



Packet Content Filter for BGP FlowSpec

draft-cui-idr-content-filter-flowspec-04

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
May 11th, 2026

Current Draft Status

- 2024/3 first proposed packet content filter @IETF 119
- 2024/5 join FSv2 design team work
- 2024/6 conduct software router function development and testbed validation
- 2024/7 introduce the latest work @IETF 120
- 2025/9 discuss with vendors and operators to optimize filter definitions
- 2024/11 introduce the work progress @IETF 121
- 2025/10 introduce the latest work @IETF 124
- 2026/2 update scaling, operational, security considerations @Interim meeting
- **2026/5 Update draft @Interim meeting**


Problem Statement

- DDoS attack intensity has surged, with a record peak of **22.2 Tbps**, far beyond scrubbing centers' defense capability
- Some real world attacks captured in operator networks show fixed payload (e.g., ACK flood, SSDP attack)



Cloudflare
@Cloudflare

Cloudflare's defenses have been working overtime. Over the past few weeks, we've autonomously blocked hundreds of hyper-volumetric DDoS attacks, with the largest reaching peaks of 5.1 Tbps and 11.5 Tbps. The 11.5 Tbps attack was a UDP flood that mainly came from Google Cloud. Stay tuned for a full breakdown in our upcoming report.




Protocol	Length	Acknowledgment number (raw)	Identification	Info	
UDP	434		0x0000 (0)	54452 → 3703	Len=388
UDP	379		0xe694 (5902...)	47558 → 3703	Len=333
UDP	446		0x0000 (0)	38607 → 3703	Len=400
UDP	497		0x6e7f (2828...)	39866 → 3703	Len=451
UDP	434		0xc702 (5094...)	37332 → 3703	Len=388
ICMP	164		0x05cc (1484...)	Destination unreachable	Len=490
UDP	536		0x0000 (0)	52468 → 3703	Len=490
ICMP	164		0xf54c (6279...)	Destination unreachable	Len=490
ICMP	164		0x1cf7 (7415...)	Destination unreachable	Len=490
UDP	368		0x0000 (0)	43325 → 3703	Len=322
ICMP	164		0xc742 (5101...)	Destination unreachable	Len=490
UDP	369		0x5179 (2085...)	58526 → 3703	Len=323
UDP	382		0x0000 (0)	57379 → 3703	Len=336
UDP	550		0x87ab (3473...)	32948 → 3703	Len=504
ICMP	164		0x8cb0 (3601...)	Destination unreachable	Len=490
ICMP	164		0x5f6f (2443...)	Destination unreachable	Len=490
ICMP	164		0x3ce1 (1558...)	Destination unreachable	Len=490
UDP	474		0x0000 (0)	39775 → 3703	Len=428
UDP	483		0x0000 (0)	39775 → 3703	Len=437
UDP	322		0x4d65 (1981...)	53867 → 3703	Len=276
UDP	328		0x2d66 (11981...)	53867 → 3703	Len=282

A new type of FlowSpec filter is needed to defend against DDoS attacks with specific payload characteristics.

Packet Content Filter

- NLRI Encoding:




- Ordering rules:

- Filters with a specific user order number would be ordered by the **user order**
- Filters with same (or no) user order would be ordered by the **default order**:



Content-length(↓) → Otype(↓) → Offset (↓) → Content(↑)

Software Implementation

- Testbed: OpenBGPD-8.3-portable, FRRouting-10.2-dev



- Defend simple network layer volumetric attack in network device
- Defend 25-55% application layer attack
- Effectively reduce the cost of attack detection and mitigation



Considerations

- Operational
 - Deploy payload filtering only at controlled locations
 - Enable only on devices that support content parsing and sufficient rule scale
 - Match on the decapsulated inner IP packet to avoid offset ambiguity with MPLS or tunnels
- Security
 - Accept rules only from trusted peers and restrict their propagation scope
 - Combine payload filter with other conditions to reduce false positives
 - Ignore unsupported rules locally and limit update rates to keep BGP stable
- Scalability
 - Limit rules to a small set of high-value entries
 - Use FSv2 rule ordering to limit the scope of traffic inspected
 - Restrict propagation scope to avoid inter-domain scale issues

Next Steps

- Any questions and comments are welcomed
- Optimize fields structure, enhance hardware verification
- Request for WG Adoption



BGP FlowSpec Extension for Feedback Binding

draft-cui-idr-flowspec-feedback-binding-00

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
May 11th, 2026

Current Draft Status

- 2025/10 first proposed feedback action @IETF 124
- 2026/2 update state machine, and fields design @Interim meeting
- 2026/3 introduce framework and draft scope @IETF 125
- 2026/5 intruduce feedback action @Interim meeting
- 2026/7 Roadmap and next steps to be presented @IETF 126

Problem Statement

- BGP FlowSpec provides **one-way control**, where successful rule propagation does not imply effective enforcement
- Operators need execution feedback to understand real enforcement behavior and continuously optimize traffic handling strategies



A **new FlowSpec action** is needed to **request execution feedback** from receiving devices

Next Steps

- Any questions and comments are welcomed
- Clarify the roadmap of the FlowSpec feedback framework
- Optimize fields design and conduct initial validation
- Request for WG Adoption

Thanks!

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