



Towards Content-Oriented Orchestration for Virtual Information Centric Networking

Long HOANG MAI & Guillaume DOYEN, on behalf of the Doctor consortium
Troyes University of Technology – Charles Delaunay Institute
Contact : guillaume.doyen@utt.fr

ICNRG Interim Meeting (IETF #101) – London – March 18, 2018




THALES



Locks for an ICN deployment

- A pragmatic approach
 - A progressive migration performed according to opportunities
 - Services that would benefit from an ICN stack at most
 - Topological locations (access, edge, core) that best fit with ICN Traffic Engineering features (e.g. symmetric routing, caching)
 - Management and security frameworks are required
 - Cohabitation with IP can be handled through NFV
 - Isolation of network protocol stacks (keeps IP as a common substrate)
 - Cost effective solution by using commodity servers
 - This is the position of the 2014-2018 Doctor Project
 - Funded by the (French) National Research Agency (ANR)
 - Selected NDN as a target ICN technology

Content-Oriented MANO - PoC



Content-Oriented MANO - PoC

■ Management

- NDN VNF monitoring (ext. of NFD mgmt protocol)
- Design and implementation of micro-detectors [IM 2015, WIFS 2015]
- Event correlation [NOMS 2018]
- A management Dashboard (partner Montimage)

■ Orchestration

- A TOSCA extension
 - Specifying an NDN service topology
 - Specifying dynamic policies
- Implementation of a NDN orchestrator
 - A chain of MANO Components processing

A TOSCA extension for ICN (1)

- Virtual Deployment Unit
 - Abstraction describing the virtual resources over which a VNF will be executed
- Virtual Network Function
 - The piece of software that will be executed on a VDU
 - NDN router, ingress gateway, egress gateway and NDN firewall
- Virtual Link
 - Resources required to link two VDUs
- Connection Point
 - The connection capability which associates a VDU to a virtual link
- Forwarding Path and Graph
 - a list of VNFs that a particular set of NDN packets will follow
 - Uses content prefixes instead of L2/L3 flow specifications

A TOSCA extension for ICN (1)

■ Policies

- Event-Condition-Action rules to apply dynamically
- Signature verification policy: change the NDN router mode (signature verification to be applied on data packets)
- The firewall policy: configure, at runtime, firewalls mode and configuration (i.e., white and black lists);
- The scaling policy: monitor VNFs performance metrics and enforce a scaling-out action when a threshold is crossed


Demonstration scenario

- European telco topology
 - ClaraNet (6 PoP part of)
 - Points of Presence (PoP) made available through the Internet Zoo Topology Dataset
- Different NDN VNFs
 - NDN routers
 - Signature verification module
 - NDN Firewall
 - Ingress/egress gateways (not included)
- The whole network is deployed through virtualized means
 - 1 PoP in 1 Openstack VM
- NDN compromised server sends poisoned content
- Attack mitigation through dynamic orchestration



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Topology



TOSCA VNF and VDU specifications



router_2:

```
type: toasca.nodes.nfv.doctor.VNF
properties:
  id: 2
  vendor: orange
  version: 1.0
requirements:
  - VDU: VDU2
```

firewall_1:

```
type:
tosca.nodes.nfv.doctor.VNF.firewall
properties:
  id: 6
  vendor: orange
  version: 1.0
  configuration:
    mode: accept
    rules:
      - action: append-drop
        prefix: [/foo]
requirements:
  - VDU: VDU4
```

VDU2:

```
type: toasca.nodes.nfv.doctor.VDU
properties:
  name: VDU2
  sw_image: maouadj/ndn_router:v1
  config: /doctor/launch_nfd_router.sh
  flavor: medium
  placement_policy: ['popLocation==uk']
```

VDU4:

```
type: toasca.nodes.nfv.doctor.VDU
properties:
  name: VDU4
  sw_image: maouadj/ndn_firewall:v1
  config: /doctor/launch_ndn_firewall.sh
  flavor: medium
  placement_policy:
['popLocation==netherlands']
```

TOSCA VL and CP specifications



VL1:

```
type: tosca.nodes.nfv.doctor.VnfVirtualLinkDesc
properties:
  name: VL1
  connectivity_type: VXLAN
```

VDU1_VL1_CP:

```
type: tosca.nodes.nfv.doctor.Cpd
properties:
  name: VDU1_VL1_CP
  layer_protocol: VXLAN
requirements:
  - virtual_link: VL1
  - virtual_binding: VDU1
```

