



**PERC Interim**  
**5/24/2017**

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# Adopted Drafts - Status Quo

## Draft

## Status

Double

One pending technical issue,  
**discussed today**

EKT

No major updates ***since April 2016***

Tunnel

No major updates ***since October 2016***

Framework


No major updates **since May 2016**

# Milestones

Jun 2017 - Submit architecture or framework specification to IESG

Jun 2017 - Submit SRTP protocol extension specification to IESG

Jun 2017 - Submit Key-management protocol specification to IESG



Almost there !! Let's see if we can make this happen

**Jun 2017 - Submit documentation of how to integrate solution in SIP, WebRTC and CLUE to IESG**

# Recap .. since ietf 98

New versions submitted - double, ekt, tunnel

PERC Keying Documentation - Cullen's video and slides. (Framework to adopt text)

Open issue on RTX/FEC/DTMF support in double - topic for today (next slide)

# Today

## Problem Statement - HBH Only Crypto Scope in Double

MDD needs HBH only control for certain RTP usages

- RTX/FEC/RTCP/DTMF ...

Clients needs to specify HBH and E2E crypto scopes explicitly

**Off to Cullen...**

# PERC Double for RTX, FEC, DTMF, & RTCP

May 2017  
Cullen Jennings

# Problem to Solve

Some RTP/RTCP packets should not have E2E security:

1. Draft currently sends RTCP only HbH protected
  - Media Distributor needs to be able to read and write RTCP payloads
2. Packet repair such as RTX and FEC can be handled by Media Distributor
  - Media Distributor needs to be able to read RTX and FEC payload
3. Some systems might want Media Distributor to see DTMF for things like mute
  - Media Distributor needs to be able to read DTMF payload

# The RTX Problem

Repairing streams at each hop is generally better than end to end repair as the errors don't accumulate reducing the probability of repair.

Not all Media Distributor will want to bother with repair so it can also be done end to end.

The Media Distributor can notice a packet is missing and request a retransmission. The repair packet will have the original sequence number in the payload which will be E2E encrypted. Very sad that it was not in the RTP headers instead.

# How RTX Works

Consider RTC with SRTP not using double

RTX forms the payload by taking the encrypted payload of the original packet and prepending the the original sequence number to form a new payload

This new payload is now encrypted with the crypto for the RTX stream

Double/PERC can not change the above without changing RTX

There seemed to be some confusion on the list about if RTX without double caused the packet to be encrypted twice. It does.

# Solutions considered to RTX

1. Send RTX/FEC non-authenticated, do the repair, and if the repair packet validated, then consider it OK
2. Provide clean way for Double to have only HbH security for identified packets
3. Provide a way to \*also\* put the original sequence number in RTP headers
4. Like we did for RTCP, add some text in the draft to detect RTX packets and handle them specially
5. Split the SRTP stack in half, redo the PERC Framework, double, and EKT, and then do RTX on an intermediate result inside the stack
6. Send the RTX on a separate DTLS-SRTP flow that is not using double
7. Don't support RTX or only support RTX in and E2E mode
8. Do a new version of RTX that has the original sequence number in header not payload

# Abbreviated Analysis

A bunch of these solutions might work as one off solution for RTX but they are undesirable because they result in a framework that is limited in what it can do for future things that have similar problems as RTX

Just doing RTX and FEC non authenticated, then doing the authentication on repaired packet may be best for “least work for DoS” and current FEC.

Unfortunately, for future FEC like reed-solomon, it would not protect FEC state from being corrupted

The DTMF example, where it is not clear if it is desirable for the Media Distributor to read DTMF or not, provides the best example of why we would want the framework to be flexible for this

# Proposed Solutions

Add a flag to the OHB (Original Header Block) that indicates if this packet is both HbH and E2E protected or just HbH protected. Call this the s-flag.

The s-flag would be set for RTCP, RTX, and FEC indicating that the E2E protection would be skipped and may or may not be set for things like DTMF

The flag needs to be sent in the OHB so that the receiver knows how to process/decrypt the packet before it has enough information to know if it is a type where s-flag would be set

The receiver does not accept media that comes in a packet with the s-flag set

# Properties of s-flag solution

- One consistent approach for RTCP, FEC, RTX, DTMF and future extensions
- Minimal changes to double, EKT, and framework as this is very close to how RTCP already works.
  - PR at <https://github.com/ietf/perc-wg/pull/112/files> is small
- Very easy to implement - basically adds if statement to skip E2E code in double if s-flag is set
  - Receiver needs clear guidance on which packets allow s-flag to be set. For media, this needs to only be things where the payload is already encrypted in E2E form.
- Most flexible solution that allows the framework to support widest range of solutions for future extensions
- The sender or Media Distributor implementation can cache encrypted payloads that might get used later or can recompute them when needed as it wishes

**back to chairs ..**

# Consensus ?

Does the presented solution (PR) address the pending issue on  
**“Specifying HBH only scope where needed “**

Does the proposed solution provides a way to  
**“Support RTX/FEC/RTCP/DTMF for HBH only use-cases”**