


### CBOR Encoding of X.509 Certificates (CBOR Certificates)

draft-mattsson-cose-cbor-cert-compress-06

COSE, John Preuß Mattsson



## Changes from -05 to -06

#### Changes from -05 to -06

- Added references to the certificate profiles CAB baseline and RFC 8603.
- Added text in introduction that certificate chain sizes are major problems also in EAP and QUIC.
- Based on the certificates found on the web, attributes, extensions, and algorithms can now all be expressed with OID and raw DER byte strings.
- Optimized for a single attribute per RDN as all the certificates on the web seem to be following this practice.
- Added registration for StreetAdress and PostalCode (included in CAB baseline)
- Algorithms registries so that the int encodes the whole AlgorithmIdentifier including parameters.
- Changed ECDSA signatureValue encoding as the old one depended on the issuer public key algorithm.
   Optimize RSA public key encoding.
- Changed from zlib to brotli
- Significantly restructured IANA tables to make them better
- Subject private key for the example certificates.
- ASN.1 appendix removed
- Editorial changes



# Plans and discussions for -07

#### Plans and discussions for -07 (or later)

Example encoding of IEEE 802.1AR DevID.

- More deployment guidance for IoT, comment that it would be good to discuss how different algorithms affect size.
- Test the encoding on a large amount of certificates, hopefully millions.
  - Summary of 1M lists: https://hackertarget.com/top-million-site-list-download/
  - Cisco Umbrella 1M: http://s3-us-west-1.amazonaws.com/umbrella-static/index.html
  - The Majestic Million: http://s3-us-west-1.amazonaws.com/umbrella-static/index.html
  - Tanco List: <u>https://tranco-list.eu/</u>
- Finalize CBOR encoding specification for all extensions that are very common for HTTPS. Plan is to base support will be based on what is used on the web.
- Certificate chain encoding (TLS certificate message) showing sizes for DER, DER+Brotli, CBOR, CBOR+Brotli.

#### Certificate chain optimizations?

1,

h'A6A55C870E39B40E', -4, "US", -6, "Arizona", -5, "Scottsdale", -8, "Starfield Technologies, Inc.", -9, "http://certs.starfieldtech.com/repository/", -1, "Starfield Secure Certificate Authority - G2" 1601581116, 1635881916, -9, "Domain Control Validated", 1, "\*.tools.ietf.org" h'B1E137E8EB82D689FADBF5C24B77F02C4ADE726E3E1360D1A8661EC4AD3D3260E5F099B5F47A7A485521EE0E3912F9CE0DCAF56961C704ED6E0F1D3B1 EAE6E97 7FF7CA694ECCD006DF5D279B3B12E7E6FE086B527B82117C72B346EBC1E878B80FCBE1EBBD064458DC8350B2A0625BDC81B836E39E7C79B2A953 94834EC8E1142E85B3AFD46EDD6946AF41250E7AAD8BF292CA79D97B324FF777E8F9B44F235CD45C03AED8AB3ACA135F5D5D5DA1 -3, -2, 7. [ 1. 2 ]. -1, 5, 4, "http://crl.starfieldtech.com/sfig2s1-242.crl", [ h'6086480186fd6e01071701', "http://certificates.starfieldtech.com/repository/", 1 ], 5, 8, [ 1, "http://ocsp.starfieldtech.com/", 2, "http://certificates.starfieldtech.com/repository/sfig2.crt" ], 6, h'254581685026383D3B2D2CBECD6AD9B63DB36663' 2, [ 2, "\*.tools.ietf.org", 2, "tools.ietf.org" ], 0, h'AD8AB41C0751D7928907B0B784622F36557A5F4D' 9. [ h'F65C942FD1773022145418083094568EE34D131933BFDF0C2F200BCC4EF164E3', 1715, 1, h'8CF54852CE5635433911CF10CDB91F52B33639223AD138A41DECA6FEDE1FE90FBCA2254366C19A2691C47A00B5B653ABBD44C2F8BAAEF4D2DA h'5CDC4392FEE6AB4544B15E9AD456E61037FBD5FA47DCA17394B25EE6F6C70ECA', 2012, 1, h'A5E0906E63E91D4FDDEFFF0352B91E50896007564B448A3828F596DC6B28726DFC91EAED02168866054EE18A2E5346C4CC51FEB3FA10A91D2EE h'14043FA0BED2EE3FA86E3A1F788EA04C35530F11061FFF60A16D0B83E9D92ADBB33F9DB3D7E0594C19A8E419A50CA770727763D5FE64510AD23 A867269CC7937CEE397F7DCF39588ED81032900D2A2C7BAABD63A8ECA090BD9FB39264BFF03D88E2D3F6B21CA8A7DD85FFB94BA83DE9CFC158D61FA672DI 31FD72FE03D2F265AF4D7EE2819B7AFD303CF552F40534A08A3E194158C8A8E05171840915AEECA57775FA18F7D577D531CCC72D

