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OPSAWG WG                                           Devendra Vishwakarma
Internet-Draft                                             Cisco Systems
Intended status: Informational                            Prakash Suthar
Expires: May 6, 2021                                         Google Inc.
                                                           Vivek Agarwal
                                                        Anil Jangam, Ed.
                                                           Cisco Systems
                                                       November 02, 2020


       RADIUS Extension for Certificate-based SSH Authentication
                       draft-ietf-opsawg-ssh-cert-radius-00

Abstract

   A scalable and centralized mechanism is required for a certificate-
   based administrative access to multitude of virtualized and physical
   network functions.  While there are mechanisms that exist today to
   provide secure administrative command-line and API-based access,
   there are certain management and maintenance overheads as well as
   certain scalability challenges related to it.  In this draft we
   discuss these challenges and propose a standardized, centralized
   server-based mechanism to authenticate a user over an SSH session
   using its client certificate.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on May 6, 2021.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.





Devendra Vishwakarma, et alExpires May 6, 2021                  [Page 1]
Internet-Draft               SSH Cert RADIUS               November 2020


   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Conventions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.1.  Centralized RADUIS Server based Solution  . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Operational Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.1.  Basic Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.2.  EAP TLS authentication  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.3.  RADIUS Access Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.4.  Radius Accounting Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.5.  Radius Access Accept  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   4.  Protocol Details  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     4.1.  Packet Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     4.2.  Packet Types  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       4.2.1.  Access Request  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     4.3.  Attributes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       4.3.1.  Service Type  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   7.  Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   8.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     9.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14

1.  Conventions and Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

   This document uses the terminology of [RFC3987] and [RFC3986] for
   RADIUS entities.







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