Fingerprint-based detection of DNS hijacks using RIPE Atlas

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DNS hijacks?



DNS hijack: you *think* Google answers your queries

RIPE Atlas?



An Internet measurement platform, ~10,000 probes

Research idea & goals

1. Send select DNS queries to the target IP -> *RIPE Atlas*
2. Rewrite replies as a feature vector -> *fingerprinting*
3. Check if the fingerprint matches the model -> *detection*

- Target: Google DNS & OpenDNS (*)
- How prevalent hijacking is - globally, per-country, per-AS?
- Which are the most risky ASes?
- What does it all mean to the Internet?

Features

1. **RIPE Atlas provides a restricted API for DNS queries**
   a. Allows specifying the target server & some query parameters
   b. Provides low-level access to DNS replies (wire format)
   c. Measures timing

2. **CHAOS TXT queries**
   a. **CH TXT hostname.bind** -> e.g. “cdns011.ovh.net” or… “who know”
   b. **CH TXT version.bind** -> e.g. “dnsmasq-2.76” or… “[SECURED]”
   c. **CH TXT id.server** -> e.g. “unbound.t72.ru” or… “go away” (RFC 4892)
   d. For each reply, store:
      i. response time & size
      ii. DNS header flags & rcode
      iii. rdata of first answer

Features #2

3. **DNSSEC support (RFC4033 - RFC4035)**
    a. **IN A dnssec-failed.org** -> should fail
    b. **IN DNSKEY pl.** -> must not fail
4. **IPv6 support**
    a. Query for a zone hosted on an IPv6-only auth NS
    b. **IN AAAA ds.v6ns.test-ipv6.ams.vr.org** -> should not fail
5. **TCP support**
    a. **IN A facebook.com / TCP** -> should not fail
6. **Replies to non-existent domains**
    a. **IN A <timestamp>.<probe-id>.surely1does2not3exist4.com**
    b. If successful, store IP, ASN, network name
7. **Qname letter case (in-)sensitivity**
    a. **IN A FaCeBoOk.cOm**
    b. Should return the same letter case

Features #3

8. **Round-trip time**
    a. Measure the minimum ICMP ping RTT to the resolver

9. **Traceroute**
    a. **Send an ICMP traceroute to the resolver**
    b. Filter out private IP addr space
    c. Store: hop count, ASPATH length, parameters of the exit AS (RTT, ASN, network)

10. **Two independent “who am I?” services:**
    a. **IN A whoami.akamai.com**
    b. **IN TXT test.ipv4.google-pdns-info.andzinski.pl**
    c. An auth server that replies with the resolver IP address
    d. Store: returned IP address, it’s ASN and network name

Measurements & tools

- **Run in June 2017 using 9,790 RIPE Atlas probes (3K ASes)**
  - ...burned a few million RIPE Atlas credits - thanks Vesna & Stephen! ;-)
  - tools published at https://github.com/recdnsfp/measurements
  - parsers at https://github.com/recdnsfp/parsejson

- **Google (8.8.8.8)**
  - Raw: https://github.com/recdnsfp/measurements/tree/master/datasets/google
  - Spreadsheet: https://goo.gl/LSXSjW

- **OpenDNS (208.67.222.222)**
  - https://github.com/recdnsfp/measurements/tree/master/datasets/opendns
  - Spreadsheet: https://goo.gl/9MEhnx

Measurements: Google Public DNS


Latency (ICMP ping)

Median: 17.8 msec


Hop count (traceroute)

Median: 9 hops

Measurements: Cisco OpenDNS


Latency (ICMP ping)

Median: 22.6 msec


Hop count (traceroute)

Median: 7 hops

Ground-truth

- No way to obtain from network operators
- Assume the most common fingerprint as “legitimate”
- Assume some deviations in the fingerprint as “hijacked” (7 features)
- ML classifier will use all of the features (40+)

Machine Learning Classification

1. **Randomly sample 50 “legitimate” vs. 50 “hijacked” probes**
   a. Randomly split into training/testing 30 times -> evaluate

2. **Evaluate the classification performance:**



	Google			OpenDNS		
	Accuracy	**%FP**	**%FN**	**Accuracy**	**%FP**	**%FN**
k-NN (n = 3)	78.11%	6.29%	15.60%	81.44%	0.60%	17.97%
Decision Tree (CART)	92.82%	0.97%	6.22%	93.56%	1.14%	5.30%
Random Forest (n = 10)	93.84%	0.00%	6.16%	93.50%	0.25%	6.25%

3. **Classify the rest of data using Random Forest classifier**
   a. Implementation at https://github.com/recdnsfp/classify

Results: Google DNS hijacks (120 = 1.54% globally)



Results: Google DNS hijacks (%)



Madagascar
Iraq
Indonesia
China

Results: Google DNS hijacks (% for >10 probes)


Intensity of identified hijack cases (Google public DNS) - only countries with more than 10 probes
% of probes
no hijack
<1%
1%
2%
5%
10%
20%
30%
40%
no data

Indonesia
India
Russia

Canada
Austria
Norway

Results: OpenDNS hijacks (94 = 1.22% globally)



