

DRIP Identity Claims

draft-wiethuechter-drip-identity-claims-02

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DRIP WG – OCT20 Interim; 28 OCT 2020

From the DRIP Charter

DRIP's goal is to specify how RID can be made trustworthy and available in both Internet and local-only connected scenarios

Overview


- Claim vs Certificate
 - Claim was chosen initially as “certificate” has a pre-establish connotation
 - Legal and technology baggage with the term and want to avoid confusion
 - This decision is in flux and we would like feedback on it! (we are now back on Certificate but Claims are reentering picture)
- Special to the UAS ecosystem for Remote ID
 - Asserts bindings between entities and objects
 - Created during provisioning of UA/Operator/Registry
- Draft name change?
 - Thinking DRIP Identity Proofs (to encompass both Certs and Claims)

Changes since v01

- Draft now written in Markdown
- Lots of text updated
 - Please re-review to find any missing things (such as references that were lost during MD conversion, etc.)
- Added Sections
 - Smaller form of Cxx found in Bob's UAS RID doc
 - Registry provisioning
- Generalized Cra into a Cxy (Short)


Form Cxx

- Self-signed unverified claim
- Used to assert binding of HHIT/HI to a given entity (x)
 - Contains: HHIT, HI, Expiration Timestamp, Signature
 - 116 bytes in length
- Three specific entities:
 - Aircraft on Aircraft (Caa)
 - Operator on Operator (Coo)
 - Registry on Registry (Crr)
- Used in other forms




Form Cxy

- Asserts binding between two entities (x and y)
 - Generally 'x' is an entity attesting 'y's claim (or adding a relationship)
 - Contains: Cxx, Cyy, Timestamp, Expiration Timestamp, Signature
 - 304/608 bytes in length
- 3 specific implementations of this form:
 - Registry on Operator (Cro)
 - Operator on Aircraft (Coa)
 - Registry on Operator on Aircraft (Croa)



Certificate: Registry on Aircraft


- Special as it is used in authentication messages of Broadcast RID
 - Contains: HHIT of Registry, Caa, Expiration Timestamp, Signature
 - 200 bytes long
- Asserts the binding between a Registry and Aircraft



Provisioning Process

Based on work in the DI WG for IATF under ICAO

Manufacturer Provisioning



Aircraft CREATED

Manufacturer GENERATES: $A0(A0_pub, A0_priv), C[A0, A0]$

Manufacturer TX to Manufacturer CA: $C[A0, A0]$

Manufacturer CA GENERATES: $C[M, A0]$

This does not need to be a DRIP style certificate – it could be X.509!

Key point: ID (whatever it is) is being bound to Manufacturer!

Manufacturer CA TX to Manufacturer: $C[M, A0]$

Manufacturer INJECTS into Aircraft: $A0(A0_pub, A0_priv), C[A0, A0], C[M, A0]$

Aircraft PACKAGED


Aircraft SHIPPED to Retailer

Retailer SELLS Aircraft to Operator

Registry (RAA, HDA) Provisioning

- RAA GENERATES: $R(R_{\text{pub}}, R_{\text{priv}})$, $C[R, R]$
- HDA GENERATES: $H(H_{\text{pub}}, H_{\text{priv}})$, $C[H, H]$
- HDA TX to RAA: $C[H, H]$
- RAA CHECKS: $C[H, H]$
- RAA GENERATES using $C[R, R]$ and $C[H, H]$: $C[R, H]$
- RAA TX to HDA: $C[R, H]$
 - Note from this point on Registry == HDA

Operator Provisioning



- Keypair generation
- HHIT derived from HI (public half of keypair)
 - Select Registry and use RAA/HDA to format valid HHIT
- Create Coo, send to Registry
- Registry perform verification check and adds HHIT/HI to DNS in the form of HIP RR
 - Verification check MUST include looking for HHIT collisions in current database of Registered HHITs
- Registry if successful, creates Cro and sends it back to Operator
- Registry if failed, sends error back asking to start over

Aircraft Provisioning (Operator Assisted)

Operator GENERATES: An(An_pub, An_priv), C[An, An]

Operator INJECTS into Aircraft: An(An_pub, An_priv), C[An, An]

Aircraft GENERATES using C[A0, A0] and C[An, An]: C[A0, An]

Operator EXTRACTS from Aircraft: C[M, A0], C[A0, An]

Operator GENERATES using C[O, O] and C[An, An]: C[O, An]

Operator TX to Registry: C[R, O], C[O, An], C[M, A0], C[A0, An]

Registry CHECKS: C[R, O], C[O, An], C[M, A0], C[A0, An]




C[M, A0] is checked using external systems (Manufacturer CA)

Registry GENERATES using C[H, H] and C[O, An] or C[A0, An]: C[R, O, An], C[R, An]

An is extracted from either C[O, An] or C[A0, An] and used to create C[R, An]

Registry TX to Operator: C[R, O, An], C[R, An]

Operator INJECTS into Aircraft: C[R, An]



Aircraft Provisioning

Operator COMMANDS Aircraft: GENERATE NEW KEYPAIR

Aircraft GENERATES: $An(An_{pub}, An_{priv}), C[An, An]$

Aircraft GENERATES using $C[A0, A0]$ and $C[An, An]$: $C[A0, An]$

Operator EXTRACTS from Aircraft: $C[An, An]$

Operator GENERATES using $C[O, O]$ and $C[An, An]$: $C[O, An]$

Operator TX to Registry: $C[R, O], C[O, An]$

Registry CHECKS: $C[R, O]$

Registry TX to Operator: P_TOKEN

Operator INJECTS into Aircraft: P_TOKEN

Operator COMMANDS Aircraft: CONTINUE PROVISIONING




Aircraft TX to Registry: P_TOKEN, $C[M, A0], C[A0, An]$

Registry CHECKS: P_TOKEN, $C[M, A0], C[A0, An], C[O, An]$
 $C[M, A0]$ is checked using external systems (Manufacturer CA)

Registry GENERATES using $C[H, H]$ and $C[O, An]$ or $C[A0, An]$: $C[R, O, An], C[R, An]$
 An is extracted from either $C[O, An]$ or $C[A0, An]$ and used to create $C[R, An]$

Registry TX to Operator: $C[R, O, An]$


Registry TX to Operator: $C[R, An]$



New Details (Draft TODOs)

- Bob has brought up Timestamp considerations
 - Use a Current Timestamp instead of Expiry Timestamp
 - Add separate forms switching or having both?
- Offline Self-Claim should be added?
 - (UA HHIT | UA HI | HDA HHIT | HDA Expiry TS | HDA Sig) | UA Expiry TS | UA Sig
 - Only first portion here (in parenthesis), rest in Auth Draft
- How to handle provisioning of those who create own software?
- Ordering of Cxy fields?

Bigger Problem



Title text: Your point that the world contains multiple problems is a real slam-dunk argument against fixing any of them.

<https://xkcd.com/2368/>

Discussion

Questions, Comments, Concerns?