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Security Automation and Continuous Monitoring (SACM) Architecture
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Abstract

This document defines an architecture enabling a cooperative Security Automation and Continuous Monitoring (SACM) ecosystem. This work is predicated upon information gleaned from SACM Use Cases and Requirements ([RFC7632] and [RFC8248] respectively), and terminology as found in [I-D.ietf-sacm-terminology].

WORKING GROUP: The source for this draft is maintained in GitHub. Suggested changes should be submitted as pull requests at <https://github.com/sacmwg/ietf-mandm-sacm-arch/>. Instructions are on that page as well.

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1. Introduction

The purpose of this draft is to define an architectural approach for a SACM Domain, based on the spirit of use cases found in [RFC7632] and requirements found in [RFC8248]. This approach gains the most advantage by supporting a variety of collection systems, and intends to enable a cooperative ecosystem of tools from disparate sources with minimal operator configuration.

1.1. Requirements notation

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119, BCP 14 [RFC2119].

2. Terms and Definitions

This draft defers to [I-D.ietf-sacm-terminology] for terms and definitions.

3. Architectural Overview

The generic approach proposed herein recognizes the need to obtain information from existing and future state collection systems, and makes every attempt to respect [RFC7632] and [RFC8248]. At the foundation of any architecture are entities, or components, that need to communicate. They communicate by sharing information, where, in a given flow, one or more components are consumers of information and one or more components are providers of information.




Figure 1: Basic Architectural Structure

A Provider can be described as an abstraction that refers to an entity capable of sending SACM-relevant information to one or many consumers. A Consumer can be described as an abstraction that refers to an entity capable of receiving SACM-relevant information from one or many providers. Different roles within a cooperative ecosystem may act as both providers and consumers of SACM-relevant information.

3.1. SACM Role-based Architecture

Within the cooperative SACM ecosystem, a number of roles act in coordination to provide relevant policy/guidance, perform data collection, storage, evaluation, and support downstream analytics and reporting.




Figure 2: Notional Role-based Architecture

As shown in Figure 2, the SACM role-based architecture consists of some basic SACM Components communicating using an integration service. The integration service is expected to maximally align with the requirements described in [RFC8248], which means that the integration service will support brokered (i.e. point-to-point) and proxied data exchange.

3.2. Architectural Roles/Components

This document suggests a variety of players in a cooperative ecosystem; known as SACM Components. SACM Components may be composed of other SACM Components, and each SACM Component plays one, or more, of several roles relevant to the ecosystem. Roles may act as providers of information, consumers of information, or both provider and consumer. Figure 2 depicts a number of SACM components which are architecturally significant and therefore warrant discussion and clarification.

3.2.1. Orchestrator(s)

Orchestrator components exist to aid in the automation of configuration, coordination, and management for the ecosystem of SACM components. The Orchestrator performs control-plane operations, administration of an implementing organization's components (including endpoints, posture collection services, and downstream activities), scheduling of automated tasks, and any ad-hoc activities such as the initiation of collection or evaluation activities. The Orchestrator is the key administrative interface into the SACM architecture.

Topic authorization policies established by the Integration Service should dictate that only the component acting as the Orchestrator has access to receive messages on the administrative topic(s) used for component onboarding (i.e. the `"/orchestrator/registration"` topic).

3.2.2. Repositories/Configuration Management Databases (CMDBs)

Figure 2 only includes a single reference to "Repositories/CMDBs", but in practice, a number of separate data repositories may exist, including posture attribute repositories, policy repositories, local vulnerability definition data repositories, and state assessment results repositories. These data repositories may exist separately or together in a single representation, and the design of these repositories may be as distinct as their intended purpose, such as the use of relational database management systems or graph/map implementations focused on the relationships between data elements. Each implementation of a SACM repository should focus on the relationships between data elements and implement the SACM information and data model(s).

3.2.3. Integration Service

If each SACM component represents a set of capabilities, then the Integration Service represents the "fabric" by which SACM components are woven together. The Integration Service acts as a message broker, combining a set of common message categories and infrastructure to allow SACM components to communicate using a shared set of interfaces. The Integration Service's brokering capabilities enable the exchange of various information payloads, orchestration of component capabilities, message routing and reliable delivery. The Integration Service minimizes the dependencies from one system to another through the loose coupling of applications through messaging. SACM components will "attach" to the Integration Service either through native support for the integration implementation, or through the use of "adapters" which provide a proxied attachment.

The Integration Service should provide mechanisms for both synchronous and asynchronous request/response-style messaging, and a publish/subscribe mechanism to implement event-based messaging. It is the responsibility of the Integration Service to coordinate and manage the sending and receiving of messages. The Integration Service should allow components to directly connect and produce or consume messages, or connect via message translators which can act as a proxy, transforming messages from a component format to one implementing a SACM data model.

The Integration Service **MUST** provide routing capabilities for payloads between producers and consumers. The Integration Service **MAY** provide further capabilities within the payload delivery pipeline. Examples of these capabilities include, but are not limited to, intermediate processing, message transformation, type conversion, validation, or other enterprise integration patterns.

3.3. Downstream Uses

As depicted by Figure 2, a number of downstream uses exist in the cooperative ecosystem. Each notional SACM component represents distinct sub-architectures which will exchange information via the integration services, using interactions described in this draft.

3.3.1. Reporting

The Reporting component represents capabilities outside of the SACM architecture scope dealing with the query and retrieval of collected posture attribute information, evaluation results, etc. in various display formats that are useful to a wide range of stakeholders.

3.3.2. Analytics

The Analytics component represents capabilities outside of the SACM architecture scope dealing with the discovery, interpretation, and communication of any meaningful patterns of data in order to inform effective decision making within the organization.

3.4. Sub-Architectures

Figure 2 shows two components representing sub-architectural roles involved in a cooperative ecosystem of SACM components: Collection and Evaluation.

3.4.1. Collection Sub-Architecture

The Collection sub-architecture is, in a SACM context, the mechanism by which posture attributes are collected from applicable endpoints and persisted to a repository, such as a configuration management database (CMDB). Orchestration components will choreograph endpoint data collection via defined interactions, using the Integration Service as a message broker. Instructions to perform endpoint data collection are directed to a Posture Collection Service capable of performing collection activities utilizing any number of methods, such as SNMP, NETCONF/RESTCONF, SSH, WinRM, packet capture, or host-based.




Figure 3: Decomposed Collection Sub-Architecture

3.4.1.1. Posture Collection Service

The Posture Collection Service (PCS) is the SACM component responsible for the collection of posture attributes from an endpoint or set of endpoints. A single PCS may be responsible for management of posture attribute collection from many endpoints. The PCS will interact with the Integration Service to receive collection instructions and to provide collected posture data for persistence to the Posture Attribute Repository. Collection instructions may be supplied in a variety of forms, including subscription to a publish/subscribe topic to which the Integration Service has published instructions, or via request/response-style messaging (either synchronous or asynchronous).

Four classifications of posture collections MAY be supported.

3.4.1.1.1. Ad-Hoc

Ad-Hoc collection is defined as a single collection of posture attributes, collected at a particular time. An example of ad-hoc collection is the single collection of a specific registry key.

3.4.1.1.2. Continuous/Scheduled

Continuous/Scheduled collection is defined as the ongoing, periodic collection of posture attributes. An example of scheduled collection is the collection of a specific registry key value every day at a given time.

3.4.1.1.3. Observational

This classification of collection is triggered by the observation, external to an endpoint, of information asserting posture attribute values for that endpoint. An example of observational collection is examination of netflow data for particular packet captures and/or specific information within those captures.

3.4.1.1.4. Event-based

Event-based collection may be triggered either internally or externally to the endpoint. Internal event-based collection is triggered when a posture attribute of interest is added, removed, or modified on an endpoint. This modification indicates a change in the current state of the endpoint, potentially affecting its adherence to some defined policy. Modification of the endpoint's minimum password length is an example of an attribute change which could trigger collection.

External event-based collection can be described as a collector being subscribed to an external source of information, receiving events from that external source on a periodic or continuous basis. An example of event-based collection is subscription to YANG Push notifications.

3.4.1.2. Endpoint

Building upon [I-D.ietf-sacm-terminology], the SACM Collection Sub-Architecture augments the definition of an Endpoint as a component within an organization's management domain from which a Posture Collection Service will collect relevant posture attributes.

3.4.1.3. Posture Attribute Repository

The Posture Attribute Repository is a SACM component responsible for the persistent storage of posture attributes collected via interactions between the Posture Collection Service and Endpoints.

3.4.1.4. Posture Collection Workflow

Posture collection may be triggered from a number of components, but commonly begin either via event-based triggering on an endpoint or through manual orchestration, both illustrated in Figure 3 above. Once orchestration has provided the directive to perform collection, posture collection services consume the directives. Posture collection is invoked for those endpoints overseen by the respective posture collection services. Collected data is then provided to the Integration Service, with a directive to store that information in an appropriate repository.

3.4.2. Evaluation Sub-Architecture

The Evaluation Sub-Architecture, in the SACM context, is the mechanism by which policy, expressed in the form of expected state, is compared with collected posture attributes to yield an evaluation result, that result being contextually dependent on the policy being evaluated.




Figure 4: Decomposed Evaluation Sub-Architecture

3.4.2.1. Posture Evaluation Service

The Posture Evaluation Service (PES) represents the SACM component responsible for coordinating the policy to be evaluated and the collected posture attributes relevant to that policy, as well as the comparison engine responsible for correctly determining compliance with the expected state.

3.4.2.2. Policy Repository

The Policy Repository represents a persistent storage mechanism for the policy to be assessed against collected posture attributes to determine if an endpoint meets the desired expected state. Examples of information contained in a Policy Repository would be Vulnerability Definition Data or configuration recommendations as part of a CIS Benchmark or DISA STIG.

3.4.2.3. Evaluation Results Repository

The Evaluation Results Repository persists the information representing the results of a particular posture assessment, indicating those posture attributes collected from various endpoints which either meet or do not meet the expected state defined by the assessed policy. Consideration should be made for the context of individual results. For example, meeting the expected state for a configuration attribute indicates a correct configuration of the endpoint, whereas meeting an expected state for a vulnerable software version indicates an incorrect configuration.

3.4.2.4. Posture Evaluation Workflow

Posture evaluation is orchestrated through the Integration Service to the appropriate Posture Evaluation Service (PES). The PES will, using interactions defined by the applicable taxonomy, query both the Posture Attribute Repository and the Policy Repository to obtain relevant state data for comparison. If necessary, the PES may be required to invoke further posture collection. Once all relevant posture information has been collected, it is compared to expected state based on applicable policy. Comparison results are then persisted to an evaluation results repository for further downstream use and analysis.

4. Interactions

SACM Components are intended to interact with other SACM Components. These interactions can be thought of, at the architectural level, as the combination of interfaces with their supported operations. Each interaction will convey a payload of information. The payload information is expected to contain sub-domain-specific characteristics and/or instructions.

4.1. Interaction Categories

Two categories of interactions SHOULD be supported by the Integration Service: broadcast and directed. Broadcast interactions are asynchronous by default, and directed interactions may be invoked either synchronously or asynchronously. Each interaction category SHOULD adhere to topic naming conventions described below.

4.1.1. Broadcast

A broadcast interaction, commonly known as publish/subscribe, allows for a wider distribution of a message payload. When a payload is published to a topic on the Integration Service, all subscribers to that topic are alerted and may consume the message payload. This category of interaction can also be described as a "unicast" interaction when a topic only has a single subscriber. An example of a broadcast interaction could be to publish Linux OVAL objects to a posture collection topic. Subscribing consumers receive the notification, and proceed to collect endpoint configuration posture based on the new content.

When interacting via broadcast, topic naming conventions should provide an adequate amount of information to be deterministic regarding the purpose of the interaction. For example, a broadcast topic named `"/collection/oval"` would indicate that (a) the payloads published to the topic are represented as OVAL definitions, and that (b) subscribers to that topic have advertised capabilities to perform collection using an OVAL-compliant engine.

4.1.2. Directed

The intent of a directed interaction is to enable point-to-point communications between a producer and consumer, through the standard interfaces provided by the Integration Service. The provider component indicates which consumer is intended to receive the payload, and the Integration Service routes the payload directly to that consumer. Two "styles" of directed interaction exist, differing only by the response from the payload consumer.

When interacting via directed messaging, topic naming conventions should provide an adequate amount of information to be deterministic regarding the operation(s) to be performed, and the component performing them. For example, a topic named `"/collector-1234/ad-hoc-collection"` would indicate a payload of collection instructions, provided to a specific component identified as `"collector-1234"`, directing that component to perform Ad-Hoc Collection.

4.1.2.1. Synchronous

Synchronous, request/response style interaction requires that the requesting component block and wait for the receiving component to respond, or to time out when that response is delayed past a given time threshold. A synchronous interaction example may be querying a CMDB for posture attribute information in order to perform an evaluation.

4.1.2.2. Asynchronous

An asynchronous interaction involves the payload producer directing the message to a consumer, but not blocking or waiting for an immediate response. This style of interaction allows the producer to continue on to other activities without the need to wait for responses. This style is particularly useful when the interaction payload invokes a potentially long-running task, such as data collection, report generation, or policy evaluation. The receiving component may reply later via callbacks or further interactions, but it is not mandatory.

4.2. Management Plane Functions

Management plane functions describe a component's interactions with the ecosystem itself, not necessarily relating to collection, evaluation, or downstream analytical processes.

4.2.1. Orchestrator Onboarding

The Orchestrator component, being a specialized role in the architecture, onboards to the SACM ecosystem in such a manner as to enable the onboarding and capability management of the other component roles. The Orchestrator must support the set of capabilities needed to manage the functions of the ecosystem.

With this in mind, the Orchestrator must first authenticate to the Integration Service. Once authentication has succeeded, the Orchestrator must establish "service handlers" per the component registration taxonomy (Section 5.2). Once "service handlers" have been established, the Orchestrator is then equipped to handle component registration, onboarding, capability discovery, and topic subscription policy.

The following requirements exist for the Orchestrator to establish "service handlers" supporting the component registration taxonomy (Section 5.2):

- * The Orchestrator MUST enable the capability to receive onboarding requests via the `"/orchestrator/registration"` topic,
- * The Orchestrator MUST have the capability to generate, manage, and persist unique identifiers for all registered components,
- * The Orchestrator MUST have the capability to inventory and manage its "roster" (the list of registered components),

- * The Orchestrator MUST have the capability to manage its roster's advertised capabilities, including those endpoints to which those capabilities apply.

In addition to supporting component registration, Orchestrators are responsible for many of the operational functions of the architecture, including initiating collection or evaluation, queries for repository data, or the assembly of information for downstream use.

- * The Orchestrator MUST support making directed requests to registered components over the component's administrative interface, as configured by the `"/orchestrator/[component-unique-identifier]"` topic. Administrative interface functions are described by their taxonomy, below.
- * The Orchestrator MUST support the publication of broadcast messages to topics configured by implementations of this ecosystem.
- * The Orchestrator MUST support the subscription to topics configured by implementations of this ecosystem as needed.

4.2.2. Component Onboarding

Component onboarding describes how an individual component becomes part of the SACM ecosystem; registering with the Orchestrator, advertising capabilities, establishing its administrative interface, and subscribing to relevant topics.

The component onboarding workflow involves multiple steps:

- * The component first authenticates to the Integration Service, and
- * The component initiates registration with the Orchestrator, per the component registration taxonomy (Section 5.2).

Once the component has onboarded and registered with the Orchestrator, its administrative interface will have been established via the `"/orchestrator/[component-unique-identifier]"` topic. This administrative interface allows the component to advertise its capabilities to the Orchestrator and in return, allow the Orchestrator to direct capability-specific topic registration to the component. This is performed using the "capability advertisement handshake" (Section 5.3.1) taxonomy. Further described below, the "capability advertisement handshake" first assumes the onboarding component has the ability to describe its capabilities so they may be understood by the Orchestrator (TBD on capability advertisement methodology).

- * The component sends a message with its operational capabilities over the administrative interface: `"/orchestrator/[component-unique-identifier]"`
- * The Orchestrator receives the component's capabilities, persists them, and responds with the list of topics to which the component should subscribe, in order to receive notifications, instructions, or other directives intended to invoke the component's supported capabilities.
- * The component then subscribes to the topics provided by the Orchestrator in order to enable receipt of broadcast instructions.

4.3. Component Interactions

Component interactions describe functionality between components relating to collection, evaluation, or other downstream processes.

4.3.1. Initiate Ad-Hoc Collection

The Orchestrator supplies a payload of collection instructions to a topic or set of topics to which Posture Collection Services are subscribed. The receiving PCS components perform the required collection based on their capabilities. Each PCS then forms a payload of collected posture attributes (including endpoint identifying information) and publishes that payload to the topic(s) to which the Posture Attribute Repository is subscribed, for persistence.

4.3.2. Coordinate Periodic Collection

Similar to ad-hoc collection, the Orchestrator supplies a payload of collection instructions similar to those of ad-hoc collection. Additional information elements containing collection identification and periodicity are included.

4.3.2.1. Schedule Periodic Collection

To enable operations on periodic collection, the scheduling payload MUST include both a unique identifier for the set of collection instructions, as well as a periodicity expression to enable the collection schedule. An optional "immediate collection" flag will indicate to the collection component that, upon receipt of the collection instructions, a collection will automatically be initiated prior to engagement of the scheduled collection.

4.3.2.2. Cancel Periodic Collection

The Orchestrator disables the periodic collection of posture attributes by supplying collector(s) the unique identifier of previously scheduled collection instructions. An optional "final collection" flag will indicate to the collection component that, upon receipt of the cancellation instructions, a final ad-hoc collection is to take place.

4.3.3. Coordinate Observational/Event-based Collection

In these scenarios, the Posture Collection Service acts as the "observer". Interactions with the observer could specify a time period of observation and potentially information intended to filter observed posture attributes to aid the PCS in determining those attributes that are applicable for collection and persistence to the Posture Attribute Repository.

4.3.3.1. Initiate Observational/Event-based Collection

The Orchestrator supplies a payload of instructions to a topic or set of topics to which Posture Collection Services (observers) are subscribed. This payload could include specific instructions based on the observer's capabilities to determine specific posture attributes to observe and collect.

4.3.3.2. Cancel Observational/Event-based Collection

The Orchestrator supplies a payload of instructions to a topic or set of topics to which Posture Collection Services are subscribed. The receiving PCS components cancel the identified observational/event-based collection executing on those PCS components.

4.3.4. Persist Collected Posture Attributes

Following successful collection, Posture Collection Services (PCS) will supply the payload of collected posture attributes to the interface(s) supporting the persistent storage of those attributes to the Posture Attribute Repository. Information in this payload should include identifying information of the computing resource(s) for which attributes were collected.

4.3.5. Initiate Ad-Hoc Evaluation

The Orchestrator supplies a payload of evaluation instructions to a topic or set of topics to which Posture Evaluation Services (PES) are subscribed. The receiving PES components perform the required evaluation based on their capabilities. The PES generates a payload of posture evaluation results and publishes that payload to the appropriate topic(s), to which the Evaluation Results Repository is subscribed, for persistence.

4.3.6. Coordinate Periodic Evaluation

Similar to ad-hoc evaluation, the Orchestrator supplies a payload of evaluation instructions similar to those of ad-hoc evaluation. Additional information elements containing evaluation identification and periodicity are included.

4.3.6.1. Schedule Periodic Evaluation

To enable operations on periodic evaluation, the scheduling payload MUST include both a unique identifier for the set of evaluation instructions, as well as a periodicity expression to enable the evaluation schedule. An optional "immediate evaluation" flag will indicate to the Posture Evaluation Service (PES) that, upon receipt of the evaluation instructions, an evaluation will automatically be initiated prior to engagement of the scheduled evaluation.

4.3.6.2. Cancel Periodic Evaluation

The Orchestrator disables the periodic evaluation of posture attributes by supplying Posture Evaluation Service(s) the unique identifier of previously scheduled evaluation instructions. An optional "final evaluation" flag will indicate to the PES that, upon receipt of the cancellation instructions, a final ad-hoc evaluation is to take place.

4.3.7. Coordinate Change-based Evaluation

A more fine-grained approach to periodic evaluation may be enabled through the triggering of Posture Evaluation based on changes to posture attribute values at the time of their collection and persistence to the Posture Attribute Repository.

4.3.7.1. Identify Attributes

The Orchestrator enables change-based evaluation through a payload published to Posture Attribute Repository component(s). This payload includes appropriate information elements describing the posture attributes on which changes in value will trigger posture evaluation.

4.3.7.2. Cancel Change-based Evaluation

An Orchestrator may disable change-based evaluation through a payload published to Posture Attribute Repository component(s), including those information elements necessary to identify those posture attributes for which change-based evaluation no longer applies.

4.3.8. Queries

Queries should allow for a "freshness" time period, allowing the requesting entity to determine if/when posture attributes must be re-collected prior to performing evaluation. This freshness time period can be "zeroed out" for the purpose of automatically triggering re-collection regardless of the most recent collection.

5. Taxonomy

The following sections describe a number of operations required to enable a cooperative ecosystem of posture attribute collection and evaluation functions.

5.1. Orchestrator Registration

The Orchestrator Registration taxonomy describes how an Orchestrator onboards to the SACM ecosystem, or how it returns from a non-operational state.

5.1.1. Interaction

Property	Value
Type	Directed (Request/Response)
Topic	N/A
Source Component	Orchestrator
Target Component(s)	N/A

Table 1

5.1.2. Request Payload

N/A;

5.1.3. Request Processing

Once the Orchestrator has authenticated to the Integration Service, it must establish (or re-establish) any service handlers interacting with administrative interfaces and/or general operational interfaces.

For initial registration, the Orchestrator MUST enable capabilities to:

- * Receive onboarding requests via the `"/orchestrator/registration"` topic,
- * Generate, manage, and persist unique identifiers for all registered components,
- * Inventory and manage its "roster" (the list of registered components), and
- * Support making directed requests to registered components over the component's administrative interface, as configured by the `"/orchestrator/[component-unique-identifier]"` topic.

Administrative interfaces are to be re-established through the inventory of previously registered components, such as Posture Collection Services, Repositories, or Posture Evaluation Services.

