# draft-xibassnez-i2nsf-capabilities-02

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# Introduction: the Context

- What can an NSF provide for policy enforcement?
- Defined by Capabilities
  - Capability: the functions that an NSFs provides, *independent*

of the customer and provider interfaces

- An abstraction with well-defined semantics
- Flexibility to represent functionality that can be either vendor-dependent or -independent

### This Draft

- Defines the concept of NSF Capabilities
  - Theory of operation and update to the Capability Algebra
- Information model
  - Policy Rules and Canabilities

#### **Modeling Overview** ------ 0..n 0..n +-----1/\| External External ECA Info Model + A -----+ Metadata |\ / Aggregates /| Info Model \_\_\_\_\_ +----+ Metadata Subclasses derived for I2NSF +----+ Capability | Sub-Model | +----+ | Capability +----+ 1..n | 1..n | \| A Common Superclass | | Sub-Model +----+ 1/| SecurityCapability | | ECAPolicyRule + A -----+ for ECA Objects -----+ 1 / // +-----\_\_\_\_\_ / \ +----+ | +----+ +----+ (subclasses to define Network (subclasses of Event, | | Content Security | | Attack Mitigation | | Security ECA Policy Rules Condition, and Action | + Capabilities | Capabilities Objects | +----+ +----+ with some extension, for Network Security) \*\_\_\_\_\_ such as InspectTraffic)

# **Policy Rule – Capability Duality**

### **ECA Policy Rules Define Behavior**

- External ECA Info Model defines Rules and Rule Components
- SecurityECAPolicyRule derived from External ECA Info Model
  - Generalizes common characteristics and behavior of all I2NSF security rules
  - Subclasses refine this to provide different functionality

### Capabilities Define Functionality

- SecurityCapability subclasses from External Metadata Info Model
  - Defines the concept of a Capability that describes an NSF
  - Subclasses refine this to provide different functionality

### **Capabilities are Manipulated by ECA Policy Rules**

- For example, ECA Policy Rules can define:
  - What is or is not a Capability
  - What Capabilities can be exposed to which consumers
  - Lifecycle management of a Capability
  - Which OAM data that is exposed to which consumers.

# **Key Point of This Draft**

No need to maintain a Capability Model and a set of Policy Models for **every** NSF type. Instead, describe the Capabilities of an NSF, and apply an appropriate policy model.

This is a scalable, model-driven approach.

# The ECA Policy Rule Model

### The Current Model Uses ECA Policy Rules

- Events: significant occurrences the NSF is able to react to
- Conditions: how the NSF decides which actions to apply
- Actions: actions performed by the NSF
- PolicyRule:

a container that aggregates an Event, a Condition, and an Action (Boolean) clause

### Behavior

- Actions MAY execute if Event and Condition (Boolean) clauses BOTH evaluate to TRUE
- Controlled by resolution strategy and metadata
  - Capability Algebra used to make resolution strategy decidable

# **Details of ECA Policy Rule Behavior**

- Policy Rules, and Policy Rule Components, are each modeled as *Reusable Objects*
- Describe each NSF as follows:
  - Ac: the set of Actions currently available from the NSF
  - **Cc**: the set of Conditions currently available from the NSF
  - **Ec**: the set of Events the NSF is able to respond to
  - RSc: the set of Resolution Strategies (how to resolve conflicts)
  - Dc defines the notion of a Default action
    - Can be a fixed action, a set of available actions, all the actions (F = full Ac), or no default action (Dc = empty set)
  - Capability Algebra
    - addition and subtraction of capabilities
    - ease the modelling of templates, compositions, plugins
    - asymmetric operations = union or set minus of Ac, Cc, Ec + RSc, Dc

# **Future Work**

Define SecurityECAPolicyRule and SecurityCapability

### Appendices

- Do the Policy Rules need full object definitions before WG adoption?
- Do the Event, Condition, and Action subclasses need full object definitions before WG adoption?
- Do the Capabilities need full object definitions before WG adoption?
- We need answers to questions posed in the draft
  - See next 2 slides for more details
- Describe Exemplary Operation
  - Include different examples with sample object class diagrams

# The Model: Discussion with the WG

- Possible improvements / extensions to consider for the next revision of this draft (all questions from the I-D)
  - Event clause / Condition clause representation
    - e.g., CNF vs. DNF for Boolean clauses
  - Event clause / Condition clause evaluation function
    - more complex expressions than simple Boolean expressions to be used
  - Action clause evaluation strategies
    - e.g., execute first action only, execute last action only, execute all actions, execute all actions until an action fails
    - More on metadata
      - authorship, time periods, (+ priorities)
    - Symmetric addition and subtraction? additional operations?

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# Switching to the Decorator Pattern

- Defined categories of NSFs that need to be modelled with the Capability Model (first instantiations)
  - based on Policy Information Models
    - Network Security Information model
    - Content Security Information model
    - Attack Mitigation Information model

#### Categories and subcategories determined with sub-classing

- pros: intuitive, simple, easy to design
- cons: not very elegant, requires non-trivial maintenance at every minor update, does not work well at run-time

#### WG: should we switch to (for example) the decorator pattern?

less intuitive but much more expressive, reduce classes at runtime, provides dynamic behavior (composition) instead of fragile, inheritancebased behavior (which is static)



## **Questions?**



"Create like a god. Command like a king. Work like a slave" - Constantin Brancusi