ECN++: Adding Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) to TCP Control
Packets
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Abstract

This document describes an experimental modification to ECN when used with TCP. It allows the use of ECN on the following TCP packets: SYN, pure ACKs, Window probes, FIN, RST, and retransmissions.

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1. Introduction

RFC 3168 [RFC3168] specifies support of Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) in IP (v4 and v6). By using the ECN capability, switches performing Active Queue Management (AQM) can use ECN marks instead of packet drops to signal congestion to the endpoints of a communication. This results in lower packet loss and increased performance. RFC 3168 also specifies support for ECN in TCP, but solely on data packets. For various reasons it precludes the use of ECN on TCP control packets (TCP SYN, TCP SYN-ACK, pure ACKs, Window probes) and on retransmitted packets. RFC 3168 is silent about the use of ECN on RST and FIN packets. RFC 5562 [RFC5562] is an experimental modification to ECN that enables ECN support for TCP SYN-ACK packets.

This document defines an experimental modification to ECN [RFC3168] that enables ECN support on all the aforementioned types of TCP packet. [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-ecn-experimentation] is a standards track procedural device that relaxes standards track requirements in RFC 3168 that would otherwise preclude these experimental modifications.

The present document also considers the implications for common derivatives and variants of TCP, such as SCTP [RFC4960], if the experiment is successful. One particular variant of TCP adds accurate ECN feedback (AccECN [I-D.ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn]), without which ECN support cannot be added to SYN packets. Nonetheless, ECN support can be added to all the other types of TCP packet whether or not AccECN is also supported.

1.1. Motivation

The absence of ECN support on TCP control packets and retransmissions has a potential harmful effect. In any ECN deployment, non-ECN-capable packets suffer a penalty when they traverse a congested bottleneck. For instance, with a drop probability of 1%, 1% of connection attempts suffer a timeout of about 1 second before the SYN is retransmitted, which is highly detrimental to the performance of short flows. TCP control packets, such as TCP SYN and pure ACKs, are important for performance, so dropping them is best avoided.

Non-ECN control packets particularly harm performance in environments where the ECN marking level is high. For example, [judd-nsdi] shows that in a data centre (DC) environment where ECN is used (in conjunction with DCTCP), the probability of being able to establish a new connection using a non-ECN SYN packet drops to close to zero even when there are only 16 ongoing TCP flows transmitting at full speed. In this data centre context, the issue is that DCTCP’s aggressive response to packet marking leads to a high marking probability for
ECN-capable packets, and in turn a high drop probability for non-ECN packets. Therefore non-ECN SYNs are dropped aggressively, rendering it nearly impossible to establish a new connection in the presence of even mild traffic load.

Finally, there are ongoing experimental efforts to promote the adoption of a slightly modified variant of DCTCP (and similar congestion controls) over the Internet to achieve low latency, low loss and scalable throughput (L4S) for all communications [I-D.briscoe-tsvwg-l4s-arch]. In such an approach, L4S packets identify themselves using an ECN codepoint. With L4S and potentially other similar cases, preventing TCP control packets from obtaining the benefits of ECN would not only expose them to the prevailing level of congestion loss, but it would also classify control packet into a different queue with different network treatment, which may also lead to reordering, further degrading TCP performance.

1.2. Experiment Goals

The goal of the experimental modifications defined in this document is to allow the use of ECN on all TCP packets. Experiments are expected in the public Internet as well as in controlled environments to understand the following issues:

- How SYNs, Window probes, pure ACKs, FINs, RSTs and retransmissions that carry the ECT(0), ECT(1) or CE codepoints are processed by the TCP endpoints and the network (including routers, firewalls and other middleboxes). In particular we would like to learn if these packets are frequently blocked or if these packets are usually forwarded and processed.

- The scale of deployment of the different flavours of ECN, including [RFC3168], [RFC5562], [RFC3540] and [I-D.ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn].

- How much the performance of TCP communications is improved by allowing ECN marking of each packet type.

- To identify any issues (including security issues) raised by enabling ECN marking of these packets.

The data gathered through the experiments described in this document, particularly under the first 2 bullets above, will help in the design of the final mechanism (if any) for adding ECN support to the different packet types considered in this document. Whenever data input is needed to assist in a design choice, it is spelled out throughout the document.
Success criteria: The experiment will be a success if we obtain enough data to have a clearer view of the deployability and benefits of enabling ECN on all TCP packets, as well as any issues. If the results of the experiment show that it is feasible to deploy such changes; that there are gains to be achieved through the changes described in this specification; and that no other major issues may interfere with the deployment of the proposed changes; then it would be reasonable to adopt the proposed changes in a standards track specification that would update RFC 3168.

1.3. Document Structure

The remainder of this document is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present the terminology used in the rest of the document. In Section 3, we specify the modifications to provide ECN support to TCP SYNs, pure ACKs, Window probes, FINs, RSTs and retransmissions. We describe both the network behaviour and the endpoint behaviour. Section 5 discusses variations of the specification that will be necessary to interwork with a number of popular variants or derivatives of TCP. RFC 3168 provides a number of specific reasons why ECN support is not appropriate for each packet type. In Section 4, we revisit each of these arguments for each packet type to justify why it is reasonable to conduct this experiment.

2. Terminology

The keywords MUST, MUST NOT, REQUIRED, SHALL, SHALL NOT, SHOULD, SHOULD NOT, RECOMMENDED, MAY, and OPTIONAL, when they appear in this document, are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

Pure ACK: A TCP segment with the ACK flag set and no data payload.

SYN: A TCP segment with the SYN (synchronize) flag set.

Window probe: Defined in [RFC0793], a window probe is a TCP segment with only one byte of data sent to learn if the receive window is still zero.

FIN: A TCP segment with the FIN (finish) flag set.

RST: A TCP segment with the RST (reset) flag set.

Retransmission: A TCP segment that has been retransmitted by the TCP sender.

ECT: ECN-Capable Transport. One of the two codepoints ECT(0) or ECT(1) in the ECN field [RFC3168] of the IP header (v4 or v6). An
ECN-capable sender sets one of these to indicate that both transport end-points support ECN. When this specification says the sender sets an ECT codepoint, by default it means ECT(0). Optionally, it could mean ECT(1), which is in the process of being redefined for use by L4S experiments [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-ecn-experimentation] [I-D.briscoe-tsvwg-ecn-l4s-id].

Not-ECT: The ECN codepoint set by senders that indicates that the transport is not ECN-capable.

CE: Congestion Experienced. The ECN codepoint that an intermediate node sets to indicate congestion [RFC3168]. A node sets an increasing proportion of ECT packets to CE as the level of congestion increases.

3. Specification

3.1. Network (e.g. Firewall) Behaviour

Previously the specification of ECN for TCP [RFC3168] required the sender to set not-ECT on TCP control packets and retransmissions. Some readers of RFC 3168 might have erroneously interpreted this as a requirement for firewalls, intrusion detection systems, etc. to check and enforce this behaviour. Section 4.3 of [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-ecn-experimentation] updates RFC 3168 to remove this ambiguity. It require firewalls or any intermediate nodes not to treat certain types of ECN-capable TCP segment differently (except potentially in one attack scenario). This is likely to only involve a firewall rule change in a fraction of cases (at most 0.4% of paths according to the tests reported in Section 4.2.2).

In case a TCP sender encounters a middlebox blocking ECT on certain TCP segments, the specification below includes behaviour to fall back to non-ECN. However, this loses the benefit of ECN on control packets. So operators are RECOMMENDED to alter their firewall rules to comply with the requirement referred to above (section 4.3 of [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-ecn-experimentation]).

3.2. Endpoint Behaviour

The changes to the specification of TCP over ECN [RFC3168] defined here solely alter the behaviour of the sending host for each half-connection. All changes can be deployed at each end-point independently of others.

The feedback behaviour at the receiver depends on whether classic ECN TCP feedback [RFC3168] or Accurate ECN (AccECN) TCP feedback [I-D.ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn] has been negotiated. Nonetheless,
neither receiver feedback behaviour is altered by the present specification.

For each type of control packet or retransmission, the following sections detail changes to the sender’s behaviour in two respects: i) whether it sets ECT; and ii) its response to congestion feedback. Table 1 summarises these two behaviours for each type of packet, but the relevant subsection below should be referred to for the detailed behaviour. The subsection on the SYN is more complex than the others, because it has to include fall-back behaviour if the ECT packet appears not to have got through, and caching of the outcome to detect persistent failures.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TCP packet type</th>
<th>ECN field if AccECN f/b negotiated*</th>
<th>ECN field if RFC3168 f/b negotiated*</th>
<th>Congestion Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SYN</td>
<td>ECT</td>
<td>not-ECT</td>
<td>Reduce IW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SYN-ACK [RFC5562]</td>
<td>ECT</td>
<td>ECT</td>
<td>Reduce IW as in [RFC5562]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pure ACK</td>
<td>ECT</td>
<td>ECT</td>
<td>Usual cwnd response and optionally [RFC5690]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W Probe</td>
<td>ECT</td>
<td>ECT</td>
<td>Usual cwnd response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIN</td>
<td>ECT</td>
<td>ECT</td>
<td>None or optionally [RFC5690]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RST</td>
<td>ECT</td>
<td>ECT</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Re-XMT</td>
<td>ECT</td>
<td>ECT</td>
<td>Usual cwnd response</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Window probe and retransmission are abbreviated to W Probe and Re-XMT.
* For a SYN, "negotiated" means "requested".

Table 1: Summary of sender behaviour. In each case the relevant section below should be referred to for the detailed behaviour.
It can be seen that the sender can set ECT in all cases, except if it is not requesting AccECN feedback on the SYN. Therefore it is RECOMMENDED that the experimental AccECN specification [I-D.ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn] is implemented (as well as the present specification), because it is expected that ECT on the SYN will give the most significant performance gain, particularly for short flows. Nonetheless, this specification also caters for the case where AccECN feedback is not implemented.

3.2.1. SYN

3.2.1.1. Setting ECT on the SYN

With classic [RFC3168] ECN feedback, the SYN was never expected to be ECN-capable, so the flag provided to feed back congestion was put to another use (it is used in combination with other flags to indicate that the responder supports ECN). In contrast, Accurate ECN (AccECN) feedback [I-D.ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn] provides two codepoints in the SYN-ACK for the responder to feed back whether or not the SYN arrived marked CE.

Therefore, a TCP initiator MUST NOT set ECT on a SYN unless it also attempts to negotiate Accurate ECN feedback in the same SYN.

For the experiments proposed here, if the SYN is requesting AccECN feedback, the TCP sender will also set ECT on the SYN. It can ignore the prohibition in section 6.1.1 of RFC 3168 against setting ECT on such a SYN.

The following subsections about the SYN solely apply to this case where the initiator sent an ECT SYN.

MEASUREMENTS NEEDED: Measurements are needed to verify that if SYN packets with the ECT(0)/ECT(1)/CE codepoints are properly delivered by the network. We need to learn if there are cases if SYN packets are dropped because having the ECT(0)/ECT(1)/CE codepoints. We also need to learn if the network clears SYN packet with the ECT(0)/ECT(1)/CE codepoints. In addition, we need measurements to learn how current deployed base of servers react to SYN packets with ECT(0)/ECT(1)/CE codepoints whether they discard it, or process it and return a SYN/ACK packet proceeding with the connection. It would be also useful to measure how the network elements and the servers react to all possible combinations of ECN codepoints and NS/CWR/ECE flags.
3.2.1.2. Caching Lack of Support for ECT on SYNs

Until AccECN servers become widely deployed, a TCP initiator that sets ECT on a SYN (which implies the same SYN also requests AccECN, as required above) SHOULD also maintain a cache per server to record any failure of previous attempts.

The initiator will record any server’s SYN-ACK response that does not support AccECN. Subsequently the initiator will not set ECT on a SYN to such a server, but it can still always request AccECN support (because the response will state any earlier stage of ECN evolution that the server supports with no performance penalty). The initiator will discover a server that has upgraded to support AccECN as soon as it next connects, then it can remove the server from its cache and subsequently always set ECT for that server.

If the initiator times out without seeing a SYN-ACK, it will also cache this fact (see fall-back in Section 3.2.1.4 for details).

There is no need to cache successful attempts, because the default ECT SYN behaviour performs optimally on success anyway. Servers that do not support ECN as a whole probably do not need to be recorded separately from non-support of AccECN because the response to a request for AccECN immediately states which stage in the evolution of ECN the server supports (AccECN [I-D.ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn], classic ECN [RFC3168] or no ECN).

The above strategy is named "optimistic ECT and cache failures". It is believed to be sufficient based on initial measurements and assumptions detailed in Section 4.2.1, which also gives alternative strategies in case larger scale measurements uncover different scenarios.

3.2.1.3. SYN Congestion Response

If the SYN-ACK returned to the TCP initiator confirms that the server supports AccECN, it will also indicate whether or not the SYN was CE-marked. If the SYN was CE-marked, the initiator MUST reduce its Initial Window (IW) and SHOULD reduce it to 1 SMSS (sender maximum segment size).

If the SYN-ACK shows that the server does not support AccECN, the TCP initiator MUST conservatively reduce its Initial Window and SHOULD reduce it to 1 SMSS. A reduction to greater than 1 SMSS MAY be appropriate (see Section 4.2.1). Conservatism is necessary because a non-AccECN SYN-ACK cannot show whether the SYN was CE-marked.
If the TCP initiator (host A) receives a SYN from the remote end (host B) after it has sent a SYN to B, it indicates the (unusual) case of a simultaneous open. Host A will respond with a SYN-ACK. Host A will probably then receive a SYN-ACK in response to its own SYN, after which it can follow the appropriate one of the two paragraphs above.

In all the above cases, the initiator does not have to back off its retransmission timer as it would in response to a timeout following no response to its SYN [RFC6298], because both the SYN and the SYN-ACK have been successfully delivered through the network. Also, the initiator does not need to exit slow start or reduce ssthresh, which is not even required when a SYN is lost [RFC5681].

If an initial window of 10 (IW10 [RFC6928]) is implemented, Section 5 gives additional recommendations.

3.2.1.4. Fall-Back Following No Response to an ECT SYN

An ECT SYN might be lost due to an over-zealous path element (or server) blocking ECT packets that do not conform to RFC 3168. However, loss is commonplace for numerous other reasons, e.g. congestion loss at a non-ECN queue on the forward or reverse path, transmission errors, etc. Alternatively, the cause of the blockage might be the attempt to negotiate AccECN, or possibly other unrelated options on the SYN.

To expedite connection set-up if, after sending an ECT SYN, the retransmission timer expires, the TCP initiator SHOULD send a SYN with the not-ECT codepoint in the IP header. If other experimental fields or options were on the SYN, it will also be necessary to follow their specifications for fall-back too. It would make sense to co-ordinate all the strategies for fall-back in order to isolate the specific cause of the problem.

If the TCP initiator is caching failed connection attempts, it SHOULD NOT give up using ECT on the first SYN of subsequent connection attempts until it is clear that the blockage persistently and specifically affects ECT on SYNs. This is because loss is so commonplace for other reasons. Even if it does eventually decide to give up on ECT on the SYN, it will probably not need to give up on AccECN on the SYN. In any case, the cache should be arranged to expire so that the initiator will infrequently attempt to check whether the problem has been resolved.

Other fall-back strategies MAY be adopted where applicable (see Section 4.2.2 for suggestions, and the conditions under which they would apply).
3.2.2. SYN-ACK

3.2.2.1. Setting ECT on the SYN-ACK

For the experiments proposed here, the TCP implementation will set ECT on SYN-ACKs. It can ignore the requirement in section 6.1.1 of RFC 3168 to set not-ECT on a SYN-ACK.

The feedback behaviour by the initiator in response to a CE-marked SYN-ACK from the responder depends on whether classic ECN feedback [RFC3168] or AccECN feedback [I-D.ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn] has been negotiated. In either case no change is required to RFC 3168 or the AccECN specification.

Some classic ECN implementations might ignore a CE-mark on a SYN-ACK, or even ignore a SYN-ACK packet entirely if it is set to ECT or CE. This is a possibility because an RFC 3168 implementation would not necessarily expect a SYN-ACK to be ECN-capable.

FOR DISCUSSION: To eliminate this problem, the WG could decide to prohibit setting ECT on SYN-ACKs unless AccECN has been negotiated. However, this issue already came up when the IETF first decided to experiment with ECN on SYN-ACKs [RFC5562] and it was decided to go ahead without any extra precautionary measures because the risk was low. This was because the probability of encountering the problem was believed to be low and the harm if the problem arose was also low (see Appendix B of RFC 5562).

MEASUREMENTS NEEDED: Server-side experiments could determine whether this specific problem is indeed rare across the current installed base of clients that support ECN.

3.2.2.2. SYN-ACK Congestion Response

A host that sets ECT on SYN-ACKs MUST reduce its initial window in response to any congestion feedback, whether using classic ECN or AccECN. It SHOULD reduce it to 1 SMSS. This is different to the behaviour specified in an earlier experiment that set ECT on the SYN-ACK [RFC5562]. This is justified in Section 4.3.

The responder does not have to back off its retransmission timer because the ECN feedback proves that the network is delivering packets successfully and is not severely overloaded. Also the responder does not have to leave slow start or reduce ssthresh, which is not even required when a SYN-ACK has been lost.

The congestion response to CE-marking on a SYN-ACK for a server that implements either the TCP Fast Open experiment (TFO [RFC7413]) or the
initial window of 10 experiment (IW10 [RFC6928]) is discussed in Section 5.

3.2.2.3. Fall-Back Following No Response to an ECT SYN-ACK

After the responder sends a SYN-ACK with ECT set, if its retransmission timer expires it SHOULD resend a SYN-ACK with not-ECT set. If other experimental fields or options were on the SYN, it will also be necessary to follow their specifications for fall-back too. It would make sense to co-ordinate all the strategies for fall-back in order to isolate the specific cause of the problem.

The server MAY cache failed connection attempts, e.g. per client access network. If the TCP server is caching failed connection attempts, it SHOULD NOT give up using ECT on the first SYN-ACK of subsequent connection attempts until it is clear that the blockage persistently and specifically affects ECT on SYN-ACKs. This is because loss is so commonplace for other reasons (see Section 3.2.1.4). The cache should be arranged to expire so that the server will infrequently attempt to check whether the problem has been resolved.

This fall-back strategy is the same as that for ECT SYN-ACKs in [RFC5562]. Other fall-back strategies MAY be adopted if found to be more effective, e.g. one retransmission attempt using ECT before reverting to not-ECT.

3.2.3. Pure ACK

For the experiments proposed here, the TCP implementation will set ECT on pure ACKs. It can ignore the requirement in section 6.1.4 of RFC 3168 to set not-ECT on a pure ACK.

A host that sets ECT on pure ACKs MUST reduce its congestion window in response to any congestion feedback, in order to regulate any data segments it might be sending amongst the pure ACKs. It MAY also implement AckCC [RFC5690] to regulate the pure ACK rate, but this is not required. Note that, in comparison, TCP Congestion Control [RFC5681] does not require a TCP to detect or respond to loss of pure ACKs at all; it requires no reduction in congestion window or ACK rate.

The question of whether the receiver of pure ACKs is required to feed back any CE marks on them is a matter for the relevant feedback specification ([RFC3168] or [I-D.ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn]). It is outside the scope of the present specification. Currently AccECN feedback is required to count CE marking of any control packet including pure ACKs. Whereas RFC 3168 is silent on this point, so
DISCUSSION: An AccECN deployment or an implementation of RFC 3168 that feeds back CE on pure ACKs will be at a disadvantage compared to an RFC 3168 implementation that does not. To solve this, the WG could decide to prohibit setting ECT on pure ACKs unless AccECN has been negotiated. If it does, the penultimate sentence of the Introduction will need to be modified.

MEASUREMENTS NEEDED: Measurements are needed to learn how the deployed base of network elements and servers react to pure ACKs marked with the ECT(0)/ECT(1)/CE codepoints, i.e. whether they are dropped, codepoint cleared or processed.

### 3.2.4. Window Probe

For the experiments proposed here, the TCP sender will set ECT on window probes. It can ignore the prohibition in section 6.1.6 of RFC 3168 against setting ECT on a window probe.

A window probe contains a single octet, so it is no different from a regular TCP data segment. Therefore a TCP receiver will feed back any CE marking on a window probe as normal (either using classic ECN feedback or AccECN feedback). The sender of the probe will then reduce its congestion window as normal.

A receive window of zero indicates that the application is not consuming data fast enough and does not imply anything about network congestion. Once the receive window opens, the congestion window might become the limiting factor, so it is correct that CE-marked probes reduce the congestion window. However, CE-marking on window probes does not reduce the rate of the probes themselves. This is unlikely to present a problem, given the duration between window probes doubles [RFC1122] as long as the receiver is advertising a zero window (currently minimum 1 second, maximum at least 1 minute [RFC6298]).

MEASUREMENTS NEEDED: Measurements are needed to learn how the deployed base of network elements and servers react to Window probes marked with the ECT(0)/ECT(1)/CE codepoints, i.e. whether they are dropped, codepoint cleared or processed.

### 3.2.5. FIN

A TCP implementation can set ECT on a FIN.
The TCP data receiver MUST ignore the CE codepoint on incoming FINs that fail any validity check. The validity check in section 5.2 of [RFC5961] is RECOMMENDED.

A congestion response to a CE-marking on a FIN is not required.

After sending a FIN, the endpoint will not send any more data in the connection. Therefore, even if the FIN-ACK indicates that the FIN was CE-marked (whether using classic or AccECN feedback), reducing the congestion window will not affect anything.

After sending a FIN, a host might send one or more pure ACKs. If it is using one of the techniques in Section 3.2.3 to regulate the delayed ACK ratio for pure ACKs, it could equally be applied after a FIN. But this is not required.

MEASUREMENTS NEEDED: Measurements are needed to learn how the deployed base of network elements and servers react to FIN packets marked with the ECT(0)/ECT(1)/CE codepoints, i.e. whether they are dropped, codepoint cleared or processed.

3.2.6. RST

A TCP implementation can set ECT on a RST.

The "challenge ACK" approach to checking the validity of RSTs (section 3.2 of [RFC5961] is RECOMMENDED at the data receiver.

A congestion response to a CE-marking on a RST is not required (and actually not possible).

MEASUREMENTS NEEDED: Measurements are needed to learn how the deployed base of network elements and servers react to RST packets marked with the ECT(0)/ECT(1)/CE codepoints, i.e. whether they are dropped, codepoint cleared or processed.

3.2.7. Retransmissions

For the experiments proposed here, the TCP sender will set ECT on retransmitted segments. It can ignore the prohibition in section 6.1.5 of RFC 3168 against setting ECT on retransmissions.

Nonetheless, the TCP data receiver MUST ignore the CE codepoint on incoming segments that fail any validity check. The validity check in section 5.2 of [RFC5961] is RECOMMENDED. This will effectively mitigate an attack that uses spoofed data packets to fool the receiver into feeding back spoofed congestion indications to the
sender, which in turn would be fooled into continually halving its congestion window.

