




# IPSEC VPN DEPLOYMENTS

I2NSF interim, IETF  
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
# HOST TO HOST VPN

One device communicates to one other device using encryption




# SITE TO SITE VPN

Individual networks are unencrypted, only the interconnect is encrypted.  
Individuals devices are unaware of the encryption.



# REMOTE ACCESS VPN

End device to site network access point encrypted – LAN still unencrypted.  
Remote devices are usually assigned an IP address to appear to be located inside the LAN.



# FULL MESH ENCRYPTION

Each device communicates with IPsec to all other (capable) devices



# IPsec PRIMER

[[RFC 6071](#)]

## IKE + IPsec = VPN

### Internet Key Exchange (IKE)

ISAKMP, IKE SA, Parent SA, Phase 1

### IPsec

IPsec SA, Child SA, Phase 2

#### Command Channel


- ~~Internet Key Exchange v1~~ [[RFC 2409](#)]
- Internet Key Exchange v2 [[RFC 7296](#)]
  - also: Minimal IKEv2 [[RFC 7815](#)]
- Uses UDP port 500 and 4500
- Peer authentication and authorization
- Connection parameter negotiation (algorithms, IP address, ports, etc)
- Generate IPsec keys (KEYMAT)
- Responsible for key rollover (PFS)
- Communicates encryption keys, modes, parameters, etc to kernel
- Lots of “plugin RFCs”
- IKE itself is encrypted
- IKE does not encrypt IP data traffic

#### Data Channel

- ESP (protocol 50): Encapsulated Security Payload [[RFC 4303](#)]
  - Tunnel Mode [[RFC 4301](#)]
  - Transport Mode [[RFC 4301](#)]
  - ~~Beet Mode [expired draft]~~
- ESPinUDP [[RFC 3948](#)]
- ~~AH (protocol 51): Authenticated Header~~
  - Instead use ESP with NULL encryption [[RFC 2410](#)]
- ~~Wrapped ESP (WESP)~~ [[RFC 5840](#)]
- NEW: ESPinTCP / ESPinTLS [[RFC 8229](#)]

# TUNNEL MODE VERSUS TRANSPORT MODE

- Tunnel Mode places the entire packet (encrypted) inside a new packet
- Transport Mode encrypts native packet - it re-uses its own IP header



# TUNNEL MODE VERSUS TRANSPORT MODE

- **Tunnel Mode**
  - Hides more information (source / destination IP address)
  - Can be used for host-to-host, site-to-site, NAT traversal deployments
  - Extra overhead takes a few extra bytes, decreases usable MTU
  - Very flexible deployments with slightly more complicated security policies
  - Swiss army knife: It can do everything but sometimes you cut yourself
- **Transport Mode**
  - Can only be used for host-to-host connections
  - Does not work well to traverse NAT's, leaks/clashes with pre-NAT IP
  - Very simple deployment with simple security policy
  - Butter knife: Works for plain bread, not fancy steaks
- In IKEv2, Transport Mode support is “optional” and dynamically negotiated