- A lot of duplicated information in certificate chain/bags like TLS certxample encoding of IEEE 802.1AR DevID.
- The issuer field is is often duplicate of a subject field from a certificate in the chain.
- The authority key identifier key identifier is is often a duplicate of a subject key identifier from a certificate in the chain.
- The authority key identifier authority Cert Issuer is often a duplicate of a subject field from a certificate in the chain.
- The issuer and key identifier in these cases could just be a relative pointer to the certificate with the information.
  - I.e. typically 0 or 1.

#### Certificate chain optimizations?

```
1,
h'A6A55C870E39B40E'
1,
1601581116,
1635881916,
  -9, "Domain Control Validated",
  1, "*.tools.ietf.org"
h'B1E137E8EB82D689FADBF5C24B77F02C4ADE726E3E1360D1A8661EC4AD3D3260E5F099B5F47A7A485521EE0E3912F9CE0DCAF56961C704ED6E0F1D3B1
EAE6E977FF7CA694ECCD006DF5D279B3B12E7E6FE086B527B82117C72B346EBC1E878B80FCBE1EBBD064458DC8350B2A0625BDC81B836E39E7C79B2A953
94834EC8E1142E85B3AFD46EDD6946AF41250E7AAD8BF292CA79D97B324FF777E8F9B44F235CD45C03AED8AB3ACA135F5D5D5DA1',
 -3, -2,
  7. [ 1. 2 ].
 -1, 5,
  4.
     "http://crl.starfieldtech.com/sfig2s1-242.crl",
  5, [ h'6086480186fd6e01071701', "http://certificates.starfieldtech.com/repository/", 1 ],
  8, [ 1, "http://ocsp.starfieldtech.com/", 2, "http://certificates.starfieldtech.com/repository/sfig2.crt" ],
  6, 1,
  2, [ 2, "*.tools.ietf.org", 2, "tools.ietf.org" ],
  0, h'AD8AB41C0751D7928907B0B784622F36557A5F4D'
  9, [
       h'F65C942FD1773022145418083094568EE34D131933BFDF0C2F200BCC4EF164E3'
       1715.
       1,
       h'8CF54852CE5635433911CF10CDB91F52B33639223AD138A41DECA6FEDE1FE90FBCA2254366C19A2691C47A00B5B653ABBD44C2F8BAAEF4D2DA
       h'5CDC4392FEE6AB4544B15E9AD456E61037FBD5FA47DCA17394B25EE6F6C70ECA',
       2012,
       1,
       h'A5E0906E63E91D4FDDEFFF0352B91E50896007564B448A3828F596DC6B28726DFC91EAED02168866054EE18A2E5346C4CC51FEB3FA10A91D2EI
       FA0RED2FE3FA86F3A1F788FA04C35530F11061FFF60A16D0B83F9D92ADBB33F9DB3D7F0594C19A8F419A50CA770727763D5FF64510AD27AD650A
A867269CC7937CEE397F7DCF39588ED81032900D2A2C7BAABD63A8ECA090BD9FB39264BFF03D88E2D3F6B21CA8A7DD85FFB94BA83DE9CFC158D61FA672DI
31FD72FE03D2F265AF4D7EE2819B7AFD303CF552F40534A08A3E194158C8A8E05171840915AEECA57775FA18F7D577D531CCC72D
```

- For the example tools.ietf.org certificate the saving are quite large
  - 1075 bytes instead of 1242 bytes
- Even bigger savings for self-issued certs that often have a authority key identifier authority Cert Issuer field (common in HTTPS).
- Should CBOR certificates provide optizations for self-issued certificates. I.e. issuer and auth key id is replaced with 0?
- Should CBOR certificates provide optizations for certs in chains . I.e. issuer and auth key id is replaced with 1?
- Provides large savings.
- Adds complexity, Makes CBOR compression two pass
- May not be needed for TLS with Brotli as Brotli hopefully compresses these things anyway (should be tested)

#### How to progress until next meeting



#### -Reviews

- -Implementations
- —Discussion on the list