The Transition from Classical to Post-Quantum Cryptography: draft-hoffman-c2pq

Paul Hoffman, ICANN

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Why the CFRG might care

- There is lots of good discussion of what algorithms the world should use to thwart future attacks from large-scale quantum computers
- There is an amazing dearth of discussion about when those computers might actually come into existence and, when they do, what the costs of running them will be
- Changing algorithms, particularly signing algorithms, is expensive and error-prone

draft-hoffman-c2pq

- **Is not** about post-quantum algorithms; **only** addresses the timing needed for the transition
- Addresses many audiences:
  - Execs who want to understand when the transition needs to happen
  - Security experts who want deeper information about how much quantum computers that can attack crypto will cost and how fast they can break keys
  - Cryptographers (and physicists!) who want something readable to point people to

The current draft is quite incomplete

- There are whole sections that need to be filled in with material and references
- It does not yet address the wide disparity in guesses that people have made about when some adversaries might be able to create an attack computer
- It might be too early to give any useful guesses, but we can at least be honest about that

Proposed way forward

- Adopt this as a CFRG work item
- I bug people people to fill in holes and suggest new parts
- Have it informally discussed at pqc events and general crypto meetings
- Finish in a year or so?
- Return to it some years later if we have better research on the difficulty of building large-scale quantum computers