# TPM-based Network Device Remote Integrity Verification draft-fedorkow-rats-network-device-attestation-05

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
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Juniper Business Use Only

#### Objective

- Standardize operational model for today's existing but proprietary TPM-based router/switch Remote Attestation solutions.
  - Enables switches/routers to be appraised by non-proprietary controllers/Verifiers.
  - Gives Network Operators needed stability for interfacing operational systems.

#### Nonce based Background Check Model



### New in Draft -05

- Focus on Operational Prerequisites for the RIV Use Case
- Alignment with RATS-Arch, addition of timing points
- Removal of some TCG-centric material to Appendices
- Addition of "What Evidence does RIV Appraise?"
- Addition of Peer-to-Peer to coordinate with draft-voit-rats-trustedpath-routing

### What Evidence does RIV Appraise?

Section 2.1.1 outlines what we expect to attest with RIV, including:

- Code
  - Firmware, OS loader, OS kernel and applications
- Credentials
  - Keys used to authorize operation of routers, e.g. code-signing public keys or network-access private keys (e.g. VPN keys)
- Configuration
  - Security-sensitive configuration files

RIV is intended to secure the infrastructure, so that subsequent higherlevel claims can be trusted.

#### Relationship to other WG drafts

Language	Profile	Interface Specification	
draft-ietf-rats-architecture <ul> <li>Terminology</li> <li>Topological models</li> </ul> Enables WG discussion via shared context	<ul> <li><u>draft-fedorkow-rats-network-device-attestation</u></li> <li>Use case</li> <li>Prerequisites/simplifying assumptions which enable operation         <ul> <li>TPM1.2/TPM2.0/equivalent needs</li> <li>Pre-established Key Types</li> <li>Pre-configured endorsements</li> </ul> </li> <li>RIV call flow</li> <li>Evidence evaluation         <ul> <li>PCR allocations for network devices</li> <li>Relevance/viability of KGVs for a subset of PCRs</li> <li>Appraisal Policy for Evidence</li> <li>Attester log type formats supportable</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul> <li><u>draft-ietf-rats-yang-tpm-charra</u></li> <li>YANG definitions &amp; RPCs for Attester</li> </ul> Defines operational pre-requisites for	Current Deployments
	Potential improvements		
	<ul> <li><u>draft-xia-rats-pubsub-model</u></li> <li>Business context</li> <li>Subscription call flow</li> </ul>	<ul> <li><u>draft-voit-rats-trusted-path-routing</u></li> <li>YANG definitions for event stream subscription</li> <li>Composite Evidence Passport</li> </ul>	Future

## Assuming WG agrees such documentation is needed:

• Where should the WG document current TPM-based router/switch Remote Attestation operational prerequisites?