If the TCP sender receives feedback that a retransmitted packet was CE-marked, it will react as it would to any feedback of CE-marking on a data packet.

MEASUREMENTS NEEDED: Measurements are needed to learn how the deployed base of network elements and servers react to retransmissions marked with the ECT(0)/ECT(1)/CE codepoints, i.e. whether they are dropped, codepoint cleared or processed.

4. Rationale

This section is informative, not normative. It presents counter-arguments against the justifications in the RFC series for disabling ECN on TCP control segments and retransmissions. It also gives rationale for why ECT is safe on control segments that have not, so far, been mentioned in the RFC series. First it addresses overarching arguments used for most packet types, then it addresses the specific arguments for each packet type in turn.

4.1. The Reliability Argument

Section 5.2 of RFC 3168 states:

"To ensure the reliable delivery of the congestion indication of the CE codepoint, an ECT codepoint MUST NOT be set in a packet unless the loss of that packet [at a subsequent node] in the network would be detected by the end nodes and interpreted as an indication of congestion."

We believe this argument is misplaced. TCP does not deliver most control packets reliably. So it is more important to allow control packets to be ECN-capable, which greatly improves reliable delivery of the control packets themselves (see motivation in Section 1.1). ECN also improves the reliability and latency of delivery of any congestion notification on control packets, particularly because TCP does not detect the loss of most types of control packet anyway. Both these points outweigh by far the concern that a CE marking applied to a control packet by one node might subsequently be dropped by another node.

The principle to determine whether a packet can be ECN-capable ought to be "do no extra harm", meaning that the reliability of a congestion signal’s delivery ought to be no worse with ECN than without. In particular, setting the CE codepoint on the very same packet that would otherwise have been dropped fulfills this
criterion, since either the packet is delivered and the CE signal is
delivered to the endpoint, or the packet is dropped and the original
congestion signal (packet loss) is delivered to the endpoint.

The concern about a CE marking being dropped at a subsequent node
might be motivated by the idea that ECN-marking a packet at the first
node does not remove the packet, so it could go on to worsen
congestion at a subsequent node. However, it is not useful to reason
about congestion by considering single packets. The departure rate
from the first node will generally be the same (fully utilized) with
or without ECN, so this argument does not apply.

4.2. SYNs

RFC 5562 presents two arguments against ECT marking of SYN packets
(quoted verbatim):

"First, when the TCP SYN packet is sent, there are no guarantees
that the other TCP endpoint (node B in Figure 2) is ECN-Capable,
or that it would be able to understand and react if the ECN CE
codepoint was set by a congested router.

Second, the ECN-Capable codepoint in TCP SYN packets could be
misused by malicious clients to "improve" the well-known TCP SYN
attack. By setting an ECN-Capable codepoint in TCP SYN packets, a
malicious host might be able to inject a large number of TCP SYN
packets through a potentially congested ECN-enabled router,
congesting it even further."

The first point actually describes two subtly different issues. So
below three arguments are countered in turn.

4.2.1. Argument 1a: Unrecognized CE on the SYN

This argument certainly applied at the time RFC 5562 was written,
when no ECN responder mechanism had any logic to recognize or feed
back a CE marking on a SYN. The problem was that, during the 3WHS,
the flag in the TCP header for ECN feedback (called Echo Congestion
Experienced) had been overloaded to negotiate the use of ECN itself.
So there was no space for feedback in a SYN-ACK.

The accurate ECN (AccECN) protocol [I-D.ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn] has
since been designed to solve this problem, using a two-pronged
approach. First AccECN uses the 3 ECN bits in the TCP header as 8
codepoints, so there is space for the responder to feed back whether
there was CE on the SYN. Second a TCP initiator can always request
AccECN support on every SYN, and any responder reveals its level of
ECN support: AccECN, classic ECN, or no ECN. Therefore, if a
responder does indicate that it supports AccECN, the initiator can be sure that, if there is no CE feedback on the SYN-ACK, then there really was no CE on the SYN.

An initiator can combine AccECN with three possible strategies for setting ECT on a SYN:

(S1): Pessimistic ECT and cache successes: The initiator always requests AccECN in the SYN, but without setting ECT. Then it records those servers that confirm that they support AccECN in a cache. On a subsequent connection to any server that supports AccECN, the initiator can then set ECT on the SYN.

(S2): Optimistic ECT: The initiator always sets ECT optimistically on the initial SYN and it always requests AccECN support. Then, if the server response shows it has no AccECN logic (so it cannot feed back a CE mark), the initiator conservatively behaves as if the SYN was CE-marked, by reducing its initial window.

A. No cache: The optimistic ECT strategy ought to work fairly well without caching any responses.

B. Cache failures: The optimistic ECT strategy can be improved by recording solely those servers that do not support AccECN. On subsequent connections to these non-AccECN servers, the initiator will still request AccECN but not set ECT on the SYN. Then, the initiator can use its full initial window (if it has enough request data to need it). Longer term, as servers upgrade to AccECN, the initiator will remove them from the cache and use ECT on subsequent SYNs to that server.

(S3): ECT by configuration: In a controlled environment, the administrator can make sure that servers support ECN-capable SYN packets. Examples of controlled environments are single-tenant DCs, and possibly multi-tenant DCs if it is assumed that each tenant mostly communicates with its own VMs.

For unmanaged environments like the public Internet, pragmatically the choice is between strategies (S1) and (S2B):

- The "pessimistic ECT and cache successes" strategy (S1) suffers from exposing the initial SYN to the prevailing loss level, even if the server supports ECT on SYNs, but only on the first connection to each AccECN server.
The "optimistic ECT and cache failures" strategy (S2B) exploits a server’s support for ECT on SYNs from the very first attempt. But if the server turns out not to support AccECN, the initiator has to conservatively limit its initial window — usually unnecessarily. Nonetheless, initiator request data (as opposed to server response data) is rarely larger than 1 SMSS anyway (ToDo: reference? (this information was given informally by Yuchung Cheng)).

The normative specification for ECT on a SYN in Section 3.2.1 uses the "optimistic ECT and cache failures" strategy (S2B) on the assumption that an initial window of 1 SMSS is usually sufficient for client requests anyway. Clients that often initially send more than 1 SMSS of data could use strategy (S1) during initial deployment, and strategy (S2B) later (when the probability of servers supporting AccECN and the likelihood of seeing some CE marking is higher). Also, as deployment proceeds, caching successes (S1) starts off small then grows, while caching failures (S2B) becomes large at first, then shrinks.

MEASUREMENTS NEEDED: Measurements are needed to determine whether one or the other strategy would be sufficient for any particular client, or whether a particular client would need both strategies in different circumstances.

4.2.2. Argument 1b: Unrecognized ECT on the SYN

Given, until now, ECT-marked SYN packets have been prohibited, it cannot be assumed they will be accepted. According to a study using 2014 data [ecn-pam] from a limited range of vantage points, out of the top 1M Alexa web sites, 4791 (0.82%) IPv4 sites and 104 (0.61%) IPv6 sites failed to establish a connection when they received a TCP SYN with any ECN codepoint set in the IP header and the appropriate ECN flags in the TCP header. Of these, about 41% failed to establish a connection due to the ECN flags in the TCP header even with a Not-ECT ECN field in the IP header (i.e. despite full compliance with RFC 3168). Therefore adding the ECN-capability to SYNs was increasing connection establishment failures by about 0.4%.

MEASUREMENTS NEEDED: In order to get these failures fixed, data will be needed on which of the possible causes below is behind them.

RFC 3168 says "a host MUST NOT set ECT on SYN [...] packets", but it does not say what the responder should do if an ECN-capable SYN arrives. So perhaps some responder implementations are checking that the SYN complies with RFC 3168, then silently ignoring non-compliant SYNs (or perhaps returning a RST). Also some middleboxes (e.g.
firewalls) might be discarding non-compliant SYNs. For the future, [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-ecn-experimentation] updates RFC 3168 to clarify that middleboxes "SHOULD NOT" do this, but that does not alter the past.

Whereas RSTs can be dealt with immediately, silent failures introduce a retransmission timeout delay (default 1 second) at the initiator before it attempts any fallback strategy. Ironically, making SYNs ECN-capable is intended to avoid the timeout when a SYN is lost due to congestion. Fortunately, where discard of ECN-capable SYNs is due to policy it will occur predictably, not randomly like congestion. So the initiator can avoid it by caching those sites that do not support ECN-capable SYNs. This further justifies the use of the "optimistic ECT and cache failures" strategy in Section 3.2.1.

**MEASUREMENTS NEEDED:** Experiments are needed to determine whether blocking of ECT on SYNs is widespread, and how many occurrences of problems would be masked by how few cache entries.

If blocking is too widespread for the "optimistic ECT and cache failures" strategy (S2B), the "pessimistic ECT and cache successes" strategy (Section 4.2.1) would be better.

**MEASUREMENTS NEEDED:** Then measurements would be needed on whether failures were still widespread on the second connection attempt after the more careful ("pessimistic") first connection.

If so, it might be necessary to send a not-ECT SYN soon after the first ECT SYN (possibly with a delay between them - effectively reducing the retransmission timeout) and only accept the non-ECT connection if it returned first. This would reduce the performance penalty for those deploying ECT SYN support.

**FOR DISCUSSION:** If this becomes necessary, how much delay ought to be required before the second SYN? Certainly less than the standard RTO (1 second). But more or less than the maximum RTT expected over the surface of the earth (roughly 250ms)? Or even back-to-back?

However, based on the data above from [ecn-pam], even a cache of a dozen or so sites ought to avoid all ECN-related performance problems with roughly the Alexa top thousand. So it is questionable whether sending two SYNs will be necessary, particularly given failures at well-maintained sites could reduce further once ECT SYNs are standardized.
4.2.3. Argument 2: DoS Attacks

[RFC5562] says that ECT SYN packets could be misused by malicious clients to augment "the well-known TCP SYN attack". It goes on to say "a malicious host might be able to inject a large number of TCP SYN packets through a potentially congested ECN-enabled router, congesting it even further."

We assume this is a reference to the TCP SYN flood attack (see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SYN_flood), which is an attack against a responder end point. We assume the idea of this attack is to use ECT to get more packets through an ECN-enabled router in preference to other non-ECN traffic so that they can go on to use the SYN flooding attack to inflict more damage on the responder end point. This argument could apply to flooding with any type of packet, but we assume SYNs are singled out because their source address is easier to spoof, whereas floods of other types of packets are easier to block.

Mandating Not-ECT in an RFC does not stop attackers using ECT for flooding. Nonetheless, if a standard says SYNs are not meant to be ECT it would make it legitimate for firewalls to discard them. However this would negate the considerable benefit of ECT SYNs for compliant transports and seems unnecessary because RFC 3168 already provides the means to address this concern. In section 7, RFC 3168 says "During periods where ... the potential packet marking rate would be high, our recommendation is that routers drop packets rather then set the CE codepoint..." and this advice is repeated in [RFC7567] (section 4.2.1). This makes it harder for flooding packets to gain from ECT.

Further experiments are needed to test how much malicious hosts can use ECT to augment flooding attacks without triggering AQMs to turn off ECN support (flying "just under the radar"). If it is found that ECT can only slightly augment flooding attacks, the risk of such attacks will need to be weighed against the performance benefits of ECT SYNs.

4.3. SYN-ACKs

The proposed approach in Section 3.2.2 for experimenting with ECN-capable SYN-ACKs is identical to the scheme called ECN+ [ECN-PLUS]. In 2005, the ECN+ paper demonstrated that it could reduce the average Web response time by an order of magnitude. It also argued that adding ECT to SYN-ACKs did not raise any new security vulnerabilities.

The IETF has already specified an experiment with ECN-capable SYN-ACK packets [RFC5562]. It was inspired by the ECN+ paper, but it
specified a much more conservative congestion response to a CE-marked SYN-ACK, called ECN+/TryOnce. This required the server to reduce its initial window to 1 segment (like ECN+), but then the server had to send a second SYN-ACK and wait for its ACK before it could continue with its initial window of 1 SMSS. The second SYN-ACK of this 5-way handshake had to carry no data, and had to disable ECN, but no justification was given for these last two aspects.

The present ECN experiment uses the ECN+ congestion response, not ECN+/TryOnce. First we argue against the rationale for ECN+/TryOnce given in sections 4.4 and 6.2 of [RFC5562]. It starts with a rather too literal interpretation of the requirement in RFC 3168 that says TCP’s response to a single CE mark has to be "essentially the same as the congestion control response to a "single" dropped packet." TCP’s response to a dropped initial (SYN or SYN-ACK) packet is to wait for the retransmission timer to expire (currently 1s). However, this long delay assumes the worst case between two possible causes of the loss: a) heavy overload; or b) the normal capacity-seeking behaviour of other TCP flows. When the network is still delivering CE-marked packets, it implies that there is an AQM at the bottleneck and that it is not overloaded. This is because an AQM under overload will disable ECN (as recommended in section 7 of RFC 3168 and repeated in section 4.2.1 of RFC 7567). So scenario (a) can be ruled out. Therefore, TCP’s response to a CE-marked SYN-ACK can be similar to its response to the loss of _any_ packet, rather than backing off as if the special _initial_ packet of a flow has been lost.

How TCP responds to the loss of any single packet depends what it has just been doing. But there is not really a precedent for TCP’s response when it experiences a CE mark having sent only one (small) packet. If TCP had been adding one segment per RTT, it would have halved its congestion window, but it hasn’t established a congestion window yet. If it had been exponentially increasing it would have exited slow start, but it hasn’t started exponentially increasing yet so it hasn’t established a slow-start threshold.

Therefore, we have to work out a reasoned argument for what to do. If an AQM is CE-marking packets, it implies there is already a queue and it is probably already somewhere around the AQM’s operating point - it is unlikely to be well below and it might be well above. So, it does not seem sensible to add a number of packets at once. On the other hand, it is highly unlikely that the SYN-ACK itself pushed the AQM into congestion, so it will be safe to introduce another single segment immediately (1 RTT after the SYN-ACK). Therefore, starting to probe for capacity with a slow start from an initial window of 1 segment seems appropriate to the circumstances. This is the approach adopted in Section 3.2.2.
4.4. Pure ACKs

Section 5.2 of RFC 3168 gives the following arguments for not allowing the ECT marking of pure ACKs (ACKs not piggy-backed on data):

"To ensure the reliable delivery of the congestion indication of the CE codepoint, an ECT codepoint MUST NOT be set in a packet unless the loss of that packet in the network would be detected by the end nodes and interpreted as an indication of congestion. Transport protocols such as TCP do not necessarily detect all packet drops, such as the drop of a "pure" ACK packet; for example, TCP does not reduce the arrival rate of subsequent ACK packets in response to an earlier dropped ACK packet. Any proposal for extending ECN-Capability to such packets would have to address issues such as the case of an ACK packet that was marked with the CE codepoint but was later dropped in the network. We believe that this aspect is still the subject of research, so this document specifies that at this time, "pure" ACK packets MUST NOT indicate ECN-Capability."

Later on, in section 6.1.4 it reads:

"For the current generation of TCP congestion control algorithms, pure acknowledgement packets (e.g., packets that do not contain any accompanying data) MUST be sent with the not-ECT codepoint. Current TCP receivers have no mechanisms for reducing traffic on the ACK-path in response to congestion notification. Mechanisms for responding to congestion on the ACK-path are areas for current and future research. (One simple possibility would be for the sender to reduce its congestion window when it receives a pure ACK packet with the CE codepoint set). For current TCP implementations, a single dropped ACK generally has only a very small effect on the TCP’s sending rate."

We next address each of the arguments presented above.

The first argument is a specific instance of the reliability argument for the case of pure ACKs. This has already been addressed by countering the general reliability argument in Section 4.1.

The second argument says that ECN ought not to be enabled unless there is a mechanism to respond to it. However, actually there _is_ a mechanism to respond to congestion on a pure ACK that RFC 3168 has overlooked - the congestion window mechanism. When data segments and pure ACKs are interspersed, congestion notifications ought to regulate the congestion window, whether they are on data segments or
on pure ACKs. Otherwise, if ECN is disabled on Pure ACKs, and if
(say) 70% of the segments in one direction are Pure ACKs, about 70%
of the congestion notifications will be missed and the data segments
will not be correctly regulated.

So RFC 3168 ought to have considered two congestion response
mechanisms - reducing the congestion window (cwnd) and reducing the
ACK rate - and only the latter was missing. Further, RFC 3168 was
incorrect to assume that, if one ACK was a pure ACK, all segments in
the same direction would be pure ACKs. Admittedly a continual stream
of pure ACKs in one direction is quite a common case (e.g. a file
download). However, it is also common for the pure ACKs to be
interspersed with data segments (e.g. HTTP/2 browser requests
controlling a web application). Indeed, it is more likely that any
congestion experienced by pure ACKs will be due to mixing with data
segments, either within the same flow, or within competing flows.

This insight swings the argument towards enabling ECN on pure ACKs so
that CE marks can drive the cwnd response to congestion (whenever
data segments are interspersed with the pure ACKs). Then to
separately decide whether an ACK rate response is also required (when
they are ECN-enabled). The two types of response are addressed
separately in the following two subsections, then a final subsection
draws conclusions.

4.4.1. Cwnd Response to CE-Marked Pure ACKs

If the sender of pure ACKs sets them to ECT, the bullets below assess
whether the three stages of the congestion response mechanism will
all work for each type of congestion feedback (classic ECN [RFC3168]
and AccECN [I-D.ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn]):

Detection: The receiver of a pure ACK can detect a CE marking on it:

* Classic feedback: the receiver will not expect CE marks on pure
  ACKs, so it will be implementation-dependent whether it happens
to check for CE marks on all packets.

* AccECN feedback: the AccECN specification requires the receiver
  of any TCP packets to count any CE marks on them (whether or
  not control packets are ECN-capable).

Feedback: TCP never ACKs a pure ACK, but the receiver of a CE-mark
on a pure ACK can feed it back when it sends a subsequent data
segment (if it ever does):
* Classic feedback: the receiver (of the pure ACKs) would set the echo congestion experienced (ECE) flag in the TCP header as normal.

* AccECN feedback: the receiver continually feeds back a count of the number of CE-marked packets that it has received (and, if possible, a count of CE-marked bytes).

Congestion response: In either case (classic or AccECN feedback), if the TCP sender does receive feedback about CE-markings on pure ACKs, it will react in the usual way by reducing its congestion window accordingly. This will regulate the rate of any data packets it is sending amongst the pure ACKs.

4.4.2. ACK Rate Response to CE-Marked Pure ACKs

Reducing the congestion window will have no effect on the rate of pure ACKs. The worst case here is if the bottleneck is congested solely with pure ACKs, but it could also be problematic if a large fraction of the load was from unresponsive ACKs, leaving little or no capacity for the load from responsive data.

Since RFC 3168 was published, Acknowledgement Congestion Control (AckCC) techniques have been documented in [RFC5690] (informational). So any pair of TCP end-points can choose to agree to regulate the delayed ACK ratio in response to lost or CE-marked pure ACKs. However, the protocol has a number of open deployment issues (e.g. it relies on two new TCP options, one of which is required on the SYN where option space is at a premium and, if either option is blocked by a middlebox, no fall-back behaviour is specified). The new TCP options addressed two problems, namely that TCP had: i) no mechanism to allow ECT to be set on pure ACKs; and ii) no mechanism to feed back loss or CE-marking of pure ACKs. A combination of the present specification and AccECN addresses both these problems, at least for ECN marking. So it might now be possible to design an ECN-specific ACK congestion control scheme without the extra TCP options proposed in RFC 5690. However, such a mechanism is out of scope of the present document.

Setting aside the practicality of RFC 5690, the need for AckCC has not been conclusively demonstrated. It has been argued that the Internet has survived so far with no mechanism to even detect loss of pure ACKs. However, it has also been argued that ECN is not the same as loss. Packet discard can naturally thin the ACK load to whatever the bottleneck can support, whereas ECN marking does not (it queues the ACKs instead). Nonetheless, RFC 3168 (section 7) recommends that an AQM switches over from ECN marking to discard when the marking
probability becomes high. Therefore discard can still be relied on to thin out ECN-enabled pure ACKs as a last resort.

4.4.3. Summary: Enabling ECN on Pure ACKs

In the case when AccECN has been negotiated, the arguments for ECT (and CE) on pure ACKs heavily outweigh those against. ECN is always more and never less reliable for delivery of congestion notification. The cwnd response has been overlooked as a mechanism for responding to congestion on pure ACKs, so it is incorrect not to set ECT on pure ACKs when they are interspersed with data segments. And when they are not, packet discard still acts as the "congestion response of last resort". In contrast, not setting ECT on pure ACKs is certainly detrimental to performance, because when a pure ACK is lost it can prevent the release of new data. Separately, AckCC (or perhaps an improved variant exploiting AccECN) could optionally be used to regulate the spacing between pure ACKs. However, it is not clear whether AckCC is justified.

In the case when Classic ECN has been negotiated, there is still an argument for ECT (and CE) on pure ACKs, but it is less clear-cut. Some existing RFC 3168 implementations might happen to (unintentionally) provide the correct feedback to support a cwnd response. Even for those that did not, setting ECT on pure ACKs would still be better for performance than not setting it and do no extra harm. If AckCC was required, it is designed to work with RFC 3168 ECN.

4.5. Window Probes

Section 6.1.6 of RFC 3168 presents only the reliability argument for prohibiting ECT on Window probes:

"If a window probe packet is dropped in the network, this loss is not detected by the receiver. Therefore, the TCP data sender MUST NOT set either an ECT codepoint or the CWR bit on window probe packets.

However, because window probes use exact sequence numbers, they cannot be easily spoofed in denial-of-service attacks. Therefore, if a window probe arrives with the CE codepoint set, then the receiver SHOULd respond to the ECN indications."

The reliability argument has already been addressed in Section 4.1.

Allowing ECT on window probes could considerably improve performance because, once the receive window has reopened, if a window probe is lost the sender will stall until the next window probe reaches the
receiver, which might be after the maximum retransmission timeout (at least 1 minute [RFC6928]).

On the bright side, RFC 3168 at least specifies the receiver behaviour if a CE-marked window probe arrives, so changing the behaviour ought to be less painful than for other packet types.

4.6. FINs

RFC 3168 is silent on whether a TCP sender can set ECT on a FIN. A FIN is considered as part of the sequence of data, and the rate of pure ACKs sent after a FIN could be controlled by a CE marking on the FIN. Therefore there is no reason not to set ECT on a FIN.

4.7. RSTs

RFC 3168 is silent on whether a TCP sender can set ECT on a RST. The host generating the RST message does not have an open connection after sending it (either because there was no such connection when the packet that triggered the RST message was received or because the packet that triggered the RST message also triggered the closure of the connection).