5.1.4. Response Payload

N/A

5.1.5. Response Processing

N/A

5.2. Component Registration

Component onboarding describes how an individual component becomes part of the SACM ecosystem; registering with the orchestrator, advertising capabilities, establishing its administrative interface, and subscribing to relevant topics.

5.2.1. Interaction

Property	Value
Type	Directed (Request/Response)
Topic	/orchestrator/registration
Source Component	Any component wishing to join the ecosystem, such as Posture Collection Services, Repositories (policy, collection content, posture attribute, evaluation results, etc.), Posture Evaluation Services and more.
Target Component(s)	Orchestrator

Table 2

5.2.2. Request Payload

When a component registers with the Orchestrator and enters the ecosystem, it must first identify itself to the Orchestrator.

```
component-registration-request:  
  component-unique-identifier (if re-establishing communication)  
  #-OR-#  
  {:component-identification:}
```

```
component-identification:  
  component-type {:component-type:}  
  component-name  
  component-description (optional)
```

```
component-type:  
  enumeration:  
    - posture-collection-service  
    - posture-evaluation-service  
    - repository  
    - orchestrator  
    - others?
```

When registering for the first time, the component will send identifying information including the component type and a name. If the component is reestablishing communications, for example after a restart of the component or deployment of a new version, the component only needs to supply its previously generated unique identifier.

5.2.3. Request Processing

When the Orchestrator receives the component's request for onboarding, it will:

- * Generate a unique identifier, "[component-unique-identifier]", for the onboarding component,
- * Persist required information (TBD probably need more specifics), including the "[component-unique-identifier]" to its component inventory, enabling an up-to-date roster of components being orchestrated,
- * Establish the administrative interface via the `"/orchestrator/[component-unique-identifier]"` topic.

5.2.4. Response Payload

The Orchestrator will respond to the component with a payload including the component's unique identifier. At this point, the Orchestrator is aware of the component's existence in the ecosystem, and the component is self-aware by virtue of receiving its unique identifier.

```

component-registration-response:
  component-unique-identifier: [component-unique-identifier]
    
```

5.2.5. Response Processing

Successful receipt of the Orchestrator's response, including the "[component-unique-identifier]" indicates the component is onboarded to the ecosystem. Using the response payload, the component can then establish its end of the administrative interface with the Orchestrator, using the "/orchestrator/[component-unique-identifier]" topic. Given this administrative interface, the component can then initiate the Section 5.3.1

5.3. Orchestrator-Component Administrative Interface

A number of functions may take place which, instead of being published to a multi-subscriber topic, may require direct interaction between an Orchestrator and a registered component. During component onboarding, this direct channel is established first by the Orchestrator and subsequently complemented by the component entering the ecosystem.

5.3.1. Capability Advertisement Handshake

Capability advertisement, otherwise known as service discovery, is necessary to establish and maintain a cooperative ecosystem of tools by allowing components to register and maintain supported capabilities with the orchestrator. Using this capability advertisement "handshake", the Orchestrator becomes knowledgeable of a component's operational capabilities, the endpoints/services with which the component interacts, and establishes a direct mode of contact for invoking those capabilities. Once initially established, orchestrators and components can maintain this capability matrix using the administrative interface.

5.3.1.1. Interaction

Property	Value
Type	Directed (Request/Response)
Topic	/orchestrator/[component-unique-identifier]
Source Component	Any ecosystem component (minus the Orchestrator)
Target	Orchestrator

Component(s)

Table 3

5.3.1.2. Request Payload

```
capability-advertisement-request:  
  component-unique-identifier: [component-unique-identifier]  
  component-type: {component-type:}  
  capabilities:  
    capability-urn: [urn]  
    capability-urn: [urn]  
    capability-urn: [urn]  
    ...
```

[TBD] Start adding capability URNs to IANA considerations section?

5.3.1.3. Request Processing

Upon receipt of the component's capability advertisement, it SHOULD:

- * Persist the component's capabilities to the Orchestrator's inventory
- * Coordinate, based on the supplied capabilities, a list of topics to which the component should subscribe

[TBD] What if the component supplies a "capability-urn" that the Orchestrator doesn't know about?

5.3.1.4. Response Payload

When responding, the Orchestrator will indicate to the component, which capabilities were successfully registered, and the topics to which those capabilities apply. Any failures to register capabilities will also be noted per capability URN, including any relevant error messages.


```

capability-advertisement-response:
  capabilities:
    capability:
      capability-urn: [urn]
      registration-status: (success | failure)
      capability-topic: /capability/topic/name
      messages: [messages]
    capability:
      capability-urn: [urn]
      registration-status: (success | failure)
      capability-topic: /capability/topic/name
      messages: [messages]
  ...

```

5.3.1.5. Response Processing

Once the component has received the response to its capability advertisement, it should subscribe to the Orchestrator-provided topics. Once the applicable topics have been subscribed, the component is considered fully onboarded to the ecosystem.

5.3.2. Heartbeat

As time passes and ecosystem components which have previously registered with the ecosystem are brought offline (perhaps for maintenance or redeployment) and back online, it is important that the Orchestrator maintains knowledge of all registered component's current operational status. The heartbeat taxonomy describes the efforts taken by an Orchestrator to maintain the most up-to-date inventory of operational components, and to potentially alert users or other outside systems of unavailable components.

5.3.2.1. Interaction

Property	Value
Type	Directed (Request/Response)
Topic	/orchestrator/[component-unique-identifier]
Source Component	Orchestrator
Target Component (s)	Any non-Orchestrator component maintained in the current operational inventory

Table 4

5.3.2.2. Request Payload

The request payload defines the heartbeat action to be taken:

```
heartbeat-request:  
  action: (ping | ping-with-capabilities)
```

5.3.2.3. Request Processing

When the target component receives the heartbeat request, it will determine based on action, the processing required. A simple "ping" request indicates the target component need only respond that it is operational and connected to the integration service. This is a simple "Are you listening? Yes, I am" interaction. The heartbeat request from the Orchestrator should be made with an appropriately small timeout indicator; only an operational component will be able to respond to the request, so if that component is offline and cannot respond, the Orchestrator should not be kept waiting for an extended amount of time.

When the requested action is "ping-with-capabilities", the receiving component is instructed to respond that it is operational and to immediately follow the response with a re-initiation of the Section 5.3.1 process. This interaction enables an Orchestrator the ability to perform capability discovery from components.

5.3.2.4. Response Payload

When responding to the heartbeat request, the initial response payload will simply indicate success: ~~~~~ heartbeat-response:
response: success ~~~~~

If the "ping-with-capabilities" action was requested, the responding component will immediately initiate the Section 5.3.1 process.

5.3.2.5. Response Processing

Upon receipt of the "heartbeat-response" payload, the Orchestrator will update its inventory of currently operational components with the timestamp of the receipt. If the Orchestrator originally requested the component's capabilities as well, further interactions will initiate and complete the Section 5.3.1 process.

5.4. Collection

The following sections detail the interactions supporting the collection of posture attributes from one or many endpoints within the ecosystem. Collector capabilities will determine both the set of endpoints each collector from which posture attributes may be collected, as well as the various methods of collection used by those collectors.

5.4.1. Ad-Hoc

Collection components support ad-hoc collection activities when receiving collection instructions from an Orchestrator and by acting upon those instructions immediately, collecting posture attributes as they exist on targeted endpoints at the moment of collection. Ad-Hoc collection may potentially be invoked by a number of components, including Orchestrators or even Posture Evaluation Services, and may be requested of Collectors either directly or through the Collector's subscription to topics as established by the Section 5.3.1 process.

5.4.1.1. Interaction

Property	Value
Type	Directed or Broadcast
Topic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Orchestrator-Component Administrative Interface: <code>"/orchestrator/[component-unique-identifier]"</code>, Component-specific Collection topic: <code>"/[component-unique-identifier]/collect"</code>, or Through subscriptions such as <code>"/collection/[collection-type]"</code>
Source Component	Orchestrator, Posture Evaluation Service
Target Component (s)	Collector

Table 5

5.4.1.2. Request Payload

Ad-Hoc collection requests take the form of collection instructions corresponding to the SACM information model. Collection instruction payloads MAY be serialized as a specific collection language supported by the Collector (taking into account any implementation-specific payload size limitations), as a generic serialization to be interpreted by the Collector, or as ID references to content persisted in a Repository.

Instructions MAY include a "response topic" to which collection results are published/directed. This can allow the requesting component to direct a Collector (or Collectors) to publish results directly to a Posture Attribute Repository component, or to simply respond to the requesting component.

```
collection-request:  
  [TBD]  
  response-topic: [response-topic]
```

5.4.1.3. Request Processing

Upon receipt of collection instructions, the Collector will need to determine whether or not any normalization or retrieval of specific instructions is required. This normalization may be required if collection instructions are not formatted specifically to the capabilities of the Collector. For example, if a payload is delivered containing a set of OVAL "object" IDs, the Collector would need to retrieve the instructions from the Repository and format them into a well-formed, valid OVAL definitions serialization for processing.

Once the collection instructions have been received and any pre-processing/normalization has occurred, the Collector will perform the actual retrieval of posture attributes. Once collected, posture attributes will need to be published back to the topic named in the request payload. This response topic could represent a callback to the component invoking collection, or a destination for the posture attributes to be persisted, i.e. a Repository.

5.4.1.4. Response Payload

The response payload generated by the Collector may take one of 2 forms:

- * Collection results using the data model supported by the collection system indicated in the collection instructions. For example, if the collection instructions were formatted as OVAL

definitions (or more specifically OVAL objects), then collection results would be formatted as OVAL system characteristics. Each collector is responsible for maintaining the capabilities necessary to produce results formats based on its collection capabilities.

- * Collection results using a "normalized" [TBD] format as defined by the SACM information model/data models.

5.4.1.5. Response Processing

Handling a payload of collected posture attributes will vary based on the component receiving that payload:

- * Posture Attribute Repository: If collection results are not "normalized" the Repository component MUST be able to perform normalization processing prior to persisting the results.
- * Non-Repository Components: The receiving component must also be capable of "normalizing" collected posture attributes

5.4.2. Periodic

Periodic collection builds upon Ad-Hoc collection by allowing Orchestration of collection activities given a periodicity. Architecturally, periodic collection is orchestrated through either the scheduling of collection or canceling an already-existing schedule. Modifications to a scheduled collection MUST be made by first canceling the existing schedule and establishing the updated schedule.

5.4.2.1. Schedule Periodic Collection

Scheduling periodic collection is established by an Orchestrator delivering collection instructions and the collection periodicity to a Collector. These instructions may be received by the Collector through a number of topics, described below.

5.4.2.1.1. Interaction

Property	Value
Type	Directed or Broadcast
Topic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Orchestrator-Component Administrative Interface: "/orchestrator/[component-unique-identifier]", Component-specific

	Collection topic: "[component-unique-identifier]/collect", orThrough subscriptions such as "/collection/[collection-type]"
Source Component	Orchestrator
Target Component (s)	Collector

Table 6

5.4.2.1.2. Request Payload

The request to schedule periodic collection is represented as a wrapper of the collection instructions used to initiate ad-hoc collection. Additional elements indicate the establishment of the schedule, the collection schedule itself, and whether or not to perform an immediate collection upon receipt of the payload.

```
periodic-collection:
  collection-identifier: 12345
  operation: schedule
  collection-schedule:
    TBD (cron formatted? other scheduling formats?)
  collect-upon-acknowledgement: true/false
  collection-instructions:
    # Formatted per Ad-Hoc Collection taxonomy
```

5.4.2.1.3. Request Processing

Upon receipt of the request to establish periodic collection, the Collector must first determine if the "collection-identifier" is unique. If an existing periodic collection, using the same identifier, is already present, an error payload MUST be returned to the Orchestrator. Once the collection identifier has been validated, the schedule is established within the scope of the Collector receiving the instructions. If the "collect-upon-acknowledgement" flag is set to "true", the Collector MUST perform an immediate ad-hoc collection based on the instructions passed in the payload and the collected posture attributes are provided to the "response-topic" per the "collection-instructions".

5.4.2.1.4. Response Payload

Essentially, two payloads could be provided in ##### Response Processing

5.4.2.2. Cancel Periodic Collection

TBD

5.4.2.2.1. Interaction

Property	Value
Type	Directed or Broadcast
Topic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Orchestrator-Component Administrative Interface: "/orchestrator/[component-unique-identifier]", Component-specific Collection topic: "/[component-unique-identifier]/collect", or Through subscriptions such as "/collection/[collection-type]"
Source Component	Orchestrator
Target Component (s)	Collector

Table 7

5.4.2.2.2. Request Payload

```
periodic-collection:
  collection-identifier: 12345
  operation: cancel
  collect-upon-acknowledgement: true/false
```

5.4.2.2.3. Request Processing

Response Payload ##### Response Processing

5.4.3. Observational/Event-based

5.5. Evaluation

5.5.1. Ad-Hoc

5.5.2. Periodic

5.5.3. Change/Event-based

6. Privacy Considerations

[TBD]

7. Security Considerations

[TBD]

8. IANA Considerations

[TBD] Revamp this section after the configuration assessment workflow is fleshed out.

IANA tables can probably be used to make life a little easier. We would like a place to enumerate:

- * Capability/operation semantics
- * SACM Component implementation identifiers
- * SACM Component versions
- * Associations of SACM Components (and versions) to specific Capabilities
- * Collection sub-architecture Identification

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Appendix A. Security Domain Workflows

This section describes three primary information security domains from which workflows may be derived: IT Asset Management, Vulnerability Management, and Configuration Management.

A.1. IT Asset Management

Information Technology asset management is easier said than done. The [CISCONTROLS] have two controls dealing with IT asset management. Control 1, Inventory and Control of Hardware Assets, states, "Actively manage (inventory, track, and correct) all hardware devices on the network so that only authorized devices are given access, and unauthorized and unmanaged devices are found and prevented from gaining access." Control 2, Inventory and Control of Software Assets, states, "Actively manage (inventory, track, and correct) all software on the network so that only authorized software is installed and can execute, and that unauthorized and unmanaged software is found and prevented from installation or execution."

In spirit, this covers all of the processing entities on your network (as opposed to things like network cables, dongles, adapters, etc.), whether physical or virtual, on-premises or in the cloud.

A.1.1. Components, Capabilities and Workflow(s)

TBD

A.1.1.1. Components

TBD

A.1.1.2. Capabilities

An IT asset management capability needs to be able to:

- * Identify and catalog new assets by executing Target Endpoint Discovery Tasks
- * Provide information about its managed assets, including uniquely identifying information (for that enterprise)
- * Handle software and/or hardware (including virtual assets)
- * Represent cloud hybrid environments

A.1.1.3. Workflow(s)

TBD

A.2. Vulnerability Management

Vulnerability management is a relatively established process. To paraphrase the [CISCONTROLS], continuous vulnerability management is the act of continuously acquiring, assessing, and taking subsequent action on new information in order to identify and remediate vulnerabilities, therefore minimizing the window of opportunity for attackers.

A vulnerability assessment (i.e. vulnerability detection) is performed in two steps:

- * Endpoint information collected by the endpoint management capabilities is examined by the vulnerability management capabilities through Evaluation Tasks.
- * If the data possessed by the endpoint management capabilities is insufficient, a Collection Task is triggered and the necessary data is collected from the target endpoint.

Vulnerability detection relies on the examination of different endpoint information depending on the nature of a specific vulnerability. Common endpoint information used to detect a vulnerability includes:

- * A specific software version is installed on the endpoint
- * File system attributes
- * Specific state attributes

In some cases, the endpoint information needed to determine an endpoint's vulnerability status will have been previously collected by the endpoint management capabilities and available in a Repository. However, in other cases, the necessary endpoint information will not be readily available in a Repository and a Collection Task will be triggered to perform collection from the target endpoint. Of course, some implementations of endpoint management capabilities may prefer to enable operators to perform this collection even when sufficient information can be provided by the endpoint management capabilities (e.g. there may be freshness requirements for information).

A.2.1. Components, Capabilities and Workflow(s)

TBD

A.2.1.1. Components

TBD

A.2.1.2. Capabilities

TBD

A.2.1.3. Workflow(s)

TBD

A.3. Configuration Management

Configuration management involves configuration assessment, which requires state assessment. The [CISCONTROLS] specify two high-level controls concerning configuration management (Control 5 for non-network devices and Control 11 for network devices). As an aside, these controls are listed separately because many enterprises have different organizations for managing network infrastructure and workload endpoints. Merging the two controls results in the following paraphrasing: Establish, implement, and actively manage (track, report on, correct) the security configuration of systems using a rigorous configuration management and change control process in order to prevent attackers from exploiting vulnerable services and settings.

Typically, an enterprise will use configuration guidance from a reputable source, and from time to time they may tailor the guidance from that source prior to adopting it as part of their enterprise standard. The enterprise standard is then provided to the appropriate configuration assessment tools and they assess endpoints and/or appropriate endpoint information.

A preferred flow follows:

- * Reputable source publishes new or updated configuration guidance
- * Enterprise configuration assessment capability retrieves configuration guidance from reputable source
- * Optional: Configuration guidance is tailored for enterprise-specific needs
- * Configuration assessment tool queries asset inventory repository to retrieve a list of affected endpoints

- * Configuration assessment tool queries configuration state repository to evaluate compliance
- * If information is stale or unavailable, configuration assessment tool triggers an ad hoc assessment

The SACM architecture needs to support varying deployment models to accommodate the current state of the industry, but should strongly encourage event-driven approaches to monitoring configuration.

A.3.1. Components, Capabilities and Workflow(s)

This section provides more detail about the components and capabilities required when considering the aforementioned configuration management workflow.

A.3.1.1. Components

The following is a minimal list of SACM Components required to implement the aforementioned configuration assessment workflow.

- * Configuration Policy Feed: An external source of authoritative configuration recommendations.
- * Configuration Policy Repository: An internal repository of enterprise standard configurations.
- * Configuration Assessment Orchestrator: A component responsible for orchestrating assessments.
- * Posture Attribute Collection Subsystem: A component responsible for collection of posture attributes from systems.
- * Posture Attribute Repository: A component used for storing system posture attribute values.
- * Configuration Assessment Evaluator: A component responsible for evaluating system posture attribute values against expected posture attribute values.
- * Configuration Assessment Results Repository: A component used for storing evaluation results.

A.3.1.2. Capabilities

Per [RFC8248], solutions MUST support capability negotiation. Components implementing specific interfaces and operations (i.e. interactions) will need a method of describing their capabilities to other components participating in the ecosystem; for example, "As a component in the ecosystem, I can assess the configuration of Windows, MacOS, and AWS using OVAL".

A.3.1.3. Configuration Assessment Workflow

This section describes the components and interactions in a basic configuration assessment workflow. For simplicity, error conditions are recognized as being necessary and are not depicted. When one component messages another component, the message is expected to be handled appropriately unless there is an error condition, or other notification, messaged in return.




Figure 5: Configuration Assessment Component Interactions

Figure 5 depicts configuration assessment components and their interactions, which are further described below.

1. A policy feed provides a configuration assessment policy payload to the Integration Service.

2. The Policy Repository, a consumer of Policy Feed information, receives and persists the Policy Feed's payload.
3. Orchestration component(s), either manually invoked, scheduled, or event-based, publish a payload to begin the configuration assessment process.
4. If necessary, Collection Sub-Architecture components may be invoked to collect needed posture attribute information.
5. If necessary, the Collection Sub-Architecture will provide collected posture attributes to the Integration Service for persistence to the Posture Attribute Repository.
6. The Posture Attribute Repository will consume a payload querying for relevant posture attribute information.
7. The Posture Attribute Repository will provide the requested information to the Integration Service, allowing further orchestration payloads requesting the Evaluation Sub-Architecture perform evaluation tasks.
8. The Evaluation Sub-Architecture consumes the evaluation payload and performs component-specific state comparison operations to produce evaluation results.
9. A payload containing evaluation results are provided by the Evaluation Sub-Architecture to the Integration Service
10. Evaluation results are consumed by/persisted to the Evaluation Results Repository

In the above flow, the payload information is expected to convey the context required by the receiving component for the action being taken under different circumstances. For example, a directed message sent from an Orchestrator to a Collection sub-architecture might be telling that Collector to watch a specific posture attribute and report only specific detected changes to the Posture Attribute Repository, or it might be telling the Collector to gather that posture attribute immediately. Such details are expected to be handled as part of that payload, not as part of the architecture described herein.

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Concise Software Identification Tags
draft-ietf-sacm-coswid-15

Abstract

ISO/IEC 19770-2:2015 Software Identification (SWID) tags provide an extensible XML-based structure to identify and describe individual software components, patches, and installation bundles. SWID tag representations can be too large for devices with network and storage constraints. This document defines a concise representation of SWID tags: Concise SWID (CoSWID) tags. CoSWID supports the same features as SWID tags, as well as additional semantics that allow CoSWIDs to describe additional types of information, all in a more memory efficient format.

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1. Introduction

SWID tags, as defined in ISO-19770-2:2015 [SWID], provide a standardized XML-based record format that identifies and describes a specific release of software, a patch, or an installation bundle, which are referred to as software components in this document. Different software components, and even different releases of a particular software component, each have a different SWID tag record associated with them. SWID tags are meant to be flexible and able to express a broad set of metadata about a software component.

SWID tags are used to support a number of processes including but not limited to:

- * Software Inventory Management, a part of a Software Asset Management [SAM] process, which requires an accurate list of discernible deployed software components.
- * Vulnerability Assessment, which requires a semantic link between standardized vulnerability descriptions and software components installed on IT-assets [X.1520].
- * Remote Attestation, which requires a link between reference integrity measurements (RIM) and security logs of measured software components [I-D.birkholz-rats-tuda].

While there are very few required fields in SWID tags, there are many optional fields that support different uses. A SWID tag consisting of only required fields might be a few hundred bytes in size; however, a tag containing many of the optional fields can be many orders of magnitude larger. Thus, real-world instances of SWID tags can be fairly large, and the communication of SWID tags in usage

scenarios, such as those described earlier, can cause a large amount of data to be transported. This can be larger than acceptable for constrained devices and networks. Concise SWID (CoSWID) tags significantly reduce the amount of data transported as compared to a typical SWID tag. This reduction is enabled through the use of the Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) [RFC7049], which maps the human-readable labels of SWID data items to more concise integer labels (indices). The use of CBOR to express SWID information in CoSWID tags allows both CoSWID and SWID tags to be part of an enterprise security solution for a wider range of endpoints and environments.

