### **BRSKI document status**

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# BRSKI document – significant editorial changes

- Version -06: major rewrite of document.
  - We took most content and put it into an appendix, and then rescued content back into document in a new order.
  - RFC tools diff, 05 to 07: https://goo.gl/m3wMhD
- Significant changes to precisely align with voucher document WGLC text.

### Editorial review: Table of Contents

### •DRAFT 05

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- 3.6. Interactions with Network Access Cont
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- 8.3. Registrar security reductions
- 8.4. MASA security reductions
- 9. Security Considerations
- 10. Acknowledgements

#### Ommitted Many lines To fit on slide

#### Organized by Who does what

### • DRAFT 07

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- 3.8.1. EST Distribution of CA Certificates
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- 4.4. MASA security reductions
- 5. IANA Considerations
- 5.1. PKIX Registry
- 6. Security Considerations
- 7. Acknowledgements


#### Shrunk From 54 pages To 42 pages

#### Ommitted Only two lines To fit

Organized by Time sequence Of activities

### Technical changes to document

- In support of the non-contiguous voucher renewal model, the voucher request is a voucher signed by the requestor.
  - Provides proof of posession of private key
  - It may include previously signed vouchers
    - It may include signed voucher from pledge



# **Registrar Identity**

- It was previously vague as to how MASA received the Registrar identity.
  - Assumed by some that it was the TLS
    ClientCertificate used by Registrar to connect.
- Signed request voucher now clarifies that entity that signed the request voucher is relevant entity.

# Voucher format: PKCS7+JSON

- Our initial voucher format will be PKCS7 signed JSON.
  - Architecture permits evolution easily to JOSE signed JSON.
    - Not the same as JWT due to differences in claims
  - JWT and CWT are also obvious next steps
- Registrar needs to be aware of formats, but MASA and Pledge can implement only one.
  - Pledge determines format that will be used when it does it's voucher request. Registrar must cope (or fail).

### **Questions and Comments**

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Are design team summaries useful?


### Next Steps

- Get feedback on appropriateness of MIME types,
  Fill in MIME registry template
- Review rest of "Appendix D", determine what additional text should be rescued.
- Design team will continue to meet weekly (after short IETF recover break), Tuesdays at 1400UTC (10am EDT).
- Anticipate WGLC by fall, to be done by IETF100.

### Extra sides: The cast

Manufacturer Manufacturer Authorized Signing Authority (MASA) Registar Join Assistant/Proxy New Node (pledge) (ownership) voucher

lanufacture eth1 :66:6423 eth1 :66:6602 Manufacture fe80::123-Installed Cortificat GRASP >fe80::proxy eth0 ·66·6601 eth1 :66:4a02 UI A :66:4a01 fd12:345::1-> registrar eth0 :66:4d01 (circuit proxy, IPIP, NAT66)



Both 6tisch/LLN, ANIMA and NETCONF share Manufacturer Installed Certificates ("MIC") [IDevID], and have a supply chain relationship with network operator via which Ownership Vouchers can be communicated.

### Network Diagram: NETCONF

