-index => uint,
    ? server-port          => uint,
    ? qr-transport-flags   => QueryResponseTransportFlags,
    ? qr-type              => QueryResponseType,
    ? qr-sig-flags         => QueryResponseFlags,
    ? query-opcode         => uint,
    ? qr-dns-flags         => DNSFlags,
    ? query-rcode          => uint,
    ? query-classtype-index => uint,
    ? query-qd-count       => uint,
    ? query-an-count       => uint,
    ? query-ns-count       => uint,
    ? query-ar-count       => uint,
    ? edns-version         => uint,
    ? udp-buf-size         => uint,
    ? opt-rdata-index      => uint,
    ? response-rcode       => uint,
}
server-address-index  = 0
server-port           = 1
qr-transport-flags    = 2
qr-type               = 3
qr-sig-flags          = 4
query-opcode          = 5
qr-dns-flags          = 6
query-rcode           = 7
query-classtype-index = 8
query-qd-count        = 9
query-an-count        = 10
query-ns-count        = 12
query-ar-count        = 12
edns-version          = 13
udp-buf-size          = 14
opt-rdata-index       = 15
response-rcode        = 16

; Transport gives the values that may appear in bits 1..4 of
; TransportFlags. There is currently no way to express this in
; CDDL, so Transport is unused. To avoid confusion when used
; with CDDL tools, it is commented out.
;
; Transport = &(
;     udp               : 0,
;     tcp               : 1,
;     tls               : 2,
;     dtls              : 3,
;)

TransportFlagValues = &(
    ip-version         : 0,     ; 0=IPv4, 1=IPv6
) / (1..4)
TransportFlags = uint .bits TransportFlagValues

QueryResponseType = &(
    stub      : 0,
    client    : 1,
    resolver  : 2,
    auth      : 3,
    forwarder : 4,
    tool      : 5,
)
QueryResponseFlagValues = &{
    has-query   : 0,
    has-response: 1,
    query-has-opt: 2,
    response-has-opt: 3,
    query-has-no-question: 4,
    response-has-no-question: 5,
}
QueryResponseFlags = uint .bits QueryResponseFlagValues

DNSFlagValues = &{
    query-cd   : 0,
    query-ad   : 1,
    query-z    : 2,
    query-ra   : 3,
    query-rd   : 4,
    query-tc   : 5,
    query_aa  : 6,
    query_do  : 7,
    response-cd: 8,
    response-ad: 9,
    response-z : 10,
    response-ra: 11,
    response-rd: 12,
    response-tc: 13,
    response-aa: 14,
}
DNSFlags = uint .bits DNSFlagValues

QuestionTables = {
    qlist => [+ QuestionList],
    qrr   => [+ Question]
}

QuestionList = [+ uint] ; Index of Question

Question = {
    name-index => uint, ; Second and subsequent questions
    classtype-index => uint,
}
name-index = 0
classtype-index = 1

RRTables = {
    rrlst => [+ RRList],
    rr   => [+ RR]
}
RRList = [+ uint] ; Index of RR

RR = {
   name-index => uint, ; Index to a name in the name-rdata table
   classtype-index => uint,
   ? ttl => uint,
   ? rdata-index => uint, ; Index to RDATA in the name-rdata table
} ; Other map key values already defined above.
ttl = 2
rdata-index = 3

MalformedMessageData = {
   ? server-address-index => uint,
   ? server-port => uint,
   ? mm-transport-flags => TransportFlags,
   ? mm-payload => bstr,
} ; Other map key values already defined above.
mm-transport-flags = 2
mm-payload = 3

; A single query/response pair.
QueryResponse = {
   ? time-offset => uticks, ; Time offset from start of block
   ? client-address-index => uint,
   ? client-port => uint,
   ? transaction-id => uint,
   ? qr-signature-index => uint,
   ? client-hoplimit => uint,
   ? response-delay => ticks,
   ? query-name-index => uint,
   ? query-size => uint, ; DNS size of query
   ? response-size => uint, ; DNS size of response
   ? response-processing-data => ResponseProcessingData,
   ? query-extended => QueryResponseExtended,
   ? response-extended => QueryResponseExtended,
}
time-offset = 0
client-address-index = 1
client-port = 2
transaction-id = 3
qr-signature-index = 4
client-hoplimit = 5
response-delay = 6
query-name-index = 7
query-size = 8
response-size = 9
response-processing-data = 10
query-extended = 11
response-extended = 12

ResponseProcessingData = {
    ? bailiwick-index => uint,
    ? processing-flags => ResponseProcessingFlags,
}
bailiwick-index = 0
processing-flags = 1

ResponseProcessingFlagValues = &{
    from-cache : 0,
}
ResponseProcessingFlags = uint .bits ResponseProcessingFlagValues

QueryResponseExtended = {
    ? question-index => uint, ; Index of QuestionList
    ? answer-index => uint, ; Index of RRList
    ? authority-index => uint,
    ? additional-index => uint,
}
question-index = 0
answer-index = 1
authority-index = 2
additional-index = 3

; ; Address event data.
;
AddressEventCount = {
    ae-type => &AddressEventType,
    ? ae-code => uint,
    ae-address-index => uint,
    ae-count => uint,
}
ae-type = 0
ae-code = 1
ae-address-index = 2
ae-count = 3

AddressEventType = {
    tcp-reset : 0,
    icmp-time-exceeded : 1,
    icmp-dest-unreachable : 2,
    icmpv6-time-exceeded : 3,
icmpv6-dest-unreachable: 4,
icmpv6-packet-too-big : 5,
)
;
; Malformed messages.
;
MalformedMessage = {
    ? time-offset           => uticks,   ; Time offset from start of block
    ? client-address-index  => uint,
    ? client-port           => uint,
    ? message-data-index    => uint,
}
;
; Other map key values already defined above.
message-data-index = 3

Appendix B. DNS Name compression example

The basic algorithm, which follows the guidance in [RFC1035], is simply to collect each name, and the offset in the packet at which it starts, during packet construction. As each name is added, it is offered to each of the collected names in order of collection, starting from the first name. If labels at the end of the name can be replaced with a reference back to part (or all) of the earlier name, and if the uncompressed part of the name is shorter than any compression already found, the earlier name is noted as the compression target for the name.

The following tables illustrate the process. In an example packet, the first name is example.com.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Uncompressed</th>
<th>Compression Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>example.com</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The next name added is bar.com. This is matched against example.com. The com part of this can be used as a compression target, with the remaining uncompressed part of the name being bar.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Uncompressed</th>
<th>Compression Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>example.com</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>bar.com</td>
<td>bar</td>
<td>1 + offset to com</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The third name added is www.bar.com. This is first matched against example.com, and as before this is recorded as a compression target, with the remaining uncompressed part of the name being www.bar. It is then matched against the second name, which again can be a compression target. Because the remaining uncompressed part of the name is www, this is an improved compression, and so it is adopted.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Uncompressed</th>
<th>Compression Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>example.com</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>bar.com</td>
<td>bar</td>
<td>1 + offset to com</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td><a href="http://www.bar.com">www.bar.com</a></td>
<td>www</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As an optimization, if a name is already perfectly compressed (in other words, the uncompressed part of the name is empty), then no further names will be considered for compression.

B.1. NSD compression algorithm

Using the above basic algorithm the packet lengths of responses generated by NSD [6] can be matched almost exactly. At the time of writing, a tiny number (<.01%) of the reconstructed packets had incorrect lengths.

B.2. Knot Authoritative compression algorithm

The Knot Authoritative [7] name server uses different compression behavior, which is the result of internal optimization designed to balance runtime speed with compression size gains. In brief, and omitting complications, Knot Authoritative will only consider the QNAME and names in the immediately preceding RR section in an RRSET as compression targets.

A set of smart heuristics as described below can be implemented to mimic this and while not perfect it produces output nearly, but not quite, as good a match as with NSD. The heuristics are:

1. A match is only perfect if the name is completely compressed AND the TYPE of the section in which the name occurs matches the TYPE of the name used as the compression target.

2. If the name occurs in RDATA:

   * If the compression target name is in a query, then only the first RR in an RRSET can use that name as a compression target.
* The compression target name MUST be in RDATA.

* The name section TYPE must match the compression target name section TYPE.

* The compression target name MUST be in the immediately preceding RR in the RRSET.

Using this algorithm less than 0.1% of the reconstructed packets had incorrect lengths.

B.3. Observed differences

In sample traffic collected on a root name server around 2-4% of responses generated by Knot had different packet lengths to those produced by NSD.

Appendix C. Comparison of Binary Formats

Several binary serialisation formats were considered, and for completeness were also compared to JSON.

- Apache Avro [8]. Data is stored according to a pre-defined schema. The schema itself is always included in the data file. Data can therefore be stored untagged, for a smaller serialisation size, and be written and read by an Avro library.

* At the time of writing, Avro libraries are available for C, C++, C#, Java, Python, Ruby and PHP. Optionally tools are available for C++, Java and C# to generate code for encoding and decoding.

- Google Protocol Buffers [9]. Data is stored according to a pre-defined schema. The schema is used by a generator to generate code for encoding and decoding the data. Data can therefore be stored untagged, for a smaller serialisation size. The schema is not stored with the data, so unlike Avro cannot be read with a generic library.

* Code must be generated for a particular data schema to to read and write data using that schema. At the time of writing, the Google code generator can currently generate code for encoding and decoding a schema for C++, Go, Java, Python, Ruby, C#, Objective-C, Javascript and PHP.

- CBOR [10]. Defined in [RFC7049], this serialisation format is comparable to JSON but with a binary representation. It does not use a pre-defined schema, so data is always stored tagged.
However, CBOR data schemas can be described using CDDL [I-D.ietf-cbor-cddl] and tools exist to verify data files conform to the schema.

* CBOR is a simple format, and simple to implement. At the time of writing, the CBOR website lists implementations for 16 languages.

Avro and Protocol Buffers both allow storage of untagged data, but because they rely on the data schema for this, their implementation is considerably more complex than CBOR. Using Avro or Protocol Buffers in an unsupported environment would require notably greater development effort compared to CBOR.

A test program was written which reads input from a PCAP file and writes output using one of two basic structures; either a simple structure, where each query/response pair is represented in a single record entry, or the C-DNS block structure.

The resulting output files were then compressed using a variety of common general-purpose lossless compression tools to explore the compressibility of the formats. The compression tools employed were:

- lz4 [13]. The command line compression tool from the reference C LZ4 implementation.
- gzip [14]. The ubiquitous GNU zip tool.
- zstd [15]. Compression using the Zstandard algorithm.
- xz [16]. A popular compression tool noted for high compression.

In all cases the compression tools were run using their default settings.

Note that this draft does not mandate the use of compression, nor any particular compression scheme, but it anticipates that in practice output data will be subject to general-purpose compression, and so this should be taken into consideration.

"test.pcap", a 662Mb capture of sample data from a root instance was used for the comparison. The following table shows the formatted size and size after compression (abbreviated to Comp. in the table headers), together with the task resident set size (RSS) and the user
time taken by the compression. File sizes are in Mb, RSS in kb and user time in seconds.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Format</th>
<th>File size</th>
<th>Comp.</th>
<th>Comp. size</th>
<th>RSS</th>
<th>User time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PCAP</td>
<td>661.87</td>
<td>snzip</td>
<td>212.48</td>
<td>2696</td>
<td>1.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>lz4</td>
<td>181.58</td>
<td>6336</td>
<td>1.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>gzip</td>
<td>153.46</td>
<td>1428</td>
<td>18.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>zstd</td>
<td>87.07</td>
<td>3544</td>
<td>4.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>xz</td>
<td>49.09</td>
<td>97416</td>
<td>160.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSON simple</td>
<td>4113.92</td>
<td>snzip</td>
<td>603.78</td>
<td>2656</td>
<td>5.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>lz4</td>
<td>386.42</td>
<td>5636</td>
<td>5.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>gzip</td>
<td>271.11</td>
<td>1492</td>
<td>73.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>zstd</td>
<td>133.43</td>
<td>3284</td>
<td>8.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>xz</td>
<td>51.98</td>
<td>97412</td>
<td>600.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avro simple</td>
<td>640.45</td>
<td>snzip</td>
<td>148.98</td>
<td>2656</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>lz4</td>
<td>111.92</td>
<td>5828</td>
<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>gzip</td>
<td>103.07</td>
<td>1540</td>
<td>11.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>zstd</td>
<td>49.08</td>
<td>3524</td>
<td>2.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>xz</td>
<td>22.87</td>
<td>97308</td>
<td>90.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBOR simple</td>
<td>764.82</td>
<td>snzip</td>
<td>164.57</td>
<td>2664</td>
<td>1.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>lz4</td>
<td>120.98</td>
<td>5892</td>
<td>1.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>gzip</td>
<td>110.61</td>
<td>1428</td>
<td>12.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>zstd</td>
<td>54.14</td>
<td>3224</td>
<td>2.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>xz</td>
<td>23.43</td>
<td>97276</td>
<td>111.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBuf simple</td>
<td>749.51</td>
<td>snzip</td>
<td>167.16</td>
<td>2660</td>
<td>1.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>lz4</td>
<td>123.09</td>
<td>5824</td>
<td>1.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>gzip</td>
<td>112.05</td>
<td>1424</td>
<td>12.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>zstd</td>
<td>53.39</td>
<td>3388</td>
<td>2.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>xz</td>
<td>23.99</td>
<td>97348</td>
<td>106.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSON block</td>
<td>519.77</td>
<td>snzip</td>
<td>106.12</td>
<td>2812</td>
<td>0.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>lz4</td>
<td>104.34</td>
<td>6080</td>
<td>0.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>gzip</td>
<td>57.97</td>
<td>1604</td>
<td>12.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>zstd</td>
<td>61.51</td>
<td>3396</td>
<td>3.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>xz</td>
<td>27.67</td>
<td>97524</td>
<td>169.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avro block</td>
<td>60.45</td>
<td>snzip</td>
<td>48.38</td>
<td>2688</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>lz4</td>
<td>48.78</td>
<td>8540</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>gzip</td>
<td>39.62</td>
<td>1576</td>
<td>2.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>zstd</td>
<td>29.63</td>
<td>3612</td>
<td>1.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>xz</td>
<td>18.28</td>
<td>97564</td>
<td>25.81</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The above results are discussed in the following sections.

C.1. Comparison with full PCAP files

An important first consideration is whether moving away from PCAP offers significant benefits.

The simple binary formats are typically larger than PCAP, even though they omit some information such as Ethernet MAC addresses. But not only do they require less CPU to compress than PCAP, the resulting compressed files are smaller than compressed PCAP.

C.2. Simple versus block coding

The intention of the block coding is to perform data de-duplication on query/response records within the block. The simple and block formats above store exactly the same information for each query/response record. This information is parsed from the DNS traffic in the input PCAP file, and in all cases each field has an identifier and the field data is typed.

The data de-duplication on the block formats show an order of magnitude reduction in the size of the format file size against the simple formats. As would be expected, the compression tools are able to find and exploit a lot of this duplication, but as the de-duplication process uses knowledge of DNS traffic, it is able to retain a size advantage. This advantage reduces as stronger compression is applied, as again would be expected, but even with the strongest compression applied the block formatted data remains around 75% of the size of the simple format and its compression requires roughly a third of the CPU time.
C.3. Binary versus text formats

Text data formats offer many advantages over binary formats, particularly in the areas of ad-hoc data inspection and extraction. It was therefore felt worthwhile to carry out a direct comparison, implementing JSON versions of the simple and block formats.

Concentrating on JSON block format, the format files produced are a significant fraction of an order of magnitude larger than binary formats. The impact on file size after compression is as might be expected from that starting point; the stronger compression produces files that are 150% of the size of similarly compressed binary format, and require over 4x more CPU to compress.

C.4. Performance

Concentrating again on the block formats, all three produce format files that are close to an order of magnitude smaller than the original "test.pcap" file. CBOR produces the largest files and Avro the smallest, 20% smaller than CBOR.

However, once compression is taken into account, the size difference narrows. At medium compression (with gzip), the size difference is 4%. Using strong compression (with xz) the difference reduces to 2%, with Avro the largest and Protocol Buffers the smallest, although CBOR and Protocol Buffers require slightly more compression CPU.

The measurements presented above do not include data on the CPU required to generate the format files. Measurements indicate that writing Avro requires 10% more CPU than CBOR or Protocol Buffers. It appears, therefore, that Avro’s advantage in compression CPU usage is probably offset by a larger CPU requirement in writing Avro.

C.5. Conclusions

The above assessments lead us to the choice of a binary format file using blocking.

As noted previously, this draft anticipates that output data will be subject to compression. There is no compelling case for one particular binary serialisation format in terms of either final file size or machine resources consumed, so the choice must be largely based on other factors. CBOR was therefore chosen as the binary serialisation format for the reasons listed in Section 5.
C.6. Block size choice

Given the choice of a CBOR format using blocking, the question arises of what an appropriate default value for the maximum number of query/response pairs in a block should be. This has two components; what is the impact on performance of using different block sizes in the format file, and what is the impact on the size of the format file before and after compression.

The following table addresses the performance question, showing the impact on the performance of a C++ program converting "test.pcap" to C-DNS. File size is in Mb, resident set size (RSS) in kb.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Block size</th>
<th>File size</th>
<th>RSS</th>
<th>User time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1000</td>
<td>133.46</td>
<td>612.27</td>
<td>15.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5000</td>
<td>89.85</td>
<td>676.82</td>
<td>14.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10000</td>
<td>76.87</td>
<td>752.40</td>
<td>14.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20000</td>
<td>67.86</td>
<td>750.75</td>
<td>14.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40000</td>
<td>61.88</td>
<td>736.30</td>
<td>14.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80000</td>
<td>58.08</td>
<td>694.16</td>
<td>14.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>160000</td>
<td>55.94</td>
<td>733.84</td>
<td>14.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>320000</td>
<td>54.41</td>
<td>799.20</td>
<td>13.97</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Increasing block size, therefore, tends to increase maximum RSS a little, with no significant effect (if anything a small reduction) on CPU consumption.

The following figure plots the effect of increasing block size on output file size for different compressions.

Figure showing effect of block size on file size (PNG) [17]

Figure showing effect of block size on file size (SVG) [18]

From the above, there is obviously scope for tuning the default block size to the compression being employed, traffic characteristics, frequency of output file rollover etc. Using a strong compression, block sizes over 10,000 query/response pairs would seem to offer limited improvements.

Authors’ Addresses
Security Considerations for RFC5011 Publishers

draft-ietf-dnsop-rfc5011-security-considerations-13

Abstract

This document extends the RFC5011 rollover strategy with timing advice that must be followed by the publisher in order to maintain security. Specifically, this document describes the math behind the minimum time-length that a DNS zone publisher must wait before signing exclusively with recently added DNSKEYs. This document also describes the minimum time-length that a DNS zone publisher must wait after publishing a revoked DNSKEY before assuming that all active RFC5011 resolvers should have seen the revocation-marked key and removed it from their list of trust anchors.

This document contains much math and complicated equations, but the summary is that the key rollover / revocation time is much longer than intuition would suggest. This document updates RFC7583 by adding an additional delays (sigExpirationTime and timingSafetyMargin).

If you are not both publishing a DNSSEC DNSKEY, and using RFC5011 to advertise this DNSKEY as a new Secure Entry Point key for use as a trust anchor, you probably don’t need to read this document.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on January 17, 2019.
Table of Contents

1.  Introduction ............................................. 3
   1.1.  Document History and Motivation ...................... 3
   1.2.  Safely Rolling the Root Zone’s KSK in 2017/2018 .................. 4
   1.3.  Requirements notation .................................... 4
2.  Background ................................................. 4
3.  Terminology ............................................... 4
4.  Timing Associated with RFC5011 Processing .................. 5
   4.1.  Timing Associated with Publication ...................... 5
   4.2.  Timing Associated with Revocation ....................... 5
5.  Denial of Service Attack Walkthrough ....................... 6
   5.1.  Enumerated Attack Example ............................. 6
      5.1.1.  Attack Timing Breakdown .......................... 7
6.  Minimum RFC5011 Timing Requirements ......................... 8
   6.1.  Equation Components .................................... 9
      6.1.1.  addHoldDownTime .................................... 9
      6.1.2.  lastSigExpirationTime ............................... 9
      6.1.3.  sigExpirationTime ................................... 9
      6.1.4.  sigExpirationTimeRemaining ........................ 9
      6.1.5.  activeRefresh ...................................... 9
      6.1.6.  timingSafetyMargin .................................. 10
      6.1.7.  retrySafetyMargin ................................... 12
   6.2.  Timing Requirements For Adding a New KSK ................ 13
      6.2.1.  Wait Timer Based Calculation ....................... 14
      6.2.2.  Wall-Clock Based Calculation ....................... 14
      6.2.3.  Timing Constraint Summary ......................... 15
      6.2.4.  Additional Considerations for RFC7583 ............. 15
      6.2.5.  Example Scenario Calculations .................... 15
   6.3.  Timing Requirements For Revoking an Old KSK ............ 16
      6.3.1.  Wait Timer Based Calculation ....................... 16
      6.3.2.  Wall-Clock Based Calculation ....................... 16
      6.3.3.  Additional Considerations for RFC7583 ............. 17
1. Introduction

[RFC5011] defines a mechanism by which DNSSEC validators can update their list of trust anchors when they’ve seen a new key published in a zone or revoke a properly marked key from a trust anchor list. However, RFC5011 [intentionally] provides no guidance to the publishers of DNSKEYs about how long they must wait before switching to exclusively using recently published keys for signing records, or how long they must wait before ceasing publication of a revoked key. Because of this lack of guidance, zone publishers may arrive at incorrect assumptions about safe usage of the RFC5011 DNSKEY advertising, rolling and revocation process. This document describes the minimum security requirements from a publisher’s point of view and is intended to complement the guidance offered in RFC5011 (which is written to provide timing guidance solely to a Validating Resolver’s point of view).

To explain the RFC5011 security analysis in this document better, Section 5 first describes an attack on a zone publisher. Then in Section 6.1 we break down each of the timing components that will be later used to define timing requirements for adding keys in Section 6.2 and revoking keys in Section 6.3.

1.1. Document History and Motivation

To confirm that this lack of understanding is wide-spread, the authors reached out to 5 DNSSEC experts to ask them how long they thought they must wait before signing a zone exclusively with a new KSK [RFC4033] that was being introduced according to the 5011 process. All 5 experts answered with an insecure value, and we determined that this lack of understanding might cause security concerns in deployment. We hope that this companion document to RFC5011 will rectify this and provide better guidance to zone publishers who wish to make use of the RFC5011 rollover process.
1.2. Safely Rolling the Root Zone’s KSK in 2017/2018

One important note about ICANN’s (currently in process) 2017/2018 KSK rollover plan for the root zone: the timing values chosen for rolling the KSK in the root zone appear completely safe, and are not affected by the timing concerns discussed in this draft.

1.3. Requirements notation

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

2. Background

RFC5011 describes a process by which an RFC5011 Resolver may accept a newly published KSK as a trust anchor for validating future DNSSEC signed records. It also describes the process for publicly revoking a published KSK. This document augments that information with additional constraints, from the SEP publisher’s points of view. Note that this document does not define any other operational guidance or recommendations about the RFC5011 process and restricts itself solely to the security and operational ramifications of prematurely switching to exclusively using recently added keys or removing revoked keys.

Failure of a DNSKEY publisher to follow the minimum recommendations associated with this draft can result in potential denial-of-service attack opportunities against validating resolvers. Failure of a DNSKEY publisher to publish a revoked key for a long enough period of time may result in RFC5011 Resolvers leaving that key in their trust anchor storage beyond the key’s expected lifetime.

3. Terminology

SEP Publisher  The entity responsible for publishing a DNSKEY (with the Secure Entry Point (SEP) bit set) that can be used as a trust anchor.

Zone Signer  The owner of a zone intending to publish a new Key-Signing-Key (KSK) that may become a trust anchor for validators following the RFC5011 process.

RFC5011 Resolver  A DNSSEC Resolver that is using the RFC5011 processes to track and update trust anchors.

Attacker  An entity intent on foiling the RFC5011 Resolver’s ability to successfully adopt the Zone Signer’s new DNSKEY as a new trust
4. Timing Associated with RFC5011 Processing

These subsections below give a high-level overview of [RFC5011] processing. This description is not sufficient for fully understanding RFC5011, but provide enough background for the reader to follow the discussion in this document. Readers need to fully understand [RFC5011] as well to fully comprehend the content and importance of this document.

4.1. Timing Associated with Publication

RFC5011’s process of safely publishing a new DNSKEY and then assuming RFC5011 Resolvers have adopted it for trust can be broken down into a number of high-level steps to be performed by the SEP Publisher.

This document discusses the following scenario, which the principal way RFC5011 is currently being used (even though Section 6 of RFC5011 suggests having a stand-by key available):

1. Publish a new DNSKEY in a zone, but continue to sign the zone with the old one.
2. Wait a period of time.
3. Begin to exclusively use recently published DNSKEYs to sign the appropriate resource records.

This document discusses the time required to wait during step 2 of the above process. Some interpretations of RFC5011 have erroneously determined that the wait time is equal to RFC5011’s “hold down time”. Section 5 describes an attack based on this (common) erroneous belief, which can result in a denial of service attack against the zone.

4.2. Timing Associated with Revocation

RFC5011’s process of advertising that an old key is to be revoked from RFC5011 Resolvers falls into a number of high-level steps:

1. Set the revoke bit on the DNSKEY to be revoked.
2. Sign the revoked DNSKEY with itself.

3. Wait a period of time.

4. Remove the revoked key from the zone.

This document discusses the time required to wait in step 3 of the above process. Some interpretations of RFC5011 have erroneously determined that the wait time is equal to RFC5011’s “hold down time”. This document describes an attack based on this (common) erroneous belief, which results in a revoked DNSKEY potentially remaining as a trust anchor in a RFC5011 Resolver long past its expected usage.

5. Denial of Service Attack Walkthrough

This section serves as an illustrative example of the problem being discussed in this document. Note that in order to keep the example simple enough to understand, some simplifications were made (such as by not creating a set of pre-signed RRSIGs and by not using values that result in the addHoldDownTime not being evenly divisible by the activeRefresh value); the mathematical formulas in Section 6 are, however, complete.

If an attacker is able to provide a RFC5011 Resolver with past responses, such as when it is on-path or able to perform any number of cache poisoning attacks, the attacker may be able to leave compliant RFC5011 Resolvers without an appropriate DNSKEY trust anchor. This scenario will remain until an administrator manually fixes the situation.

The time-line below illustrates an example of this situation.

5.1. Enumerated Attack Example

The following settings are used in the example scenario within this section:

TTL (all records) 1 day

sigExpirationTime 10 days

Zone resigned every 1 day

Given these settings, the sequence of events in Section 5.1.1 depicts how a SEP Publisher that waits for only the RFC5011 hold time timer length of 30 days subjects its users to a potential Denial of Service attack. The timeline below is based on a SEP Publisher publishing a new Key Signing Key (KSK), with the intent that it will later be used
as a trust anchor. We label this publication time as "T+0". All numbers in this timeline refer to days before and after this initial publication event. Thus, T-1 is the day before the introduction of the new key, and T+15 is the 15th day after the key was introduced into the example zone being discussed.

In this exposition, we consider two keys within the example zone:

K_old: An older KSK and Trust Anchor being replaced.

K_new: A new KSK being transitioned into active use and expected to become a Trust Anchor via the RFC5011 automated trust anchor update process.

5.1.1. Attack Timing Breakdown

Below we examine an attack that foils the adoption of a new DNSKEY by a 5011 Resolver when the SEP Publisher that starts signing and publishing with the new DNSKEY too quickly.

T-1 The K_old based RRSIGs are being published by the Zone Signer. [It may also be signing ZSKs as well, but they are not relevant to this event so we will not talk further about them; we are only considering the RRSIGs that cover the DNSKEYs in this document.] The Attacker queries for, retrieves and caches this DNSKEY set and corresponding RRSIG signatures.

T+0 The Zone Signer adds K_new to their zone and signs the zone’s key set with K_old. The RFC5011 Resolver (later to be under attack) retrieves this new key set and corresponding RRSIGs and notices the publication of K_new. The RFC5011 Resolver starts the (30-day) hold-down timer for K_new. [Note that in a more real-world scenario there will likely be a further delay between the point where the Zone Signer publishes a new RRSIG and the RFC5011 Resolver notices its publication; though not shown in this example, this delay is accounted for in the equation in Section 6 below]

T+5 The RFC5011 Resolver queries for the zone’s keyset per the RFC5011 Active Refresh schedule, discussed in Section 2.3 of RFC5011. Instead of receiving the intended published keyset, the Attacker successfully replays the keyset and associated signatures recorded at T-1 to the victim RFC5011 Resolver. Because the signature lifetime is 10 days (in this example), the replayed signature and keyset is accepted as valid (being only 6 days old, which is less than sigExpirationTime) and the RFC5011 Resolver cancels the (30-day) hold-down timer for K_new, per the RFC5011 algorithm.
T+10  The RFC5011 Resolver queries for the zone’s keyset and discovers a signed keyset that includes K_new (again), and is signed by K_old. Note: the attacker is unable to replay the records cached at T-1, because the signatures have now expired. Thus at T+10, the RFC5011 Resolver starts (anew) the hold-timer for K_new.

T+11 through T+29  The RFC5011 Resolver continues checking the zone’s key set at the prescribed regular intervals. During this period, the attacker can no longer replay traffic to their benefit.

T+30  The Zone Signer knows that this is the first time at which some validators might accept K_new as a new trust anchor, since the hold-down timer of a RFC5011 Resolver not under attack that had queried and retrieved K_new at T+0 would now have reached 30 days. However, the hold-down timer of our attacked RFC5011 Resolver is only at 20 days.

T+35  The Zone Signer (mistakenly) believes that all validators following the Active Refresh schedule (Section 2.3 of RFC5011) should have accepted K_new as a the new trust anchor (since the hold down time (30 days) + the query interval [which is just 1/2 the signature validity period in this example] would have passed). However, the hold-down timer of our attacked RFC5011 Resolver is only at 25 days (T+35 minus T+10); thus the RFC5011 Resolver won’t consider it a valid trust anchor addition yet, as the required 30 days have not yet elapsed.

T+36  The Zone Signer, believing K_new is safe to use, switches their active signing KSK to K_new and publishes a new RRSIG, signed with (only) K_new, covering the DNSKEY set. Non-attacked RFC5011 validators, with a hold-down timer of at least 30 days, would have accepted K_new into their set of trusted keys. But, because our attacked RFC5011 Resolver now has a hold-down timer for K_new of only 26 days, it failed to ever accept K_new as a trust anchor. Since K_old is no longer being used to sign the zone’s DNSKEYs, all the DNSKEY records from the zone will be treated as invalid. Subsequently, all of the records in the DNS tree below the zone’s apex will be deemed invalid by DNSSEC.