Moreover, the receiver of a CE-marked RST message can either: i) accept the RST message and close the connection; ii) emit a so-called challenge ACK in response (with suitable throttling) [RFC5961] and otherwise ignore the RST (e.g. because the sequence number is in-window but not the precise number expected next); or iii) discard the RST message (e.g. because the sequence number is out-of-window). In the first two cases there is no point in echoing any CE mark received because the sender closed its connection when it sent the RST. In the third case it makes sense to discard the CE signal as well as the RST.

Although a congestion response following a CE-marking on a RST does not appear to make sense, the following factors have been considered before deciding whether the sender ought to set ECT on a RST message:

- As explained above, a congestion response by the sender of a CE-marked RST message is not possible;
- So the only reason for the sender setting ECT on a RST would be to improve the reliability of the message’s delivery;
- RST messages are used to both mount and mitigate attacks:
* Spoofed RST messages are used by attackers to terminate ongoing connections, although the mitigations in RFC 5961 have considerably raised the bar against off-path RST attacks;

* Legitimate RST messages allow endpoints to inform their peers to eliminate existing state that correspond to non-existing connections, liberating resources e.g. in DoS attacks scenarios;

** AQMs are advised to disable ECN marking during persistent overload, so:

* it is harder for an attacker to exploit ECN to intensify an attack;

* it is harder for a legitimate user to exploit ECN to more reliably mitigate an attack.

** Prohibiting ECT on a RST would deny the benefit of ECN to legitimate RST messages, but not to attackers who can disregard RFCs;

** If ECT were prohibited on RSTs

* it would be easy for security middleboxes to discard all ECN-capable RSTs;

* However, unlike a SYN flood, it is already easy for a security middlebox (or host) to distinguish a RST flood from legitimate traffic [RFC5961], and even if some legitimate RSTs are accidentally removed as well, legitimate connections still function.

So, on balance, it has been decided that it is worth experimenting with ECT on RSTs. During experiments, if the ECN capability on RSTs is found to open a vulnerability that is hard to close, this decision can be reversed, before it is specified for the standards track.


RFC 3168 says the sender "MUST NOT" set ECT on retransmitted packets. The rationale for this consumes nearly 2 pages of RFC 3168, so the reader is referred to section 6.1.5 of RFC 3168, rather than quoting it all here. There are essentially three arguments, namely: reliability; DoS attacks; and over-reaction to congestion. We address them in order below.

The reliability argument has already been addressed in Section 4.1.
Protection against DoS attacks is not afforded by prohibiting ECT on retransmitted packets. An attacker can set CE on spoofed retransmissions whether or not it is prohibited by an RFC. Protection against the DoS attack described in section 6.1.5 of RFC 3168 is solely afforded by the requirement that "the TCP data receiver SHOULD ignore the CE codepoint on out-of-window packets". Therefore in Section 3.2.7 the sender is allowed to set ECT on retransmitted packets, in order to reduce the chance of them being dropped. We also strengthen the receiver's requirement from "SHOULD ignore" to "MUST ignore". And we generalize the receiver's requirement to include failure of any validity check, not just out-of-window checks, in order to include the more stringent validity checks in RFC 5961 that have been developed since RFC 3168.

A consequence is that, for those retransmitted packets that arrive at the receiver after the original packet has been properly received (so-called spurious retransmissions), any CE marking will be ignored. There is no problem with that because the fact that the original packet has been delivered implies that the sender’s original congestion response (when it deemed the packet lost and retransmitted it) was unnecessary.

Finally, the third argument is about over-reacting to congestion. The argument goes that, if a retransmitted packet is dropped, the sender will not detect it, so it will not react again to congestion (it would have reduced its congestion window already when it retransmitted the packet). Whereas, if retransmitted packets can be CE tagged instead of dropped, senders could potentially react more than once to congestion. However, we argue that it is legitimate to respond again to congestion if it still persists in subsequent round trip(s).

Therefore, in all three cases, it is not incorrect to set ECT on retransmissions.

5. Interaction with popular variants or derivatives of TCP

The following subsections discuss any interactions between setting ECT on all all packets and using the following popular variants or derivatives of TCP: SCTP, IW10 and TFO. This section is informative not normative, because no interactions have been identified that require any change to specifications. The subsection on IW10 discusses potential changes to specifications but recommends that no changes are needed.

TCP variants that have been assessed and found not to interact adversely with ECT on TCP control packets are: SYN cookies (see
Appendix A of [RFC4987] and section 3.1 of [RFC5562]), TCP Fast Open (TFO [RFC7413]) and L4S [I-D.briscoe-tsvwg-l4s-arch].

5.1. SCTP

Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP [RFC4960]) is a standards track protocol derived from TCP. SCTP currently does not include ECN support, but Appendix A of RFC 4960 broadly describes how it would be supported and a draft on the addition of ECN to SCTP has been produced [I-D.stewart-tsvwg-sctpecn]. This draft avoids setting ECT on control packets and retransmissions, closely following the arguments in RFC 3168. When ECN is finally added to SCTP, experience from experiments on adding ECN support to all TCP packets ought to be directly transferable to SCTP.

5.2. IW10

IW10 is an experiment to determine whether it is safe for TCP to use an initial window of 10 SMSS [RFC6928].

This subsection does not recommend any additions to the present specification in order to interwork with IW10. The specifications as they stand are safe, and there is only a corner-case with ECT on the SYN where performance could be occasionally improved, as explained below.

As specified in Section 3.2.1.1, a TCP initiator can only set ECT on the SYN if it requests AccECN support. If, however, the SYN-ACK tells the initiator that the responder does not support AccECN, Section 3.2.1.1 advises the initiator to conservatively reduce its initial window to 1 SMSS because, if the SYN was CE-marked, the SYN-ACK has no way to feed that back.

If the initiator implements IW10, it seems rather over-conservative to reduce IW from 10 to 1 just in case a congestion marking was missed. Nonetheless, the reduction to 1 SMSS will rarely harm performance, because:

- as long as the initiator is caching failures to negotiate AccECN, subsequent attempts to access the same server will not use ECT on the SYN anyway, so there will no longer be any need to conservatively reduce IW;

- currently it is not common for a TCP initiator (client) to have more than one data segment to send {ToDo: evidence/reference?} - IW10 is primarily exploited by TCP servers.
If a responder receives feedback that the SYN-ACK was CE-marked, Section 3.2.2.2 mandates that it reduces its initial window to 1 SMSS. When the responder also implements IW10, it is particularly important to adhere to this requirement in order to avoid overflowing a queue that is clearly already congested.

5.3. TFO

TCP Fast Open (TFO [RFC7413]) is an experiment to remove the round trip delay of TCP’s 3-way hand-shake (3WHS). A TFO initiator caches a cookie from a previous connection with a TFO-enabled server. Then, for subsequent connections to the same server, any data included on the SYN can be passed directly to the server application, which can then return up to an initial window of response data on the SYN-ACK and on data segments straight after it, without waiting for the ACK that completes the 3WHS.

The TFO experiment and the present experiment to add ECN-support for TCP control packets can be combined without altering either specification, which is justified as follows:

- The handling of ECN marking on a SYN is no different whether or not it carries data.
- In response to any CE-marking on the SYN-ACK, the responder adopts the normal response to congestion, as discussed in Section 7.2 of [RFC7413].

6. Security Considerations

Section 3.2.6 considers the question of whether ECT on RSTs will allow RST attacks to be intensified. There are several security arguments presented in RFC 3168 for preventing the ECN marking of TCP control packets and retransmitted segments. We believe all of them have been properly addressed in Section 4, particularly Section 4.2.3 and Section 4.8 on DoS attacks using spoofed ECT-marked SYNs and spoofed CE-marked retransmissions.

7. IANA Considerations

There are no IANA considerations in this memo.

8. Acknowledgments

Thanks to Mirja Kuehlewind and David Black for their useful reviews.

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consortiums view, but the consortium is not liable for any use that may be made of any of the information contained therein.

9. References

9.1. Normative References


9.2. Informative References


[I-D.briscoe-tsvwg-l4s-arch]

[I-D.stewart-tsvwg-sctpecn]

[judd-nsdi]


[ECN-PLUS]

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More Accurate ECN Feedback in TCP
draft-ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn-07

Abstract

Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) is a mechanism where network nodes can mark IP packets instead of dropping them to indicate incipient congestion to the end-points. Receivers with an ECN-capable transport protocol feed back this information to the sender. ECN is specified for TCP in such a way that only one feedback signal can be transmitted per Round-Trip Time (RTT). Recently, new TCP mechanisms like Congestion Exposure (ConEx), Data Center TCP (DCTCP) or Low Latency Low Loss Scalable Throughput (L4S) need more accurate ECN feedback information whenever more than one marking is received in one RTT. This document specifies an experimental scheme to provide more than one feedback signal per RTT in the TCP header. Given TCP header space is scarce, it allocates a reserved header bit, that was previously used for the ECN-Nonce which has now been declared historic. It also overloads the two existing ECN flags in the TCP header. Supplementary feedback information can optionally be provided in a new TCP option, which is never used on the TCP SYN.

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This Internet-Draft will expire on January 3, 2019.
Internet-Draft          Accurate TCP-ECN Feedback              July 2018

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1. Introduction

Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) [RFC3168] is a mechanism where network nodes can mark IP packets instead of dropping them to indicate incipient congestion to the end-points. Receivers with an ECN-capable transport protocol feed back this information to the sender. ECN is specified for TCP in such a way that only one feedback signal can be transmitted per Round-Trip Time (RTT).

Recently, proposed mechanisms like Congestion Exposure (ConEx [RFC7713]), DCTCP [RFC8257] or L4S [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-l4s-arch] need to know when more than one marking is received in one RTT which is information that cannot be provided by the feedback scheme as specified in [RFC3168]. This document specifies an alternative feedback scheme that provides more accurate information and could be used by these new TCP extensions. A fuller treatment of the motivation for this specification is given in the associated requirements document [RFC7560].

This document specifies an experimental scheme for ECN feedback in the TCP header to provide more than one feedback signal per RTT. It will be called the more accurate ECN feedback scheme, or AccECN for short. If AccECN progresses from experimental to the standards track, it is intended to be a complete replacement for classic TCP/
ECN feedback, not a fork in the design of TCP. AccECN feedback complements TCP’s loss feedback and it supplements classic TCP/ECN feedback, so its applicability is intended to include all public and private IP networks (and even any non-IP networks over which TCP is used today), whether or not any nodes on the path support ECN of whatever flavour.

Until the AccECN experiment succeeds, [RFC3168] will remain as the only standards track specification for adding ECN to TCP. To avoid confusion, in this document we use the term ‘classic ECN’ for the pre-existing ECN specification [RFC3168].

AccECN feedback overloads the two existing ECN flags and allocates the currently reserved flag (previously called NS) in the TCP header, to be used as one field indicating the number of congestion experienced marked packets. Given the new definitions of these three bits, both ends have to support the new wire protocol before it can be used. Therefore during the TCP handshake the two ends use these three bits in the TCP header to negotiate the most advanced feedback protocol that they can both support, in a way that is backward compatible with [RFC3168].

AccECN is solely an (experimental) change to the TCP wire protocol; it only specifies the negotiation and signaling of more accurate ECN feedback from a TCP Data Receiver to a Data Sender. It is completely independent of how TCP might respond to congestion feedback, which is out of scope. For that we refer to [RFC3168] or any RFC that specifies a different response to TCP ECN feedback, for example: [RFC8257]; or the ECN experiments referred to in [RFC8311], namely: a TCP-based Low Latency Low Loss Scalable (L4S) congestion control [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-l4s-arch]; ECN-capable TCP control packets [I-D.ietf-tcpm-generalized-ecn], or Alternative Backoff with ECN (ABE) [I-D.ietf-tcpm-alternativebackoff-ecn].

It is likely (but not required) that the AccECN protocol will be implemented along with the following experimental additions to the TCP-ECN protocol: ECN-capable TCP control packets and retransmissions [I-D.ietf-tcpm-generalized-ecn], which includes the ECN-capable SYN/ACK experiment [RFC5562]; and testing receiver non-compliance [I-D.moncaster-tcpm-rcv-cheat].

1.1. Document Roadmap

The following introductory sections outline the goals of AccECN (Section 1.2) and the goal of experiments with ECN (Section 1.3) so that it is clear what success would look like. Then terminology is defined (Section 1.4) and a recap of existing prerequisite technology is given (Section 1.5).
Section 2 gives an informative overview of the AccECN protocol. Then
Section 3 gives the normative protocol specification. Section 4
assesses the interaction of AccECN with commonly used variants of
TCP, whether standardised or not. Section 5 summarises the features
and properties of AccECN.

Section 6 summarises the protocol fields and numbers that IANA will
need to assign and Section 7 points to the aspects of the protocol
that will be of interest to the security community.

Appendix A gives pseudocode examples for the various algorithms that
AccECN uses.

1.2. Goals

[RFC7560] enumerates requirements that a candidate feedback scheme
will need to satisfy, under the headings: resilience, timeliness,
integrity, accuracy (including ordering and lack of bias),
complexity, overhead and compatibility (both backward and forward).
It recognises that a perfect scheme that fully satisfies all the
requirements is unlikely and trade-offs between requirements are
likely. Section 5 presents the properties of AccECN against these
requirements and discusses the trade-offs made.

The requirements document recognises that a protocol as ubiquitous as
TCP needs to be able to serve as-yet-unspecified requirements.
Therefore an AccECN receiver aims to act as a generic (dumb)
reflector of congestion information so that in future new sender
behaviours can be deployed unilaterally.

1.3. Experiment Goals

TCP is critical to the robust functioning of the Internet, therefore
any proposed modifications to TCP need to be thoroughly tested. The
present specification describes an experimental protocol that adds
more accurate ECN feedback to the TCP protocol. The intention is to
specify the protocol sufficiently so that more than one
implementation can be built in order to test its function, robustness
and interoperability (with itself and with previous version of ECN
and TCP).

The experimental protocol will be considered successful if testing
confirms that the proposed mechanism can be deployed at large scale.
Testing will mostly focus on fall-back strategies in case of
middlebox interference. Current recommended strategies are specified
in Sections 3.1.2, 3.2.3, 3.2.4 and 3.2.7. The effectiveness of
these strategies depends on the actual deployment situation of
middleboxes. Therefore experimental verification to confirm large-
scale path traversal in the Internet is needed before finalizing this
specification on the Standards Track.

Another experimentation focus is the implementation feasibility of
change-triggered ACKs as described in section 3.2.8. While on
average this should not lead to a higher ACK rate, it changes the ACK
pattern which can particularly have an impact on hardware offload.
It is currently specified as a hard requirement, because the sender
can exploit the predictability of the receiver’s behaviour. However,
further experimentation is needed to advise if will have to become
just preferred behavior.

1.4. Terminology

AccECN: The more accurate ECN feedback scheme will be called AccECN
for short.

Classic ECN: the ECN protocol specified in [RFC3168].

Classic ECN feedback: the feedback aspect of the ECN protocol
specified in [RFC3168], including generation, encoding,
transmission and decoding of feedback, but not the Data Sender’s
subsequent response to that feedback.

ACK: A TCP acknowledgement, with or without a data payload.

Pure ACK: A TCP acknowledgement without a data payload.

TCP client: The TCP stack that originates a connection.

TCP server: The TCP stack that responds to a connection request.

Data Receiver: The endpoint of a TCP half-connection that receives
data and sends AccECN feedback.

Data Sender: The endpoint of a TCP half-connection that sends data
and receives AccECN feedback.

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119]
[RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown
here.
1.5. Recap of Existing ECN feedback in IP/TCP

ECN [RFC3168] uses two bits in the IP header. Once ECN has been negotiated with the receiver at the transport layer, an ECN sender can set two possible codepoints (ECT(0) or ECT(1)) in the IP header to indicate an ECN-capable transport (ECT). If both ECN bits are zero, the packet is considered to have been sent by a Not-ECN-capable Transport (Not-ECT). When a network node experiences congestion, it will occasionally either drop or mark a packet, with the choice depending on the packet’s ECN codepoint. If the codepoint is Not-ECT, only drop is appropriate. If the codepoint is ECT(0) or ECT(1), the node can mark the packet by setting both ECN bits, which is termed 'Congestion Experienced’ (CE), or loosely a 'congestion mark'. Table 1 summarises these codepoints.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IP-ECN codepoint (binary)</th>
<th>Codepoint name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>00</td>
<td>Not-ECT</td>
<td>Not ECN-Capable Transport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>ECT(1)</td>
<td>ECN-Capable Transport (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>ECT(0)</td>
<td>ECN-Capable Transport (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>CE</td>
<td>Congestion Experienced</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: The ECN Field in the IP Header

In the TCP header the first two bits in byte 14 are defined as flags for the use of ECN (CWR and ECE in Figure 1 [RFC3168]). A TCP client indicates it supports ECN by setting ECE=CWR=1 in the SYN, and an ECN-enabled server confirms ECN support by setting ECE=1 and CWR=0 in the SYN/ACK. On reception of a CE-marked packet at the IP layer, the Data Receiver starts to set the Echo Congestion Experienced (ECE) flag continuously in the TCP header of ACKs, which ensures the signal is received reliably even if ACKs are lost. The TCP sender confirms that it has received at least one ECE signal by responding with the congestion window reduced (CWR) flag, which allows the TCP receiver to stop repeating the ECN-Echo flag. This always leads to a full RTT of ACKs with ECE set. Thus any additional CE markings arriving within this RTT cannot be fed back.

The last bit in byte 13 of the TCP header was defined as the Nonce Sum (NS) for the ECN Nonce [RFC3540]. In the absence of widespread deployment RFC 3540 has been reclassified as historic [RFC8311] and the respective flag has been marked as "reserved", making this TCP flag available for use by the AccECN experiment instead.
2. AccECN Protocol Overview and Rationale

This section provides an informative overview of the AccECN protocol that will be normatively specified in Section 3.

Like the original TCP approach, the Data Receiver of each TCP half-connection sends AccECN feedback to the Data Sender on TCP acknowledgements, reusing data packets of the other half-connection whenever possible.

The AccECN protocol has had to be designed in two parts:

- an essential part that re-uses ECN TCP header bits to feed back the number of arriving CE marked packets. This provides more accuracy than classic ECN feedback, but limited resilience against ACK loss;

- a supplementary part using a new AccECN TCP Option that provides additional feedback on the number of bytes that arrive marked with each of the three ECN codepoints (not just CE marks). This provides greater resilience against ACK loss than the essential feedback, but it is more likely to suffer from middlebox interference.

The two part design was necessary, given limitations on the space available for TCP options and given the possibility that certain incorrectly designed middleboxes prevent TCP using any new options.

The essential part overloads the previous definition of the three flags in the TCP header that had been assigned for use by ECN. This design choice deliberately replaces the classic ECN feedback protocol, rather than leaving classic ECN feedback intact and adding more accurate feedback separately because:

- this efficiently reuses scarce TCP header space, given TCP option space is approaching saturation;

- a single upgrade path for the TCP protocol is preferable to a fork in the design;
Accurate TCP-ECN Feedback

2.1. Capability Negotiation

AccECN is a change to the wire protocol of the main TCP header, therefore it can only be used if both endpoints have been upgraded to understand it. The TCP client signals support for AccECN on the initial SYN of a connection and the TCP server signals whether it supports AccECN on the SYN/ACK. The TCP flags on the SYN that the client uses to signal AccECN support have been carefully chosen so that a TCP server will interpret them as a request to support the most recent variant of ECN feedback that it supports. Then the client falls back to the same variant of ECN feedback.

An AccECN TCP client does not send the new AccECN Option on the SYN as SYN option space is limited and successful negotiation using the flags in the main header is taken as sufficient evidence that both ends also support the AccECN Option. The TCP server sends the AccECN Option on the SYN/ACK and the client sends it on the first ACK to test whether the network path forwards the option correctly.

2.2. Feedback Mechanism

A Data Receiver maintains four counters initialised at the start of the half-connection. Three count the number of arriving payload bytes marked CE, ECT(1) and ECT(0) respectively. The fourth counts the number of packets arriving marked with a CE codepoint (including control packets without payload if they are CE-marked).

The Data Sender maintains four equivalent counters for the half connection, and the AccECN protocol is designed to ensure they will match the values in the Data Receiver’s counters, albeit after a little delay.

Each ACK carries the three least significant bits (LSBs) of the packet-based CE counter using the ECN bits in the TCP header, now renamed the Accurate ECN (ACE) field (see Figure 2 later). The LSBs of each of the three byte counters are carried in the AccECN Option.
2.3. Delayed ACKs and Resilience Against ACK Loss

With both the ACE and the AccECN Option mechanisms, the Data Receiver continually repeats the current LSBs of each of its respective counters. There is no need to acknowledge these continually repeated counters, so the congestion window reduced (CWR) mechanism is no longer used. Even if some ACKs are lost, the Data Sender should be able to infer how much to increment its own counters, even if the protocol field has wrapped.

The 3-bit ACE field can wrap fairly frequently. Therefore, even if it appears to have incremented by one (say), the field might have actually cycled completely then incremented by one. The Data Receiver is required not to delay sending an ACK to such an extent that the ACE field would cycle. However cyling is still a possibility at the Data Sender because a whole sequence of ACKs carrying intervening values of the field might all be lost or delayed in transit.

The fields in the AccECN Option are larger, but they will increment in larger steps because they count bytes not packets. Nonetheless, their size has been chosen such that a whole cycle of the field would never occur between ACKs unless there had been an infeasibly long sequence of ACK losses. Therefore, as long as the AccECN Option is available, it can be treated as a dependable feedback channel.

If the AccECN Option is not available, e.g. it is being stripped by a middlebox, the AccECN protocol will only feed back information on CE markings (using the ACE field). Although not ideal, this will be sufficient, because it is envisaged that neither ECT(0) nor ECT(1) will ever indicate more severe congestion than CE, even though future uses for ECT(0) or ECT(1) are still unclear [RFC8311]. Because the 3-bit ACE field is so small, when it is the only field available the Data Sender has to interpret it conservatively assuming the worst possible wrap.

Certain specified events trigger the Data Receiver to include an AccECN Option on an ACK. The rules are designed to ensure that the order in which different markings arrive at the receiver is communicated to the sender (as long as there is no ACK loss). Implementations are encouraged to send an AccECN Option more frequently, but this is left up to the implementer.

2.4. Feedback Metrics

The CE packet counter in the ACE field and the CE byte counter in the AccECN Option both provide feedback on received CE-marks. The CE packet counter includes control packets that do not have payload.
data, while the CE byte counter solely includes marked payload bytes. If both are present, the byte counter in the option will provide the more accurate information needed for modern congestion control and policing schemes, such as DCTCP or ConEx. If the option is stripped, a simple algorithm to estimate the number of marked bytes from the ACE field is given in Appendix A.3.

Feedback in bytes is recommended in order to protect against the receiver using attacks similar to ‘ACK-Division’ to artificially inflate the congestion window, which is why [RFC5681] now recommends that TCP counts acknowledged bytes not packets.

