Network Working Group R. Asati
Internet-Draft H. Singh
Updates: 4862, 4861 (if approved) W. Beebee
Intended status: Standards Track Cisco Systems, Inc.
Expires: November 25, 2013 E. Dart
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory
W. George
Time Warner Cable
C. Pignataro
Cisco Systems, Inc.
May 24, 2013
Enhanced Duplicate Address Detection
draft-ietf-6man-enhanced-dad-03
Abstract
Appendix A of the IPv6 Duplicate Address Detection (DAD) document in
RFC 4862 discusses Loopback Suppression and DAD. However, RFC 4862
does not settle on one specific automated means to detect loopback of
Neighbor Discovery (ND of RFC 4861) messages used by DAD. Several
service provider communities have expressed a need for automated
detection of looped backed ND messages used by DAD. This document
includes mitigation techniques and then outlines the Enhanced DAD
algorithm to automate detection of looped back IPv6 ND messages used
by DAD. For network loopback tests, the Enhanced DAD algorithm
allows IPv6 to self-heal after a loopback is placed and removed.
Further, for certain access networks the document automates resolving
a specific duplicate address conflict.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on November 25, 2013.
Asati, et al. Expires November 25, 2013 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft Enhanced DAD May 2013
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document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents
1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Operational Mitigation Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. Disable DAD on Interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. Dynamic Disable/Enable of DAD Using Layer 2 Protocol . . 5
3.3. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. The Enhanced DAD Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.1. General Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2. Processing Rules for Senders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.3. Processing Rules for Receivers . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.4. Impact on SEND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.5. Changes to RFC 4862 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.6. Changes to RFC 4861 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. Actions to Perform on Detecting a Genuine Duplicate . . . . . 9
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1. Terminology
o DAD-failed state - Duplication Address Detection failure as
specified in [RFC4862]. Failure also includes if the Target
datatracker.ietf.org