1.1. The SWID and CoSWID Tag Lifecycle

In addition to defining the format of a SWID tag record, ISO/IEC 19770-2:2015 defines requirements concerning the SWID tag lifecycle. Specifically, when a software component is installed on an endpoint, that software component's SWID tag is also installed. Likewise, when the software component is uninstalled or replaced, the SWID tag is deleted or replaced, as appropriate. As a result, ISO/IEC 19770-2:2015 describes a system wherein there is a correspondence between the set of installed software components on an endpoint, and the presence of the corresponding SWID tags for these components on that endpoint. CoSWIDs share the same lifecycle requirements as a SWID tag.

The SWID specification and supporting guidance provided in NIST Internal Report (NISTIR) 8060: Guidelines for the Creation of Interoperable SWID Tags [SWID-GUIDANCE] defines four types of SWID tags: primary, patch, corpus, and supplemental. The following text is paraphrased from these sources.

1. Primary Tag - A SWID or CoSWID tag that identifies and describes an installed software component on an endpoint. A primary tag is intended to be installed on an endpoint along with the corresponding software component.
2. Patch Tag - A SWID or CoSWID tag that identifies and describes an installed patch that has made incremental changes to a software component installed on an endpoint. A patch tag is intended to be installed on an endpoint along with the corresponding software component patch.
3. Corpus Tag - A SWID or CoSWID tag that identifies and describes an installable software component in its pre-installation state. A corpus tag can be used to represent metadata about an installation package or installer for a software component, a software update, or a patch.

4. Supplemental Tag - A SWID or CoSWID tag that allows additional information to be associated with a referenced SWID tag. This allows tools and users to record their own metadata about a software component without modifying SWID primary or patch tags created by a software provider.

The type of a tag is determined by specific data elements, which are discussed in Section 3.

Corpus, primary, and patch tags have similar functions in that they describe the existence and/or presence of different types of software components (e.g., software installers, software installations, software patches), and, potentially, different states of these software components. Supplemental tags have the same structure as other tags, but are used to provide information not contained in the referenced corpus, primary, and patch tags. All four tag types come into play at various points in the software lifecycle and support software management processes that depend on the ability to accurately determine where each software component is in its lifecycle.




Figure 1: Use of Tag Types in the Software Lifecycle

Figure 1 illustrates the steps in the software lifecycle and the relationships among those lifecycle events supported by the four types of SWID and CoSWID tags. The figure identifies the types of tags that can be deployed and previously deployed tags that are typically removed (indicated by an "x" prefix) at each lifecycle stage, as follows:

- Software Deployment. Before the software component is installed (i.e., pre-installation), and while the product is being deployed, a corpus tag provides information about the installation files and distribution media (e.g., CD/DVD, distribution package).

- Software Installation. A primary tag will be installed with the software component (or subsequently created) to uniquely identify and describe the software component. Supplemental tags are created to augment primary tags with additional site-specific or extended information. While not illustrated in the figure, patch tags can also be installed during software installation to provide information about software fixes deployed along with the base software installation.
- Software Patching. A new patch tag is provided, when a patch is applied to the software component, supplying details about the patch and its dependencies. While not illustrated in the figure, a corpus tag can also provide information about the patch installer and patching dependencies that need to be installed before the patch.
- Software Upgrading. As a software component is upgraded to a new version, new primary and supplemental tags replace existing tags, enabling timely and accurate tracking of updates to software inventory. While not illustrated in the figure, a corpus tag can also provide information about the upgrade installer and dependencies that need to be installed before the upgrade.
- Software Removal. Upon removal of the software component, relevant SWID tags are removed. This removal event can trigger timely updates to software inventory reflecting the removal of the product and any associated patch or supplemental tags.

As illustrated in the figure, supplemental tags can be associated with any corpus, primary, or patch tag to provide additional metadata about an installer, installed software, or installed patch respectively.

Understanding the use of CoSWIDs in the software lifecycle provides a basis for understanding the information provided in a CoSWID and the associated semantics of this information. Each of the different SWID and CoSWID tag types provide different sets of information. For example, a "corpus tag" is used to describe a software component's installation image on an installation media, while a "patch tag" is meant to describe a patch that modifies some other software component.

1.2. Concise SWID Format

This document defines the CoSWID tag format, which is based on CBOR. CBOR-based CoSWID tags offer a more concise representation of SWID information as compared to the XML-based SWID tag representation in ISO-19770-2:2015. The structure of a CoSWID is described via the Concise Data Definition Language (CDDL) [RFC8610]. The resulting CoSWID data definition is aligned to the information able to be expressed with the XML schema definition of ISO-19770-2:2015 [SWID]. This alignment allows both SWID and CoSWID tags to represent a common set of software component information and allows CoSWID tags to support the same uses as a SWID tag. To achieve this end, the CDDL representation includes every SWID tag field and attribute.

The vocabulary, i.e., the CDDL names of the types and members used in the CoSWID data definition, are mapped to more concise labels represented as small integer values (indices). The names used in the CDDL data definition and the mapping to the CBOR representation using integer indices is based on the vocabulary of the XML attribute and element names defined in ISO/IEC 19770-2:2015.

1.3. Requirements Notation

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

2. Concise SWID Data Definition

The following describes the general rules and processes for encoding data using CDDL representation. Prior familiarity with CBOR and CDDL concepts will be helpful in understanding this CoSWID data definition.

This section describes the rules by which SWID tag XML is represented in the CoSWID CDDL structure. The CamelCase [CamelCase] notation used in the XML schema definition is changed to a hyphen-separated notation [KebabCase] (e.g. ResourceCollection is named resource-collection) in the CoSWID data definition. This deviation from the original notation used in the XML representation reduces ambiguity when referencing certain attributes in corresponding textual descriptions. An attribute referred to by its name in CamelCase notation explicitly relates to XML SWID tags; an attribute referred to by its name in KebabCase notation explicitly relates to CBOR CoSWID tags. This approach simplifies the composition of further work that reference both XML SWID and CBOR CoSWID documents.

In most cases, mapping attribute names between SWID and CoSWID can be done automatically by converting between CamelCase and KebabCase attribute names. However, some CoSWID CDDL attribute names show greater variation relative to their corresponding SWID XML Schema attributes. This is done when the change improves clarity in the specification. For example the "name" and "version" SWID fields corresponds to the "software-name" and "software-version" CoSWID fields, respectively. As such, it is not always possible to mechanically translate between corresponding attribute names in the two formats. In such cases, a manual mapping will need to be used.

The 57 human-readable text labels of the CDDL-based CoSWID vocabulary are mapped to integer indices via a block of rules at the bottom of the definition. This allows a more concise integer-based form to be stored or transported, as compared to the less efficient text-based form of the original vocabulary.

In CBOR, an array is encoded using bytes that identify the array, and the array's length or stop point (see [RFC7049]). To make items that support 1 or more values, the following CDDL notion is used.

```
_name_ = (_label_ => _data_ / [ 2* _data_ ])
```

The CDDL rule above allows either a single data item or an array of 2 or more data values to be provided. When a singleton data value is provided, the CBOR markers for the array, array length, and stop point are not needed, saving bytes. When two or more data values are provided, these values are encoded as an array. This modeling pattern is used frequently in the CoSWID CDDL data definition to allow for more efficient encoding of singleton values.

The following subsections describe the different parts of the CoSWID model.

2.1. Character Encoding

The CDDL "text" type is represented in CBOR as a major type 3, which represents "a string of Unicode characters that [are] encoded as UTF-8 [RFC3629]" (see [RFC7049] section 2.1). Thus both SWID and CoSWID use UTF-8 for the encoding of characters in text strings.

To ensure that UTF-8 character strings are able to be encoded/decoded and exchanged interoperably, text strings in CoSWID MUST be encoded consistent with the Net-Unicode definition defined in [RFC5198].

All names registered with IANA according to requirements in section Section 5.2 also need to be valid according to the XML Schema NMTOKEN data type (see [W3C.REC-xmlschema-2-20041028] section 3.3.4) to ensure compatibility with the SWID specification where these names are used.

2.2. Concise SWID Extensions

The CoSWID data definition contains two features that are not included in the SWID data definition on which it is based. These features are:

- * The explicit definition of types for some attributes in the ISO-19770-2:2015 XML representation that are typically represented by the "any attribute" in the SWID model. These are covered in Section 2.5.
- * The inclusion of extension points in the CoSWID data definition using CDDL sockets (see [RFC8610] section 3.9). The use of CDDL sockets allow for well-formed extensions to be defined in supplementary CDDL descriptions that support additional uses of CoSWID tags that go beyond the original scope of ISO-19770-2:2015 tags. This extension mechanism can also be used to update the CoSWID format as revisions to ISO-19770-2 are published.

The following CDDL sockets (extension points) are defined in this document, which allow the addition of new information structures to their respective CDDL groups.

Map Name	CDDL Socket	Defined in
concise-swid-tag	\$\$coswid-extension	Section 2.3
entity-entry	\$\$entity-extension	Section 2.6
link-entry	\$\$link-extension	Section 2.7
software-meta-entry	\$\$software-meta-extension	Section 2.8
file-entry	\$\$file-extension	Section 2.9.2
directory-entry	\$\$directory-extension	Section 2.9.2
process-entry	\$\$process-extension	Section 2.9.2
resource-entry	\$\$resource-extension	Section 2.9.2
payload-entry	\$\$payload-extension	Section 2.9.3
evidence-entry	\$\$evidence-extension	Section 2.9.4

Table 1: CoSWID CDDL Group Extension Points

The CoSWID Items Registry defined in Section 5.1 provides a registration mechanism allowing new items, and their associated index values, to be added to the CoSWID model through the use of the CDDL sockets described in the table above. This registration mechanism provides for well-known index values for data items in CoSWID extensions, allowing these index values to be recognized by implementations supporting a given extension.

The following additional CDDL sockets are defined in this document to allow for adding new values to corresponding type-choices (i.e. to represent enumerations) via custom CDDL data definitions.

Enumeration Name	CDDL Socket	Defined in
version-scheme	\$version-scheme	Section 4.1
role	\$role	Section 4.2
ownership	\$ownership	Section 4.3
rel	\$rel	Section 4.4
use	\$use	Section 4.5

Table 2: CoSWID CDDL Enumeration Extension Points

A number of SWID/CoSWID value registries are also defined in Section 5.2 that allow new values to be registered with IANA for the enumerations above. This registration mechanism supports the definition of new well-known index values and names for new enumeration values used by both SWID and CoSWID. This registration mechanism allows new standardized enumerated values to be shared between both specifications (and implementations) over time, and references to the IANA registries will be added to the next revision of [SWID].

2.3. The concise-swid-tag Map

The CDDL data definition for the root concise-swid-tag map is as follows and this rule and its constraints MUST be followed when creating or validating a CoSWID tag:

```
concise-swid-tag = {
  global-attributes,
  tag-id => text / bstr .size 16,
  tag-version => integer,
  ? corpus => bool,
  ? patch => bool,
  ? supplemental => bool,
  software-name => text,
  ? software-version => text,
  ? version-scheme => $version-scheme,
  ? media => text,
  ? software-meta => software-meta-entry / [ 2* software-meta-entry ],
  entity => entity-entry / [ 2* entity-entry ],
  ? link => link-entry / [ 2* link-entry ],
  ? (( payload => payload-entry ) // ( evidence => evidence-entry )),
  * $$coswid-extension,
}
```

```
tag-id = 0
software-name = 1
entity = 2
evidence = 3
link = 4
software-meta = 5
payload = 6
corpus = 8
patch = 9
media = 10
supplemental = 11
tag-version = 12
software-version = 13
version-scheme = 14
```

```
$version-scheme /= multipartnumeric
$version-scheme /= multipartnumeric-suffix
$version-scheme /= alphanumeric
$version-scheme /= decimal
$version-scheme /= semver
$version-scheme /= uint / text
multipartnumeric = 1
multipartnumeric-suffix = 2
alphanumeric = 3
decimal = 4
semver = 16384
```

The following describes each member of the concise-swid-tag root map.

- * `global-attributes`: A list of items including an optional language definition to support the processing of text-string values and an unbounded set of any-attribute items. Described in Section 2.5.
- * `tag-id` (index 0): A 16 byte binary string or textual identifier uniquely referencing a software component. The tag identifier **MUST** be globally unique. If represented as a 16 byte binary string, the identifier **MUST** be a valid universally unique identifier as defined by [RFC4122]. There are no strict guidelines on how this identifier is structured, but examples include a 16 byte GUID (e.g. class 4 UUID) [RFC4122], or a text string appended to a DNS domain name to ensure uniqueness across organizations.
- * `tag-version` (index 12): An integer value that indicate the specific release revision of the tag. Typically, the initial value of this field is set to 0 and the value is monotonically increased for subsequent tags produced for the same software component release. This value allows a CoSWID tag producer to correct an incorrect tag previously released without indicating a change to the underlying software component the tag represents. For example, the tag version could be changed to add new metadata, to correct a broken link, to add a missing payload entry, etc. When producing a revised tag, the new tag-version value **MUST** be greater than the old tag-version value.
- * `corpus` (index 8): A boolean value that indicates if the tag identifies and describes an installable software component in its pre-installation state. Installable software includes a installation package or installer for a software component, a software update, or a patch. If the CoSWID tag represents installable software, the corpus item **MUST** be set to "true". If not provided, the default value **MUST** be considered "false".
- * `patch` (index 9): A boolean value that indicates if the tag identifies and describes an installed patch that has made incremental changes to a software component installed on an endpoint. Typically, an installed patch has made a set of file modifications to pre-installed software and does not alter the version number or the descriptive metadata of an installed software component. If a CoSWID tag is for a patch, the patch item **MUST** be set to "true". If not provided, the default value **MUST** be considered "false".

Note: If the software component's version number is modified, then the correct course of action would be to replace the previous primary tag for the component with a new primary tag that reflected this new version. In such a case, the new tag would have a patch item value of "false" or would omit this item completely.

- * supplemental (index 11): A boolean value that indicates if the tag is providing additional information to be associated with another referenced SWID or CoSWID tag. This allows tools and users to record their own metadata about a software component without modifying SWID primary or patch tags created by a software provider. If a CoSWID tag is a supplemental tag, the supplemental item MUST be set to "true". If not provided, the default value MUST be considered "false".
- * software-name (index 1): This textual item provides the software component's name. This name is likely the same name that would appear in a package management tool.
- * software-version (index 13): A textual value representing the specific release or development version of the software component.
- * version-scheme (index 14): An integer or textual value representing the versioning scheme used for the software-version item. If an integer value is used it MUST be an index value in the range -256 to 65535. Integer values in the range -256 to -1 are reserved for testing and use in closed environments (see section Section 5.2.2). Integer values in the range 0 to 65535 correspond to registered entries in the IANA "SWID/CoSWID Version Scheme Value" registry (see section Section 5.2.4. If a string value is used it MUST be a private use name as defined in section Section 5.2.2. String values based on a Version Scheme Name from the IANA "SWID/CoSWID Version Scheme Value" registry MUST NOT be used, as these values are less concise than their index value equivalent.
- * media (index 10): This text value is a hint to the tag consumer to understand what target platform this tag applies to. This item represents a query as defined by the W3C Media Queries Recommendation (see [W3C.REC-css3-mediaqueries-20120619]).

- * `software-meta` (index 5): An open-ended map of key/value data pairs. A number of predefined keys can be used within this item providing for common usage and semantics across the industry. Use of this map allows any additional attribute to be included in the tag. It is expected that industry groups will use a common set of attribute names to allow for interoperability within their communities. Described in Section 2.8.
- * `entity` (index 2): Provides information about one or more organizations responsible for producing the CoSWID tag, and producing or releasing the software component referenced by this CoSWID tag. Described in Section 2.6.
- * `link` (index 4): Provides a means to establish relationship arcs between the tag and another items. A given link can be used to establish the relationship between tags or to reference another resource that is related to the CoSWID tag, e.g. vulnerability database association, ROLIE feed [RFC8322], MUD resource [RFC8520], software download location, etc). This is modeled after the HTML "link" element. Described in Section 2.7.
- * `payload` (index 6): This item represents a collection of software artifacts (described by child items) that compose the target software. For example, these artifacts could be the files included with an installer for a corpus tag or installed on an endpoint when the software component is installed for a primary or patch tag. The artifacts listed in a payload may be a superset of the software artifacts that are actually installed. Based on user selections at install time, an installation might not include every artifact that could be created or executed on the endpoint when the software component is installed or run. Described in Section 2.9.3.
- * `evidence-entry` (index 3): This item can be used to record the results of a software discovery process used to identify untagged software on an endpoint or to represent indicators for why software is believed to be installed on the endpoint. In either case, a CoSWID tag can be created by the tool performing an analysis of the software components installed on the endpoint. Described in Section 2.9.4.
- * `$$coswid-extension`: This CDDL socket is used to add new information structures to the `concise-swid-tag` root map. See Section 2.2.

2.4. concise-swid-tag Co-constraints

The following co-constraints apply to the information provided in the concise-swid-tag group.

- * The patch and supplemental items MUST NOT both be set to "true".
- * If the patch item is set to "true", the tag SHOULD contain at least one link item (see section Section 2.7) with both the rel item value of "patches" and an href item specifying an association with the software that was patched.
- * If the supplemental item is set to "true", the tag SHOULD contain at least one link item with both the rel item value of "supplemental" and an href item specifying an association with the software that is supplemented.
- * If all of the corpus, patch, and supplemental items are "false", or if the corpus item is set to "true", then a software-version item MUST be included with a value set to the version of the software component. This ensures that primary and corpus tags have an identifiable software version.

2.5. The global-attributes Group

The global-attributes group provides a list of items, including an optional language definition to support the processing of text-string values, and an unbounded set of any-attribute items allowing for additional items to be provided as a general point of extension in the model.

The CDDL for the global-attributes follows:

```
global-attributes = (  
    ? lang,  
    * any-attribute,  
)  
  
any-attribute = (  
    label => text / int / [ 2* text ] / [ 2* int ]  
)  
  
label = text / int
```

The following describes each child item of this group.

- * lang (index 15): A textual language tag that conforms with IANA "Language Subtag Registry" [RFC5646]. The context of the specified language applies to all sibling and descendant textual values, unless a descendant object has defined a different language tag. Thus, a new context is established when a descendant object redefines a new language tag. All textual values within a given context MUST be considered expressed in the specified language.
- * any-attribute: This sub-group provides a means to include arbitrary information via label/index ("key") value pairs. Labels can be either a single integer or text string. Values can be a single integer, a text string, or an array of integers or text strings.

2.6. The entity-entry Map

The CDDL for the entity-entry map follows:

```
entity-entry = {  
  global-attributes,  
  entity-name => text,  
  ? reg-id => any-uri,  
  role => $role / [ 2* $role ],  
  ? thumbprint => hash-entry,  
  * $$entity-extension,  
}
```

```
entity-name = 31  
reg-id = 32  
role = 33  
thumbprint = 34
```

```
$role /= tag-creator  
$role /= software-creator  
$role /= aggregator  
$role /= distributor  
$role /= licensor  
$role /= maintainer  
$role /= uint / text  
tag-creator=1  
software-creator=2  
aggregator=3  
distributor=4  
licensor=5  
maintainer=6
```

The following describes each child item of this group.

- * `global-attributes`: The `global-attributes` group described in Section 2.5.
- * `entity-name` (index 32): The textual name of the organizational entity claiming the roles specified by the role item for the CoSWID tag.
- * `reg-id` (index 32): The registration id value is intended to uniquely identify a naming authority in a given scope (e.g. global, organization, vendor, customer, administrative domain, etc.) for the referenced entity. The value of a registration ID MUST be a RFC 3986 URI. The scope SHOULD be the scope of an organization. In a given scope, the registration id MUST be used consistently for CoSWID tag production.
- * `role` (index 33): An integer or textual value representing the relationship(s) between the entity, and this tag or the referenced software component. If an integer value is used it MUST be an index value in the range -256 to 255. Integer values in the range -256 to -1 are reserved for testing and use in closed environments (see section Section 5.2.2). Integer values in the range 0 to 255 correspond to registered entries in the IANA "SWID/CoSWID Entity Role Value" registry (see section Section 5.2.5. If a string value is used it MUST be a private use name as defined in section Section 5.2.2. String values based on a Role Name from the IANA "SWID/CoSWID Entity Role Value" registry MUST NOT be used, as these values are less concise than their index value equivalent.

The following additional requirements exist for the use of the "role" item:

- An entity item MUST be provided with the role of "tag-creator" for every CoSWID tag. This indicates the organization that created the CoSWID tag.
 - An entity item SHOULD be provided with the role of "software-creator" for every CoSWID tag, if this information is known to the tag creator. This indicates the organization that created the referenced software component.
- * `thumbprint` (index 34): The value of the thumbprint item provides an integer-based hash algorithm identifier (`hash-alg-id`) and a byte string value (`hash-value`) that contains the corresponding hash value (i.e. the thumbprint) of the signing entity's public key certificate. This provides an indicator of which entity signed the CoSWID tag, which will typically be the tag creator. If the `hash-alg-id` is not known, then the integer value "0" MUST be used. This ensures parity between the SWID tag specification

[SWID], which does not allow an algorithm to be identified for this field. See Section 2.9.1 for more details on the use of the hash-entry data structure.

- * \$\$entity-extension: This CDDL socket can be used to extend the entity-entry group model. See Section 2.2.

2.7. The link-entry Map

The CDDL for the link-entry map follows:

```
link-entry = {
  global-attributes,
  ? artifact => text,
  href => any-uri,
  ? media => text,
  ? ownership => $ownership,
  rel => $rel,
  ? media-type => text,
  ? use => $use,
  * $$link-extension,
}
```

```
media = 10
artifact = 37
href = 38
ownership = 39
rel = 40
media-type = 41
use = 42
```

```
$ownership /= shared
$ownership /= private
$ownership /= abandon
$ownership /= uint / text
shared=1
private=2
abandon=3
```

```
$rel /= ancestor
$rel /= component
$rel /= feature
$rel /= installationmedia
$rel /= packageinstaller
$rel /= parent
$rel /= patches
$rel /= requires
$rel /= see-also
```

```
$rel /= supersedes
$rel /= supplemental
$rel /= uint / text
ancestor=1
component=2
feature=3
installationmedia=4
packageinstaller=5
parent=6
patches=7
requires=8
see-also=9
supersedes=10
supplemental=11

$use /= optional
$use /= required
$use /= recommended
$use /= uint / text
optional=1
required=2
recommended=3
```

The following describes each member of this map.