2.5. Generic (Dumb) Reflector

The ACE field provides information about CE markings on both data and control packets. According to [RFC3168] the Data Sender is meant to set control packets to Not-ECT. However, mechanisms in certain private networks (e.g. data centres) set control packets to be ECN capable because they are precisely the packets that performance depends on most.

For this reason, AccECN is designed to be a generic reflector of whatever ECN markings it sees, whether or not they are compliant with a current standard. Then as standards evolve, Data Senders can upgrade unilaterally without any need for receivers to upgrade too. It is also useful to be able to rely on generic reflection behaviour when senders need to test for unexpected interference with markings (for instance [I-D.kuehlewind-tcpm-ecn-fallback] and [I-D.moncaster-tcpm-rcv-cheat]).

The initial SYN is the most critical control packet, so AccECN provides feedback on whether it is CE marked. Although RFC 3168 prohibits an ECN-capable SYN, providing feedback of CE marking on the SYN supports future scenarios in which SYNs might be ECN-enabled (without prejudging whether they ought to be). For instance, [RFC8311] updates this aspect of RFC 3168 to allow experimentation with ECN-capable TCP control packets.

Even if the TCP client (or server) has set the SYN (or SYN/ACK) to not-ECT in compliance with RFC 3168, feedback on the state of the ECN field when it arrives at the receiver could still be useful, because middleboxes have been known to overwrite the ECN IP field as if it is still part of the old Type of Service (ToS) field [Mandalari18]. If a TCP client has set the SYN to Not-ECT, but receives feedback that the ECN field on the SYN arrived with a different codepoint, it can detect such middlebox interference and send Not-ECT for the rest of the connection (see [I-D.kuehlewind-tcpm-ecn-fallback]). Today, if a TCP server receives ECT or CE on a SYN, it cannot know whether it is
invalid (or valid) because only the TCP client knows whether it originally marked the SYN as Not-ECT (or ECT). Therefore, prior to AccECN, the server’s only safe course of action was to disable ECN for the connection. Instead, the AccECN protocol allows the server to feed back the received ECN field to the client, which then has all the information to decide whether the connection has to fall-back from supporting ECN (or not).

3. AccECN Protocol Specification

3.1. Negotiating to use AccECN

3.1.1. Negotiation during the TCP handshake

Given the ECN Nonce [RFC3540] has been reclassified as historic [RFC8311], the present specification re-allocates the TCP flag at bit 7 of the TCP header, which was previously called NS (Nonce Sum), as the AE (Accurate ECN) flag (see IANA Considerations in Section 6).

During the TCP handshake at the start of a connection, to request more accurate ECN feedback the TCP client (host A) MUST set the TCP flags AE=1, CWR=1 and ECE=1 in the initial SYN segment.

If a TCP server (B) that is AccECN-enabled receives a SYN with the above three flags set, it MUST set both its half connections into AccECN mode. Then it MUST set the TCP flags on the SYN/ACK to one of the 4 values shown in the top block of Table 2 to confirm that it supports AccECN. The TCP server MUST NOT set one of these 4 combination of flags on the SYN/ACK unless the preceding SYN requested support for AccECN as above.

A TCP server in AccECN mode MUST set the AE, CWR and ECE TCP flags on the SYN/ACK to the value in Table 2 that feeds back the IP-ECN field that arrived on the SYN. This applies whether or not the server itself supports setting the IP-ECN field on a SYN or SYN/ACK (see Section 2.5 for rationale).

Once a TCP client (A) has sent the above SYN to declare that it supports AccECN, and once it has received the above SYN/ACK segment that confirms that the TCP server supports AccECN, the TCP client MUST set both its half connections into AccECN mode.

The procedure for the client to follow if a SYN/ACK does not arrive before its retransmission timer expires is given in Section 3.1.2.

The three flags set to 1 to indicate AccECN support on the SYN have been carefully chosen to enable natural fall-back to prior stages in the evolution of ECN. Table 2 tabulates all the negotiation
possibilities for ECN-related capabilities that involve at least one AccECN-capable host. The entries in the first two columns have been abbreviated, as follows:

AccECN: More Accurate ECN Feedback (the present specification)

Nonce: ECN Nonce feedback [RFC3540]

ECN: ‘Classic’ ECN feedback [RFC3168]

No ECN: Not-ECN-capable. Implicit congestion notification using packet drop.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SYN A-&gt;B</th>
<th>SYN/ACK B-&gt;A</th>
<th>Feedback Mode</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AccECN</td>
<td>AccECN</td>
<td>1 1 1</td>
<td>0 1 0</td>
<td>AccECN (Not-ECT on SYN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AccECN</td>
<td>AccECN</td>
<td>1 1 1</td>
<td>0 1 1</td>
<td>AccECN (ECT1 on SYN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AccECN</td>
<td>AccECN</td>
<td>1 1 1</td>
<td>1 0 0</td>
<td>AccECN (ECT0 on SYN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AccECN</td>
<td>AccECN</td>
<td>1 1 1</td>
<td>1 1 0</td>
<td>AccECN (CE on SYN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Nonce</td>
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<td>1 0 1</td>
<td>classic ECN</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>AccECN</td>
<td>Broken</td>
<td>1 1 1</td>
<td>1 1 1</td>
<td>Not ECN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: ECN capability negotiation between Client (A) and Server (B)

Table 2 is divided into blocks each separated by an empty row.

1. The top block shows the case already described where both endpoints support AccECN and how the TCP server (B) indicates congestion feedback.

2. The second block shows the cases where the TCP client (A) supports AccECN but the TCP server (B) supports some earlier variant of TCP feedback, indicated in its SYN/ACK. Therefore, as soon as an AccECN-capable TCP client (A) receives the SYN/ACK
shown it MUST set both its half connections into the feedback mode shown in the rightmost column.

3. The third block shows the cases where the TCP server (B) supports AccECN but the TCP client (A) supports some earlier variant of TCP feedback, indicated in its SYN. Therefore, as soon as an AccECN-enabled TCP server (B) receives the SYN shown, it MUST set both its half connections into the feedback mode shown in the rightmost column.

4. The fourth block displays a combination labelled ‘Broken’. Some older TCP server implementations incorrectly set the reserved flags in the SYN/ACK by reflecting those in the SYN. Such broken TCP servers (B) cannot support ECN, so as soon as an AccECN-capable TCP client (A) receives such a broken SYN/ACK it MUST fall-back to Not ECN mode for both its half connections.

The following exceptional cases need some explanation:

ECN Nonce: With AccECN implementation, there is no need for the ECN Nonce feedback mode [RFC3540], which has also been reclassified as historic [RFC8311], as AccECN is compatible with an alternative ECN feedback integrity approach that does not use up the ECT(1) codepoint and can be implemented solely at the sender (see Section 4.3).

Simultaneous Open: An originating AccECN Host (A), having sent a SYN with AE=1, CWR=1 and ECE=1, might receive another SYN from host B. Host A MUST then enter the same feedback mode as it would have entered had it been a responding host and received the same SYN. Then host A MUST send the same SYN/ACK as it would have sent had it been a responding host.

3.1.2. Retransmission of the SYN

If the sender of an AccECN SYN times out before receiving the SYN/ACK, the sender SHOULD attempt to negotiate the use of AccECN at least one more time by continuing to set all three TCP ECN flags on the first retransmitted SYN (using the usual retransmission time-outs). If this first retransmission also fails to be acknowledged, the sender SHOULD send subsequent retransmissions of the SYN without any TCP-ECN flags set. This adds delay, in the case where a middlebox drops an AccECN (or ECN) SYN deliberately. However, current measurements imply that a drop is less likely to be due to middlebox interference than other intermittent causes of loss, e.g. congestion, wireless interference, etc.
Implementers MAY use other fall-back strategies if they are found to be more effective (e.g. attempting to negotiate AccECN on the SYN only once or more than twice (most appropriate during high levels of congestion); or falling back to classic ECN feedback rather than non-ECN). Further it may make sense to also remove any other experimental fields or options on the SYN in case a middlebox might be blocking them, although the required behaviour will depend on the specification of the other option(s) and any attempt to co-ordinate fall-back between different modules of the stack. In any case, the TCP initiator SHOULD cache failed connection attempts. If it does, it SHOULD NOT give up attempting to negotiate AccECN on the SYN of subsequent connection attempts until it is clear that the blockage is persistently and specifically due to AccECN. The cache should be arranged to expire so that the initiator will infrequently attempt to check whether the problem has been resolved.

The fall-back procedure if the TCP server receives no ACK to acknowledge a SYN/ACK that tried to negotiate AccECN is specified in Section 3.2.7.

3.2. AccECN Feedback

Each Data Receiver of each half connection maintains four counters, \( r.cep \), \( r.ceb \), \( r.e0b \) and \( r.e1b \). The CE packet counter (\( r.cep \)), counts the number of packets the host receives with the CE code point in the IP ECN field, including CE marks on control packets without data. \( r.ceb \), \( r.e0b \) and \( r.e1b \) count the number of TCP payload bytes in packets marked respectively with the CE, ECT(0) and ECT(1) codepoint in their IP-ECN field. When a host first enters AccECN mode, it initializes its counters to \( r.cep = 5 \), \( r.e0b = 1 \) and \( r.ceb = r.e1b = 0 \) (see Appendix A.5). Non-zero initial values are used to support a stateless handshake (see Section 4.1) and to be distinct from cases where the fields are incorrectly zeroed (e.g. by middleboxes – see Section 3.2.7.4).

A host feeds back the CE packet counter using the Accurate ECN (ACE) field, as explained in the next section. And it feeds back all the byte counters using the AccECN TCP Option, as specified in Section 3.2.6. Whenever a host feeds back the value of any counter, it MUST report the most recent value, no matter whether it is in a pure ACK, an ACK with new payload data or a retransmission. Therefore the feedback carried on a retransmitted packet is unlikely to be the same as the feedback on the original packet.
3.2.1. Initialization of Feedback Counters at the Data Sender

Each Data Sender of each half connection maintains four counters, s.cep, s.ceb, s.e0b and s.e1b intended to track the equivalent counters at the Data Receiver. When a host enters AccECN mode, it initializes them to s.cep = 5, s.e0b = 1 and s.ceb = s.e1b = 0.

If a TCP client (A) in AccECN mode receives a SYN/ACK with CE feedback, i.e. AE=1, CWR=1, ECE=0, it increments s.cep to 6. Otherwise, for any of the 3 other combinations of the 3 ECN TCP flags (the top 3 rows in Table 2), s.cep remains initialized to 5.

3.2.2. The ACE Field

After AccECN has been negotiated on the SYN and SYN/ACK, both hosts overload the three TCP flags (AE, CWR and ECE) in the main TCP header as one 3-bit field. Then the field is given a new name, ACE, as shown in Figure 2.

```
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
|               |           |           | U | A | P | R | S | F |
| Header Length | Reserved  |    ACE    | R | C | S | S | Y | I |
|               |           |           | G | K | H | T | N | N |
```

Figure 2: Definition of the ACE field within bytes 13 and 14 of the TCP Header (when AccECN has been negotiated and SYN=0).

The original definition of these three flags in the TCP header, including the addition of support for the ECN Nonce, is shown for comparison in Figure 1. This specification does not rename these three TCP flags to ACE unconditionally; it merely overloads them with another name and definition once an AccECN connection has been established.

A host MUST interpret the AE, CWR and ECE flags as the 3-bit ACE counter on a segment with the SYN flag cleared (SYN=0) that it sends or receives if both of its half-connections are set into AccECN mode having successfully negotiated AccECN (see Section 3.1). A host MUST NOT interpret the 3 flags as a 3-bit ACE field on any segment with SYN=1 (whether ACK is 0 or 1), or if AccECN negotiation is incomplete or has not succeeded.

Both parts of each of these conditions are equally important. For instance, even if AccECN negotiation has been successful, the ACE field is not defined on any segments with SYN=1 (e.g. a retransmission of an unacknowledged SYN/ACK, or when both ends send...
SYN/ACKs after AccECN support has been successfully negotiated during a simultaneous open).

With only one exception, on any packet with the SYN flag cleared (SYN=0), the Data Receiver MUST encode the three least significant bits of its r.cep counter into the ACE field it feeds back to the Data Sender.

There is only one exception to this rule: On the final ACK of the 3WHS, a TCP client (A) in AccECN mode MUST use the ACE field to feed back which of the 4 possible values of the IP-ECN field were on the SYN/ACK (the binary encoding is the same as that used on the SYN/ACK). Table 3 shows the meaning of each possible value of the ACE field on the ACK of the SYN/ACK and the value that an AccECN server MUST set s.cep to as a result. The encoding in Table 3 is solely applicable on a packet in the client-server direction with an acknowledgement number 1 greater than the Initial Sequence Number (ISN) that was used by the server.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACE on ACK of SYN/ACK</th>
<th>IP-ECN codepoint on SYN/ACK inferred by server</th>
<th>Initial s.cep of server in AccECN mode</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0b000</td>
<td>(Notes 1, 2)</td>
<td>Disable ECN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0b001</td>
<td>(Notes 2, 3)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0b010</td>
<td>Not-ECT</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0b011</td>
<td>ECT(1)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0b100</td>
<td>ECT(0)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0b101</td>
<td>Currently Unused (Note 3)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0b110</td>
<td>CE</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0b111</td>
<td>Currently Unused (Note 3)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Meaning of the ACE field on the ACK of the SYN/ACK

(Note 1): If the server is in AccECN mode, the value of zero raises suspicion of zeroing of the ACE field on the path (see Section 3.2.3).

(Note 2): If a server is in AccECN mode, there ought to be no valid case where the ACE field on the last ACK of the 3WHS has a value of 0b000 or 0b001.

However, in the case where a server that implements AccECN is also using a stateless handshake (termed a SYN cookie) it will not remember whether it entered AccECN mode. Then these two values
remind it that it did not enter AccECN mode (see Section 4.1 for details).

(Note 3): If the server is in AccECN mode, these values are Currently Unused but the AccECN server’s behaviour is still defined for forward compatibility.

3.2.3. Testing for Zeroing of the ACE Field

Section 3.2.2 required the Data Receiver to initialize the r.cep counter to a non-zero value. Therefore, in either direction the initial value of the ACE field ought to be non-zero.

If AccECN has been successfully negotiated, the Data Sender SHOULD check the initial value of the ACE field in the first arriving segment with SYN=0. If the initial value of the ACE field is zero (0b0000), the Data Sender MUST disable sending ECN-capable packets for the remainder of the half-connection by setting the IP/ECN field in all subsequent packets to Not-ECT.

For example, the server checks the ACK of the SYN/ACK or the first data segment from the client, while the client checks the first data segment from the server. More precisely, the "first segment with SYN=0" is defined as: the segment with SYN=0 that i) acknowledges sequence space at least covering the initial sequence number (ISN) plus 1; and ii) arrives before any other segments with SYN=0 so it is unlikely to be a retransmission. If no such segment arrives (e.g. because it is lost and the ISN is first acknowledged by a subsequent segment), no test for invalid initialization can be conducted, and the half-connection will continue in AccECN mode.

Note that the Data Sender MUST NOT test whether the arriving counter in the initial ACE field has been initialized to a specific valid value - the above check solely tests whether the ACE fields have been incorrectly zeroed. This allows hosts to use different initial values as an additional signalling channel in future.

3.2.4. Testing for Mangling of the IP/ECN Field

The value of the ACE field on the SYN/ACK indicates the value of the IP/ECN field when the SYN arrived at the server. The client can compare this with how it originally set the IP/ECN field on the SYN. If this comparison implies an unsafe transition of the IP/ECN field, for the remainder of the connection the client MUST NOT send ECN-capable packets, but it MUST continue to feed back any ECN markings on arriving packets.
The value of the ACE field on the last ACK of the 3WHS indicates the value of the IP/ECN field when the SYN/ACK arrived at the client. The server can compare this with how it originally set the IP/ECN field on the SYN/ACK. If this comparison implies an unsafe transition of the IP/ECN field, for the remainder of the connection the server MUST NOT send ECN-capable packets, but it MUST continue to feedback any ECN markings on arriving packets.

The ACK of the SYN/ACK is not reliably delivered (nonetheless, the count of CE marks is still eventually delivered reliably). If this ACK does not arrive, the server has to continue to send ECN-capable packets without having tested for mangling of the IP/ECN field on the SYN/ACK. Experiments with AccECN deployment will assess whether this limitation has any effect in practice.

Invalid transitions of the IP/ECN field are defined in [RFC3168] and repeated here for convenience:

- the not-ECT codepoint changes;
- either ECT codepoint transitions to not-ECT;
- the CE codepoint changes.

RFC 3168 says that a router that changes ECT to not-ECT is invalid but safe. However, from a host’s viewpoint, this transition is unsafe because it could be the result of two transitions at different routers on the path: ECT to CE (safe) then CE to not-ECT (unsafe). This scenario could well happen where an ECN-enabled home router congests its upstream mobile broadband bottleneck link, then the ingress to the mobile network clears the ECN field [Mandalari18].

The above fall-back behaviours are necessary in case mangling of the IP/ECN field is asymmetric, which is currently common over some mobile networks [Mandalari18]. Then one end might see no unsafe transition and continue sending ECN-capable packets, while the other end sees an unsafe transition and stops sending ECN-capable packets.

3.2.5. Safety against Ambiguity of the ACE Field

If too many CE-marked segments are acknowledged at once, or if a long run of ACKs is lost, the 3-bit counter in the ACE field might have cycled between two ACKs arriving at the Data Sender.

Therefore an AccECN Data Receiver SHOULD immediately send an ACK once ‘n’ CE marks have arrived since the previous ACK, where ‘n’ SHOULD be 2 and MUST be no greater than 6.
If the Data Sender has not received AccECN TCP Options to give it more dependable information, and it detects that the ACE field could have cycled under the prevailing conditions, it SHOULD conservatively assume that the counter did cycle. It can detect if the counter could have cycled by using the jump in the acknowledgement number since the last ACK to calculate or estimate how many segments could have been acknowledged. An example algorithm to implement this policy is given in Appendix A.2. An implementer MAY develop an alternative algorithm as long as it satisfies these requirements.

If missing acknowledgement numbers arrive later (reordering) and prove that the counter did not cycle, the Data Sender MAY attempt to neutralise the effect of any action it took based on a conservative assumption that it later found to be incorrect.

3.2.6. The AccECN Option

The AccECN Option is defined as shown below in Figure 3. It consists of three 24-bit fields that provide the 24 least significant bits of the r.e0b, r.ceb and r.e1b counters, respectively. The initial 'E' of each field name stands for 'Echo'.

```
+--------------------------+
<p>|  Kind = TBD1  |  Length = 11  |          EE0B field           |
|--------------------------|
| EE0B (cont’d) |           ECEB field                          |
|--------------------------|</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EE1B field</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
```

Figure 3: The AccECN Option

The Data Receiver MUST set the Kind field to TBD1, which is registered in Section 6 as a new TCP option Kind called AccECN. An experimental TCP option with Kind=254 MAY be used for initial experiments, with magic number 0xACCE.

Appendix A.1 gives an example algorithm for the Data Receiver to encode its byte counters into the AccECN Option, and for the Data Sender to decode the AccECN Option fields into its byte counters.

Note that there is no field to feedback Not-ECT bytes. Nonetheless an algorithm for the Data Sender to calculate the number of payload bytes received as Not-ECT is given in Appendix A.5.
Whenever a Data Receiver sends an AccECN Option, the rules in Section 3.2.8 expect it to always send a full-length option. To cope with option space limitations, it can omit unchanged fields from the tail of the option, as long as it preserves the order of the remaining fields and includes any field that has changed. The length field MUST indicate which fields are present as follows:

Length=11: EE0B, ECEB, EE1B
Length=8: EE0B, ECEB
Length=5: EE0B
Length=2: (empty)

The empty option of Length=2 is provided to allow for a case where an AccECN Option has to be sent (e.g. on the SYN/ACK to test the path), but there is very limited space for the option. For initial experiments, the Length field MUST be 2 greater to accommodate the 16-bit magic number.

All implementations of a Data Sender MUST be able to read in AccECN Options of any of the above lengths. If the AccECN Option is of any other length, implementations MUST use those whole 3 octet fields that fit within the length and ignore the remainder of the option.

The use of the AccECN option is optional for the Data Receiver. If the Data Receiver intents to use the AccECN option at any time during the rest of the connection it strongly recommended to also test its path traversal by including it in the SYN/ACK as specified in the next section. By default the use of the AccECN option is RECOMMENDED.

3.2.7. Path Traversal of the AccECN Option

3.2.7.1. Testing the AccECN Option during the Handshake

The TCP client MUST NOT include the AccECN TCP Option on the SYN. Nonetheless, if the AccECN negotiation using the ECN flags in the main TCP header (Section 3.1) is successful, it implicitly declares that the endpoints also support the AccECN TCP Option. A fall-back strategy for the loss of the SYN (possibly due to middlebox interference) is specified in Section 3.1.2.

A TCP server that confirms its support for AccECN (in response to an AccECN SYN from the client as described in Section 3.1) SHOULD include an AccECN TCP Option in the SYN/ACK.
A TCP client that has successfully negotiated AccECN SHOULD include an AccECN Option in the first ACK at the end of the 3WHS. However, this first ACK is not delivered reliably, so the TCP client SHOULD also include an AccECN Option on the first data segment it sends (if it ever sends one).

A host MAY NOT include an AccECN Option in any of these three cases if it has cached knowledge that the packet would be likely to be blocked on the path to the other host if it included an AccECN Option.

3.2.7.2. Testing for Loss of Packets Carrying the AccECN Option

If after the normal TCP timeout the TCP server has not received an ACK to acknowledge its SYN/ACK, the SYN/ACK might just have been lost, e.g. due to congestion, or a middlebox might be blocking the AccECN Option. To expedite connection setup, the TCP server SHOULD retransmit the SYN/ACK with the same TCP flags (AE, CWR and ECE) but with no AccECN Option. If this retransmission times out, to expedite connection setup, the TCP server SHOULD disable AccECN and ECN for this connection by retransmitting the SYN/ACK with AE=CWR=ECE=0 and no AccECN Option. Implementers MAY use other fall-back strategies if they are found to be more effective (e.g. falling back to classic ECN feedback on the first retransmission; retrying the AccECN Option for a second time before fall-back (most appropriate during high levels of congestion); or falling back to classic ECN feedback rather than non-ECN on the third retransmission).

If the TCP client detects that the first data segment it sent with the AccECN Option was lost, it SHOULD fall back to no AccECN Option on the retransmission. Again, implementers MAY use other fall-back strategies such as attempting to retransmit a second segment with the AccECN Option before fall-back, and/or caching whether the AccECN Option is blocked for subsequent connections.

Either host MAY include the AccECN Option in a subsequent segment to retest whether the AccECN Option can traverse the path.

