







Advance

ent that









Not Presented



"what's your take on it? To me it seems simple and very sensible... how soon do you think it might actually turn into something real?"

– anonymous colleague

"very simple, very concise"

– unnamed ∞-author













after the interim is this other interim







Daniel Fett <fett@danielfett.de> Thu. Feb 27, 2020 at 12:39 PM To: oauth@ietf.org What about DPoP? -Daniel Am 27.02.20 um 18:51 schrieb IESG Secretary: The Web Authorization Protocol (oauth) Working Group will hold a virtual interim meeting on 2020-03-09 from 18:00 to 19:30 Europe/Vienna. Agenda: This meeting is setup to discuss proof-of-possession tokens. Several documents are relevant to this discussion, including https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-pop-architecture-08 https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-signed-http-request-03 https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-richanna-oauth-http-signature-pop-00 https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-cavage-http-signatures-12 https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8613 https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-pop-key-distribution-07 https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7800 https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ace-oauth-authz-33 https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-mtls-17 Information about remote participation: https://ietf.webex.com/ietf/j.php?MTID=m9fc3ef4d116ad78e120c520eda96b269 OAuth mailing list OAuth@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth OAuth mailing list OAuth@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth

[Some] Motivations for [D]PoP



- Do something that's better than bearer
- OAuth 2.0 Security BCP (somewhat aspirationally) recommends use of "sender-constrained" tokens as do various FAPI profiles
 - To prevent token (re)play at a different endpoint/resource (among other benefits)
- Proof-of-possession bound refresh tokens for public clients (also per Security BCP)
- Yet OAuth lacks suitable and widely-applicable PoP mechanism
 - MTLS is "Virtually undeployable [for] general purpose applications" a WG participant
 - What else is there really?
- Especially lacking for Single Page Applications (SPA)
 - MTLS for OAuth 2.0 would have major UX issues with SPAs
 - Token Binding is dead in the water & needed fetch() API changes anyway

Some existing PoP efforts:



- OAuth 1.0a RFC 5849
- The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework RFC 6749
- OAuth 2.0 Message Authentication Code (MAC) Tokens draft-ietf-oauth-v2-http-mac
- Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for JSON Web Tokens RFC 7800
- OAuth 2.0 Proof-of-Possession (PoP) Security Architecture draft-ietf-oauth-pop-architecture
- OAuth 2.0 Proof-of-Possession: Authorization Server to Client Key Distribution draft-ietf-oauth-pop-key-distribution
- A Method for Signing HTTP Requests for OAuth draft-ietf-oauth-signed-http-request
- OAuth 2.0 Token Binding draft-ietf-oauth-token-binding
- The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: JWT Pop Token Usage draft-sakimura-oauth-jpop
- OAuth 2.0 Mutual-TLS Client Authentication and Certificate-Bound Access Tokens RFC 8705
- OAuth 2.0 Demonstration of Proof-of-Possession at the Application Layer (DPoP) draft-fettoauth-dpop
- "a tentative suggestion for an alternative (to/in DPoP) design" Neil Madden email
- Proof-of-Possession Tokens for OAuth Using JWS HTTP Signatures draft-richanna-oauthhttp-signature-pop
- Signing HTTP Requests via JSON Web Signatures draft-richanna-http-jwt-signature
- Signing HTTP Messages draft-richanna-http-message-signatures formerly draft-cavage-httpsignatures

Criticisms of DPoP (paraphrased)



- It's not draft-ietf-oauth-pop-key-distribution
- An asymmetric crypto operation on every single HTTP request is too expensive
- Tracking `jti` is prohibitive at scale
- Bit of a Rorschach Test even amongst its supporters

Where to now?

Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3

Collect underpants Profit

- Stay the course
 - Something between doing nothing and -pop-key-distribution + some HTTP signing
- Push forward and adopt and tweak DPoP
 - "... for us mere mortals, DPoP is fine as-is"
 - "we need to sender constrain refresh tokens issued to SPAs yesterday."
- Work toward an approach that's similar(ish) to DPoP using asymmetric keys but with ECDH to amortize the cost of asymmetric crypto over *many* requests (riffing on Neil's idea)
 - allowing for the aggreged/derived key (unique to client/RS or client/AS) to be non-exportable
- ? -> Profit

