EAP-based Authentication Service for CoAP

Changes for draft-ietf-ace-wg-coap-eap-04

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Summary of main changes for v04

- Update on Flow independent of CON and NON (Clarification from last interim)
- Discovery
- Sending server resource in the first message
- Keeping OSCORE to confirm keys in CoAP-EAP
- Current flow of operation

CON and NON independence
Clarification from last interim

- After a design meeting with Carsten and Christian, some clarifications were made regarding the use of CON or NON in CoAP-EAP
  - Reliability mechanism will be used using CoAP-EAP (CON, or TCP, etc.)

- No assumptions about piggybacking

Discovery of the EAP authenticator

- Out of scope
- A brief discussion on this will be added to the next version - 04
  - First approach, to receive the IPv6 of the Border Router (e.g., RA) and send there the initial message

  Other approaches to be considered
  - DHCPv6 [RFC8415]
  - mDNS [RFC6762]

Sending the resource on the first message

- Saves bytes over the air: well-known only sent once
- Avoids the CoAP server receiving unexpected well-known messages



Keeping OSCORE to confirm keys in CoAP-EAP

- After a design meeting with Christian we arrived to the conclusion that OSCORE can be maintained, as originally intended
  - An OSCORE message can be treated as alternate success indication
  - An OSCORE security context can be pre-defined, leaving the key to be completed after the EAP success is processed and the MSK is retrieved to complete security context
  - Recipient and Sender ID are now sent in Steps 1 and 2

Current flow of operation

Tagged CBOR structure



Extensible CBOR structure

THANK YOU