- * `global-attributes`: The `global-attributes` group described in Section 2.5.
- * `artifact (index: 37)`: To be used with `rel="installation-media"`, this item's value provides the path to the installer executable or script that can be run to launch the referenced installation. Links with the same artifact name **MUST** be considered mirrors of each other, allowing the installation media to be acquired from any of the described sources.
- * `href (index 38)`: A URI for the referenced resource. The `"href"` item's value can be, but is not limited to, the following (which is a slightly modified excerpt from [SWID]):
 - If no URI scheme is provided, then the URI is to be interpreted as being relative to the URI of the CoSWID tag. For example, `./folder/supplemental.coswid`.
 - a physical resource location with any acceptable URI scheme (e.g., `file:// http:// https:// ftp://`)

- a URI with "swid:" as the scheme refers to another SWID or CoSWID by the referenced tag's tag-id. This URI needs to be resolved in the context of the endpoint by software that can lookup other SWID or CoSWID tags. For example, "swid:2df9de35-0aff-4a86-ace6-f7dddddade4c" references the tag with the tag-id value "2df9de35-0aff-4a86-ace6-f7dddddade4c".
- a URI with "swidpath:" as the scheme, which refers to another CoSWID via an XPATH query. This URI would need to be resolved in the context of the system entity via software components that can lookup other CoSWID tags and select the appropriate tag based on an XPATH query [W3C.REC-xpath20-20101214].

Examples include:

- o swidpath://SoftwareIdentity[Entity/@regid='http://contoso.com'] would retrieve all SWID or CoSWID tags that include an entity where the regid is "Contoso"
 - o swidpath://SoftwareIdentity[Meta/@persistentId='b0c55172-38e9-4e36-be86-92206ad8eddb'] would match all SWID or CoSWID tags with the persistent-id value "b0c55172-38e9-4e36-be86-92206ad8eddb"
- * media (index 10): A hint to the consumer of the link to what target platform the link is applicable to. This item represents a query as defined by the W3C Media Queries Recommendation (see [W3C.REC-css3-mediaqueries-20120619]). See also media defined in Section 2.3.
- * ownership (index 39): An integer or textual value used when the "href" item references another software component to indicate the degree of ownership between the software component referenced by the CoSWID tag and the software component referenced by the link. If an integer value is used it MUST be an index value in the range -256 to 255. Integer values in the range -256 to -1 are reserved for testing and use in closed environments (see section Section 5.2.2). Integer values in the range 0 to 255 correspond to registered entries in the IANA "SWID/CoSWID Link Ownership Value" registry (see section Section 5.2.6. If a string value is used it MUST be a private use name as defined in section Section 5.2.2. String values based on a Ownership Type Name from the IANA "SWID/CoSWID Link Ownership Value" registry MUST NOT be used, as these values are less concise than their index value equivalent.

- * `rel` (index 40): An integer or textual value that identifies the relationship between this CoSWID and the target resource identified by the `href` item. If an integer value is used it MUST be an index value in the range -256 to 65535. Integer values in the range -256 to -1 are reserved for testing and use in closed environments (see section Section 5.2.2). Integer values in the range 0 to 65535 correspond to registered entries in the IANA "SWID/CoSWID Link Relationship Value" registry (see section Section 5.2.7. If a string value is used it MUST be either a private use name as defined in section Section 5.2.2 or a "Relation Name" from the IANA "Link Relation Types" registry: <https://www.iana.org/assignments/link-relations/link-relations.xhtml> as defined by [RFC8288]. When a string value defined in the IANA "SWID/CoSWID Link Relationship Value" registry matches a Relation Name defined in the IANA "Link Relation Types" registry, the index value in the IANA "SWID/CoSWID Link Relationship Value" registry MUST be used instead, as this relationship has a specialized meaning in the context of a SWID/CoSWID tag. String values based on a Relationship Type Name from the IANA "SWID/CoSWID Link Relationship Value" registry MUST NOT be used, as these values are less concise than their index value equivalent.
- * `media-type` (index 41): A link can point to arbitrary resources on the endpoint, local network, or Internet using the `href` item. Use of this item supplies the resource consumer with a hint of what type of resource to expect. Media types are identified by referencing a "Name" from the IANA "Media Types" registry: <http://www.iana.org/assignments/media-types/media-types.xhtml>.
- * `use` (index 42): An integer or textual value used to determine if the referenced software component has to be installed before installing the software component identified by the CoSWID tag. If an integer value is used it MUST be an index value in the range -256 to 255. Integer values in the range -256 to -1 are reserved for testing and use in closed environments (see section Section 5.2.2). Integer values in the range 0 to 255 correspond to registered entries in the IANA "Link Use Value Value" registry (see section Section 5.2.8. If a string value is used it MUST be a private use name as defined in section Section 5.2.2. String values based on an Link Use Type Name from the IANA "SWID/CoSWID Link Use Value" registry MUST NOT be used, as these values are less concise than their index value equivalent.
- * `$$link-extension`: This CDDL socket can be used to extend the link-entry map model. See Section 2.2.

2.8. The software-meta-entry Map

The CDDL for the software-meta-entry map follows:

```
software-meta-entry = {
  global-attributes,
  ? activation-status => text,
  ? channel-type => text,
  ? colloquial-version => text,
  ? description => text,
  ? edition => text,
  ? entitlement-data-required => bool,
  ? entitlement-key => text,
  ? generator => text,
  ? persistent-id => text,
  ? product => text,
  ? product-family => text,
  ? revision => text,
  ? summary => text,
  ? unspsc-code => text,
  ? unspsc-version => text,
  * $$software-meta-extension,
}
```

```
activation-status = 43
channel-type = 44
colloquial-version = 45
description = 46
edition = 47
entitlement-data-required = 48
entitlement-key = 49
generator = 50
persistent-id = 51
product = 52
product-family = 53
revision = 54
summary = 55
unspsc-code = 56
unspsc-version = 57
```

The following describes each child item of this group.

- * `global-attributes`: The `global-attributes` group described in Section 2.5.
- * `activation-status` (index 43): A textual value that identifies how the software component has been activated, which might relate to specific terms and conditions for its use (e.g. Trial,

Serialized, Licensed, Unlicensed, etc) and relate to an entitlement. This attribute is typically used in supplemental tags as it contains information that might be selected during a specific install.

- * channel-type (index 44): A textual value that identifies which sales, licensing, or marketing channel the software component has been targeted for (e.g. Volume, Retail, OEM, Academic, etc). This attribute is typically used in supplemental tags as it contains information that might be selected during a specific install.
- * colloquial-version (index 45): A textual value for the software component's informal or colloquial version. Examples may include a year value, a major version number, or similar value that are used to identify a group of specific software component releases that are part of the same release/support cycle. This version can be the same through multiple releases of a software component, while the software-version specified in the concise-swid-tag group is much more specific and will change for each software component release. This version is intended to be used for string comparison only and is not intended to be used to determine if a specific value is earlier or later in a sequence.
- * description (index 46): A textual value that provides a detailed description of the software component. This value MAY be multiple paragraphs separated by CR LF characters as described by [RFC5198].
- * edition (index 47): A textual value indicating that the software component represents a functional variation of the code base used to support multiple software components. For example, this item can be used to differentiate enterprise, standard, or professional variants of a software component.
- * entitlement-data-required (index 48): A boolean value that can be used to determine if accompanying proof of entitlement is needed when a software license reconciliation process is performed.

- * entitlement-key (index 49): A vendor-specific textual key that can be used to identify and establish a relationship to an entitlement. Examples of an entitlement-key might include a serial number, product key, or license key. For values that relate to a given software component install (i.e., license key), a supplemental tag will typically contain this information. In other cases, where a general-purpose key can be provided that applies to all possible installs of the software component on different endpoints, a primary tag will typically contain this information.
- * generator (index 50): The name (or tag-id) of the software component that created the CoSWID tag. If the generating software component has a SWID or CoSWID tag, then the tag-id for the generating software component SHOULD be provided.
- * persistent-id (index 51): A globally unique identifier used to identify a set of software components that are related. Software components sharing the same persistent-id can be different versions. This item can be used to relate software components, released at different points in time or through different release channels, that may not be able to be related through use of the link item.
- * product (index 52): A basic name for the software component that can be common across multiple tagged software components (e.g., Apache HTTPD).
- * product-family (index 53): A textual value indicating the software components overall product family. This should be used when multiple related software components form a larger capability that is installed on multiple different endpoints. For example, some software families may consist of server, client, and shared service components that are part of a larger capability. Email systems, enterprise applications, backup services, web conferencing, and similar capabilities are examples of families. Use of this item is not intended to represent groups of software that are bundled or installed together. The persistent-id or link items SHOULD be used to relate bundled software components.
- * revision (index 54): A string value indicating an informal or colloquial release version of the software. This value can provide a different version value as compared to the software-version specified in the concise-swid-tag group. This is useful when one or more releases need to have an informal version label that differs from the specific exact version value specified by software-version. Examples can include SP1, RC1, Beta, etc.

- * `summary` (index 55): A short description of the software component. This MUST be a single sentence suitable for display in a user interface.
- * `unspsc-code` (index 56): An 8 digit UNSPSC classification code for the software component. For more information see <https://www.unspsc.org/>.
- * `unspsc-version` (index 57): The version of UNSPSC used to define the `unspsc-code` value.
- * `$$meta-extension`: This CDDL socket can be used to extend the `software-meta-entry` group model. See Section 2.2.

2.9. The Resource Collection Definition

2.9.1. The hash-entry Array

CoSWID adds explicit support for the representation of hash entries using algorithms that are registered in the IANA "Named Information Hash Algorithm Registry" using the `hash` member (index 7) and the corresponding `hash-entry` type.

```
hash-entry = [  
    hash-alg-id: int,  
    hash-value: bytes,  
]
```

The number used as a value for `hash-alg-id` MUST refer an ID in the "Named Information Hash Algorithm Registry" (see <https://www.iana.org/assignments/named-information/named-information.xhtml>); other hash algorithms MUST NOT be used. The `hash-value` MUST represent the raw hash value of the hashed resource generated using the hash algorithm indicated by the `hash-alg-id`.

2.9.2. The resource-collection Group

A list of items both used in evidence (created by a software discovery process) and payload (installed in an endpoint) content of a CoSWID tag document to structure and differentiate the content of specific CoSWID tag types. Potential content includes directories, files, processes, or resources.

The CDDL for the `resource-collection` group follows:

```
path-elements-group = ( ? directory => directory-entry / [ 2* directory-entry
],
                        ? file => file-entry / [ 2* file-entry ],
                        )

resource-collection = (
  path-elements-group,
  ? process => process-entry / [ 2* process-entry ],
  ? resource => resource-entry / [ 2* resource-entry ],
  * $$resource-collection-extension,
)

filesystem-item = (
  global-attributes,
  ? key => bool,
  ? location => text,
  fs-name => text,
  ? root => text,
)

file-entry = {
  filesystem-item,
  ? size => integer,
  ? file-version => text,
  ? hash => hash-entry,
  * $$file-extension,
}

directory-entry = {
  filesystem-item,
  path-elements => { path-elements-group },
  * $$directory-extension,
}

process-entry = {
  global-attributes,
  process-name => text,
  ? pid => integer,
  * $$process-extension,
}

resource-entry = {
  global-attributes,
  type => text,
  * $$resource-extension,
}

directory = 16
file = 17
```

process = 18
resource = 19
size = 20
file-version = 21
key = 22
location = 23
fs-name = 24
root = 25
path-elements = 26
process-name = 27
pid = 28
type = 29

The following describes each member of the groups and maps illustrated above.

- * filesystem-item: A list of common items used for representing the filesystem root, relative location, name, and significance of a file or directory item.
- * global-attributes: The global-attributes group described in Section 2.5.
- * directory (index 16): A directory item allows child directory and file items to be defined within a directory hierarchy for the software component.
- * file (index 17): A file item allows details about a file to be provided for the software component.
- * process (index 18): A process item allows details to be provided about the runtime behavior of the software component, such as information that will appear in a process listing on an endpoint.
- * resource (index 19): A resource item can be used to provide details about an artifact or capability expected to be found on an endpoint or evidence collected related to the software component. This can be used to represent concepts not addressed directly by the directory, file, or process items. Examples include: registry keys, bound ports, etc. The equivalent construct in [SWID] is currently under specified. As a result, this item might be further defined through extension in the future.
- * size (index 20): The file's size in bytes.
- * file-version (index 21): The file's version as reported by querying information on the file from the operating system.

- * `key` (index 22): A boolean value indicating if a file or directory is significant or required for the software component to execute or function properly. These are files or directories that can be used to affirmatively determine if the software component is installed on an endpoint.
- * `location` (index 23): The filesystem path where a file is expected to be located when installed or copied. The location MUST be either relative to the location of the parent directory item (preferred) or relative to the location of the CoSWID tag if no parent is defined. The location MUST NOT include a file's name, which is provided by the `fs-name` item.
- * `fs-name` (index 24): The name of the directory or file without any path information.
- * `root` (index 25): A filesystem-specific name for the root of the filesystem. The location item is considered relative to this location if specified. If not provided, the value provided by the location item is expected to be relative to its parent or the location of the CoSWID tag if no parent is provided.
- * `path-elements` (index 26): This group allows a hierarchy of directory and file items to be defined in payload or evidence items.
- * `process-name` (index 27): The software component's process name as it will appear in an endpoint's process list.
- * `pid` (index 28): The process ID identified for a running instance of the software component in the endpoint's process list. This is used as part of the evidence item.
- * `type` (index 29): A string indicating the type of resource.
- * `$$resource-collection-extension`: This CDDL socket can be used to extend the resource-collection group model. This can be used to add new specialized types of resources. See Section 2.2.
- * `$$file-extension`: This CDDL socket can be used to extend the file-entry group model. See Section 2.2.
- * `$$directory-extension`: This CDDL socket can be used to extend the directory-entry group model. See Section 2.2.
- * `$$process-extension`: This CDDL socket can be used to extend the process-entry group model. See Section 2.2.

- * `$$resource-extension`: This CDDL socket can be used to extend the `resource-entry` group model. See Section 2.2.

2.9.3. The `payload-entry` Map

The CDDL for the `payload-entry` map follows:

```
payload-entry = {  
  global-attributes,  
  resource-collection,  
  * $$payload-extension,  
}
```

The following describes each child item of this group.

- * `global-attributes`: The `global-attributes` group described in Section 2.5.
- * `resource-collection`: The `resource-collection` group described in Section 2.9.2.
- * `$$payload-extension`: This CDDL socket can be used to extend the `payload-entry` group model. See Section 2.2.

2.9.4. The `evidence-entry` Map

The CDDL for the `evidence-entry` map follows:

```
evidence-entry = {  
  global-attributes,  
  resource-collection,  
  ? date => time,  
  ? device-id => text,  
  * $$evidence-extension,  
}
```

```
date = 35  
device-id = 36
```

The following describes each child item of this group.

- * `global-attributes`: The `global-attributes` group described in Section 2.5.
- * `resource-collection`: The `resource-collection` group described in Section 2.9.2.

- * `date` (index 35): The date and time the information was collected pertaining to the evidence item.
- * `device-id` (index 36): The endpoint's string identifier from which the evidence was collected.
- * `$$evidence-extension`: This CDDL socket can be used to extend the `evidence-entry` group model. See Section 2.2.

2.10. Full CDDL Definition

In order to create a valid CoSWID document the structure of the corresponding CBOR message MUST adhere to the following CDDL data definition.

```
concise-swid-tag = {
  global-attributes,
  tag-id => text / bstr .size 16,
  tag-version => integer,
  ? corpus => bool,
  ? patch => bool,
  ? supplemental => bool,
  software-name => text,
  ? software-version => text,
  ? version-scheme => $version-scheme,
  ? media => text,
  ? software-meta => software-meta-entry / [ 2* software-meta-entry ],
  entity => entity-entry / [ 2* entity-entry ],
  ? link => link-entry / [ 2* link-entry ],
  ? (( payload => payload-entry ) // ( evidence => evidence-entry )),
  * $$coswid-extension,
}

any-uri = text
label = text / int

$version-scheme /= multipartnumeric
$version-scheme /= multipartnumeric-suffix
$version-scheme /= alphanumeric
$version-scheme /= decimal
$version-scheme /= semver
$version-scheme /= uint / text

any-attribute = (
  label => text / int / [ 2* text ] / [ 2* int ]
)

global-attributes = (
```



```
    ? lang => text,
    * any-attribute,
  )

hash-entry = [
  hash-alg-id: int,
  hash-value: bytes,
]

entity-entry = {
  global-attributes,
  entity-name => text,
  ? reg-id => any-uri,
  role => $role / [ 2* $role ],
  ? thumbprint => hash-entry,
  * $$entity-extension,
}

$role /= tag-creator
$role /= software-creator
$role /= aggregator
$role /= distributor
$role /= licensor
$role /= maintainer
$role /= uint / text

link-entry = {
  global-attributes,
  ? artifact => text,
  href => any-uri,
  ? media => text,
  ? ownership => $ownership,
  rel => $rel,
  ? media-type => text,
  ? use => $use,
  * $$link-extension
}

$ownership /= shared
$ownership /= private
$ownership /= abandon
$ownership /= uint / text

$rel /= ancestor
$rel /= component
$rel /= feature
$rel /= installationmedia
$rel /= packageinstaller
```

```
$rel /= parent
$rel /= patches
$rel /= requires
$rel /= see-also
$rel /= supersedes
$rel /= supplemental
$rel /= uint / text

$use /= optional
$use /= required
$use /= recommended
$use /= uint / text

software-meta-entry = {
  global-attributes,
  ? activation-status => text,
  ? channel-type => text,
  ? colloquial-version => text,
  ? description => text,
  ? edition => text,
  ? entitlement-data-required => bool,
  ? entitlement-key => text,
  ? generator => text,
  ? persistent-id => text,
  ? product => text,
  ? product-family => text,
  ? revision => text,
  ? summary => text,
  ? unspsc-code => text,
  ? unspsc-version => text,
  * $$software-meta-extension,
}

path-elements-group = ( ? directory => directory-entry / [ 2* directory-entry
],
                        ? file => file-entry / [ 2* file-entry ],
                        )

resource-collection = (
  path-elements-group,
  ? process => process-entry / [ 2* process-entry ],
  ? resource => resource-entry / [ 2* resource-entry ],
  * $$resource-collection-extension,
)

file-entry = {
  filesystem-item,
  ? size => uint,
  ? file-version => text,
```

```
    ? hash => hash-entry,  
    * $$file-extension,  
  }  
  
  directory-entry = {  
    filesystem-item,  
    ? path-elements => { path-elements-group },  
    * $$directory-extension,  
  }  
  
  process-entry = {  
    global-attributes,  
    process-name => text,  
    ? pid => integer,  
    * $$process-extension,  
  }  
  
  resource-entry = {  
    global-attributes,  
    type => text,  
    * $$resource-extension,  
  }  
  
  filesystem-item = (  
    global-attributes,  
    ? key => bool,  
    ? location => text,  
    fs-name => text,  
    ? root => text,  
  )  
  
  payload-entry = {  
    global-attributes,  
    resource-collection,  
    * $$payload-extension,  
  }  
  
  evidence-entry = {  
    global-attributes,  
    resource-collection,  
    ? date => time,  
    ? device-id => text,  
    * $$evidence-extension,  
  }  
  
; "global map member" integer indexes  
tag-id = 0  
software-name = 1
```

entity = 2
evidence = 3
link = 4
software-meta = 5
payload = 6
hash = 7
corpus = 8
patch = 9
media = 10
supplemental = 11
tag-version = 12
software-version = 13
version-scheme = 14
lang = 15
directory = 16
file = 17
process = 18
resource = 19
size = 20
file-version = 21
key = 22
location = 23
fs-name = 24
root = 25
path-elements = 26
process-name = 27
pid = 28
type = 29
entity-name = 31
reg-id = 32
role = 33
thumbprint = 34
date = 35
device-id = 36
artifact = 37
href = 38
ownership = 39
rel = 40
media-type = 41
use = 42
activation-status = 43
channel-type = 44
colloquial-version = 45
description = 46
edition = 47
entitlement-data-required = 48
entitlement-key = 49
generator = 50

```
persistent-id = 51
product = 52
product-family = 53
revision = 54
summary = 55
unspsc-code = 56
unspsc-version = 57

; "version-scheme" integer indexes
multipartnumeric = 1
multipartnumeric-suffix = 2
alphanumeric = 3
decimal = 4
semver = 16384

; "role" integer indexes
tag-creator=1
software-creator=2
aggregator=3
distributor=4
licensor=5
maintainer=6

; "ownership" integer indexes
shared=1
private=2
abandon=3

; "rel" integer indexes
ancestor=1
component=2
feature=3
installationmedia=4
packageinstaller=5
parent=6
patches=7
requires=8
see-also=9
supersedes=10
; supplemental=11 ; this is already defined earlier

; "use" integer indexes
optional=1
required=2
recommended=3
```

3. Determining the Type of CoSWID

The operational model for SWID and CoSWID tags was introduced in Section 1.1, which described four different CoSWID tag types. The following additional rules apply to the use of CoSWID tags to ensure that created tags properly identify the tag type.

The first matching rule MUST determine the type of the CoSWID tag.

1. **Primary Tag:** A CoSWID tag MUST be considered a primary tag if the corpus, patch, and supplemental items are "false".
2. **Supplemental Tag:** A CoSWID tag MUST be considered a supplemental tag if the supplemental item is set to "true".
3. **Corpus Tag:** A CoSWID tag MUST be considered a corpus tag if the corpus item is "true".
4. **Patch Tag:** A CoSWID tag MUST be considered a patch tag if the patch item is "true".

