

OnboardICNg: a Secure Protocol for On-boarding IoT Devices in ICN

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OnboardICNg


A secure protocol for on-boarding constrained devices into a wireless mesh network

Analog to EAP-PANA onboarding in ZigBee-IP

Roadmap:

- Protocol description
- Security properties
- Resource usage comparison to ZigBee-IP EAP/PA


System Model



Design Requirements

- **Mutual Authentication:** The trusted network and the joining device d_j are able to mutually authenticate
- **Fresh Authorization:** The protocol guarantees that the authorization to join the network is fresh and unique, generated specifically for the current protocol session.
- **Minimal network traffic:** The protocol minimizes the interaction with the AAM in order to preserve the overall network's and devices' resources.
- **Bootstrap the initial key material:** The protocol must distribute the necessary cryptographic material to later allow a secure key management and communications.

Protocol Message Flow



Security Discussion

- Fraudulently join a trusted network

Outsider: to mislead d_{nbr} , md_j needs to obtain a valid k' ; however, (a) md_j cannot have a PSK to derive k' , (b) k' cannot be eavesdropped

Insider: (a) cd_{nbr} collaborates with md_j ; however, the authorization phase for md_j at the AAM fails, or (b) cd_{nbr} clones itself to attach elsewhere, which can be detected by duplicate authorization at AAM

- Impersonate a trusted network

Outsider: To force d_j to authenticate the malicious device md_{nbr} as a trusted device, the outsider must either retrieve a valid k' or break the AKEP2 scheme

Insider: cd_{nbr} needs the PSK belonging to d_j to spoof the packet in step 11

- Obtain the distributed symmetric keys

Outsider: PSK for d_j is never transmitted across the network; to extract k' , attacker needs PSK for d_{nbr} , which is encrypted with PSK for d_j

Insider: PSK for d_j is never transmitted across the network; to extract k' , cd_{nbr} needs PSK for PSK for d_{nbr} , which has been securely established during d_{nbr} 's onboarding phase

Evaluation against EAP-PSK/PANA

Metric	OnboardICNg		EAP-PSK/PANA	
	d_j	d_{nbr}	d_j	d_{nbr}
Communication (bytes transmitted)	549 bytes	318 bytes	1380 bytes	2481 bytes
Computation (milliseconds)	60.73 ms	53.87 ms	72.65 ms	0.00 ms
Energy (microjoules)	5993 μ joules	7082 μ joules	10905 μ joules	20695 μ joules
Memory (bytes)	332 bytes	159 bytes	224 bytes	0 bytes

Conclusion

- OnboardICNg provides secure authentication and authorization to join a wireless mesh network using ICN
- Resilient to outsider and insider attacks
- Securely bootstraps cryptographic material for subsequent secure communication
- Resource utilization compares favorably with EAP-PSK/PANA

