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LISP Threats Analysis
draft-ietf-lisp-threats-10

Document type: Active Internet-Draft (lisp WG)
Document stream: IETF
Last updated: 2014-07-04
Intended RFC status: Unknown
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Network Working Group                                          D. Saucez
Internet-Draft                                                     INRIA
Intended status: Informational                                L. Iannone
Expires: January 5, 2015                               Telecom ParisTech
                                                          O. Bonaventure
                                        Universite catholique de Louvain
                                                            July 4, 2014

                         LISP Threats Analysis
                     draft-ietf-lisp-threats-10.txt

Abstract

   This document proposes a threat analysis of the Locator/Identifier
   Separation Protocol (LISP).

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 5, 2015.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
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   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Saucez, et al.           Expires January 5, 2015                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft                LISP Threats                     July 2014

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Threat model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     2.1.  Attacker modes of operation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
       2.1.1.  On-path attackers vs. Off-path attackers . . . . . . .  4
       2.1.2.  Internal attackers vs. External attackers  . . . . . .  4
       2.1.3.  Live attackers vs. Time-shifted attackers  . . . . . .  4
       2.1.4.  Control-plane attackers vs. Data-plane attackers . . .  5
       2.1.5.  Cross mode attackers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     2.2.  Threat categories  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
       2.2.1.  Replay attack  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
       2.2.2.  Packet manipulation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
       2.2.3.  Packet interception and suppression  . . . . . . . . .  6
       2.2.4.  Spoofing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
       2.2.5.  Rogue attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
       2.2.6.  Denial of Service (DoS) attack . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
       2.2.7.  Performance attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
       2.2.8.  Intrusion attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
       2.2.9.  Amplification attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
       2.2.10. Multi-category attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   3.  Attack vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     3.1.  Gleaning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     3.2.  Locator Status Bits  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     3.3.  Map-Version  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     3.4.  Echo-Nonce algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     3.5.  Instance ID  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     3.6.  Interworking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     3.7.  Map-Request messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     3.8.  Map-Reply messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     3.9.  Map-Register messages  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     3.10. Map-Notify messages  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
   4.  Note on Privacy  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
   5.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
   6.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
   7.  Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
   8.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

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