6. Minimum RFC5011 Timing Requirements

This section defines the minimum timing requirements for making exclusive use of newly added DNSKEYs and timing requirements for ceasing the publication of DNSKEYs to be revoked. We break our timing solution requirements into two primary components: the mathematically-based security analysis of the RFC5011 publication
process itself, and an extension of this that takes operational realities into account that further affect the recommended timings.

First, we define the component terms used in all equations in Section 6.1.

6.1. Equation Components

6.1.1. addHoldDownTime

The addHoldDownTime is defined in Section 2.4.1 of [RFC5011] as:

The add hold-down time is 30 days or the expiration time of the original TTL of the first trust point DNSKEY RRSet that contained the new key, whichever is greater. This ensures that at least two validated DNSKEY RRSets that contain the new key MUST be seen by the resolver prior to the key’s acceptance.

6.1.2. lastSigExpirationTime

The latest value (i.e. the future most date and time) of any RRSig Signature Expiration field covering any DNSKEY RRSet containing only the old trust anchor(s) that are being superseded. Note that for organizations pre-creating signatures this time may be fairly far in the future unless they can be significantly assured that none of their pre-generated signatures can be replayed at a later date.

6.1.3. sigExpirationTime

The amount of time between the DNSKEY RRSIG’s Signature Inception field and the Signature Expiration field.

6.1.4. sigExpirationTimeRemaining

sigExpirationTimeRemaining is defined in Section 3.

6.1.5. activeRefresh

activeRefresh time is defined by RFC5011 by

A resolver that has been configured for an automatic update of keys from a particular trust point MUST query that trust point (e.g., do a lookup for the DNSKEY RRSet and related RRSIG records) no less often than the lesser of 15 days, half the original TTL for the DNSKEY RRSet, or half the RRSIG expiration interval and no more often than once per hour.
activeRefresh = MAX(1 hour, 
    MIN(sigExpirationTime / 2, 
        MAX(TTL of K_old DNSKEY RRSet) / 2, 
        15 days) 
    )

6.1.6. timingSafetyMargin

Mentally, it is easy to assume that the period of time required for SEP publishers to wait after making changes to SEP marked DNSKEY sets will be entirely based on the length of the addHoldDownTime. Unfortunately, analysis shows that both the design of the RFC5011 protocol and the operational realities in deploying it require waiting and additional period of time longer. In subsections Section 6.1.6.1 to Section 6.1.6.3 below, we discuss three sources of additional delay. In the end, we will pick the largest of these delays as the minimum additional time that the SEP Publisher must wait in our final timingSafetyMargin value, which we define in Section 6.1.6.4.

6.1.6.1. activeRefreshOffset

A security analysis of the timing associated with the query rate of RFC5011 Resolvers shows that it may not perfectly align with the addHoldDownTime when the addHoldDownTime is not evenly divisible by the activeRefresh time. Consider the example of a zone with an activeRefresh period of 7 days. If an associated RFC5011 Resolver started its holdDown timer just after the SEP published a new DNSKEY (at time T+0), the resolver would send checking queries at T+7, T+14, T+21 and T+28 Days and will finally accept it at T+35 days, which is 5 days longer than the 30-day addHoldDownTime.

The activeRefreshOffset term defines this time difference and becomes:

activeRefreshOffset = addHoldDownTime % activeRefresh

The % symbol denotes the mathematical mod operator (calculating the remainder in a division problem). This will frequently be zero, but can be nearly as large as activeRefresh itself.

6.1.6.2. clockSkewDriftMargin

Even small clock drifts can have negative impacts upon the timing of the RFC5011 Resolver’s measurements. Consider the simplest case where the RFC5011 Resolver’s clock shifts over time to be 2 seconds
slower near the end of the RFC5011 Resolver’s addHoldDownTime period. I.E., if the RFC5011 Resolver first noticed a new DNSKEY at:

\[ \text{firstSeen} = \text{sigExpirationTime} + \text{activeRefresh} + 1 \text{ second} \]

The effect of 2 second clock drift between the SEP Publisher and the RFC5011 Resolver may result in the RFC5011 Resolver querying again at:

\[ \text{justBefore} = \text{sigExpirationTime} + \text{addHoldDownTime} + \text{activeRefresh} + 1 \text{ second} - 2 \text{ seconds} \]

which becomes:

\[ \text{justBefore} = \text{sigExpirationTime} + \text{addHoldDownTime} + \text{activeRefresh} - 1 \text{ second} \]

The net effect is the addHoldDownTime will not have been reached from the perspective of the RFC5011 Resolver, but it will have been reached from the perspective of the SEP Publisher. The net effect is it may take one additional activeRefresh period longer for this RFC5011 Resolver to accept the new key (at sigExpirationTime + addHoldDownTime + 2 * activeRefresh - 1 second).

We note that even the smallest clockske errors can require waiting an additional activeRefresh period, and thus define the clockskeDriftMargin as:

\[ \text{clockskeDriftMargin} = \text{activeRefresh} \]

6.1.6.3. retryDriftMargin

Drift associated with a lost transmission and an accompanying re-transmission (see Section 2.3 of [RFC5011]) will cause RFC5011 Resolvers to also change the timing associated with query times such that it becomes impossible to predict, from the perspective of the SEP Publisher, when the conclusive measurement query will arrive. Similarly, any software that restarts/reboots without saving next-query timing state may also commence with a new random starting time. Thus, an additional activeRefresh is needed to handle both these cases as well.

\[ \text{retryDriftMargin} = \text{activeRefresh} \]

Note that we account for additional time associated with cumulative multiple retries, especially under high-loss conditions, in Section 6.1.6.4.
6.1.6.4. timingSafetyMargin Value

The activeRefreshOffset, clockskewDriftMargin, and retryDriftMargin parameters all deal with additional wait-periods that must be accounted for after analyzing what conditions the client will take longer than expected to make its last query while waiting for the addHoldDownTime period to pass. But these values may be merged into a single term by waiting the longest of any of them. We define timingSafetyMargin as this "worst case" value:

\[
\text{timingSafetyMargin} = \max(\text{activeRefreshOffset}, \text{clockskewDriftMargin}, \text{retryDriftMargin})
\]

\[
\text{timingSafetyMargin} = \max(\text{addWaitTime} \% \text{activeRefresh}, \text{activeRefresh}, \text{activeRefresh})
\]

\[
\text{timingSafetyMargin} = \text{activeRefresh}
\]

6.1.7. retrySafetyMargin

The retrySafetyMargin is an extra period of time to account for caching, network delays, dropped packets, and other operational concerns otherwise beyond the scope of this document. The value operators should choose is highly dependent on the deployment situation associated with their zone. Note that no value of a retrySafetyMargin can protect against resolvers that are "down". Nonetheless, we do offer the following as one method considering reasonable values to select from.

The following list of variables need to be considered when selecting an appropriate retrySafetyMargin value:

- successRate: A likely success rate for client queries and retries
- numResolvers: The number of client RFC5011 Resolvers

Note that RFC5011 defines retryTime as:

If the query fails, the resolver MUST repeat the query until satisfied no more often than once an hour and no less often than the lesser of 1 day, 10% of the original TTL, or 10% of the original expiration interval. That is,

\[
\text{retryTime} = \max(1 \text{ hour}, \min(1 \text{ day}, 0.1 \times \text{origTTL}, 0.1 \times \text{expireInterval})).
\]
With the successRate and numResolvers values selected and the
definition of retryTime from RFC5011, one method for determining how
many retryTime intervals to wait in order to reduce the set of
resolvers that have not accepted the new trust anchor to 0 is thus:

\[ x = \frac{1}{1 - \text{successRate}} \]

retryCountWait = \text{Log}_x(\text{numResolvers})

To reduce the need for readers to pull out a scientific calculator,
we offer the following lookup table based on successRate and
numResolvers:

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
Number of client RFC5011 Resolvers (numResolvers) & 10,000 & 100,000 & 1,000,000 & 10,000,000 & 100,000,000 \\
\hline
\text{Probability} of Success & 0.01 & 917 & 1146 & 1375 & 1604 \\
\hline
\text{Per Retry} Interval & 0.05 & 180 & 225 & 270 & 315 \\
\hline
\text{(successRate)} & 0.10 & 88 & 110 & 132 & 153 \\
\hline
\text{retryCountWait}lookup table & 0.15 & 57 & 71 & 86 & 100 \\
\hline
\text{retryCountWait}lookup table & 0.25 & 33 & 41 & 49 & 57 \\
\hline
\text{retryCountWait}lookup table & 0.50 & 14 & 17 & 20 & 24 \\
\hline
\text{retryCountWait}lookup table & 0.90 & 4 & 5 & 6 & 7 \\
\hline
\text{retryCountWait}lookup table & 0.95 & 2 & 3 & 3 & 4 \\
\hline
\text{retryCountWait}lookup table & 0.99 & 2 & 2 & 2 & 3 \\
\hline
\text{retryCountWait}lookup table & 0.999 & 2 & 2 & 2 & 3 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

Finally, a suggested value of retrySafetyMargin can then be this
retryCountWait number multiplied by the retryTime from RFC5011:

\[ \text{retrySafetyMargin} = \text{retryCountWait} \times \text{retryTime} \]

6.2. Timing Requirements For Adding a New KSK

Given the defined parameters and analysis from Section 6.1, we can
now create a method for calculating the amount of time to wait until
it is safe to start signing exclusively with a new DNSKEY (especially
useful for writing code involving sleep based timers) in
Section 6.2.1, and define a method for calculating a wall-clock value
after which it is safe to start signing exclusively with a new DNSKEY
(especially useful for writing code based on clock-based event
triggers) in Section 6.2.2.
6.2.1. Wait Timer Based Calculation

Given the attack description in Section 5, the correct minimum length of time required for the Zone Signer to wait after publishing K_new but before exclusively using it and newer keys is:

\[
\text{addWaitTime} = \text{addHoldDownTime} + \text{sigExpirationTimeRemaining} + \text{activeRefresh} + \text{timingSafetyMargin} + \text{retrySafetyMargin}
\]

6.2.1.1. Fully expanded equation

Given the equation components defined in Section 6.1, the full expanded equation is:

\[
\text{addWaitTime} = \text{addHoldDownTime} + \text{sigExpirationTimeRemaining} + 2 \times \max(1 \text{ hour}, \min(\text{sigExpirationTime} / 2, \max(\text{TTL of K_old DNSKEY RRSet} / 2, 15 \text{ days})) + \text{retrySafetyMargin}
\]

6.2.2. Wall-Clock Based Calculation

The equations in Section 6.2.1 are defined based upon how long to wait from a particular moment in time. An alternative, but equivalent, method is to calculate the date and time before which it is unsafe to use a key for signing. This calculation thus becomes:

\[
\text{addWallClockTime} = \text{lastSigExpirationTime} + \text{addHoldDownTime} + \text{activeRefresh} + \text{timingSafetyMargin} + \text{retrySafetyMargin}
\]

where lastSigExpirationTime is the latest value of any sigExpirationTime for which RRSIGs were created that could potentially be replayed. Fully expanded, this becomes:
addWallClockTime = lastSigExpirationTime
+ addHoldDownTime
+ 2 * MAX(1 hour,
      MIN(sigExpirationTime / 2,
          MAX(TTL of K\textsubscript{old} DNSKEY RRSet) / 2,
          15 days)
     )
+ retrySafetyMargin

6.2.3. Timing Constraint Summary

The important timing constraint introduced by this memo relates to the last point at which a RFC5011 Resolver may have received a replayed original DNSKEY set, containing K\textsubscript{old} and not K\textsubscript{new}. The next query of the RFC5011 validator at which K\textsubscript{new} will be seen without the potential for a replay attack will occur after the old DNSKEY RRSIG's Signature Expiration Time. Thus, the latest time that a RFC5011 Validator may begin their hold down timer is an "Active Refresh" period after the last point that an attacker can replay the K\textsubscript{old} DNSKEY set. The worst case scenario of this attack is if the attacker can replay K\textsubscript{old} just seconds before the (DNSKEY RRSIG Signature Validity) field of the last K\textsubscript{old} only RRSIG.

6.2.4. Additional Considerations for RFC7583

Note: our notion of addWaitTime is called "Itrp" in Section 3.3.4.1 of [RFC7583]. The equation for Itrp in RFC7583 is insecure as it does not include the sigExpirationTime listed above. The Itrp equation in RFC7583 also does not include the 2*TTL safety margin, though that is an operational consideration.

6.2.5. Example Scenario Calculations

For the parameters listed in Section 5.1, our resulting addWaitTime is:

\[
\text{addWaitTime} = 30 \\
+ 10 \\
+ \frac{1}{2} \\
+ \frac{1}{2} \quad \text{(days)}
\]

\[
\text{addWaitTime} = 43 \quad \text{(days)}
\]

This addWaitTime of 42.5 days is 12.5 days longer than just the hold down timer, even with the needed retrySafetyMargin value being left out (which we exclude due to the lack of necessary operational parameters).
6.3. Timing Requirements For Revoking an Old KSK

This issue affects not just the publication of new DNSKEYs intended to be used as trust anchors, but also the length of time required to continuously publish a DNSKEY with the revoke bit set.

Section 6.2.1 defines a method for calculating the amount of time operators need to wait until it is safe to cease publishing a DNSKEY (especially useful for writing code involving sleep based timers), and Section 6.2.2 defines a method for calculating a minimal wall-clock value after which it is safe to cease publishing a DNSKEY (especially useful for writing code based on clock-based event triggers).

6.3.1. Wait Timer Based Calculation

Both of these publication timing requirements are affected by the attacks described in this document, but with revocation the key is revoked immediately and the addHoldDown timer does not apply. Thus the minimum amount of time that a SEP Publisher must wait before removing a revoked key from publication is:

\[
\text{remWaitTime} = \text{sigExpirationTimeRemaining} + \text{activeRefresh} + \text{timingSafetyMargin} + \text{retrySafetyMargin}
\]

\[
\text{remWaitTime} = \text{sigExpirationTimeRemaining} + \text{MAX}(1\text{ hour}, \text{MIN}((\text{sigExpirationTime}) / 2, \text{MAX}(\text{TTL of K_old DNSKEY RRSet}) / 2, 15\text{ days})) + \text{activeRefresh} + \text{retrySafetyMargin}
\]

Note also that adding retryTime intervals to the remWaitTime may be wise, just as it was for addWaitTime in Section 6.

6.3.2. Wall-Clock Based Calculation

Like before, the above equations are defined based upon how long to wait from a particular moment in time. An alternative, but equivalent, method is to calculate the date and time before which it is unsafe to cease publishing a revoked key. This calculation thus becomes:
remWallClockTime = lastSigExpirationTime
   + activeRefresh
   + timingSafetyMargin
   + retrySafetyMargin

remWallClockTime = lastSigExpirationTime
   + MAX(1 hour,
       MIN((sigExpirationTime) / 2,
            MAX(TTL of K_old DNSKEY RRSet) / 2,
             15 days))
   + timingSafetyMargin
   + retrySafetyMargin

where lastSigExpirationTime is the latest value of any
sigExpirationTime for which RRSIGs were created that could
potentially be replayed. Fully expanded, this becomes:

6.3.3. Additional Considerations for RFC7583

Note that our notion of remWaitTime is called "Irev" in
Section 3.3.4.2 of [RFC7583]. The equation for Irev in RFC7583 is
insecure as it does not include the sigExpirationTime listed above.
The Irev equation in RFC7583 also does not include a safety margin,
though that is an operational consideration.

6.3.4. Example Scenario Calculations

For the parameters listed in Section 5.1, our example:

remwaitTime = 10
   + 1 / 2
   (days)

remwaitTime = 10.5
   (days)

Note that for the values in this example produce a length shorter
than the recommended 30 days in RFC5011’s section 6.6, step 3. Other
values of sigExpirationTime and the original TTL of the K_old DNSKEY
RRSet, however, can produce values longer than 30 days.

Note that because revocation happens immediately, an attacker has a
much harder job tricking a RFC5011 Resolver into leaving a trust
anchor in place, as the attacker must successfully replay the old
data for every query a RFC5011 Resolver sends, not just one.
7. IANA Considerations

This document contains no IANA considerations.

8. Operational Considerations

A companion document to RFC5011 was expected to be published that describes the best operational practice considerations from the perspective of a zone publisher and SEP Publisher. However, this companion document has yet to be published. The authors of this document hope that it will at some point in the future, as RFC5011 timing can be tricky as we have shown, and a BCP is clearly warranted. This document is intended only to fill a single operational void which, when left misunderstood, can result in serious security ramifications. This document does not attempt to document any other missing operational guidance for zone publishers.

9. Security Considerations

This document, is solely about the security considerations with respect to the SEP Publisher’s ability to advertise new DNSKEYs via the RFC5011 automated trust anchor update process. Thus the entire document is a discussion of Security Considerations when adding or removing DNSKEYs from trust anchor storage using the RFC5011 process.

For simplicity, this document assumes that the SEP Publisher will use a consistent RRSIG validity period. SEP Publishers that vary the length of RRSIG validity periods will need to adjust the sigExpirationTime value accordingly so that the equations in Section 6 and Section 6.3 use a value that coincides with the last time a replay of older RRSIGs will no longer succeed.

10. Acknowledgements

The authors would like to especially thank to Michael StJohns for his help and advice and the care and thought he put into RFC5011 itself and his continued reviews and suggestions for this document. He also designed the suggested math behind the suggested retrySafetyMargin values in Section 6.1.7.

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11. Normative References


Appendix A. Real World Example: The 2017 Root KSK Key Roll

In 2017 and 2018, ICANN expects to (or has, depending on when you’re reading this) roll the key signing key (KSK) for the root zone. The relevant parameters associated with the root zone at the time of this writing is as follows:

- `addHoldDownTime`: 30 days
- `Old DNSKEY sigExpirationTime`: 21 days
- `Old DNSKEY TTL`: 2 days

Thus, sticking this information into the equation in Section 6 yields (in days from publication time):
addWaitTime = 30
   + 21
   + MAX(1 hour,     # activeRefresh
       MIN(21 / 2,     # activeRefresh
           MAX(2) / 2,  # activeRefresh
           15 days),     # activeRefresh
       )
   + activeRefresh

addWaitTime = 30 + 21 + 1 + 1

addWaitTime = 53 days

Also note that we exclude the retrySafetyMargin value, which is calculated based on the expected client deployment size.

Thus, ICANN must wait a minimum of 52 days before switching to the newly published KSK (and 26 days before removing the old revoked key once it is published as revoked). ICANN’s current plans involve waiting over 3 months before using the new KEY and 69 days before removing the old, revoked key. Thus, their current rollover plans are sufficiently secure from the attack discussed in this memo.

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Abstract

This document defines a new DNS OPCODE for DNS Stateful Operations (DSO). DSO messages communicate operations within persistent stateful sessions, using type-length-value (TLV) syntax. Three TLVs are defined that manage session timeouts, termination, and encryption padding, and a framework is defined for extensions to enable new stateful operations. This document updates RFC 1035 by adding a new DNS header opcode which has different message semantics, and a new result code. This document updates RFC 7766 by redefining a session, providing new guidance on connection re-use, and providing a new mechanism for handling session idle timeouts.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

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This Internet-Draft will expire on March 31, 2019.
1. Introduction

This document specifies a mechanism for managing stateful DNS connections. DNS most commonly operates over a UDP transport, but can also operate over streaming transports; the original DNS RFC specifies DNS over TCP [RFC1035] and a profile for DNS over TLS [RFC7858] has been specified. These transports can offer persistent, long-lived sessions and therefore when using them for transporting DNS messages it is of benefit to have a mechanism that can establish parameters associated with those sessions, such as timeouts. In such situations it is also advantageous to support server-initiated messages (such as DNS Push Notifications [I-D.ietf-dnssd-push]).
The existing EDNS(0) Extension Mechanism for DNS [RFC6891] is explicitly defined to only have "per-message" semantics. While EDNS(0) has been used to signal at least one session-related parameter (edns-tcp-keepalive EDNS0 Option [RFC7828]) the result is less than optimal due to the restrictions imposed by the EDNS(0) semantics and the lack of server-initiated signalling. For example, a server cannot arbitrarily instruct a client to close a connection because the server can only send EDNS(0) options in responses to queries that contained EDNS(0) options.

This document defines a new DNS OPCODE, DSO ([TBA1], tentatively 6), for DNS Stateful Operations. DSO messages are used to communicate operations within persistent stateful sessions, expressed using type-length-value (TLV) syntax. This document defines an initial set of three TLVs, used to manage session timeouts, termination, and encryption padding.

All three TLVs defined here are mandatory for all implementations of DSO. Further TLVs may be defined in additional specifications.

DSO messages may or may not be acknowledged; this is signalled by providing a non-zero message ID for messages that must be acknowledged (DSO request messages) and a zero message ID for messages that are not to be acknowledged (DSO unidirectional messages), and is also specified in the definition of a particular DSO message type. Messages are pipelined; answers may appear out of order when more than one answer is pending.

The format for DSO messages (Section 5.4) differs somewhat from the traditional DNS message format used for standard queries and responses. The standard twelve-byte header is used, but the four count fields (QDCOUNT, ANCOUNT, NSCOUNT, ARCOUNT) are set to zero and accordingly their corresponding sections are not present.

The actual data pertaining to DNS Stateful Operations (expressed in TLV syntax) is appended to the end of the DNS message header. Just as in traditional DNS over TCP [RFC1035] [RFC7766] the stream protocol carrying DSO messages (which are just another kind of DNS message) frames them by putting a 16-bit message length at the start, so the length of the DSO message is determined from that length, rather than from any of the DNS header counts.

When displayed using packet analyzer tools that have not been updated to recognize the DSO format, this will result in the DSO data being displayed as unknown additional data after the end of the DNS message.
This new format has distinct advantages over an RR-based format because it is more explicit and more compact. Each TLV definition is specific to its use case, and as a result contains no redundant or overloaded fields. Importantly, it completely avoids conflating DNS Stateful Operations in any way with normal DNS operations or with existing EDNS(0)-based functionality. A goal of this approach is to avoid the operational issues that have befallen EDNS(0), particularly relating to middlebox behaviour (see for example [I-D.ietf-dnsop-no-response-issue] sections 3.2 and 4).

With EDNS(0), multiple options may be packed into a single OPT pseudo-RR, and there is no generalized mechanism for a client to be able to tell whether a server has processed or otherwise acted upon each individual option within the combined OPT pseudo-RR. The specifications for each individual option need to define how each different option is to be acknowledged, if necessary.

In contrast to EDNS(0), with DSO there is no compelling motivation to pack multiple operations into a single message for efficiency reasons, because DSO always operates using a connection-oriented transport protocol. Each DSO operation is communicated in its own separate DNS message, and the transport protocol can take care of packing several DNS messages into a single IP packet if appropriate. For example, TCP can pack multiple small DNS messages into a single TCP segment. This simplification allows for clearer semantics. Each DSO request message communicates just one primary operation, and the RCODE in the corresponding response message indicates the success or failure of that operation.

2. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.
3. Terminology

DSO: DNS Stateful Operations.

collection: a bidirectional byte (or message) stream, where the bytes (or messages) are delivered reliably and in-order, such as provided by using DNS over TCP [RFC1035] [RFC7766] or DNS over TLS [RFC7858].

session: The unqualified term "session" in the context of this document refers to a persistent network connection between two endpoints which allows for the exchange of DNS messages over a connection where either end of the connection can send messages to the other end. (The term has no relationship to the "session layer" of the OSI "seven-layer model".)

DSO Session: a session established between two endpoints that acknowledge persistent DNS state via the exchange of DSO messages over the connection. This is distinct from a DNS-over-TCP session as described in the previous specification for DNS over TCP [RFC7766].

close gracefully: a normal session shutdown, where the client closes the TCP connection to the server using a graceful close, such that no data is lost (e.g., using TCP FIN, see Section 5.3).

forcibly abort: a session shutdown as a result of a fatal error, where the TCP connection is unilaterally aborted without regard for data loss (e.g., using TCP RST, see Section 5.3).

server: the software with a listening socket, awaiting incoming connection requests, in the usual DNS sense.

client: the software which initiates a connection to the server’s listening socket, in the usual DNS sense.

initiator: the software which sends a DSO request message or a DSO unidirectional message during a DSO session. Either a client or server can be an initiator

responder: the software which receives a DSO request message or a DSO unidirectional message during a DSO session. Either a client or server can be a responder.

sender: the software which is sending a DNS message, a DSO message, a DNS response, or a DSO response.
receiver: the software which is receiving a DNS message, a DSO message, a DNS response, or a DSO response.

service instance: a specific instance of server software running on a specific host (Section 9.1).

long-lived operation: a long-lived operation is an outstanding operation on a DSO session where either the client or server, acting as initiator, has requested that the responder send new information regarding the request, as it becomes available.

Fast Open message: A TCP SYN packet that begins a DSO connection and contains early data ([RFC8446] section 2.3). Fast Open is only permitted when using TLS encapsulation: a TCP SYN message that does not use TLS encapsulation but contains early data is not permitted.

DNS message: any DNS message, including DNS queries, response, updates, DSO messages, etc.

DNS request message: any DNS message where the QR bit is 0.

DNS response message: any DNS message where the QR bit is 1.

DSO message: a DSO request message, DSO unidirectional message, or a DSO response to a DSO request message. If the QR bit is 1 in a DSO message, it is a DSO response message. If the QR bit is 0 in a DSO message, it is a DSO request message or DSO unidirectional message, as determined by the specification of its primary TLV.

DSO response message: a response to a DSO request message.

DSO request message: a DSO message that requires a response.

DSO unidirectional message: a DSO message that does not require and cannot induce a response.

Primary TLV: The first TLV in a DSO message or DSO response; in the DSO message this determines the nature of the operation being performed.

Additional TLV: Any TLVs in a DSO message response that follow the primary TLV.

Response Primary TLV: The (optional) first TLV in a DSO response.

Response Additional TLV: Any TLVs in a DSO response that follow the (optional) Response Primary TLV.
inactivity timer: the time since the most recent non-keepalive DNS message was sent or received. (see Section 6.4)

keepalive timer: the time since the most recent DNS message was sent or received. (see Section 6.5)

session timeouts: the inactivity timer and the keepalive timer.

inactivity timeout: the maximum value that the inactivity timer can have before the connection is gracefully closed.

keepalive interval: the maximum value that the keepalive timer can have before the client is required to send a keepalive. (see Section 7.1)

resetting a timer: setting the timer value to zero and restarting the timer.

clearing a timer: setting the timer value to zero but not restarting the timer.
4. Applicability

DNS Stateful Operations are applicable to several known use cases and are only applicable on transports that are capable of supporting a DSO Session.

4.1. Use Cases

There are several use cases for DNS Stateful operations that can be described here.

4.1.1. Session Management

Firstly, establishing session parameters such as server-defined timeouts is of great use in the general management of persistent connections. For example, using DSO sessions for stub-to-recursive DNS-over-TLS [RFC7858] is more flexible for both the client and the server than attempting to manage sessions using just the edns-tcp-keepalive EDNS0 Option [RFC7828]. The simple set of TLVs defined in this document is sufficient to greatly enhance connection management for this use case.

4.1.2. Long-lived Subscriptions

Secondly, DNS-SD [RFC6763] has evolved into a naturally session-based mechanism where, for example, long-lived subscriptions lend themselves to ‘push’ mechanisms as opposed to polling. Long-lived stateful connections and server-initiated messages align with this use case [I-D.ietf-dnssd-push].

A general use case is that DNS traffic is often bursty but session establishment can be expensive. One challenge with long-lived connections is to maintain sufficient traffic to maintain NAT and firewall state. To mitigate this issue this document introduces a new concept for the DNS, that is DSO "Keepalive traffic". This traffic carries no DNS data and is not considered ‘activity’ in the classic DNS sense, but serves to maintain state in middleboxes, and to assure client and server that they still have connectivity to each other.
4.2. Applicable Transports

DNS Stateful Operations are applicable in cases where it is useful to maintain an open session between a DNS client and server, where the transport allows such a session to be maintained, and where the transport guarantees in-order delivery of messages, on which DSO depends. Examples of transports that can support DNS Stateful Operations are DNS-over-TCP [RFC1035] [RFC7766] and DNS-over-TLS [RFC7858].

Note that in the case of DNS over TLS, there is no mechanism for upgrading from DNS-over-TCP to DNS-over-TLS mid-connection (see [RFC7858] section 7). A connection is either DNS-over-TCP from the start, or DNS-over-TLS from the start.

DNS Stateful Operations are not applicable for transports that cannot support clean session semantics, or that do not guarantee in-order delivery. While in principle such a transport could be constructed over UDP, the current DNS specification over UDP transport [RFC1035] does not provide in-order delivery or session semantics, and hence cannot be used. Similarly, DNS-over-HTTP [I-D.ietf-doh-dns-over-https] cannot be used because HTTP has its own mechanism for managing sessions, and this is incompatible with the mechanism specified here.

No other transports are currently defined for use with DNS Stateful Operations. Such transports can be added in the future, if they meet the requirements set out in the first paragraph of this section.
5. Protocol Details

The overall flow of DNS Stateful Operations goes through a series of phases:

Connection Establishment: A client establishes a connection to a server. (Section 4.2)

Connected but sessionless: A connection exists, but a DSO session has not been established. DNS messages can be sent from the client to server, and DNS responses can be sent from servers to clients. In this state a client that wishes to use DSO can attempt to establish a DSO session (Section 5.1). Standard DNS-over-TCP inactivity timeout handling is in effect [RFC7766] (see Section 7.1.2).

DSO Session Establishment in Progress: A client has sent a DSO request, but has not yet received a DSO response. In this phase, the client may send more DSO requests and more DNS requests, but MUST NOT send DSO unidirectional messages (Section 5.1).

DSO Session Establishment Failed: The attempt to establish the DSO session did not succeed. At this point, the client is permitted to continue operating without a DSO session (Connected but Sessionless) but does not send further DSO messages (Section 5.1).

DSO Session Established: Both client and server may send DSO messages and DNS messages; both may send replies in response to messages they receive (Section 5.2). The inactivity timer (Section 6.4) is active; the keepalive timer (Section 6.5) is active. Standard DNS-over-TCP inactivity timeout handling is no longer in effect [RFC7766] (see Section 7.1.2).

Server Shutdown: The server has decided to gracefully terminate the session, and has sent the client a Retry Delay message (Section 6.6.1). There may still be unprocessed messages from the client; the server will ignore these. The server will not send any further messages to the client (Section 6.6.1.1).

Client Shutdown: The client has decided to disconnect, either because it no longer needs service, the connection is inactive (Section 6.4.1), or because the server sent it a Retry Delay message (Section 6.6.1). The client closes the connection gracefully Section 5.3.

Reconnect: The client disconnected as a result of a server shutdown. The client either waits for the server-specified Retry Delay to expire (Section 6.6.2), or else contacts a different server.
instance. If the client no longer needs service, it does not reconnect.

Forcibly Abort: The client or server detected a protocol error, and further communication would have undefined behavior. The client or server forcibly aborts the connection (Section 5.3).

Abort Reconnect Wait: The client has forcibly aborted the connection, but still needs service. Or, the server forcibly aborted the connection, but the client still needs service. The client either connects to a different service instance (Section 9.1) or waits to reconnect (Section 6.6.2.1).

