draft-ietf-stir-certificates-ocsp draft-peterson-stir-certificates-shortlived

IETF 113i (virtual) STIR WG Jon

Who Cares about Freshness?

- This is a rerun from IETF 98 (!)
- Freshness is different for STIR certs than regular PKI certs
 - This is due to TNAuthList
 - Not for SPCs, really, just for TNs
 - The problem is the inherent dynamism of number assignment
 - Relying parties want to know if a cert is still valid for a number right now
- So why are these back on the menu?
 - Because of certificate delegation, and the use of TN's byreference in delegate certs especially
 - Need a way to verify that a particular number is valid for a cert that does not involve downloading an entire TNAuthList


Two paths

• Refreshed some ancient drafts: OCSP and shortlived certs

- They have very different privacy properties, potentially

- Basically, I propose we explore both paths a bit and see what the experience yields
 - Still (!) because the drafts have been updated to be about the TN use of TNAuthList for certificate delegation in particular
 - Not intended to compete with any CRLs for SPC use of TNAuthList, be they centralized or federated


Real-time Credential Validation




The OCSP Path

- Two ways: either terminating side or stapled
 - Terminating side is where much of the privacy leak occurs
- Probably, we would recommend stapling
 - We would define a SIP header for carrying a staple
 - Probably a general SIP feature, actually, not just for STIR
 - Staple basically says "the cert is valid for this number right now"
- The properties of stapling and short-lived certs start to look real, real similar

Stapled Validation




Short-lived Credentials



Short-lived

- Issuing certs that expire soon
 - Could be for individual numbers even (or ranges)
 - Basically says, "this cert is valid for this number right now"
 - Also obviates the need for relying parties to talk to the CA
- What does short-lived mean?
 - Hours? Days? Not months or years anyway.
 - Part of our job is to decide what is appropriate
- The hard part is getting the new cert... but...

ACME makes short-lived easy



Individual TN certs: not just for end users

- ACME allows CSPs that control large number blocks to use disposable, single-number certs
 - A CSP basically uses an ACME "account" to get certs issued for numbers under its control as needed
 - Relying parties only know that the cert attests a number doesn't reveal the SPC unless you want to
 - Might be useful for some SHAKEN-like environments
- Similar mechanisms could work for enterprises
- Solves privacy concerns without requiring new protocol work for OCSP, new staple header, etc.

So what to do?

- I (still) say let's explore both a bit, see which story is better
- Not much harm in kicking the tires on both approaches out there in implementation
 - In fact, they aren't really incompatible, both could coexist in the marketplace
- Should we advance either/both?