Note: Multiple of the corpus, patch, and supplemental items can have values set as "true". The rules above provide a means to determine the tag's type in such a case. For example, a SWID or CoSWID tag for a patch installer might have both corpus and patch items set to "true". In such a case, the tag is a "Corpus Tag". The tag installed by this installer would have only the patch item set to "true", making the installed tag type a "Patch Tag".

4. CoSWID Indexed Label Values

4.1. Version Scheme

The following table contains a set of values for use in the concise-swid-tag group's version-scheme item. These values match the version schemes defined in the ISO/IEC 19770-2:2015 [SWID] specification. Index value indicates the value to use as the version-scheme item's value. The Version Scheme Name provides human-readable text for the value. The Definition describes the syntax of allowed values for each entry.

Index	Version Scheme Name	Definition
1	multipartnumeric	Numbers separated by dots, where the numbers are interpreted as integers (e.g., 1.2.3, 1.4.5, 1.2.3.4.5.6.7)
2	multipartnumeric+suffix	Numbers separated by dots, where the numbers are interpreted as integers with an additional textual suffix (e.g., 1.2.3a)
3	alphanumeric	Strictly a string, sorting is done alphanumerically
4	decimal	A floating point number (e.g., 1.25 is less than 1.3)
16384	semver	Follows the [SEMVER] specification

Table 3: Version Scheme Values

The values above are registered in the IANA "SWID/CoSWID Version Scheme Value" registry defined in section Section 5.2.4. Additional entries will likely be registered over time in this registry.

These version schemes have partially overlapping value spaces. The following guidelines help to ensure that the most specific version-scheme is used:

- * "decimal" and "multipartnumeric" partially overlap in their value space when a value matches a decimal number . When a corresponding software-version item's value falls within this overlapping value space, the "decimal" version scheme SHOULD be used.
- * "multipartnumeric" and "semver" partially overlap in their value space when a "multipartnumeric" value matches the semantic versioning syntax. When a corresponding software-version item's value falls within this overlapping value space, the "semver" version scheme SHOULD be used.

- * "alphanumeric" and other version schemes might overlap in their value space. When a corresponding software-version item's value falls within this overlapping value space, the other version scheme SHOULD be used instead of "alphanumeric".

4.2. Entity Role Values

The following table indicates the index value to use for the entity-entry group's role item (see Section 2.6). These values match the entity roles defined in the ISO/IEC 19770-2:2015 [SWID] specification. The "Index" value indicates the value to use as the role item's value. The "Role Name" provides human-readable text for the value. The "Definition" describes the semantic meaning of each entry.

Index	Role Name	Definition
1	tagCreator	The person or organization that created the containing SWID or CoSWID tag
2	softwareCreator	The person or organization entity that created the software component.
3	aggregator	From [SWID], "An organization or system that encapsulates software from their own and/or other organizations into a different distribution process (as in the case of virtualization), or as a completed system to accomplish a specific task (as in the case of a value added reseller)."
4	distributor	From [SWID], "An entity that furthers the marketing, selling and/or distribution of software from the original place of manufacture to the ultimate user without modifying the software, its packaging or its labelling."
5	licensor	From [SAM] as "software licensor", a "person or organization who owns or holds the rights to issue a software license for a specific software [component]"
6	maintainer	The person or organization that is responsible for coordinating and making updates to the source code for the software component. This SHOULD be used when the "maintainer" is a different person or organization than the original "softwareCreator".

Table 4: Entity Role Values

The values above are registered in the IANA "SWID/CoSWID Entity Role Value" registry defined in section Section 5.2.5. Additional values will likely be registered over time. Additionally, the index values 128 through 255 and the name prefix "x_" have been reserved for private use.

4.3. Link Ownership Values

The following table indicates the index value to use for the link-entry group's ownership item (see Section 2.7). These values match the link ownership values defined in the ISO/IEC 19770-2:2015 [SWID] specification. The "Index" value indicates the value to use as the link-entry group ownership item's value. The "Ownership Type" provides human-readable text for the value. The "Definition" describes the semantic meaning of each entry.

Index	Ownership Type	Definition
1	abandon	If the software component referenced by the CoSWID tag is uninstalled, then the referenced software SHOULD NOT be uninstalled
2	private	If the software component referenced by the CoSWID tag is uninstalled, then the referenced software SHOULD be uninstalled as well.
3	shared	If the software component referenced by the CoSWID tag is uninstalled, then the referenced software SHOULD be uninstalled if no other components sharing the software.

Table 5: Link Ownership Values

The values above are registered in the IANA "SWID/CoSWID Link Ownership Value" registry defined in section Section 5.2.6. Additional values will likely be registered over time. Additionally, the index values 128 through 255 and the name prefix "x_" have been reserved for private use.

4.4. Link Rel Values

The following table indicates the index value to use for the link-entry group's rel item (see Section 2.7). These values match the link rel values defined in the ISO/IEC 19770-2:2015 [SWID] specification. The "Index" value indicates the value to use as the link-entry group ownership item's value. The "Relationship Type" provides human-readable text for the value. The "Definition" describes the semantic meaning of each entry.

Index	Relationship Type	Definition
1	ancestor	The link references a SWID/CoSWID tag for a previous release of this software. This can be useful to define an upgrade path.
2	component	The link references a SWID/CoSWID tag for a separate component of this software.
3	feature	The link references a configurable feature of this software that can be enabled or disabled without changing the installed files.
4	installationmedia	The link references the installation package that can be used to install this software.
5	packageinstaller	The link references the installation software needed to install this software.
6	parent	The link references a SWID/CoSWID tag that is the parent of this SWID/CoSWID tag. This relationship can be used when multiple software components are part of a software bundle, where the "parent" is the SWID/CoSWID tag for the bundle, and each child is a "component". In such a case, each child component can provide a "parent" link relationship to the bundle's SWID/CoSWID tag, and the bundle can provide a "component"

		link relationship to each child software component.
7	patches	The link references a SWID/CoSWID tag that this software patches. Typically only used for patch SWID/CoSWID tags (see Section 1.1).
8	requires	The link references a prerequisite for installing this software. A patch SWID/CoSWID tag (see Section 1.1) can use this to represent base software or another patch that needs to be installed first.
9	see-also	The link references other software that may be of interest that relates to this software.
10	supersedes	The link references another software that this software replaces. A patch SWID/CoSWID tag (see Section 1.1) can use this to represent another patch that this patch incorporates or replaces.
11	supplemental	The link references a SWID/CoSWID tag that this tag supplements. Used on supplemental SWID/CoSWID tags (see Section 1.1).

Table 6: Link Relationship Values

The values above are registered in the IANA "SWID/CoSWID Link Relationship Value" registry defined in section Section 5.2.7. Additional values will likely be registered over time. Additionally, the index values 32768 through 65535 and the name prefix "x_" have been reserved for private use.

4.5. Link Use Values

The following table indicates the index value to use for the link-entry group's use item (see Section 2.7). These values match the link use values defined in the ISO/IEC 19770-2:2015 [SWID] specification. The "Index" value indicates the value to use as the link-entry group use item's value. The "Use Type" provides human-readable text for the value. The "Definition" describes the semantic meaning of each entry.

Index	Use Type	Definition
1	optional	From [SWID], "Not absolutely required; the [Link]'d software is installed only when specified."
2	required	From [SWID], "The [Link]'d software is absolutely required for an operation software installation."
3	recommended	From [SWID], "Not absolutely required; the [Link]'d software is installed unless specified otherwise."

Table 7: Link Use Values

The values above are registered in the IANA "SWID/CoSWID Link Use Value" registry defined in section Section 5.2.8. Additional values will likely be registered over time. Additionally, the index values 128 through 255 and the name prefix "x_" have been reserved for private use.

5. IANA Considerations

This document has a number of IANA considerations, as described in the following subsections. In summary, 6 new registries are established with this request, with initial entries provided for each registry. New values for 5 other registries are also requested.

5.1. CoSWID Items Registry

This registry uses integer values as index values in CBOR maps.

This document defines a new registry titled "CoSWID Items". Future registrations for this registry are to be made based on [RFC8126] as follows:

Range	Registration Procedures
0-32767	Standards Action
32768-4294967295	Specification Required

Table 8: CoSWID Items Registration Procedures

All negative values are reserved for Private Use.

Initial registrations for the "CoSWID Items" registry are provided below. Assignments consist of an integer index value, the item name, and a reference to the defining specification.

Index	Item Name	Specification
0	tag-id	RFC-AAAA
1	software-name	RFC-AAAA
2	entity	RFC-AAAA
3	evidence	RFC-AAAA
4	link	RFC-AAAA
5	software-meta	RFC-AAAA
6	payload	RFC-AAAA
7	hash	RFC-AAAA
8	corpus	RFC-AAAA
9	patch	RFC-AAAA
10	media	RFC-AAAA
11	supplemental	RFC-AAAA
12	tag-version	RFC-AAAA
13	software-version	RFC-AAAA
14	version-scheme	RFC-AAAA

15	lang	RFC-AAAA
16	directory	RFC-AAAA
17	file	RFC-AAAA
18	process	RFC-AAAA
19	resource	RFC-AAAA
20	size	RFC-AAAA
21	file-version	RFC-AAAA
22	key	RFC-AAAA
23	location	RFC-AAAA
24	fs-name	RFC-AAAA
25	root	RFC-AAAA
26	path-elements	RFC-AAAA
27	process-name	RFC-AAAA
28	pid	RFC-AAAA
29	type	RFC-AAAA
31	entity-name	RFC-AAAA
32	reg-id	RFC-AAAA
33	role	RFC-AAAA
34	thumbprint	RFC-AAAA
35	date	RFC-AAAA
36	device-id	RFC-AAAA
37	artifact	RFC-AAAA
38	href	RFC-AAAA
39	ownership	RFC-AAAA

40	rel	RFC-AAAA
41	media-type	RFC-AAAA
42	use	RFC-AAAA
43	activation-status	RFC-AAAA
44	channel-type	RFC-AAAA
45	colloquial-version	RFC-AAAA
46	description	RFC-AAAA
47	edition	RFC-AAAA
48	entitlement-data-required	RFC-AAAA
49	entitlement-key	RFC-AAAA
50	generator	RFC-AAAA
51	persistent-id	RFC-AAAA
52	product	RFC-AAAA
53	product-family	RFC-AAAA
54	revision	RFC-AAAA
55	summary	RFC-AAAA
56	unspsc-code	RFC-AAAA
57	unspsc-version	RFC-AAAA
58-4294967295	Unassigned	

Table 9: CoSWID Items Initial Registrations

5.2. SWID/CoSWID Value Registries

The following IANA registries provide a mechanism for new values to be added over time to common enumerations used by SWID and CoSWID.

5.2.1. Registration Procedures

The following registries allow for the registration of index values and names. New registrations will be permitted through either the Standards Action policy or the Specification Required policy [BCP26]. The latter SHOULD be used only for registrations requested by SDOs outside the IETF. New index values will be provided on a First Come First Served as defined by [BCP26].

The following registries also reserve the integer-based index values in the range of -1 to -256 for private use as defined by [BCP26] in section 4.1. This allows values -1 to -24 to be expressed as a single uint_8t in CBOR, and values -25 to -256 to be expressed using an additional uint_8t in CBOR.

5.2.2. Private Use of Index and Name Values

The integer-based index values in the private use range (-1 to -256) are intended for testing purposes and closed environments; values in other ranges SHOULD NOT be assigned for testing.

For names that correspond to private use index values, an Internationalized Domain Name prefix MUST be used to prevent name conflicts using the form:

```
"domain.prefix-name"
```

Where "domain.prefix" MUST be a valid Internationalized Domain Name as defined by [RFC5892], and "name" MUST be a unique name within the namespace defined by the "domain.prefix". Use of a prefix in this way allows for a name to be used initially in the private use range, and to be registered at a future point in time. This is consistent with the guidance in [BCP178].

5.2.3. Expert Review Guidelines

Designated experts MUST ensure that new registration requests meet the following additional guidelines:

- * The requesting specification MUST provide a clear semantic definition for the new entry. This definition MUST clearly differentiate the requested entry from other previously registered entries.
- * The requesting specification MUST describe the intended use of the entry, including any co-constraints that exist between the use of the entry's index value or name, and other values defined within the SWID/CoSWID model.

- * Index values and names outside the private use space MUST NOT be used without registration. This is considered squatting and SHOULD be avoided. Designated experts MUST ensure that reviewed specifications register all appropriate index values and names.
- * Standards track documents MAY include entries registered in the range reserved for entries under the Specification Required policy. This can occur when a standards track document provides further guidance on the use of index values and names that are in common use, but were not registered with IANA. This situation SHOULD be avoided.
- * All registered names MUST be valid according to the XML Schema NMTOKEN data type (see [W3C.REC-xmlschema-2-20041028] section 3.3.4). This ensures that registered names are compatible with the SWID format [SWID] where they are used.
- * Registration of vanity names SHOULD be discouraged. The requesting specification MUST provide a description of how a requested name will allow for use by multiple stakeholders.

5.2.4. SWID/CoSWID Version Scheme Value Registry

This document establishes a new registry titled "SWID/CoSWID Version Scheme Values". This registry provides index values for use as version-scheme item values in this document and version scheme names for use in [SWID].

[TO BE REMOVED: This registration should take place at the following location: <https://www.iana.org/assignments/swid>]

This registry uses the registration procedures defined in Section 5.2.1 with the following associated ranges:

Range	Registration Procedures
0-16383	Standards Action
16384-65535	Specification Required

Table 10: CoSWID Version Scheme Registration Procedures

Assignments MUST consist of an integer Index value, the Version Scheme Name, and a reference to the defining specification.

Initial registrations for the "SWID/CoSWID Version Scheme Value" registry are provided below, which are derived from the textual version scheme names defined in [SWID].

Index	Version Scheme Name	Specification
0	Reserved	
1	multipartnumeric	See Section 4.1
2	multipartnumeric+suffix	See Section 4.1
3	alphanumeric	See Section 4.1
4	decimal	See Section 4.1
5-16383	Unassigned	
16384	semver	[SEMVER]
16385-65535	Unassigned	

Table 11: CoSWID Version Scheme Initial Registrations

Registrations MUST conform to the expert review guidelines defined in Section 5.2.3.

Designated experts MUST also ensure that newly requested entries define a value space for the corresponding version item that is unique from other previously registered entries. Note: The initial registrations violate this requirement, but are included for backwards compatibility with [SWID]. Guidelines on how to deconflict these value spaces are defined in section Section 4.1.

5.2.5. SWID/CoSWID Entity Role Value Registry

This document establishes a new registry titled "SWID/CoSWID Entity Role Values". This registry provides index values for use as entity-entry role item values in this document and entity role names for use in [SWID].

[TO BE REMOVED: This registration should take place at the following location: <https://www.iana.org/assignments/swid>]

This registry uses the registration procedures defined in Section 5.2.1 with the following associated ranges:

Range	Registration Procedures
0-127	Standards Action
128-255	Specification Required

Table 12: CoSWID Entity Role
Registration Procedures

Assignments consist of an integer Index value, a Role Name, and a reference to the defining specification.

Initial registrations for the "SWID/CoSWID Entity Role Value" registry are provided below, which are derived from the textual entity role names defined in [SWID].

Index	Role Name	Specification
0	Reserved	
1	tagCreator	See Section 4.2
2	softwareCreator	See Section 4.2
3	aggregator	See Section 4.2
4	distributor	See Section 4.2
5	licensor	See Section 4.2
6	maintainer	See Section 4.2
7-255	Unassigned	

Table 13: CoSWID Entity Role Initial
Registrations

Registrations MUST conform to the expert review guidelines defined in Section 5.2.3.

5.2.6. SWID/CoSWID Link Ownership Value Registry

This document establishes a new registry titled "SWID/CoSWID Link Ownership Values". This registry provides index values for use as link-entry ownership item values in this document and link ownership names for use in [SWID].

[TO BE REMOVED: This registration should take place at the following location: <https://www.iana.org/assignments/swid>]

This registry uses the registration procedures defined in Section 5.2.1 with the following associated ranges:

Range	Registration Procedures
0-127	Standards Action
128-255	Specification Required

Table 14: CoSWID Link Ownership Registration Procedures

Assignments consist of an integer Index value, an Ownership Type Name, and a reference to the defining specification.

Initial registrations for the "SWID/CoSWID Link Ownership Value" registry are provided below, which are derived from the textual entity role names defined in [SWID].

Index	Ownership Type Name	Definition
0	Reserved	
1	abandon	See Section 4.3
2	private	See Section 4.3
3	shared	See Section 4.3
4-255	Unassigned	

Table 15: CoSWID Link Ownership Initial Registrations

Registrations MUST conform to the expert review guidelines defined in Section 5.2.3.

5.2.7. SWID/CoSWID Link Relationship Value Registry

This document establishes a new registry titled "SWID/CoSWID Link Relationship Values". This registry provides index values for use as link-entry rel item values in this document and link ownership names for use in [SWID].

[TO BE REMOVED: This registration should take place at the following location: <https://www.iana.org/assignments/swid>]

This registry uses the registration procedures defined in Section 5.2.1 with the following associated ranges:

Range	Registration Procedures
0-32767	Standards Action
32768-65535	Specification Required

Table 16: CoSWID Link Relationship Registration Procedures

Assignments consist of an integer Index value, the Relationship Type Name, and a reference to the defining specification.

Initial registrations for the "SWID/CoSWID Link Relationship Value" registry are provided below, which are derived from the link relationship values defined in [SWID].

Index	Relationship Type Name	Specification
0	Reserved	
1	ancestor	See Section 4.4
2	component	See Section 4.4
3	feature	See Section 4.4
4	installationmedia	See Section 4.4
5	packageinstaller	See Section 4.4
6	parent	See Section 4.4
7	patches	See Section 4.4
8	requires	See Section 4.4
9	see-also	See Section 4.4
10	supersedes	See Section 4.4
11	supplemental	See Section 4.4
12-65535	Unassigned	

Table 17: CoSWID Link Relationship Initial Registrations

Registrations MUST conform to the expert review guidelines defined in Section 5.2.3.

Designated experts MUST also ensure that a newly requested entry documents the URI schemes allowed to be used in an href associated with the link relationship and the expected resolution behavior of these URI schemes. This will help to ensure that SWID/CoSWID applications are able to interoperate when resolving resources referenced by a link of a given type.

5.2.8. SWID/CoSWID Link Use Value Registry

This document establishes a new registry titled "SWID/CoSWID Link Use Values". This registry provides index values for use as link-entry use item values in this document and link use names for use in [SWID].

[TO BE REMOVED: This registration should take place at the following location: <https://www.iana.org/assignments/swid>]

This registry uses the registration procedures defined in Section 5.2.1 with the following associated ranges:

Range	Registration Procedures
0-127	Standards Action
128-255	Specification Required

Table 18: CoSWID Link Use Registration Procedures

Assignments consist of an integer Index value, the Link Use Type Name, and a reference to the defining specification.

Initial registrations for the "SWID/CoSWID Link Use Value" registry are provided below, which are derived from the link relationship values defined in [SWID].

Index	Link Use Type Name	Specification
0	Reserved	
1	optional	See Section 4.5
2	required	See Section 4.5
3	recommended	See Section 4.5
4-255	Unassigned	

Table 19: CoSWID Link Use Initial Registrations

Registrations MUST conform to the expert review guidelines defined in Section 5.2.3.

5.3. swid+cbor Media Type Registration

IANA is requested to add the following to the IANA "Media Types" registry.

Type name: application

Subtype name: swid+cbor

Required parameters: none

Optional parameters: none

Encoding considerations: Must be encoded as using [RFC7049]. See RFC-AAAA for details.

Security considerations: See Section 6 of RFC-AAAA.

Interoperability considerations: Applications MAY ignore any key value pairs that they do not understand. This allows backwards compatible extensions to this specification.

Published specification: RFC-AAAA

Applications that use this media type: The type is used by software asset management systems, vulnerability assessment systems, and in applications that use remote integrity verification.

Fragment identifier considerations: Fragment identification for application/swid+cbor is supported by using fragment identifiers as specified by RFC-7049 section 7.5.

Additional information:

Magic number(s): first five bytes in hex: da 53 57 49 44

File extension(s): coswid

Macintosh file type code(s): none

Macintosh Universal Type Identifier code: org.ietf.coswid conforms to public.data

Person & email address to contact for further information: Henk Birkholz <henk.birkholz@sit.fraunhofer.de>

Intended usage: COMMON

Restrictions on usage: None

Author: Henk Birkholz <henk.birkholz@sit.fraunhofer.de>

Change controller: IESG

5.4. CoAP Content-Format Registration

IANA is requested to assign a CoAP Content-Format ID for the CoSWID media type in the "CoAP Content-Formats" sub-registry, from the "IETF Review or IESG Approval" space (256..999), within the "CoRE Parameters" registry [RFC7252]:

Media type	Encoding	ID	Reference
application/swid+cbor	-	TBD1	RFC-AAAA

Table 20: CoAP Content-Format IDs

5.5. CBOR Tag Registration

IANA is requested to allocate a tag in the "CBOR Tags" registry, preferably with the specific value requested:

Tag	Data Item	Semantics
1398229316	map	Concise Software Identifier (CoSWID) [RFC-AAAA]

Table 21: CoSWID CBOR Tag

5.6. URI Scheme Registrations

The ISO 19770-2:2015 SWID specification describes use of the "swid" and "swidpath" URI schemes, which are currently in use in implementations. This document continues this use for CoSWID. The following subsections provide registrations for these schemes in to ensure that a permanent registration exists for these schemes that is suitable for use in the SWID and CoSWID specifications.

5.6.1. "swid" URI Scheme Registration

There is a need for a scheme name that can be used in URIs that point to a specific SWID/CoSWID tag by that tag's tag-id, such as the use of the link entry as described in section Section 2.7) of this document. Since this scheme is used in a standards track document and an ISO standard, this scheme needs to be used without fear of conflicts with current or future actual schemes. The scheme "swid" is hereby registered as a 'permanent' scheme for that purpose.

The "swid" scheme is specified as follows:

Scheme syntax: The scheme specific part consists of a SWID or CoSWID tag's tag-id that is URI encoded according to [RFC3986] section 2.1. The following expression is a valid example:

```
<swid:2df9de35-0aff-4a86-ace6-f7dddlade4c>
```

Scheme semantics: URIs in the "swid" scheme are to be used to reference a SWID or CoSWID tag by its tag-id. A tag-id referenced in this way can be used to identify the tag resource in the context of where it is referenced from. For example, when a tag is installed on a given device, that tag can reference related tags on the same device using this URI scheme.