If the TCP server receives a second SYN with a request for AccECN support, it should resend the SYN/ACK, again confirming its support for AccECN, but this time without the AccECN Option. This approach rules out any interference by middleboxes that may drop packets with unknown options, even though it is more likely that the SYN/ACK would have been lost due to congestion. The TCP server MAY try to send another packet with the AccECN Option at a later point during the connection but should monitor if that packet got lost as well, in which case it SHOULD disable the sending of the AccECN Option for this half-connection.
Similarly, an AccECN end-point MAY separately memorize which data packets carried an AccECN Option and disable the sending of AccECN Options if the loss probability of those packets is significantly higher than that of all other data packets in the same connection.

3.2.7.3. Testing for Stripping of the AccECN Option

If the TCP client has successfully negotiated AccECN but does not receive an AccECN Option on the SYN/ACK, it switches into a mode that assumes that the AccECN Option is not available for this half connection.

Similarly, if the TCP server has successfully negotiated AccECN but does not receive an AccECN Option on the first segment that acknowledges sequence space at least covering the ISN, it switches into a mode that assumes that the AccECN Option is not available for this half connection.

While a host is in this mode that assumes incoming AccECN Options are not available, it MUST adopt the conservative interpretation of the ACE field discussed in Section 3.2.5. However, it cannot make any assumption about support of outgoing AccECN Options on the other half connection, so it SHOULD continue to send the AccECN Option itself (unless it has established that sending the AccECN Option is causing packets to be blocked as in Section 3.2.7.2).

If a host is in the mode that assumes incoming AccECN Options are not available, but it receives an AccECN Option at any later point during the connection, this clearly indicates that the AccECN Option is not blocked on the respective path, and the AccECN endpoint MAY switch out of the mode that assumes the AccECN Option is not available for this half connection.

3.2.7.4. Test for Zeroing of the AccECN Option

For a related test for invalid initialization of the ACE field, see Section 3.2.3

Section 3.2 required the Data Receiver to initialize the r.e0b counter to a non-zero value. Therefore, in either direction the initial value of the EE0B field in the AccECN Option (if one exists) ought to be non-zero. If AccECN has been negotiated:

- the TCP server MAY check the initial value of the EE0B field in the first segment that acknowledges sequence space that at least covers the ISN plus 1. If the initial value of the EE0B field is zero, the server will switch into a mode that ignores the AccECN Option for this half connection.
the TCP client MAY check the initial value of the EE0B field on the SYN/ACK. If the initial value of the EE0B field is zero, the client will switch into a mode that ignores the AccECN Option for this half connection.

While a host is in the mode that ignores the AccECN Option it MUST adopt the conservative interpretation of the ACE field discussed in Section 3.2.5.

Note that the Data Sender MUST NOT test whether the arriving byte counters in the initial AccECN Option have been initialized to specific valid values - the above checks solely test whether these fields have been incorrectly zeroed. This allows hosts to use different initial values as an additional signalling channel in future. Also note that the initial value of either field might be greater than its expected initial value, because the counters might already have been incremented. Nonetheless, the initial values of the counters have been chosen so that they cannot wrap to zero on these initial segments.

3.2.7.5. Consistency between AccECN Feedback Fields

When the AccECN Option is available it supplements but does not replace the ACE field. An endpoint using AccECN feedback MUST always consider the information provided in the ACE field whether or not the AccECN Option is also available.

If the AccECN option is present, the s.cep counter might increase while the s.ccb counter does not (e.g. due to a CE-marked control packet). The sender’s response to such a situation is out of scope, and needs to be dealt with in a specification that uses ECN-capable control packets. Theoretically, this situation could also occur if a middlebox mangled the AccECN Option but not the ACE field. However, the Data Sender has to assume that the integrity of the AccECN Option is sound, based on the above test of the well-known initial values and optionally other integrity tests (Section 4.3).

If either end-point detects that the s.ccb counter has increased but the s.cep has not (and by testing ACK coverage it is certain how much the ACE field has wrapped), this invalid protocol transition has to be due to some form of feedback mangling. So, the Data Sender MUST disable sending ECN-capable packets for the remainder of the half-connection by setting the IP/ECN field in all subsequent packets to Not-ECT.
3.2.8. Usage of the AccECN TCP Option

The following rules determine when a Data Receiver in AccECN mode sends the AccECN TCP Option, and which fields to include:

Change-Triggered ACKs: If an arriving packet increments a different byte counter to that incremented by the previous packet, the Data Receiver MUST immediately send an ACK with an AccECN Option, without waiting for the next delayed ACK (this is in addition to the safety recommendation in Section 3.2.5 against ambiguity of the ACE field).

This is stated as a "MUST" so that the data sender can rely on change-triggered ACKs to detect transitions right from the very start of a flow, without first having to detect whether the receiver complies. A concern has been raised that certain offload hardware needed for high performance might not be able to support change-triggered ACKs, although high performance protocols such as DCTCP successfully use change-triggered ACKs. One possible experimental compromise would be for the receiver to heuristically detect whether the sender is in slow-start, then to implement change-triggered ACKs in software while the sender is in slow-start, and offload to hardware otherwise. If the operator disables change-triggered ACKs, whether partially like this or otherwise, the operator will also be responsible for ensuring a co-ordinated sender algorithm is deployed;

Continual Repetition: Otherwise, if arriving packets continue to increment the same byte counter, the Data Receiver can include an AccECN Option on most or all (delayed) ACKs, but it does not have to. If option space is limited on a particular ACK, the Data Receiver MUST give precedence to SACK information about loss. It SHOULD include an AccECN Option if the r.ceb counter has incremented and it MAY include an AccECN Option if r.ec0b or r.ec1b has incremented;

Full-Length Options Preferred: It SHOULD always use full-length AccECN Options. It MAY use shorter AccECN Options if space is limited, but it MUST include the counter(s) that have incremented since the previous AccECN Option and it MUST only truncate fields from the right-hand tail of the option to preserve the order of the remaining fields (see Section 3.2.6);

Beaconing Full-Length Options: Nonetheless, it MUST include a full-length AccECN TCP Option on at least three ACKs per RTT, or on all ACKs if there are less than three per RTT (see Appendix A.4 for an example algorithm that satisfies this requirement).
The following example series of arriving IP/ECN fields illustrates when a Data Receiver will emit an ACK if it is using a delayed ACK factor of 2 segments and change-triggered ACKs: 01 -> ACK, 01, 01 -> ACK, 10 -> ACK, 10, 01 -> ACK, 01, 11 -> ACK, 01 -> ACK.

For the avoidance of doubt, the change-triggered ACK mechanism is deliberately worded to ignore the arrival of a control packet with no payload, which therefore does not alter any byte counters, because it is important that TCP does not acknowledge pure ACKs. The change-triggered ACK approach can lead to some additional ACKs but it feeds back the timing and the order in which ECN marks are received with minimal additional complexity. If only CE marks are infrequent, or there are multiple marks in a row, the additional load will be low. Other marking patterns could increase the load significantly. Investigating the additional load is a goal of the proposed experiment.

Implementation note: sending an AccECN Option each time a different counter changes and including a full-length AccECN Option on every delayed ACK will satisfy the requirements described above and might be the easiest implementation, as long as sufficient space is available in each ACK (in total and in the option space).

Appendix A.3 gives an example algorithm to estimate the number of marked bytes from the ACE field alone, if the AccECN Option is not available.

If a host has determined that segments with the AccECN Option always seem to be discarded somewhere along the path, it is no longer obliged to follow the above rules.

3.3. Requirements for TCP Proxies, Offload Engines and other Middleboxes on AccECN Compliance

A large class of middleboxes split TCP connections. Such a middlebox would be compliant with the AccECN protocol if the TCP implementation on each side complied with the present AccECN specification and each side negotiated AccECN independently of the other side.

Another large class of middleboxes intervenes to some degree at the transport layer, but attempts to be transparent (invisible) to the end-to-end connection. A subset of this class of middleboxes attempts to ‘normalise’ the TCP wire protocol by checking that all values in header fields comply with a rather narrow interpretation of the TCP specifications. To comply with the present AccECN specification, such a middlebox MUST NOT change the ACE field or the AccECN Option and it SHOULD preserve the timing of each ACK (for example, if it coalesced ACKs it would not be AccECN-compliant) as
these can be used by the Data Sender to infer further information about the path congestion level. A middlebox claiming to be transparent at the transport layer MUST forward the AccECN TCP Option unaltered, whether or not the length value matches one of those specified in Section 3.2.6, and whether or not the initial values of the byte-counter fields are correct. This is because blocking apparently invalid values does not improve security (because AccECN hosts are required to ignore invalid values anyway), while it prevents the standardised set of values being extended in future (because outdated normalisers would block updated hosts from using the extended AccECN standard).

Hardware to offload certain TCP processing represents another large class of middleboxes, even though it is often a function of a host’s network interface and rarely in its own 'box'. Leeway has been allowed in the present AccECN specification in the expectation that offload hardware could comply and still serve its function. Nonetheless, such hardware SHOULD also preserve the timing of each ACK (for example, if it coalesced ACKs it would not be AccECN-compliant).

4. Interaction with Other TCP Variants

This section is informative, not normative.

4.1. Compatibility with SYN Cookies

A TCP server can use SYN Cookies (see Appendix A of [RFC4987]) to protect itself from SYN flooding attacks. It places minimal commonly used connection state in the SYN/ACK, and deliberately does not hold any state while waiting for the subsequent ACK (e.g. it closes the thread). Therefore it cannot record the fact that it entered AccECN mode for both half-connections. Indeed, it cannot even remember whether it negotiated the use of classic ECN [RFC3168].

Nonetheless, such a server can determine that it negotiated AccECN as follows. If a TCP server using SYN Cookies supports AccECN and if it receives a pure ACK that acknowledges an ISN that is a valid SYN cookie, and if the ACK contains an ACE field with the value 0b010 to 0b111 (decimal 2 to 7), it can assume that:

- the TCP client must have requested AccECN support on the SYN
- it (the server) must have confirmed that it supported AccECN

Therefore the server can switch itself into AccECN mode, and continue as if it had never forgotten that it switched itself into AccECN mode earlier.
If the pure ACK that acknowledges a SYN cookie contains an ACE field with the value 0b000 or 0b001, these values indicate that the client did not request support for AccECN and therefore the server does not enter AccECN mode for this connection. Further, 0b001 on the ACK implies that the server sent an ECN-capable SYN/ACK, which was marked CE in the network, and the non-AccECN client fed this back by setting ECE on the ACK of the SYN/ACK.

4.2. Compatibility with Other TCP Options and Experiments

AccECN is compatible (at least on paper) with the most commonly used TCP options: MSS, time-stamp, window scaling, SACK and TCP-AO. It is also compatible with the recent promising experimental TCP options TCP Fast Open (TFO [RFC7413]) and Multipath TCP (MPTCP [RFC6824]).

AccECN is friendly to all these protocols, because space for TCP options is particularly scarce on the SYN, where AccECN consumes zero additional header space.

When option space is under pressure from other options, Section 3.2.8 provides guidance on how important it is to send an AccECN Option and whether it needs to be a full-length option.

4.3. Compatibility with Feedback Integrity Mechanisms

Three alternative mechanisms are available to assure the integrity of ECN and/or loss signals. AccECN is compatible with any of these approaches:

- The Data Sender can test the integrity of the receiver’s ECN (or loss) feedback by occasionally setting the IP-ECN field to a value normally only set by the network (and/or deliberately leaving a sequence number gap). Then it can test whether the Data Receiver’s feedback faithfully reports what it expects [I-D.moncaster-tcpm-rcv-cheat]. Unlike the ECNNonce [RFC3540], this approach does not waste the ECT(1) codepoint in the IP header, it does not require standardisation and it does not rely on misbehaving receivers volunteering to reveal feedback information that allows them to be detected. However, setting the CE mark by the sender might conceal actual congestion feedback from the network and should therefore only be done sparsely.

- Networks generate congestion signals when they are becoming congested, so networks are more likely than Data Senders to be concerned about the integrity of the receiver’s feedback of these signals. A network can enforce a congestion response to its ECN markings (or packet losses) using congestion exposure (ConEx) audit [RFC7713]. Whether the receiver or a downstream network is suppressing congestion feedback or the sender is unresponsive to
the feedback, or both, ConEx audit can neutralise any advantage that any of these three parties would otherwise gain.

ConEx is a change to the Data Sender that is most useful when combined with AccECN. Without AccECN, the ConEx behaviour of a Data Sender would have to be more conservative than would be necessary if it had the accurate feedback of AccECN.

- The TCP authentication option (TCP-AO [RFC5925]) can be used to detect any tampering with AccECN feedback between the Data Receiver and the Data Sender (whether malicious or accidental). The AccECN fields are immutable end-to-end, so they are amenable to TCP-AO protection, which covers TCP options by default. However, TCP-AO is often too brittle to use on many end-to-end paths, where middleboxes can make verification fail in their attempts to improve performance or security, e.g. by resegmentation or shifting the sequence space.

Originally the ECN Nonce [RFC3540] was proposed to ensure integrity of congestion feedback. With minor changes AccECN could be optimised for the possibility that the ECT(1) codepoint might be used as an ECN Nonce. However, given RFC 3540 has been reclassified as historic, the AccECN design has been generalised so that it ought to be able to support other possible uses of the ECT(1) codepoint, such as a lower severity or a more instant congestion signal than CE.

5. Protocol Properties

This section is informative not normative. It describes how well the protocol satisfies the agreed requirements for a more accurate ECN feedback protocol [RFC7560].

**Accuracy:** From each ACK, the Data Sender can infer the number of new CE marked segments since the previous ACK. This provides better accuracy on CE feedback than classic ECN. In addition if the AccECN Option is present (not blocked by the network path) the number of bytes marked with CE, ECT(1) and ECT(0) are provided.

**Overhead:** The AccECN scheme is divided into two parts. The essential part reuses the 3 flags already assigned to ECN in the IP header. The supplementary part adds an additional TCP option consuming up to 11 bytes. However, no TCP option is consumed in the SYN.

**Ordering:** The order in which marks arrive at the Data Receiver is preserved in AccECN feedback, because the Data Receiver is expected to send an ACK immediately whenever a different mark arrives.
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Timeliness: While the same ECN markings are arriving continually at the Data Receiver, it can defer ACKs as TCP does normally, but it will immediately send an ACK as soon as a different ECN marking arrives.

Timeliness vs Overhead: Change-Triggered ACKs are intended to enable latency-sensitive uses of ECN feedback by capturing the timing of transitions but not wasting resources while the state of the signalling system is stable. The receiver can control how frequently it sends the AccECN TCP Option and therefore it can control the overhead induced by AccECN.

Resilience: All information is provided based on counters. Therefore if ACKs are lost, the counters on the first ACK following the losses allows the Data Sender to immediately recover the number of the ECN markings that it missed.

Resilience against Bias: Because feedback is based on repetition of counters, random losses do not remove any information, they only delay it. Therefore, even though some ACKs are change-triggered, random losses will not alter the proportions of the different ECN markings in the feedback.

Resilience vs Overhead: If space is limited in some segments (e.g. because more option are need on some segments, such as the SACK option after loss), the Data Receiver can send AccECN Options less frequently or truncate fields that have not changed, usually down to as little as 5 bytes. However, it has to send a full-sized AccECN Option at least three times per RTT, which the Data Sender can rely on as a regular beacon or checkpoint.

Resilience vs Timeliness and Ordering: Ordering information and the timing of transitions cannot be communicated in three cases: i) during ACK loss; ii) if something on the path strips the AccECN Option; or iii) if the Data Receiver is unable to support Change-Triggered ACKs.

Complexity: An AccECN implementation solely involves simple counter increments, some modulo arithmetic to communicate the least significant bits and allow for wrap, and some heuristics for safety against fields cycling due to prolonged periods of ACK loss. Each host needs to maintain eight additional counters. The hosts have to apply some additional tests to detect tampering by middleboxes, but in general the protocol is simple to understand, simple to implement and requires few cycles per packet to execute.

Integrity: AccECN is compatible with at least three approaches that can assure the integrity of ECN feedback. If the AccECN Option is
stripped the resolution of the feedback is degraded, but the integrity of this degraded feedback can still be assured.

Backward Compatibility: If only one endpoint supports the AccECN scheme, it will fall-back to the most advanced ECN feedback scheme supported by the other end.

Backward Compatibility: If the AccECN Option is stripped by a middlebox, AccECN still provides basic congestion feedback in the ACE field. Further, AccECN can be used to detect mangling of the IP ECN field; mangling of the TCP ECN flags; blocking of ECT-marked segments; and blocking of segments carrying the AccECN Option. It can detect these conditions during TCP’s 3WHS so that it can fall back to operation without ECN and/or operation without the AccECN Option.

Forward Compatibility: The behaviour of endpoints and middleboxes is carefully defined for all reserved or currently unused codepoints in the scheme, to ensure that any blocking of anomalous values is always at least under reversible policy control.

6. IANA Considerations

This document reassigns bit 7 of the TCP header flags to the AccECN experiment. This bit was previously called the Nonce Sum (NS) flag [RFC3540], but RFC 3540 is being reclassified as historic [RFC8311]. The flag will now be defined as:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bit</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>AE (Accurate ECN)</td>
<td>RFC XXXX</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[TO BE REMOVED: IANA is requested to update the existing entry in the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) Header Flags registration (https://www.iana.org/assignments/tcp-header-flags/tcp-header-flags.xhtml#tcp-header-flags-1) for Bit 7 to "AE (Accurate ECN), previously used as NS (Nonce Sum) by [RFC3540], which is now Historic [RFC8311]" and change the reference to this RFC-to-be instead of RFC8311.]

This document also defines a new TCP option for AccECN, assigned a value of TBD1 (decimal) from the TCP option space. This value is defined as:
Early implementation before the IANA allocation MUST follow [RFC6994] and use experimental option 254 and magic number 0xACCE (16 bits), then migrate to the new option after the allocation.

7. Security Considerations

If ever the supplementary part of AccECN based on the new AccECN TCP Option is unusable (due for example to middlebox interference) the essential part of AccECN’s congestion feedback offers only limited resilience to long runs of ACK loss (see Section 3.2.5). These problems are unlikely to be due to malicious intervention (because if an attacker could strip a TCP option or discard a long run of ACKs it could wreak other arbitrary havoc). However, it would be of concern if AccECN’s resilience could be indirectly compromised during a flooding attack. AccECN is still considered safe though, because if the option is not presented, the AccECN Data Sender is then required to switch to more conservative assumptions about wrap of congestion indication counters (see Section 3.2.5 and Appendix A.2).

Section 4.1 describes how a TCP server can negotiate AccECN and use the SYN cookie method for mitigating SYN flooding attacks.

There is concern that ECN markings could be altered or suppressed, particularly because a misbehaving Data Receiver could increase its own throughput at the expense of others. AccECN is compatible with the three schemes known to assure the integrity of ECN feedback (see Section 4.3 for details). If the AccECN Option is stripped by an incorrectly implemented middlebox, the resolution of the feedback will be degraded, but the integrity of this degraded information can still be assured.

There is a potential concern that a receiver could deliberately omit the AccECN Option pretending that it had been stripped by a middlebox. No known way can yet be contrived to take advantage of this downgrade attack, but it is mentioned here in case someone else can contrive one.
The AccECN protocol is not believed to introduce any new privacy concerns, because it merely counts and feeds back signals at the transport layer that had already been visible at the IP layer.

8. Acknowledgements

We want to thank Koen De Schepper, Praveen Balasubramanian, Michael Welzl, Gorry Fairhurst, David Black, Spencer Dawkins, Michael Scharf and Michael Tuexen for their input and discussion. The idea of using the three ECN-related TCP flags as one field for more accurate TCP-ECN feedback was first introduced in the re-ECN protocol that was the ancestor of ConEx.

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9. Comments Solicited

Comments and questions are encouraged and very welcome. They can be addressed to the IETF TCP maintenance and minor modifications working group mailing list <tcpm@ietf.org>, and/or to the authors.

10. References

10.1. Normative References


10.2. Informative References

[I-D.ietf-tcpm-alternativebackoff-ecn]

[I-D.ietf-tcpm-generalized-ecn]

[I-D.ietf-tsvwg-l4s-arch]

[I-D.kuehlewind-tcpm-ecn-fallback]

[I-D.moncaster-tcpm-rcv-cheat]

[Mandalari18]

(to appear)


Appendix A. Example Algorithms

This appendix is informative, not normative. It gives example algorithms that would satisfy the normative requirements of the AccECN protocol. However, implementers are free to choose other ways to implement the requirements.

A.1. Example Algorithm to Encode/Decode the AccECN Option

The example algorithms below show how a Data Receiver in AccECN mode could encode its CE byte counter r.ceb into the ECEB field within the AccECN TCP Option, and how a Data Sender in AccECN mode could decode the ECEB field into its byte counter s.ceb. The other counters for bytes marked ECT(0) and ECT(1) in the AccECN Option would be similarly encoded and decoded.

It is assumed that each local byte counter is an unsigned integer greater than 24b (probably 32b), and that the following constant has been assigned:

\[
\text{DIVOPT} = 2^{24}
\]

Every time a CE marked data segment arrives, the Data Receiver increments its local value of r.ceb by the size of the TCP Data. Whenever it sends an ACK with the AccECN Option, the value it writes into the ECEB field is

\[
\text{ECEB} = r.ceb \mod \text{DIVOPT}
\]

where ‘\%’ is the modulo operator.

On the arrival of an AccECN Option, the Data Sender uses the TCP acknowledgement number and any SACK options to calculate newlyAckedB, the amount of new data that the ACK acknowledges in bytes. If newlyAckedB is negative it means that a more up to date ACK has already been processed, so this ACK has been superseded and the Data Sender has to ignore the AccECN Option. Then the Data Sender calculates the minimum difference d.ceb between the ECEB field and its local s.ceb counter, using modulo arithmetic as follows:

\[
\text{if (newlyAckedB} \geq 0) \{
    \text{d.ceb} = (\text{ECEB} + \text{DIVOPT} - (\text{s.ceb} \mod \text{DIVOPT})) \mod \text{DIVOPT}
    \text{s.ceb} += \text{d.ceb}
\}
\]

For example, if s.ceb is 33,554,433 and ECEB is 1461 (both decimal), then
s.ceb % DIVOPT = 1
\[
d.ceb = (1461 + 2^{24} - 1) \ mate 2^{24} \\
= 1460 \\
s.ceb = 33,554,433 + 1460 \\
= 33,555,893
\]

A.2. Example Algorithm for Safety Against Long Sequences of ACK Loss

The example algorithms below show how a Data Receiver in AccECN mode could encode its CE packet counter r.cep into the ACE field, and how the Data Sender in AccECN mode could decode the ACE field into its s.cep counter. The Data Sender’s algorithm includes code to heuristically detect a long enough unbroken string of ACK losses that could have concealed a cycle of the congestion counter in the ACE field of the next ACK to arrive.

Two variants of the algorithm are given: i) a more conservative variant for a Data Sender to use if it detects that the AccECN Option is not available (see Section 3.2.5 and Section 3.2.7); and ii) a less conservative variant that is feasible when complementary information is available from the AccECN Option.