TOSCA Forwarding Path Specification



```
http_from_r2_to_as1:
  type: tosca.nodes.nfv.doctor.FP
  description: creates path for /http
from r2 to as1
  properties:
    id: 2
    policy:
      type: NDN
      prefix: [/com/google]
      path:
        - forwarder: router_2
          capability: VDU2_VL10_CP

        - forwarder: router_x
          capability: VDUX_VL10_CP

        - forwarder: router_x
          capability: VDUX_VL2_CP
```

```
- forwarder: router_4
  capability: VDU3_VL2_CP


- forwarder: router_4
  capability: VDU3_VL3_CP

- forwarder: firewall_1
  capability: VDU4_VL3_CP

- forwarder: firewall_1
  capability: VDU4_VL4_CP

- forwarder: peering_router_1
  capability: VDU5_VL4_CP
```

Dynamic orchestration for CPA mitigation



Content Poisoning Attack scenario

- Legitimate user
 - Requests content among 1 million whose popularity follows zipf law
 - Average rate of 10 Interests/s following a Poisson law
- Attacker consumer
 - Send Interests for popular contents
 - Top most 1% (10 000 contents) at the 64 Interests/s fixed rate
- Network
 - Setup with a multicast routing strategy
 - Do not enforce signature verification for performance purposes
- Attacker provider
 - Pushes poisoned Data to routers
- Legitimate user
 - Detects invalid signatures and asks for newer version of the same content
 - Competes with the attacker client

- Dynamically starts the signature verification enforcement if a CPA alert is raised

policies:

- CPA_countermeasure:

```
type: tosca.policies.nfv.doctor.security.signature_verification
```

```
targets: [router_4, router_5]
```

```
triggers:
```

```
  peeringPoint1_verification:
```

```
    event_type: tosca.nfv.doctor.security.alert.cpa
```

```
    condition:
```

```
      constraint: triggered_by router_2
```

```
    action:
```

```
      action_type: update_router_mode
```

```
      mode: signing
```

```
      target_router: router_4
```

- Dynamically updates the firewall black list with prefixes whose signature is invalid

policies:

- update_firewall:

type: `tosca.policies.nfv.doctor.ndn.security.update_firewall`

targets: `[firewall_1, firewall_2]`

triggers:

peering_point_1:

event_type: `tosca.nfv.doctor.security.alert.poisoned_content`

condition:

constraint: `triggred_by router_4`

action:

action_type: `update_firewall`

target_firewall: `firewall_1`

- Dynamically spawn NDN routers to cope with the resource exhaustion due to signature verification

policies:

- scaling_out_policy:

- type: `tosca.policies.nfv.doctor.ndn.scaling`

- targets: `[router_4, router_5]`

- triggers:

- scale_out:

- meter_name: `PIT`

- event_type: `tosca.policies.nfv.doctor.ndn.utilization`

- condition:

- constraint: `pending_interests greater_than 10`

- threshold: `10`

- comparison_operator: `gt`

- period: `10`

- action:

- action_type: `scale_out`

- number: `3`

Outline

- Context
 - On the maturity of the ICN paradigm
 - Locks for an ICN deployment
- On the road for an ICN deployment
 - Service migration
 - Management and security
 - Infrastructure means
- Leveraging NFV as an ICN enabler
 - Opportunities and challenges
 - Proposition of a Network Function Virtualization Infrastructure
 - ICN Management and Orchestration
- Demonstration
- Conclusion and perspectives

Conclusion and perspectives

- An ongoing work toward the design and implementation of NFV-MANO components for NFV
 - A proof of concept of the whole architecture
 - Code availability
 - <https://github.com/DOCTOR-ANR>
- Doctor and ICNRG
 - Doctor is open to serve ICNRG efforts to push forward the deployment and standardization of this network paradigm
- Future work
 - Evaluate the benefits of an NDN virtual network carrying web traffic with real end-users
 - Further explore the content orchestration
 - Explore micro-services orchestration for NDN



Questions ?



THALES



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[ICN 2016] Xavier Marchal, Moustapha El Aoun, Bertrand Mathieu, Wissam Mallouli, Thibault Cholez, Guillaume Doyen, Patrick Truong, Alain Ploix, Edgardo Montes de Oca. A virtualized and monitored NDN infrastructure featuring a NDN/HTTP gateway. ICN 2016: 225-226

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