Encoding considerations: See Section 2.5 of [RFC3986] for guidelines.

Interoperability considerations: None.

Security considerations: None.

5.6.2. "swidpath" URI Scheme Registration

There is a need for a scheme name that can be used in URIs to identify a collection of specific SWID/CoSWID tags with data elements that match an XPath expression, such as the use of the link entry as described in section Section 2.7) of this document. Since this scheme is used in a standards track document and an ISO standard, this scheme needs to be used without fear of conflicts with current or future actual schemes. The scheme "swidpath" is hereby registered as a 'permanent' scheme for that purpose.

The "swidpath" scheme is specified as follows:

Scheme syntax: The scheme specific part consists of an XPath expression as defined by [W3C.REC-xpath20-20101214]. The included XPath expression will be URI encoded according to [RFC3986] section 2.1.

Scheme semantics: URIs in the "swidpath" scheme are to be used specify the data that must be found in a given SWID/CoSWID tag for that tag to be considered a matching tag to be included in the identified tag collection. Tags to be evaluated include all tags in the context of where the tag is referenced from. For example, when a tag is installed on a given device, that tag can reference related tags on the same device using this URI scheme. A tag is matching if the XPath evaluation result value has an effective boolean value of "true" according to [W3C.REC-xpath20-20101214] section 2.4.3. rence related tags on the same device using this URI scheme.

Encoding considerations: See Section 2.5 of [RFC3986] for guidelines.

Interoperability considerations: None.

Security considerations: None.

5.7. CoSWID Model for use in SWIMA Registration

The Software Inventory Message and Attributes (SWIMA) for PA-TNC specification [RFC8412] defines a standardized method for collecting an endpoint device's software inventory. A CoSWID can provide evidence of software installation which can then be used and exchanged with SWIMA. This registration adds a new entry to the IANA "Software Data Model Types" registry defined by [RFC8412] to support CoSWID use in SWIMA as follows:

Pen: 0

Integer: TBD2

Name: Concise Software Identifier (CoSWID)

Defining Specification: RFC-AAAA

Deriving Software Identifiers:

A Software Identifier generated from a CoSWID tag is expressed as a concatenation of the form:

TAG_CREATOR_REGID "_" "_" UNIQUE_ID

Where TAG_CREATOR_REGID is the reg-id ietm value of the tag's entity item having the role value of 1 (corresponding to "tag creator"), and the UNIQUE_ID is the same tag's tag-id item. If the tag-id item's value is expressed as a 16 byte binary string, the UNIQUE_ID MUST be represented using the UUID string representation defined in [RFC4122] including the "urn:uuid:" prefix.

The TAG_CREATOR_REGID and the UNIQUE_ID are connected with a double underscore (_), without any other connecting character or whitespace.

6. Security Considerations

SWID and CoSWID tags contain public information about software components and, as such, do not need to be protected against disclosure on an endpoint. Similarly, SWID/CoSWID tags are intended to be easily discoverable by applications and users on an endpoint in order to make it easy to identify and collect all of an endpoint's SWID tags. As such, any security considerations regarding SWID/CoSWID tags focus on the application of SWID/CoSWID tags to address security challenges, and the possible disclosure of the results of those applications.

A tag is considered "authoritative" if the SWID/CoSWID tag was created by the software provider. An authoritative SWID/CoSWID tag contains information about a software component provided by the maintainer of the software component, who is expected to be an expert in their own software. Thus, authoritative SWID/CoSWID tags can be trusted to represent authoritative information about the software component.

A signed SWID/CoSWID tag (see Appendix A) whose signature has been validated can be relied upon to be unchanged since it was signed. By contrast, the data contained in unsigned tags cannot be trusted to be unmodified.

When an authoritative tag is signed, the software provider can be authenticated as the originator of the signature. Having a signed authoritative SWID/CoSWID tag can be useful when the information in the tag needs to be trusted, such as when the tag is being used to convey reference integrity measurements for software components.

SWID/CoSWID tags are designed to be easily added and removed from an endpoint along with the installation or removal of software components. On endpoints where addition or removal of software components is tightly controlled, the addition or removal of SWID tags can be similarly controlled. On more open systems, where many users can manage the software inventory, SWID/CoSWID tags can be easier to add or remove. On such systems, it can be possible to add or remove SWID/CoSWID tags in a way that does not reflect the actual presence or absence of corresponding software components. Similarly, not all software products automatically install SWID/CoSWID tags, so products can be present on an endpoint without providing a corresponding SWID tag. As such, any collection of SWID/CoSWID tags cannot automatically be assumed to represent either a complete or fully accurate representation of the software inventory of the

endpoint. However, especially on endpoint devices that more strictly control the ability to add or remove applications, SWID/CoSWID tags are an easy way to provide an preliminary understanding of that endpoint's software inventory.

Any report of an endpoint's SWID/CoSWID tag collection provides information about the software inventory of that endpoint. If such a report is exposed to an attacker, this can tell them which software products and versions thereof are present on the endpoint. By examining this list, the attacker might learn of the presence of applications that are vulnerable to certain types of attacks. As noted earlier, SWID/CoSWID tags are designed to be easily discoverable by an endpoint, but this does not present a significant risk since an attacker would already need to have access to the endpoint to view that information. However, when the endpoint transmits its software inventory to another party, or that inventory is stored on a server for later analysis, this can potentially expose this information to attackers who do not yet have access to the endpoint. For this reason, it is important to protect the confidentiality of SWID/CoSWID tag information that has been collected from an endpoint, not because those tags individually contain sensitive information, but because the collection of SWID/CoSWID tags and their association with an endpoint reveals information about that endpoint's attack surface.

Finally, both the ISO-19770-2:2015 XML schema SWID definition and the CoSWID data definition allow for the construction of "infinite" tags with link item loops or tags that contain malicious content with the intent of creating non-deterministic states during validation or processing of those tags. While software providers are unlikely to do this, SWID/CoSWID tags can be created by any party and the SWID/CoSWID tags collected from an endpoint could contain a mixture of vendor and non-vendor created tags. For this reason, tools that consume SWID/CoSWID tags ought to treat the tag contents as potentially malicious and employ input sanitizing and loop detection on the tags they ingest.

7. Acknowledgments

This document draws heavily on the concepts defined in the ISO/IEC 19770-2:2015 specification. The authors of this document are grateful for the prior work of the 19770-2 contributors.

We are also grateful to the careful reviews provided by ...

8. Change Log

[THIS SECTION TO BE REMOVED BY THE RFC EDITOR.]

Changes from version 12 to version 14:

- * Moved key identifier to protected COSE header
- * Fixed index reference for hash
- * Removed indirection of CDDL type definition for filesystem-item
- * Fixed quantity of resource and process
- * Updated resource-collection
- * Renamed socket name in software-meta to be consistent in naming
- * Aligned excerpt examples in I-D text with full CDDL
- * Fixed titels where title was referring to group instead of map
- * Added missig date in SEMVER
- * Fixed root cardinality for file and directory, etc.
- * Transformed path-elements-entry from map to group for re-usability
- * Scrubbed IANA section
- * Removed redundant supplemental rule
- * Aligned discrepancy with ISO spec.
- * Addressed comments on typos.
- * Fixed kramdown nits and BCP reference.
- * Addressed comments from WGLC reviewers.

Changes in version 12:

- * Addressed a bunch of minor editorial issues based on WGLC feedback.
- * Added text about the use of UTF-8 in CoSWID.
- * Adjusted tag-id to allow for a UUID to be provided as a bstr.

- * Cleaned up descriptions of index ranges throughout the document, removing discussion of 8 bit, 16 bit, etc.
- * Adjusted discussion of private use ranges to use negative integer values and to be more clear throughout the document.
- * Added discussion around resolving overlapping value spaces for version schemes.
- * Added a set of expert review guidelines for new IANA registries created by this document.
- * Added new registrations for the "swid" and "swidpath" URI schemes, and for using CoSWID with SWIMA.

Changes from version 03 to version 11:

- * Reduced representation complexity of the media-entry type and removed the section describing the older data structure.
- * Added more signature schemes from COSE
- * Included a minimal required set of normative language
- * Reordering of attribute name to integer label by priority according to semantics.
- * Added an IANA registry for CoSWID items supporting future extension.
- * Cleaned up IANA registrations, fixing some inconsistencies in the table labels.
- * Added additional CDDL sockets for resource collection entries providing for additional extension points to address future SWID/CoSWID extensions.
- * Updated section on extension points to address new CDDL sockets and to reference the new IANA registry for items.
- * Removed unused references and added new references to address placeholder comments.
- * Added table with semantics for the link ownership item.
- * Clarified language, made term use more consistent, fixed references, and replacing lowercase RFC2119 keywords.

Changes from version 02 to version 03:

- * Updated core CDDL including the CDDL design pattern according to RFC 8428.

Changes from version 01 to version 02:

- * Enforced a more strict separation between the core CoSWID definition and additional usage by moving content to corresponding appendices.
- * Removed artifacts inherited from the reference schema provided by ISO (e.g. NMTOKEN(S))
- * Simplified the core data definition by removing group and type choices where possible
- * Minor reordering of map members
- * Added a first extension point to address requested flexibility for extensions beyond the any-element

Changes from version 00 to version 01:

- * Ambiguity between evidence and payload eliminated by introducing explicit members (while still allowing for "empty" SWID tags)
- * Added a relatively restrictive COSE envelope using cose_sign1 to define signed CoSWID (single signer only, at the moment)
- * Added a definition how to encode hashes that can be stored in the any-member using existing IANA tables to reference hash-algorithms

Changes since adopted as a WG I-D -00:

- * Removed redundant any-attributes originating from the ISO-19770-2:2015 XML schema definition
- * Fixed broken multi-map members
- * Introduced a more restrictive item (any-element-map) to represent custom maps, increased restriction on types for the any-attribute, accordingly
- * Fixed X.1520 reference

- * Minor type changes of some attributes (e.g. NMTOKENS)
- * Added semantic differentiation of various name types (e.g. fs-name)

Changes from version 06 to version 07:

- * Added type choices/enumerations based on textual definitions in 19770-2:2015
- * Added value registry request
- * Added media type registration request
- * Added content format registration request
- * Added CBOR tag registration request
- * Removed RIM appendix to be addressed in complementary draft
- * Removed CWT appendix
- * Flagged firmware resource collection appendix for revision
- * Made use of terminology more consistent
- * Better defined use of extension points in the CDDL
- * Added definitions for indexed values
- * Added IANA registry for Link use indexed values

Changes from version 05 to version 06:

- * Improved quantities
- * Included proposals for implicit enumerations that were NMTOKENS
- * Added extension points
- * Improved exemplary firmware-resource extension

Changes from version 04 to version 05:

- * Clarified language around SWID and CoSWID to make more consistent use of these terms.

- * Added language describing CBOR optimizations for single vs. arrays in the model front matter.
- * Fixed a number of grammatical, spelling, and wording issues.
- * Documented extension points that use CDDL sockets.
- * Converted IANA registration tables to markdown tables, reserving the 0 value for use when a value is not known.
- * Updated a number of references to their current versions.

Changes from version 03 to version 04:

- * Re-index label values in the CDDL.
- * Added a section describing the CoSWID model in detail.
- * Created IANA registries for entity-role and version-scheme

Changes from version 02 to version 03:

- * Updated CDDL to allow for a choice between a payload or evidence
- * Re-index label values in the CDDL.
- * Added item definitions
- * Updated references for COSE, CBOR Web Token, and CDDL.

Changes from version 01 to version 02:

- * Added extensions for Firmware and CoSWID use as Reference Integrity Measurements (CoSWID RIM)
- * Changes meta handling in CDDL from use of an explicit use of items to a more flexible unconstrained collection of items.
- * Added sections discussing use of COSE Signatures and CBOR Web Tokens

Changes from version 00 to version 01:

- * Added CWT usage for absolute SWID paths on a device
- * Fixed cardinality of type-choices including arrays
- * Included first iteration of firmware resource-collection

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Appendix A. Signed Concise SWID Tags using COSE

SWID tags, as defined in the ISO-19770-2:2015 XML schema, can include cryptographic signatures to protect the integrity of the SWID tag. In general, tags are signed by the tag creator (typically, although not exclusively, the vendor of the software component that the SWID tag identifies). Cryptographic signatures can make any modification of the tag detectable, which is especially important if the integrity of the tag is important, such as when the tag is providing reference integrity measurements for files.

The ISO-19770-2:2015 XML schema uses XML DSIG to support cryptographic signatures. CoSWID tags require a different signature scheme than this. COSE (CBOR Object Signing and Encryption) provides the required mechanism [RFC8152]. Concise SWID can be wrapped in a COSE Single Signer Data Object (COSE_Sign1) that contains a single signature. The following CDDL defines a more restrictive subset of header attributes allowed by COSE tailored to suit the requirements of Concise SWID tags.

```
<CODE BEGINS>
signed-coswid = #6.18(COSE-Sign1-coswid)

cose-label = int / tstr
cose-values = any

protected-signed-coswid-header = {
  1 => int,                ; algorithm identifier
  3 => "application/swid+cbor",
  4 => bstr,                ; key identifier
  * cose-label => cose-values,
}

unprotected-signed-coswid-header = {
  * cose-label => cose-values,
}

COSE-Sign1-coswid = [
  protected: bstr .cbor protected-signed-coswid-header,
  unprotected: unprotected-signed-coswid-header,
  payload: bstr .cbor concise-swid-tag,
  signature: bstr,
]
<CODE ENDS>
```

Optionally, the COSE_Sign structure that allows for more than one signature to be applied to a CoSWID tag MAY be used. The corresponding usage scenarios are domain-specific and require well-defined application guidance. Representation of the corresponding guidance is out-of-scope of this document.

Additionally, the COSE Header counter signature MAY be used as an attribute in the unprotected header map of the COSE envelope of a CoSWID. The application of counter signing enables second parties to provide a signature on a signature allowing for a proof that a signature existed at a given time (i.e., a timestamp).

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Endpoint Posture Collection Profile
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Abstract

This document specifies the Endpoint Posture Collection Profile, which describes the requirements for the application of IETF, TNC, and ISO/IEC data models, protocols, and interfaces to support the on-going collection and communication of endpoint posture to a centralized server where it can be stored and made available to other tools.

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1. Introduction

The Endpoint Posture Collection Profile (EPCP) describes the requirements for the collection and communication of posture information from network-connected endpoints to a centralized server leveraging prior work from the IETF NEA WG, the IETF NETCONF WG, IETF NETMOD WG, the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) Trusted Network Communications [TNC] Work Group, and the International Organization for Standardization/International Electrotechnical Commission Joint Technical Committee (JTC) 1, Subcommittee (SC) 7, WG 21 (ISO/IEC JTC 1, SC7, WG21).

This document focuses on reducing the security exposure of a network by enabling:

- o event-driven posture collection;
- o standardized querying of additional posture information as needed;
- o and the communication of that data to a centralized server where it can be made available to other components.

Thus, eliminating the need for multiple collection tools on an endpoint collecting the same data for different purposes. Future revisions of this document may include support for the collection of posture information from other endpoint types as well as a standardized interface for storing and querying data in repositories among other capabilities. Additional information about this future work can be found in Section 5 of this document.

To support the collection of posture information from new endpoint types, this document is organized such that it first provides a high-level overview of EPCP as well as the abstract components and transactions that will be realized by implementations (Section 2). This is followed by individual sections that discuss the requirements for specific implementations of the EPCP for a given endpoint type (e.g., traditional workstations and servers, network devices, mobile devices, etc.) along with any extensions for supported use cases (software asset management, vulnerability management, etc.). Over time, the requirements may be expanded to address issues that arise, support new capabilities, or support new implementations beyond IETF NEA and IETF NETCONF.

1.1. Conventions Used in This Document

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP14 [RFC2119][RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

This specification does not distinguish blocks of informative comments and normative requirements. Therefore, for the sake of clarity, note that lower case instances of must, should, etc. do not indicate normative requirements.

1.2. Terminology

This document uses terms as defined in [I-D.ietf-sacm-terminology] unless otherwise specified.

2. Endpoint Posture Collection Profile

The EPCP describes how IETF, TCG, and ISO/IEC data models, protocols, and interfaces can be used to support the posture assessment of endpoints on a network. This profile does not generate new data models, protocols, or interfaces; rather, it offers requirements for a full end-to-end solution for posture assessment, as well as a fresh perspective on how existing standards can be leveraged against vulnerabilities. Rationale for the EPCP solution as well as the supported and non-supported use cases is available in Appendix A and Appendix B respectively.

The EPCP makes it possible to perform posture assessments against all network-connected endpoints by:

1. uniquely identifying the endpoint;
2. collecting and evaluating posture based on data from the endpoint (asset management, software asset management, vulnerability management, and configuration management);
3. creating a secure, authenticated, confidential channel between the endpoint and the posture manager;
4. enabling the endpoint to notify the posture manager about changes to its configuration;
5. enabling the posture manager to request information about the configuration of the endpoint; and

6. storing the posture information in a repository linked to the identifier for the endpoint.

Furthermore, the EPCP aims to support data storage and data sharing capabilities to make the collected posture information available to authorized parties and components in support of other post-processes (analytic, access control, remediation, reporting, etc.).

2.1. Components

To support posture assessment, data storage, and data sharing capabilities, the EPCP defines several components. Some of these components reside on the target endpoint. Others reside on the posture manager that manages communications with the target endpoint and stores the target endpoint's posture information in a repository.

The primary focus of this document is on the communication between the posture manager and endpoints through the posture collection manager and posture collection engine components. While the orchestrator, evaluator, repository, and API will be discussed in the context of the EPCP, these components are for illustrative purposes only and are not strictly defined nor are requirements provided for them. As a result, vendors are free to implement these components and interfaces in a way that makes the most sense for their products.




Figure 1: EPCP Components

2.1.1. Endpoint

An endpoint is defined in [RFC6876]. In the EPCP, the endpoint is monitored by the enterprise and is the target of posture assessments. To support these posture assessments, posture information is collected via a posture collection engine.

2.1.1.1. Posture Collection Engine

The posture collection engine is located on the target endpoint and can either push data to the posture collection manager (see Section 2.2.3) or receive queries for data from the posture collection manager (see Section 2.2.4). The posture collection engine sends collected posture information to the posture manager where it can be sanity checked and stored in the repository. The posture collection engine also contains a capability that sets up exchanges between the target endpoint and posture manager. This capability makes the posture collection engine responsible for performing the client-side portion of encryption handshakes, and for locating authorized posture managers with which to communicate.

2.1.2. Posture Manager

The posture manager is an endpoint that collects and validates posture information received about a target endpoint. It also stores the posture information it receives in the repository where it can be retrieved and used in evaluations. The posture manager does not evaluate the posture information.

2.1.2.1. Posture Collection Manager

The posture collection manager is a lightweight and extensible component that facilitates the coordination and execution of posture collection requests using collection mechanisms deployed across the enterprise. The posture collection manager may query and retrieve guidance from the repository to guide the collection of posture information from the target endpoint.

The posture collection manager also contains a capability that sets up exchanges between the target endpoint and the posture manager, and manages data sent to and from the posture collection engine. It is also responsible for performing the server-side portion of encryption handshakes.

If the posture manager wants to register for the continuous collection of endpoint posture changes with the endpoint, then it must do so in a secure and scalable way. Specifically, it will need to create subscriptions with endpoints in a way which allows the posture data to be pushed. Effectively, this means that the target endpoint must be able to establish secure transport connectivity to the posture collection manager as needed, and the posture collection manager must be able to periodically collect the current state of the endpoint and assess its posture.

2.1.3. Repository

The repository hosts guidance, endpoint identification information, and posture information reported by target endpoints where it is made available to authorized components and persisted over a period of time set by the administrator. Information stored in the repository will be accessible to authorized parties via a standardized API. The repository may be a standalone component or may be located on the posture manager. Furthermore, an implementation is not restricted to a single repository and may leverage several repositories to provide this functionality.

2.1.4. Evaluator

The evaluator assesses the posture status of a target endpoint by comparing collected posture information against the desired state of the target endpoint specified in guidance. The evaluator queries and retrieves the appropriate guidance from the repository as well as queries and retrieves the posture information required for the assessment from the repository. If the required posture information is not available in the repository, the evaluator may request the posture information from the posture collection manager, which will result in the collection of additional posture information from the target endpoint. This information is subsequently stored in the repository where it is made available to the evaluator and other components. The results of the assessment are stored in the repository where they are available to tools and administrators for post-processes including follow-up actions, further evaluation, and historical purposes. The evaluator may also be triggered by events on an endpoint or the network.

2.1.5. Orchestrator

The orchestrator provides a publish/subscribe interface for the repository so that infrastructure endpoints can subscribe to and receive published posture assessment results from the repository regarding endpoint posture changes.

2.1.6. Application Programming Interface

The API allows authorized users, infrastructure endpoints, and software to query the repository as well as manage endpoints and other components used in EPCP via the posture manager.

2.2. Transactions

The following sections describe the transactions associated with EPCP components and may be provided in an implementation. The transactions span the deployment of an endpoint, integration into the EPCP, data collection, and the storage and dissemination of that information for different use cases.

2.2.1. Provisioning

An endpoint is provisioned with one or more attributes that will serve as its unique identifier on the network as well as the components (e.g., posture collection engine, etc.) and data models (e.g., SWID) necessary to interact with the posture manager. Examples of such attributes include serial numbers, hardware certificates compliant with [IEEE-802-1ar], and the identities of hardware cryptographic modules among others. An endpoint should also have a MAC address which should change over time. Once provisioning is complete, the endpoint is deployed on the network. Over time, components and data models may need to be added to the endpoint or updated to support the collection needs of an enterprise.

2.2.2. Discovery and Validation

If necessary, the target endpoint finds and validates the posture manager. The posture collection engine on the target endpoint and posture collection manager on the posture manager complete an encryption handshake, during which endpoint identity information is exchanged.

2.2.3. Event-Driven Collection

The posture assessment is initiated when the posture collector engine on the target endpoint notices that relevant posture information on the endpoint has changed. Then, the posture collection engine initiates a posture assessment information exchange with the posture collection manager.

