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Enhanced Duplicate Address Detection
draft-ietf-6man-enhanced-dad-10

Network Working Group                                           R. Asati
Internet-Draft                                                  H. Singh
Updates: 4862, 4861, 3971 (if approved)                        W. Beebee
Intended status: Standards Track                            C. Pignataro
Expires: May 17, 2015                                Cisco Systems, Inc.
                                                                 E. Dart
                                   Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory
                                                               W. George
                                                       Time Warner Cable
                                                       November 13, 2014

                  Enhanced Duplicate Address Detection
                    draft-ietf-6man-enhanced-dad-10

Abstract

   IPv6 Loopback Suppression and Duplicate Address Detection (DAD) are
   discussed in Appendix A of RFC4862.  That specification mentions a
   hardware-assisted mechanism to detect looped back DAD messages.  If
   hardware cannot suppress looped back DAD messages, a software
   solution is required.  Several service provider communities have
   expressed a need for automated detection of looped backed Neighbor
   Discovery (ND) messages used by DAD.  This document includes
   mitigation techniques and outlines the Enhanced DAD algorithm to
   automate the detection of looped back IPv6 ND messages used by DAD.
   For network loopback tests, the Enhanced DAD algorithm allows IPv6 to
   self-heal after a loopback is placed and removed.  Further, for
   certain access networks the document automates resolving a specific
   duplicate address conflict.  This document updates RFC4861, RFC4862,
   and RFC3971.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on May 17, 2015.

Asati, et al.             Expires May 17, 2015                  [Page 1]
Internet-Draft                Enhanced DAD                 November 2014

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Two Deployment Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.1.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Operational Mitigation Options  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.1.  Disable DAD on an Interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.2.  Dynamic Disable/Enable of DAD Using Layer-2 Protocol  . .   5
     3.3.  Operational Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   4.  The Enhanced DAD Algorithm  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.1.  Processing Rules for Senders  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.2.  Processing Rules for Receivers  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.3.  Impact on SEND  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.4.  Changes to RFC 4862 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.5.  Changes to RFC 4861 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.6.  Changes to RFC 3971 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   5.  Actions to Perform on Detecting a Genuine Duplicate . . . . .   9
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   8.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   9.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11

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