A.2.1. Safety Algorithm without the AccECN Option

It is assumed that each local packet counter is a sufficiently sized unsigned integer (probably 32b) and that the following constant has been assigned:

\[
DIVACE = 2^3
\]

Every time a CE marked packet arrives, the Data Receiver increments its local value of r.cep by 1. It repeats the same value of ACE in every subsequent ACK until the next CE marking arrives, where

\[
ACE = r.cep \ mate DIVACE.
\]

If the Data Sender received an earlier value of the counter that had been delayed due to ACK reordering, it might incorrectly calculate that the ACE field had wrapped. Therefore, on the arrival of every ACK, the Data Sender uses the TCP acknowledgement number and any SACK options to calculate newlyAckedB, the amount of new data that the ACK acknowledges. If newlyAckedB is negative it means that a more up to date ACK has already been processed, so this ACK has been superseded and the Data Sender has to ignore the AccECN Option. If newlyAckedB is zero, to break the tie the Data Sender could use timestamps (if present) to work out newlyAckedT, the amount of new time that the ACK acknowledges. Then the Data Sender calculates the minimum difference
Section 3.2.5 requires the Data Sender to assume that the ACE field did cycle if it could have cycled under prevailing conditions. The 3-bit ACE field in an arriving ACK could have cycled and become ambiguous to the Data Sender if a row of ACKs goes missing that covers a stream of data long enough to contain 8 or more CE marks. We use the word ‘missing’ rather than ‘lost’, because some or all the missing ACKs might arrive eventually, but out of order. Even if some of the lost ACKs are piggy-backed on data (i.e. not pure ACKs) retransmissions will not repair the lost AccECN information, because AccECN requires retransmissions to carry the latest AccECN counters, not the original ones.

The phrase ‘under prevailing conditions’ allows the Data Sender to take account of the prevailing size of data segments and the prevailing CE marking rate just before the sequence of ACK losses. However, we shall start with the simplest algorithm, which assumes segments are all full-sized and ultra-conservatively it assumes that ECN marking was 100% on the forward path when ACKs on the reverse path started to all be dropped. Specifically, if newlyAckedB is the amount of data that an ACK acknowledges since the previous ACK, then the Data Sender could assume that this acknowledges newlyAckedPkt full-sized segments, where newlyAckedPkt = newlyAckedB/MSS. Then it could assume that the ACE field incremented by

\[ d_{\text{Safer}.\text{cep}} = \text{newlyAckedPkt} - \left( (\text{newlyAckedPkt} - d.\text{cep}) \mod \text{DIVACE} \right), \]

For example, imagine an ACK acknowledges newlyAckedPkt=9 more full-size segments than any previous ACK, and that ACE increments by a minimum of 2 CE marks (d.cep=2). The above formula works out that it would still be safe to assume 2 CE marks (because 9 - ((9-2) % 8) = 2). However, if ACE increases by a minimum of 2 but acknowledges 10 full-sized segments, then it would be necessary to assume that there could have been 10 CE marks (because 10 - ((10-2) % 8) = 10).

Implementers could build in more heuristics to estimate prevailing average segment size and prevailing ECN marking. For instance, newlyAckedPkt in the above formula could be replaced with newlyAckedPktHeur = newlyAckedPkt*p*MSS/s, where s is the prevailing segment size and p is the prevailing ECN marking probability. However, ultimately, if TCP’s ECN feedback becomes inaccurate it still has loss detection to fall back on. Therefore, it would seem safe to implement a simple algorithm, rather than a perfect one.
The simple algorithm for dSafer.cep above requires no monitoring of prevailing conditions and it would still be safe if, for example, segments were on average at least 5% of full-sized as long as ECN marking was 5% or less. Assuming it was used, the Data Sender would increment its packet counter as follows:

\[ s.cep += dSafer.cep \]

If missing acknowledgement numbers arrive later (due to reordering), Section 3.2.5 says "the Data Sender MAY attempt to neutralise the effect of any action it took based on a conservative assumption that it later found to be incorrect". To do this, the Data Sender would have to store the values of all the relevant variables whenever it made assumptions, so that it could re-evaluate them later. Given this could become complex and it is not required, we do not attempt to provide an example of how to do this.

### A.2.2. Safety Algorithm with the AccECN Option

When the AccECN Option is available on the ACKs before and after the possible sequence of ACK losses, if the Data Sender only needs CE-marked bytes, it will have sufficient information in the AccECN Option without needing to process the ACE field. However, if for some reason it needs CE-marked packets, if dSafer.cep is different from d.cep, it can calculate the average marked segment size that each implies to determine whether d.cep is likely to be a safe enough estimate. Specifically, it could use the following algorithm, where d.ceb is the amount of newly CE-marked bytes (see Appendix A.1):

\[
\begin{align*}
SAFETY\_FACTOR &= 2 \\
\text{if} \ (dSafer.cep > d.cep) \ { &} \{ \\
& \quad s = d.ceb/d.cep \\
& \quad \text{if} \ (s <= MSS) \ { &} \{ \\
& \quad \quad sSafer = d.ceb/dSafer.cep \\
& \quad \quad \text{if} \ (sSafer < MSS/SAFETY\_FACTOR) \\
& \quad \quad \quad dSafer.cep = d.cep \quad \% \ d.cep \ is \ a \ safe \ enough \ estimate \\
& \quad \} \ % \ else \\
& \quad \% \ No \ need \ for \ else; \ dSafer.cep \ is \ already \ correct, \\
& \quad \% \ because \ d.cep \ must \ have \ been \ too \ small \\
\}
\end{align*}
\]

The chart below shows when the above algorithm will consider d.cep can replace dSafer.cep as a safe enough estimate of the number of CE-marked packets:
The following examples give the reasoning behind the algorithm, assuming MSS=1,460 [B]:

- if d.cep=0, dSafer.cep=8 and d.ceb=1,460, then s=∞ and sSafer=182.5. Therefore even though the average size of 8 data segments is unlikely to have been as small as MSS/8, d.cep cannot have been correct, because it would imply an average segment size greater than the MSS.

- if d.cep=2, dSafer.cep=10 and d.ceb=1,460, then s=730 and sSafer=146. Therefore d.cep is safe enough, because the average size of 10 data segments is unlikely to have been as small as MSS/10.

- if d.cep=7, dSafer.cep=15 and d.ceb=10,200, then s=1,457 and sSafer=680. Therefore d.cep is safe enough, because the average data segment size is more likely to have been just less than one MSS, rather than below MSS/2.

If pure ACKs were allowed to be ECN-capable, missing ACKs would be far less likely. However, because [RFC3168] currently precludes this, the above algorithm assumes that pure ACKs are not ECN-capable.

A.3. Example Algorithm to Estimate Marked Bytes from Marked Packets

If the AccECN Option is not available, the Data Sender can only decode CE-marking from the ACE field in packets. Every time an ACK arrives, to convert this into an estimate of CE-marked bytes, it needs an average of the segment size, s_ave. Then it can add or subtract s_ave from the value of d.ceb as the value of d.cep increments or decrements.
To calculate $s_{ave}$, it could keep a record of the byte numbers of all the boundaries between packets in flight (including control packets), and recalculate $s_{ave}$ on every ACK. However it would be simpler to merely maintain a counter $packets_{in\_flight}$ for the number of packets in flight (including control packets), which it could update once per RTT. Either way, it would estimate $s_{ave}$ as:

$$s_{ave} \approx \frac{flightsize}{packets_{in\_flight}},$$

where $flightsize$ is the variable that TCP already maintains for the number of bytes in flight. To avoid floating point arithmetic, it could right-bit-shift by $\text{lg}(packets_{in\_flight})$, where $\text{lg}()$ means log base 2.

An alternative would be to maintain an exponentially weighted moving average (EWMA) of the segment size:

$$s_{ave} = a \times s + (1-a) \times s_{ave},$$

where $a$ is the decay constant for the EWMA. However, then it is necessary to choose a good value for this constant, which ought to depend on the number of packets in flight. Also the decay constant needs to be power of two to avoid floating point arithmetic.

### A.4. Example Algorithm to Beacon AccECN Options

Section 3.2.8 requires a Data Receiver to beacon a full-length AccECN Option at least 3 times per RTT. This could be implemented by maintaining a variable to store the number of ACKs (pure and data ACKs) since a full AccECN Option was last sent and another for the approximate number of ACKs sent in the last round trip time:

```c
if (acks_since_full_last_sent > acks_in_round / BEACON_FREQ)
    send_full_AccECN_Option()
```

For optimised integer arithmetic, $\text{BEACON\_FREQ} = 4$ could be used, rather than 3, so that the division could be implemented as an integer right bit-shift by $\text{lg}(\text{BEACON\_FREQ})$.

In certain operating systems, it might be too complex to maintain $acks_{in\_round}$. In others it might be possible by tagging each data segment in the retransmit buffer with the number of ACKs sent at the point that segment was sent. This would not work well if the Data Receiver was not sending data itself, in which case it might be necessary to beacon based on time instead, as follows:

```c
if ( time_now > time_last_option_sent + (RTT / BEACON_FREQ) )
    send_full_AccECN_Option()
```
This time-based approach does not work well when all the ACKs are sent early in each round trip, as is the case during slow-start. In this case few options will be sent (evtl. even less than 3 per RTT). However, when continuously sending data, data packets as well as ACKs will spread out equally over the RTT and sufficient ACKs with the AccECN option will be sent.

A.5. Example Algorithm to Count Not-ECT Bytes

A Data Sender in AccECN mode can infer the amount of TCP payload data arriving at the receiver marked Not-ECT from the difference between the amount of newly ACKed data and the sum of the bytes with the other three markings, d.ceb, d.e0b and d.elb. Note that, because r.e0b is initialized to 1 and the other two counters are initialized to 0, the initial sum will be 1, which matches the initial offset of the TCP sequence number on completion of the 3WHS.

For this approach to be precise, it has to be assumed that spurious (unnecessary) retransmissions do not lead to double counting. This assumption is currently correct, given that RFC 3168 requires that the Data Sender marks retransmitted segments as Not-ECT. However, the converse is not true; necessary transmissions will result in under-counting.

However, such precision is unlikely to be necessary. The only known use of a count of Not-ECT marked bytes is to test whether equipment on the path is clearing the ECN field (perhaps due to an out-dated attempt to clear, or bleach, what used to be the ToS field). To detect bleaching it will be sufficient to detect whether nearly all bytes arrive marked as Not-ECT. Therefore there should be no need to keep track of the details of retransmissions.

Appendix B. Rationale for Usage of TCP Header Flags

B.1. Three TCP Header Flags in the SYN-SYN/ACK Handshake

AccECN uses a rather unorthodox but justified approach to negotiate the highest version TCP ECN feedback scheme that both ends support. It follows from the original TCP ECN capability negotiation [RFC3168], in which the client set the 2 least significant reserved flags in the TCP header, and fell back to no ECN support if the server responded with the 2 flags cleared, which had previously been the default. It is not recorded why ECN originally used this approach instead of the more orthodox use of a TCP option.

In order to be backward compatible with RFC 3168, AccECN continues this approach, using the 3rd least significant TCP header flag that had previously been allocated for the ECN nonce (now historic).
Then, whatever form of server an AccECN client encounters, the connection can fall back to the highest version of feedback protocol that both ends support, as explained in Section 3.1.

If AccECN had used the more orthodox approach of a TCP option, it would still have had to set the two ECN flags in the main TCP header, in order to be able to fall back to Classic RFC 3168 ECN, or to disable ECN support, without another round of negotiation. Then AccECN would also have had to handle all the different ways that servers currently respond to settings of the ECN flags in the main TCP header, including all the conflicting cases where a server might have said it supported one approach in the flags and another approach in the new TCP option. And AccECN would have had to deal with all the additional possibilities where a middlebox might have mangled the ECN flags, or removed the TCP option. Thus, usage of the 3rd reserved TCP header flag simplified the protocol.

The third flag was used in a way that could be distinguished from the ECN nonce, in case any nonce deployment was encountered. Previous usage of this flag for the ECN nonce was integrated into the original ECN negotiation. This further justified the 3rd flag’s use for AccECN, because a non-ECN usage of this flag would have had to use it as a separate single bit, rather than in combination with the other 2 ECN flags.

Indeed, having overloaded the original uses of these three flags for its handshake, AccECN overloads all three bits again as a 3-bit counter.

B.2. Four Codepoints in the SYN/ACK

Of the 8 possible codepoints that the 3 TCP header flags can indicate on the SYN/ACK, 4 already indicated earlier (or broken) versions of ECN support. In the early design of AccECN, an AccECN server could use only 2 of the 4 remaining codepoints. They both indicated AccECN support, but one fed back that the SYN had arrived marked as CE. Even though ECN support on a SYN is not yet on the standards track, the idea is for either end to act as a dumb reflector, so that future capabilities can be unilaterally deployed without requiring 2-ended deployment (justified in Section 2.5).

During traversal testing it was discovered that the ECN field in the SYN was mangled on a non-negligible proportion of paths. Therefore it was necessary to allow the SYN/ACK to feed all four IP/ECN codepoints that the SYN could arrive with back to the client. Without this, the client could not know whether to disable ECN for the connection due to mangling of the IP/ECN field (also explained in Section 2.5). This development consumed the remaining 2 codepoints.
on the SYN/ACK that had been reserved for future use by AccECN in earlier versions.

B.3. Space for Future Evolution

Despite availability of usable TCP header space being extremely scarce, the AccECN protocol has taken all possible steps to ensure that there is space to negotiate possible future variants of the protocol, either if the experiment proves that a variant of AccECN is required, or if a completely different ECN feedback approach is needed:

Future AccECN variants: The requirement not to reject unexpected initial values of the ACE counter (in the main TCP header) in the last para of Section 3.2.3 ensures that 5 unused codepoints on the final ACK of the 3-way handshake and 7 unused values on the first data packet from the server could be used to negotiate future variants of the AccECN protocol between the endpoints. Also, a similar requirement not to reject unexpected initial values in the TCP option is for the same purpose. If traversal of the TCP option were reliable, this would have enabled a far wider range of future variation.

Future non-AccECN variants: Five codepoints out of the 8 possible in the 3 TCP header flags used by AccECN are unused on the initial SYN (in the order AE,CWR,ECE): 001, 010, 100, 101, 110. All possible combinations of SYN/ACK could be used in response except 000 and reflection of the same values sent on the SYN. These would not allow fall-back to Classic ECN support for a server that did not understand them, but they are available, perhaps for uses other than ECN in future.

Of course, other ways could be resorted to in order to extend AccECN or ECN in future, although their traversal properties are likely to be inferior. They include a new TCP option; using the remaining reserved flags in the main TCP header (preferably extending the 3-bit combinations used by AccECN to 4-bit combinations, rather than burning one bit for just one state); a non-zero urgent pointer in combination with the URG flag cleared; or some other unexpected combination of fields yet to be invented.

Authors’ Addresses
TCP Alternative Backoff with ECN (ABE)
draft-ietf-tcpm-alternativebackoff-ecn-08

Abstract

Active Queue Management (AQM) mechanisms allow for burst tolerance while enforcing short queues to minimise the time that packets spend enqueued at a bottleneck. This can cause noticeable performance degradation for TCP connections traversing such a bottleneck, especially if there are only a few flows or their bandwidth-delay-product is large. The reception of a Congestion Experienced (CE) ECN mark indicates that an AQM mechanism is used at the bottleneck, and therefore the bottleneck network queue is likely to be short. Feedback of this signal allows the TCP sender-side ECN reaction in congestion avoidance to reduce the Congestion Window (cwnd) by a smaller amount than the congestion control algorithm’s reaction to inferred packet loss. This specification therefore defines an experimental change to the TCP reaction specified in RFC3168, as permitted by RFC 8311.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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This Internet-Draft will expire on February 8, 2019.
1. Introduction

Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) [RFC3168] makes it possible for an Active Queue Management (AQM) mechanism to signal the presence of incipient congestion without necessarily incurring packet loss. This lets the network deliver some packets to an application that would have been dropped if the application or transport did not support ECN. This packet loss reduction is the most obvious benefit of ECN, but it is often relatively modest. Other benefits of deploying ECN have been documented in RFC8087 [RFC8087].
The rules for ECN were originally written to be very conservative, and required the congestion control algorithms of ECN-Capable transport protocols to treat indications of congestion signalled by ECN exactly the same as they would treat an inferred packet loss [RFC3168]. Research has demonstrated the benefits of reducing network delays that are caused by interaction of loss-based TCP congestion control and excessive buffering [BUFFERBLOAT]. This has led to the creation of AQM mechanisms like PIE [RFC8033] and CoDel [CODEL2012][RFC8289], which prevent bloated queues that are common with unmanaged and excessively large buffers deployed across the Internet [BUFFERBLOAT].

The AQM mechanisms mentioned above aim to keep a sustained queue short while tolerating transient (short-term) packet bursts. However, currently used loss-based congestion control mechanisms cannot always utilise a bottleneck link well where there are short queues. For example, a TCP sender using the Reno congestion control needs to be able to store at least an end-to-end bandwidth-delay product (BDP) worth of data at the bottleneck buffer if it is to maintain full path utilisation in the face of loss-induced reduction of the congestion window (cwnd) [RFC5681], which effectively doubles the amount of data that can be in flight, the maximum round-trip time (RTT) experience, and the path’s effective RTT using the network path.

Modern AQM mechanisms can use ECN to signal the early signs of impending queue buildup long before a tail-drop queue would be forced to resort to dropping packets. It is therefore appropriate for the transport protocol congestion control algorithm to have a more measured response when it receives an indication with an early-warning of congestion after the remote endpoint receives an ECN CE-marked packet. Recognizing these changes in modern AQM practices, the strict requirement that ECN CE signals be treated identically to inferred packet loss have been relaxed [RFC8311]. This document therefore defines a new sender-side-only congestion control response, called "ABE" (Alternative Backoff with ECN). ABE improves TCP’s average throughput when routers use AQM controlled buffers that allow for short queues only.

2. Definitions

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
3. Specification

This specification changes the congestion control algorithm of an ECN-Capable TCP transport protocol by changing the TCP sender response to feedback from the TCP receiver that indicates reception of a CE-marked packet, i.e., receipt of a packet with the ECN-Echo flag (defined in [RFC3168]) set, following the process defined in [RFC8311].

The TCP sender response is currently specified in section 6.1.2 of the ECN specification [RFC3168], updated by [RFC8311]:

> The indication of congestion should be treated just as a congestion loss in non-ECN-Capable TCP. That is, the TCP source halves the congestion window "cwnd" and reduces the slow start threshold "ssthresh", unless otherwise specified by an Experimental RFC in the IETF document stream.

This is replaced with:

> Receipt of a packet with the ECN-Echo flag SHOULD trigger the TCP source to set the slow start threshold (ssthresh) to 0.8 times the FlightSize, with a lower bound of 2 * SMSS applied to the result. As in [RFC5681], the TCP sender also reduces the cwnd value to no more than the new ssthresh value. RFC 3168 section 6.1.2 provides guidance on setting a cwnd less than 2 * SMSS.

3.1. Choice of ABE Multiplier

ABE decouples the reaction of a TCP sender to inferred packet loss and indication of ECN-signalled congestion in the congestion avoidance phase. To achieve this, ABE uses a different scaling factor in Equation 4 in Section 3.1 of [RFC5681]. The description respectively uses beta_{loss} and beta_{ecn} to refer to the multiplicative decrease factors applied in response to inferred packet loss, and in response to a receiver indicating ECN-signalled congestion. For non-ECN-enabled TCP connections, only beta_{loss} applies.

In other words, in response to inferred packet loss:

\[
\text{ssthresh} = \max (\text{FlightSize} \times \text{beta}_{\text{loss}}, 2 \times \text{SMSS})
\]

and in response to an indication of an ECN-signalled congestion:

\[
\text{ssthresh} = \max (\text{FlightSize} \times \text{beta}_{\text{ecn}}, 2 \times \text{SMSS})
\]
\[ \text{cwnd} = \text{ssthresh} \]

(If \text{ssthresh} == 2 * SMSS, RFC 3168 section 6.1.2 provides guidance on setting a \text{cwnd} lower than 2 * SMSS.)

where \text{FlightSize} is the amount of outstanding data in the network, upper-bounded by the smaller of the sender’s \text{cwnd} and the receiver’s advertised window (\text{rwnd}) [RFC5681]. The higher the values of \text{beta}_{\text{loss}} and \text{beta}_{\text{ecn}}, the less aggressive the response of any individual backoff event.

The appropriate choice for \text{beta}_{\text{loss}} and \text{beta}_{\text{ecn}} values is a balancing act between path utilisation and draining the bottleneck queue. More aggressive backoff (smaller \text{beta} \_*) risks underutilising the path, while less aggressive backoff (larger \text{beta} \_*) can result in slower draining of the bottleneck queue.

The Internet has already been running with at least two different \text{beta}_{\text{loss}} values for several years: the standard value is 0.5 [RFC5681], and the Linux implementation of CUBIC [RFC8312] has used a multiplier of 0.7 since kernel version 2.6.25 released in 2008. ABE does not change the value of \text{beta}_{\text{loss}} used by current TCP implementations.

The recommendation in this document specifies a value of \text{beta}_{\text{ecn}}=0.8. This recommended \text{beta}_{\text{ecn}} value is only applicable for the standard TCP congestion control [RFC5681]. The selection of \text{beta}_{\text{ecn}} enables tuning the response of a TCP connection to shallow AQM marking thresholds. \text{beta}_{\text{loss}} characterizes the response of a congestion control algorithm to packet loss, i.e., exhaustion of buffers (of unknown depth). Different values for \text{beta}_{\text{loss}} have been suggested for TCP congestion control algorithms. Consequently, \text{beta}_{\text{ecn}} is likely to be an algorithm-specific parameter rather than a constant multiple of the algorithm’s existing \text{beta}_{\text{loss}}.

A range of tests (section IV, [ABE2017]) with NewReno and CUBIC over CoDel and PIE in lightly-multiplexed scenarios have explored this choice of parameter. The results of these tests indicate that CUBIC connections benefit from \text{beta}_{\text{ecn}} of 0.85 (cf. \text{beta}_{\text{loss}} = 0.7), and NewReno connections see improvements with \text{beta}_{\text{ecn}} in the range 0.7 to 0.85 (cf. \text{beta}_{\text{loss}} = 0.5).
4. Discussion

Much of the technical background to ABE can be found in a research paper [ABE2017]. This paper used a mix of experiments, theory and simulations with NewReno [RFC5681] and CUBIC [RFC8312] to evaluate the technique. The technique was shown to present "...significant performance gains in lightly-multiplexed [few concurrent flows] scenarios, without losing the delay-reduction benefits of deploying CoDel or PIE". The performance improvement is achieved when reacting to ECN-Echo in congestion avoidance (when ssthresh > cwnd) by multiplying cwnd and ssthresh with a value in the range [0.7, 0.85]. Applying ABE when cwnd <= ssthresh is not currently recommended, but may benefit from additional attention, experimentation and specification.