2.2.4. Querying the Endpoint

The posture assessment is initiated by the posture collection manager. This can occur because:

1. policy states that a previous assessment has become invalid, or
2. the posture collection manager is triggered by a sensor or an administrator (via the posture manager's API) that an assessment must be completed.

2.2.5. Data Storage

Once posture information is received by the posture manager, it is forwarded to the repository. The repository could be co-located with the posture manager, or standalone where the repository and posture manager directly communicate with each other or the communication is brokered through the orchestrator. The posture information is stored in the repository along with past posture information collected about the target endpoint.

2.2.6. Data Sharing

Because the target endpoint posture information was sent in standards-based data models over secure, standardized protocols, and then stored in a centralized repository linked to unique endpoint identifiers, authorized parties are able to access the posture information. Such authorized parties may include, but are not limited to, administrators or endpoint owners (via the posture manager's API), evaluators that access the repository directly, and orchestrators that rely on publish/subscribe communications with the repository.

3. IETF NEA EPCP Implementation for Traditional Endpoints

When EPCP is used, posture collectors running on the target endpoint gather posture information as changes occur on the endpoint. The posture information is aggregated by the posture broker client and forwarded to a posture manager, over a secure channel, via the posture transport client. Once received by the posture transport server on the posture manager, the posture information is directed by the posture broker server to the appropriate posture validators where it can be processed and stored in a repository. There the posture information can be used to carry out assessments or other post-processing tasks. Posture collectors can also be queried by posture validators to refresh posture information about the target endpoint or to ask a specific question about posture information. This is shown in Figure 2.




Figure 2: NEA Components

These requirements are written with a view to performing a posture assessment on an endpoint and refer to defined components of the NEA architecture [RFC5209] as well as the IF-IMV [IF-IMV] and IF-IMC [IF-IMC] interfaces defined in the Trusted Computing Group's TNC Work Group. As with the NEA architecture, vendors have discretion as to how these NEA components map to separate pieces of software or endpoints.

It should be noted that the posture broker client and posture transport client components of the posture collection engine and the posture broker server and posture transport server components of the posture collection manager would likely need to be implemented by a single vendor because there are no standardized interfaces between the respective components and would not be interoperable.

Examples of the EPCP as implemented using the components from the NEA architecture are provided in Appendix C.

3.1. Endpoint Provisioning

An endpoint SHOULD be provisioned with a machine certificate that will serve as its unique identifier on the network as well as the components necessary to interact with the posture manager. This includes a posture collection engine to manage requests from the posture manager and the posture collectors necessary to collect the posture information of importance to the enterprise. The endpoint is deployed on the network.

The target endpoint SHOULD authenticate to the posture manager using a machine certificate during the establishment of the outer tunnel achieved with the posture transport protocol defined in [RFC6876]. [IF-IMV] specifies how to pull an endpoint identifier out of a machine certificate. An endpoint identifier SHOULD be created in conformance with [IF-IMV] from a machine certificate sent via [RFC6876].

Other authenticators are possible. The target endpoint MAY authenticate to the posture manager using a combination of the machine account and password; however, this is less secure and not recommended. A more secure approach would leverage a hardware certificate compliant with [IEEE-802-1ar]; this identifier SHOULD be associated with the identity of a hardware cryptographic module, in accordance with [IEEE-802-1ar], if present on the endpoint. The enterprise SHOULD establish a certificate root authority; install its root certificate on endpoints and on the posture manager; and provision the endpoints and the posture manager with machine certificates.

3.2. Endpoint

The endpoint MUST conform to [RFC5793], which levies several requirements against the endpoint. An endpoint that complies with these requirements will be able to:

1. attempt to initiate a session with the posture manager if the posture makes a request to send an update to the posture manager;
2. notify the posture collector if no PT-TLS session with the posture manager can be created;
3. notify the posture collector when a PT-TLS session is established; and
4. receive information from the posture collectors, forward this information to the posture manager via the posture collection engine.

3.2.1. Posture Collector

Any posture collector used in an EPCP solution MUST be conformant with the TCG TNC Integrity Measurement Collector interface [IF-IMC].

3.2.2. Posture Broker Client

The posture broker client MUST conform to [IF-IMC] to enable communications between the posture broker client and the posture collectors on the endpoint.

3.2.3. Posture Transport Client

The posture transport client MUST implement PT-TLS.

The posture transport client MUST support the use of machine certificates for TLS at each endpoint consistent with the requirements stipulated in [RFC6876] and [Server-Discovery].

The posture transport client MUST be able to locate an authorized posture manager, and switch to a new posture manager when required by the network, in conformance with [Server-Discovery].

3.3. Posture Manager

The posture manager MUST conform to all requirements in [RFC5793].

3.3.1. Posture Validator

Any posture validator used in an EPCP solution MUST be conformant with the TCG TNC Integrity Measurement Verifier interface [IF-IMV].

3.3.2. Posture Broker Server

The posture broker server MUST conform to [IF-IMV]. Conformance to [IF-IMV] enables the posture broker server to obtain endpoint identity information from the posture transport server, and pass this information to any posture validators on the posture manager.

3.3.3. Posture Transport Server

The posture transport server MUST implement PT-TLS.

The posture transport server MUST support the use of machine certificates for TLS at each endpoint consistent with the requirements stipulated in [RFC6876] and [Server-Discovery].

3.4. Repository

EPCP requires a simple interface for the repository. Posture validators on the posture manager receive the target endpoint posture information via PA-TNC [RFC5792] messages sent from corresponding posture collectors on the target endpoint. The posture validators store this information in the repository linked to the identity of the target endpoint where the posture collectors are located.

3.5. IETF SACM Software Asset Management Extension to the IETF NEA EPCP Implementation

This section defines the requirements associated with the Software Inventory Message and Attributes (SWIMA) extension for PA-TNC [RFC8412] in support of the software asset management use case with the IETF NEA EPCP implementation.

3.5.1. Endpoint Pre-Provisioning

The following requirements assume that the platform or OS vendor supports the use of [SWID] and/or [I-D.ietf-sacm-coswid] tags and the standard directory locations for the SWID and CoSWID tags as specified by the [SWID] specification.

3.5.2. SWID Tags

The primary content for the EPCP is the information conveyed in the elements of a SWID or CoSWID tag. The SWID specification defines an XML-based software identification tag and the CoSWID specification defines a Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) that is compatible with the SWID specification. CoSWID tags require significantly less memory and bandwidth to store and transmit as compared to the traditional XML-based SWID tags.

For readability, since CoSWID is a concise representation of SWID, only SWID is used throughout the remainder of this document although CoSWID may be used in addition to, or in place of, SWID.

The endpoint MUST have SWID tags stored in a directory specified in [SWID]. The tags SHOULD be provided by the software vendor; they MAY also be generated by:

- o the software installer; or
- o third-party software that creates tags based on the applications it sees installed on the endpoint.

The elements in the SWID tag MUST be populated as specified in [SWID]. These tags, and the directory in which they are stored, MUST be updated as software is added, removed, or updated.

3.5.3. SWID Posture Collectors and Posture Validators

The following sections outline the requirements for SWID Posture Collectors and Posture Validators.

3.5.3.1. The SWID Posture Collector

For the EPCP, the SWID posture collector MUST be conformant with [RFC8412], which includes requirements for:

1. Collecting SWID tags from the SWID directory;
2. Monitoring the SWID directory for changes;
3. Initiating a session with the posture manager to report changes to the directory;
4. Maintaining a list of changes to the SWID directory when updates take place and no PT-TLS connection can be created with the posture manager;
5. Responding to a request for SWID tags from the SWID Posture Validator on the posture manager; and
6. Responding to a query from the SWID posture validator as to whether all updates have been sent.

The SWID posture collector is not responsible for detecting that the SWID directory was not updated when an application was either installed or uninstalled.

3.5.3.2. The SWID Posture Validator

Conformance to [RFC8412] enables the SWID posture validator to:

1. Send messages to the SWID posture collector (at the behest of the administrator at the posture manager console) requesting updates for SWID tags located on endpoint;
2. Ask the SWID posture collector whether all updates to the SWID directory located at the posture manager have been sent; and
3. Perform any validation and processing on the collected SWID posture information prior to storage.

In addition to these requirements, a SWID posture validator used in conformance with this profile MUST be capable of passing this SWID posture information as well as the associated endpoint identity to the repository for storage.

3.5.4. Repository

The interface SHOULD enable an administrator to:

1. Query which endpoints have reported SWID tags for a particular application
2. Query which SWID tags are installed on an endpoint; and
3. Query tags based on characteristics, such as vendor, publisher, etc.

4. IETF NETCONF EPCP Implementation for Network Device Endpoints

When EPCP is used, a NETCONF client that implements the posture collection manager sends a query to target network device endpoint requesting posture information over a secure channel. Once the NETCONF server on the endpoint receives the request, it queries one or more datastores for the posture information. The NETCONF server then reports the information back to the NETCONF client where it can be stored in a repository for use by other tools. This is shown in Figure 3.




Figure 3: NETCONF Components

These requirements are written with a view to performing a posture assessment on network device endpoints (routers, switches, etc.) and refer to defined components of the NETCONF architecture and map back to EPCP. As with the NETCONF architecture, vendors have discretion as to how these NETCONF components map to separate pieces of software or endpoints.

4.1. Endpoint Provisioning

For the posture manager to be able to query the datastores on the endpoint, the endpoint **MUST** be configured to grant the posture manager access to its datastores as described in [RFC6241]. The posture manager is identified by its NETCONF username. The endpoint is deployed on the network.

4.2. Posture Manager Provisioning

For the posture manager to be able to query the datastores on the endpoint, the posture manager **MUST** be provisioned with a NETCONF username that will be used to authenticate the posture manager to the endpoint as described in [RFC6241]. The username generated will be determined by the selected transport protocol. The posture manager is deployed on the network.

4.3. Endpoint

An endpoint **MUST** conform to the requirements outlined for servers in the NETCONF protocol as defined in [RFC6241]. This requires the implementation of NETCONF over SSH [RFC6242]. An endpoint **MAY** support the NETCONF protocol over other transports such as TLS [RFC7589] as well as the RESTCONF protocol as defined in [RFC8040].

4.3.1. Datastore

A NETCONF datastore on an endpoint **MUST** support the operations outlined in [RFC6241], but, the actual implementation of the datastore is left to the endpoint vendor.

Datastores **MUST** support the YANG data modeling language [RFC7950] for expressing endpoint posture information in a structured format. In addition, datastores **MAY** support other data models such as XML (via YIN) for representing posture information.

Datastores **MUST** support the compliance posture information specified in [RFC7317]. Datastores **MAY** support other models standardized or proprietary as deemed appropriate by the endpoint vendor.

4.4. Posture Manager

A posture manager MUST conform to the requirements specified for clients in the NETCONF protocol as defined in [RFC6241]. This requires the implementation of NETCONF over SSH [RFC6242]. A posture manager MAY also support the NETCONF protocol over other transports such as TLS [RFC7589]. In addition, a posture manager MAY support the RESTCONF protocol as defined in [RFC8040].

4.5. Repository

EPCP requires a simple interface for the repository. The posture collection manager on the posture manager receives the target endpoint posture information via NETCONF [RFC6241] messages sent from posture collection engine on the target endpoint. The posture collection manager stores this information in the repository linked to the identity of the target endpoint from which it was collected.

5. Future Work

This section captures ideas for future work related to EPCP that might be of interest to the IETF SACM WG. These ideas are listed in no particular order.

- o [RFC8639], [RFC8640], and [RFC8641] could be leveraged for an HTTP-based subscription for EPCP. Specifically, it could be used for the posture collection manager to continuously receive posture changes as they happen from the posture collection engine. At this point, it seems like [I-D.ietf-netconf-restconf-notif] would be a good match to these requirements. However, further investigation into the applicability of supporting a RESTCONF server capability to handle subscription requests needs to be made. Specific questions which should be examined include:
 - * Number of endpoints which can be continuously tracked by a single posture collection manager. Scalability questions to be considered include elements from the number of transport connections maintained as well as the volume and churn of posture evidence which will be continuously pushed to the posture collection manager.
 - * Ability of the posture collection manager to establish and maintain a continuous state of endpoint posture during failures. This includes failures/reboots on either side of the interface.
 - * Ability to support the full set of functions described for NETCONF within Section 4.

- o Add support endpoint types beyond workstations, servers, and network infrastructure devices.
- o Examine the integration of [I-D.ietf-mile-xmpp-grid].
- o Define a standard interface and API for interacting with the repository. Requirements to consider include: creating a secure channel between a publisher and the repository, creating a secure channel between a subscriber and the repository, and the types of interactions that must be supported between publishers and subscribers to a repository.
- o Define a standard interface for communications between the posture broker client and posture transport client(s) as well as the posture broker server and posture transport server(s).
- o Retention of posture information on the target endpoint.
- o Define an orchestrator component as well as publish/subscribe interface for it.
- o Define an evaluator component as well as an interface for it.
- o Reassess the use of MAC addresses as a device identifier among network tools, based on technical research into current security best practices in IoT, automotive, mobile, and other privacy-sensitive market domains.

6. Contributors

The authors wish to thank all of those in the TCG TNC work group who contributed to development of the TNC ECP specification [ECP] upon which this document is based.

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7. IANA Considerations

This document does not define any new IANA registries. However, this document does reference other documents that do define IANA registries. As a result, the IANA Considerations section of the referenced documents should be consulted.

8. Security Considerations

This Security Considerations section includes an analysis of the attacks that may be mounted against systems that implement the EPCP (Section 8.1) and the countermeasures that may be used to prevent or mitigate these attacks (Section 8.2). Overall, a substantial reduction in cyber risk can be achieved.

8.1. Threat Model

This section lists the attacks that can be mounted on a NEA implementation of an EPCP environment. The following section (Section 8.2) describes countermeasures.

Because the EPCP describes a specific use case for NEA components, many security considerations for these components are addressed in more detail in the technical specifications: [RFC8412], [IF-IMC], [RFC5793], [Server-Discovery], [RFC6876], [IF-IMV].

8.1.1. Endpoint Attacks

While the EPCP provides substantial improvements in endpoint security, endpoints can still be compromised. For this reason, all parties must regard data coming from endpoints as potentially unreliable or even malicious. An analogy can be drawn with human testimony in an investigation or trial. Human testimony is essential but must be regarded with suspicion.

- o Compromise of endpoint: A compromised endpoint may report false information to confuse or even provide maliciously crafted information with a goal of infecting others.
- o Putting bad information in SWID directory: Even if an endpoint is not completely compromised, some of the software running on it may be unreliable or even malicious. This software, potentially including the SWID generation or discovery tool, or malicious software pretending to be a SWID generation or discovery tool, can place incorrect or maliciously crafted information into the SWID directory. Endpoint users may even place such information in the directory, whether motivated by curiosity or confusion or a desire to bypass restrictions on their use of the endpoint.
- o Identity spoofing (impersonation): A compromised endpoint may attempt to impersonate another endpoint to gain its privileges or to besmirch the reputation of that other endpoint. This is of particular concern when using MAC addresses to identify endpoints, which while widely used in endpoint behavior monitoring and threat assessment tools, are easy to spoof.

8.1.2. Network Attacks

Generally, the network cannot be trusted. A variety of attacks can be mounted using the network, including:

- o Eavesdropping, modification, injection, replay, deletion;
- o Traffic analysis; and
- o Denial of service and blocking traffic.

8.1.3. Posture Manager Attacks

The posture manager is a critical security element and therefore merits considerable scrutiny. A variety of attacks can be leveraged against the Posture Manager.

- o Compromised trusted posture manager: A compromised posture manager or a malicious party that is able to impersonate a posture manager can incorrectly grant or deny access to endpoints, place incorrect information into the repository, or send malicious messages to endpoints.
- o Misconfiguration of posture manager: Accidental or purposeful misconfiguration of a trusted posture manager can cause effects that are similar to those listed for "Compromised trusted posture manager".
- o Malicious untrusted posture manager: An untrusted posture manager cannot mount any significant attacks because all properly implemented endpoints will refuse to engage in any meaningful dialog with such a posture manager.

8.1.4. Repository Attacks

The repository is also an important security element and therefore merits careful scrutiny.

- o Putting bad information into trusted repository: An authorized repository client such as a server may be able to put incorrect information into a trusted repository or delete or modify historical information, causing incorrect decisions about endpoint security. Placing maliciously crafted data in the repository could even lead to the compromise of repository clients, if they fail to carefully check such data.
- o Compromised trusted repository: A compromised trusted repository or a malicious untrusted repository that is able to impersonate a

trusted repository can lead to effects similar to those listed for "Putting bad information into trusted repository". Further, a compromised trusted repository can report different results to different repository clients or deny access to the repository for selected repository clients.

- o Misconfiguration of trusted repository: Accidental or purposeful misconfiguration of a trusted repository can deny access to the repository or result in loss of historical data.
- o Malicious untrusted repository: An untrusted repository cannot mount any significant attacks because all properly implemented repository clients will refuse to engage in any meaningful dialog with such a repository.

8.2. Countermeasures

This section lists the countermeasures that can be used in a NEA implementation of an EPCP environment.

8.2.1. Countermeasures for Endpoint Attacks

This profile is in and of itself a countermeasure for a compromised endpoint. A primary defense for an endpoint is to run up to date software configured to be run as safely as possible.

Ensuring that anti-virus signatures are up to date and that a firewall is configured are also protections for an endpoint that are supported by the current NEA specifications.

For secure device identification and to correlate device identifiers if the MAC address is randomized, MAC addresses should be collected along with other, more secure endpoint identifiers. Endpoints that have hardware cryptographic modules that are provisioned by the enterprise, in accordance with [IEEE-802-1ar], can protect the private keys used for authentication and help prevent adversaries from stealing credentials that can be used for impersonation. Future versions of the EPCP may want to discuss in greater detail how to use a hardware cryptographic module, in accordance with [IEEE-802-1ar], to protect credentials and to protect the integrity of the code that executes during the bootstrap process by hashing or recording indicators of compromise.

8.2.2. Countermeasures for Network Attacks

To address network attacks, [RFC6876] includes required encryption, authentication, integrity protection, and replay protection. [Server-Discovery] also includes authorization checks to ensure that

only authorized servers are trusted by endpoints. Any unspecified or not yet specified network protocols employed in the EPCP (e.g., the protocol used to interface with the repository) should include similar protections.

These protections reduce the scope of the network threat to traffic analysis and denial of service. Countermeasures for traffic analysis (e.g., masking) are usually impractical but may be employed. Countermeasures for denial of service (e.g., detecting and blocking particular sources) SHOULD be used when appropriate to detect and block denial of service attacks. These are routine practices in network security.

8.2.3. Countermeasures for Posture Manager Attacks

Because of the serious consequences of posture manager compromise, posture managers SHOULD be especially well-hardened against attack and minimized to reduce their attack surface. They SHOULD be monitored using the NEA protocols to ensure the integrity of the behavior and analysis data stored on the posture manager and SHOULD utilize an [IEEE-802-1ar]-compliant hardware cryptographic module for identity and/or integrity measurements of the posture manager. They should be well-managed to minimize vulnerabilities in the underlying platform and in systems upon which the posture manager depends. Network security measures such as firewalls or intrusion detection systems may be used to monitor and limit traffic to and from the posture manager. Personnel with administrative access to the posture manager should be carefully screened and monitored to detect problems as soon as possible. Posture manager administrators should not use password-based authentication but should instead use non-reusable credentials and multi-factor authentication (where available). Physical security measures should be employed to prevent physical attacks on posture managers.

To ease detection of posture manager compromise, should it occur, posture manager behavior should be monitored to detect unusual behavior (such as a server reboot, unusual traffic patterns, or other odd behavior). Endpoints should log and/or notify users and/or administrators when peculiar posture manager behavior is detected. To aid forensic investigation, permanent read-only audit logs of security-relevant information pertaining to posture manager (especially administrative actions) should be maintained. If posture manager compromise is detected, the posture manager's certificate should be revoked and careful analysis should be performed of the source and impact of this compromise. Any reusable credentials that may have been compromised should be reissued.

Endpoints can reduce the threat of server compromise by minimizing the number of trusted posture managers, using the mechanisms described in [Server-Discovery].

8.2.4. Countermeasures for Repository Attacks

If the host for the repository is located on its own endpoint, it should be protected with the same measures taken to protect the posture manager. In this circumstance, all messages between the posture manager and repository should be protected with a mature security protocol such as TLS or IPsec.

The repository can aid in the detection of compromised endpoints if an adversary cannot tamper with its contents. For instance, if an endpoint reports that it does not have an application with a known vulnerability installed, an administrator can check whether the endpoint might be lying by querying the repository for the history of what applications were installed on the endpoint.

To help prevent tampering with the information in the repository:

1. Only authorized parties should have privilege to run code on the endpoint and to change the repository.
2. If a separate endpoint hosts the repository, then the functionality of that endpoint should be limited to hosting the repository. The firewall on the repository should only allow access to the posture manager and to any endpoint authorized for administration.
3. The repository should ideally use "write-once" media to archive the history of what was placed in the repository, to include a snapshot of the current status of applications on endpoints.

9. Privacy Considerations

The EPCP specifically addresses the collection of posture data from enterprise endpoints by an enterprise network. As such, privacy is a fundamental concern for those deploying this EPCP solution, given EU GDPR, California CCPA, and many other privacy regulations. The enterprise SHOULD implement and enforce their duty of care.

A possible exception may be the concerns a user may have when attempting to connect a personal endpoint (such as a phone or mobile endpoint) to an enterprise network. The user may not want to share certain details, such as an endpoint identifier or SWID tags, with the enterprise. The user can configure their NEA client to reject requests for this information; however, it is possible that the

enterprise policy will not allow the user's endpoint to connect to the network without providing the requested data.

An enterprise network SHOULD limit access to endpoint posture and identification information to authorized users and SHOULD enforce policies that prevent the export of endpoint posture metadata to unauthorized third parties.

