Emerging Use Cases for Encrypted DNS

Potential Next Steps for ADD

For the IETF ADD interim, January 2021

Rough consensus of: Chris Box, Tommy Jensen, Tiru Reddy, Jim Reid, Ben Schwartz

Overview

- draft-box-add-requirements-02 describes what we need to upgrade from unencrypted to encrypted, in an untrusted network.
- DEER and draft-btw-add-home suggest mechanisms for part of this space.
- What's next for ADD?
- In these slides: three scenarios beyond simple designation, with proposed requirements

Draft-box-add-requirements-02

An outline of the main changes vs -01

- Equivalence can mean many things, so we don't make it a requirement.
- Instead we concentrate on on the ability of an untrusted network or resolver to designate one or more resolvers.
- Designation is defined as an assertion by a network, or by a resolver, that one or more other resolvers are safe and appropriate to use without user intervention.
- Three subcases of resolver-identified: local to local, local to upstream and public to public.
- Clients still need to make their own decisions about whether and when to use designated resolvers (or not). Supplying additional information into that process would be useful.
- So we should ask ourselves which information could usefully be transported to the client to assist with that?

Three scenarios

- 1. DNS configuration on explicitly trusted networks
- 2. Resolver behavior self-description
- 3. Publishing and using directories of encrypted resolvers

Goals

- Solicit feedback on scope and requirements
- Gauge interest in possible next steps for the WG
- Proceed with proper requirements drafts where there is interest
- Support compliance and compatibility with other IETF standards
 - e.g. <u>Unknown RR types</u>, <u>DNSSEC</u>, <u>Extended DNS Errors</u>

Non-goals

- Requiring the WG to solve all three scenarios
- Taking control away from the client
- Communicating policy
 - Resolvers indicate their own behavior, not policies to impose on the client
 - Resolver selection is always left to the client
 - Policies of a managed device are controlled by the administrator

DNS configuration on explicitly trusted networks

- Client can authenticate the identity of the network (or pre-existing relationship with the network) and the user has authorized the client to override local DNS settings for a specific network.
 - BYOD devices joining Enterprise network without any MDM and configuration profile (e.g., using EAP-pwd, EAP-PSK).
 - IoT devices joining Enterprise network without a device management tool

DNS configuration on explicitly trusted networks

Goals

- Standardized discovery mechanism for BYOD and IoT devices.
- Discover local names to use Enterprise DNS server (similar to split DNS configuration in IKEv2)
 - Discover if the Enterprise network offers a split DNS configuration
- Secure Discovery of Enterprise DNS server
 - Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructures (BRSKI) discussed in ANIMA WG for IoT devices.
 - Leverage existing secure discovery mechanisms like IKEv2 for VPN

DNS configuration on explicitly trusted networks

Non-goals

- IT-managed devices and IoT devices (using device management tool) are out of scope
- BYOD managed by MDM
- BYOD provisioned with configuration profile (e.g., Over-The-Air enrollment).

Defining local-only namespaces

- Express namespaces which only this resolver can resolve
 - Authoritatively if the namespace collides with any global names
- Ex 1: Enterprise resolvers serving corporation-specific namespaces
- Ex 2: Public Wi-Fi or cellular networks offering network-local services

Defining per-namespace optimization

- Express namespaces for which this resolver provides preferable resolutions
- Ex 1: ISP routes public content requests to network caches
- Ex 2: Public resolver designated to serve a namespace to limit parties privy to resolution

Defining resolver identity

- Express information consumable by humans describing the resolver's identity
- Ex 1: Provide human-legible documentation
 - Most likely a web page link to explain server identity, terms of use, etc.
 - Not used for decision making by any protocol peer; communicated to clients for display to users
- Ex 2: Provide human-friendly description of the resolver identity
 - Friendly name and/or iconography for display in client UI identifying configured resolver

Defining protocol support

- Express what optional DNS-related functionality is supported
- Ex 1: DNS Extended Errors and which codes to expect
 - Not exhaustive: server can still return any code
 - Codes 15-17 indicate kinds of filtering the resolver implements
- Ex 2: Access-controlled resolvers describing their properties outside of access control

Three Parties:

- Publisher: Curates a list of distinct resolvers
- Client: Fetches the list from a trusted source
- Resolvers: Identified in the list, ready for access by the client

Example use cases

- An application (e.g. web browser) that provides users with a list of resolvers to consider, curated by a trusted third party
- An OS vendor wants to keep its list of trusted resolvers current without requiring a software update
- A user wants to choose a resolver from a list offered by a network operator who they trust

Requirements

- A list can be published by a trusted network
- A list can be published at an HTTP URL
- Each resolver controls its own self-description
- Provides optional non-repudiability for the publisher
- Suitable for use in an onscreen interactive menu
- Can be used as an additional safeguard for untrusted upgrade instructions
- Uses the same protocols as the previous scenarios

Non-requirements

- Defending against a malicious or inept publisher
- Defending against a malicious or inept resolver
- Support for extremely long lists (e.g. >1000 resolvers)
- Combining multiple resolvers that are not sufficient independently
- Grouping related resolvers
- Enable connection without use of a bootstrap resolver

Questions?

<end of slides>