Results: OpenDNS hijacks (%)



Samoa
Iraq
Indonesia
Mexico

Results: OpenDNS hijacks (% for >10 probes)

Intensity of identified hijack cases (OpenDNS) - only countries with more than 10 probes



Indonesia
India
Iran

Canada
Belgium
Austria

Results: Google hijacks per AS

#	Network	ASN	Count	% Total	% in ASN
1	BRITISH_TELECOMMUNICATIONS_PLC	AS2856	6	5.00%	8.96%
2	VODAFONE_ITALIA_SPA	AS30722	5	4.17%	62.50%
3	COMCAST_CABLE_COMMUNICATIONS_LLC	AS7922	4	3.33%	1.35%
4	LIBERTY_GLOBAL_OPERATIONS_BV	AS6830	4	3.33%	1.63%
5	UNARTEL_SRO	AS198977	4	3.33%	80.00%
6	PT_TELEKOMUNIKASI_INDONESIA	AS17974	4	3.33%	80.00%
7	CLOSED_JOINT_STOCK_COMPANY_TRANSTELECOM	AS47313	2	1.67%	100.00%
8	IRENALA	AS37608	2	1.67%	100.00%
9	ABSOLIGHT	AS29608	2	1.67%	100.00%
10	BREDBAND2_AB	AS29518	2	1.67%	40.00%
	Other		85	70.83%	

Results: OpenDNS hijacks per AS

#	Network	ASN	Count	% Total	% in AS
1	BRITISH_TELECOMMUNICATIONS_PLC	AS2856	6	6.38%	9.52%
2	VODAFONE_ITALIA_SPA	AS30722	5	5.32%	62.50%
3	PT_TELEKOMUNIKASI_INDONESIA	AS17974	4	4.26%	80.00%
4	COMCAST_CABLE_COMMUNICATIONS_LLC	AS7922	3	3.19%	1.02%
5	LIBERTY_GLOBAL_OPERATIONS_BV	AS6830	2	2.13%	0.82%
6	TELECOMMUNICATION_INFRASTRUCTURE_COMPANY	AS48159	2	2.13%	100.00%
7	SKYLOGIC_SPA	AS29286	2	2.13%	100.00%
8	FREE_SAS	AS12322	2	2.13%	1.36%
9	JASA_TERPADU_TELEMATIKA_JASATEL	AS9785	1	1.06%	100.00%
10	TOKYO_INSTITUTE_OF_TECHNOLOGY	AS9367	1	1.06%	100.00%
	Other		66	70.21%	

Results: Google vs OpenDNS



Google Public DNS

52

probes

68

probes

Cisco OpenDNS

26

probes

Results: the most risky ASes

1. **Take probes with both Google & OpenDNS hijacked**
2. **Drop ASes with less than 3 probes with hijacked DNS**

Results:

1. AS 17974, Telkom Indonesia: 4 out of 6
2. AS 30722, Vodafone Italy: 5 out of 9
3. AS 2856, British Telecommunications: 5 out of 88

Conclusions

- **DNS hijacking is a real thing happening on the Internet**
  - We found several RIPE Atlas probes with hijacked DNS resolver (120/94)
  - Some countries have >25% chances of DNS being hijacked (>1% avg)
- **The risk does not necessarily come from a government**
  - Some ASes seem to have a policy of DNS hijacking
  - Many hijacks in developed countries (e.g. US, UK, Italy)
  - Probably many motivations - not only “censorship”
- **No big difference for Google DNS vs. OpenDNS**
  - Just switching the resolver IP will not help
- **The Internet absolutely needs more secure DNS**
  - Hijacking opens endless possibilities for manipulation & surveillance
  - We need to secure the stub vs. recursive resolver path

Future Work

- **IPv6**
- **Better ground-truth method**
- **Analyze data returned by hijacked resolvers**
- **Publish a paper :)**

Thank You!

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https://github.com/recdnsfp

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- Stephen D. Strowes (RIPE NCC)
- RIPE NCC DNS Hackathon (2017)

Backup slides

recdnsfp vs. fpdns

- Uses all RIPE Atlas probes vs. a single machine
- Uses Machine Learning vs. static rules
- Targets recursive DNS servers only
- Different purpose: detect hijacks vs. server software version

Results: Google DNS hijacks (% for >20 probes)


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
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Indonesia
Iran
India

Measurements: default probe resolvers

Resolver network,
as seen by whoami.akamai.com



#	Network	Count	Percentage
1	GOOGLE	1,857	21.63%
2	OPENDNS	351	4.09%
	+ *DIRECT_MEDIA*	*31*	*0.36%*
3	LIBERTY_GLOBAL_OPERATIONS	234	2.73%
4	DEUTSCHE_TELEKOM	222	2.59%
5	COMCAST_CABLE_COMMUNICATIONS	212	2.47%
6	ORANGE	147	1.71%
7	FREE_SAS	115	1.34%
8	XS4ALL_INTERNET_BV	65	0.76%
9	BRITISH_TELECOMMUNICATIONS_PLC	65	0.76%
10	MCI_COMMUNICATIONS	61	0.71%
	Other / N/A:	5,224	60.86%