
New CoAP Block-Wise Transfer Options draft-bosh-core-new-block CoRE virtual interim 13th May 2020

Mohamed Boucadair Jon Shallow

DOTS Use Case Example Environment



- DDoS Open Threat Signalling (DOTS)
- DOTS: App CBOR CoAP DTLS IP
- Client requests mitigation (NON)
- Server updates with simple DOTS mitigation status (NON)
- Inbound Pipe Overload
 - Clients Can still request mitigations
 - Mitigation should be able to control pipe overload

DOTS General Operation

- Configuration
 - Confirmable
 - Peace Time
- Mitigation Requests / Responses
 - Non Confirmable
 - Single Packets contain all the information
 - Works with response packet loss
 - E.g. Request Mitigate traffic to IP W.X.Y.Z/32
 - Status updates may get lost
- Application Heartbeats
 - Non Confirmable
 - Initiated separately by Client and Server
 - Server can detect Client alive at all times
 - Client continues, even if no Server traffic seen

DOTS Telemetry

- DDoS Telemetry information both ways
 - (Smart) Client -> Server (PUT)
 - Server -> Client (GET)
- Data likely larger than Single Packet
- Without Packet Loss
 - BLOCK1 and BLOCK2 fine (Non Confirmable)
- With Packet Loss (usually Server -> Client)
 - Next BLOCK1 response lost
 - Next BLOCK2 packet request lost
 - All stalls even when using Non Confirmable

Oversized Packet Handling

• Use IP Fragmentation

- Requires large receipt buffers
- Unable to recover missing fragments
- Application break up data into Chunks
 - YANG <anydata> requires chunk to be full JSON as per RFC7951
 - How to break data down to minimize no of chunks
- Use BLOCK1 and BLOCK2: Has limitations
 - Performance (symmetric traffic requires 'ACK' before next block is sent)
 - Handling lossy environments

CoAP Options BLOCK3 and BLOCK4

- Same as BLOCK1 and BLOCK2 with additions
- All Blocks sent before 'ACK' required
 - Similar to using fragmented IP packets
 - NSTART needs to be increased if CONfirmable
- Missing Blocks can be re-requested
- Each set of Blocks have same Block ID (BID) for reassembly
 - Could use ETag for BID, but RFC7252 says:
 "An entity-tag is intended for use as a resource-local identifier for differentiating between representations of the same resource"

BLOCK1 vs. BLOCK3

- BLOCK1
 - If NON and no response, limited to PROBING_RATE (1 Byte/sec)
- BLOCK3
 - "Body" of data subject to PROBING_RATE
 - Higher transmit rate for "body" with multiple blocks as all sent with no waiting
- Both can utilize 4.08 for missing blocks
- 4.08 needs to be extended to include array of missing blocks in response (using repeat option with BLOCK3?)

BLOCK2 vs. BLOCK4

- BLOCK2
 - Server has to wait for next block request
 - Copy of "body" maintained for EXCHANGE_LIFETIME
- BLOCK4
 - Entire set of Blocks for "body" can be sent without waiting
 - Higher performance (negligible waits between blocks arriving at Client)
 - A Client can indicate multiple blocks are missing
 - Server can 'delete' "body" on successful receipt
 - Caches can keep data at Block and / or "body" level

BLOCK3 & BLOCK4 Tokens

- How should Tokens be handled
 - Set of Block4 responses (same BID) tokens all the same?
 - Affect on Proxies
- RFC7252 5.4.1:

"The Token is used to match a response with a request." "A token is intended for use as a client-local identifier"

• RFC7641 4.2:

"Each such notification response (including the initial response) MUST echo the token specified by the client in the GET request."

• RFC7959 3.4:

"requests for additional blocks cannot make use of the token of the Observation relationship"

Next Steps

- RFC 8613 OSCORE implications
- Further discussion

Thank You

Appendix

Example of Mitigation Status with Telemetry

```
"ietf-dots-signal-channel:mitigation-scope": {
"scope":
    "mid": 12332,
    "mitigation-start": "1507818434",
    "alias-name": [
      "https1",
      "https2"
    ],
    "lifetime": 1600,
    "status": "attack-successfully-mitigated",
    "bytes-dropped": "134334555",
    "bps-dropped": "43344",
    "pkts-dropped": "333334444",
    "pps-dropped": "432432",
    "ietf-dots-telemetry:total-attack-traffic": [
        "ietf-dots-telemetry:unit": "megabit-ps",
        "ietf-dots-telemetry:mid-percentile-g": "900"
    ],
    "ietf-dots-telemetry::attack-detail": [
        "ietf-dots-telemetry:vendor-id": 1234,
        "ietf-dots-telemetry:attack-id": 77,
        "ietf-dots-telemetry:source-count": {
          "ietf-dots-telemetry:peak-q": "10000"
```

Example of DOTS Telemetry

```
"ietf-dots-telemetry:telemetry": {
"pre-or-ongoing-mitigation": [
    "tmid": 123,
    "target": {
      "target-prefix": [
        "2001:db8::1/128"
      1
    },
    "target-protocol": [
      17
    1,
    "total-attack-traffic": [
        "unit": "megabit-ps",
        "mid-percentile-g": "900"
      }
    ],
    "attack-detail": [
      {
        "vendor-id": 1234,
        "attack-id": 77,
        "start-time": "1957818434",
        "attack-severity": "high"
```

{