5.1. DSO Session Establishment

In order for a session to be established between a client and a server, the client must first establish a connection to the server, using an applicable transport (see Section 4).

In some environments it may be known in advance by external means that both client and server support DSO, and in these cases either client or server may initiate DSO messages at any time. In this case, the session is established as soon as the connection is established; this is referred to as implicit session establishment.

However, in the typical case a server will not know in advance whether a client supports DSO, so in general, unless it is known in advance by other means that a client does support DSO, a server MUST NOT initiate DSO request messages or DSO unidirectional messages until a DSO Session has been mutually established by at least one successful DSO request/response exchange initiated by the client, as described below. This is referred to as explicit session establishment.

Until a DSO session has been implicitly or explicitly established, a client MUST NOT initiate DSO unidirectional messages.

A DSO Session is established over a connection by the client sending a DSO request message, such as a DSO Keepalive request message (Section 7.1), and receiving a response, with matching MESSAGE ID, and RCODE set to NOERROR (0), indicating that the DSO request was successful.

Some DSO messages are permitted in Fast Open messages (Section 11.1). Others are not. Unidirectional messages are never permitted in Fast Open messages unless an implicit session exists.
If a server receives a Fast Open message containing a DSO message whose primary TLV is not permitted to appear in a Fast Open message, the server MUST forcibly abort the connection. If a client receives a Fast Open message containing any DSO message, and there is no implicit DSO session, the client MUST forcibly abort the connection.

If a server or client receives a Fast Open message that is not a TLS 1.3 message, it MUST forcibly abort the connection.

5.1.1. Session Establishment Failure

If the response RCODE is set to NOTIMP (4), or in practise any value other than NOERROR (0) or DSOTYPENI (defined below), then the client MUST assume that the server does not implement DSO at all. In this case the client is permitted to continue sending DNS messages on that connection, but the client MUST NOT issue further DSO messages on that connection.

If the RCODE in the response is set to DSOTYPENI ("DSO-TYPE Not Implemented", [TBA2] tentatively RCODE 11) this indicates that the server does support DSO, but does not implement the DSO-TYPE of the primary TLV in this DSO request message. A server implementing DSO MUST NOT return DSOTYPENI for a DSO Keepalive request message, because the Keepalive TLV is mandatory to implement. But in the future, if a client attempts to establish a DSO Session using a response-requiring DSO request message using some newly-defined DSO-TYPE that the server does not understand, that would result in a DSOTYPENI response. If the server returns DSOTYPENI then a DSO Session is not considered established, but the client is permitted to continue sending DNS messages on the connection, including other DSO messages such as the DSO Keepalive, which may result in a successful NOERROR response, yielding the establishment of a DSO Session.

Two other possibilities exist: the server might drop the connection, or the server might send no response to the DSO message.

In the first case, the client SHOULD mark that service instance as not supporting DSO, and not attempt a DSO connection for some period of time (at least an hour) after the failed attempt. The client MAY reconnect but not use DSO, if appropriate (Section 6.6.2.2).

In the second case, the client SHOULD wait 30 seconds, after which time the server will be assumed not to support DSO. If the server doesn’t respond within 30 seconds, the client MUST forcibly abort the connection to the server, since the server’s behavior is out of spec, and hence its state is undefined. The client MAY reconnect, but not use DSO, if appropriate (Section 6.6.2.1).
5.1.2. Session Establishment Success

When the server receives a DSO request message from a client, and transmits a successful NOERROR response to that request, the server considers the DSO Session established.

When the client receives the server’s NOERROR response to its DSO request message, the client considers the DSO Session established.

Once a DSO Session has been established, either end may unilaterally send appropriate DSO messages at any time, and therefore either client or server may be the initiator of a message.

5.2. Operations After Session Establishment

Once a DSO Session has been established, clients and servers should behave as described in this specification with regard to inactivity timeouts and session termination, not as previously prescribed in the earlier specification for DNS over TCP [RFC7766].

Because a server that supports DNS Stateful Operations MUST return an RCODE of NOERROR when it receives a Keepalive TLV DSO request message, the Keepalive TLV is an ideal candidate for use in establishing a DSO session. Any other option that can only succeed when sent to a server of the desired kind is also a good candidate for use in establishing a DSO session. For clients that implement only the DSO-TYPEs defined in this base specification, sending a Keepalive TLV is the only DSO request message they have available to initiate a DSO Session. Even for clients that do implement other future DSO-TYPEs, for simplicity they MAY elect to always send an initial DSO Keepalive request message as their way of initiating a DSO Session. A future definition of a new response-requiring DSO-TYPE gives implementers the option of using that new DSO-TYPE if they wish, but does not change the fact that sending a Keepalive TLV remains a valid way of initiating a DSO Session.
5.3. Session Termination

A "DSO Session" is terminated when the underlying connection is closed. Sessions are "closed gracefully" as a result of the server closing a session because it is overloaded, the client closing the session because it is done, or the client closing the session because it is inactive. Sessions are "forcibly aborted" when either the client or server closes the connection because of a protocol error.

- Where this specification says, "close gracefully," that means sending a TLS close_notify (if TLS is in use) followed by a TCP FIN, or the equivalents for other protocols. Where this specification requires a connection to be closed gracefully, the requirement to initiate that graceful close is placed on the client, to place the burden of TCP’s TIME-WAIT state on the client rather than the server.

- Where this specification says, "forcibly abort," that means sending a TCP RST, or the equivalent for other protocols. In the BSD Sockets API this is achieved by setting the SO_LINGER option to zero before closing the socket.

5.3.1. Handling Protocol Errors

In protocol implementation there are generally two kinds of errors that software writers have to deal with. The first is situations that arise due to factors in the environment, such as temporary loss of connectivity. While undesirable, these situations do not indicate a flaw in the software, and they are situations that software should generally be able to recover from.

The second is situations that should never happen when communicating with a compliant DSO implementation. If they do happen, they indicate a serious flaw in the protocol implementation, beyond what it is reasonable to expect software to recover from. This document describes this latter form of error condition as a "fatal error" and specifies that an implementation encountering a fatal error condition "MUST forcibly abort the connection immediately".
5.4. Message Format

A DSO message begins with the standard twelve-byte DNS message header [RFC1035] with the OPCODE field set to the DSO OPCODE. However, unlike standard DNS messages, the question section, answer section, authority records section and additional records sections are not present. The corresponding count fields (QDCOUNT, ANCOUNT, NSCOUNT, ARCOUNT) MUST be set to zero on transmission.

If a DSO message is received where any of the count fields are not zero, then a FORMERR MUST be returned.
5.4.1. DNS Header Fields in DSO Messages

In a DSO unidirectional message the MESSAGE ID field MUST be set to zero. In a DSO request message the MESSAGE ID field MUST be set to a unique nonzero value, that the initiator is not currently using for any other active operation on this connection. For the purposes here, a MESSAGE ID is in use in this DSO Session if the initiator has used it in a DSO request message for which it is still awaiting a response, or if the client has used it to set up a long-lived operation that has not yet been cancelled. For example, a long-lived operation could be a Push Notification subscription [I-D.ietf-dnssd-push] or a Discovery Relay interface subscription [I-D.ietf-dnssd-mdns-relay].

Whether a message is a DSO request message or a DSO unidirectional message is determined only by the specification for the Primary TLV. An acknowledgment cannot be requested by including a nonzero message ID in a message that is required according to its primary TLV to be unidirectional. Nor can an acknowledgment be prevented by sending a message ID of zero in a message that is required to be a DSO request message according to its primary TLV. A responder that receives either such malformed message MUST treat it as a fatal error and forcibly abort the connection immediately.

In a DSO request message or DSO unidirectional message the DNS Header QR bit MUST be zero (QR=0). If the QR bit is not zero the message is not a DSO request or DSO unidirectional message.

In a DSO response message the DNS Header QR bit MUST be one (QR=1). If the QR bit is not one, the message is not a response message.

In a DSO response message (QR=1) the MESSAGE ID field MUST contain a copy of the value of the MESSAGE ID field in the DSO request message being responded to. In a DSO response message (QR=1) the MESSAGE ID field MUST NOT be zero. If a DSO response message (QR=1) is received where the MESSAGE ID is zero this is a fatal error and the recipient MUST forcibly abort the connection immediately.

The DNS Header OPCODE field holds the DSO OPCODE value.

The Z bits are currently unused in DSO messages, and in both DSO request messages and DSO responses the Z bits MUST be set to zero (0) on transmission and MUST be ignored on reception.

In a DSO request message (QR=0) the RCODE is set according to the definition of the request. For example, in a Retry Delay message (Section 6.6.1) the RCODE indicates the reason for termination. However, in most cases, except where clearly specified otherwise, in

a DSO request message (QR=0) the RCODE is set to zero on transmission, and silently ignored on reception.

The RCODE value in a response message (QR=1) may be one of the following values:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Mnemonic</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>NOERROR</td>
<td>Operation processed successfully</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>FORMERR</td>
<td>Format error</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>SERVFAIL</td>
<td>Server failed to process DSO request message due to a problem with the server</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>NOTIMP</td>
<td>DSO not supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>REFUSED</td>
<td>Operation declined for policy reasons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[TBA2]</td>
<td>DSOTYPENI</td>
<td>Primary TLV’s DSO-Type is not implemented</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Use of the above RCODEs is likely to be common in DSO but does not preclude the definition and use of other codes in future documents that make use of DSO.

If a document defining a new DSO-TYPE makes use of response codes not defined here, then that document MUST specify the specific interpretation of those RCODE values in the context of that new DSO TLV.
5.4.2. DSO Data

The standard twelve-byte DNS message header with its zero-valued count fields is followed by the DSO Data, expressed using TLV syntax, as described below in Section 5.4.3.

A DSO request message or DSO unidirectional message MUST contain at least one TLV. The first TLV in a DSO request message or DSO unidirectional message is referred to as the "Primary TLV" and determines the nature of the operation being performed, including whether it is a DSO request or a DSO unidirectional operation. In some cases it may be appropriate to include other TLVs in a DSO request message or DSO unidirectional message, such as the Encryption Padding TLV (Section 7.3), and these extra TLVs are referred to as the "Additional TLVs" and are not limited to what is defined in this document. New "Additional TLVs" may be defined in the future and those definitions will describe when their use is appropriate.

A DSO response message may contain no TLVs, or it may be specified to contain one or more TLVs appropriate to the information being communicated. This includes "Primary TLVs" and "Additional TLVs" defined in this document as well as in future TLV definitions. It may be permissible for an additional TLV to appear in a response to a primary TLV even though the specification of that primary TLV does not specify it explicitly. See Section 8.2 for more information.

A DSO response message may contain one or more TLVs with the Primary TLV DSO-TYPE the same as the Primary TLV from the corresponding DSO request message or it may contain zero or more Additional TLVs only. The MESSAGE ID field in the DNS message header is sufficient to identify the DSO request message to which this response message relates.

A DSO response message may contain one or more TLVs with DSO-TYPEs different from the Primary TLV from the corresponding DSO request message, in which case those TLV(s) are referred to as "Response Additional TLVs".

Response Primary TLV(s), if present, MUST occur first in the response message, before any Response Additional TLVs.

It is anticipated that most DSO operations will be specified to use DSO request messages, which generate corresponding DSO responses. In some specialized high-traffic use cases, it may be appropriate to specify DSO unidirectional messages. DSO unidirectional messages can be more efficient on the network, because they don't generate a stream of corresponding reply messages. Using DSO unidirectional messages can also simplify software in some cases, by removing need
for an initiator to maintain state while it waits to receive replies it doesn’t care about. When the specification for a particular TLV states that, when used as a Primary TLV (i.e., first) in an outgoing DSO request message (i.e., QR=0), that message is to be unidirectional, the MESSAGE ID field MUST be set to zero and the receiver MUST NOT generate any response message corresponding to this DSO unidirectional message.

The previous point, that the receiver MUST NOT generate responses to DSO unidirectional messages, applies even in the case of errors.

When a DSO message is received where both the QR bit and the MESSAGE ID field are zero, the receiver MUST NOT generate any response. For example, if the DSO-TYPE in the Primary TLV is unrecognized, then a DSOTYPENI error MUST NOT be returned; instead the receiver MUST forcibly abort the connection immediately.

DSO unidirectional messages MUST NOT be used "speculatively" in cases where the sender doesn’t know if the receiver supports the Primary TLV in the message, because there is no way to receive any response to indicate success or failure. DSO unidirectional messages are only appropriate in cases where the sender already knows that the receiver supports, and wishes to receive, these messages.

For example, after a client has subscribed for Push Notifications [I-D.ietf-dnssd-push], the subsequent event notifications are then sent as DSO unidirectional messages, and this is appropriate because the client initiated the message stream by virtue of its Push Notification subscription, thereby indicating its support of Push Notifications, and its desire to receive those notifications.

Similarly, after a Discovery Relay client has subscribed to receive inbound mDNS (multicast DNS, [RFC6762]) traffic from a Discovery Relay, the subsequent stream of received packets is then sent using DSO unidirectional messages, and this is appropriate because the client initiated the message stream by virtue of its Discovery Relay link subscription, thereby indicating its support of Discovery Relay, and its desire to receive inbound mDNS packets over that DSO session [I-D.ietf-dnssd-mdns-relay].
5.4.3. TLV Syntax

All TLVs, whether used as "Primary", "Additional", "Response Primary", or "Response Additional", use the same encoding syntax.

Specifications that define new TLVs must specify whether the DSO-TYPE can be used as the Primary TLV, used as an Additional TLV, or used in either context, both in the case of requests and of responses. The specification for a TLV must also state whether, when used as the Primary (i.e., first) TLV in a DSO message (i.e., QR=0), that DSO message is unidirectional or is a request message which requires a response. If the DSO message requires a response, the specification must also state which TLVs, if any, are to be included in the response. The Primary TLV may or may not be contained in the response, depending on what is specified for that TLV.

```
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
|                           DSO-TYPE                            |
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
|                          DSO-LENGTH                           |
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
|                                                               |
/                           DSO-DATA                            /
/                                                               /
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
```

DSO-TYPE: A 16-bit unsigned integer, in network (big endian) byte order, giving the DSO-TYPE of the current DSO TLV per the IANA DSO Type Code Registry.

DSO-LENGTH: A 16-bit unsigned integer, in network (big endian) byte order, giving the size in bytes of the DSO-DATA.

DSO-DATA: Type-code specific format. The generic DSO machinery treats the DSO-DATA as an opaque "blob" without attempting to interpret it. Interpretation of the meaning of the DSO-DATA for a particular DSO-TYPE is the responsibility of the software that implements that DSO-TYPE.
5.4.3.1. Request TLVs

The first TLV in a DSO request message or DSO unidirectional message is the "Primary TLV" and indicates the operation to be performed. A DSO request message or DSO unidirectional message MUST contain at least one TLV - the Primary TLV.

Immediately following the Primary TLV, a DSO request message or DSO unidirectional message MAY contain one or more "Additional TLVs", which specify additional parameters relating to the operation.

5.4.3.2. Response TLVs

Depending on the operation, a DSO response message MAY contain no TLVs, because it is simply a response to a previous DSO request message, and the MESSAGE ID in the header is sufficient to identify the DSO request in question. Or it may contain a single response TLV, with the same DSO-TYPE as the Primary TLV in the request message. Alternatively it may contain one or more TLVs of other types, or a combination of the above, as appropriate for the information that needs to be communicated. The specification for each DSO TLV determines what TLVs are required in a response to a DSO request message using that TLV.

If a DSO response is received for an operation where the specification requires that the response carry a particular TLV or TLVs, and the required TLV(s) are not present, then this is a fatal error and the recipient of the defective response message MUST forcibly abort the connection immediately.
5.4.3.3. Unrecognized TLVs

If DSO request message is received containing an unrecognized Primary TLV, with a nonzero MESSAGE ID (indicating that a response is expected), then the receiver MUST send an error response with matching MESSAGE ID, and RCODE DSOTYPENI. The error response MUST NOT contain a copy of the unrecognized Primary TLV.

If DSO unidirectional message is received containing an unrecognized Primary TLV, with a zero MESSAGE ID (indicating that no response is expected), then this is a fatal error and the recipient MUST forcibly abort the connection immediately.

If a DSO request message or DSO unidirectional message is received where the Primary TLV is recognized, containing one or more unrecognized Additional TLVs, the unrecognized Additional TLVs MUST be silently ignored, and the remainder of the message is interpreted and handled as if the unrecognized parts were not present.

Similarly, if a DSO response message is received containing one or more unrecognized TLVs, the unrecognized TLVs MUST be silently ignored, and the remainder of the message is interpreted and handled as if the unrecognized parts were not present.
5.4.4. EDNS(0) and TSIG

Since the ARCOUNT field MUST be zero, a DSO message cannot contain a valid EDNS(0) option in the additional records section. If functionality provided by current or future EDNS(0) options is desired for DSO messages, one or more new DSO TLVs need to be defined to carry the necessary information.

For example, the EDNS(0) Padding Option [RFC7830] used for security purposes is not permitted in a DSO message, so if message padding is desired for DSO messages then the Encryption Padding TLV described in Section 7.3 MUST be used.

A DSO message can’t contain a TSIG record, because a TSIG record is included in the additional section of the message, which would mean that ARCOUNT would be greater than zero. DSO messages are required to have an ARCOUNT of zero. Therefore, if use of signatures with DSO messages becomes necessary in the future, a new DSO TLV would have to be defined to perform this function.

Note however that, while DSO *messages* cannot include EDNS(0) or TSIG records, a DSO *session* is typically used to carry a whole series of DNS messages of different kinds, including DSO messages, and other DNS message types like Query [RFC1034] [RFC1035] and Update [RFC2136], and those messages can carry EDNS(0) and TSIG records.

Although messages may contain other EDNS(0) options as appropriate, this specification explicitly prohibits use of the edns-tcp-keepalive EDNS0 Option [RFC7828] in *any* messages sent on a DSO Session (because it is obsoleted by the functionality provided by the DSO Keepalive operation). If any message sent on a DSO Session contains an edns-tcp-keepalive EDNS0 Option this is a fatal error and the recipient of the defective message MUST forcibly abort the connection immediately.
5.5. Message Handling

As described above in Section 5.4.1, whether an outgoing DSO message with the QR bit in the DNS header set to zero is a DSO request or DSO unidirectional message is determined by the specification for the Primary TLV, which in turn determines whether the MESSAGE ID field in that outgoing message will be zero or nonzero.

Every DSO message with the QR bit in the DNS header set to zero and a nonzero MESSAGE ID field is a DSO request message, and MUST elicit a corresponding response, with the QR bit in the DNS header set to one and the MESSAGE ID field set to the value given in the corresponding DSO request message.

Valid DSO request messages sent by the client with a nonzero MESSAGE ID field elicit a response from the server, and valid DSO request messages sent by the server with a nonzero MESSAGE ID field elicit a response from the client.

Every DSO message with both the QR bit in the DNS header and the MESSAGE ID field set to zero is a DSO unidirectional message, and MUST NOT elicit a response.
5.5.1. Delayed Acknowledgement Management

Generally, most good TCP implementations employ a delayed acknowledgement timer to provide more efficient use of the network and better performance.

With a DSO request message, the TCP implementation waits for the application-layer client software to generate the corresponding DSO response message, which enables the TCP implementation to send a single combined IP packet containing the TCP acknowledgement, the TCP window update, and the application-generated DSO response message. This is more efficient than sending three separate IP packets.

With a DSO unidirectional message or DSO response message, there is no corresponding application-generated DSO response message, and consequently, no hint to the transport protocol about when it should send its acknowledgement and window update. Some networking APIs provide a mechanism that allows the application-layer client software to signal to the transport protocol that no response will be forthcoming (in effect it can be thought of as a zero-length "empty" write). Where available in the networking API being used, the recipient of a DSO unidirectional message or DSO response message, having parsed and interpreted the message, SHOULD then use this mechanism provided by the networking API to signal that no response for this message will be forthcoming, so that the TCP implementation can go ahead and send its acknowledgement and window update without further delay. See Section 9.5 for further discussion of why this is important.
5.5.2. MESSAGE ID Namespaces

The namespaces of 16-bit MESSAGE IDs are independent in each direction. This means it is *not* an error for both client and server to send DSO request messages at the same time as each other, using the same MESSAGE ID, in different directions. This simplification is necessary in order for the protocol to be implementable. It would be infeasible to require the client and server to coordinate with each other regarding allocation of new unique MESSAGE IDs. It is also not necessary to require the client and server to coordinate with each other regarding allocation of new unique MESSAGE IDs. The value of the 16-bit MESSAGE ID combined with the identity of the initiator (client or server) is sufficient to unambiguously identify the operation in question. This can be thought of as a 17-bit message identifier space, using message identifiers 0x00001-0x0FFFFF for client-to-server DSO request messages, and message identifiers 0x10001-0x1FFFFF for server-to-client DSO request messages. The least-significant 16 bits are stored explicitly in the MESSAGE ID field of the DSO message, and the most-significant bit is implicit from the direction of the message.

As described above in Section 5.4.1, an initiator MUST NOT reuse a MESSAGE ID that it already has in use for an outstanding DSO request message (unless specified otherwise by the relevant specification for the DSO-TYPE in question). At the very least, this means that a MESSAGE ID can’t be reused in a particular direction on a particular DSO Session while the initiator is waiting for a response to a previous DSO request message using that MESSAGE ID on that DSO Session (unless specified otherwise by the relevant specification for the DSO-TYPE in question), and for a long-lived operation the MESSAGE ID for the operation can’t be reused while that operation remains active.

If a client or server receives a response (QR=1) where the MESSAGE ID is zero, or is any other value that does not match the MESSAGE ID of any of its outstanding operations, this is a fatal error and the recipient MUST forcibly abort the connection immediately.

If a responder receives a DSO request message (QR=0) where the MESSAGE ID is not zero, and the responder tracks request MESSAGE IDs, and the MESSAGE ID matches the MESSAGE ID of a DSO request message it received for which a response has not yet been sent, it MUST forcibly abort the connection immediately. This behavior is required to prevent a hypothetical attack that takes advantage of undefined behavior in this case. However, if the responder does not track MESSAGE IDs in this way, no such risk exists, so tracking MESSAGE IDs just to implement this sanity check is not required.
5.5.3.  Error Responses

When a DSO unidirectional message type is received (MESSAGE ID field is zero), the receiver should already be expecting this DSO message type. Section 5.4.3.3 describes the handling of unknown DSO message types. Parsing errors MUST also result in the receiver forcibly aborting the connection. When a DSO unidirectional message of an unexpected type is received, the receiver SHOULD forcibly abort the connection. Whether the connection should be forcibly aborted for other internal errors processing the DSO unidirectional message is implementation dependent, according to the severity of the error.

When a DSO request message is unsuccessful for some reason, the responder returns an error code to the initiator.

In the case of a server returning an error code to a client in response to an unsuccessful DSO request message, the server MAY choose to end the DSO Session, or MAY choose to allow the DSO Session to remain open. For error conditions that only affect the single operation in question, the server SHOULD return an error response to the client and leave the DSO Session open for further operations.

For error conditions that are likely to make all operations unsuccessful in the immediate future, the server SHOULD return an error response to the client and then end the DSO Session by sending a Retry Delay message, as described in Section 6.6.1.

Upon receiving an error response from the server, a client SHOULD NOT automatically close the DSO Session. An error relating to one particular operation on a DSO Session does not necessarily imply that all other operations on that DSO Session have also failed, or that future operations will fail. The client should assume that the server will make its own decision about whether or not to end the DSO Session, based on the server’s determination of whether the error condition pertains to this particular operation, or would also apply to any subsequent operations. If the server does not end the DSO Session by sending the client a Retry Delay message (Section 6.6.1) then the client SHOULD continue to use that DSO Session for subsequent operations.
5.6. Responder-Initiated Operation Cancellation

This document, the base specification for DNS Stateful Operations, does not itself define any long-lived operations, but it defines a framework for supporting long-lived operations, such as Push Notification subscriptions [I-D.ietf-dnssd-push] and Discovery Relay interface subscriptions [I-D.ietf-dnssd-mdns-relay].

Long-lived operations, if successful, will remain active until the initiator terminates the operation.

However, it is possible that a long-lived operation may be valid at the time it was initiated, but then a later change of circumstances may render that operation invalid. For example, a long-lived client operation may pertain to a name that the server is authoritative for, but then the server configuration is changed such that it is no longer authoritative for that name.

In such cases, instead of terminating the entire session it may be desirable for the responder to be able to cancel selectively only those operations that have become invalid.

The responder performs this selective cancellation by sending a new response message, with the MESSAGE ID field containing the MESSAGE ID of the long-lived operation that is to be terminated (that it had previously acknowledged with a NOERROR RCODE), and the RCODE field of the new response message giving the reason for cancellation.

After a response message with nonzero RCODE has been sent, that operation has been terminated from the responder’s point of view, and the responder sends no more messages relating to that operation.

After a response message with nonzero RCODE has been received by the initiator, that operation has been terminated from the initiator’s point of view, and the cancelled operation’s MESSAGE ID is now free for reuse.
6. DSO Session Lifecycle and Timers

6.1. DSO Session Initiation

A DSO Session begins as described in Section 5.1.

The client may perform as many DNS operations as it wishes using the newly created DSO Session. When the client has multiple messages to send, it SHOULD NOT wait for each response before sending the next message.

The server MUST act on messages in the order they are received, but SHOULD NOT delay sending responses to those messages as they become available in order to return them in the order the requests were received.

Section 6.2.1.1 of the DNS-over-TCP specification [RFC7766] specifies this in more detail.
6.2. DSO Session Timeouts

Two timeout values are associated with a DSO Session: the inactivity timeout, and the keepalive interval. Both values are communicated in the same TLV, the Keepalive TLV (Section 7.1).

The first timeout value, the inactivity timeout, is the maximum time for which a client may speculatively keep an inactive DSO Session open in the expectation that it may have future requests to send to that server.

The second timeout value, the keepalive interval, is the maximum permitted interval between messages if the client wishes to keep the DSO Session alive.

The two timeout values are independent. The inactivity timeout may be lower, the same, or higher than the keepalive interval, though in most cases the inactivity timeout is expected to be shorter than the keepalive interval.

A shorter inactivity timeout with a longer keepalive interval signals to the client that it should not speculatively keep an inactive DSO Session open for very long without reason, but when it does have an active reason to keep a DSO Session open, it doesn’t need to be sending an aggressive level of DSO keepalive traffic to maintain that session. An example of this would be a client that has subscribed to DNS Push notifications: in this case, the client is not sending any traffic to the server, but the session is not inactive, because there is a active request to the server to receive push notifications.

A longer inactivity timeout with a shorter keepalive interval signals to the client that it may speculatively keep an inactive DSO Session open for a long time, but to maintain that inactive DSO Session it should be sending a lot of DSO keepalive traffic. This configuration is expected to be less common.

In the usual case where the inactivity timeout is shorter than the keepalive interval, it is only when a client has a long-lived, low-traffic, operation that the keepalive interval comes into play, to ensure that a sufficient residual amount of traffic is generated to maintain NAT and firewall state and to assure client and server that they still have connectivity to each other.

On a new DSO Session, if no explicit DSO Keepalive message exchange has taken place, the default value for both timeouts is 15 seconds.

For both timeouts, lower values of the timeout result in higher network traffic, and higher CPU load on the server.
6.3. Inactive DSO Sessions

At both servers and clients, the generation or reception of any complete DNS message (including DNS requests, responses, updates, DSO messages, etc.) resets both timers for that DSO Session, with the one exception that a DSO Keepalive message resets only the keepalive timer, not the inactivity timeout timer.

In addition, for as long as the client has an outstanding operation in progress, the inactivity timer remains cleared, and an inactivity timeout cannot occur.

For short-lived DNS operations like traditional queries and updates, an operation is considered in progress for the time between request and response, typically a period of a few hundred milliseconds at most. At the client, the inactivity timer is cleared upon transmission of a request and remains cleared until reception of the corresponding response. At the server, the inactivity timer is cleared upon reception of a request and remains cleared until transmission of the corresponding response.

For long-lived DNS Stateful operations (such as a Push Notification subscription [I-D.ietf-dnssd-push] or a Discovery Relay interface subscription [I-D.ietf-dnssd-mdns-relay]), an operation is considered in progress for as long as the operation is active, i.e. until it is cancelled. This means that a DSO Session can exist, with active operations, with no messages flowing in either direction, for far longer than the inactivity timeout, and this is not an error. This is why there are two separate timers: the inactivity timeout, and the keepalive interval. Just because a DSO Session has no traffic for an extended period of time does not automatically make that DSO Session "inactive", if it has an active operation that is awaiting events.
6.4. The Inactivity Timeout

The purpose of the inactivity timeout is for the server to balance the trade off between the costs of setting up new DSO Sessions and the costs of maintaining inactive DSO Sessions. A server with abundant DSO Session capacity can offer a high inactivity timeout, to permit clients to keep a speculative DSO Session open for a long time, to save the cost of establishing a new DSO Session for future communications with that server. A server with scarce memory resources can offer a low inactivity timeout, to cause clients to promptly close DSO Sessions whenever they have no outstanding operations with that server, and then create a new DSO Session later when needed.

6.4.1. Closing Inactive DSO Sessions

When a connection’s inactivity timeout is reached the client MUST begin closing the idle connection, but a client is not required to keep an idle connection open until the inactivity timeout is reached. A client MAY close a DSO Session at any time, at the client’s discretion. If a client determines that it has no current or reasonably anticipated future need for a currently inactive DSO Session, then the client SHOULD gracefully close that connection.

If, at any time during the life of the DSO Session, the inactivity timeout value (i.e., 15 seconds by default) elapses without there being any operation active on the DSO Session, the client MUST close the connection gracefully.

If, at any time during the life of the DSO Session, twice the inactivity timeout value (i.e., 30 seconds by default), or five seconds, if twice the inactivity timeout value is less than five seconds, elapses without there being any operation active on the DSO Session, the server MUST consider the client delinquent, and MUST forcibly abort the DSO Session.

In this context, an operation being active on a DSO Session includes a query waiting for a response, an update waiting for a response, or an active long-lived operation, but not a DSO Keepalive message exchange itself. A DSO Keepalive message exchange resets only the keepalive interval timer, not the inactivity timeout timer.

If the client wishes to keep an inactive DSO Session open for longer than the default duration then it uses the DSO Keepalive message to request longer timeout values, as described in Section 7.1.
6.4.2. Values for the Inactivity Timeout

For the inactivity timeout value, lower values result in more frequent DSO Session teardown and re-establishment. Higher values result in lower traffic and lower CPU load on the server, but higher memory burden to maintain state for inactive DSO Sessions.

A server may dictate any value it chooses for the inactivity timeout (either in a response to a client-initiated request, or in a server-initiated message) including values under one second, or even zero.

An inactivity timeout of zero informs the client that it should not speculatively maintain idle connections at all, and as soon as the client has completed the operation or operations relating to this server, the client should immediately begin closing this session.