4.1. Why Use ECN to Vary the Degree of Backoff?

AQM mechanisms such as CoDel [RFC8289] and PIE [RFC8033] set a delay target in routers and use congestion notifications to constrain the queuing delays experienced by packets, rather than in response to impending or actual bottleneck buffer exhaustion. With current default delay targets, CoDel and PIE both effectively emulate a bottleneck with a short queue (section II, [ABE2017]) while also allowing short traffic bursts into the queue. This provides acceptable performance for TCP connections over a path with a low BDP, or in highly multiplexed scenarios (many concurrent transport flows). However, in a lightly-multiplexed case over a path with a large BDP, conventional TCP backoff leads to gaps in packet transmission and under-utilisation of the path.

Instead of discarding packets, an AQM mechanism is allowed to mark ECN-Capable packets with an ECN CE-mark. The reception of a CE-mark feedback not only indicates congestion on the network path, it also indicates that an AQM mechanism exists at the bottleneck along the path, and hence the CE-mark likely came from a bottleneck with a controlled short queue. Reacting differently to an ECN-signalled congestion than to an inferred packet loss can then yield the benefit of a reduced back-off when queues are short. Using ECN can also be advantageous for several other reasons [RFC8087].

The idea of reacting differently to inferred packet loss and detection of an ECN-signalled congestion pre-dates this specification. For example, previous research proposed using ECN CE-marked feedback to modify TCP congestion control behaviour via a larger multiplicative decrease factor in conjunction with a smaller additive increase factor [ICC2002]. The goal of this former work was to operate across AQM bottlenecks using Random Early Detection (RED).
that were not necessarily configured to emulate a short queue (The current usage of RED as an Internet AQM method is limited [RFC7567]).

4.2. An RTT-based response to indicated congestion

This specification applies to the use of ECN feedback as defined in [RFC3168], which specifies a response to indicated congestion that is no more frequent that once per path round trip time. Since ABE responds to indicated congestion once per RTT, it therefore does not respond to any further loss within the same RTT, because an ABE sender has already reduced the congestion window. If congestion persists after such reduction, ABE continues to reduce the congestion window in each consecutive RTT. This consecutive reduction can protect the network against long-standing unfairness in the case of AQM algorithms that do not keep a small average queue length. The mechanism does not rely on Accurate ECN ([I-D.ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn]).

In contrast, transport protocol mechanisms can also be designed to utilise more frequent and detailed ECN feedback (e.g., Accurate ECN [I-D.ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn]), which then permit a congestion control response that adjusts the sending rate more frequently. Datacenter TCP (DCTCP) [RFC8257] is an example of this approach.

5. ABE Deployment Requirements

This update is a sender-side only change. Like other changes to congestion control algorithms, it does not require any change to the TCP receiver or to network devices. It does not require any ABE-specific changes in routers or the use of Accurate ECN feedback [I-D.ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn] by a receiver.

If the method is only deployed by some senders, and not by others, the senders that use this method can gain some advantage, possibly at the expense of other flows that do not use this updated method. Because this advantage applies only to ECN-marked packets and not to packet loss indications, an ECN-Capable bottleneck will still fall back to dropping packets if an TCP sender using ABE is too aggressive, and the result is no different than if the TCP sender was using traditional loss-based congestion control.

When used with bottlenecks that do not support ECN-marking the specification does not modify the transport protocol.
6. ABE Experiment Goals

RFC3168 states that the congestion control response following an indication of ECN-signalled congestion is the same as the response to a dropped packet [RFC3168]. [RFC8311] updates this specification to allow systems to provide a different behaviour when they experience ECN-signalled congestion rather than packet loss. The present specification defines such an experiment and has thus been assigned an Experimental status before being proposed as a Standards-Track update.

The purpose of the Internet experiment is to collect experience with deployment of ABE, and confirm acceptable safety in deployed networks that use this update to TCP congestion control. To evaluate ABE, this experiment therefore requires support in AQM routers for ECN-marking of packets carrying the ECN-Capable Transport, ECT(0), codepoint [RFC3168].

The result of this Internet experiment ought to include an investigation of the implications of experiencing an ECN-CE mark followed by loss within the same RTT. At the end of the experiment, this will be reported to the TCPM WG or IESG.

7. Acknowledgements

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Author G. Armitage performed most of his work on this document while employed by Swinburne University of Technology, Melbourne, Australia.

The authors would like to thank Stuart Cheshire for many suggestions when revising the draft, and the following people for their contributions to [ABE2017]: Chamil Kulatunga, David Ros, Stein Gjessing, Sebastian Zander. Thanks also to (in alphabetical order) Roland Bless, Bob Briscoe, David Black, Markku Kojo, John Leslie, Lawrence Stewart, Dave Taht and the TCPM working group for providing valuable feedback on this document.

The authors would finally like to thank everyone who provided feedback on the congestion control behaviour specified in this update received from the IRTF Internet Congestion Control Research Group (ICCRG).
8. IANA Considerations

This document includes no request to IANA.

9. Implementation Status

ABE is implemented as a patch for Linux and FreeBSD. It is meant for research and available for download from http://heim.ifi.uio.no/naeemk/research/ABE/. This code was used to produce the test results that are reported in [ABE2017]. The FreeBSD code has been committed to the mainline kernel on March 19, 2018 [ABE-FreeBSD].

10. Security Considerations

The described method is a sender-side only transport change, and does not change the protocol messages exchanged. The security considerations for ECN [RFC3168] therefore still apply.

This is a change to TCP congestion control with ECN that will typically lead to a change in the capacity achieved when flows share a network bottleneck. This could result in some flows receiving more than their fair share of capacity. Similar unfairness in the way that capacity is shared is also exhibited by other congestion control mechanisms that have been in use in the Internet for many years (e.g., CUBIC [RFC8312]). Unfairness may also be a result of other factors, including the round trip time experienced by a flow. ABE applies only when ECN-marked packets are received, not when packets are lost, hence use of ABE cannot lead to congestion collapse.

11. Revision Information

-08. Addressed comments from AD review on the document structure, and relationship to existing RFCs.
-07. Addressed comments following WGLC.
-06. Updated Reference citations.
-05. Removed paragraph containing a wrong statement related to timeout in section 4.1.
-04. Discuss what happens when cwnd <= ssthresh.
-06. Addressed Michael Scharf’s comments.

-05. Refined the description of the experiment based on feedback at IETF-100. Incorporated comments from David Black.

-04. Incorporates review comments from Lawrence Stewart and the remaining comments from Roland Bless. References are updated.

-03. Several review comments from Roland Bless are addressed. Consistent terminology and equations. Clarification on the scope of recommended beta_{ecn} value.

-02. Corrected the equations in Section 3.1. Updated the affiliations. Lower bound for cwnd is defined. A recommendation for window-based transport protocols is changed to cover all transport protocols that implement a congestion control reduction to an ECN congestion signal. Added text about ABE’s FreeBSD mainline kernel status including a reference to the FreeBSD code review page. References are updated.

-01. Text improved, mainly incorporating comments from Stuart Cheshire. The reference to a technical report has been updated to a published version of the tests [ABE2017]. Used "AQM Mechanism" throughout in place of other alternatives, and more consistent use of technical language and clarification on the intended purpose of the experiments required by EXP status. There was no change to the technical content.

-00. draft-ietf-tcpm-alternativebackoff-ecn-00 replaces draft-khademi-tcpm-alternativebackoff-ecn-01. Text describing the nature of the experiment was added.

Individual draft -01. This I-D now refers to draft-black-tsvwg-ecn-experimentation-02, which replaces draft-khademi-tsvwg-ecn-response-00 to make a broader update to RFC3168 for the sake of allowing experiments. As a result, some of the motivating and discussing text that was moved from draft-khademi-alternativebackoff-ecn-03 to draft-khademi-tsvwg-ecn-response-00 has now been re-inserted here.

Individual draft -00. draft-khademi-tsvwg-ecn-response-00 and draft-khademi-tcpm-alternativebackoff-ecn-00 replace draft-khademi-alternativebackoff-ecn-03, following discussion in the TSVWG and TCPM working groups.
12. References

12.1. Normative References


12.2. Informative References


Authors’ Addresses
TCPM WG
Internet Draft
Intended status: Informational
Expires: January 2019

M. Welzl
S. Islam
University of Oslo
July 19, 2018

TCP Control Block Interdependence
draft-touch-tcpm-2140bis-04.txt

Status of this Memo

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This Internet-Draft will expire on July 19, 2018.
Abstract

This memo describes interdependent TCP control blocks, where part of the TCP state is shared among similar concurrent or consecutive connections. TCP state includes a combination of parameters, such as connection state, current round-trip time estimates, congestion control information, and process information. Most of this state is maintained on a per-connection basis in the TCP Control Block (TCB), but implementations can (and do) share certain TCB information across connections to the same host. Such sharing is intended to improve overall transient transport performance, while maintaining backward-compatibility with existing implementations. The sharing described herein is limited to only the TCB initialization and so has no effect on the long-term behavior of TCP after a connection has been established.
1. Introduction

TCP is a connection-oriented reliable transport protocol layered over IP [RFC793]. Each TCP connection maintains state, usually in a data structure called the TCP Control Block (TCB). The TCB contains information about the connection state, its associated local process, and feedback parameters about the connection’s transmission properties. As originally specified and usually implemented, most TCB information is maintained on a per-connection basis. Some implementations can (and now do) share certain TCB information across connections to the same host. Such sharing is intended to lead to better overall transient performance, especially for numerous short-lived and simultaneous connections, as often used in the World-Wide Web [Be94],[Br02].

This document discusses TCB state sharing that affects only the TCB initialization, and so has no effect on the long-term behavior of TCP after a connection has been established. Path information shared across SYN destination port numbers assumes that TCP segments having the same host-pair experience the same path properties, irrespective of TCP port numbers. The observations about TCB sharing in this document apply similarly to any protocol with congestion state, including SCTP [RFC4960] and DCCP [RFC4340], as well as for individual subflows in Multipath TCP [RFC6824].

2. Conventions used in this document

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

In this document, these words will appear with that interpretation only when in ALL CAPS. Lower case uses of these words are not to be interpreted as carrying significance described in RFC 2119.

In this document, the characters ">>" preceding an indented line(s) indicates a statement using the key words listed above. This convention aids reviewers in quickly identifying or finding the portions of this RFC covered by these keywords.
3. Terminology

Host - a source or sink of TCP segments associated with a single IP address

Host-pair - a pair of hosts and their corresponding IP addresses

Path - an Internet path between the IP addresses of two hosts

4. The TCP Control Block (TCB)

A TCB describes the data associated with each connection, i.e., with each association of a pair of applications across the network. The TCB contains at least the following information [RFC793]:

- Local process state
- Pointers to send and receive buffers
- Pointers to retransmission queue and current segment
- Pointers to Internet Protocol (IP) PCB

- Per-connection shared state
  - Macro-state
    - Connection state
    - Timers
    - Flags
    - Local and remote host numbers and ports
  - TCP option state
  - Micro-state
    - Send and receive window state (size*, current number)
    - Round-trip time and variance
    - Cong. window size (snd_cwnd)*
    - Cong. window size threshold (ssthresh)*
    - Max window size seen*
    - SendMSS#
    - MMS_S#
    - MMS_R#
    - PMTU#
    - Round-trip time and variance#

The per-connection information is shown as split into macro-state and micro-state, terminology borrowed from [Co91]. Macro-state describes the finite state machine; we include the endpoint numbers and components (timers, flags) used to help maintain that state. Macro-state describes the protocol for establishing and maintaining shared state about the connection. Micro-state describes the protocol after a connection has been established, to maintain the reliability and congestion control of the data transferred in the connection.
We further distinguish two other classes of shared micro-state that are associated more with host-pairs than with application pairs. One class is clearly host-pair dependent (#, e.g., MSS, MMS, PMTU, RTT), and the other is host-pair dependent in its aggregate (*, e.g., congestion window information, current window sizes, etc.).

5. TCB Interdependence

There are two cases of TCB interdependence. Temporal sharing occurs when the TCB of an earlier (now CLOSED) connection to a host is used to initialize some parameters of a new connection to that same host, i.e., in sequence. Ensemble sharing occurs when a currently active connection to a host is used to initialize another (concurrent) connection to that host.

6. An Example of Temporal Sharing

The TCB data cache is accessed in two ways: it is read to initialize new TCBs and written when more current per-host state is available. New TCBs are initialized using context from past connections as follows:

TEMPORAL SHARING - TCB Initialization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Safe?</th>
<th>Cached TCB</th>
<th>New TCB</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>yes</td>
<td>old_MMS_S</td>
<td>old_MMS_S or not cached</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yes</td>
<td>old_MMS_R</td>
<td>old_MMS_R or not cached</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yes</td>
<td>old_sendMSS</td>
<td>old_sendMSS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yes</td>
<td>old_PMTU</td>
<td>old_PMTU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>old_RTT</td>
<td>old_RTT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>old_RTTvar</td>
<td>old_RTTvar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>varies</td>
<td>old_option</td>
<td>(option specific)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>old_ssthresh</td>
<td>old_ssthresh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>old_snd_cwnd</td>
<td>old_snd_cwnd</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table entries indicate which are considered to be safe to share temporally. The other entries are discussed in section 8.
Most cached TCB values are updated when a connection closes. The exceptions are MMS_R and MMS_S, which are reported by IP [RFC1122], PMTU which is updated after Path MTU Discovery [RFC1191][RFC4821][RFC8201], and sendMSS, which is updated if the MSS option is received in the TCP SYN header.

Sharing sendMSS information affects only data in the SYN of the next connection, because sendMSS information is typically included in most TCP SYN segments. Caching PMTU can accelerate the efficiency of PMTUD, but can also result in black-holing until corrected if in error. Caching MMS_R and MMS_S may be of little direct value as they are reported by the local IP stack anyway.

The way in which other TCP option state can be shared depends on the details of that option. E.g., TFO state includes the TCP Fast Open Cookie [RFC7413] or, in case TFO fails, a negative TCP Fast Open response. RFC 7413 states, "The client MUST cache negative responses from the server in order to avoid potential connection failures. Negative responses include the server not acknowledging the data in the SYN, ICMP error messages, and (most importantly) no response (SYN-ACK) from the server at all, i.e., connection timeout." [RFC 7413]. TFOinfo is cached when a connection is established.

Other TCP option state might not be as readily cached. E.g., TCP-AO [RFC5925] success or failure between a host pair for a single SYN destination port might be usefully cached. TCP-AO success or failure to other SYN destination ports on that host pair is never useful to cache because TCP-AO security parameters can vary per service.

The table below gives an overview of option-specific information that is considered safe to share.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TEMPORAL SHARING - Option info</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cached</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>old_TFO_Cookie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>old_TFO_Cookie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>old_TFO_Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>old_TFO_Failure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TEMPORAL SHARING - Cache Updates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Safe?</th>
<th>Cached TCB</th>
<th>Current TCB</th>
<th>when?</th>
<th>New Cached TCB</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>yes</td>
<td>old_MMS_S</td>
<td>curr_MMS_S</td>
<td>OPEN</td>
<td>curr_MMS_S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yes</td>
<td>old_MMS_R</td>
<td>curr_MMS_R</td>
<td>OPEN</td>
<td>curr_MMS_R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yes</td>
<td>old_sendMSS</td>
<td>curr_sendMSS</td>
<td>MSSopt</td>
<td>curr_sendMSS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yes</td>
<td>old_PMTU</td>
<td>curr_PMTU</td>
<td>PMTUD</td>
<td>curr_PMTU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>old_RTT</td>
<td>curr_RTT</td>
<td>CLOSE</td>
<td>merge(curr,old)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>old_RTTvar</td>
<td>curr_RTTvar</td>
<td>CLOSE</td>
<td>merge(curr,old)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>varies</td>
<td>old_option</td>
<td>curr_option</td>
<td>ESTAB</td>
<td>(depends on option)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>old_ssthresh</td>
<td>curr_ssthresh</td>
<td>CLOSE</td>
<td>merge(curr,old)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>old_snd_cwnd</td>
<td>curr_snd_cwnd</td>
<td>CLOSE</td>
<td>merge(curr,old)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Caching PMTU and sendMSS is trivial; reported values are cached, and the most recent values are used. The cache is updated when the MSS option is received in a SYN or after PMTUD (i.e., when an ICMPv4 Fragmentation Needed [RFC1191] or ICMPv6 Packet Too Big message is received [RFC8201] or the equivalent is inferred, e.g. as from PLPMTUD [RFC4821]), respectively, so the cache always has the most recent values from any connection. For sendMSS, the cache is consulted only at connection establishment and not otherwise updated, which means that MSS options do not affect current connections. The default sendMSS is never saved; only reported MSS values update the cache, so an explicit override is required to reduce the sendMSS. There is no particular benefit to caching MMS_S and MMS_R as these are reported by the local IP stack.

TCP options are copied or merged depending on the details of each option, where "merge" is some function that combines the values of "curr" and "old". E.g., TFO state is updated when a connection is established and read before establishing a new connection.

RTT values are updated by a more complicated mechanism [RFC1644][Ja86]. Dynamic RTT estimation requires a sequence of RTT measurements. As a result, the cached RTT (and its variance) is an average of its previous value with the contents of the currently active TCB for that host, when a TCB is closed. RTT values are updated only when a connection is closed. The method for merging old
and current values needs to attempt to reduce the transient for new connections.

The updates for RTT, RTTvar and ssthresh rely on existing information, i.e., old values. Should no such values exist, the current values are cached instead.

### TEMPORAL SHARING - Option info Updates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cached</th>
<th>Current</th>
<th>when?</th>
<th>New Cached</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>old_TFO_Cookie</td>
<td>old_TFO_Cookie</td>
<td>ESTAB</td>
<td>old_TFO_Cookie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>old_TFO_Failure</td>
<td>old_TFO_Failure</td>
<td>ESTAB</td>
<td>old_TFO_Failure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. An Example of Ensemble Sharing

Sharing cached TCB data across concurrent connections requires attention to the aggregate nature of some of the shared state. For example, although MSS and RTT values can be shared by copying, it may not be appropriate to copy congestion window or ssthresh information (see section 8 for a discussion of congestion window or ssthresh sharing).

### ENSEMBLE SHARING - TCB Initialization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Safe?</th>
<th>Cached TCB</th>
<th>New TCB</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>yes</td>
<td>old_MMS_S</td>
<td>old_MMS_S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yes</td>
<td>old_MMS_R</td>
<td>old_MMS_R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yes</td>
<td>old_sendMSS</td>
<td>old_sendMSS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yes</td>
<td>old_PMTU</td>
<td>old_PMTU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>old_RTT</td>
<td>TBD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>old_RTTvar</td>
<td>old_RTTvar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>old_option</td>
<td>(option-specific)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table entries indicate which are considered to be safe to share across an ensemble. The other entries are discussed in section 8.
The table below gives an overview of option-specific information that is considered safe to share.

### ENSEMBLE SHARING - Option info

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cached</th>
<th>New</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>old_TFO_Cookie</td>
<td>old_TFO_Cookie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>old_TFO_Failure</td>
<td>old_TFO_Failure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### ENSEMBLE SHARING - Cache Updates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Safe?</th>
<th>Cached TCB</th>
<th>Current TCB</th>
<th>when?</th>
<th>New Cached TCB</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>yes</td>
<td>old_MMS_S</td>
<td>curr_MMS_S</td>
<td>OPEN</td>
<td>curr_MMS_S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yes</td>
<td>old_MMS_R</td>
<td>curr_MMS_R</td>
<td>OPEN</td>
<td>curr_MMS_R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yes</td>
<td>old_sendMSS</td>
<td>curr_sendMSS</td>
<td>MSSopt</td>
<td>curr_sendMSS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yes</td>
<td>old_PMTU</td>
<td>curr_PMTU</td>
<td>PMTUD/PLPMTUD</td>
<td>curr_PMTU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>old_RTT</td>
<td>curr_RTT</td>
<td>update</td>
<td>rtt_update(old,cur)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>old_RTTvar</td>
<td>curr_RTTvar</td>
<td>update</td>
<td>rtt_update(old,cur)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>varies</td>
<td>old_option</td>
<td>curr_option</td>
<td>(depends)</td>
<td>(option specific)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For ensemble sharing, TCB information should be cached as early as possible, sometimes before a connection is closed. Otherwise, opening multiple concurrent connections may not result in TCB data sharing if no connection closes before others open. The amount of work involved in updating the aggregate average should be minimized, but the resulting value should be equivalent to having all values measured within a single connection. The function "rtt_update" in the ensemble sharing table indicates this operation, which occurs whenever the RTT would have been updated in the individual TCP connection. As a result, the cache contains the shared RTT variables, which no longer need to reside in the TCB [Ja86].

Congestion window size and ssthresh aggregation are more complicated in the concurrent case. When there is an ensemble of connections, we
need to decide how that ensemble would have shared these variables, in order to derive initial values for new TCBs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cached</th>
<th>Current</th>
<th>when?</th>
<th>New Cached</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>old_TFO_Cookie</td>
<td>old_TFO_Cookie</td>
<td>ESTAB</td>
<td>old_TFO_Cookie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>old_TFO_Failure</td>
<td>old_TFO_Failure</td>
<td>ESTAB</td>
<td>old_TFO_Failure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Any assumption of this sharing can be incorrect because identical endpoint address pairs may not share network paths. In current implementations, new congestion windows are set at an initial value of 4-10 segments [RFC3390][RFC6928], so that the sum of the current windows is increased for any new connection. This can have detrimental consequences where several connections share a highly congested link.

There are several ways to initialize the congestion window in a new TCB among an ensemble of current connections to a host. Current TCP implementations initialize it to four segments as standard [rfc3390] and 10 segments experimentally [RFC6928] and T/TCP hinted that it should be initialized to the old window size [RFC1644]. In the former cases, the assumption is that new connections should behave as conservatively as possible. In the latter T/TCP case, no accommodation is made for concurrent aggregate behavior.

8. Compatibility Issues

For the congestion and current window information, the initial values computed by TCB interdependence may not be consistent with the long-term aggregate behavior of a set of concurrent connections between the same endpoints. Under conventional TCP congestion control, if a single existing connection has converged to a congestion window of 40 segments, two newly joining concurrent connections assume initial windows of 10 segments [RFC6928], and the current connection’s window doesn’t decrease to accommodate this additional load and connections can mutually interfere. One example of this is seen on low-bandwidth, high-delay links, where concurrent connections supporting Web traffic can collide because their initial windows were too large, even when set at one segment.

There have been ongoing analysis and experiments to validate these assumptions. For example, [Ph12] recommends to only cache ssthresh for temporal sharing when flows are long. Sharing ssthresh between
short flows can deteriorate the overall performance of individual connections[Phi12, Nd16], although this may benefit overall network performance. [TBD - the details of this issue need to be summarized and clarified herein].

