

# UFM RG planning for IETF-118

Sep 1<sup>st</sup> 2023

Chairs: Jonathan Hoyland, Stephen Farrell

Charter: <https://datatracker.ietf.org/rg/ufmrg>

Mailing list: [ufmrg@irtf.org](mailto:ufmrg@irtf.org)

RG Wiki: <https://wiki.ietf.org/en/group/ufm>

Meetecho:

<https://meetings.conf.meetecho.com/interim/?short=e5de2fa9-406c-41d8-918d-feeadd76485d8>

# Note Well

This is a reminder of IETF policies in effect on various topics such as patents or code of conduct. It is only meant to point you in the right direction. Exceptions may apply. The IETF's patent policy and the definition of an IETF "contribution" and "participation" are set forth in BCP 79; please read it carefully.

As a reminder:

- By participating in the IETF, you agree to follow IETF processes and policies.
- If you are aware that any IETF contribution is covered by patents or patent applications that are owned or controlled by you or your sponsor, you must disclose that fact, or not participate in the discussion.
- As a participant in or attendee to any IETF activity you acknowledge that written, audio, video, and photographic records of meetings may be made public.
- Personal information that you provide to IETF will be handled in accordance with the IETF Privacy Statement.


As a reminder:

- As a participant or attendee, you agree to work respectfully with other participants; please contact the ombudsteam ( <https://www.ietf.org/contact/ombudsteam/>) if you have questions or concerns about this.

Definitive information is in the documents listed below and other IETF BCPs. For advice, please talk to WG chairs or ADs:

- BCP 9 (Internet Standards Process),
- BCP 25 (Working Group processes),
- BCP 25 (Anti-Harassment Procedures),
- BCP 54 (Code of Conduct),
- BCP 78 (Copyright),
- BCP 79 (Patents, Participation),
- <https://www.ietf.org/privacy-policy/> (Privacy Policy)

# IETF 117 Meeting Tips



## In-person participants

- Make sure to sign into the session using the Meetecho (usually the “onsite tool” client) from the Datatracker agenda
- Use Meetecho to join the mic queue

## Remote participants

- Make sure your audio and video are off unless you are presenting or speaking during a session
- Use of a headset is strongly recommended


# Agenda

- 1) agenda bash and chairs outline the likely logistics and let folks ask questions about that (10 mins)
- 2) we establish the list of those who can still volunteer, for this time around, given the constraints from #1 (5 mins)
- 3) for each technology that has someone volunteering, we get a 5 minute description of what might be possible, or not possible, this time (up to 25 mins)
- 4) open discussion of HOTWO pick 2 from 5 (10 mins)
- 5) AOB (10 mins)

# Possible Technologies

- RecordFlux
- Isabelle
- Tamarin
- Coq
- Proverif

**Backup Slides**



# RG Status

- We're a "proposed" IRTF Research Group
  - If we act like an effective RG, we'll become an official RG
- IRTF != IETF (more in a bit)
  - Don't say "working group" :-)
- We'll prosper or flounder based on people doing or not doing work
  - We don't get to make anyone do stuff
  - Don't be shy about volunteering things
- Be tolerant if someone suggests something you think unlikely to succeed
  - Actually, just generally "be tolerant" :-)

# Goals (summarised)

From <https://datatracker.ietf.org/rg/ufmrg/about/>

1. Bring together the IETFers and the researchers studying formal methods to share experience and ideas
2. Explore strengths and limitations of formal methods for systems specified in the IETF, and try improve things
3. Explore how formal methods can be usefully incorporated into IETF work
4. Educational material, examples, open source software that can be used by the IETFers
5. Experimentation with formal methods relevant to IETF



# A word of caution

- No matter how smart we are, no matter how excellent our formalisms, we do not get to tell the IETF what to do
  - ‘Cause we’re an IRTF RG
  - We might help demonstrate that there’s some new better way to do things that gets voluntarily adopted in the IETF though
- Maybe consider formal methods work on IETF protocol foo as mostly an activity of the IETF foo-wg, but one that’s welcome to be discussed in UFMRG?
  - IOW: If you’re doing such work, consider yourself as participating in the IETF WG for the foo protocol, in addition to being someone doing work relevant to UFMRG
  - Why? ‘cause IETF WGs mightn’t welcome external protocol police parachuting in:-)

# UFM RG Wiki

- Nice start: we have a bunch of references to formal analyses of IETF protocols (TLS, EDHOC etc)
  - <https://wiki.ietf.org/en/group/ufm>
  - Thanks to those who've already done edits!
- For later:
  - How'd we like to use that?
  - Who wants to volunteer to add what content (or structure)?

Usable Formal Methods Proposed RG

This is the wiki page for the [ufm](#) rg.

Please feel free to add content however you think best, and we'll discuss how to organise that during IETF 116.

