PERC Virtual Interim

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27 April 2016

WG Roadmap

Signaling

Key management \leftarrow you are here

SRTP/SRTCP transforms \leftarrow (documents adopted now)

Today:

Requirements / architecture discussion for KMF-MDD protocol

PERC is creating an entity with intermediate privilege

Normal SRTP/SRTCP divides the world into two classes:

In the session: Can encrypt / decrypt payload, MAC/verify headers + payload

Not in the session: Can observe header fields, encrypted payload

PERC is about creating an entity intermediate between these two

Not in the session, but gets some capabilities that things in the session have

MDD = Network Attacker + (minimum privilege to do conferencing)

PERC key management assigns these roles

Basic requirement: Establish and distribute two crypto contexts

- 1. HbH context shared among participants AND MDD
- 2. E2E context shared among participants AND NOT MDD

E2E and HbH contexts => normal SRTP participant, full access

only HbH context => intermediate participant, partial access (i.e., the MDD)

What does the KMF do?


- Distributes E2E and HbH contexts to participants
- Distributes the HbH context to the MDD ← need a protocol for this
- Authenticates to participants (at the DTLS layer)
- Participants authenticate to it (also DTLS)
- [[Might be further identity / authentication]]

Topic today: A protocol for KMF-MDD interactions

Requirements for the KMF-MDD Protocol

Assumptions


- 1. KMF-MDD relationship is configured out of band
 - e.g., which KMF is responsible for each conference
- 2. One KMF-MDD protocol session per conference on the MDD
 - No need to multiplex multiple conferences on a single KMF-MDD protocol session
 - KMF might have multiple tunnels to different MDDs serving the same conference



Functional Requirements

The KMF-MDD protocol must enable:

- 1. MDD to tell the KMF its supported protection profiles for HBH operations
- 2. KMF to tell the MDD the HBH cipher, key & salts
- 3. Bi-directional exchange of DTLS packets between end-points & the KMF via the MDD




Transport Requirements

The KMF-MDD protocol must:

- Reliably convey KMF-MDD information (profiles, keys, salts)
- Provide unreliable transport for DTLS packets
- Use secure, mutually authenticated transport for KMF-MDD information
- May use secure transport for DTLS packets
- Enable the MDD to demultiplex DTLS packets received from the KMF to the

correct endpoints



... over to Paul ...

Thank You