

Raytime: Validating token expiry on an unbounded local time interval

`draft-amsuess-t2trg-raytime`

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Essence of the document

If your clock may *lose power*, and you'll have to authenticate *time limited credentials*, and *no connectivity* to time sources are around, you have two options: *fail "safe"* (but fail), or suffer the consequences of *best-effort* time checks.

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Power limits are common in “constrained” environments ([RFC 7228](#)).

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That's best practice and approximately equivalent to revocation checking.

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Think “maintenance of data logger in remote mountain valley” –
RTT=6h (walk down and back up).
GNSS is not network.

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safety – security – reliability

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Raytime that case: How good can best-effort be, what is best practice, what can attackers do and what not.

Raytime in T2TRG

Q: (Where) Has this been described before?

Q: Is T2TRG a good place for this?