A server will forcibly abort an idle client session after twice the inactivity timeout value, or five seconds, whichever is greater. In the case of a zero inactivity timeout value, this means that if a client fails to close an idle client session then the server will forcibly abort the idle session after five seconds.

An inactivity timeout of 0xFFFFFFFF represents "infinity" and informs the client that it may keep an idle connection open as long as it wishes. Note that after granting an unlimited inactivity timeout in this way, at any point the server may revise that inactivity timeout by sending a new DSO Keepalive message dictating new Session Timeout values to the client.

The largest *finite* inactivity timeout supported by the current Keepalive TLV is 0xFFFFFFFF (2^32-2 milliseconds, approximately 49.7 days).
6.5. The Keepalive Interval

The purpose of the keepalive interval is to manage the generation of sufficient messages to maintain state in middleboxes (such as NAT gateways or firewalls) and for the client and server to periodically verify that they still have connectivity to each other. This allows them to clean up state when connectivity is lost, and to establish a new session if appropriate.

6.5.1. Keepalive Interval Expiry

If, at any time during the life of the DSO Session, the keepalive interval value (i.e., 15 seconds by default) elapses without any DNS messages being sent or received on a DSO Session, the client MUST take action to keep the DSO Session alive, by sending a DSO Keepalive message (Section 7.1). A DSO Keepalive message exchange resets only the keepalive timer, not the inactivity timer.

If a client disconnects from the network abruptly, without cleanly closing its DSO Session, perhaps leaving a long-lived operation uncanceled, the server learns of this after failing to receive the required DSO keepalive traffic from that client. If, at any time during the life of the DSO Session, twice the keepalive interval value (i.e., 30 seconds by default) elapses without any DNS messages being sent or received on a DSO Session, the server SHOULD consider the client delinquent, and SHOULD forcibly abort the DSO Session.

6.5.2. Values for the Keepalive Interval

For the keepalive interval value, lower values result in a higher volume of DSO keepalive traffic. Higher values of the keepalive interval reduce traffic and CPU load, but have minimal effect on the memory burden at the server, because clients keep a DSO Session open for the same length of time (determined by the inactivity timeout) regardless of the level of DSO keepalive traffic required.

It may be appropriate for clients and servers to select different keepalive interval values depending on the nature of the network they are on.

A corporate DNS server that knows it is serving only clients on the internal network, with no intervening NAT gateways or firewalls, can impose a higher keepalive interval, because frequent DSO keepalive traffic is not required.

A public DNS server that is serving primarily residential consumer clients, where it is likely there will be a NAT gateway on the path,
may impose a lower keepalive interval, to generate more frequent DSO keepalive traffic.

A smart client may be adaptive to its environment. A client using a private IPv4 address [RFC1918] to communicate with a DNS server at an address outside that IPv4 private address block, may conclude that there is likely to be a NAT gateway on the path, and accordingly request a lower keepalive interval.

By default it is RECOMMENDED that clients request, and servers grant, a keepalive interval of 60 minutes. This keepalive interval provides for reasonably timely detection if a client abruptly disconnects without cleanly closing the session, and is sufficient to maintain state in firewalls and NAT gateways that follow the IETF recommended Best Current Practice that the "established connection idle-timeout" used by middleboxes be at least 2 hours 4 minutes [RFC5382] [RFC7857].

Note that the lower the keepalive interval value, the higher the load on client and server. For example, a (hypothetical and unrealistic) keepalive interval value of 100 ms would result in a continuous stream of ten messages per second or more, in both directions, to keep the DSO Session alive. And, in this extreme example, a single packet loss and retransmission over a long path could introduce a momentary pause in the stream of messages of over 200 ms, long enough to cause the server to overzealously abort the connection.

Because of this concern, the server MUST NOT send a DSO Keepalive message (either a response to a client-initiated request, or a server-initiated message) with a keepalive interval value less than ten seconds. If a client receives a DSO Keepalive message specifying a keepalive interval value less than ten seconds this is a fatal error and the client MUST forcibly abort the connection immediately.

A keepalive interval value of 0xFFFFFFFF represents "infinity" and informs the client that it should generate no DSO keepalive traffic. Note that after signaling that the client should generate no DSO keepalive traffic in this way, at any point the server may revise that DSO keepalive traffic requirement by sending a new DSO Keepalive message dictating new Session Timeout values to the client.

The largest *finite* keepalive interval supported by the current Keepalive TLV is 0xFFFFFFFF (2^32-2 milliseconds, approximately 49.7 days).
6.6. Server-Initiated Session Termination

In addition to cancelling individual long-lived operations selectively (Section 5.6) there are also occasions where a server may need to terminate one or more entire sessions. An entire session may need to be terminated if the client is defective in some way, or departs from the network without closing its session. Sessions may also need to be terminated if the server becomes overloaded, or if the server is reconfigured and lacks the ability to be selective about which operations need to be cancelled.

This section discusses various reasons a session may be terminated, and the mechanisms for doing so.

In normal operation, closing a DSO Session is the client’s responsibility. The client makes the determination of when to close a DSO Session based on an evaluation of both its own needs, and the inactivity timeout value dictated by the server. A server only causes a DSO Session to be ended in the exceptional circumstances outlined below. Some of the exceptional situations in which a server may terminate a DSO Session include:

- The server application software or underlying operating system is shutting down or restarting.
- The server application software terminates unexpectedly (perhaps due to a bug that makes it crash, causing the underlying operating system to send a TCP RST).
- The server is undergoing a reconfiguration or maintenance procedure, that, due to the way the server software is implemented, requires clients to be disconnected. For example, some software is implemented such that it reads a configuration file at startup, and changing the server’s configuration entails modifying the configuration file and then killing and restarting the server software, which generally entails a loss of network connections.
- The client fails to meet its obligation to generate the required DSO keepalive traffic, or to close an inactive session by the prescribed time (twice the time interval dictated by the server, or five seconds, whichever is greater, as described in Section 6.2).
- The client sends a grossly invalid or malformed request that is indicative of a seriously defective client implementation.
- The server is over capacity and needs to shed some load.
6.6.1. Server-Initiated Retry Delay Message

In the cases described above where a server elects to terminate a DSO Session, it could do so simply by forcibly aborting the connection. However, if it did this the likely behavior of the client might be simply to treat this as a network failure and reconnect immediately, putting more burden on the server.

Therefore, to avoid this reconnection implosion, a server SHOULD instead choose to shed client load by sending a Retry Delay message, with an appropriate RCODE value informing the client of the reason the DSO Session needs to be terminated. The format of the Retry Delay TLV, and the interpretations of the various RCODE values, are described in Section 7.2. After sending a Retry Delay message, the server MUST NOT send any further messages on that DSO Session.

The server MAY randomize retry delays in situations where many retry delays are sent in quick succession, so as to avoid all the clients attempting to reconnect at once. In general, implementations should avoid using the Retry Delay message in a way that would result in many clients reconnecting at the same time, if every client attempts to reconnect at the exact time specified.

Upon receipt of a Retry Delay message from the server, the client MUST make note of the reconnect delay for this server, and then immediately close the connection gracefully.

After sending a Retry Delay message the server SHOULD allow the client five seconds to close the connection, and if the client has not closed the connection after five seconds then the server SHOULD forcibly abort the connection.

A Retry Delay message MUST NOT be initiated by a client. If a server receives a Retry Delay message this is a fatal error and the server MUST forcibly abort the connection immediately.

6.6.1.1. Outstanding Operations

At the instant a server chooses to initiate a Retry Delay message there may be DNS requests already in flight from client to server on this DSO Session, which will arrive at the server after its Retry Delay message has been sent. The server MUST silently ignore such incoming requests, and MUST NOT generate any response messages for them. When the Retry Delay message from the server arrives at the client, the client will determine that any DNS requests it previously sent on this DSO Session, that have not yet received a response, now will certainly not be receiving any response. Such requests should
be considered failed, and should be retried at a later time, as appropriate.

In the case where some, but not all, of the existing operations on a DSO Session have become invalid (perhaps because the server has been reconfigured and is no longer authoritative for some of the names), but the server is terminating all affected DSO Sessions en masse by sending them all a Retry Delay message, the reconnect delay MAY be zero, indicating that the clients SHOULD immediately attempt to re-establish operations.

It is likely that some of the attempts will be successful and some will not, depending on the nature of the reconfiguration.

In the case where a server is terminating a large number of DSO Sessions at once (e.g., if the system is restarting) and the server doesn’t want to be inundated with a flood of simultaneous retries, it SHOULD send different reconnect delay values to each client. These adjustments MAY be selected randomly, pseudorandomly, or deterministically (e.g., incrementing the time value by one tenth of a second for each successive client, yielding a post-restart reconnection rate of ten clients per second).

6.6.2. Client Reconnection

After a DSO Session is ended by the server (either by sending the client a Retry Delay message, or by forcibly aborting the underlying transport connection) the client SHOULD try to reconnect, to that service instance, or to another suitable service instance, if more than one is available. If reconnecting to the same service instance, the client MUST respect the indicated delay, if available, before attempting to reconnect. Clients should not attempt to randomize the delay; the server will randomly jitter the retry delay values it sends to each client if this behavior is desired.

If the service instance will only be out of service for a short maintenance period, it should use a value a little longer that the expected maintenance window. It should not default to a very large delay value, or clients may not attempt to reconnect after it resumes service.

If a particular service instance does not want a client to reconnect ever (perhaps the service instance is being de-commissioned), it SHOULD set the retry delay to the maximum value 0xFFFFFFFF (2^32-1 milliseconds, approximately 49.7 days). It is not possible to instruct a client to stay away for longer than 49.7 days. If, after 49.7 days, the DNS or other configuration information still indicates that this is the valid service instance for a particular service,
then clients MAY attempt to reconnect. In reality, if a client is rebooted or otherwise lose state, it may well attempt to reconnect before 49.7 days elapses, for as long as the DNS or other configuration information continues to indicate that this is the service instance the client should use.

6.6.2.1. Reconnecting After a Forcible Abort

If a connection was forcibly aborted by the client, the client SHOULD mark that service instance as not supporting DSO. The client MAY reconnect but not attempt to use DSO, or may connect to a different service instance, if applicable.

6.6.2.2. Reconnecting After an Unexplained Connection Drop

It is also possible for a server to forcibly terminate the connection; in this case the client doesn’t know whether the termination was the result of a protocol error or a network outage. The client could determine which of the two is occurring by noticing if a connection is repeatedly dropped by the server; if so, the client can mark the server as not supporting DSO.

6.6.2.3. Probing for Working DSO Support

Once a server has been marked by the client as not supporting DSO, the client SHOULD NOT attempt DSO operations on that server until some time has elapsed. A reasonable minimum would be an hour. Since forcibly aborted connections are the result of a software failure, it’s not likely that the problem will be solved in the first hour after it’s first encountered. However, by restricting the retry interval to an hour, the client will be able to notice when the problem has been fixed without placing an undue burden on the server.
7. Base TLVs for DNS Stateful Operations

This section describes the three base TLVs for DNS Stateful Operations: Keepalive, Retry Delay, and Encryption Padding.

7.1. Keepalive TLV

The Keepalive TLV (DSO-TYPE=1) performs two functions. Primarily it establishes the values for the Session Timeouts. Incidentally, it also resets the keepalive timer for the DSO Session, meaning that it can be used as a kind of "no-op" message for the purpose of keeping a session alive. The client will request the desired session timeout values and the server will acknowledge with the response values that it requires the client to use.

DSO messages with the Keepalive TLV as the primary TLV may appear in Fast Open messages.

The DSO-DATA for the Keepalive TLV is as follows:

```
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|                 INACTIVITY TIMEOUT (32 bits)                  |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|                 KEEPALIVE INTERVAL (32 bits)                  |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
```

INACTIVITY TIMEOUT: The inactivity timeout for the current DSO Session, specified as a 32-bit unsigned integer, in network (big endian) byte order, in units of milliseconds. This is the timeout at which the client MUST begin closing an inactive DSO Session. The inactivity timeout can be any value of the server’s choosing. If the client does not gracefully close an inactive DSO Session, then after twice this interval, or five seconds, whichever is greater, the server will forcibly abort the connection.

KEEPALIVE INTERVAL: The keepalive interval for the current DSO Session, specified as a 32-bit unsigned integer, in network (big endian) byte order, in units of milliseconds. This is the interval at which a client MUST generate DSO keepalive traffic to maintain connection state. The keepalive interval MUST NOT be less than ten seconds. If the client does not generate the mandated DSO keepalive traffic, then after twice this interval the server will forcibly abort the connection. Since the minimum allowed keepalive interval is ten seconds, the minimum time at which a server will forcibly disconnect a client for failing to generate the mandated DSO keepalive traffic is twenty seconds.
The transmission or reception of DSO Keepalive messages (i.e., messages where the Keepalive TLV is the first TLV) reset only the keepalive timer, not the inactivity timer. The reason for this is that periodic DSO Keepalive messages are sent for the sole purpose of keeping a DSO Session alive, when that DSO Session has current or recent non-maintenance activity that warrants keeping that DSO Session alive. Sending DSO keepalive traffic itself is not considered a client activity; it is considered a maintenance activity that is performed in service of other client activities. If DSO keepalive traffic itself were to reset the inactivity timer, then that would create a circular livelock where keepalive traffic would be sent indefinitely to keep a DSO Session alive, where the only activity on that DSO Session would be the keepalive traffic keeping the DSO Session alive so that further keepalive traffic can be sent. For a DSO Session to be considered active, it must be carrying something more than just keepalive traffic. This is why merely sending or receiving a DSO Keepalive message does not reset the inactivity timer.

When sent by a client, the DSO Keepalive request message MUST be sent as a DSO request message, with a nonzero MESSAGE ID. If a server receives a DSO Keepalive message with a zero MESSAGE ID then this is a fatal error and the server MUST forcibly abort the connection immediately. The DSO Keepalive request message resets a DSO Session’s keepalive timer, and at the same time communicates to the server the client’s requested Session Timeout values. In a server response to a client-initiated DSO Keepalive request message, the Session Timeouts contain the server’s chosen values from this point forward in the DSO Session, which the client MUST respect. This is modeled after the DHCP protocol, where the client requests a certain lease lifetime using DHCP option 51 [RFC2132], but the server is the ultimate authority for deciding what lease lifetime is actually granted.

When a client is sending its second and subsequent DSO Keepalive request messages to the server, the client SHOULD continue to request its preferred values each time. This allows flexibility, so that if conditions change during the lifetime of a DSO Session, the server can adapt its responses to better fit the client’s needs.

Once a DSO Session is in progress (Section 5.1) a DSO Keepalive message MAY be initiated by a server. When sent by a server, the DSO Keepalive message MUST be sent as a DSO unidirectional message, with the MESSAGE ID set to zero. The client MUST NOT generate a response to a server-initiated DSO Keepalive message. If a client receives a DSO Keepalive request message with a nonzero MESSAGE ID then this is a fatal error and the client MUST forcibly abort the connection immediately. The DSO Keepalive unidirectional message from the
server resets a DSO Session’s keepalive timer, and at the same time unilaterally informs the client of the new Session Timeout values to use from this point forward in this DSO Session. No client DSO response to this unilateral declaration is required or allowed.

In DSO Keepalive response messages, the Keepalive TLV is REQUIRED and is used only as a Response Primary TLV sent as a reply to a DSO Keepalive request message from the client. A Keepalive TLV MUST NOT be added to other responses as a Response Additional TLV. If the server wishes to update a client’s Session Timeout values other than in response to a DSO Keepalive request message from the client, then it does so by sending an DSO Keepalive unidirectional message of its own, as described above.

It is not required that the Keepalive TLV be used in every DSO Session. While many DNS Stateful operations will be used in conjunction with a long-lived session state, not all DNS Stateful operations require long-lived session state, and in some cases the default 15-second value for both the inactivity timeout and keepalive interval may be perfectly appropriate. However, note that for clients that implement only the DSO-TYPEs defined in this document, a DSO Keepalive request message is the only way for a client to initiate a DSO Session.

7.1.1. Client handling of received Session Timeout values

When a client receives a response to its client-initiated DSO Keepalive message, or receives a server-initiated DSO Keepalive message, the client has then received Session Timeout values dictated by the server. The two timeout values contained in the Keepalive TLV from the server may each be higher, lower, or the same as the respective Session Timeout values the client previously had for this DSO Session.

In the case of the keepalive timer, the handling of the received value is straightforward. The act of receiving the message containing the DSO Keepalive TLV itself resets the keepalive timer, and updates the keepalive interval for the DSO Session. The new keepalive interval indicates the maximum time that may elapse before another message must be sent or received on this DSO Session, if the DSO Session is to remain alive.

In the case of the inactivity timeout, the handling of the received value is a little more subtle, though the meaning of the inactivity timeout remains as specified -- it still indicates the maximum permissible time allowed without useful activity on a DSO Session. The act of receiving the message containing the Keepalive TLV does not itself reset the inactivity timer. The time elapsed since the
last useful activity on this DSO Session is unaffected by exchange of DSO Keepalive messages. The new inactivity timeout value in the Keepalive TLV in the received message does update the timeout associated with the running inactivity timer; that becomes the new maximum permissible time without activity on a DSO Session.

- If the current inactivity timer value is less than the new inactivity timeout, then the DSO Session may remain open for now. When the inactivity timer value reaches the new inactivity timeout, the client MUST then begin closing the DSO Session, as described above.

- If the current inactivity timer value is equal to the new inactivity timeout, then this DSO Session has been inactive for exactly as long as the server will permit, and now the client MUST immediately begin closing this DSO Session.

- If the current inactivity timer value is already greater than the new inactivity timeout, then this DSO Session has already been inactive for longer than the server permits, and the client MUST immediately begin closing this DSO Session.

- If the current inactivity timer value is already more than twice the new inactivity timeout, then the client is immediately considered delinquent (this DSO Session is immediately eligible to be forcibly terminated by the server) and the client MUST immediately begin closing this DSO Session. However if a server abruptly reduces the inactivity timeout in this way, then, to give the client time to close the connection gracefully before the server resorts to forcibly aborting it, the server SHOULD give the client an additional grace period of one quarter of the new inactivity timeout, or five seconds, whichever is greater.

7.1.2. Relationship to edns-tcp-keepalive EDNS0 Option

The inactivity timeout value in the Keepalive TLV (DSO-TYPE=1) has similar intent to the edns-tcp-keepalive EDNS0 Option [RFC7828]. A client/server pair that supports DSO MUST NOT use the edns-tcp-keepalive EDNS0 Option within any message after a DSO Session has been established. A client that has sent a DSO message to establish a session MUST NOT send an edns-tcp-keepalive EDNS0 Option from this point on. Once a DSO Session has been established, if either client or server receives a DNS message over the DSO Session that contains an edns-tcp-keepalive EDNS0 Option, this is a fatal error and the receiver of the edns-tcp-keepalive EDNS0 Option MUST forcibly abort the connection immediately.
7.2. Retry Delay TLV

The Retry Delay TLV (DSO-TYPE=2) can be used as a Primary TLV (unidirectional) in a server-to-client message, or as a Response Additional TLV in either direction. DSO messages with a Relay Delay TLV as their primary TLV are not permitted in Fast Open messages.

The DSO-DATA for the Retry Delay TLV is as follows:

```
  1 1 1 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RETRY DELAY (32 bits)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
RETRY DELAY: A time value, specified as a 32-bit unsigned integer, in network (big endian) byte order, in units of milliseconds, within which the initiator MUST NOT retry this operation, or retry connecting to this server. Recommendations for the RETRY DELAY value are given in Section 6.6.1.

7.2.1. Retry Delay TLV used as a Primary TLV

When sent from server to client, the Retry Delay TLV is used as the Primary TLV in a DSO unidirectional message. It is used by a server to instruct a client to close the DSO Session and underlying connection, and not to reconnect for the indicated time interval.

In this case it applies to the DSO Session as a whole, and the client MUST begin closing the DSO Session, as described in Section 6.6.1. The RCODE in the message header SHOULD indicate the principal reason for the termination:

- NOERROR indicates a routine shutdown or restart.
- FORMERR indicates that a client request was too badly malformed for the session to continue.
- SERVFAIL indicates that the server is overloaded due to resource exhaustion and needs to shed load.
- REFUSED indicates that the server has been reconfigured, and at this time it is now unable to perform one or more of the long-lived client operations that were previously being performed on this DSO Session.
- NOTAUTH indicates that the server has been reconfigured and at this time it is now unable to perform one or more of the long-
lived client operations that were previously being performed on this DSO Session because it does not have authority over the names in question (for example, a DNS Push Notification server could be reconfigured such that it is no longer accepting DNS Push Notification requests for one or more of the currently subscribed names).

This document specifies only these RCODE values for the Retry Delay message. Servers sending Retry Delay messages SHOULD use one of these values. However, future circumstances may create situations where other RCODE values are appropriate in Retry Delay messages, so clients MUST be prepared to accept Retry Delay messages with any RCODE value.

In some cases, when a server sends a Retry Delay message to a client, there may be more than one reason for the server wanting to end the session. Possibly the configuration could have been changed such that some long-lived client operations can no longer be continued due to policy (REFUSED), and other long-lived client operations can no longer be performed due to the server no longer being authoritative for those names (NOTAUTH). In such cases the server MAY use any of the applicable RCODE values, or RCODE=NOERROR (routine shutdown or restart).

Note that the selection of RCODE value in a Retry Delay message is not critical, since the RCODE value is generally used only for information purposes, such as writing to a log file for future human analysis regarding the nature of the disconnection. Generally clients do not modify their behavior depending on the RCODE value. The RETRY DELAY in the message tells the client how long it should wait before attempting a new connection to this service instance.

For clients that do in some way modify their behavior depending on the RCODE value, they should treat unknown RCODE values the same as RCODE=NOERROR (routine shutdown or restart).

A Retry Delay message from server to client is a DSO unidirectional message; the MESSAGE ID MUST be set to zero in the outgoing message and the client MUST NOT send a response.

A client MUST NOT send a Retry Delay DSO message to a server. If a server receives a DSO message where the Primary TLV is the Retry Delay TLV, this is a fatal error and the server MUST forcibly abort the connection immediately.
7.2.2. Retry Delay TLV used as a Response Additional TLV

In the case of a DSO request message that results in a nonzero RCODE value, the responder MAY append a Retry Delay TLV to the response, indicating the time interval during which the initiator SHOULD NOT attempt this operation again.

The indicated time interval during which the initiator SHOULD NOT retry applies only to the failed operation, not to the DSO Session as a whole.
7.3. Encryption Padding TLV

The Encryption Padding TLV (DSO-TYPE=3) can only be used as an Additional or Response Additional TLV. It is only applicable when the DSO Transport layer uses encryption such as TLS.

The DSO-DATA for the Padding TLV is optional and is a variable length field containing non-specified values. A DSO-LENGTH of 0 essentially provides for 4 bytes of padding (the minimum amount).

