

Empirical Analysis of Route Leaks

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Confirmed route leaks

- Spans 11 months
- Confirmed route leaks at a large IXP
- Also observe these leaks from three other IXPs on other continents (RIPE RIS data)


Findings

- 10 route leaks, about once a month
- These leaks generally follow same patterns
- We only have control-plane data, so cannot know about reachability





Findings

- Leaked prefixes are not originated by the leaker!
- We analyse by looking at affected prefixes and ASes
- IXP O is the originating IXP, the other three are A, B, and C.


Affected prefixes



Affected ASes




Update frequency of affected prefixes



Max 5-min interval: 13,283 updates

Event #3


Update frequency of affected prefixes



Max 5-min interval: 142,827 updates

Event #4


Update frequency of affected prefixes



Max 5-min interval: 4,537 updates

Event #5


Update frequency of affected prefixes




Max 5-min interval: 74,782 updates

Event #8


Peak 5-minute interval update frequencies



Number of ASNs that
had their originated
prefix changed



Number of prefixes
that had their
originating ASN
changed



Discussion

- Transit (non)diversity
- Router performance during spikes

Thank you!

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