[TBD - placeholder for corresponding RTT discussion]

Due to mechanisms like ECMP and LAG [RFC7424], TCP connections sharing the same host-pair may not always share the same path. This does not matter for host-specific information such as RWIN and TCP option state, such as TFOinfo. When TCB information is shared across different SYN destination ports, path-related information can be incorrect; however, the impact of this error is potentially diminished if (as discussed here) TCB sharing affects only the transient event of a connection start or if TCB information is shared only within connections to the same SYN destination port. In case of Temporal Sharing, TCB information could also become invalid over time. Because this is similar to the case when a connection becomes idle, mechanisms that address idle TCP connections (e.g., [RFC7661]) could also be applied to TCB cache management.

There may be additional considerations to the way in which TCB interdependence rebalances congestion feedback among the current connections, e.g., it may be appropriate to consider the impact of a connection being in Fast Recovery [RFC5861] or some other similar unusual feedback state, e.g., as inhibiting or affecting the calculations described herein.

TCP is sometimes used in situations where packets of the same host-pair always take the same path. Because ECMP and LAG examine TCP port numbers, they may not be supported when TCP segments are encapsulated, encrypted, or altered - for example, some Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) are known to use proprietary UDP encapsulation methods. Similarly, they cannot operate when the TCP header is encrypted, e.g., when using IPsec ESP. TCB interdependence among the entire set sharing the same endpoint IP addresses should work without problems under these circumstances. Moreover, measures to increase the probability that connections use the same path could be applied: e.g., the connections could be given the same IPv6 flow label. TCB interdependence can also be extended to sets of host IP address pairs that share the same network path conditions, such as when a group of addresses is on the same LAN (see Section 9).

It can be wrong to share TCB information between TCP connections on the same host as identified by the IP address if an IP address is assigned to a new host (e.g., IP address spinning, as is used by ISPs to inhibit running servers). It can be wrong if Network Address
(and Port) Translation (NA(P)T) [RFC2663] or any other IP sharing mechanism is used. Such mechanisms are less likely to be used with IPv6. Other methods to identify a host could also be considered to make correct TCB sharing more likely. Moreover, some TCB information is about dominant path properties rather than the specific host. IP addresses may differ, yet the relevant part of the path may be the same.

9. Implications

There are several implications to incorporating TCB interdependence in TCP implementations. First, it may reduce the need for application-layer multiplexing for performance enhancement [RFC7231]. Protocols like HTTP/2 [RFC7540] avoid connection reestablishment costs by serializing or multiplexing a set of per-host connections across a single TCP connection. This avoids TCP’s per-connection OPEN handshake and also avoids recomputing MSS, RTT, and congestion windows. By avoiding the so-called, "slow-start restart," performance can be optimized. TCB interdependence can provide the "slow-start restart avoidance" of multiplexing, without requiring a multiplexing mechanism at the application layer.

TCB interdependence pushes some of the TCP implementation from the traditional transport layer (in the ISO model), to the network layer. This acknowledges that some state is in fact per-host-pair or can be per-path as indicated solely by that host-pair. Transport protocols typically manage per-application-pair associations (per stream), and network protocols manage per-host-pair and path associations (routing). Round-trip time, MSS, and congestion information could be more appropriately handled in a network-layer fashion, aggregated among concurrent connections, and shared across connection instances [RFC3124].

An earlier version of RTT sharing suggested implementing RTT state at the IP layer, rather than at the TCP layer [Ja86]. Our observations are for sharing state among TCP connections, which avoids some of the difficulties in an IP-layer solution. One such problem is determining the associated prior outgoing packet for an incoming packet, to infer RTT from the exchange. Because RTTs are still determined inside the TCP layer, this is simpler than at the IP layer. This is a case where information should be computed at the transport layer, but could be shared at the network layer.

Per-host-pair associations are not the limit of these techniques. It is possible that TCBs could be similarly shared between hosts on a subnet or within a cluster, because the predominant path can be subnet-subnet, rather than host-host. Additionally, TCB
interdependence can be applied to any protocol with congestion state, including SCTP [RFC4960] and DCCP [RFC4340], as well as for individual subflows in Multipath TCP [RFC6824].

There may be other information that can be shared between concurrent connections. For example, knowing that another connection has just tried to expand its window size and failed, a connection may not attempt to do the same for some period. The idea is that existing TCP implementations infer the behavior of all competing connections, including those within the same host or subnet. One possible optimization is to make that implicit feedback explicit, via extended information associated with the endpoint IP address and its TCP implementation, rather than per-connection state in the TCB.

Like its initial version in 1997, this document’s approach to TCB interdependence focuses on sharing a set of TCBs by updating the TCB state to reduce the impact of transients when connections begin or end. Other mechanisms have since been proposed to continuously share information between all ongoing communication (including connectionless protocols), updating the congestion state during any congestion-related event (e.g., timeout, loss confirmation, etc.) [RFC3124]. By dealing exclusively with transients, TCB interdependence is more likely to exhibit the same behavior as unmodified, independent TCP connections.

10. Implementation Observations

The observation that some TCB state is host-pair specific rather than application-pair dependent is not new and is a common engineering decision in layered protocol implementations. A discussion of sharing RTT information among protocols layered over IP, including UDP and TCP, occurred in [Ja86]. Although now deprecated, T/TCP was the first to propose using caches in order to maintain TCB states (see Appendix A for more information).

The table below describes the current implementation status for some TCB information in Linux kernel version 4.6, FreeBSD 10 and Windows (as of October 2016). In the table, "shared" only refers to temporal sharing.
11. Security Considerations

These presented implementation methods do not have additional ramifications for explicit attacks. They may be susceptible to denial-of-service attacks if not otherwise secured. For example, an application can open a connection and set its window size to zero, denying service to any other subsequent connection between those hosts.

TCB sharing may be susceptible to denial-of-service attacks, wherever the TCB is shared, between connections in a single host, or between hosts if TCB sharing is implemented within a subnet (see Implications section). Some shared TCB parameters are used only to create new TCBs, others are shared among the TCBs of ongoing connections. New connections can join the ongoing set, e.g., to optimize send window size among a set of connections to the same host.

Attacks on parameters used only for initialization affect only the transient performance of a TCP connection. For short connections, the performance ramification can approach that of a denial-of-
service attack. E.g., if an application changes its TCB to have a false and small window size, subsequent connections would experience performance degradation until their window grew appropriately.

12. IANA Considerations

There are no IANA implications or requests in this document.

This section should be removed upon final publication as an RFC.

13. References

13.1. Normative References


13.2. Informative References


Internet-Draft    TCP Control Block Interdependence           July 2018


[Ja86] Jacobson, V., (mail to public list "tcp-ip", no archive found), 1986.


Touch                  Expires January 19, 2019               [Page 16]
14. Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank for Praveen Balasubramanian for information regarding TCB sharing in Windows, and Yuchung Cheng, Lars Eggert, Ilpo Jarvinen and Michael Scharf for comments on earlier versions of the draft. This work has received funding from a collaborative research project between the University of Oslo and Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd., and is partly supported by USC/ISI’s Postel Center.

This document was prepared using 2-Word-v2.0.template.dot.

15. Change log

03:
- Updated Touch’s affiliation and address information

02:
- Stated that our OS implementation overview table only covers temporal sharing.
- Correctly reflected sharing of old_RTT in Linux in the implementation overview table.
- Marked entries that are considered safe to share with an asterisk (suggestion was to split the table)
- Discussed correct host identification: NATs may make IP addresses the wrong input, could e.g. use HTTP cookie.
- Included MMS_S and MMS_R from RFC1122; fixed the use of MSS and MTU
- Added information about option sharing, listed options in the appendix

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16. Appendix A: TCB sharing history

T/TCP proposed using caches to maintain TCB information across instances (temporal sharing), e.g., smoothed RTT, RTT variance, congestion avoidance threshold, and MSS [RFC1644]. These values were in addition to connection counts used by T/TCP to accelerate data delivery prior to the full three-way handshake during an OPEN. The goal was to aggregate TCB components where they reflect one association — that of the host-pair, rather than artificially separating those components by connection.

At least one T/TCP implementation saved the MSS and aggregated the RTT parameters across multiple connections, but omitted caching the congestion window information [Br94], as originally specified in [RFC1379]. Some T/TCP implementations immediately updated MSS when the TCP MSS header option was received [Br94], although this was not addressed specifically in the concepts or functional specification [RFC1379]. In later T/TCP implementations, RTT values were updated only after a CLOSE, which does not benefit concurrent sessions.

Temporal sharing of cached TCB data was originally implemented in the SunOS 4.1.3 T/TCP extensions [Br94] and the FreeBSD port of same [FreeBSD]. As mentioned before, only the MSS and RTT parameters were cached, as originally specified in [RFC1379]. Later discussion of T/TCP suggested including congestion control parameters in this cache [RFC1644].

17. Appendix B: Options

In addition to the options that can be cached and shared, this memo also lists all options for which state should *not* be kept. This list is meant to avoid work duplication and should be removed upon publication.

Obsolete (MUST NOT keep state):

ECHO
ECHO REPLY
PO Conn permitted
PO service profile
CC
CC.NEW
CC.ECHO
Alt CS req
Alt CS data

No state to keep:

EOL
NOP
WS
SACK
TS
MD5
TCP-AO
EXP1
EXP2

MUST NOT keep state:
Skeeter (DH exchange – might be obsolete, though)
Bubba (DH exchange – might really be obsolete, though)
Trailer CS
SCPS capabilities
S-NACK
Records boundaries
Corruption experienced
SNAP
TCP Compression
Quickstart response
UTO
MPTCP (can we cache when this fails?)
TFO success

MAY keep state:
MSS
TFO failure (so we don’t try again, since it’s optional)
MUST keep state:

TFP cookie (if TFO succeeded in the past)
TCP Low Latency Option
draft-wang-tcpm-low-latency-opt-00

Abstract

This document specifies the TCP Low Latency option, which TCP connections can use during the connection establishment handshake to communicate extra parameters that can improve performance in low-latency environments. With the first such parameter, a TCP data receiver can advertise a hint about the Maximum ACK Delay (MAD) it will schedule for its own delayed ACK mechanism. This enables the TCP data sender to achieve lower latencies during loss recovery by using the Maximum ACK Delay advertised by the remote receiver to help compute retransmission timeouts that are potentially much lower than would otherwise be feasible. The Low Latency option is extensible, and later versions of this draft will introduce other mechanisms, including TCP timestamps with a finer granularity than those supported by RFC 7323.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on December 10, 2017.
1. Introduction

TCP receivers typically implement a delayed ACK algorithm, as specified in [RFC1122] Sec 4.2.3.2; as summarized in [RFC5681] sec 4.2, "an ACK SHOULD be generated for at least every second full-sized segment, and MUST be generated within 500 ms of the arrival of the first unacknowledged packet." In practice, many widely-deployed implementations have tended to delay ACKs by up to roughly 200ms. This is probably a historical artifact inherited from the 200ms "fast timeout" mechanism in the BSD TCP implementation from the late 1980s [WS95].

As a result, to avoid spurious timeouts due to delayed ACKs, widely-deployed TCP sender implementations have adapted to this delayed ACK behavior by constraining retransmission timeout (RTO) values to be at least 200ms.

Unfortunately, this 200ms value is 2000x the typical RTT of today’s commodity datacenter networks (which are typically below 100 microseconds). So senders constraining RTOs to be at least 200ms are paying a latency penalty much higher than the RTT in such environments.

The TCP Low Latency option enables a TCP data receiver to advertise a hint about the Maximum ACK Delay (MAD) it will schedule for its own delayed ACK mechanism. The receiver specifies the MAD value in the Low Latency option because the value that is feasible can be quite different for different receivers, based on the CPU’s speed, CPU and network workloads, and OS-specific constraints on minimum supported timer granularity.

This Low Latency option enables the TCP data sender to achieve lower latencies during loss recovery by using the Maximum ACK Delay
advertised by the remote receiver to help compute retransmission timeouts that are potentially much lower than would otherwise be feasible.

2. Terminology

The keywords "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

In this document, "MAD" refers to the Maximum Ack Delay used by the data receiver to delay TCP acknowledgments, and "minRTO" refers to the Minimum Retransmit Timeout.

3. Detailed Protocol

3.1. TCP Low Latency Option

The Low Latency option is only valid in SYN or SYN/ACK packets during the three way handshake. It MUST be ignored in other cases.

The format of the TCP Low Latency option is as follows:

```
0                   1                   2                   3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|      Kind     |    Length     |M u|        MAD        |       |
|               |               |A n|       Value       |  Res  |
|               |               |  d|     (10 bits)     |       |
|               |               |  t|                   |       |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
              |                                                               |
˜                        ...  Reserved  ...                     ˜|
              |                                                               |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
```

Kind: 1 byte: value = IANA-assigned option number
Length: 1 byte: value = 4 (or longer in later versions)
MAD unit: 2 bits: indicates time unit for MAD value:
0: reserved
1: milliseconds
2: microseconds
3: nanoseconds
MAD value: 10 bits: indicates MAD value set on the host:
0: no MAD value is specified
1 ... 1023: MAD value in the given units
Reserved: N>=4 bits: value = 0
In order to support future extensions, the option is variable-length. Bits beyond those defined so far in IETF standards should be considered "reserved". TCP implementations MUST (a) set to zero any reserved bits they add for padding, and (b) ignore any reserved bits (whether they are set or not).

3.2. Overview

The communication, starting from the TCP connection handshake, looks like the following:

TCP A (Active)                                  TCP B (Passive)
---------                                       ---------
CLOSED                                          LISTEN
#1 SYN-SENT       ----- <SYN,MAD=10ms>  ------> SYN-RCVD
(Adjust RTO accordingly)
#2 ESTABLISHED  <---- <SYN,ACK,MAD=5ms> ----- SYN-RCVD
(Adjust RTO accordingly)
#3 ESTABLISHED    -------<ACK>----------------> ESTABLISHED
#4 Send()            --------<DATA-1>------------> -
                        | Delay Ack < 5ms
                        |    <----<ACK-1>----------------
#5                                    Recv()        
#6 Send()            ---------<DATA-2>-------------->  
                        | RTO >= 5ms
                        |    --------<DATA-2 retransmit>--->
                        |    <------<ACK-2>----------------
#7                                    Recv()        

3.3. Configuring maximum ACK delay

An implementation that supports the maximum ACK delay parameter MUST provide a user API to configure the maximum ACK delay for a specific connection or all TCP connections.

- If the user does not specify a MAD value, then the implementation SHOULD NOT specify a MAD value in the Low Latency option.
- If the user specifies a MAD value outside the range of ACK delay values supported by the implementation, then the implementation SHOULD allow the request to succeed, but SHOULD silently constrain the MAD value to be within the valid range (between the minimum and maximum ACK delay for the implementation). This is intended...
to allow applications to portably request a MAD value without
needing special logic to search for a valid value.

- If the specified connections are not in CLOSED or LISTEN states,
  the API SHOULD return an error and ignore the request to specify a
  MAD value.

- Otherwise the implementation SHOULD use the user-specified value
  as the maximum timeout for the delayed ACK and the MAD value in
  the Low Latency option of the specified TCP connections.

The exact design and implementation of such an API is intentionally
left to the implementation. We discuss some examples in the
appendix.

### 3.4. Announcing the maximum ACK delay

- The maximum ACK delay is announced to the remote TCP endpoint by
  including a Low Latency option with a non-zero MAD value in the
  SYN or SYN/ACK packet. A "MAD value" field of 0 in the Low
  Latency option indicates that the sender is not specifying a MAD
  value.

- If specified, then the MAD value in the Low Latency option MUST be
  set, as close as possible, to the implementation’s actual delayed
  ACK timeout for the connection. Note that the actual maximum
  delayed ACK timeout of the connection may be larger than the
  actual user specified value because of implementation constraints
  (e.g. timer granularity limitations).

- If the user has specified a MAD value for an active connection,
  then the active open side SHOULD include a Low Latency option with
  a MAD value in the SYN packet.

- If the user has specified a MAD value for a passive connection,
  and the passive side has received at least one SYN packet with a
  Low Latency option with a valid MAD value, then the passive open
  side SHOULD return its MAD value in the Low Latency option.

### 3.5. Adjusting TCP retransmission timeouts

If the MAD value advertised in a received Low Latency option is 0, or
greater than the default maximum ACK delay of 200ms, then the option
SHOULD be ignored and no further action is needed.

Otherwise the (data) sender MAY use the maximum delayed ACK
advertised by the receiver to adjust the sender’s RTO calculation.
Specifically, if the sender implements an RTO calculation based on
[RFC6298], it MAY replace the 1 second lower-bound specified in step 2.4 in Section 2 with the value of the maximum ACK delay advertised in the Low Latency option, so that the calculation becomes:

\[ \text{RTO} \leftarrow \text{SRTT} + \max(G, K \times \text{RTTVAR}) + \max(G, \text{max\_ACK\_delay}) \]

instead of

\[ \text{RTO} \leftarrow \max(\text{SRTT} + \max(G, K \times \text{RTTVAR}), 1 \text{ second}) \] /* [RFC6298] */

Here we use the notation of [RFC6298], including SRTT (smoothed round-trip time), RTTVAR (round-trip time variation), and G (clock granularity).

Also, if the sender also implements [draft-ietf-tcpm-rack] then it SHOULD replace the maximum delayed ACK parameter (WCDelAckT) with the max\_ACK\_delay specified in the Low Latency option.

Using the MAD value in the RTO calculation helps senders reduce the RTO significantly while still avoiding spurious retransmissions due to delayed acks. With this new algorithm, the RTO can be drastically shortened in most environments where the receiver advertises a MAD. In particular, in data center environments the RTO can often be reduced from more than one second to single-digit milliseconds. Using the MAD to reduce the RTO can improve performance and thus mitigate TCP incast issues. More details are provided in the following Related work section.

4. Related work

Several research papers have shown that reducing the minimum retransmission timeout (minRTO) significantly improves the performance of TCP in the datacenter, by mitigating the effect of TCP timeouts. As a result, this can mitigate TCP incast issues.

- In "Attaining the Promise and Avoiding the Pitfalls of TCP in the Datacenter" [JS15], the authors show that reducing minRTO from 200ms to 5ms greatly reduced the impact of TCP incast issues.

- In "Understanding TCP incast throughput collapse in datacenter networks" [CG09], the authors show significant improvement in goodput when reducing minRTO.

- In "Measurement and Analysis of TCP Throughput Collapse in Cluster-based Storage Systems" [PK07], the authors show that reducing minRTO from 200 milliseconds to 200 microseconds improved goodput by an order of magnitude in some data center scenarios they evaluated.
In "Safe and Effective Fine-grained TCP Retransmissions for Datacenter Communication" [VP09], the authors point out that the imbalance between the TCP minRTO and datacenter latencies can result in poor performance for applications sensitive to millisecond-scale delays in query response times. In simulations of datacenter scenarios they show that goodput drops when increasing minRTO above 1ms. Moreover, in some data center scenarios the default minRTO of 200ms results in nearly 2 orders of magnitude lower throughput compared to a minRTO of 1ms.

In Google data centers a TCP option mechanism equivalent to the Low Latency option’s MAD parameter has been used since 2005, and the TCP minRTO has been set to 5ms by default since 2013 [CC16].

5. Middlebox Considerations

The new Low Latency option might expose some middlebox issues:

- Middleboxes could dropSYNs with a Low Latency option in the case where it treats the Low Latency option as an unknown option. However, this happens fairly rarely according to "Is it still possible to extend TCP?" [HN11], table 3.

- In case middleboxes alter the content in the Low Latency option, the receiver SHOULD do a sanity check on the MAD value included in the Low Latency option to verify it is less than or equal to the default maximum ACK delay of 200ms. As explained earlier, it is not practical for users to set MAD value greater than default. So it is safe to consider a MAD value greater than default as a result of a bad user configuration or a malfunctioning middlebox and ignore the Low Latency option completely in such cases.

6. Security Considerations

TBD

7. IANA Considerations

As no official option number has been issued for the new Low Latency option by IANA yet, experimental option 254 per [RFC6994] with magic number 0xF990 (16 bits) is used for now.

The option format with experimental ID is as follows:
### Kind: 1 byte: value = 254

### Length: 1 byte: value = 6 (or longer in later versions)

### Experiment ID: 2 bytes: value = 0xF990

### MAD unit: 2 bits: indicates time unit for MAD value:

- 0: reserved
- 1: milliseconds
- 2: microseconds
- 3: nanoseconds

### MAD value: 10 bits: indicates MAD value set on the host:

- 0: no MAD value is specified
- 1 ... 1023: MAD value in the given units

### Reserved: N>=4 bits: value = 0

We will migrate to using the official option number for the Low Latency option after IANA has assigned one.

### 8. Appendix

#### 8.1. Example user API in Linux to configure maximum ACK delay

##### 8.1.1. Per-route MAD configuration API

A new configuration option called "mad" will be added to the "ip" command line tool in the iproute2 package. Users can use this to configure a per-route MAD value like the following:

```
ip route add 10.1.2.0/24 dev eth0 scope link src 10.1.2.123 mad 5ms
```

This configures all connections destined to 10.1.2.0/24 to have a MAD value of 5ms. When implementing this new MAD option field, the "ip" command line tool will verify that the provided MAD parameter is less than or equal to the default MAD value of 200ms. If the MAD is invalid then the ip route command will ignore the command and report an error to user.

Newly-created TCP sockets have the default 200ms MAD value. When a TCP connection is opened, it SHOULD consult the ip routing table to check if there is any configured MAD value for the route. If so, the
implementation copies the route’s MAD value to the connection’s MAD value.

This per-route configuration will mostly be used by network administrators when configuring routes on the host.

8.1.2. MAD Socket option API

Socket options provide per-connection configuration parameters. To allow per-connection configuration of the MAD value in the Low Latency option, a new TCP socket option called TCP_MAD will be added to the TCP implementation. This will allow applications to request a MAD value on a finer granularity than the per-route configuration, depending on the application's requirements.

The API will look like the following example:

```c
int mad_val = 5 * 1000 * 1000; // in ns unit: 5ms
err = setsockopt(fd, SOL_TCP, TCP_MAD, &mad_val, sizeof(mad_val));
```

The socket option implementation will sanitize the MAD value provided by the user. Per the specification above, in the "Configuring maximum ACK delay" section, if the user specifies a MAD value outside the range of ACK delay values supported by the implementation, then the implementation will allow the request to succeed, but will silently constrain the MAD value to be within the valid range (between the minimum and maximum ACK delay for the implementation). This is intended to allow applications to portably request a MAD value without needing special logic to search for a valid value.

Once the implementation has sanitized the provided MAD value, it will record the value in the socket as the socket’s own MAD value.

Note: the MAD value set by the socket option SHOULD always override the per-route MAD value if there is one.

9. References

9.1. Normative References

[draft-ietf-tcpm-rack]

9.2. Informative References


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