```
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
| / |
| / |
| / |
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
```

As specified for the EDNS(0) Padding Option [RFC7830] the PADDING bytes SHOULD be set to 0x00. Other values MAY be used, for example, in cases where there is a concern that the padded message could be subject to compression before encryption. PADDING bytes of any value MUST be accepted in the messages received.

The Encryption Padding TLV may be included in either a DSO request message, response, or both. As specified for the EDNS(0) Padding Option [RFC7830] if a DSO request message is received with an Encryption Padding TLV, then the DSO response MUST also include an Encryption Padding TLV.

The length of padding is intentionally not specified in this document and is a function of current best practices with respect to the type and length of data in the preceding TLVs [I-D.ietf-dprive-padding-policy].
8. Summary Highlights

This section summarizes some noteworthy highlights about various aspects of the DSO protocol.

8.1. QR bit and MESSAGE ID

In DSO Request Messages the QR bit is 0 and the MESSAGE ID is nonzero.

In DSO Response Messages the QR bit is 1 and the MESSAGE ID is nonzero.

In DSO Unidirectional Messages the QR bit is 0 and the MESSAGE ID is zero.

The table below illustrates which combinations are legal and how they are interpreted:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>QR=0</th>
<th>DSO unidirectional Message</th>
<th>DSO Request Message</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>QR=1</td>
<td>Invalid - Fatal Error</td>
<td>DSO Response Message</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8.2. TLV Usage

The table below indicates, for each of the three TLVs defined in this document, whether they are valid in each of ten different contexts.

The first five contexts are DSO requests or DSO unidirectional messages from client to server, and the corresponding responses from server back to client:

- **C-P** - Primary TLV, sent in DSO Request message, from client to server, with nonzero MESSAGE ID indicating that this request MUST generate response message.
- **C-U** - Primary TLV, sent in DSO Unidirectional message, from client to server, with zero MESSAGE ID indicating that this request MUST NOT generate response message.
- **C-A** - Additional TLV, optionally added to a DSO request message or DSO unidirectional message from client to server.
- **CRP** - Response Primary TLV, included in response message sent back to the client (in response to a client "C-P" request with nonzero MESSAGE ID indicating that a response is required) where the DSO-TYPE of the Response TLV matches the DSO-TYPE of the Primary TLV in the request.
- **CRA** - Response Additional TLV, included in response message sent back to the client (in response to a client "C-P" request with nonzero MESSAGE ID indicating that a response is required) where the DSO-TYPE of the Response TLV does not match the DSO-TYPE of the Primary TLV in the request.

The second five contexts are their counterparts in the opposite direction: DSO requests or DSO unidirectional messages from server to client, and the corresponding responses from client back to server.

- **S-P** - Primary TLV, sent in DSO Request message, from server to client, with nonzero MESSAGE ID indicating that this request MUST generate response message.
- **S-U** - Primary TLV, sent in DSO Unidirectional message, from server to client, with zero MESSAGE ID indicating that this request MUST NOT generate response message.
- **S-A** - Additional TLV, optionally added to a DSO request message or DSO unidirectional message from server to client.
- SRP - Response Primary TLV, included in response message sent back to the server (in response to a server "S-P" request with nonzero MESSAGE ID indicating that a response is required) where the DSO-TYPE of the Response TLV matches the DSO-TYPE of the Primary TLV in the request.

- SRA - Response Additional TLV, included in response message sent back to the server (in response to a server "S-P" request with nonzero MESSAGE ID indicating that a response is required) where the DSO-TYPE of the Response TLV does not match the DSO-TYPE of the Primary TLV in the request.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>C-P</th>
<th>C-U</th>
<th>C-A</th>
<th>CRP</th>
<th>CRA</th>
<th>S-P</th>
<th>S-U</th>
<th>S-A</th>
<th>SRP</th>
<th>SRA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KeepAlive</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RetryDelay</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Padding</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note that some of the columns in this table are currently empty. The table provides a template for future TLV definitions to follow. It is recommended that definitions of future TLVs include a similar table summarizing the contexts where the new TLV is valid.
9. Additional Considerations

9.1. Service Instances

We use the term service instance to refer to software running on a host which can receive connections on some set of IP address and port tuples. What makes the software an instance is that regardless of which of these tuples the client uses to connect to it, the client is connected to the same software, running on the same node (but see Section 9.2), and will receive the same answers and the same keying information.

Service instances are identified from the perspective of the client. If the client is configured with IP addresses and port number tuples, it has no way to tell if the service offered at one tuple is the same server that is listening on a different tuple. So in this case, the client treats each such tuple as if it references a separate service instance.

In some cases a client is configured with a hostname and a port number (either implicitly, where the port number is omitted and assumed, or explicitly, as in the case of DNS SRV records). In these cases, the (hostname, port) tuple uniquely identifies the service instance (hostname comparisons are case-insensitive [RFC1034]).

It is possible that two hostnames might point to some common IP addresses; this is a configuration error which the client is not obliged to detect. The effect of this could be that after being told to disconnect, the client might reconnect to the same server because it is represented as a different service instance.

Implementations SHOULD NOT resolve hostnames and then perform matching of IP address(es) in order to evaluate whether two entities should be determined to be the "same service instance".
9.2. Anycast Considerations

When an anycast service is configured on a particular IP address and port, it must be the case that although there is more than one physical server responding on that IP address, each such server can be treated as equivalent. What we mean by "equivalent" here is that both servers can provide the same service and, where appropriate, the same authentication information, such as PKI certificates, when establishing connections.

In principle, anycast servers could maintain sufficient state that they can both handle packets in the same TCP connection. In order for this to work with DSO, they would need to also share DSO state. It is unlikely that this can be done successfully, however, so we recommend that each anycast server instance maintain its own session state.

If a change in network topology causes packets in a particular TCP connection to be sent to an anycast server instance that does not know about the connection, the new server will automatically terminate the connection with a TCP reset, since it will have no record of the connection, and then the client can reconnect or stop using the connection, as appropriate.

If after the connection is re-established, the client’s assumption that it is connected to the same service is violated in some way, that would be considered to be incorrect behavior in this context. It is however out of the possible scope for this specification to make specific recommendations in this regard; that would be up to follow-on documents that describe specific uses of DNS stateful operations.
9.3.  Connection Sharing

As previously specified for DNS over TCP [RFC7766]:

To mitigate the risk of unintentional server overload, DNS clients MUST take care to minimize the number of concurrent TCP connections made to any individual server. It is RECOMMENDED that for any given client/server interaction there SHOULD be no more than one connection for regular queries, one for zone transfers, and one for each protocol that is being used on top of TCP (for example, if the resolver was using TLS). However, it is noted that certain primary/secondary configurations with many busy zones might need to use more than one TCP connection for zone transfers for operational reasons (for example, to support concurrent transfers of multiple zones).

A single server may support multiple services, including DNS Updates [RFC2136], DNS Push Notifications [I-D.ietf-dnssd-push], and other services, for one or more DNS zones. When a client discovers that the target server for several different operations is the same service instance (see Section 9.1), the client SHOULD use a single shared DSO Session for all those operations.

This requirement has two benefits. First, it reduces unnecessary connection load on the DNS server. Second, it avoids paying the TCP slow start penalty when making subsequent connections to the same server.

However, server implementers and operators should be aware that connection sharing may not be possible in all cases. A single host device may be home to multiple independent client software instances that don’t coordinate with each other. Similarly, multiple independent client devices behind the same NAT gateway will also typically appear to the DNS server as different source ports on the same client IP address. Because of these constraints, a DNS server MUST be prepared to accept multiple connections from different source ports on the same client IP address.
9.4. Operational Considerations for Middlebox

Where an application-layer middlebox (e.g., a DNS proxy, forwarder, or session multiplexer) is in the path, care must be taken to avoid a configuration in which DSO traffic is mis-handled. The simplest way to avoid such problems is to avoid using middleboxes. When this is not possible, middleboxes should be evaluated to make sure that they behave correctly.

Correct behavior for middleboxes consists of one of:

- The middlebox does not forward DSO messages, and responds to DSO messages with a response code other than NOERROR or DSOTYPENI.
- The middlebox acts as a DSO server and follows this specification in establishing connections.
- There is a 1:1 correspondence between incoming and outgoing connections, such that when a connection is established to the middlebox, it is guaranteed that exactly one corresponding connection will be established from the middlebox to some DNS resolver, and all incoming messages will be forwarded without modification or reordering. An example of this would be a NAT forwarder or TCP connection optimizer (e.g. for a high-latency connection such as a geosynchronous satellite link).

Middleboxes that do not meet one of the above criteria are very likely to fail in unexpected and difficult-to-diagnose ways. For example, a DNS load balancer might unbundle DNS messages from the incoming TCP stream and forward each message from the stream to a different DNS server. If such a load balancer is in use, and the DNS servers it points implement DSO and are configured to enable DSO, DSO session establishment will succeed, but no coherent session will exist between the client and the server. If such a load balancer is pointed at a DNS server that does not implement DSO or is configured not to allow DSO, no such problem will exist, but such a configuration risks unexpected failure if new server software is installed which does implement DSO.

It is of course possible to implement a middlebox that properly supports DSO. It is even possible to implement one that implements DSO with long-lived operations. This can be done either by maintaining a 1:1 correspondence between incoming and outgoing connections, as mentioned above, or by terminating incoming sessions at the middlebox, but maintaining state in the middlebox about any long-lived that are requested. Specifying this in detail is beyond the scope of this document.
9.5. TCP Delayed Acknowledgement Considerations

Most modern implementations of the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) include a feature called "Delayed Acknowledgement" [RFC1122].

Without this feature, TCP can be very wasteful on the network. For illustration, consider a simple example like remote login, using a very simple TCP implementation that lacks delayed acks. When the user types a keystroke, a data packet is sent. When the data packet arrives at the server, the simple TCP implementation sends an immediate acknowledgement. Mere milliseconds later, the server process reads the one byte of keystroke data, and consequently the simple TCP implementation sends an immediate window update. Mere milliseconds later, the server process generates the character echo, and sends this data back in reply. The simple TCP implementation then sends this data packet immediately too. In this case, this simple TCP implementation sends a burst of three packets almost instantaneously (ack, window update, data).

Clearly it would be more efficient if the TCP implementation were to combine the three separate packets into one, and this is what the delayed ack feature enables.

With delayed ack, the TCP implementation waits after receiving a data packet, typically for 200 ms, and then send its ack if (a) more data packet(s) arrive (b) the receiving process generates some reply data, or (c) 200 ms elapses without either of the above occurring.

With delayed ack, remote login becomes much more efficient, generating just one packet instead of three for each character echo.

The logic of delayed ack is that the 200 ms delay cannot do any significant harm. If something at the other end were waiting for something, then the receiving process should generate the reply that the thing at the end is waiting for, and TCP will then immediately send that reply (and the ack and window update). And if the receiving process does not in fact generate any reply for this particular message, then by definition the thing at the other end cannot be waiting for anything, so the 200 ms delay is harmless.

This assumption may be true, unless the sender is using Nagle’s algorithm, a similar efficiency feature, created to protect the network from poorly written client software that performs many rapid small writes in succession. Nagle’s algorithm allows these small writes to be combined into larger, less wasteful packets.
Unfortunately, Nagle’s algorithm and delayed ack, two valuable efficiency features, can interact badly with each other when used together [NagleDA].

DSO request messages elicit responses; DSO unidirectional messages and DSO response messages do not.

For DSO request messages, which do elicit responses, Nagle’s algorithm and delayed ack work as intended.

For DSO messages that do not elicit responses, the delayed ack mechanism causes the ack to be delayed by 200 ms. The 200 ms delay on the ack can in turn cause Nagle’s algorithm to prevent the sender from sending any more data for 200 ms until the awaited ack arrives. On an enterprise GigE backbone with sub-millisecond round-trip times, a 200 ms delay is enormous in comparison.

When this issues is raised, there are two solutions that are often offered, neither of them ideal:

1. Disable delayed ack. For DSO messages that elicit no response, removing delayed ack avoids the needless 200 ms delay, and sends back an immediate ack, which tells Nagle’s algorithm that it should immediately grant the sender permission to send its next packet. Unfortunately, for DSO messages that *do* elicit a response, removing delayed ack removes the efficiency gains of combining acks with data, and the responder will now send two or three packets instead of one.

2. Disable Nagle’s algorithm. When acks are delayed by the delayed ack algorithm, removing Nagle’s algorithm prevents the sender from being blocked from sending its next small packet immediately. Unfortunately, on a network with a higher round-trip time, removing Nagle’s algorithm removes the efficiency gains of combining multiple small packets into fewer larger ones, with the goal of limiting the number of small packets in flight at any one time.

For DSO messages that elicit a response, delayed ack and Nagle’s algorithm do the right thing.

The problem here is that with DSO messages that elicit no response, the TCP implementation is stuck waiting, unsure if a response is about to be generated, or whether the TCP implementation should go ahead and send an ack and window update.

The solution is networking APIs that allow the receiver to inform the TCP implementation that a received message has been read, processed,
and no response for this message will be generated. TCP can then stop waiting for a response that will never come, and immediately go ahead and send an ack and window update.

For implementations of DSO, disabling delayed ack is NOT RECOMMENDED, because of the harm this can do to the network.

For implementations of DSO, disabling Nagle’s algorithm is NOT RECOMMENDED, because of the harm this can do to the network.

At the time that this document is being prepared for publication, it is known that at least one TCP implementation provides the ability for the recipient of a TCP message to signal that it is not going to send a response, and hence the delayed ack mechanism can stop waiting. Implementations on operating systems where this feature is available SHOULD make use of it.
10. IANA Considerations

10.1. DSO OPCODE Registration

The IANA is requested to record the value [TBA1] (tentatively 6) for the DSO OPCODE in the DNS OPCODE Registry. DSO stands for DNS Stateful Operations.

10.2. DSO RCODE Registration

The IANA is requested to record the value [TBA2] (tentatively 11) for the DSOTYPENI error code in the DNS RCODE Registry. The DSOTYPENI error code ("DSO-TYPE Not Implemented") indicates that the receiver does implement DNS Stateful Operations, but does not implement the specific DSO-TYPE of the primary TLV in the DSO request message.

10.3. DSO Type Code Registry

The IANA is requested to create the 16-bit DSO Type Code Registry, with initial (hexadecimal) values as shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Fast</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0000</td>
<td>Reserved</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>Standard</td>
<td>RFC-TBD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0001</td>
<td>KeepAlive</td>
<td>OK</td>
<td>Standard</td>
<td>RFC-TBD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0002</td>
<td>RetryDelay</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>Standard</td>
<td>RFC-TBD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0003</td>
<td>EncryptionPadding</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Standard</td>
<td>RFC-TBD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0004-003F</td>
<td>Unassigned, reserved for DSO session-management TLVs</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>Standard</td>
<td>RFC-TBD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0040-F7FF</td>
<td>Unassigned</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F800-FBFF</td>
<td>Experimental/local use</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FC00-FFFF</td>
<td>Reserved for future expansion</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The meanings of the fields are as follows:

- **Type**: the 16-bit DSO type code
Name: the human-readable name of the TLV

Fast Open: If OK, this TLV may be sent in a Fast Open (TLS 0-RTT) ([RFC8446] Section 2.3) message. If NA, the TLV may appear as a secondary TLV in a DSO message that is included in a Fast Open message.

Status: IETF Document status (or "External" if not documented in an IETF document.

Reference: A stable reference to the document in which this TLV is defined.

DSO Type Code zero is reserved and is not currently intended for allocation.

Registrations of new DSO Type Codes in the "Reserved for DSO session-management" range 0004-003F and the "Reserved for future expansion" range FC00-FFFF require publication of an IETF Standards Action document [RFC8126].

Any document defining a new TLV which lists a value of "OK" in the Fast Open or 0-RTT column must include a threat analysis for the use of the TLV in the case of TCP Fast Open and in the case of TLS 0-RTT. See Section 11.1 for details.

Requests to register additional new DSO Type Codes in the "Unassigned" range 0040-F7FF are to be recorded by IANA after Expert Review [RFC8126]. The expert review should validate that the requested type code is specified in a way that conforms to this specification, and that the intended use for the code would not be addressed with an experimental/local assignment.

DSO Type Codes in the "experimental/local" range F800-FBFF may be used as Experimental Use or Private Use values [RFC8126] and may be used freely for development purposes, or for other purposes within a single site. No attempt is made to prevent multiple sites from using the same value in different (and incompatible) ways. There is no need for IANA to review such assignments (since IANA does not record them) and assignments are not generally useful for broad interoperability. It is the responsibility of the sites making use of "experimental/local" values to ensure that no conflicts occur within the intended scope of use.
11. Security Considerations

If this mechanism is to be used with DNS over TLS, then these messages are subject to the same constraints as any other DNS-over-TLS messages and MUST NOT be sent in the clear before the TLS session is established.

The data field of the "Encryption Padding" TLV could be used as a covert channel.

When designing new DSO TLVs, the potential for data in the TLV to be used as a tracking identifier should be taken into consideration, and should be avoided when not required.

When used without TLS or similar cryptographic protection, a malicious entity maybe able to inject a malicious unidirectional DSO Retry Delay Message into the data stream, specifying an unreasonably large RETRY DELAY, causing a denial-of-service attack against the client.

The establishment of DSO sessions has an impact on the number of open TCP connections on a DNS server. Additional resources may be used on the server as a result. However, because the server can limit the number of DSO sessions established and can also close existing DSO sessions as needed, denial of service or resource exhaustion should not be a concern.

11.1. TCP Fast Open and TLS 0-RTT Considerations

DSO permits zero round-trip operation using TCP Fast Open [RFC7413] with TLS 1.3 [RFC8446] 0-RTT to reduce or eliminate round trips in session establishment.

A DSO message may or may not be permitted to be sent in a Fast Open message. The definition for each TLV that can be used as a primary TLV is required to state whether or not that TLV is permitted in Fast Open messages. Only response-requiring messages are ever permitted in Fast Open messages, and only clients are permitted to send any DSO message in a Fast Open message, unless there is an implicit session (see Section 5.1).

For DSO messages that are permitted in Fast Open messages, a client MAY include one or more such messages messages in a Fast Open message without having to wait for a DSO response to the first DSO request message to confirm successful establishment of a DSO session.
However, unless there is an implicit session, a client MUST NOT send DSO unidirectional messages until after a DSO Session has been mutually established.

Similarly, unless there is an implicit session, a server MUST NOT send DSO request messages until it has received a response-requiring DSO request message from a client and transmitted a successful NOERROR response for that request.

Caution must be taken to ensure that DSO messages sent before the first round-trip is completed are idempotent, or are otherwise immune to any problems that could be result from the inadvertent replay that can occur with zero round-trip operation.

It would be possible to add a TLV that requires the server to do some significant work, and send that to the server as initial data in a TCP SYN packet. A flood of such packets could be used as a DoS attack on the server. None of the TLVs defined here have this property.

If a new TLV is specified that does have this property, that TLV must be specified as not permitted in 0-RTT messages. This prevents work from being done until a round-trip has occurred from the server to the client to verify that the source address of the packet is reachable.

Documents that define new TLVs must state whether each new TLV is permitted for use with TCP Fast Open and 0-RTT. Such documents must include a threat analysis in the security considerations section for each TLV defined in the document that is permitted to be used for TCP Fast Open and 0-RTT. This threat analysis should be done based on the advice given in [RFC8446] Section 2.3, 8 and Appendix E.5.

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13. References

13.1. Normative References

13.2. Informative References

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[I-D.ietf-dnssd-mdns-relay]

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Abstract

The domain name system (DNS) is defined in literally dozens of different RFCs. The terminology used by implementers and developers of DNS protocols, and by operators of DNS systems, has sometimes changed in the decades since the DNS was first defined. This document gives current definitions for many of the terms used in the DNS in a single document.

This document obsoletes RFC 7719 and updates RFC 2308.

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1. Introduction

The Domain Name System (DNS) is a simple query-response protocol whose messages in both directions have the same format. (Section 2 gives a definition of "public DNS", which is often what people mean when they say "the DNS".) The protocol and message format are defined in [RFC1034] and [RFC1035]. These RFCs defined some terms, but later documents defined others. Some of the terms from [RFC1034] and [RFC1035] now have somewhat different meanings than they did in 1987.

This document collects a wide variety of DNS-related terms. Some of them have been precisely defined in earlier RFCs, some have been loosely defined in earlier RFCs, and some are not defined in any earlier RFC at all.
Most of the definitions here are the consensus definition of the DNS community -- both protocol developers and operators. Some of the definitions differ from earlier RFCs, and those differences are noted. In this document, where the consensus definition is the same as the one in an RFC, that RFC is quoted. Where the consensus definition has changed somewhat, the RFC is mentioned but the new stand-alone definition is given. See Appendix A for a list of the definitions that this document updates.

It is important to note that, during the development of this document, it became clear that some DNS-related terms are interpreted quite differently by different DNS experts. Further, some terms that are defined in early DNS RFCs now have definitions that are generally agreed to, but that are different from the original definitions. Therefore, this document is a substantial revision to [RFC7719].

The terms are organized loosely by topic. Some definitions are for new terms for things that are commonly talked about in the DNS community but that never had terms defined for them.

Other organizations sometimes define DNS-related terms their own way. For example, the WHATWG defines "domain" at <https://url.spec.whatwg.org/>. The Root Server System Advisory Committee (RSSAC) has a good lexicon [RSSAC026].

Note that there is no single consistent definition of "the DNS". It can be considered to be some combination of the following: a commonly used naming scheme for objects on the Internet; a distributed database representing the names and certain properties of these objects; an architecture providing distributed maintenance, resilience, and loose coherency for this database; and a simple query-response protocol (as mentioned below) implementing this architecture. Section 2 defines "global DNS" and "private DNS" as a way to deal with these differing definitions.

Capitalization in DNS terms is often inconsistent among RFCs and various DNS practitioners. The capitalization used in this document is a best guess at current practices, and is not meant to indicate that other capitalization styles are wrong or archaic. In some cases, multiple styles of capitalization are used for the same term due to quoting from different RFCs.

Readers should note that the terms in this document are grouped by topic. Someone who is not already familiar with the DNS can probably not learn about the DNS from scratch by reading this document from front to back. Instead, skipping around may be the only way to get enough context to understand some of the definitions. This document
has an index that might be useful for readers who are attempting to
learn the DNS by reading this document.

2. Names

Naming system: A naming system associates names with data. Naming systems have many significant facets that help differentiate them from each other. Some commonly-identified facets include:

* Composition of names
* Format of names
* Administration of names
* Types of data that can be associated with names
* Types of metadata for names
* Protocol for getting data from a name
* Context for resolving a name

Note that this list is a small subset of facets that people have identified over time for naming systems, and the IETF has yet to agree on a good set of facets that can be used to compare naming systems. For example, other facets might include "protocol to update data in a name", "privacy of names", and "privacy of data associated with names", but those are not as well-defined as the ones listed above. The list here is chosen because it helps describe the DNS and naming systems similar to the DNS.

Domain name: An ordered list of one or more labels.

Note that this is a definition independent of the DNS RFCs, and the definition here also applies to systems other than the DNS. [RFC1034] defines the "domain name space" using mathematical trees and their nodes in graph theory, and this definition has the same practical result as the definition here. Any path of a directed acyclic graph can be represented by a domain name consisting of the labels of its nodes, ordered by decreasing distance from the root(s) (which is the normal convention within the DNS, including this document). A domain name whose last label identifies a root of the graph is fully qualified; other domain names whose labels form a strict prefix of a fully qualified domain name are relative to its first omitted node.
Also note that different IETF and non-IETF documents have used the term "domain name" in many different ways. It is common for earlier documents to use "domain name" to mean "names that match the syntax in [RFC1035]", but possibly with additional rules such as "and are, or will be, resolvable in the global DNS" or "but only using the presentation format".

Label: An ordered list of zero or more octets that makes up a portion of a domain name. Using graph theory, a label identifies one node in a portion of the graph of all possible domain names.

Global DNS: Using the short set of facets listed in "Naming system", the global DNS can be defined as follows. Most of the rules here come from [RFC1034] and [RFC1035], although the term "global DNS" has not been defined before now.

Composition of names -- A name in the global DNS has one or more labels. The length of each label is between 0 and 63 octets inclusive. In a fully-qualified domain name, the last label in the ordered list is 0 octets long; it is the only label whose length may be 0 octets, and it is called the "root" or "root label". A domain name in the global DNS has a maximum total length of 255 octets in the wire format; the root represents one octet for this calculation. (Multicast DNS [RFC6762] allows names up to 255 bytes plus a terminating zero byte based on a different interpretation of RFC 1035 and what is included in the 255 octets.)

Format of names -- Names in the global DNS are domain names. There are three formats: wire format, presentation format, and common display.

The basic wire format for names in the global DNS is a list of labels ordered by decreasing distance from the root, with the root label last. Each label is preceded by a length octet. [RFC1035] also defines a compression scheme that modifies this format.

The presentation format for names in the global DNS is a list of labels ordered by decreasing distance from the root, encoded as ASCII, with a "." character between each label. In presentation format, a fully-qualified domain name includes the root label and the associated separator dot. For example, in presentation format, a fully-qualified domain name with two non-root labels is always shown as "example.tld." instead of "example.tld". [RFC1035] defines a method for showing octets that do not display in ASCII.
The common display format is used in applications and free text. It is the same as the presentation format, but showing the root label and the "." before it is optional and is rarely done. For example, in common display format, a fully-qualified domain name with two non-root labels is usually shown as "example.tld" instead of "example.tld." Names in the common display format are normally written such that the directionality of the writing system presents labels by decreasing distance from the root (so, in both English and the C programming language the root or TLD label in the ordered list is right-most; but in Arabic it may be left-most, depending on local conventions).

Administration of names -- Administration is specified by delegation (see the definition of "delegation" in Section 7). Policies for administration of the root zone in the global DNS are determined by the names operational community, which convenes itself in the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). The names operational community selects the IANA Functions Operator for the global DNS root zone. At the time this document is published, that operator is Public Technical Identifiers (PTI). (See <https://pti.icann.org/> for more information about PTI operating the IANA Functions.) The name servers that serve the root zone are provided by independent root operators. Other zones in the global DNS have their own policies for administration.

Types of data that can be associated with names -- A name can have zero or more resource records associated with it. There are numerous types of resource records with unique data structures defined in many different RFCs and in the IANA registry at [IANA_Resource_Registry].

Types of metadata for names -- Any name that is published in the DNS appears as a set of resource records (see the definition of "RRset" in Section 5). Some names do not themselves have data associated with them in the DNS, but "appear" in the DNS anyway because they form part of a longer name that does have data associated with it (see the definition of "empty non-terminals" in Section 7).

Protocol for getting data from a name -- The protocol described in [RFC1035].

Context for resolving a name -- The global DNS root zone distributed by PTI.

Private DNS: Names that use the protocol described in [RFC1035] but that do not rely on the global DNS root zone, or names that are
otherwise not generally available on the Internet but are using the protocol described in [RFC1035]. A system can use both the global DNS and one or more private DNS systems; for example, see "Split DNS" in Section 6.

Note that domain names that do not appear in the DNS, and that are intended never to be looked up using the DNS protocol, are not part of the global DNS or a private DNS even though they are domain names.

Multicast DNS: "Multicast DNS (mDNS) provides the ability to perform DNS-like operations on the local link in the absence of any conventional Unicast DNS server. In addition, Multicast DNS designates a portion of the DNS namespace to be free for local use, without the need to pay any annual fee, and without the need to set up delegations or otherwise configure a conventional DNS server to answer for those names." (Quoted from [RFC6762], Abstract) Although it uses a compatible wire format, mDNS is strictly speaking a different protocol than DNS. Also, where the above quote says "a portion of the DNS namespace", it would be clearer to say "a portion of the domain name space" The names in mDNS are not intended to be looked up in the DNS.

Locally served DNS zone: A locally served DNS zone is a special case of private DNS. Names are resolved using the DNS protocol in a local context. [RFC6303] defines subdomains of IN-ADDR.ARPA that are locally served zones. Resolution of names through locally served zones may result in ambiguous results. For example, the same name may resolve to different results in different locally served DNS zone contexts. The context for a locally served DNS zone may be explicit, for example, as defined in [RFC6303], or implicit, as defined by local DNS administration and not known to the resolution client.

Fully qualified domain name (FQDN): This is often just a clear way of saying the same thing as "domain name of a node", as outlined above. However, the term is ambiguous. Strictly speaking, a fully qualified domain name would include every label, including the zero-length label of the root: such a name would be written "www.example.net." (note the terminating dot). But because every name eventually shares the common root, names are often written relative to the root (such as "www.example.net") and are still called "fully qualified". This term first appeared in [RFC0819]. In this document, names are often written relative to the root.

The need for the term "fully qualified domain name" comes from the existence of partially qualified domain names, which are names where one or more of the last labels in the ordered list are
omitted (for example, a domain name of "www" relative to "example.net" identifies "www.example.net"). Such relative names are understood only by context.

Host name: This term and its equivalent, "hostname", have been widely used but are not defined in [RFC1034], [RFC1035], [RFC1123], or [RFC2181]. The DNS was originally deployed into the Host Tables environment as outlined in [RFC0952], and it is likely that the term followed informally from the definition there. Over time, the definition seems to have shifted. "Host name" is often meant to be a domain name that follows the rules in Section 3.5 of [RFC1034], the "preferred name syntax" (that is, every character in each label is a letter, a digit, or a hyphen). Note that any label in a domain name can contain any octet value; hostnames are generally considered to be domain names where every label follows the rules in the "preferred name syntax", with the amendment that labels can start with ASCII digits (this amendment comes from Section 2.1 of [RFC1123]).

People also sometimes use the term hostname to refer to just the first label of an FQDN, such as "printer" in "printer.admin.example.com". (Sometimes this is formalized in configuration in operating systems.) In addition, people sometimes use this term to describe any name that refers to a machine, and those might include labels that do not conform to the "preferred name syntax".

TLD: A Top-Level Domain, meaning a zone that is one layer below the root, such as "com" or "jp". There is nothing special, from the point of view of the DNS, about TLDs. Most of them are also delegation-centric zones (defined in Section 7, and there are significant policy issues around their operation. TLDs are often divided into sub-groups such as Country Code Top-Level Domains (ccTLDs), Generic Top-Level Domains (gTLDs), and others; the division is a matter of policy, and beyond the scope of this document.

IDN: The common abbreviation for "Internationalized Domain Name". The IDNA protocol is the standard mechanism for handling domain names with non-ASCII characters in applications in the DNS. The current standard at the time of this writing, normally called "IDNA2008", is defined in [RFC5890], [RFC5891], [RFC5892], [RFC5893], and [RFC5894]. These documents define many IDN-specific terms such as "LDH label", "A-label", and "U-label". [RFC6365] defines more terms that relate to internationalization (some of which relate to IDNs), and [RFC6055] has a much more extensive discussion of IDNs, including some new terminology.
Subdomain: "A domain is a subdomain of another domain if it is contained within that domain. This relationship can be tested by seeing if the subdomain’s name ends with the containing domain’s name." (Quoted from [RFC1034], Section 3.1). For example, in the host name "nnn.mmm.example.com", both "mmm.example.com" and "nnn.mmm.example.com" are subdomains of "example.com". Note that the comparisons here are done on whole labels; that is, "ooo.example.com" is not a subdomain of "oo.example.com".

Alias: The owner of a CNAME resource record, or a subdomain of the owner of a DNAME resource record (DNAME records are defined in [RFC6672]). See also "canonical name".

Canonical name: A CNAME resource record "identifies its owner name as an alias, and specifies the corresponding canonical name in the R DATA section of the RR." (Quoted from [RFC1034], Section 3.6.2) This usage of the word "canonical" is related to the mathematical concept of "canonical form".

CNAME: "It is traditional to refer to the owner of a CNAME record as ‘a CNAME’. This is unfortunate, as ‘CNAME’ is an abbreviation of ‘canonical name’, and the owner of a CNAME record is an alias, not a canonical name." (Quoted from [RFC2181], Section 10.1.1)

3. DNS Response Codes

Some of response codes that are defined in [RFC1035] have acquired their own shorthand names. All of the RCODEs are listed at [IANA_Resource_Registry], although that site uses mixed-case capitalization, while most documents use all-caps. Some of the common names are described here, but the official list is in the IANA registry.

NOERROR: "No error condition" (Quoted from [RFC1035], Section 4.1.1.)

FORMERR: "Format error - The name server was unable to interpret the query." (Quoted from [RFC1035], Section 4.1.1.)

SERVFAIL: "Server failure - The name server was unable to process this query due to a problem with the name server." (Quoted from [RFC1035], Section 4.1.1.)

NXDOMAIN: "Name Error - This code signifies that the domain name referenced in the query does not exist." (Quoted from [RFC1035], Section 4.1.1.) [RFC2308] established NXDOMAIN as a synonym for Name Error.
NOTIMP: "Not Implemented - The name server does not support the requested kind of query." (Quoted from [RFC1035], Section 4.1.1.)

REFUSED: "Refused - The name server refuses to perform the specified operation for policy reasons. For example, a name server may not wish to provide the information to the particular requester, or a name server may not wish to perform a particular operation (e.g., zone transfer) for particular data." (Quoted from [RFC1035], Section 4.1.1.)

NODATA: "A pseudo RCODE which indicates that the name is valid for the given class, but there are no records of the given type. A NODATA response has to be inferred from the answer." (Quoted from [RFC2308], Section 1.) "NODATA is indicated by an answer with the RCODE set to NOERROR and no relevant answers in the answer section. The authority section will contain an SOA record, or there will be no NS records there." (Quoted from [RFC2308], Section 2.2.) Note that referrals have a similar format to NODATA replies; [RFC2308] explains how to distinguish them.

The term "NXRRSET" is sometimes used as a synonym for NODATA. However, this is a mistake, given that NXRRSET is a specific error code defined in [RFC2136].

Negative response: A response that indicates that a particular RRset does not exist, or whose RCODE indicates the nameserver cannot answer. Sections 2 and 7 of [RFC2308] describe the types of negative responses in detail.

4. DNS Transactions

The header of a DNS message is its first 12 octets. Many of the fields and flags in the header diagram in Sections 4.1.1 through 4.1.3 of [RFC1035] are referred to by their names in that diagram. For example, the response codes are called "RCODEs", the data for a record is called the "RDATA", and the authoritative answer bit is often called "the AA flag" or "the AA bit".

Class: A class "identifies a protocol family or instance of a protocol" (Quoted from [RFC1034], Section 3.6). "The DNS tags all data with a class as well as the type, so that we can allow parallel use of different formats for data of type address." (Quoted from [RFC1034], Section 2.2). In practice, the class for nearly every query is "IN". There are some queries for "CH", but they are usually for the purposes of information about the server itself rather than for a different type of address.
QNAME: The most commonly-used rough definition is that the QNAME is a field in the Question section of a query. "A standard query specifies a target domain name (QNAME), query type (QTYPE), and query class (QCLASS) and asks for RRs which match." (Quoted from [RFC1034], Section 3.7.1.). Strictly speaking, the definition comes from [RFC1035], Section 4.1.2, where the QNAME is defined in respect of the Question Section. This definition appears to be applied consistently: the discussion of inverse queries in section 6.4 refers to the "owner name of the query RR and its TTL", because inverse queries populate the Answer Section and leave the Question Section empty. (Inverse queries are deprecated in [RFC3425], and so relevant definitions do not appear in this document.)

[RFC2308], however, has an alternate definition that puts the QNAME in the answer (or series of answers) instead of the query. It defines QNAME as: "...the name in the query section of an answer, or where this resolves to a CNAME, or CNAME chain, the data field of the last CNAME. The last CNAME in this sense is that which contains a value which does not resolve to another CNAME." This definition has a certain internal logic, because of the way CNAME substitution works and the definition of CNAME. If a name server does not find an RRset that matches a query, but it finds the same name in the same class with a CNAME record, then the name server "includes the CNAME record in the response and restarts the query at the domain name specified in the data field of the CNAME record." (Quoted from [RFC1034] Section 3.6.2). This is made explicit in the resolution algorithm outlined in Section 4.3.2 of [RFC1034], which says to "change QNAME to the canonical name in the CNAME RR, and go back to step 1" in the case of a CNAME RR. Since a CNAME record explicitly declares that the owner name is canonically named what is in the RDATA, then there is a way to view the new name (i.e. the name that was in the RDATA of the CNAME RR) as also being the QNAME.

This creates a kind of confusion, however, because the response to a query that results in CNAME processing contains in the echoed Question Section one QNAME (the name in the original query), and a second QNAME that is in the data field of the last CNAME. The confusion comes from the iterative/recursive mode of resolution, which finally returns an answer that need not actually have the same owner name as the QNAME contained in the original query.

To address this potential confusion, it is helpful to distinguish between three meanings:

* QNAME (original): The name actually sent in the Question Section in the original query, which is always echoed in the
(final) reply in the Question Section when the QR bit is set to 1.

* QNAME (effective): A name actually resolved, which is either the name originally queried, or a name received in a CNAME chain response.

* QNAME (final): The name actually resolved, which is either the name actually queried or else the last name in a CNAME chain response.

Note that, because the definition in [RFC2308] is actually for a different concept than what was in [RFC1034], it would have been better if [RFC2308] had used a different name for that concept. In general use today, QNAME almost always means what is defined above as "QNAME (original)".

Referrals: A type of response in which a server, signaling that it is not (completely) authoritative for an answer, provides the querying resolver with an alternative place to send its query. Referrals can be partial.

A referral arises when a server is not performing recursive service while answering a query. It appears in step 3(b) of the algorithm in [RFC1034], Section 4.3.2.

There are two types of referral response. The first is a downward referral (sometimes described as "delegation response"), where the server is authoritative for some portion of the QNAME. The authority section RRset’s RDATA contains the name servers specified at the referred-to zone cut. In normal DNS operation, this kind of response is required in order to find names beneath a delegation. The bare use of "referral" means this kind of referral, and many people believe that this is the only legitimate kind of referral in the DNS.

The second is an upward referral (sometimes described as "root referral"), where the server is not authoritative for any portion of the QNAME. When this happens, the referred-to zone in the authority section is usually the root zone (.). In normal DNS operation, this kind of response is not required for resolution or for correctly answering any query. There is no requirement that any server send upward referrals. Some people regard upward referrals as a sign of a misconfiguration or error. Upward referrals always need some sort of qualifier (such as "upward" or "root"), and are never identified by the bare word "referral".
A response that has only a referral contains an empty answer section. It contains the NS RRset for the referred-to zone in the authority section. It may contain RRs that provide addresses in the additional section. The AA bit is clear.

In the case where the query matches an alias, and the server is not authoritative for the target of the alias but it is authoritative for some name above the target of the alias, the resolution algorithm will produce a response that contains both the authoritative answer for the alias, and also a referral. Such a partial answer and referral response has data in the answer section. It has the NS RRset for the referred-to zone in the authority section. It may contain RRs that provide addresses in the additional section. The AA bit is set, because the first name in the answer section matches the QNAME and the server is authoritative for that answer (see [RFC1035], Section 4.1.1).

5. Resource Records

RR: An acronym for resource record. ([RFC1034], Section 3.6.)

RRset: A set of resource records "with the same label, class and type, but with different data". (Definition from [RFC2181], Section 5) Also spelled RRSet in some documents. As a clarification, "same label" in this definition means "same owner name". In addition, [RFC2181] states that "the TTLs of all RRs in an RRSet must be the same".

Note that RRSIG resource records do not match this definition. [RFC4035] says: "An RRset MAY have multiple RRSIG RRs associated with it. Note that as RRSIG RRs are closely tied to the RRsets whose signatures they contain, RRSIG RRs, unlike all other DNS RR types, do not form RRsets. In particular, the TTL values among RRSIG RRs with a common owner name do not follow the RRset rules described in [RFC2181]."

Master file: "Master files are text files that contain RRs in text form. Since the contents of a zone can be expressed in the form of a list of RRs a master file is most often used to define a zone, though it can be used to list a cache's contents." (Quoted from [RFC1035], Section 5.) Master files are sometimes called "zone files".

Presentation format: The text format used in master files. This format is shown but not formally defined in [RFC1034] and [RFC1035]. The term "presentation format" first appears in [RFC4034].
EDNS: The extension mechanisms for DNS, defined in [RFC6891]. Sometimes called "EDNS0" or "EDNS(0)" to indicate the version number. EDNS allows DNS clients and servers to specify message sizes larger than the original 512 octet limit, to expand the response code space, and to carry additional options that affect the handling of a DNS query.

OPT: A pseudo-RR (sometimes called a "meta-RR") that is used only to contain control information pertaining to the question-and-answer sequence of a specific transaction. (Definition from [RFC6891], Section 6.1.1) It is used by EDNS.

Owner: "The domain name where a RR is found" (Quoted from [RFC1034], Section 3.6). Often appears in the term "owner name".

SOA field names: DNS documents, including the definitions here, often refer to the fields in the RDATA of an SOA resource record by field name. "SOA" stands for "start of a zone of authority". Those names are defined in Section 3.3.13 of [RFC1035]. The names (in the order they appear in the SOA RDATA) are MNAME, RNAME, SERIAL, REFRESH, RETRY, EXPIRE, and MINIMUM. Note that the meaning of MINIMUM field is updated in Section 4 of [RFC2308]; the new definition is that the MINIMUM field is only "the TTL to be used for negative responses". This document tends to use field names instead of terms that describe the fields.

TTL: The maximum "time to live" of a resource record. "A TTL value is an unsigned number, with a minimum value of 0, and a maximum value of 2^{31} - 1. When transmitted, the TTL is encoded in the less significant 31 bits of the 32 bit TTL field, with the most significant, or sign, bit set to zero." (Quoted from [RFC2181], Section 8) (Note that [RFC1035] erroneously stated that this is a signed integer; that was fixed by [RFC2181].)

The TTL "specifies the time interval that the resource record may be cached before the source of the information should again be consulted". (Quoted from [RFC1035], Section 3.2.1) Also: "the time interval (in seconds) that the resource record may be cached before it should be discarded". (Quoted from [RFC1035], Section 4.1.3). Despite being defined for a resource record, the TTL of every resource record in an RRset is required to be the same ([RFC2181], Section 5.2).

The reason that the TTL is the maximum time to live is that a cache operator might decide to shorten the time to live for operational purposes, such as if there is a policy to disallow TTL values over a certain number. Some servers are known to ignore
the TTL on some RRsets (such as when the authoritative data has a very short TTL) even though this is against the advice in RFC 1035. An RRset can be flushed from the cache before the end of the TTL interval, at which point the value of the TTL becomes unknown because the RRset with which it was associated no longer exists.

There is also the concept of a "default TTL" for a zone, which can be a configuration parameter in the server software. This is often expressed by a default for the entire server, and a default for a zone using the $TTL directive in a zone file. The $TTL directive was added to the master file format by [RFC2308].

Class independent: A resource record type whose syntax and semantics are the same for every DNS class. A resource record type that is not class independent has different meanings depending on the DNS class of the record, or the meaning is undefined for some class. Most resource record types are defined for class 1 (IN, the Internet), but many are undefined for other classes.

Address records: Records whose type is A or AAAA. [RFC2181] informally defines these as "(A, AAAA, etc)". Note that new types of address records could be defined in the future.

6. DNS Servers and Clients

This section defines the terms used for the systems that act as DNS clients, DNS servers, or both. In the RFCs, DNS servers are sometimes called "name servers", "nameservers", or just "servers". There is no formal definition of DNS server, but the RFCs generally assume that it is an Internet server that listens for queries and sends responses using the DNS protocol defined in [RFC1035] and its successors.

It is important to note that the terms "DNS server" and "name server" require context in order to understand the services being provided. Both authoritative servers and recursive resolvers are often called "DNS servers" and "name servers" even though they serve different roles (but may be part of the same software package).

For terminology specific to the public DNS root server system, see [RSSAC026]. That document defines terms such as "root server", "root server operator", and terms that are specific to the way that the root zone of the public DNS is served.

Resolver: A program "that extract[s] information from name servers in response to client requests." (Quoted from [RFC1034], Section 2.4) A resolver performs queries for a name, type, and
class, and receives responses. The logical function is called "resolution". In practice, the term is usually referring to some specific type of resolver (some of which are defined below), and understanding the use of the term depends on understanding the context.

A related term is "resolve", which is not formally defined in [RFC1034] or [RFC1035]. An imputed definition might be "asking a question that consists of a domain name, class, and type, and receiving some sort of response". Similarly, an imputed definition of "resolution" might be "the response received from resolving".

Stub resolver: A resolver that cannot perform all resolution itself. Stub resolvers generally depend on a recursive resolver to undertake the actual resolution function. Stub resolvers are discussed but never fully defined in Section 5.3.1 of [RFC1034]. They are fully defined in Section 6.1.3.1 of [RFC1123].

Iterative mode: A resolution mode of a server that receives DNS queries and responds with a referral to another server. Section 2.3 of [RFC1034] describes this as "The server refers the client to another server and lets the client pursue the query". A resolver that works in iterative mode is sometimes called an "iterative resolver". See also "iterative resolution" later in this section.

Recursive mode: A resolution mode of a server that receives DNS queries and either responds to those queries from a local cache or sends queries to other servers in order to get the final answers to the original queries. Section 2.3 of [RFC1034] describes this as "The first server pursues the query for the client at another server". Section 4.3.1 of [RFC1034] says "in [recursive] mode the name server acts in the role of a resolver and returns either an error or the answer, but never referrals." That same section also says "The recursive mode occurs when a query with RD set arrives at a server which is willing to provide recursive service; the client can verify that recursive mode was used by checking that both RA and RD are set in the reply."

A server operating in recursive mode may be thought of as having a name server side (which is what answers the query) and a resolver side (which performs the resolution function). Systems operating in this mode are commonly called "recursive servers". Sometimes they are called "recursive resolvers". In practice it is not possible to know in advance whether the server that one is querying will also perform recursion; both terms can be observed in use interchangeably.
Recursive resolver: A resolver that acts in recursive mode. In general, a recursive resolver is expected to cache the answers it receives (which would make it a full-service resolver), but some recursive resolvers might not cache.

[RFC4697] tried to differentiate between a recursive resolver and an iterative resolver.

Recursive query: A query with the Recursion Desired (RD) bit set to 1 in the header. (See Section 4.1.1 of [RFC1035].) If recursive service is available and is requested by the RD bit in the query, the server uses its resolver to answer the query. (See Section 4.3.2 of [RFC1035].)

Non-recursive query: A query with the Recursion Desired (RD) bit set to 0 in the header. A server can answer non-recursive queries using only local information: the response contains either an error, the answer, or a referral to some other server "closer" to the answer. (See Section 4.3.1 of [RFC1035].)

Iterative resolution: A name server may be presented with a query that can only be answered by some other server. The two general approaches to dealing with this problem are "recursive", in which the first server pursues the query on behalf of the client at another server, and "iterative", in which the server refers the client to another server and lets the client pursue the query there. (See Section 2.3 of [RFC1034].)

In iterative resolution, the client repeatedly makes non-recursive queries and follows referrals and/or aliases. The iterative resolution algorithm is described in Section 5.3.3 of [RFC1034].

Full resolver: This term is used in [RFC1035], but it is not defined there. RFC 1123 defines a "full-service resolver" that may or may not be what was intended by "full resolver" in [RFC1035]. This term is not properly defined in any RFC.

Full-service resolver: Section 6.1.3.1 of [RFC1123] defines this term to mean a resolver that acts in recursive mode with a cache (and meets other requirements).

Priming: "The act of finding the list of root servers from a configuration that lists some or all of the purported IP addresses of some or all of those root servers." (Quoted from [RFC8109], Section 2.) In order to operate in recursive mode, a resolver needs to know the address of at least one root server. Priming is most often done from a configuration setting that contains a list of authoritative servers for the root zone.
Root hints: "Operators who manage a DNS recursive resolver typically need to configure a 'root hints file'. This file contains the names and IP addresses of the authoritative name servers for the root zone, so the software can bootstrap the DNS resolution process. For many pieces of software, this list comes built into the software." (Quoted from [IANA_RootFiles]) This file is often used in priming.

Negative caching: "The storage of knowledge that something does not exist, cannot give an answer, or does not give an answer."
(Quoted from [RFC2308], Section 1)

Authoritative server: "A server that knows the content of a DNS zone from local knowledge, and thus can answer queries about that zone without needing to query other servers." (Quoted from [RFC2182], Section 2.) An authoritative server is named in the NS ("name server") record in a zone. It is a system that responds to DNS queries with information about zones for which it has been configured to answer with the AA flag in the response header set to 1. It is a server that has authority over one or more DNS zones. Note that it is possible for an authoritative server to respond to a query without the parent zone delegating authority to that server. Authoritative servers also provide "referrals", usually to child zones delegated from them; these referrals have the AA bit set to 0 and come with referral data in the Authority and (if needed) the Additional sections.

Authoritative-only server: A name server that only serves authoritative data and ignores requests for recursion. It will "not normally generate any queries of its own. Instead, it answers non-recursive queries from iterative resolvers looking for information in zones it serves." (Quoted from [RFC4697], Section 2.4) In this case, "ignores requests for recursion" means "responds to requests for recursion with responses indicating that recursion was not performed".

Zone transfer: The act of a client requesting a copy of a zone and an authoritative server sending the needed information. (See Section 7 for a description of zones.) There are two common standard ways to do zone transfers: the AXFR ("Authoritative Transfer") mechanism to copy the full zone (described in [RFC5936], and the IXFR ("Incremental Transfer") mechanism to copy only parts of the zone that have changed (described in [RFC1995]). Many systems use non-standard methods for zone transfer outside the DNS protocol.

Slave server: See "Secondary server".
Secondary server: "An authoritative server which uses zone transfer to retrieve the zone" (Quoted from [RFC1996], Section 2.1). Secondary servers are also discussed in [RFC1034]. [RFC2182] describes secondary servers in more detail. Although early DNS RFCs such as [RFC1996] referred to this as a "slave", the current common usage has shifted to calling it a "secondary".

Master server: See "Primary server".

Primary server: "Any authoritative server configured to be the source of zone transfer for one or more [secondary] servers" (Quoted from [RFC1996], Section 2.1) or, more specifically, "an authoritative server configured to be the source of AXFR or IXFR data for one or more [secondary] servers" (Quoted from [RFC2136]). Primary servers are also discussed in [RFC1034]. Although early DNS RFCs such as [RFC1996] referred to this as a "master", the current common usage has shifted to "primary".

Primary master: "The primary master is named in the zone’s SOA MNAME field and optionally by an NS RR". (Quoted from [RFC1996], Section 2.1). [RFC2136] defines "primary master" as "Master server at the root of the AXFR/IXFR dependency graph. The primary master is named in the zone’s SOA MNAME field and optionally by an NS RR. There is by definition only one primary master server per zone."

The idea of a primary master is only used in [RFC1996] and [RFC2136]. A modern interpretation of the term "primary master" is a server that is both authoritative for a zone and that gets its updates to the zone from configuration (such as a master file) or from UPDATE transactions.

Stealth server: This is "like a slave server except not listed in an NS RR for the zone." (Quoted from [RFC1996], Section 2.1)

Hidden master: A stealth server that is a primary server for zone transfers. "In this arrangement, the master name server that processes the updates is unavailable to general hosts on the Internet; it is not listed in the NS RRset." (Quoted from [RFC6781], Section 3.4.3). An earlier RFC, [RFC4641], said that the hidden master’s name "appears in the SOA RRs MNAME field", although in some setups, the name does not appear at all in the public DNS. A hidden master can also be a secondary server for the zone itself.

Forwarding: The process of one server sending a DNS query with the RD bit set to 1 to another server to resolve that query.
Forwarding is a function of a DNS resolver; it is different than simply blindly relaying queries.

[RFC5625] does not give a specific definition for forwarding, but describes in detail what features a system that forwards needs to support. Systems that forward are sometimes called "DNS proxies", but that term has not yet been defined (even in [RFC5625]).

Forwarder: Section 1 of [RFC2308] describes a forwarder as "a nameserver used to resolve queries instead of directly using the authoritative nameserver chain". [RFC2308] further says "The forwarder typically either has better access to the internet, or maintains a bigger cache which may be shared amongst many resolvers." That definition appears to suggest that forwarders normally only query authoritative servers. In current use, however, forwarders often stand between stub resolvers and recursive servers. [RFC2308] is silent on whether a forwarder is iterative-only or can be a full-service resolver.

Policy-implementing resolver: A resolver acting in recursive mode that changes some of the answers that it returns based on policy criteria, such as to prevent access to malware sites or objectionable content. In general, a stub resolver has no idea whether upstream resolvers implement such policy or, if they do, the exact policy about what changes will be made. In some cases, the user of the stub resolver has selected the policy-implementing resolver with the explicit intention of using it to implement the policies. In other cases, policies are imposed without the user of the stub resolver being informed.

Open resolver: A full-service resolver that accepts and processes queries from any (or nearly any) client. This is sometimes also called a "public resolver", although the term "public resolver" is used more with open resolvers that are meant to be open, as compared to the vast majority of open resolvers that are probably misconfigured to be open. Open resolvers are discussed in [RFC5358]

Split DNS: The terms "split DNS" and "split-horizon DNS" have long been used in the DNS community without formal definition. In general, they refer to situations in which DNS servers that are authoritative for a particular set of domains provide partly or completely different answers in those domains depending on the source of the query. The effect of this is that a domain name that is notionally globally unique nevertheless has different meanings for different network users. This can sometimes be the result of a "view" configuration, described below.
Section 3.8 gives a related definition that is too specific to be generally useful.

View: A configuration for a DNS server that allows it to provide different responses depending on attributes of the query, such as for "split DNS". Typically, views differ by the source IP address of a query, but can also be based on the destination IP address, the type of query (such as AXFR), whether it is recursive, and so on. Views are often used to provide more names or different addresses to queries from "inside" a protected network than to those "outside" that network. Views are not a standardized part of the DNS, but they are widely implemented in server software.

Passive DNS: A mechanism to collect DNS data by storing DNS responses from name servers. Some of these systems also collect the DNS queries associated with the responses, although doing so raises some privacy concerns. Passive DNS databases can be used to answer historical questions about DNS zones such as which values were present at a given time in the past, or when a name was spotted first. Passive DNS databases allow searching of the stored records on keys other than just the name and type, such as "find all names which have A records of a particular value".

Anycast: "The practice of making a particular service address available in multiple, discrete, autonomous locations, such that datagrams sent are routed to one of several available locations." (Quoted from [RFC4786], Section 2) See [RFC4786] for more detail on Anycast and other terms that are specific to its use.

Instance: "When anycast routing is used to allow more than one server to have the same IP address, each one of those servers is commonly referred to as an ‘instance’." "An instance of a server, such as a root server, is often referred to as an ‘Anycast instance’." (Quoted from [RSSAC026])

Privacy-enabling DNS server: "A DNS server that implements DNS over TLS [RFC7858] and may optionally implement DNS over DTLS [RFC8094]." (Quoted from [RFC8310], Section 2) Other types of DNS servers might also be considered privacy-enabling, such as those running DNS over HTTPS [I-D.ietf-doh-dns-over-https].

7. Zones

This section defines terms that are used when discussing zones that are being served or retrieved.

Zone: "Authoritative information is organized into units called ‘zones’, and these zones can be automatically distributed to the
name servers which provide redundant service for the data in a zone." (Quoted from [RFC1034], Section 2.4)

Child: "The entity on record that has the delegation of the domain from the Parent." (Quoted from [RFC7344], Section 1.1)

Parent: "The domain in which the Child is registered." (Quoted from [RFC7344], Section 1.1) Earlier, "parent name server" was defined in [RFC0882] as "the name server that has authority over the place in the domain name space that will hold the new domain". (Note that [RFC0882] was obsoleted by [RFC1034] and [RFC1035]). [RFC0819] also has some description of the relationship between parents and children.

Origin:

There are two different uses for this term:

(a) "The domain name that appears at the top of a zone (just below the cut that separates the zone from its parent). The name of the zone is the same as the name of the domain at the zone’s origin." (Quoted from [RFC2181], Section 6.) These days, this sense of "origin" and "apex" (defined below) are often used interchangeably.

(b) The domain name within which a given relative domain name appears in zone files. Generally seen in the context of "$ORIGIN", which is a control entry defined in [RFC1035], Section 5.1, as part of the master file format. For example, if the $ORIGIN is set to "example.org.", then a master file line for "www" is in fact an entry for "www.example.org.".

Apex: The point in the tree at an owner of an SOA and corresponding authoritative NS RRset. This is also called the "zone apex". [RFC4033] defines it as "the name at the child’s side of a zone cut". The "apex" can usefully be thought of as a data-theoretic description of a tree structure, and "origin" is the name of the same concept when it is implemented in zone files. The distinction is not always maintained in use, however, and one can find uses that conflict subtly with this definition. [RFC1034] uses the term "top node of the zone" as a synonym of "apex", but that term is not widely used. These days, the first sense of "origin" (above) and "apex" are often used interchangeably.

Zone cut: The delimitation point between two zones where the origin of one of the zones is the child of the other zone.
"Zones are delimited by 'zone cuts'. Each zone cut separates a 'child' zone (below the cut) from a 'parent' zone (above the cut)." (Quoted from [RFC2181], Section 6; note that this is barely an ostensive definition.) Section 4.2 of [RFC1034] uses "cuts" instead of "zone cut".

Delegation: The process by which a separate zone is created in the name space beneath the apex of a given domain. Delegation happens when an NS RRset is added in the parent zone for the child origin. Delegation inherently happens at a zone cut. The term is also commonly a noun: the new zone that is created by the act of delegating.

Authoritative data: "All of the RRs attached to all of the nodes from the top node of the zone down to leaf nodes or nodes above cuts around the bottom edge of the zone." (Quoted from [RFC1034], Section 4.2.1) Note that this definition might inadvertently also cause any NS records that appear in the zone to be included, even those that might not truly be authoritative because there are identical NS RRs below the zone cut. This reveals the ambiguity in the notion of authoritative data, because the parent-side NS records authoritatively indicate the delegation, even though they are not themselves authoritative data.

[LFC4033], Section 2, defines "Authoritative RRset" which is related to authoritative data but has a more precise definition.

Lame delegation: "A lame delegations exists when a nameserver is delegated responsibility for providing nameservice for a zone (via NS records) but is not performing nameservice for that zone (usually because it is not set up as a primary or secondary for the zone)." (Quoted from [RFC1912], Section 2.8)

Another definition is that a lame delegation "happens when a name server is listed in the NS records for some domain and in fact it is not a server for that domain. Queries are thus sent to the wrong servers, who don’t know nothing (at least not as expected) about the queried domain. Furthermore, sometimes these hosts (if they exist!) don’t even run name servers." (Quoted from [RFC1713], Section 2.3)

Glue records: "[Resource records] which are not part of the authoritative data [of the zone], and are address resource records for the [name servers in subzones]. These RRs are only necessary if the name server’s name is 'below' the cut, and are only used as part of a referral response." Without glue "we could be faced with the situation where the NS RRs tell us that in order to learn a name server’s address, we should contact the server using the..."
address we wish to learn." (Definition from [RFC1034], Section 4.2.1)

A later definition is that glue "includes any record in a zone file that is not properly part of that zone, including nameserver records of delegated sub-zones (NS records), address records that accompany those NS records (A, AAAA, etc), and any other stray data that might appear" (Quoted from [RFC2181], Section 5.4.1). Although glue is sometimes used today with this wider definition in mind, the context surrounding the [RFC2181] definition suggests it is intended to apply to the use of glue within the document itself and not necessarily beyond.

Bailiwick: "In-bailiwick" is an adjective to describe a name server whose name is either a subdomain of or (rarely) the same as the origin of the zone that contains the delegation to the name server. In-bailiwick name servers may have glue records in their parent zone (using the first of the definitions of "glue records" in the definition above). (The term "bailiwick" means the district or territory where a bailiff or policeman has jurisdiction.)

"In-bailiwick" names are divided into two type of name server names: "in-domain" names and "sibling domain" names.

* In-domain: an adjective to describe a name server whose name is either subordinate to or (rarely) the same as the owner name of the NS resource records. An in-domain name server name MUST have glue records or name resolution fails. For example, a delegation for "child.example.com" may have "in-domain" name server name "ns.child.example.com".

* Sibling domain: a name server’s name that is either subordinate to or (rarely) the same as the zone origin and not subordinate to or the same as the owner name of the NS resource records. Glue records for sibling domains are allowed, but not necessary. For example, a delegation for "child.example.com" in "example.com" zone may have "sibling" name server name "ns.another.example.com".

"Out-of-bailiwick" is the antonym of in-bailiwick. An adjective to describe a name server whose name is not subordinate to or the same as the zone origin. Glue records for out-of-bailiwick name servers are useless. Following table shows examples of delegation types.
Delegation | Parent | Name Server Name | Type
-------------+--------+-----------------+-----------------------------
com          | .      | a.gtld-servers.net | in-bailiwick / sibling domain
net          | .      | a.gtld-servers.net | in-bailiwick / in-domain
example.org  | org    | ns.example.org    | in-bailiwick / in-domain
example.org  | org    | ns.ietf.org       | in-bailiwick / sibling domain
example.org  | org    | ns.example.com    | out-of-bailiwick
example.jp   | jp     | ns.example.jp     | in-bailiwick / in-domain
example.jp   | jp     | ns.example.ne.jp  | in-bailiwick / sibling domain
example.jp   | jp     | ns.example.com    | out-of-bailiwick

Root zone: The zone of a DNS-based tree whose apex is the zero-length label. Also sometimes called "the DNS root".

Empty non-terminals (ENT): "Domain names that own no resource records but have subdomains that do." (Quoted from [RFC4592], Section 2.2.2.) A typical example is in SRV records: in the name "_sip._tcp.example.com", it is likely that "_tcp.example.com" has no RRsets, but that "_sip._tcp.example.com" has (at least) an SRV RRset.

Delegation-centric zone: A zone that consists mostly of delegations to child zones. This term is used in contrast to a zone that might have some delegations to child zones, but also has many data resource records for the zone itself and/or for child zones. The term is used in [RFC4956] and [RFC5155], but is not defined there.

Occluded name: "The addition of a delegation point via dynamic update will render all subordinate domain names to be in a limbo, still part of the zone, but not available to the lookup process. The addition of a DNAME resource record has the same impact. The subordinate names are said to be 'occluded'." (Quoted from [RFC5936], Section 3.5)

Fast flux DNS: This "occurs when a domain is found in DNS using A records to multiple IP addresses, each of which has a very short Time-to-Live (TTL) value associated with it. This means that the domain resolves to varying IP addresses over a short period of time." (Quoted from [RFC6561], Section 1.1.5, with typo corrected) In addition to having legitimate uses, fast flux DNS can used to deliver malware. Because the addresses change so rapidly, it is difficult to ascertain all the hosts. It should be noted that the technique also works with AAAA records, but such use is not frequently observed on the Internet as of this writing.

Reverse DNS, reverse lookup: "The process of mapping an address to a name is generally known as a 'reverse lookup', and the IN-
ADDR.ARPA and IP6.ARPA zones are said to support the 'reverse DNS'." (Quoted from [RFC5855], Section 1)

Forward lookup: "Hostname-to-address translation". (Quoted from [RFC2133], Section 6)

arpa: Address and Routing Parameter Area Domain: "The ‘arpa’ domain was originally established as part of the initial deployment of the DNS, to provide a transition mechanism from the Host Tables that were common in the ARPANET, as well as a home for the IPv4 reverse mapping domain. During 2000, the abbreviation was redesignated to ‘Address and Routing Parameter Area’ in the hope of reducing confusion with the earlier network name." (Quoted from [RFC3172], Section 2.) .arpa is an "infrastructure domain", a domain whose "role is to support the operating infrastructure of the Internet". (Quoted from [RFC3172], Section 2.) See [RFC3172] for more history of this name.

Service name: "Service names are the unique key in the Service Name and Transport Protocol Port Number registry. This unique symbolic name for a service may also be used for other purposes, such as in DNS SRV records." (Quoted from [RFC6335], Section 5.)

8. Wildcards

Wildcard: [RFC1034] defined "wildcard", but in a way that turned out to be confusing to implementers. For an extended discussion of wildcards, including clearer definitions, see [RFC4592]. Special treatment is given to RRs with owner names starting with the label "+". "Such RRs are called ‘wildcards’. Wildcard RRs can be thought of as instructions for synthesizing RRs." (Quoted from [RFC1034], Section 4.3.3)

Asterisk label: "The first octet is the normal label type and length for a 1-octet-long label, and the second octet is the ASCII representation for the '*' character. A descriptive name of a label equaling that value is an 'asterisk label'." (Quoted from [RFC4592], Section 2.1.1)

Wildcard domain name: "A ‘wildcard domain name’ is defined by having its initial (i.e., leftmost or least significant) label be asterisk label." (Quoted from [RFC4592], Section 2.1.1)

Closest encloser: "The longest existing ancestor of a name." (Quoted from [RFC5155], Section 1.3) An earlier definition is "The node in the zone’s tree of existing domain names that has the most labels matching the query name (consecutively, counting from the root label downward). Each match is a ‘label match’ and the order
of the labels is the same."  (Quoted from [RFC4592],
Section 3.3.1)

Closest provable encloser: "The longest ancestor of a name that can
be proven to exist.  Note that this is only different from the
closest encloser in an Opt-Out zone."  (Quoted from [RFC5155],
Section 1.3) See Section 10 for more on "opt-out".

Next closer name: "The name one label longer than the closest
provable encloser of a name."  (Quoted from [RFC5155],
Section 1.3)

Source of Synthesis: "The source of synthesis is defined in the
context of a query process as that wildcard domain name
immediately descending from the closest encloser, provided that
this wildcard domain name exists.  'Immediately descending' means
that the source of synthesis has a name of the form: <asterisk
label>.<closest encloser>."  (Quoted from [RFC4592],
Section 3.3.1)

9. Registration Model

Registry: The administrative operation of a zone that allows
registration of names within that zone.  People often use this
term to refer only to those organizations that perform
registration in large delegation-centric zones (such as TLDs); but
formally, whoever decides what data goes into a zone is the
registry for that zone.  This definition of "registry" is from a
DNS point of view; for some zones, the policies that determine
what can go in the zone are decided by zones that are
superordinate and not the registry operator.

Registrant: An individual or organization on whose behalf a name in
a zone is registered by the registry.  In many zones, the registry
and the registrant may be the same entity, but in TLDs they often
are not.

Registrar: A service provider that acts as a go-between for
registrants and registries.  Not all registrations require a
registrar, though it is common to have registrars involved in
registrations in TLDs.

EPP: The Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP), which is commonly
used for communication of registration information between
registries and registrars.  EPP is defined in [RFC5730].

WHOIS: A protocol specified in [RFC3912], often used for querying
registry databases.  WHOIS data is frequently used to associate
registration data (such as zone management contacts) with domain names. The term "WHOIS data" is often used as a synonym for the registry database, even though that database may be served by different protocols, particularly RDAP. The WHOIS protocol is also used with IP address registry data.

RDAP: The Registration Data Access Protocol, defined in [RFC7480], [RFC7481], [RFC7482], [RFC7483], [RFC7484], and [RFC7485]. The RDAP protocol and data format are meant as a replacement for WHOIS.

DNS operator: An entity responsible for running DNS servers. For a zone’s authoritative servers, the registrant may act as their own DNS operator, or their registrar may do it on their behalf, or they may use a third-party operator. For some zones, the registry function is performed by the DNS operator plus other entities who decide about the allowed contents of the zone.

Public suffix: "A domain that is controlled by a public registry." (Quoted from [RFC6265], Section 5.3) A common definition for this term is a domain under which subdomains can be registered by third parties, and on which HTTP cookies (which are described in detail in [RFC6265]) should not be set. There is no indication in a domain name whether it is a public suffix; that can only be determined by outside means. In fact, both a domain and a subdomain of that domain can be public suffixes.

There is nothing inherent in a domain name to indicate whether it is a public suffix. One resource for identifying public suffixes is the Public Suffix List (PSL) maintained by Mozilla (http://publicsuffix.org/).

For example, at the time this document is published, the "com.au" domain is listed as a public suffix in the PSL. (Note that this example might change in the future.)

Note that the term "public suffix" is controversial in the DNS community for many reasons, and may be significantly changed in the future. One example of the difficulty of calling a domain a public suffix is that designation can change over time as the registration policy for the zone changes, such as was the case with the "uk" TLD in 2014.

Subordinate and Superordinate: These terms are introduced in [RFC3731] for use in the registration model, but not defined there. Instead, they are given in examples. "For example, domain name ‘example.com’ has a superordinate relationship to host name ns1.example.com’." "For example, host ns1.example1.com is a
subordinate host of domain example1.com, but it is not a subordinate host of domain example2.com." (Quoted from [RFC3731], Section 1.1.) These terms are strictly ways of referring to the relationship standing of two domains where one is a subdomain of the other.

10. General DNSSEC

Most DNSSEC terms are defined in [RFC4033], [RFC4034], [RFC4035], and [RFC5155]. The terms that have caused confusion in the DNS community are highlighted here.

DNSSEC-aware and DNSSEC-unaware: These two terms, which are used in some RFCs, have not been formally defined. However, Section 2 of [RFC4033] defines many types of resolvers and validators, including "non-validating security-aware stub resolver", "non-validating stub resolver", "security-aware name server", "security-aware recursive name server", "security-aware resolver", "security-aware stub resolver", and "security-oblivious 'anything'". (Note that the term "validating resolver", which is used in some places in DNSSEC-related documents, is also not defined in those RFCs, but is defined below.)

Signed zone: "A zone whose RRsets are signed and that contains properly constructed DNSKEY, Resource Record Signature (RRSIG), Next Secure (NSEC), and (optionally) DS records." (Quoted from [RFC4033], Section 2.) It has been noted in other contexts that the zone itself is not really signed, but all the relevant RRsets in the zone are signed. Nevertheless, if a zone that should be signed contains any RRsets that are not signed (or opted out), those RRsets will be treated as bogus, so the whole zone needs to be handled in some way.

It should also be noted that, since the publication of [RFC6840], NSEC records are no longer required for signed zones: a signed zone might include NSEC3 records instead. [RFC7129] provides additional background commentary and some context for the NSEC and NSEC3 mechanisms used by DNSSEC to provide authenticated denial-of-existence responses. NSEC and NSEC3 are described below.

Unsigned zone: Section 2 of [RFC4033] defines this as "a zone that is not signed". Section 2 of [RFC4035] defines this as "A zone that does not include these records [properly constructed DNSKEY, Resource Record Signature (RRSIG), Next Secure (NSEC), and (optionally) DS records] according to the rules in this section". There is an important note at the end of Section 5.2 of [RFC4035] that defines an additional situation in which a zone is considered unsigned: "If the resolver does not support any of the algorithms
listed in an authenticated DS RRset, then the resolver will not be able to verify the authentication path to the child zone. In this case, the resolver SHOULD treat the child zone as if it were unsigned."

NSEC: "The NSEC record allows a security-aware resolver to authenticate a negative reply for either name or type non-existence with the same mechanisms used to authenticate other DNS replies." (Quoted from [RFC4033], Section 3.2.) In short, an NSEC record provides authenticated denial of existence.

"The NSEC resource record lists two separate things: the next owner name (in the canonical ordering of the zone) that contains authoritative data or a delegation point NS RRset, and the set of RR types present at the NSEC RR’s owner name." (Quoted from Section 4 of RFC 4034)

NSEC3: Like the NSEC record, the NSEC3 record also provides authenticated denial of existence; however, NSEC3 records mitigate against zone enumeration and support Opt-Out. NSEC3 resource records require associated NSEC3PARAM resource records. NSEC3 and NSEC3PARAM resource records are defined in [RFC5155].

Note that [RFC6840] says that [RFC5155] "is now considered part of the DNS Security Document Family as described by Section 10 of [RFC4033]". This means that some of the definitions from earlier RFCs that only talk about NSEC records should probably be considered to be talking about both NSEC and NSEC3.

Opt-out: "The Opt-Out Flag indicates whether this NSEC3 RR may cover unsigned delegations." (Quoted from [RFC5155], Section 3.1.2.1.) Opt-out tackles the high costs of securing a delegation to an insecure zone. When using Opt-Out, names that are an insecure delegation (and empty non-terminals that are only derived from insecure delegations) don’t require an NSEC3 record or its corresponding RRSIG records. Opt-Out NSEC3 records are not able to prove or deny the existence of the insecure delegations. (Adapted from [RFC7129], Section 5.1)

Insecure delegation: "A signed name containing a delegation (NS RRset), but lacking a DS RRset, signifying a delegation to an unsigned subzone." (Quoted from [RFC4956], Section 2.)

Zone enumeration: "The practice of discovering the full content of a zone via successive queries." (Quoted from [RFC5155], Section 1.3.) This is also sometimes called "zone walking". Zone enumeration is different from zone content guessing where the guesser uses a large dictionary of possible labels and sends
successive queries for them, or matches the contents of NSEC3 records against such a dictionary.

Validation: Validation, in the context of DNSSEC, refers to one of the following:

* Checking the validity of DNSSEC signatures
* Checking the validity of DNS responses, such as those including authenticated denial of existence
* Building an authentication chain from a trust anchor to a DNS response or individual DNS RRsets in a response

The first two definitions above consider only the validity of individual DNSSEC components such as the RRSIG validity or NSEC proof validity. The third definition considers the components of the entire DNSSEC authentication chain, and thus requires "configured knowledge of at least one authenticated DNSKEY or DS RR" (as described in [RFC4035], Section 5).

[RFC4033], Section 2, says that a "Validating Security-Aware Stub Resolver... performs signature validation" and uses a trust anchor "as a starting point for building the authentication chain to a signed DNS response", and thus uses the first and third definitions above. The process of validating an RRSIG resource record is described in [RFC4035], Section 5.3.

[RFC5155] refers to validating responses throughout the document, in the context of hashed authenticated denial of existence; this uses the second definition above.

The term "authentication" is used interchangeably with "validation", in the sense of the third definition above. [RFC4033], Section 2, describes the chain linking trust anchor to DNS data as the "authentication chain". A response is considered to be authentic if "all RRsets in the Answer and Authority sections of the response [are considered] to be authentic" (Quoted from [RFC4035]). DNS data or responses deemed to be authentic or validated have a security status of "secure" ([RFC4035], Section 4.3; [RFC4033], Section 5). "Authenticating both DNS keys and data is a matter of local policy, which may extend or even override the [DNSSEC] protocol extensions" (Quoted from [RFC4033], Section 3.1).

The term "verification", when used, is usually synonym for "validation".
Validating resolver: A security-aware recursive name server, security-aware resolver, or security-aware stub resolver that is applying at least one of the definitions of validation (above), as appropriate to the resolution context. For the same reason that the generic term "resolver" is sometimes ambiguous and needs to be evaluated in context (see Section 6), "validating resolver" is a context-sensitive term.

Key signing key (KSK): DNSSEC keys that "only sign the apex DNSKEY RRs set in a zone." (Quoted from [RFC6781], Section 3.1)

Zone signing key (ZSK): "DNSSEC keys that can be used to sign all the RRs sets in a zone that require signatures, other than the apex DNSKEY RRs set." (Quoted from [RFC6781], Section 3.1) Also note that a ZSK is sometimes used to sign the apex DNSKEY RRs set.

Combined signing key (CSK): "In cases where the differentiation between the KSK and ZSK is not made, i.e., where keys have the role of both KSK and ZSK, we talk about a Single-Type Signing Scheme." (Quoted from [RFC6781], Section 3.1) This is sometimes called a "combined signing key" or CSK. It is operational practice, not protocol, that determines whether a particular key is a ZSK, a KSK, or a CSK.

Secure Entry Point (SEP): A flag in the DNSKEY RDATA that "can be used to distinguish between keys that are intended to be used as the secure entry point into the zone when building chains of trust, i.e., they are (to be) pointed to by parental DS RRs or configured as a trust anchor. Therefore, it is suggested that the SEP flag be set on keys that are used as KSKs and not on keys that are used as ZSKs, while in those cases where a distinction between a KSK and ZSK is not made (i.e., for a Single-Type Signing Scheme), it is suggested that the SEP flag be set on all keys." (Quoted from [RFC6781], Section 3.2.3.) Note that the SEP flag is only a hint, and its presence or absence may not be used to disqualify a given DNSKEY RR from use as a KSK or ZSK during validation.

The original definition of SEPs was in [RFC3757]. That definition clearly indicated that the SEP was a key, not just a bit in the key. The abstract of [RFC3757] says: "With the Delegation Signer (DS) resource record (RR), the concept of a public key acting as a secure entry point (SEP) has been introduced. During exchanges of public keys with the parent there is a need to differentiate SEP keys from other public keys in the Domain Name System KEY (DNSKEY) resource record set. A flag bit in the DNSKEY RR is defined to indicate that DNSKEY is to be used as a SEP." That definition of
the SEP as a key was made obsolete by [RFC4034], and the
definition from [RFC6781] is consistent with [RFC4034].

Trust anchor: "A configured DNSKEY RR or DS RR hash of a DNSKEY RR.
A validating security-aware resolver uses this public key or hash
as a starting point for building the authentication chain to a
signed DNS response. In general, a validating resolver will have
to obtain the initial values of its trust anchors via some secure
or trusted means outside the DNS protocol." (Quoted from
[RFC4033], Section 2)

DNSSEC Policy (DP): A statement that "sets forth the security
requirements and standards to be implemented for a DNSSEC-signed
zone." (Quoted from [RFC6841], Section 2)

DNSSEC Practice Statement (DPS): "A practices disclosure document
that may support and be a supplemental document to the DNSSEC
Policy (if such exists), and it states how the management of a
given zone implements procedures and controls at a high level."
(Quoted from [RFC6841], Section 2)

Hardware security module (HSM): A specialized piece of hardware that
is used to create keys for signatures and to sign messages without
ever disclosing the private key. In DNSSEC, HSMs are often used
to hold the private keys for KSKs and ZSKs and to create the
signatures used in RRSIG records at periodic intervals.

Signing software: Authoritative DNS servers that support DNSSEC
often contain software that facilitates the creation and
maintenance of DNSSEC signatures in zones. There is also stand-
alone software that can be used to sign a zone regardless of
whether the authoritative server itself supports signing.
Sometimes signing software can support particular HSMs as part of
the signing process.

11. DNSSEC States

A validating resolver can determine that a response is in one of four
states: secure, insecure, bogus, or indeterminate. These states are
defined in [RFC4033] and [RFC4035], although the two definitions
differ a bit. This document makes no effort to reconcile the two
definitions, and takes no position as to whether they need to be
reconciled.

Section 5 of [RFC4033] says:
A validating resolver can determine the following 4 states:

Secure: The validating resolver has a trust anchor, has a chain of trust, and is able to verify all the signatures in the response.

Insecure: The validating resolver has a trust anchor, a chain of trust, and, at some delegation point, signed proof of the non-existence of a DS record. This indicates that subsequent branches in the tree are provably insecure. A validating resolver may have a local policy to mark parts of the domain space as insecure.

Bogus: The validating resolver has a trust anchor and a secure delegation indicating that subsidiary data is signed, but the response fails to validate for some reason: missing signatures, expired signatures, signatures with unsupported algorithms, data missing that the relevant NSEC RR says should be present, and so forth.

Indeterminate: There is no trust anchor that would indicate that a specific portion of the tree is secure. This is the default operation mode.

Section 4.3 of [RFC4035] says:
A security-aware resolver must be able to distinguish between four cases:

Secure: An RRset for which the resolver is able to build a chain of signed DNSKEY and DS RRs from a trusted security anchor to the RRset. In this case, the RRset should be signed and is subject to signature validation, as described above.

Insecure: An RRset for which the resolver knows that it has no chain of signed DNSKEY and DS RRs from any trusted starting point to the RRset. This can occur when the target RRset lies in an unsigned zone or in a descendent [sic] of an unsigned zone. In this case, the RRset may or may not be signed, but the resolver will not be able to verify the signature.

Bogus: An RRset for which the resolver believes that it ought to be able to establish a chain of trust but for which it is unable to do so, either due to signatures that for some reason fail to validate or due to missing data that the relevant DNSSEC RRs indicate should be present. This case may indicate an attack but may also indicate a configuration error or some form of data corruption.

Indeterminate: An RRset for which the resolver is not able to determine whether the RRset should be signed, as the resolver is not able to obtain the necessary DNSSEC RRs. This can occur when the security-aware resolver is not able to contact security-aware name servers for the relevant zones.

12. Security Considerations

These definitions do not change any security considerations for the DNS.

13. IANA Considerations

None.

14. References

14.1. Normative References

[IANA_RootFiles]


Internet-Draft DNS Terminology September 2018


14.2. Informative References

[I-D.ietf-doh-dns-over-https]

[IANA_Resource_Registry]
Internet Assigned Numbers Authority, "Resource Record (RR) TYPES", 2017,


The following definitions from RFCs are updated by this document:

- Forwarder in [RFC2308]
- QNAME in [RFC2308]
- Secure Entry Point (SEP) in [RFC3757]; note, however, that this RFC is already obsolete
Appendix B. Definitions First Defined in this Document

The following definitions are first defined in this document:

- "Alias" in Section 2
- "Apex" in Section 7
- "arpa" in Section 7
- "Bailiwick" in Section 7
- "Class independent" in Section 5
- "Delegation-centric zone" in Section 7
- "Delegation" in Section 7
- "DNS operator" in Section 9
- "DNSSEC-aware" in Section 10
- "DNSSEC-unaware" in Section 10
- "Forwarding" in Section 6
- "Full resolver" in Section 6
- "Fully qualified domain name" in Section 2
- "Global DNS" in Section 2
- "Hardware Security Module (HSM)" in Section 10
- "Host name" in Section 2
- "IDN" in Section 2
- "In-bailiwick" in Section 7
- "Iterative resolution" in Section 6
- "Label" in Section 2
- "Locally served DNS zone" in Section 2
- "Naming system" in Section 2
- "Negative response" in Section 3
- "Non-recursive query" in Section 6
- "Open resolver" in Section 6
- "Out-of-bailiwick" in Section 7
- "Passive DNS" in Section 6
- "Policy-implementing resolver" in Section 6
- "Presentation format" in Section 5
- "Priming" in Section 6
- "Private DNS" in Section 2
- "Recursive resolver" in Section 6
- "Referrals" in Section 4
- "Registrant" in Section 9
- "Registrar" in Section 9
- "Registry" in Section 9
- "Root zone" in Section 7
- "Secure Entry Point (SEP)" in Section 10
- "Signing software" in Section 10
- "Split DNS" in Section 6
- "Stub resolver" in Section 6
- "Subordinate" in Section 8
- "Superordinate" in Section 8
- "TLD" in Section 2
- "Validating resolver" in Section 10
- "Validation" in Section 10
"View" in Section 6
"Zone transfer" in Section 6

Index

A
Address records 15
Alias 9
Anycast 21
Apex 22
Asterisk label 26
Authoritative data 23
Authoritative server 18
Authoritative-only server 18
arpa: Address and Routing Parameter Area Domain 26

C
CNAME 9
Canonical name 9
Child 22
Class 10
Class independent 15
Closest encloser 26
Closest provable encloser 27
Combined signing key (CSK) 32

D
DNS operator 28
DNSSEC Policy (DP) 33
DNSSEC Practice Statement (DPS) 33
DNSSEC-aware and DNSSEC-unaware 29
Delegation 23
Delegation-centric zone 25
Domain name 4

E
EDNS 14
EPP 27
Empty non-terminals (ENT) 25

F
FORMERR 9
Fast flux DNS 25
Forward lookup 26
Forwarder 20
Forwarding 19
Full resolver 17
Full-service resolver 17
Fully qualified domain name (FQDN) 7

G
Global DNS 5
Glue records 23

H
Hardware security module (HSM) 33
Hidden master 19
Host name 8

I
IDN 8
In-bailiwick 24
Insecure delegation 30
Instance 21
Iterative mode 16
Iterative resolution 17

K
Key signing key (KSK) 32

L
Label 5
Lame delegation 23
Locally served DNS zone 7

M
Master file 13
Master server 19
Multicast DNS 7

N
NODATA 10
NOERROR 9
NOTIMP 10
NS 18
NSEC 30
NSEC3 30
NXDOMAIN 9
Naming system 4
Negative caching 18
Negative response 10
Next closer name 27
Non-recursive query 17

O
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Abstract

This document describes a mechanism whereby a DNS resolver can opportunistically refresh the TTLs of cached records of a zone using serial number information carried in responses from the zone’s nameservers. As well as improving resolver response time by reducing the need to make upstream queries, the mechanism can also reduce the workload of authoritative servers.

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1. Introduction

DNS secondary nameservers use the value in a zone’s SOA RR’s SERIAL field [RFC1035] to determine freshness of the copy of a zone that they are maintaining locally and so establish whether a zone transfer to update the zone is necessary. The SOA RR is retrieved either in response to a NOTIFY message from the primary or by the passing of an interval equal to the SOA refresh timeout. A comparison of the serial numbers of the stored zone and that in the SOA record [RFC1982] establishes whether a zone transfer is necessary. By using the SOA RR’s SERIAL field, nameservers avoid redundant and unnecessary zone transfers for local data that is already fresh, thereby reducing network traffic and nameserver resource usage.

This memo introduces a similar - but optional - scheme, to a regular DNS query. A DNS resolver requests an authoritative server to return the SOA record along with the the results of a query. By associating these records with the serial number of zone at the time they were retrieved, a resolver can use subsequent responses from the zone to determine whether cached records have changed; if not, the cached...
records can continue to be used, so eliminating the need to re-fetch the record from its zone’s nameservers.

2. Requirements Notation

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

3. Opportunistic DNS Refresh

3.1. Overview

The idea is best illustrated with an example:

1. At time t=0, a resolver queries an authoritative server of example.com for the AAAA record of www.example.com. It includes an EDNS0 option [RFC6891] that requests that the example.com nameservers also return the SOA RR of example.com. The authoritative server returns the AAAA record for www.example.com along with the copy of the current SOA record. It also returns the ZONESERIAL EDNS0 option that guarantees to the resolver that any change in the example.com zone will be accompanied by a change in the zone’s serial number. Suppose that the AAAA record is the address 2001:DB8::1 and that it has a TTL of 3600. Also suppose that the serial number of the SOA record is 42.

2. At time t=3000, the resolver queries an authoritative server of example.com for the MX record of example.com. This query also includes the EDNS0 option requesting the SOA RR. The authoritative server returns the requested data, together with the SOA RR in the Additional Section of the response as well as the ZONESERIAL EDNS0 option. Assume that the SOA record indicates that the serial number is unchanged at 42.

3. At time t=4000, the resolver receives a query for the AAAA record of www.example.com. In the normal course of events the resolver would have to re-fetch the record because the cached record has expired. However, the resolver knows that had it queried for the AAAA record of www.example.com at t=3000, it would have got the same answer as it has cached (2001:DB8::1 and an initial TTL of 3600), since the query for the MX record showed that the zone’s serial number was unchanged and that the server guarantees that the serial number will change on every update to the zone. The only difference would be that instead of the record being expired, the TTL of the record would now be 2600 (the original TTL of 3600 less the 1000 seconds that have elapsed since the query for the MX record). Instead of fetching the record again,
the resolver can set the TTL to 2600, reflecting the valid state that would have occurred had the resolver queried for the record at the same time as it queried for the MX record.

Use of opportunistic refresh requires that both resolvers and authoritative servers signal their support for the protocol via an EDNS0 option. This is the ZONESERIAL option and is required because:

- Resolvers need to explicitly request that authoritative servers include an SOA RR in their responses, since adding an SOA record to a response when it is not needed just wastes bandwidth.

- Authoritative servers need to signal that the zone’s serial number changes every time the contents of the zone change, so confirming to resolvers that the serial number is an indication of the zone’s freshness. This should be the normal state of affairs, but some authoritative servers generate content on the fly and may not update the SOA serial number. Although omission of the SOA RR could be used as an indication that the server does not support opportunistic refresh, this feature allows zone freshness information to be extracted from any SOA record in the answer, e.g. responses returning NXDOMAIN or explicit queries for the SOA. Under these circumstances, the ZONESERIAL option is required in the response in order to prevent misinterpretation.

4. Detailed Description

4.1. Resolver Behavior - Querying an Authoritative Server

To signal support for DNS opportunistic refresh, resolvers MUST add the ZONESERIAL EDNS0 option to their queries. Bit 7 of the option’s FLAGS field is the request/acknowledge flag and MUST be clear in the request to the authoritative server.

4.2. Authoritative Server Behavior - Processing a Query

Upon receiving a ZONESERIAL EDNS0 option with the request/acknowledge flag clear, the action of the authoritative server depends on the response being returned:

- If the answer is a negative response (e.g. NODATA or NXDOMAIN), no special action is required: the SOA of the zone that was searched for the answer will be included in the response.

- If the answer is a positive response or a referral, the SOA for the zone from which the answer was obtained SHOULD be included in the additional section of the answer.
In all cases, the authoritative server MUST include the ZONESERIAL EDNS0 option in the response. The request/acknowledge bit in the FLAGS field MUST also be set in the message.

4.3. Resolver Behavior - Processing a Response

Upon receiving a positive response containing an SOA RR and a valid ZONESERIAL EDNS0 option, the resolver SHOULD associate the zone’s serial number with the RRs in the answer. In addition, it SHOULD note the serial number as the indication of the zone’s freshness along with the time at which the serial number was valid.

If a negative response is received and the message contains a valid ZONESERIAL EDNS0 option, the resolver SHOULD update its record of the zone’s serial number, as well as noting the time at which this serial number was valid.

4.4. Resolver Behavior - Processing a Subsequent Query

When a resolver receives a query, it will check its cache to see whether the answer is present. If it is, but the TTL has expired, an opportunistic refresh-enabled resolver SHOULD check to see if the record is associated with a zone serial number. If it is, the resolver SHOULD compare the serial number against the latest serial number it has for the zone. If the numbers are the same, the resolver SHOULD calculate a new TTL:

\[
\text{candidate TTL} = \text{Original TTL} - (\text{current time} - \text{latest serial number retrieval time})
\]

If this value is positive and the record is not signed, the resolver MAY set the TTL of the cached record to this value and return it to the client without re-querying the authoritative server.

If the value is positive and the record is signed the resolver SHOULD calculate the time to signature expiration. If this is a positive value, the resolver MAY set the TTL of the record to:

\[
\text{New TTL} = \text{MIN(Candidate TTL, Time to Signature Expiration)}
\]

In all other cases (including cases where - perhaps for policy reasons - the resolver chooses not to extend the TTL), the resolver MUST NOT reset the TTL; instead, it should fetch a new copy of the record from the appropriate nameservers.
4.5. Notes

There are a number of cases that require special processing:

- An authoritative server receiving a misconfigured ZONESERIAL option in a query SHOULD return a FORMERR response.

- A resolver receiving a misconfigured ZONESERIAL option in a response MUST NOT interpret the serial number in any SOA RR in that response as an indication of zone freshness. It MAY however regard the RRs in the response as valid.

- If, in response to a query containing the ZONESERIAL option to a zone it has previously established supports this option, a resolver receives a response containing either no ZONESERIAL option or an invalid one, the resolver should assume that the zone can no longer guarantee that the serial number will change on every zone update. It MUST clear all existing serial number information for the zone related to opportunistic DNS refresh. Subsequent queries to the zone SHOULD include the ZONESERIAL option, allowing the resolver to start building refresh information again.

- In the case of NS records, although the child zone is authoritative for the NS information, a resolver must periodically query for the parent’s copy of the NS records to ensure that the delegation is still valid. To avoid the extension of an NS record’s TTL preventing the resolver from querying the parent, the resolver MUST NOT extend the TTL of NS records using the method described here.

- To avoid any complications related to transitive use of this scheme through forwarders and other intermediate resolvers where the nameserver may return a non-authoritative answer, nameservers that are not authoritative for a zone MUST NOT include a ZONESERIAL EDNS0 option in a response to a query for a name in that zone.

- If Client Subnet [RFC7871] is enabled, resource records in the cache may be associated with a subnet. In these cases, the resolver MUST ensure that the zone serial number associated with such records is obtained from an SOA record associated with the identical subnet.
5. Option Format

The opportunistic DNS refresh option is encoded as follows:

```
+-------------------------------+-------------------------------+
|     FLAGS     |                         |
+---------------+                         |
| OPTION-CODE   | OPTION-LENGTH             |
+-------------------------------+-------------------------------+
```

where:

- **OPTION-CODE** the EDNS0 option code assigned to opportunistic DNS refresh, <TBD>
- **OPTION-LENGTH** the value 1.
- **FLAGS** Flags field. Bit 7 of this field is the request/acknowledge flag. This bit MUST be clear in requests from the resolver to the authoritative server and MUST be set in responses from the authoritative server to the resolver. By flipping the bit in a response, answers from misbehaving authoritative servers that just copy unknown EDNS0 options from query to response are not mistakenly treated as being from servers that understand opportunistic DNS refresh.

  Bits 0 to 6 of the FLAGS field are reserved. They MUST be set to zero by the sender, and MUST be ignored by the receiving server.

6. Security Considerations

TDB

7. IANA considerations

The IANA is directed to assign an EDNS0 option code for the ZONERSERIAL option from the DNS EDNS0 Option Codes (OPT) registry as follows:
8. Acknowledgements

This document evolved from discussions with a number of people during and after IETF-94: Ray Bellis, Geoff Huston, George Michaelson, Cathy Almond, Mark Andrews, Evan Hunt, Witold Krecicki. We would also like to acknowledge Bob Harold, who suggested the underlying idea in a post to the DNSOP mailing list back in October 2015.

9. References

9.1. Normative references


9.2. Informative references


Appendix A. Change history (to be removed before publication)

- draft-muks-dnsop-dns-opportunistic-refresh-00
  Initial draft.
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Client ID in Forwarded DNS Queries
draft-tale-dnsop-edns0-clientid-01

Abstract

This draft defines a DNS EDNS option to carry a client-specific identifier in DNS queries, with guidance for privacy protection of such information.

Ed note

Text inside square brackets ([ ]) is additional background information, answers to frequently asked questions, general musings, etc. They will be removed before publication. This document is being collaborated on in GitHub at <https://github.com/vttale/edns0-clientid>. The most recent version of the document, open issues, etc should all be available here. The authors gratefully accept pull requests.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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This Internet-Draft will expire on September 14, 2017.

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1. Introduction

Some DNS operators generate, or wish to generate, customized DNS responses based on the originator of a DNS query. For example, [RFC7871], "Client Subnet in DNS Queries", defines a method to convey partial IP network address information about the device that originated a DNS request, so that a response could be targeted to be topographically near the source.

Some specialized services, however, need more precise client identity information to function adequately. For example, a parental control service that restricts access to particular domains from particular devices needs to have a device-specific identifier.

This document defines an EDNS [RFC6891] option to convey client identification information that is relevant to the DNS query. It is added by software on the client’s local area network, for transmission to the upstream DNS provider.
A similar EDNS option is already being used on the public Internet in two different implementations. One is between the [dnsmasq] resolver on the client side and Nominum’s [Vantio_CacheServe] upstream. It uses EDNS option code 65073 from the "Reserved for Local/Experimental Use" range to pass the client’s Media Access Control (MAC) address. The other implementation is for Cisco’s [Umbrella], aka OpenDNS, which encodes the client’s MAC address and complete IP address. It uses option codes 26946 and 20292, respectively, from the middle of the "Unassigned" range.

This document codifies a more flexible format that can accommodate the needs of both implementations, as well as other more opaque identifiers. It is intended to supersede those non-standard options.

This option is intended only for constrained environments where its use can be carefully controlled. It is completely optional and should be ignored by most DNS software.

2. Privacy Considerations

The IETF is actively working on enhancing DNS privacy [DPRIVE_Working_Group], and the re-injection of personally identifiable information has been identified as a problematic design pattern [I-D.hardie-privsec-metadata-insertion].

Because this option transmits information that is meant to identify specific clients, to be considered compliant with this draft implementations MUST NOT add the option without explicit opt-in by an administrator on the local area network. For example, agreeing to the terms of service for a device-specific DNS filtering product would allow the option to be enabled, and only for communication to the product’s DNS server(s).

Implementers need to be aware of the various laws and regulations governing handling personal data, but they are out of scope of this document.

No explicit provision is made in the protocol to opt-out. For more discussion on this, see Section 9, "Security Considerations".

3. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]

For a comprehensive treatment of DNS terms, please see [RFC7719].

This document uses the following additional terms:
ECID  EDNS Client Identification.

Client  The user or device that originates a DNS lookup.

Nameserver  A DNS server capable of resolving a DNS query and formulating a response.

Forwarding Resolver  A nameserver that does not do iterative resolution itself, but instead passes that responsibility to another resolver, called a "Forwarder" in [RFC2308] section 1.

Tailored Response  A response from a nameserver that is customized based on a policy defined for the client requesting the query.

4.  Option Format

This protocol uses an EDNS [RFC6891] option to include client identification information in DNS messages. The option is structured as follows:

+0 (MSB)                        +1 (LSB)
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
0: |                         OPTION-CODE                       |
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
2: |                        OPTION-LENGTH                      |
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
4: |                       IDENTIFIER-TYPE                     |
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
6: |                                                           /
    /                      CLIENT-IDENTIFIER                    /
    /                                                           /
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+

OPTION-CODE:  2 octets per [RFC6891]. For ECID the code is TBD by IANA.

OPTION-LENGTH:  2 octets per [RFC6891]. Contains the length of the payload following OPTION-LENGTH, in octets.

IDENTIFIER-TYPE:  2 octets per [Address_Family_Numbers], describing the format of CLIENT-IDENTIFIER as elaborated below. [Is it better to call this ADDRESS-FAMILY?]

CLIENT-IDENTIFIER:  A variable number of octets, depending on IDENTIFIER-TYPE.

All fields are in network byte order ("big-endian", per [RFC1700], Data Notation).
This draft only specifies behaviour for the following IDENTIFIER-TYPE values and the corresponding CLIENT-IDENTIFIER lengths:

- 16389 (0x4005, 48-bit MAC): 6 octets, fixed.
- 1 (0x0001, IP version 4): 4 octets, fixed.
- 2 (0x0002, IP version 6): 16 octets, fixed.
- 16 (0x0010, Domain Name System): Variable-length domain name in uncompressed wire format followed by a variable-length custom token.

For DNS servers that implement ECID, it is RECOMMENDED that they recognize at least the 48-bit MAC CLIENT-IDENTIFIER.

The use of Domain Name System as an address family is to facilitate custom tokens that are not well-conceptualized as addresses, as described in Section 6.

Other types of identifying addresses, such as a 64-bit MAC [RFC7042] or a DHCP Unique Identifier [RFC3315] and [RFC6355] could be accommodated as devices and needs change, without needing to define new EDNS option codes to cover them. [ Why not just bless those obvious candidates now? ]

Multiple ECID options MAY appear in the OPT record. However, the same IDENTIFIER-TYPE SHOULD not appear more than once, and each ECID option MUST only carry one IDENTIFIER-TYPE and CLIENT-IDENTIFIER pair.

5. Protocol Description

5.1. DNS Query

Any client that originates a DNS query message MAY include the ECID option in the DNS Query message. It is normally expected that the client itself would not do this, but rather that it will be added by the local forwarding resolver.

When a DNS forwarding resolver, provided as part of a router for example, receives a DNS query message from the originating client it adds any IDENTIFIER-TYPE / CLIENT-IDENTIFIER pairs that it supports but which are not present in the existing client request. It then sends the request to the upstream full-service resolver.

Because the option contains personally identifiable information, it should be protected by either only being used within Autonomous
Systems [RFC1930] controlled by the same provider, by going over an opaque channel such as DNS over TLS [RFC7858], or by being securely encoded and varying per request. It MUST NOT be sent in clear-text across the Internet.

5.2. DNS Response

The logic used by a full-service resolver to customize a response based on ECID is out of scope for this document. The resolver MUST NOT include the ECID option in any queries that it makes to external authoritative DNS servers.

For possible caching purposes, the forwarding resolver needs to know whether filtering affected the response. If the name resolution involved any names for which customization was possible, even if such filtering resulted in delivering the original data, the response SHOULD include an ECID option which contains the FAMILY-ADDRESS and CLIENT-IDENTIFIER pairs that were considered for filtering.

For example, if a filter is set such that only names in the example.com domain are possibly restricted to some devices, then a request for foo.example.com would have the ECID in the response even when the request came from a device which was not restricted. Requests for any other names would not include ECID in the response.

So that the caching forwarding resolver does not need to have any knowledge about what filters are in place, it is the full-service resolver’s responsibility to adjust any TTLs in the response as might be dictated by the filter policy it has configured. That is, if some name is filtered only between the hours of 09:00 and 17:00 and a request is received for that name at 16:59:59, the TTL on a positive response or the SOA ncache field on a negative response should be set to just one second and the ECID option included as described above.

If the request contains a malformed ECID option, such as CLIENT-IDENTIFIER not correctly matching the length of described by OPTION-LENGTH and IDENTIFIER-TYPE, the resolver SHOULD reply with DNS rcode FORMERR.

If the resolver by policy does not respond to requests that are lacking ECID of the appropriate IDENTIFIER-TYPE, it SHOULD reply with DNS rcode REFUSED.

6. Using the DNS Address Family

When IDENTIFIER-TYPE 16 is used, the uncompressed wire format of the domain name is followed by a token that is otherwise opaque to this specification. The length of that token is defined by OPTION-LENGTH
less the two octets used for IDENTIFIER-TYPE and the length of the
domain name.

The name used SHOULD be in a namespace that is controlled by the
service provider that is using the option, but need not be resolvable
in the DNS. We RECOMMEND that providers use short domain names to
minimize DNS packet length.

The domain name provides protection against conflicts with other
users of the option without the burden of creating yet another IANA
Registry to manage yet another two-octet code. Co-operating
forwarder/resolver pairs are the only users of the data who need to
be concerned with its format.

7. Implementation Status

[RFC Editor: per RFC 6982 this section should be removed prior to
publication.]

The protocol proposed here is not currently used anywhere exactly as
described, though the Nominum and Umbrella implementations are
substantially similar.

The authors know of at least two providers who wish to have it
properly standardized and would implement the standard in preference
either of the existing non-standard methods.

8. NAT Considerations

Devices that perform Network Address Translation (NAT) SHOULD NOT
give special consideration for ECID. NAT translates between a layer
3 private IP address assigned to a client device on the Local Area
Network and a layer 3 public IP address for use within the Wide Area
Network. If ECID is being used to pass an IPv4 or IPv6 address, it
SHOULD use the internal address without NAT translation, because
transforming it to the public address of the NAT device would
coalesce all internal devices to just one address.

Other ECID options identify a client device by a different means,
e.g. its layer 2 address. This sort of device’s identifier is not
impacted by NAT. Therefore, DNS queries may be passed without
modification of any ECID information.

9. Security Considerations

The identifier of the client that initiated the request will be
visible to all servers that are passed the ECID option, and the
various devices on the path between the local network and the full-service resolver being used by the forwarding resolver.

DNS filtering products are easy circumvented and should not be considered real security measures. With commonly available tools it is trivial to discover the non-filtered DNS responses and use them in place of the filtered responses.

Along those lines, opting out of this specific protocol is as simple as using a different resolver, such as a full-service resolver on the device itself or one of the well-known public resolvers. Of course, other devices on the local network will still be able to see unencrypted DNS requests from the device, and the only way to really protect against such monitoring is to use an opaque tunnel to a trusted resolver.

10.  IANA Considerations

IANA is requested to assign a new value in the DNS EDNS Option Codes registry for the Device ID option.

11.  Acknowledgements

The authors wish to thank the Barry Greene, Martin Deen, Benjamin Petrin, and Robert Fleischman for their feedback and review during the initial development of this document.

12.  References

12.1.  Normative References


12.2. Informative References


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Abstract

This document defines an extensible method to return additional information about the cause of DNS errors. The primary use case is to extend SERVFAIL to provide additional information about the cause of DNS and DNSSEC failures.

[Open question: The document currently defines a registry for errors. It has also been suggested that the option also carry human readable (text) messages, to allow the server admin to provide additional debugging information (e.g. "example.com pointed their NS at us. No idea why...", "We don’t provide recursive DNS to 192.0.2.0. Please stop asking...", "Have you tried Acme Anvil and DNS? We do DNS right..." (!). Please let us know if you think text is needed, or if a 16bit FCFS registry is expressive enough.]

[Open question: This document discusses extended *errors*, but it has been suggested that this could be used to also annotate *non-error* messages. The authors do not think that this is a good idea, but could be persuaded otherwise.]
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Table of Contents

1. Introduction and background ....................................... 3
   1.1. Requirements notation .................................... 3
2. Extended Error EDNS0 option format ................................. 3
3. Use of the Extended DNS Error option .............................. 4
4. Defined Extended DNS Errors ........................................ 5
   4.1. Extended DNS Error Code 1 - DNSSEC Bogus .................... 5
   4.2. Extended DNS Error Code 2 - DNSSEC Indeterminate .......... 5
   4.3. Extended DNS Error Code 3 - Lame .......................... 5
   4.4. Extended DNS Error Code 4 - Prohibited .................... 5
   4.5. Extended DNS Error Code 5 - TooBusy ........................ 6
5. IANA Considerations ................................................ 6
6. Open questions .................................................... 7
7. Security Considerations ............................................ 7
8. Acknowledgements .................................................. 7
9. References ........................................................ 7
   9.1. Normative References ....................................... 7
   9.2. Informative References ..................................... 8
Appendix A. Changes / Author Notes. .................................. 8
Authors’ Addresses .................................................. 8
1. Introduction and background

There are many reasons that a DNS query may fail, some of them transient, some permanent; some can be resolved by querying another server, some are likely best handled by stopping resolution. Unfortunately, the error signals that a DNS server can return are very limited, and are not very expressive. This means that applications and resolvers often have to "guess" at what the issue is — e.g. the answer was marked REFUSED because of a lame delegation, or because there is a lame delegation or because the nameserver is still starting up and loading zones? Is a SERVFAIL a DNSSEC validation issue, or is the nameserver experiencing a bad hair day?

A good example of issues that would benefit by additional error information is an error caused by a DNSSEC validation issue. When a stub resolver queries a DNSSEC bogus name (using a validating resolver), the stub resolver receives only a SERVFAIL in response. Unfortunately, SERVFAIL is used to signal many sorts of DNS errors, and so the stub resolver simply asks the next configured DNS resolver. The result of trying the next resolver is one of two outcomes: either the next resolver also validates, a SERVFAIL is returned again, and the user gets an (largely) incomprehensible error message; or the next resolver is not a validating resolver, and the user is returned a potentially harmful result.

This document specifies a mechanism to extend (or annotate) DNS errors to provide additional information about the cause of the error. This information can be used by the resolver to make a decision regarding whether or not to retry, or by technical users attempting to debug issues.

Here is a reference to an "external" (non-RFC / draft) thing: ([IANA.AS_Numbers]). And this is a link to an ID:[I-D.ietf-sidr-iana-objects].

1.1. Requirements notation

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

2. Extended Error EDNS0 option format

This draft uses an EDNS0 ([RFC2671]) option to include extended error (ExtError) information in DNS messages. The option is structured as follows:
OPTION-CODE, 2 octets (defined in [RFC6891]), for ExtError is TBD.

OPTION-LENGTH, 2 octets ((defined in [RFC6891]) contains the length of the payload (everything after OPTION-LENGTH) in octets and should be 4.

FLAGS, 2 octets.

CODE, 2 octets.

Currently the only defined flag is the R flag.

R - Retry The R (or Retry) flag provides a hint to the receiver if it should retry the query, possibly by querying another server. If the R bit is set (1), the sender believes that retrying the query may provide a successful answer next time; if the R bit is clear (0), the sender believes that it should not ask another server.

The remaining bits in the flags field MUST be set to 0 by the sender and SHOULD be ignored by the receiver.

Code: A code point into the IANA "Extended DNS Errors" registry.

3. Use of the Extended DNS Error option

The Extended DNS Error (EDE) is an EDNS option. It can be included in any error response (SERVFAIL, NXDOMAIN, REFUSED, etc) to a query that includes an EDNS option. This document includes a set of initial codepoints (and requests to the IANA to add them to the registry), but is extensible via the IANA registry to allow additional error codes to be defined in the future.

The R (Retry) flag provides a hint (or suggestion) as to what the receiver may want to do with this annotated error. The mechanism is specifically designed to be extensible, and so implementations may
receive EDE codes that it does not understand. The R flag allows implementations to make a decision as to what to do if it receives a response with an unknown code - retry or drop the query. Note that this flag is only a suggestion or hint. Receivers can choose to ignore this hint.

4. Defined Extended DNS Errors

This document defines some initial EDE codes. The mechanism is intended to be extensible, and additional codepoints will be registered in the "Extended DNS Errors" registry. This document provides suggestions for the R flag, but the originating server may ignore these recommendations if it knows better.

4.1. Extended DNS Error Code 1 - DNSSEC Bogus

The resolver attempted to perform DNSSEC validation, but validation ended in the Bogus state. The R flag should be set.

4.2. Extended DNS Error Code 2 - DNSSEC Indeterminate

The resolver attempted to perform DNSSEC validation, but validation ended in the Indeterminate state.

Usually attached to SERVFAIL messages. The R flag should be set.

4.3. Extended DNS Error Code 3 - Lame

An authoritative resolver that receives a query (with the RD bit clear) for a domain for which it is not authoritative SHOULD include this EDE code in the REFUSED response.

Implementations should not set the R flag in this case (another nameserver might not be lame).

4.4. Extended DNS Error Code 4 - Prohibited

An authoritative or recursive resolver that receives a query from an "unauthorized" client can annotate its REFUSED message with this code. Examples of "unauthorized" clients are recursive queries from IP addresses outside the network, blacklisted IP addresses, etc.

Implementations SHOULD allow operators to define what to set the R flag to in this case.
4.5. Extended DNS Error Code 5 - TooBusy

[ Ed: This might be a bad idea. It is intended to allow servers under a DoS (for example a random subdomain attack) to signal to recursive clients that they are being abusive and should back off. This may be a bad idea -- it may "complete the attack", it may be spoofable (by anyone who could also do a MITM style attack), etc. ]

A nameserver which is under excessive load (for example, because it is experiencing a DoS) may annotate any answer with this code.

It is RECOMMENDED that implementations set the R flag in this case, but may allow operators to define what to set the R flag to.

[ agreed: bad idea -wjh ]

5. IANA Considerations

[This section under construction, beware. ]

This document defines a new EDNS(0) option, entitled "Extended DNS Error", assigned a value of TBD1 from the "DNS EDNS0 Option Codes (OPT)" registry [to be removed upon publication: http://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-parameters/dns-parameters.xhtml#dns-parameters-11]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>Extended DNS Error</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>[ This document ]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data Tag Name Length Meaning ---- ---- ------ ------- TBD1 FooBar N FooBar server

The IANA is requested to create and maintain the "Extended DNS Error codes" registry. The codepoint space is broken into 3 ranges:

- 1 - 16384: Specification required.
- 16385 - 65000: First Come First Served
- 65000 - 65534: Experimental / Private use

The codepoints 0, 65535 are reserved.
6. Open questions

1. Can this be included in *any* response or only responses to requests that included an EDNS option? Resolvers are supposed to ignore additional. EDNS capable ones are supposed to simply ignore unknown options. I know the spec says you can only include EDNS0 in a response if in a request -- it is time to reevaluate this?

2. Can this be applied to *any* response, or only error responses?

3. Should textual information be allowed as well? What if the only thing allowed is a domain name, e.g to point at where validation began failing?

7. Security Considerations

DNSSEC is being deployed - unfortunately a significant number of clients (~11% according to [GeoffValidation]), when receiving a SERVFAIL from a validating resolver because of a DNSSEC validation issue simply ask the next (non-validating) resolver in their list, and do don't get any of the protections which DNSSEC should provide. This is very similar to a kid asking his mother if he can have another cookie. When the mother says "No, it will ruin your dinner!", going off and asking his (more permissive) father and getting a "Yes, sure, cookie!".

8. Acknowledgements

The authors wish to thank Geoff Huston. They also vaguely remember discussing this with a number of people over the years, but have forgotten who all they were -- if you were one of them, and are not listed, please let us know and we'll acknowledge you.

I also want to thank the band "Infected Mushroom" for providing a good background soundtrack (and to see if I can get away with this!) Another author would like to thank the band "Mushroom Infectors". This was funny at the time we wrote it, but I cannot remember why...

9. References

9.1. Normative References

[IANA.AS_Numbers]
IANA, "Autonomous System (AS) Numbers",
<http://www.iana.org/assignments/as-numbers>.
9.2. Informative References

[GeoffValidation]

[I-D.ietf-sidr-iana-objects]

Appendix A. Changes / Author Notes.

[RFC Editor: Please remove this section before publication ]

From -02 to -03:

- Added David Lawrence -- I somehow missed that in last version.

From -00 to -01:

- Fixed up some of the text, minor clarifications.

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Abstract

The BULK DNS resource record type defines a method of pattern-based creation of DNS resource records based on numeric substrings of query names. The intent of BULK is to simplify generic assignments in a memory-efficient way that can be easily shared between the primary and secondary nameservers for a zone.

Ed note

Text inside square brackets ([ ]) is additional background information, answers to frequently asked questions, general musings, etc. They will be removed before publication. This document is being collaborated on in GitHub at <https://github.com/vttale/bulk-rr>. The most recent version of the document, open issues, etc should all be available here. The authors gratefully accept pull requests.

Status of This Memo

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction .............................................. 3
  1.1. Background and Terminology .......................... 4
2. The BULK Resource Record .................................. 4
  2.1. BULK RDATA Wire Format .............................. 4
  2.2. The BULK RR Presentation Format .................... 6
3. BULK Replacement ........................................... 7
  3.1. Matching the Domain Name Pattern .................... 7
  3.2. Record Generation using Replacement Pattern ......... 7
    3.2.1. Delimiters .................................... 8
    3.2.2. Delimiter intervals ............................ 8
    3.2.3. Padding length ................................. 8
    3.2.4. Final processing ............................... 9
4. Known Limitations .......................................... 9
  4.1. Unsupported Nameservers .............................. 9
5. Security Considerations .................................... 10
  5.1. DNSSEC Signature Strategies .......................... 10
    5.1.1. On-the-fly Signatures ......................... 10
    5.1.2. Alternative Signature Scheme .................. 10
    5.1.3. Non-DNSSEC Zone Support Only .................. 11
  5.2. DDOS Attack Vectors and Mitigation .................. 11
  5.3. Implications of Large-Scale DNS Records ............. 11
6. Privacy Considerations .................................... 12
7. IANA Considerations ....................................... 12
8. Acknowledgments .......................................... 12
9. References ................................................ 12
  9.1. Normative References ................................ 12
  9.2. Informative References .............................. 13
Appendix A. BULK Examples ................................... 13
  A.1. Example 1 ........................................ 13
  A.2. Example 2 ........................................ 14
  A.3. Example 3 ........................................ 15
1. Introduction

The BULK DNS resource record defines a pattern-based method for on-the-fly resource record generation. It is essentially an enhanced wildcard mechanism, constraining generated resource record owner names to those that match a pattern of variable numeric substrings. It is also akin to the $GENERATE master file directive [bind-arm] without being limited to numeric values and without creating all possible records in the zone data.

For example, consider the following record:

```plaintext
example.com. 86400 IN BULK A {
        10.55.${1}.${2}
}
```

It will answer requests for pool-A-0-0.example.com through pool-A-255-255.example.com with the IPv4 addresses 10.55.0.0 through 10.55.255.255.

Much larger record sets can be defined while minimizing the associated requirements for server memory and zone transfer network bandwidth.

This record addresses a number of real-world operational problems that authoritative DNS service providers experience. For example, operators who host many large reverse lookup zones, even for only IPv4 space in in-addr.arpa, would benefit from the disk space, memory size, and zone transfer efficiencies that are gained by encapsulating a simple record-generating algorithm versus enumerating all of the individual records to cover the same space.

Production zones of tens of thousands of pattern-generated records currently exist, that could be reduced to just one BULK RR. These zones can look deceptively small on the primary nameserver and balloon to 100MB or more when expanded.

BULK also allows administrators to more easily deal with singletons, records in the pattern space that are an exception to the normal data generation rules. Whereas a mechanism like $GENERATE may need to be adjusted to account for these individual records, the processing rules for BULK have explicit records more naturally override the dynamically generated ones. This collision problem is not just a theoretical concern, but a real source of support calls for providers.
Pattern-generated records are also not only for the reverse DNS space. Forward zones also occasionally have entries that follow patterns that would be well-addressed by the BULK RR.

1.1. Background and Terminology

The reader is assumed to be familiar with the basic DNS and DNSSEC concepts described in [RFC1034], [RFC1035], [RFC4033], [RFC4034], and [RFC4035]; subsequent RFCs that update them in [RFC2181] and [RFC2308]; and DNS terms in [RFC7719].

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

2. The BULK Resource Record

The BULK resource record enables an authoritative nameserver to generate RRs for other types based upon the query received.

The Type value for the BULK RR type is TBD.

The BULK RR is class-independent.

2.1. BULK RDATA Wire Format

The RDATA for a BULK RR is as follows:

```
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|           Match Type          |                               |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+       Domain Name Pattern     |
|                               |                               |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|                               |                               |
|                               |                               |
|                               |                               |
|                               |                               |
|                               |                               |
|                               |                               |
|                               |                               |
|                               |                               |
|                               |                               |
|                               |                               |
|                               |                               |
|                               |                               |
Match Type identifies the type of the RRset to be generated by this BULK record. It is two octets corresponding to an RR TYPE code as specified in [RFC1035], Section 3.2.1.

Domain Name Pattern consists of a pattern encoded as a wire-format fully qualified domain name. The full name is used so that numeric
substrings above the zone cut can be captured in addition to those in
the zone. It needs no length indicator for the entire field because
the root label marks its end.

Special characters are interpreted as per the following Augmented
Backus-Naur Form (ABNF) notation from [RFC5234].

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{match} & = 1*(\text{range} / \text{string}) \\
\text{range} & = "[" [\text{decnum} \ "-" \ \text{decnum}] "]" / \\
& \quad "<" [\text{hexnum} \ "-" \ \text{hexnum}] ">" \\
& ; \text{create references for substitution} \\
& ; \text{limit of 32 references} \\
& ; [] \text{is syntactic sugar for 0-255} \\
& ; <> \text{is syntactic sugar for 00-ff} \\
\text{string} & = 1*(\text{ctext} / \text{quoted-char}) \\
\text{decnum} & = 1*\text{decdigit} \\
& ; \text{constrained to 65535 maximum.} \\
\text{hexnum} & = 1*\text{hexdigit} \\
& ; \text{constrained to ffff maximum.} \\
\text{octet} & = %x00-FF \\
\text{decdigit} & = %x30-39 \\
& ; 0-9 \\
\text{hexdigit} & = \text{decdigit} / 0x41-0x46 / 0x61-66 \\
& ; 0-9, A-F, a-f \\
\text{ctext} & = <\text{any octet excepting } "\" > \\
\text{quoted-char} & = "\" \text{octet} \\
& ; \text{to allow special characters as literals}
\end{align*}
\]

Interpretation of the Domain Name Pattern is described in detail in
the "BULK Replacement" section. Note that quoted-char must be stored
in the wire format to preserve its semantics when the BULK RR is
interpreted by nameservers.

The limit of 32 references is meant to simplify implementation
details. It is largely but not entirely arbitrary, as it could
capture every individual character of the text representation of a
full IPv6 address.

Replacement Pattern describes how the answer RRset MUST be generated
for the matching query. It needs no length indicator because its end
can be derived from the RDATA length minus Match Type and Domain Name Pattern lengths. It uses the following additional ABNF elements:

```
replace       = 1*(reference / string)
reference     = "$" "{" (positions / "*")) [options] "}" 
positions     = (position / posrange) 0*"," (position / posrange)
posrange      = position "-" position
position      = 1*decnum
options       = delimiter [interval [padding]]
delimiter     = "\" 0*(c|text | quoted-char)
interval      = "\" *2decdigit
padding       = "\" *2decdigit
```

[ Is the formatting complexity beyond simple \$1, \$2, etc, really worth it? I definitely see how it could make for shorter replacement patterns, but does it enhance their clarity and usability, adding a feature someone really wants? ]

The Replacement Pattern MUST end in the root label if it is intended to represent a fully qualified domain name.

2.2. The BULK RR Presentation Format

Match Type is represented as an RR type mnemonic or with [RFC3597]’s generic TYPE mechanism.

Domain Name Pattern is represented as a fully qualified domain name as per [RFC1035] Section 5.1 rules for encoding whitespace and other special characters.

Replacement Pattern is represented by the standard <character-string> text rules for master files as per [RFC1035] section 5.1.

It is suggested that lines longer than 80 characters be wrapped with parenthetical line continuation, per [RFC1035] Section 5.1, starting after Match Type and ending after Replacement Pattern.
3. BULK Replacement

When a BULK-aware authoritative nameserver receives a query for which it does not have a matching name or a covering wildcard, it MUST then look for BULK RRs at the zone apex, selecting all BULK RRs with a Match Type that matches the query type and a Domain Name Pattern that matches the query name. Note that query type ANY will select all Match Types, and all query types match a CNAME or DNAME Match Type. One or more answer RRs will be generated per the replacement rules below. Examples are provided in an appendix.

By only triggering the BULK algorithm when the query name does not exist, administrators are given the flexibility to explicitly override the behaviour of specific names that would otherwise match the BULK record’s Domain Name Pattern. This is unlike BIND’s $GENERATE directive, which adds the generated RRs to any existing names.

3.1. Matching the Domain Name Pattern

A query name matches the Domain Name Pattern if the characters that appear outside the numeric ranges match exactly and those within numeric ranges have values that fall within the range. Numeric matches MUST be of the appropriate decimal or hexadecimal type as specified by the delimiters in the pattern. For example, if a range is given as [0-255], then FF does not match even though its value as a hexadecimal number is within the range. Leading zeros in the numeric part(s) of the qname MUST be ignored; for example, 001.example.com, 01.example.com and 1.example.com would all match [] example.com.

When a query name matches a Domain Name Pattern, the value in each numeric range is stored for use by the Replacement Pattern, with reference numbers starting at 1 and counting from the left. For example, matching the query name host-24-156 against host-[0-255]-[0-255] assigns 24 to $\{1\}$ and 156 to $\{2\}$.

3.2. Record Generation using Replacement Pattern

The Replacement Pattern generates the record data by replacing the $\{\ldots\}$ references with data captured from the query name, and copying all other characters literally.

The simplest form of reference uses only the reference number between the braces, "(" and ")". The value of the reference is simply copied directly from the matching position of the query name.
The next form of reference notation uses the asterisk, ".*. With
${*}$, all captured values in order of ascending position, delimited
by its default delimiter (described below), are placed in the answer.

Numeric range references, such as ${1-4}$, replaces all values
captured by those references, in order, delimited by the default
delimiter described below. To reverse the order in which they are
copied, reverse the upper and lower values, such as ${4-1}$. This is
useful for generating PTR records from query names in which the
address is encoded in network order.

Similar to range references, separating positions by commas creates
sets for replacement. For example, ${1,4}$ would be replaced by the
first and fourth captured values, delimited its default delimiter.
This notation may be combined with the numeric range form, such as
${3,2,1,8-4}$.

3.2.1. Delimiters

A reference can specify a delimiter to use by following a vertical
bar, "|", with zero or more characters. Zero characters, such as in
${1-3|}$, means no delimiter is used, while other characters up to an
unescape vertical bar or closing brace are copied between position
values in the replacement. The default delimiter is the hyphen, "-".

3.2.2. Delimiter intervals

A second vertical bar in the reference options introduces a delimiter
interval. The default behavior of a multi-position reference is to
combine each captured value specified with a delimiter between each.
With a delimiter interval the delimiters are only added between every
Nth value. For example, ${*|-|4}$ adds a hyphen between every group
of four captured positions. This can be a handy feature in the IPv6
reverse namespace where every nibble is captured as a separate value
and generated hostnames include sets of 4 nibbles. An empty or 0
value for the delimiter interval MUST be interpreted as the default
value of 1.

3.2.3. Padding length

The fourth and final reference option determines the field width of
the copied value. Shorter values MUST be padded with leading zeroes
("0") and longer values MUST be truncated to the width.

The default behavior, and that of an explicit empty padding length,
is that the captured query name substring is copied exactly. A width
of zero "0" is a signal to "unpad", and any leading zeros MUST be
removed. [ Unnecessary complexity? ]
If a delimiter interval greater than 1 is used, captured values between the intervals will be concatenated and the padding or unpadding applied as a unit and not individually. An example of this would be ${*|4|4}$ which would combine each range of 4 captured values and pad or truncate them to a width of 4 characters.

[ If this is kept, the element/feature should probably be renamed from "padding" since it is just as likely to truncate. ]

3.2.4. Final processing

The string that results from all replacements is converted to the appropriate RDATA format for the record type. If the conversion fails, the SERVFAIL rcode MUST be set on the response, representing a misconfiguration that the server was unable to perform. [ The EDNS extended-error code would be useful here. ]

The TTL of each RR generated by a BULK RR is the TTL of the corresponding BULK record itself. [ BULK should probably have its own TTL field because using that of the record itself feels like bad design. On the other hand, if BULK is never meant to be queried for directly and only appears in authoritative data, its own TTL is pretty useless normally. ]

The class for the RRSet is the class of the BULK RR.

If the generated record type is one that uses domain names in its resource record data, such as CNAME, a relative domain names MUST be fully qualified with the origin domain of the BULK RR.

4. Known Limitations

This section defines known limitations of the BULK resource type.

4.1. Unsupported Nameservers

Authoritative nameservers that do not understand the semantics of the new record type will not be able to deliver the intended answers even when the type appears in their zone data. This significantly affects the interoperability of primary versus secondary authorities that are not all running the same software. Adding new RRs which affect handling by authoritative servers, or being unable to add them, is an issue that needs to be explored more thoroughly within dnsop.
5. Security Considerations

Two known security considerations exist for the BULK resource record, DNSSEC and DDOS attack vectors.

5.1. DNSSEC Signature Strategies

DNSSEC was designed to provide validation for DNS resource records, requiring each tuple of owner, class, and type to have its own signature. This essentially defeats the purpose of providing large generated blocks of RRs in a single RR as each generated RR would require its own legitimate RRSIG record.

In the following sections several options are discussed to address this issue. Of the options, on-the-fly provides the most secure solution and NPN provides the most flexible.

5.1.1. On-the-fly Signatures

A significant design goal of DNSSEC was to be able to do offline cryptographic signing of zone contents, keeping the key material more secure.

On-the-fly processing requires authoritative nameservers to sign generated records as they are created. Not all authoritative nameserver implementations offer on-the-fly signatures, and even with those that do not all operators will want to keep signing keys online. This solution would either require all implementations to support on-the-fly signing or be ignored by implementations which can not or will not comply.

One possibly mitigation for addressing the risk of keeping the zone signing key online would be to continue to keep the key for signing positive answers offline and introduce a second key for online signing of negative answers.

No changes to validating resolvers is required to support this solution.

5.1.2. Alternative Signature Scheme

Previous versions of this draft proposed a new signature scheme using a Numeric Pattern Normalization (NPN) RR. It was a method to support offline signatures for BULK records, with the drawback that is required updates to DNSSEC-aware resolvers.
That mechanism is not specific to BULK and has been removed from the current draft. If there is further interest in pursuing it, it can be reopened as a separate draft.

5.1.3. Non-DNSSEC Zone Support Only

As a final option zones which wish to remain entirely without DNSSEC support may serve such zones without either of the above solutions and records generated based on BULK RRs will require zero support from recursive resolvers.

5.2. DDOS Attack Vectors and Mitigation

As an additional defense against Distributed Denial Of Service (DDOS) attacks against recursive (resolving) nameservers it is highly recommended shorter TTLs be used for BULK RRs than others. While disabling caching with a zero TTL is not recommended, as this would only result in a shift of the attack target, a balance will need to be found. While this document uses 24 hours (86400 seconds) in its examples, values between 300 to 900 seconds are likely more appropriate and is RECOMMENDED. What is ultimately deemed appropriate may differ from zone to zone and administrator to administrator.

[ I am unclear how this helps DDOS mitigation against anyone at all, and suspect this section should be removed.. ]

5.3. Implications of Large-Scale DNS Records

The production of such large-scale records in the wild may have some unintended side-effects. These side-effects could be of concern or add unexpected complications to DNS based security offerings or forensic and anti-spam measures. While outside the scope of this document, implementers of technology relying on DNS resource records for critical decision making must take into consideration how the existence of such a volume of records might impact their technology.

Solutions to the magnitude problem for BULK generated RRs are expected be similar if not identical to that of existing wildcard records, the core difference being the resultant RDATA will be unique for each requested Domain Name within its scope.

The authors of this document are confident that by careful consideration, negative_side-effects produced by implementing the features described in this document can be eliminated from any such service or product.
6. Privacy Considerations

The BULK record does not introduce any new privacy concerns to DNS data.

7. IANA Considerations

IANA is requested to assign numbers for the BULK RR.

8. Acknowledgments

This document was created as an extension to the DNS infrastructure. As such, many people over the years have contributed to its creation and the authors are appreciative to each of them even if not thanked or identified individually.

A special thanks is extended for the kindness, wisdom and technical advice of Robert Whelton (CenturyLink, Inc.) and Gary O’Brien (Secure64 Software Corp).

9. References

9.1. Normative References


9.2. Informative References

[bind-arm]


Appendix A. BULK Examples

A.1. Example 1
A query received for the PTR of 4.3.2.10.in-addr.arpa will create the references ${1} through ${4} with the first four labels of the query name. The ${4-1} reference in the replacement pattern will then substitute them in reverse with the default delimiter of hyphen between every character and no special field width modifications. The TTL of the BULK RR is used for the generated record, making the response:

4.3.2.10.in-addr.arpa 86400 IN PTR pool-10-2-3-4.example.com.

Example 2

Example 2 is similar to Example 1, except that it modifies the replacement pattern. The empty option after the first vertical bar causes no delimiters to be inserted, while the second empty option that would keep the delimiter interval as 1. The latter is relevant because the final value, padding of 3, is applied over each delimiter interval even when no delimiter is used. Not all captures from the substring are required to be used in the response.

The result is that a query for the PTR of 4.3.2.10.in-addr.arpa generates this response:

4.3.2.10.in-addr.arpa 86400 IN PTR pool-003004.example.com.

[ Admittedly you can’t do this very effectively without the field width complexity. Is this sort of name common? Does it need support? Admittedly $GENERATE had the feature, but is that reason enough? ]

[ Change this to a hex matching example? ]
A.3. Example 3

This example contains a classless IPv4 delegation on the /22 CIDR boundary as defined by [RFC2317]. The network for this example is "10.2.0/22" delegated to a nameserver "ns1.sub.example.com.". RRs for this example are defined as:

$ORIGIN 2.10.in-addr.arpa.
@ 7200 IN BULK CNAME [0-255].[0-3] ${*|.}.0-3
0-3 86400 IN NS ns1.sub.example.com.

A query for the PTR of 25.2.2.10.in-addr.arpa is received and the BULK record with the CNAME Match Type matches all query types. 25 and 2 are captured as references, and joined in the answer by the period ("." ) character as a delimiter, with ".0-3" then appended literally and fully qualified by the origin domain. The final synthesized record is:

25.2.2.10.in-addr.arpa 7200 IN CNAME 25.2.0-3.2.10.in-addr.arpa.

[ Without $* and options complexity, the pattern to get the same result is just ${1}.{$2}.0-3 which is not really significantly onerous to enter, and slightly less arcane looking to comprehend. ]

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