### **Transporting Access Tokens**

draft-seitz-ace-oauth-authz-00

Ludwig Seitz (ludwig@sics.se)

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# How to get there from here

- This issue is about getting the token from the Client to the Resource Server
- Possible options
  - POST to a well-known or discoverable resource (e.g. /authz-info)
  - Use a dedicated CoAP option
  - Use TLS supplemental data (RFC 4680)
  - Use psk\_identity (DCAF)
  - Define new TLS certificate type (similar to RPK)
  - Other suggestions?

# POST to /authz-info

- + Works for both (D)TLS and object security
- + Possible to update access token during a secure session
- Requires a resource without access control
- Requires a separate request

# **Dedicated CoAP option**

- + Works for both (D)TLS and object security
- + Possible to update access token during a secure session
- + No additional messages (token sent with request)
- + Works for requests that have no payload (GET, DELETE)
- Can lead to problems with fragmentation

### Use RFC 4680

- + Works for (D)TLS
- + Access token transferred during the handshake
- Requires new handshake to update token
- RFC 4680 : "Any such data MUST NOT need to be processed by the TLS protocol."

 $\rightarrow$  Cannot transfer keys or certificates in the token that are used for the handshake

# Use psk\_identity

- + Works for (D)TLS
- + Access token transferred during the handshake
- Requires new handshake to update token
- Weird use of psk\_identity (it's not really a key identity we are transmitting here)

# Define new certificate type

- + Works for (D)TLS
- + Access token transferred during the handshake
- +/- Could be done similarly to raw public keys (RFC 7250)
- Requires work in the TLS WG
- Defines a whole new handshake for a very specific problem

#### Thank you!

#### Questions/comments?