Update of access rights

https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ace/dLkW-MYHXfZqmtY7AP7ZBDJpxOw/


Francesca Palombini, Ericsson


Status of OSCORE Profile of ACE

https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ace-oscore-profile-10

- Answered Ben's review in v-10
- V-11 in PR:
 - Answers OCF comments
 - Adresses Ben re-review
 - Attempts to address 2 leftover github issues from Jim
- Still missing:
 - Text explaining why we recommend 64 bits nonces
 - Update of access rights

Update of access rights - now





Update of access rights - now

- 1. Client retrieves access token T1 from AS
- 2. Client posts T1 to RS, together with nonce N1
- 3. RS replies with 2.01 and nonce N2
- 4. Client and RS derive OSCORE Sec Ctx "Sec1" from T1 ("osc" object), N1, N2
- 5. Client uses Sec1 to protect its request to RS
- 6. RS uses Sec1 to verify request. Verification success => Sec1 is validated and associated with T1 (at the RS)
- 7. Client wants to update its access rights: retrieves T2 from AS. Note that this T2 has different authorization info, but does not contain input keying material ("osc"), only a reference to identify Sec1 ("kid" in "cnf")
- 8. Client posts T2 to RS, together with nonce N1'
- 9. RS replies with 2.01 and nonce N2'


- 10. Client and RS derive OSCORE Sec Ctx "Sec2" from T1 keying input material ("osc" object), N1', N2'
- 11. Client uses Sec2 to protect its request to RS 12. RS uses Sec2 to verify request. Verification success => Sec2 is validated and associated with T2 (at the RS); T1 is removed; Sec1 is removed




1: mandate that the access token to update the access rights MUST be sent over the secure channel.

- in OSCORE and DTLS profiles
- in framework too?
- 1.b: separate /authz-info and /authz-info-update endpoints at the RS
 - simplifies processing and implementations
 - /authz-info-update unprotected messages are rejected
 - messages to /authz-info \rightarrow always new security association C-RS

Update of access rights - proposal





Update of access rights - proposal

- 1. Client retrieves access token T1 from AS
- 2. Client posts T1 to RS, together with nonce N1
- 3. RS replies with 2.01 and nonce N2

- 4. Client and RS derive OSCORE Sec Ctx "Sec1" from T1 ("osc" object), N1, N2
- 5. Client uses Sec1 to protect its request to RS
- 6. RS uses Sec1 to verify request. Verification success => Sec1 is validated and associated with T1 (at the RS)
- 7. Client wants to update its access rights: retrieves T2 from AS. Note that this T2 has different authorization info, but does not contain input keying material, only a reference to identify Sec1
- 8. Client posts T2 to RS, without nonce protected with Sec1
- 9. RS verifies that this is an update of access right, replacing T1 (associated with Sec1); Sec1 is associated with T2; T1 is removed; RS replies with 2.01 without nonce protected with Sec1
- 10. Client uses **Sec1** to protect its request to RS

Feedback

- Ludwig \rightarrow 1 yes. 1.b not necessary
- Rikard, Marco (ace OSCORE implementation) → 1 is doable even without 1.b for their implementation
- Michael R. → considerations on access rights(T1) and access rights(T2) (superset, subset, disjoint, subset + something else)
- Ben \rightarrow possibility of collisions of kid (talk about key)