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Appendix A. Rationale for an EPCP Solution

A.1. Preventative Posture Assessments

The value of continuous endpoint posture assessment is well established. Security experts have identified asset management and vulnerability remediation as a critical step for preventing intrusions. Application whitelisting, patching applications and operating systems, and using the latest versions of applications top the Defense Signals Directorate's "Top 4 Mitigations to Protect Your ICT System". [DSD] "Inventory of Authorized and Unauthorized Endpoints", "Inventory of Authorized and Unauthorized Software", and "Continuous Vulnerability Assessment and Remediation" are Controls 1, 2, and 3, respectively, of the CIS Controls [CIS]. While there are commercially available solutions that attempt to address these security controls, these solutions do not:

- o run on all types of endpoints;
- o consistently interoperate with other tools that could make use of the data collected;
- o collect posture information from all types of endpoints in a consistent, standardized schema;
- o require vetted, standardized protocols that have been evaluated by the international community for cryptographic soundness.

As is true of most solutions offered today, the solution found in the EPCP does not attempt to solve the lying endpoint problem, or detect infected endpoints; rather, it focuses on ensuring that healthy endpoints remain healthy by keeping software up-to-date and patched.

A.2. All Network-Connected Endpoints are Endpoints

As defined by [I-D.ietf-sacm-terminology], an endpoint is any physical or virtual computing endpoint that can be connected to a network. Posture assessment against policy is equally, if not more, important for continuously-connected endpoints, such as enterprise workstations and infrastructure endpoints, as it is for sporadically connected endpoints. Continuously-connected endpoints are just as likely to fall out of compliance with policy, and a standardized posture assessment method is necessary to ensure they can be properly handled.

A.3. All Endpoints on the Network Must be Uniquely Identified

Many administrators struggle to identify what endpoints are connected to the network at any given time. By requiring a standardized method of endpoint identity, the EPCP will enable administrators to answer the basic question, "What is on my network?" In [I-D.ietf-sacm-terminology], SACM defines this set of endpoints on the network as the SACM domain. Unique endpoint identification also enables the comparison of current and past endpoint posture assessments, by allowing administrators to correlate assessments from the same endpoint. This makes it easier to flag suspicious changes in endpoint posture for manual or automatic review, and helps to swiftly identify malicious changes to endpoint applications.

A.4. Standardized Data Models

EPCP requirements prescribe the use of standardized data models for the exchange of posture information. This helps to ensure that the posture information sent from endpoints to the repository can be easily stored, due to their known format, and shared with authorized endpoints and users.

Posture information must be sent over standardized protocols to ensure the confidentiality and authenticity of this data while in transit. Implementations of the EPCP include [RFC6876] and [RFC6241] for communication between the target endpoint and the posture manager. These protocols allow networks that implement this solution to collect large amounts of posture information from an endpoint to make decisions about that endpoint's compliance with some policy. The EPCP offers a solution for all endpoints already connected to the network. Periodic assessments and automated reporting of changes to endpoint posture allow for instantaneous identification of connected endpoints that are no longer compliant with some policy.

A.5. Posture Information Must Be Stored

Posture information must be stored by the repository and must be exposed to an interface at the posture manager. Standardized data models enable standardized queries from an interface exposed to an administrator at the posture manager. A repository must retain any current posture information retrieved from the target endpoint and store it indexed by the unique identifier for the endpoint. Any posture collection manager specified by this profile must be able to ascertain from its corresponding posture collection engine whether the posture information is up to date. An interface on the posture manager must support a request to obtain up-to-date information when an endpoint is connected. This interface must also support the ability to make a standard set of queries about the posture

information stored by the repository. In the future, some forms of posture information might be retained at the endpoint. The interface on the posture manager must accommodate the ability to make a request to the corresponding posture collection engine about the posture of the target endpoint. Standardized data models and protocols also enable the security of posture assessment results. By storing these results indexed under the endpoint's unique identifier, secure storage itself enables endpoint posture information correlation, and ensures that the enterprise's repositories always offer the freshest, most up-to-date view of the enterprise's endpoint posture information possible.

A.6. Posture Information Can Be Shared

By exposing posture information using a standardized interface and API, other security and operational components have a high level of insight into the enterprise's endpoints and the software installed on them. This will support innovation in the areas of asset management, vulnerability scanning, and interfaces, as any authorized infrastructure endpoint can interact with the posture information.

A.7. Enterprise Asset Posture Information Belongs to the Enterprise

Owners and administrators must have complete control of posture information, policy, and endpoint mitigation. Standardized data models, protocols and interfaces help to ensure that this posture information is not locked in proprietary databases, but is made available to its owners. This enables administrators to develop as nuanced a policy as necessary to keep their networks secure. Of course, there may be exceptions to this such as the case with privacy-related information (e.g., personally identifiable information).

Appendix B. EPCP Supported Use Cases and Non-Supported Use Cases

B.1. Supported Use Cases

The following sections describe the different use cases supported by the EPCP.

B.1.1. Hardware Asset Management

Using the API on the posture manager, an authorized user can learn:

- o what endpoints are connected to the network at any given time; and
- o what SWID tags were reported for the endpoints.

The ability to answer these questions offers a standards-based approach to asset management, which is a vital part of enterprise processes such as compliance report generation for the Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA), Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS), Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), etc.

B.1.2. Software Asset Management

The API on the posture manager provides the ability for authorized users and infrastructure to know which software is installed on which endpoints on the enterprise's network. This allows the enterprise to answer questions about what software is installed to determine if it is licensed or prohibited. This information can also drive other use cases such as:

- o vulnerability management: knowing what software is installed supports the ability to determine which endpoints contain vulnerable software and need to be patched.
- o configuration management: knowing which security controls need to be applied to harden installed software and better protect endpoints.

B.1.3. Vulnerability Management

The API also provides the ability for authorized users or infrastructure to locate endpoints running software for which vulnerabilities have been announced. Because of

1. the unique IDs assigned to each endpoint; and
2. the rich application data provided in the endpoints' posture information,

the repository can be queried to find all endpoints running a vulnerable application. Endpoints suspected of being vulnerable can be addressed by the administrator or flagged for further scrutiny.

B.1.4. Threat Detection and Analysis

The repository's standardized API allows authorized infrastructure endpoints and software to search endpoint posture assessment information for evidence that an endpoint's software inventory has changed, and can make endpoint software inventory data available to other endpoints. This automates security data sharing in a way that expedites the correlation of relevant network data, allowing administrators and infrastructure endpoints to identify odd endpoint

behavior and configuration using secure, standardized data models and protocols.

B.2. Non-Supported Use Cases

Several use cases, including but not limited to these, are not covered by the EPCP:

- o Gathering non-standardized types of posture information: The EPCP does not prevent administrators from collecting posture information in proprietary formats from the endpoint; however, it does not set requirements for doing so.
- o Solving the lying endpoint problem: The EPCP does not address the lying endpoint problem; the profile makes no assertions that it can catch an endpoint that is, either maliciously or accidentally, reporting false posture information to the posture manager. However, other solutions may be able to use the posture information collected using the capabilities described in this profile to catch an endpoint in a lie. For example, a sensor may be able to compare the posture information it has collected on an endpoint's activity on the network to what the endpoint reported to the posture manager and flag discrepancies. However, these capabilities are not described in this profile.

Appendix C. Endpoint Posture Collection Profile Examples

The following subsections provide examples of the EPCP as implemented using components from the NEA architecture.

C.1. Continuous Posture Assessment of an Endpoint




Figure 4: Continuous Posture Assessment of an Endpoint

C.1.1. Change on Endpoint Triggers Posture Assessment

A new application is installed on the endpoint, and the SWID directory is updated. This triggers an update from the SWID posture collector to the SWID posture validator. The message is sent down the NEA stack, encapsulated by NEA protocols until it is sent by the posture transport client to the posture transport server. The posture transport server then forwards it up through the stack, where the layers of encapsulation are removed until the SWID message arrives at the SWID posture validator.




Figure 5: Compliance Protocol Encapsulation

The SWID posture validator stores the new tag information in the repository. If the tag indicates that the endpoint is compliant with the policy, then the process is complete until the next time an update is needed (either because policy states that the endpoint must submit posture assessment results periodically or because an install/uninstall/update event on the endpoint triggers a posture assessment).




Figure 6: Storing SWIDs in the Repository

If the endpoint has fallen out of compliance with a policy, the posture manager can alert the administrator via the posture manager's API. The administrator can then take steps to address the problem. If the administrator has already established a policy for automatically addressing this problem, that policy will be followed.




Figure 7: Server Alerts Network Admin

C.2. Administrator Searches for Vulnerable Endpoints

An announcement is made that a particular version of a piece of software has a vulnerability. The administrator uses the API on the posture manager to search the repository for endpoints that reported the SWID tag for the vulnerable software.




Figure 8: Admin Searches for Vulnerable Endpoints

The repository returns a list of entries matching the administrator's search. The administrator can then address the vulnerable endpoints by taking some follow-up action such as removing it from the network, quarantining it, or updating the vulnerable software.

Appendix D. Change Log

D.1. -00 to -01

Changed the status of the draft from "Best Current Practices" to "Standards Track".

D.2. -05 to -00

Changed the title of the draft to draft-ietf-sacm-epcp.

Updated the diagram so the Endpoint and Posture Manager are the primary focus of EPCP.

Added a reference to CoSWID in the Software Asset Management extension of the IETF NEA EPCP implementation.

Further clarified the use of MAC addresses in EPCP.

Included a requirement in the Privacy Considerations that the enterprise should exercise due diligence with respect to the privacy of certain data given privacy regulations.

Added a requirement around an endpoint being provisioned with a machine certificate.

Clarified that other protocols and interfaces may be supported beyond IETF NEA and NETCONF.

Made various typographical and editorial changes.

D.3. -04 to -05

Updated the diagram so the Evaluator and Repository are "current work".

Clarified how the Posture Collection Engine can push data, respond to queries, and establish secure transport connectivity for fulfilling subscriptions.

Expanded on the future work around leveraging NETCONF, RESTCONF, and YANG Push for network devices.

Documented the need to reassess MAC addresses as a device identifier.

Made various typographical and editorial changes.

D.4. -03 to -04

Addressed various comments from the SACM WG.

Refactored the document to better focus it on the communications between endpoints and the posture manager and the best practices for EPCP implementations.

Made other editorial changes and improved consistency throughout the document.

D.5. -02 to -03

Addressed various comments from the SACM WG.

Added a reference to TCG ECP 1.0.

Removed text in the "SWID Posture Validator" section that states it performs evaluation. This was removed because it contradicts the posture manager not performing any evaluations.

Expanded the "Provisioning" section of the "EPCP Transactions" section to include examples of endpoint identifiers and the need to provision endpoints with components and data models.

Combined text for the capabilities of the Administrative Interface and API.

Removed superfluous and introductory text from the "Security Considerations" section.

Renamed section "Vulnerability Searches" to Vulnerability Management".

Changed I-D category to BCP.

Changed references to the NETMOD architecture to the NETCONF architecture because NETCONF represents the management protocol whereas NETMOD is focused on the definition of data models.

Addressed various editorial suggestions.

D.6. -01 to -02

Addressed various comments from the SACM WG.

Added a section for the collection of posture information from network devices using standards from the NETMOD WG.

Updated EPCP component diagrams so they were not specific to a NEA-based implementation.

Updated EPCP NEA example diagrams to reflect all the components in the NEA architecture.

D.7. -00 to -01

There are no textual changes associated with this revision. This revision simply reflects a resubmission of the document so that it remains in active status.

D.8. -01 to -02

Added references to the Software Inventory Message and Attributes (SWIMA) for PA-TNC I-D.

Replaced references to PC-TNC with IF-IMC.

Removed erroneous hyphens from a couple of section titles.

Made a few minor editorial changes.

D.9. -02 to -00

Draft adopted by IETF SACM WG.

D.10. -00 to -01

Significant edits to up-level the draft to describe SACM collection over multiple different protocols.

Replaced references to SANS with CIS.

Made other minor editorial changes.

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Definition of the ROLIE configuration checklist Extension
draft-mandm-sacm-rolie-configuration-checklist-02

Abstract

This document extends the Resource-Oriented Lightweight Information Exchange (ROLIE) core to add the information type categories and related requirements needed to support security configuration checklist use cases. Additional categories, properties, and requirements based on content type enables a higher level of interoperability between ROLIE implementations, and richer metadata for ROLIE consumers. Additionally, this document discusses requirements and usage of other ROLIE elements in order to best syndicate security configuration checklists.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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1. Introduction

Default configurations for endpoints (operating systems, applications, etc.) are normally geared towards ease-of-use or ease-of-deployment, not security. As such, many enterprises operate according to guidance provided to them by a control framework ([CIS_Critical_Controls], [PCI_DSS], [NIST_800-53] etc.), which often prescribe that an enterprise define a standard, security-minded configuration for each technology they operate. Such standard configurations are often referred to as configuration checklists. This document defines an extension to the Resource-Oriented Lightweight Information Exchange (ROLIE) protocol [I-D.ietf-mile-rolie] to support the publication of configuration checklist information. Configuration checklists contain a set of configuration recommendations for a given endpoint. A configuration recommendation prescribes expected values pertaining to one or more discrete endpoint attributes.

2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

The previous key words are used in this document to define the requirements for implementations of this specification. As a result, the key words in this document are not used for recommendations or requirements for the use of ROLIE.

As an extension of [RFC8322], this document refers to many terms defined in that document. In particular, the use of "Entry" and "Feed" are aligned with the definitions presented in section TODO of ROLIE.

Several places in this document refer to the "information-type" of a Resource (Entry or Feed). This refers to the "term" attribute of an "atom:category" element whose scheme is "urn:ietf:params:rolie:category:information-type". For an Entry, this value can be inherited from it's containing Feed as per [RFC8322].

Other terminology used in this document is defined below:

Configuration Item Generally synonymous with endpoint attribute.

Configuration Checklist A configuration checklist is an organized collection of rules about a particular kind of system or platform.

Configuration Recommendation A configuration recommendation is an expression of the desired posture of one or more configuration items. A configuration recommendation generally includes the description of the recommendation, a rationale statement, and the expected state of collected posture information.

TODO: There needs to be a "normative" reference to the SCAP 1.2/3 specifications and schema definitions

3. The 'configuration-checklist' information-type

This document registers a new information type for use in ROLIE repositories. The "configuration-checklist" information type represents a body of information describing a set of configuration recommendations. A configuration recommendation is, minimally, a single configuration item paired with a recommended value or range of

values. Depending on the source, a configuration recommendation may carry with it additional information (i.e. description, references, rationale, etc.). Provided below is a non-exhaustive list of information that may be considered as components of a configuration checklist.

- o A "Data Stream"
- o A "Benchmark"
- o A "Profile"
- o A "Value"
- o A "Rule" or "Group" of Rules
 - * Description
 - * Rationale
 - * Remediation Instructions
 - * Information, described in the dialect of a supported "check system", indicating the method(s) used to audit the checklist configuration item.
- o Applicable Platform Information
- o Information regarding a set of patches to be evaluated

4. rolie:property Extensions

A breadth of metadata may be included with a configuration checklist as identifying information. A publishing organization may wish to recognize or attribute checklist authors or contributors, or maintain a revision/version history over time. Other metadata that may be included could indicate the various categories of products to which the checklist applies, such as Operating System, Network Device, or Application Server.

This document registers several new rolie:property elements to express this metadata in a more efficient and automatable form.

- o contributor (0..n)
 - * name: urn:ietf:params:rolie:property:checklist:contributor

- * value: Indicates those individuals noted as recognized contributors to the configuration checklist and/or the recommendations contained within. The value MUST be either a plaintext name of a entity, or a link to an <author> element that describes an entity.
- o checklist version
 - * name: urn:ietf:params:rolie:property:checklist:version
 - * value: Indicates the version/revision number of the configuration checklist. Implementations MAY choose to incorporate a semantic versioning scheme illustrating "major.minor.point" releases, such as "3.1.1".
- o title
 - * name: urn:ietf:params:rolie:property:checklist:title
 - * value: Indicates the document title of the configuration checklist, such as "CIS Benchmark for Microsoft Windows Server 2019".
- o overview
 - * name: urn:ietf:params:rolie:property:checklist:overview
 - * value: This property allows for a textual overview and/or introduction to the configuration checklist including, but not limited to, overview of the technology under assessment, limitations or caveats, or assumptions to be made when evaluating the checklist.
- o product name (0..n)
 - * name: urn:ietf:params:rolie:property:checklist:product-name
 - * value: This property allows for further refinement and identification of the configuration checklist using the name of the product or products to which the checklist applies, such as Microsoft Windows Server 2019, Red Hat Enterprise Linux, IBM WebSphere Application Server, Google Chrome, etc.
- o product category (0..n)
 - * name: urn:ietf:params:rolie:property:checklist:product-category

* value: This property allows for further refinement and identification of the configuration checklist using the technology category. Examples of product category values may be (but aren't limited to):

- + Antivirus Software
- + Application Server
- + Auditing
- + Authentication
- + Automation/Productivity Application Suite
- + Client and Server Encryption
- + Configuration Management Software
- + Database Management System
- + Desktop Application
- + Desktop Client
- + DHCP Server
- + Directory Service
- + DNS Server
- + Email Server
- + Encryption Software
- + Enterprise Application
- + File Encryption
- + Firewall
- + Firmware
- + Handheld Device
- + Identity Management
- + Intrusion Detection System

- + KVM
- + Mail Server
- + Malware
- + Mobile Solution
- + Monitoring
- + Multi-Functional Peripheral
- + Network Router
- + Network Switch
- + Office Suite
- + Operating System
- + Peripheral Device
- + Security Server
- + Server
- + Virtual Machine
- + Virtualization Software
- + Web Browser
- + Web Server
- + Wireless Email
- + Wireless Network

5. Handling Existing Checklist Formats

Today, checklists are distributed in a myriad of different formats, using a variety of organization schemes. This standard attempts to be as flexible as possible in its approach, in order to be usable by as many checklist distributors as possible.

Using the NIST National Checklist Program as a foundation, checklists consist of a primary set of content and a list of supporting content. These pieces of content come in a number of machine readable and

human readable formats, and it is out of scope of this standard to describe guidance for all them. Instead, a best effort should be made to use the available properties, elements, and attributes to describe the content. Moreover, the content is often a compressed file that consists of a package of other content. Likewise, describing this nested structure is out of scope for this standard. Each organization should use a description scheme that best matches their use and business cases, and this description scheme should be documented as thoroughly as possible for all users.

When existing identifiers, titles, authors, and dates are provided in machine-readable forms inside a ROLIE Entry, automated processes can find and acquire checklist content with more ease than the current state-of-the-art methodology. Fully solving the checklist automation problem will require a more significant effort touching on all parts of the checklist ecosystem.

6. atom:link Extensions

Name	Description
ancestor	Links to a configuration checklist supersceded by that described in this entry
target-platform	Links to a software descriptor resource defining the software subject to this configuration checklist entry
supporting	Links to a supporting document for the main content. The "title" attribute SHOULD be used to provide a human readable title for this document. Where possible, the "type" attribute MAY be used to describe the type of the supporting document. If the type is a simple IANA Media Type, the media type text should be used, otherwise, a short human readable description should be used.

7. IANA Considerations

7.1. configuration-checklist information-type

IANA has added an entry to the "ROLIE Security Resource Information Type Sub-Registry" registry located at <https://www.iana.org/assignments/rolie/category/information-type> .

The entry is as follows:

```
name: configuration-checklist
index: TBD
reference: This document, Section 3
```

7.2. checklist:contributor property

IANA has added an entry to the "ROLIE URN Parameters" registry located in [<https://www.iana.org/assignments/rolie/>](https://www.iana.org/assignments/rolie/).

The entry is as follows:

```
name: property:checklist:contributor
Extension IRI:
urn:ietf:params:rolie:property:checklist:contributor
Reference: This document, Section 4
Subregistry: None
```

8. Security Considerations

Use of this extension requires understanding and managing the security considerations of the core ROLIE specification. Beyond that, there must be considerations made for the common use cases and data types that would be shared with this extension in particular.

Checklist information, while typically shared publicly, can have potential security impact if compromised. In these cases, the utmost care should be taken to secure the REST endpoint. Ensure that only authenticated users are allowed request access to any part of the ROLIE repository. Authentication schemes such as OAUTH or basic HTTP Auth provides a significant barrier to compromise. When providing checklist information as a paid service, security is valuable as a means to protect valuable data from being stolen or taken for free. In these cases, the above strategies still apply, but providers may want to make the Feed visible to non-authenticated users, with meaningful error messages sent to users that have not yet paid for the service.

Typical RESTful security measures applied commonly on the web would be effective to secure this ROLIE extension. As a flexible and relatively simple RESTful service, ROLIE server implementations have great flexibility and freedom in securing their repository.

9. Privacy Considerations

This extension poses no additional privacy considerations above and beyond those stated in the core ROLIE specification.

10. References

10.1. Normative References

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10.2. Informative References

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Hanson, R., "NIST 800-53", September 2007, <<http://deusty.blogspot.com/2007/09/stunt-out-of-band-channels.html>>.
- [PCI_DSS] "PCI Data Security Standard", April 2016, <https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/document_library?category=pcidss&document=pci_dss>.

Appendix A. Examples

This section provides some brief examples of a Checklist Information Type ROLIE Entry.

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<entry xmlns="https://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
  xmlns:rolie="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:rolie-1.0" xml:lang="en-US">
  <id>c8db0a93-4dcb-426e-997f-ba43c100b863</id>
  <title>NIST National Checklist for Red Hat Virtualization Host 4.x</title>
  <published>2020-06-29T18:13:51.0Z</published>
  <updated>2020-06-29T18:13:51.0Z</updated>
  <category scheme="urn:ietf:params:rolie:category:information-type" term="checklist"/>
  <summary>SCAP content for evaluation of Red Hat Virtualization Host 4.x systems. The Red Hat content embeds multiple pre-established compliance profiles.</summary>
  <rolie:format ns="scapl3namespace"/>
  <content type="application/zip" src="https://nvd.nist.gov/ncp/checklist/908/download/5615"/>
  <link rel="supporting" title="OpenControl-formatted NIST 800-53 responses for Red Hat Virtualization Host 4.x" href="https://github.com/ComplianceAsCode/redhat/tree/master/virtualization-host" type="Machine-Readable Format"/>
  <link rel="supporting" title="[DRAFT] DISA STIG for Red Hat Virtualization Host (RHVH)" href="https://galaxy.ansible.com/RedHatOfficial/rhv4_rhvh_stig" type="Ansible Playbook"/>
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