### Oblivious HTTP

Type	Peer-reviewed	Reference
Tamarin model (symbolic)	No	<a href="https://github.com/cloudflare/ohhttp-analysis">https://github.com/cloudflare/ohhttp-analysis</a>

### Oblivious DoH

Type	Peer-reviewed	Reference
Tamarin model (symbolic)	?	<a href="https://github.com/cloudflare/odoh-analysis">https://github.com/cloudflare/odoh-analysis</a>

### TLS 1.3

Type	Peer-reviewed	Reference
TODO	Y	<a href="#">Boudouche et al. - 2015 - A Messy State of the Union: Taming the Composite State Machines of TLS</a>
TODO	Y	<a href="#">Cremers et al. - 2017 - A Comprehensive Symbolic Analysis of TLS 1.3</a>
TODO	Y	<a href="#">Bharagavan et al. - 2018 - Verified Models and Reference Implementations for the TLS 1.3 Standard Candidate</a>
TODO	Y	<a href="#">Parton et al. - 2018 - Partially Specified Channels</a>

Old TLS versions:

- [Krawczyk et al. - 2013 - On the Security of the TLS Protocol: A Systematic Analysis](#)
- [Bharagavan et al. - 2014 - Proving the TLS Handshake Secure \(as it is\)](#)

### TLS Extensions

Extension	Type	Peer-reviewed	Reference
TLS Encrypted ClientHello	ProVerif model (symbolic)	Y	<a href="#">A Symbolic Analysis of Privacy for TLS 1.3 with Encrypted Client Hello</a>
Exported Authenticators	TODO	?	<a href="#">Exported Authenticators</a>
KEMTLS (AuthKEM and Hybrid KEX)	Computational	Y	<a href="#">KEMTLS</a>
KEMTLS (AuthKEM and Hybrid KEX)	Tamarin model (symbolic)	Y	<a href="#">A Tale of Two Models: Formal Verification of KEMTLS via Tamarin</a>

### Message Layer Security (and protocol)

Type	Peer-reviewed	Reference
TODO	?	<a href="#">[Cohn-Gordon et al. - 2018 - On End-to-End Encryption]</a>
TODO	?	<a href="#">Bharagavan et al. - 2018 - TrustKEM: Asynchronous Decentralized Key Management for Large Dynamic Groups</a>

### LAKE/EDHOC

Type	Peer-reviewed	Reference
TODO	?	<a href="#">[Bruni] Bruni, A., Sahl, Jørgensen, T., Grønbech Petersen, T., and C. Schürmann, "Formal Verification of Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC)", November 2018, <a href="https://www.scripseproffessional.de/en/formal-verification-of-ephemeral-diffie-hellman-over-cose-edhoc/16284346">https://www.scripseproffessional.de/en/formal-verification-of-ephemeral-diffie-hellman-over-cose-edhoc/16284346</a></a>
TODO	?	<a href="#">[Norman20] Norman, K., Sundarajan, V., and A. Bruni, "Formal Analysis of EDHOC Key Establishment for Constrained IoT Devices", September 2020, <a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2007.11427">https://arxiv.org/abs/2007.11427</a></a>
TODO	?	<a href="#">[CottierPointcheval22] Cottier, B. and D. Pointcheval, "Security Analysis of the EDHOC protocol", September 2022, <a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2209.03999">https://arxiv.org/abs/2209.03999</a></a>
TODO	?	<a href="#">[Jacomme23] Jacomme, C., Klein, E., Krieger, S., and M. Racocho, "A comprehensive, formal and automated analysis of the EDHOC protocol", October 2022, <a href="https://hal.inria.fr/hal-03811973">https://hal.inria.fr/hal-03811973</a></a>
TODO	?	<a href="#">[Guentherlunga23] Günther, F. and M. Bungas, "Careful with MAC-then-Sign: A Computational Analysis of the EDHOC Lightweight Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol", December 2022, <a href="https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1795">https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1795</a></a>

### OPAQUE

Type	Peer-reviewed	Reference
TODO	?	<a href="#">OPAQUE</a>

### CPACE

Type	Peer-reviewed	Reference
TODO	?	<a href="#">CPACE</a>

### OAuth 2.0

Type	Peer-reviewed	Reference
<a href="#">WIM</a> (symbolic)	Y	<a href="#">Fett, Klitters, Schmitz - A Comprehensive Formal Security Analysis of OAuth 2.0</a>
<a href="#">WIM</a> (symbolic)	Y	<a href="#">OAuth 2.0 + extensions (PKCE, mTLS, etc), Fett, Hosseini, Klitters, An Extensive Formal Security Analysis of the OpenID Financial-grade AOP</a>

### ACME

Type	Peer-reviewed	Reference
<a href="#">BY* model</a> (symbolic)	Y	<a href="#">Bharagavan, Bichhawat, Do, Hosseini, Klitters, Schmitz, Wirsale, An In-Depth Symbolic Security Analysis of the ACME Standard</a>

### RATS

Type	Peer-reviewed	Reference
ProVerif model (symbolic)	N	<a href="#">Sardar, Fossati, Frost, Sok, Attestation in Confidential Computing</a>

All contributions to this wiki are covered by the IETF Public License. Powered by Wiki.js