Stateless Forwarding in Information Centric Networking

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Stateful Forwarding

Default CCN/NDN operation uses stateful forwarding

- Pending Interest Tables (PITs) store information on received requests:
 - Content name
 - \circ Incoming/outgoing interfaces \twoheadrightarrow Tell how to forward Data pkts
 - Nonces (if implemented) → Identify duplicate/new requests
 - \circ Timeout values \rightarrow Limit storage overhead by purging entries for failed requests

Stateful forwarding has multiple purposes

- Aggregate incoming requests

 e.g., same name, different incoming interface and nonce values
- Prevent attacks targeting a content name
 as requests targeting the same name are
 suppressed at the edge
- Create breadcrumbs for the Data packets → received Data packets are checked with PIT entries for a match

Motivation for Stateless Forwarding

What are the main concerns for stateful forwarding?

- Aggregation is limited to edges \rightarrow not necessary everywhere
- Shown to not fully prevent attacks \rightarrow may use other means to provide security
- Introduces additional overhead: storage and processing



What remains is the breadcrumb advantage

• replicated using stateless forwarding, using in-packet filters

Design Objectives for Stateless Forwarding

We can summarize the basic design objectives as follows:

- Limit forwarding state to domain-based or globally shared forwarding strategy and remove per-request dependency
- Reduce processing and storage requirements at ICN routers without relaxing the security considerations
- Allow for easier transition towards enabling future networking architectures (for instance, ICN over P4)

These objectives can be achieved using in-packet filters, which carry reversepath information, with vertically-integrated or horizontally-integrated designs



Vertical Design Choice: Counting Bloom Filter

Classic Bloom filter is not a desirable option due to no modification along reverse-path and false positives, which can introduce significant overhead

Filter header consists of **constant sized Bloom filter component** and **variable-sized encoded counter**



Vertical Design Choice: Packet Processing Flow



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Horizontal Design Choice: Interleaved Labels

Design objective is to remove dependency of in-packet filter on Bloom filters

 provide same advantages as a Bloom filter based design while avoiding false positives with minimal added complexity

Utilize **integrated multi-label forwarding** to address the complexity of more advanced BF-based designs, while increasing the robustness in terms of security

Each ICN router implements a Local Transform Filter (LTF)

modify in-packet filters for received Interest and Data packets

Each ICN router also carries a Filter Database (FDB)

carry the mappings between interfaces and local filters

As filter implementation is decentralized, each ICN router can insert a dynamic set of control bits to the selected filter for improved robustness

Horizontal Design Choice: Local Transform Filter



Horizontal Design Choice: Interest Processing



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Horizontal Design Choice: Data Processing



enable efficient reverse mapping

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Router 2 towards Router 1

Discussion on Common Limitation: Path Failure

Both solutions suffer from the same problem: cannot properly handle link/node failures

link/node failure typically leads to packet drops as path information is lost

Vertical design choice:

- link failure; without knowledge on alternate path's filter, need to use an alternate means to forward the data packet, longer paths increase the impact of false positives
- node failure; without having access to an ICN router's filter database, cannot determine the next hop beyond the next hop

Horizontal design choice:

- link failure; similar to above (need an alternate means)
- node failure; as labels are interleaved, without having access to a node's LTF parameters, cannot recover the path information

How to Support Fast Path Recovery with Stateless Forwarding?

Objective is to create a secure on-demand source route on the fly by utilizing locally transformed path segment identifiers to create the stateless path

• also continue to address privacy concerns without exposing path information

Store-and-pass path-segment information during path setup using interleaved path segment identifiers



Routers create a path-**segment identifier database** (SID) to include all k-hop path-segments, where k=2 (SID, as intended to include unique path-segment identifiers, may not be necessary and not used for scalability reasons)

Basic Architecture to Support Fast Path Recovery



Path Recovery during Data Packet Forwarding



1. Router D extracts LPF(B,D), and decrypts it using its private key

2. Router D extracts information on Router B and Router D; Router E's identifier indicates the previous hop as Router C (same information can also be forwarded by Router E, as separate filter entry)

3. Path(C,D) is broken, so Router D identifies an alternative path to forward Data packet to Router B over Path(B,Y,Z)

4. Router D can include a new path filter of LPF*(B,Y,Z), a non-encrypted path filter, identifying, path and end-host Router B, in case of further failures, packet is forwarded to target Router B through the alternative path(s)

0. Router E receives the following data packet Type=D Name LPF(A,C) LPF(B,D) LPF(C,E)

1. Router E extracts the LPF(C,E), and decrypts it using its private key

2. Router E extracts information on Router C and Router E; Router E's identifier indicates the previous hop as Router D

3. If path is operational, Router E sends the packet to D (may or may not include information on C) after removing LPF(C,E) (or replacing with info on Router C)